Karnataka High Court Upholds State's 120-Day Limit For Written Statements But Preserves Judicial Discretion In 'Exceptional' Cases
The Karnataka High Court has upheld the constitutional validity of the state's amendment prescribing a 120-day outer limit for filing written statements. [2026 LiveLaw (Kar) 274]However, the single judge bench of Justice Sachin Shankar Magadum has 'read down' the provision to ensure that civil courts retain a 'narrow and exceptional' discretion to accept written statements beyond the 120 days...
The Karnataka High Court has upheld the constitutional validity of the state's amendment prescribing a 120-day outer limit for filing written statements. [2026 LiveLaw (Kar) 274]
However, the single judge bench of Justice Sachin Shankar Magadum has 'read down' the provision to ensure that civil courts retain a 'narrow and exceptional' discretion to accept written statements beyond the 120 days in cases where denial could lead to grave 'miscarriage of justice'.
While reading down the provision to avoid inconsistency with the other portions of CPC, the court tested the amendment on the touchstone of Article 14 and notes as below”
“…Tested on the touchstone of Article 14 of the Constitution, this Court is of the considered opinion that the legislative objective of prescribing an outer limit of 120 days for filing the written statement is, in itself, neither arbitrary nor constitutionally infirm... The constitutional infirmity, however, lies not in the prescription of the time limit, but in the incorporation of the expressions that, upon the expiry of one hundred and twenty days, 'the defendant shall forfeit the right to file the written statement' and 'the Court shall not allow the written statement to be taken on record', if those expressions are construed as creating an absolute and inflexible embargo, wholly excluding judicial discretion…”, the court laid down the law.
The court reasoned that the amendment challenged, in its true interpretation, is partial. While it introduced a rigid proviso through the amendment, it consciously left untouched Order VIII Rule 10, which allows the court to 'make such order in relation to the suit as it thinks fit', and Section 151 preserving the court's inherent powers.
Relying on the same, the court opined that a 'literal' interpretation of the120 days forfeiture clause [amendment challenged] would render the other provisions otiose and create inconsistency in CPC.
“…The Legislature, by merely adding a proviso while consciously leaving untouched Order VIII Rule 10, Section 151, has itself furnished a compelling reason for adopting the doctrine of reading down. Such an interpretation alone preserves the internal coherence of the Code, gives meaningful operation to every provision enacted by Parliament, respects the law declared by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Salem Advocate Bar Association(supra)…”, the court noted in the order.
For context, Salem Advocate Bar Association v. Union of India (2005) had held that the time limit for filing a written statement is directory and that courts retain discretion to extend it in exceptional cases.
For further context, the pleas were filed challenging the amended provisions of Order VIII Rule 1 CPC, brought forth by the state-specific Code of Civil Procedure (Karnataka Amendment) Act, 2024. The petitioners included Senior Advocate and Karnataka State Bar Council member Basavaraj S. and another litigant named Johar Abbas.
Section 4 of the Karnataka Amendment bars a defendant from filing a written statement after the lapse of 120 days from the date of service of summons. The new proviso to Order VIII Rule 1 CPC explicitly prevents the defendant from filing the written statement after 120 days, irrespective of any extenuating circumstances.
Earlier, the 120-day cap for filing a written statement was only strictly observed in commercial disputes.
The court, in its order, has also taken into account the practical realities faced by litigants and the ground reality in rural Karnataka.
“…Despite considerable digitisation of land records, a large volume of historical revenue records continues to remain in physical custody of revenue authorities. Survey records, old grant files, Tippani extracts and village maps are not always readily accessible. Litigants are frequently required to make repeated visits to Taluk Offices, Survey Departments and Village Accountant offices to obtain certified copies. Administrative delays in securing such documents are neither uncommon nor attributable to the negligence of litigants….”, the court points out in its order.
The singled judge bench also pointed out that in some instances, especially with regard to certain class of defendants, it might not be literally feasible to file written statement within the prescribed period.
“…In suits instituted against a minor or a person of unsound mind, the written statement cannot be filed unless a guardian ad litem is appointed by the Court and such guardian accepts the appointment. The process of appointment, issuance of notice to the proposed guardian, acceptance of guardianship, and obtaining necessary instructions inevitably consumes time, which is often beyond the control of the defendant…”, the court said further.
The court also opined that such rigours won't be applicable with regard to partition suits and coparcenary rights:
“…The procedural rigour introduced by the Amendment Act cannot be applied in a manner that defeats substantive rights, particularly in suits for partition where rights flow by birth under the substituted Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. A daughter, whether married or unmarried, or a sister who is impleaded as a defendant in a partition suit instituted by a male coparcener, cannot be denied an opportunity to place her claim on record solely on the ground that the written statement is tendered beyond the prescribed period of one hundred and twenty days…”, the court explained further.
Another example cited by the court was its inapplicability when it comes to Section 89, which obligates the civil court to facilitate an amicable settlement of all civil disputes, particularly in suits involving family members, where preservation of familial relationships assumes greater significance than expeditious adjudication.
While discussing the applicability and relevance of the precedent in Sale Advocate Bar Association, the court noted as below:
“...The importance of Salem Advocate Bar Association (supra) lies not merely in declaring ninety days as directory. Its enduring significance lies in the constitutional recognition that procedural prescriptions cannot altogether extinguish judicial discretion where denial of such discretion would result in failure of justice. It is this principle, rather than the numerical period of ninety days, which constitutes the binding declaration of law under Article 141 of the Constitution…”
On another note, the court significantly also opined that the 'narrow prism' of procedural timelines cannot be utilised as a means to prevent the pendency of cases in the courts.
“…Judicial delay is a systemic challenge arising from a confluence of institutional, infrastructural and administrative deficiencies which extend far beyond the conduct of individual litigants... Persistent vacancies in the judicial service, inadequate court infrastructure, shortage of ministerial staff, delays in establishment of new Courts commensurate with the increasing docket, and the necessity of judicial officers holding concurrent charge of multiple Courts or functioning as itinerant Courts are among the systemic factors that substantially contribute to pendency.”
Accordingly, the court noted that 'forfeiture' mentioned in the amendment shall not be construed as completely excluding judicial discretion in exceptionally rare cases. The court also directed the Trial Courts to ensure strict adherence to the timeline, but to exercise the preserved discretion only in exceptional circumstances, recording detailed reasons and imposing costs, if required.
Sufficient cause must be established by litigants if the circumstances are genuinely exceptional and beyond their control, such as prolonged illness, natural calamities, or delay in obtaining indispensable public documents, the court added.
“…Since the impugned amendment is reasonably capable of a construction that harmonises its provisions with Order VIII Rule 10, Section 151, Sections 122 to 127 of the Code and the binding law declared by the Hon'ble Supreme Court under Article 141 of the Constitution, this Court finds no necessity to invalidate the amendment…”, the court concluded in the order.
The High Court has also made it clear that the amendment would operate prospectively, and apply only to suits instituted on or after the date of its commencement, as per an earlier coordinate bench ruling.
Case Title: Shri Basavaraj S. v. State of Karnataka & Anr.
Case Title:WP No. 8032 of 2026 & WP No. 9372 of 2026
Citation: 2026 LiveLaw (Kar) 274