Redisplaying Of Defamatory Content Can Attract Offence U/S 499, 500 IPC: Kerala High Court Refuses To Quash Case Against Magazine Editors

Justice G. Girish held that the offence of defamation as provided under Section 499 IPC makes no distinction between first time publication of defamatory content and redisplaying it. Unless the impugned act falls within the seven exceptions provided under the provision, redisplaying defamatory content already published on another platform can attract the offence, the Court opined.

The complainant is an actor and director involved in the film and television sector. The first accused in the case, who is also a film personality, and the complainant had a disagreement regarding the arrest of a prominent actor for his involvement in the rape of an actress.

Afterwards, the first accused posted derogatory comments against the complainant in a facebook group in which both of them were members. These statements were redisplayed by accused nos. 2 to 4, which was a publication and its editors, in their website. It is alleged that when these were published in the accused's website, many of the complainant's friends and well-wishers came across it and as a result, the complainant's reputation was affected.

According to the complainant, these persons formed an opinion that he was someone of deplorable character, who supported a rapist for personal gains. Thus, he alleged that the accused's publication harmed his reputation and filed a private complaint before the Magistrate.

The Magistrate took the complaint to file, recorded the complainant's statement and issued summons to the accused to appear and face trial for the offence under Section 500 IPC [Punishment for defamation]. The accused magazine and its editors then approached the High Court seeking to quash the private complaint.

They argued that the offence is not attracted since they merely redisplayed the post that another person made in another social media platform and the imputation contained in that had already reached the public. Another argument raised was that the contents redisplayed are not defamatory to the complainant.

Rejecting the first contention, the Court held:

“Section 499 I.P.C does not make any distinction between a defamatory publication, which is made for the first time, and the redisplay of a defamatory publication, which had already been made in another media. If it is shown that the derogatory words about the complainant, which were published by the accused, contained any imputation, which would harm the reputation of the complainant, then the fact that the words so published were already there in the public domain, do not absolve the criminal liability of the accused, who ventured to publish those derogatory words again by redisplaying the publication already made through another media. Unless the act of the accused would come under any of the seven exceptions envisaged under Section 499 I.P.C, the accused cannot be absolved of the criminal liability for the publication of the derogatory words for the reason that those words were already published by some other accused through another platform.”

Considering the second argument, the Court noted that prima facie, the nature of the words published on the petitioners' website was such as to lower the moral and intellectual character of the complainant among others.

The Court also took note of the fact that the complainant had made an allegation that the petitioners were influenced by the first accused and they published the derogatory words without good faith to lower his reputation.

“The petitioners, by quoting the above words used by the first accused, in their website, have committed the act of publishing those words of highly defamatory contents, capable of harming the reputation of the complainant. The sworn statement of the complainant would reveal that many of his friends and well wishers got a negative impression about the character of the complainant by reading the above derogatory words published in the website of the petitioners. Therefore, it is apparent that the matter which the petitioners published in their website, was highly defamatory to the complainant,” the Court remarked.

Though the petitioners had relied on various decisions, including Malayalam Communications Limited v. K.C.Venugopal, Mammen Mathew v. K.Bhaskaran Master and Jaideep Bose v. M/s.Bid and Hammer Auctioneers Pvt.Ltd., the Court felt that these were not applicable in the facts of the present case.

Thus, the Court dismissed the plea.

Case No: Crl.M.C No. 3711/2019

Case Title: Vellinakshathram and Ors. v. State of Kerala and Ors.

Citation: 2026 LiveLaw (Ker) 140

Counsel for the petitioners: Thoufeek Ahamed, P.A. Ahammed

Counsel for the respondents: R. Bindu (Sasthamangalam), B. Mohanlal, R. Jayakrishnan,

Prasanth M.P., Sudheer G. – Public Prosecutor

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