Kerala High Court Reserves Order On 'Kerala Story 2' Movie Producer's Appeal Against Single Bench's Stay On Release

The Kerala High Court on Thursday heard appeals preferred by the producer of the movie 'Kerala Story 2: Goes Beyond' against the interim order of the Single Judge granting stay on the release of the movie, slated to hit the theatres tomorrow.

The Division Bench of Justice Sushrut Arvind Dharmadhikari and Justice P.V. Balakrishnan heard the appeals urgently today, at 7:30 p.m., just hours after the Single Bench pronounced the order.

The appeal was moved by the movie's producer Vipul Amrutlal Shah.

Senior Advocate Neeraj Kishan Kaul appeared for the appellant and assailed the interim order on multiple grounds.

At the outset, Senior Counsel submitted that the writ petition challenging the film was filed 16 days after the teaser was released, and that even the Single Judge described the matter as being moved at the “eleventh hour.”

He pointed out that when the first film in the franchise was released, no stay had been granted. The earlier movie, he submitted, went on to receive a National Award. Now, with the sequel, the storyline is no longer confined to Kerala but extends to other States as well, including Rajasthan and Madhya Pradesh.

“Are We So Frail That A Movie Would Shake Religious Tenets?”

Challenging the continuation of the interim order, Senior Counsel argued that the revision petition ought to be considered expeditiously and that the interim stay should not operate in the meantime.

“Are we so frail that a movie would scandalise or shake the faiths and tenets of a religion?” he submitted, contending that the storyline of a film is the prerogative of the storyteller.

He emphasised that the film does not denigrate the State of Kerala in any manner. “It is a State that everyone loves,” he said, adding that the movie addresses what the filmmakers perceive as a social evil—an issue on which there may be differences of opinion.

“Courts Have Not Interfered In Films On Other Religions”

Senior Counsel further argued that in several instances where films depicted or even made fun of Hindu gods, Hindu godmen, or Catholic priests, courts had not intervened.

“If every other religion had been subjected to satire or critical portrayal and the Court had not interfered, this case also should not be interfered with,” he submitted.

He stressed that the protagonists in the film are shown as fighting back against the system and that there is no denigration of any religion. “It is a proud religion, a great religion. There is no denigration,” he argued.

“Commercial Disruption Will Destroy Creative Work”

Highlighting the commercial ramifications of the stay, the Senior Counsel submitted that the film was slated for release in 1,500 theatres the following day. Due to the interim order, the release had been halted not only domestically but also overseas.

“I have given it to distributors. This disruption is not merely for a week or two. It finally finishes a person who is coming out with a creative work of art,” he contended.

Senior Advocate Neeraj Kishan Kaul submitted that the film deals with a “social evil,” adding that the Supreme Court and various High Courts have, in several decisions, recognised the existence of such societal concerns. 

At this stage, the Bench sought clarification on the specific reliefs sought in the writ petition. On being asked about the prayers, counsel read out portions of one of the pleas, which sought modification of the film's title to a neutral name, removal of all direct references portraying the State as indulging in romantic or forceful conversions, and deletion of the tagline “inspired by true events” to be replaced with a disclaimer stating that the film is purely fictional and unsupported by government data.

Responding to the nature of these prayers, Senior Counsel submitted that even the first instalment of the franchise had “Kerala” in its title. Justice Sushrut Arvind Dharmadhikari queried whether the earlier film was titled Kerala Story and whether the present film was its sequel. 

Counsel clarified that while the first movie centred on a protagonist from Kerala, the sequel expands beyond the State, with protagonists from Rajasthan and Madhya Pradesh. He argued that it is untenable to suggest that such a film denigrates a “great State like Kerala.”

The Bench then asked what, according to the appellants, was derogatory in the film and noted that the learned Single Judge had earlier asked to view the movie, which the appellants had declined. In response, Senior Counsel submitted that at the relevant time they were pressing arguments on maintainability and locus standi. He maintained that there was nothing in the film to show that the State of Kerala was denigrated

The Bench further questioned the maintainability of the writ petition. Justice Sushrut Arvind Dharmadhikari asked, “Who is this petitioner? What is the locus standi?” In response, counsel for the appellant submitted that the petitioner is a Keralite. The Court then queried whether the matter was in the nature of a public interest litigation and observed that the manner in which the petition was framed resembled a PIL. Justice Dharmadhikari also questioned how the learned Single Judge had heard the matter, remarking that if it were indeed a PIL, it ought to have been placed before a Division Bench.

Senior Advocate Neeraj Kishan Kaul submitted that the learned Single Judge had proceeded on the footing that the film was distorting communal harmony. He reiterated that the movie portrays a social evil, which, according to him, is not confined to any one State. “It is happening in Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh; it could very well be in any State in India,” he argued. Emphasising artistic freedom, he submitted that if a social evil is to be portrayed, it must necessarily be shown as it is perceived by the storyteller. “A storyteller need not include every religion. He can take any religion. Tomorrow, it can be Hinduism or Christianity,” he contended.

Justice P.V. Balakrishnan then asked whether there existed a statutory remedy against the grant of certification. Counsel responded that a revision remedy is available under Section 6 of the Cinematograph Act. Justice Dharmadhikari inquired whether such a revision was already pending and whether any interim application had been moved therein. Counsel confirmed that the revision petition is pending consideration

Senior Counsel Elvin Peter, also appearing for the film producer, read out Section 6 of the Act, which earlier empowered the Central Government to call for records of proceedings relating to a film pending before or decided by the Board or the Tribunal. He submitted that the petitioners had invoked this provision and moved the Central Government accordingly.

The Bench, led by Justice Dharmadhikari, queried whether such revisional powers survived after the amendment to the Act.

“Revisional powers have been taken away by the amended Act?” the Court asked.

In response, Senior Counsel Peter submitted that if the revisional power had indeed been taken away, then the writ petition would have to be considered on its own merits.

Justice Dharmadhikari noted that the earlier provision enabled the Central Government, notwithstanding anything contained in the relevant part of the Act, to call for the record of any proceeding relating to a film. However, he observed that the provision now stands deleted.

“This is not revisional power. Under which provision has this order been passed?” the Court asked, further seeking clarification on what the impugned order stated and whether it proceeded on the footing that a revision was required to be decided.

Senior Counsel Peter then read out the concluding portion of the Single Bench's interim order.

The Court questioned whether any party had objected to the maintainability of the revision before the Single Judge. “No one objected that revision is not maintainable? Where is that provision?” Justice Dharmadhikari asked.

Advocate Maitreyi Hegde, for the writ petitioner, submitted that the second respondent, the Central Board of Film Certification (CBFC), had orally contended that moving the Central Government was the appropriate remedy.

Senior Counsel Peter, however, argued that Section 6(2)(c) merely vests suo motu powers in the Central Government and does not constitute a statutory remedy as claimed by the petitioner.

Senior Counsel Kaul referred to paragraph 25 of the Single Judge's order. Kaul also cited the recent Supreme Court's judgment in MANGAL RAJENDRA KAMTHE VERSUS TAHSILDAR, PURANDHAR & ORS which deprecated the practice of High Courts granting interim relief while relegating parties to the statutory authorities.

The Bench then asked whether the relevant judgment had been placed before the Single Judge after it was rendered. Counsel responded that it had been submitted through written notes.

Justice Dharmadhikari remarked that the Single Judge “did not have any time to apply his mind” in that case. 

Senior Counsel Kaul argued that the present course adopted by litigants—filing a revision before the Central Government and thereafter moving a Public Interest Litigation (PIL) to seek a stay on a film's release—could have drastic commercial consequences.

“In every case, they will file revision and then file a PIL and get a movie stayed. Such a commercial disruption would destroy a person. You are effectively destroying free speech with commercial disruption,” Kaul submitted.

He contended that this trend amounts to weaponising procedural remedies to stall certified films at the last minute, thereby undermining freedom of expression through economic harm rather than direct censorship.

Referring to the Supreme Court's recent ruling in Mangal Rajendra Kamthe v. Tahsildar, Purandhar & Ors, Kaul argued that the Single Judge was effectively circumventing the binding precedent by retaining the writ petition instead of finally disposing of it.

“How the Single Judge is circumventing this judgment is by not disposing of the writ petition—retaining the writ petition,” he submitted.

Kaul further questioned the practice of seeking last-minute injunctions against film releases.

“Can you come in at the last minute and ask for an injunction? The first movie goes and succeeds till the Supreme Court. Nowhere does a movie get a stay at the first stage,” he argued, emphasising that courts have consistently exercised restraint in granting pre-release stays once a film has been certified.

Kaul relied on Supreme Court jurisprudence to submit that it is the duty of the State to ensure protection of certified films.

“The Supreme Court says it is the duty of the State to protect,” he argued, adding that terms such as “disruption of communal harmony” and “contemptuous of a religion,” as used in the Single Judge's order, lacked foundation.

“With all respect to the Single Judge, what is the basis of saying all this? Commercials of a movie is not just about making money. Commercials of a movie is about free speech,” Kaul submitted.

Kaul contended that the Single Judge ought not to have entertained what was effectively a Public Interest Litigation (PIL). He argued that once a statutory revision was pending, the writ court could not retain the petition and simultaneously stall the release.

“The Single Judge can't say that till the revision is decided, I will retain the writ petition. The Single Judge cannot substitute his view for that of the statutory body, the Central Board of Film Certification (CBFC). It is not sitting as a court of appeal. It is exercising extraordinary jurisdiction,” he submitted.

He emphasised that creative choices, including storyline selection, fall squarely within the ambit of artistic freedom.

“Storyline choice, creative right of free speech cannot be interfered with. It is my right as a storyteller to pick and choose. A group cannot just come and say otherwise. The CBFC has considered it. It is a fight of three women—that is the storyline,” Kaul argued.

He further pointed out that in the first round of litigation (against the prequel, The Kerala Story), the film had not been interfered with.

“This order needs to be interfered with. It cannot commercially destroy free speech,” he said, adding that the film was slated for worldwide release the following day.

“I cannot release it abroad. If it is not released in India, there might be piracy across,” he cautioned.

Senior Counsel Peter referred to a Public Interest Litigation pending before the Madras High Court challenging the prequel to the present film, namely The Kerala Story.

He submitted that in the present case, the interim order granting a stay on release was “as good as allowing the writ petition itself.”

“The prayer is to change the title. Now the Single Bench has stayed the release, which was supposed to be released tomorrow,” Peter argued.

Senior Counsel Peter submitted that three petitions had originally been filed before the Single Judge.

“Three petitions were filed. One was dismissed for being a public interest litigation. A common order was passed in the other two petitions, filed by two different petitioners. These are also PILs,” he argued.

Justice Balakrishnan sought clarification on representation.

“Both of them (the senior counsels) are appearing for the same party?” the Court asked.

It was clarified that the senior counsels were appearing in two different writ appeals arising from the common order.

Justice Dharmadhikari then queried whether one of the petitions had indeed been dismissed on the ground that it was a PIL.

“It was dismissed for being a PIL?” the Court asked.

Advocate Maitreyi intervened to clarify that the dismissal was not on the ground that it was styled as a PIL, but rather on the ground of lack of locus standi.

At the outset, Justice Dharmadhikari asked the petitioners' counsel to address the issue of locus standi.

“First, tell us about the locus,” the Court said.

Advocate Maitreyi responded, “I will take Your Lordships to my locus.”

The Bench then sought clarity on whether the proceedings were, in substance, in the nature of a Public Interest Litigation (PIL).

“Is this litigation in the nature of a public interest?” Justice Dharmadhikari asked.

“No,” Advocate Maitreyi replied.

Justice Dharmadhikari observed, “It is not a PIL. How are his rights affected? In our High Court, there is a provision for filing a PIL.”

'Right To Reputation Affected'

Advocate Maitreyi submitted that the petitioner's fundamental right to reputation was implicated.

“The right of reputation is about a person's entire personality,” she argued, contending that the portrayal in the film adversely affected that right.

The Bench, however, remarked: “You may be affected, but you are espousing the cause of all the people of Kerala.”

In response, Advocate Maitreyi maintained that the grievance was personal and constitutionally grounded.

“I am saying that my right to reputation is affected by the bad portrayal of Kerala,” she submitted.

She relied on the Supreme Court judgment in the case concerning the film Ghooskar Pandat, where the title of the movie was ultimately changed. Reading from the decision, she submitted that the Supreme Court had observed that a community cannot be denigrated.

Justice Dharmadhikari sought to crystallise the constitutional basis of the plea.

“You are saying that your right under Article 21 is violated?” he asked.

“Yes,” Advocate Maitreyi replied.

Referring to the relief sought in the writ petition, Justice Dharmadhikari noted that the prayer appeared to seek removal of the word “Kerala” from the film's title.

“As per your prayer, this 'Kerala' should be removed? That is why we read out the prayer clause at the beginning itself. 'Kerala' word is not derogatory,” the Court observed.

Advocate Maitreyi clarified that the objection was not to the word in isolation but to the combined effect of the title and the visuals in the film.

She submitted that it was the portrayal in conjunction with the title that allegedly cast the State in a negative light and thereby infringed her right to reputation. 

Advocate Maitreyi continued submissions on behalf of the petitioners, addressing concerns regarding the imminent release of the film.

She submitted that the film had not yet been screened by the producers.

“As Your Lordship already noted, the movie was not screened. The producers had not. If they had screened, the circumstance could have been different,” she said.

Justice Dharmadhikari then questioned the petitioners' reliance on revisional powers.

“What about your prayer for revision? So according to you, there is no provision for revision. You agree,” the Court asked.

Advocate Maitreyi contended that if the film were released the next day, the petitioners would be left without an effective remedy and the producers would profit further.

“Tomorrow, the movie will get released, I will have no remedy. They will get more money,” she submitted.

The Bench observed, “You should have thought about it.”

Maitreyi responded that the commercial and reputational damage was personal and irreparable, not directed at the producer.

“Otherwise, this movie will not get this much traction. This is not irreparable damage to the producer; it would be irreparable damage to me. They can very well release the movie whenever the CBFC decides,” she argued.

She also referred to a prior judgment by the same Bench relating to the film Haal, to illustrate procedural considerations.

Finally, Advocate Maitreyi raised a grievance regarding timing and opportunity to respond.

“The copy of the writ appeal was given at 7:20 when the special hearing was scheduled at 7:30. There should be some reasonable time for me to respond. I was given 10 minutes,” she submitted.

Advocate Maitreyi addressed contentions raised by the producers regarding the timing of the petition.

She submitted that the producers' arguments—that the plea was premature and, simultaneously, filed at the eleventh hour—were contradictory.

“I saw the teaser and trailer, which are extremely damaging to my reputation,” she argued.

Justice Dharmadhikari sought clarification.

“What did you see?” the Court asked.

“I saw the teaser and trailer,” Maitreyi confirmed.

“The movie is yet to be released,” the Bench observed.

Advocate Maitreyi then submitted that the statutory parameters under Section 5B of the Cinematograph Act, 1952 had not been properly considered by the CBFC.

Justice Dharmadhikari noted that such issues would be considered on merits.

“My senior friend submitted on merits. That's the only reason I am here,” Maitreyi clarified, indicating that her arguments focused on procedural and reputational concerns pending substantive consideration.

Justice Dharmadhikari questioned Advocate Maitreyi regarding interim relief before the revisional authority.

“Did you file an interim application before the revisional authority? What happened?” the Court asked.

“Nothing happened,” Maitreyi replied.

“Why?” the Bench sought to know.

“It has not reached,” she explained.

She further submitted that if the Court found a prima facie case, relief could be granted, emphasizing the wide scope of Article 226 of the Constitution.

“My submission is that Article 226 has wide scope and, if Your Lordships are satisfied of a prima facie case, relief can very well be granted,” she said.

Senior Counsel Peter referred the Bench to paragraph 23 of the Single Judge's interim order, pointing out that the CBFC had suggested as many as 16 cuts in the film.

“There are as many as 16 cuts suggested by the CBFC. Then it cannot be said that there is no application of mind by the CBFC,” Peter submitted.

In rejoinder, Senior Counsel Kaul relied on the Supreme Court's Ghooskar Pandat case, in which he had assisted the Court.

“The Court never asked us to change. We voluntarily changed,” Kaul submitted.

Kaul further argued that the petitioners' claims of irreparable injury and personal rights were misconceived.

“Secondly, my friend referred to irreparable injury. The respondent is ignorant of commercials. Clearly, balance of convenience and irreparable injury is in our favour,” he argued.

He also questioned the basis of alleged personal rights and denigration.

“What personal right is she talking about? What personal injury is she talking about? Where is denigration? It succeeded in the first round. Even if it is a PIL, I would say it is motivated,” Kaul submitted.

After hearing the arguments, the Division Bench reserved the matter for judgement.

The appeals are moved by Advocates A.C. Venugopal, Gautham Mohan. 

Advocates Maitreyi Sachidananda Hegde, Rizla K.M., and Deepika K. Sasi & Sreerag Shylan, Ferha Azeez, and Devananda S. appeared respectively for Sreedev Namboodiri and Freddy V. Francis, who had challenged the certification for the movie.

Case Nos: WA No. 547/2026 and WA 548/2026

Case Titles: Vipul Amrutlal Shah v. Freddy V. Francis and Ors. and connected case