Sabarimala Ghee Supply Allegations Not Enough To Supersede Milk Union Committee Without Notice: Kerala High Court

The Court held that the Sabarimala ghee supply allegation was not enough to supersede the committee by dispensing with the mandatory procedural safeguards under Section 32 of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Act, 1969.

A Division Bench comprising Justice A.K. Jayasankaran Nambiar and Justice Preetha A.K., passed the order in an appeal against the Single Judge judgment which has dismissed the writ petition challenging the order of Director of the Diary Development Department which has superseded the elected Managing Committee.

The supersession was ordered in connection with the allegations against the Managing Committee which included issues relating to the supply of ghee to Sabarimala. 

The supersession order had been issued without providing the Committee an opportunity to submit its objections and without consulting the financing bank and the State Co-operative Union, invoking the exceptional power under Section 32(3) of the Act on the ground that following the ordinary procedure was not reasonably practicable.

The Single Judge had earlier upheld the supersession, and held that the available materials supported a substantial allegation pertaining to the supply of ghee to Sabarimala and that the possibility of tampering with records justified dispensing with a prior show-cause notice.

The Division Bench examined Section 32 of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Act, 1969 and noted that the supersession of a democratically elected Managing Committee is an exceptional measure and that an elected body should ordinarily be permitted to complete its tenure.

Reliance was placed on the decision in Rajeevan T.V. and Others c K.A. Sukumaran and Others [2013 (3) KHC and State of M.P and Others v Sanjay Nagayach and Others [2013 KHC 4422], to emphasize that the exceptional power under Section 32(3) must be exercised strictly.

The Bench noted that Section 32(1) contemplates an opportunity for the Committee to state its objections before an order of supersession is passed. Section 32(2), in turn, requires consultation with the financing bank and the Circle Co-operative Union or State Co-operative Union, as applicable.

The exception under Section 32(3), permitting the authority to dispense with these requirements when it is not reasonably practicable to follow them, cannot be resorted to without cogent and acceptable reasons.

The Court took note of the report dated July 16, 2026, prepared by the Joint Director (General), Directorate of Dairy Development, pursuant to an inquiry under Section 66 of the Act.

The Division Bench noted that the report relied upon materials relating to the Pathanamthitta Dairy which had been made available to the Inquiry Officer by the Managing Director. The report itself demonstrated that the authorities had access to sufficient materials to draw inferences concerning the allegations against the appellants.

“Since it is clear from a perusal of the report dated 16.07.2026 that the respondent authorities already had with them the material necessary to support the allegations eventually raised against the appellants, there was no justification for harbouring a presumption that the appellants would tamper with or destroy material that could be used against them in any legal proceedings leading to a supersession.” the Court observed.

The Court observed that the appellants had fully cooperated with the inquiry by providing access to materials in their possession and custody. In such circumstances, there was no justification for presuming that they would tamper with or suppress records so as to warrant invocation of the exceptional procedure under Section 32(3).

The Bench further observed that the only materials which the appellants could potentially rely upon from the files in their custody would be those necessary to defend themselves against the proposed supersession, and such materials could not be withheld from them.

The Court therefore concluded that the circumstances did not justify dispensing with the statutory safeguards contemplated under Sections 32(1) and 32(2).

The Division Bench thus set aside the judgment of the Single Judge and the Director's order dated July 25, 2026.

The Court directed the Director of Dairy Development Department to follow the procedure prescribed under Section 32(1) and (2) of the Act, afford the appellants an opportunity of hearing and pass appropriate orders thereafter.

The Court had also directed that the appellants be reinstated forthwith as members of the Managing Committee, replacing the Administrator appointed pursuant to the supersession order.

“We do so because unlike in a situation where the reinstatement is directed in the backdrop of an employer-employee relationship, when it comes to reinstating a democratically elected body such as the Managing Committee of a Co-operative Society, any factor that vitiates the order of supersession passed against them must operate to their advantage in securing an immediate reinstatement through restoration of the status quo ante.” the Court added.

Counsel for Appellant: Renjith Thampan (Sr.), Y. Jafar Khan, V.M. Krishnakumar

Counsel for Respondent: K. Jaju Babu (AG), Arun Chandran (Spl. GP), P.N. Mohanan