Applications Filed Under Muslim Women's Divorce Act Subject To 3-Year Limitation Period: Kerala High Court

The division bench comprising Dr. Justice A K Jayasankaran Nambiar and Justice Jobin Sebastian, delivered the order in an Intra-Court Reference initiated after a Single Judge questioned the correctness of the earlier precedent in Hassainar v. Raziya (1993 (2) KLT 805), which had held that a three-year limitation period governs claims for fair and reasonable provision and maintenance under Section 3 of the 1986 Act.

The petitioner had filed a claim for maintenance nearly nine years after her 2004 divorce, leading the Magistrate to hold that the claim was time-barred under Article 137. The Sessions Court. In the revision petition affirmed the applicability of the limitation law but found, on facts, that her claim was nevertheless within time because it was filed within three years from the alleged refusal of maintenance. The Court also held that the petitioner has not proved that the respondent husband had sufficient means to pay the amount claimed by her and dismissed the revision petition.

A criminal miscellaneous petition was filed before the Single judge of the High Court, challenging the findings of the Sessions Court that she has relinquished all her rights under the 1986 Act.

Although limitation was not actually in dispute before the Single Judge, since the Sessions Court's finding on limitation was in favour of the petitioner, the Single Judge expressed reservations about the correctness of Hassainar and referred the legal question to a Division Bench.

The division bench held that the reference order was founded on a mistaken premise that applications under Section 3 of the 1986 Act are criminal proceedings, rendering the Limitation Act inapplicable.

The Court noted that the exclusion of the provisions of the Limitation Act in criminal proceedings is premised on the fundamental principle the 'crimes never dies' which is expressed through the Latin maxim nullum tempus aut locus occurrit regi that translates as 'lapse of time is no bar to the Crown in proceeding against offenders'.

The Court observed that the proceedings under Section 3 of the 1986 Act are not criminal proceedings but civil proceedings, although the adjudicatory forum might be a Magistrate court.

“The mere fact that the enforcement machinery to effectuate the adjudicated right is specified under the Cr.P.C does not take away from the fact that the adjudication proceedings themselves are civil proceedings.” the Court added.

Reaffirming Hassainar, the Bench held that applications under Section 3 of the 1986 Act are “applications” within the meaning of Article 137, which prescribes a limitation period of three years for applications for which no specific limitation period is provided.

The Court rejected the argument that Section 3 should be treated similarly to Section 125 CrPC, where no limitation applies, observing that unlike Section 125, the 1986 Act does not contain a built-in safeguard restricting claims to the period after the application's filing. Instead, the 1986 Act creates a specific statutory right, and applying limitations prevents claims from being revived indefinitely.

The Bench thus answered the reference in the affirmative, holding that the provisions of Article 137 of the Limitation Act would apply to applications for adjudication made under Section 3 of the 1986 Act.

The case was remitted to the Single Judge to consider an unresolved factual issue, whether the husband had sufficient means to pay the amount claimed by the petitioner.

Case Title: Safia P M v State of Kerala and Anr.

Case No: ICR (Crl.MC) 14/ 2025

Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Ker) 786

Counsel for Petitioner: Prasanth Padmanabhan, K V Bhadra Kumari

Counsel for Respondent: Sheeba Thomas (PP), B J John Prakash, P Pramel, Sooraj M S, Varsha Vijayakumar Nair, Anagha Madath Thekkepatte, Sona A B, Colin Alex