Trade Union Not 'State', Employer Can't Generally Invoke Article 226 To Restrain Proposed Strike: Karnataka High Court
The Karnataka High Court has held that a writ petition against a workers' union to restrain a proposed strike is not maintainable as a general rule under the Industrial Relations Code 2020, remarking that Trade Union does not qualify as 'State' under the Constitution. On the other hand, an aggrieved employer could approach the Industrial Tribunal for enforcement of the statutory prohibition...
The Karnataka High Court has held that a writ petition against a workers' union to restrain a proposed strike is not maintainable as a general rule under the Industrial Relations Code 2020, remarking that Trade Union does not qualify as 'State' under the Constitution.
On the other hand, an aggrieved employer could approach the Industrial Tribunal for enforcement of the statutory prohibition on strikes during conciliation proceedings. [2026 LiveLaw (Kar) 276]
For context, proposed strike is prohibited under Section 62(1)(d) and is illegal under Section 63 of the Industrial Relations Code, 2020
The single judge bench of Justice Anant Ramanath Hegde, while dismissing the writ petition filed by Bosch Automotive Electronics India Pvt. Ltd. against a strike notice issued by its Automotive Electronics Employees Union, said,
“it is evident that respondent No.2-Union does not qualify as a body discharging public duty or public function. Admittedly, the Union is neither the 'State' nor an instrumentality or agency of the State. It is neither a statutory authority nor a body substantially funded by the State. Nor is it a body required by statute to discharge any public function. In the present case, no statutory obligation involving the discharge of a public duty is imposed upon respondent No.2-Union. The petitioner is, indeed, complaining of violation of the statutory provisions of the Code, 2020 governing strikes. Such statutory obligations, however, cannot, by themselves, be equated with a public duty or public function"
The court said that while the petitioner was complaining of violation of the statutory provisions of the Code, 2020 governing strikes; however such statutory obligations, cannot by themselves be "equated with a public duty or public function".
…The employer, the Union and the workers are undoubtedly bound by the provisions of the Code. That, by itself, is not sufficient to invoke jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Despite its registration and recognition, a workers' Union or Trade Unions and Negotiating Unions or Negotiating Councils do not partake the character of an instrumentality of the State…”, the Court observed.
Relying on the Supreme Court's judgment in S. Shobha v. Muthoot Finance Ltd.(2025), the Court applied the 'public function' test and observed that a workers' union does not qualify as a body discharging public duty or public function. It is neither the State nor an instrumentality of the State under Article 12, nor a statutory authority, nor a body substantially funded by the State, the court opined.
“…The writ petition against respondent No.2-workers' Union to restrain the proposed strike during the pendency of conciliation proceeding, as a general rule is not maintainable. Such recourse may be available in exceptional circumstances, brought about in a given case…”, the court added.
The court hence noted that it had only a limited scope of judicial intervention under Article 226 of the Constitution, and it couldn't determine the 'illegality or otherwise' of a strike, except in exceptional circumstances. The Industrial Tribunal alone has such jurisdiction, even during the pendency of conciliation proceedings for the limited purpose of enforcing a statutory prohibition under Section 62, the court said.
“…Notwithstanding the pendency of conciliation proceedings, an aggrieved party can approach the Industrial Tribunal for limited relief where the opposite party proposes to commence or continue a strike or lock-out in violation of the statutory prohibition contained in Section 62 of the Code, 2020. While exercising such limited jurisdiction, the Tribunal shall confine itself to the statutory question arising under Section 62 and shall not adjudicate the merits of the proposed strike or lock-out or the substantive industrial dispute which is the subject matter of conciliation and grant such interim protection incidental to the grievance raised…”, the court added further.
BOSCH had challenged the strike notice dated February 23 issued by the Union stating that a strike would commence on or after March 9. The dispute originated from a charter of demands submitted by the Union. Conciliation proceedings commenced on March 3 and were pending when the Union proposed to go on strike on March 9.
Bosch contended that the proposed strike by the Union was illegal under Section 63 and in contravention of Section 62(1)(d), which prohibits strikes during the pendency of conciliation proceedings and for seven days after their conclusion.
The Court noted that Section 44(7)(c) of the Code expressly places the 'illegality or otherwise of a strike or lockout' within the jurisdiction of the Industrial Tribunal. The court further opined that while Section 53(6) postpones the commencement of proceedings relating to an industrial dispute before the Tribunal until conciliation comes to an end, this would not create an absolute bar on the Tribunal's jurisdiction during the pendency of conciliation proceedings, if the grievance to be addressed relates to a statutory violation such as Section 62 or 63.
"If the Court is to take the view that the aggrieved party cannot approach the Tribunal to enforce the statutory right under Sections 62(1)(d) and 63 of the Code, 2020, then such an interpretation would rob both provisions of their essence and efficacy," the Court observed that the tribunal is entrusted with the responsibility of determining whether a strike or lock out is legal or not.
While dismissing the plea and upholding the limited jurisdiction of Tribunal, in the current case, the court said that the Tribunal shall confine itself to the statutory question arising under Section 62 about prohibition on strikes during conciliation proceedings, and not adjudicate the merits of the proposed strike or lock-out.
It held that under the 2020 Code, conciliation proceedings do not automatically stand concluded upon the expiry of fourteen days (as prescribed under the first proviso to Section 53(5)). The proceedings would remain pending if they have not concluded in the manner prescribed under Section 60 of the Code.
The Court also noted that under the Code, 2020, conciliation proceedings are deemed to have concluded when the failure of conciliation is recorded by the Conciliation Officer, contrary to Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, where conclusion was dependent upon receipt of the report by the appropriate Government.
Hence, liberty was reserved to the petitioner to approach the Industrial Tribunal, seeking relief in respect of the alleged violation of Section 62(1)(d), provided the statutory prohibition [pendency of conciliation proceedings] is still operative.
Case Title: Bosch Automotive Electronics India Pvt. Ltd. v. Addl. Labour Commissioner & Anr.
Case No.: Writ Petition No. 8044 of 2026
Citation: 2026 LiveLaw (Kar) 276