Touching Child's Chest With Sexual Intent Attracts POCSO Act, 'Chest' And 'Breast' Distinction Immaterial: Kerala High Court
The Kerala High Court has held that an accused grabbing a child's chest with sexual intent would satisfy the requirement of sexual assault prescribed under Section 7 POCSO Act, and that the anatomical different between chest and breast is immaterial. [2026 LiveLaw (Ker) 386]For context, Section 7 states that whoever, with sexual intent, touches the vagina, penis, anus or breast of the child...
The Kerala High Court has held that an accused grabbing a child's chest with sexual intent would satisfy the requirement of sexual assault prescribed under Section 7 POCSO Act, and that the anatomical different between chest and breast is immaterial. [2026 LiveLaw (Ker) 386]
For context, Section 7 states that whoever, with sexual intent, touches the vagina, penis, anus or breast of the child or makes the child touch the vagina, penis, anus or breast of such person or any other person, or does any other act with sexual intent which involves physical contact without penetration, is said to commit sexual assault.
Justice A. Badharudeen delivered the judgment while partly allowing an appeal by a man convicted by the Special POCSO Court, Manjeri.
The prosecution case is that the accused committed aggravated sexual assault on the victim, a boy aged 12 years by pressing on the 'chest' and by catching hold on his abdomen from behind. The prosecution alleged commission of offences under Sections 7 r/w 8 and 9(l) r/w 10 of the POCSO Act.
The trial court had convicted him under Sections 9(l) and 10 of the POCSO Act for aggravated sexual assault and sentenced him to seven years' rigorous imprisonment.
The High Court examined the meaning of the word 'chest' and 'breast'. The Court noted that as per the Oxford dictionary chest means 'the top part of the body between the neck and stomach', while breast is defined as either of the two soft protruding organs on the front of a woman's body that produce milk or the similar smaller and underdeveloped organs on a man's body.
The Court observed that while medical dictionaries distinguish between the two terms, in cases involving sexual offences the word "chest" is commonly used as a synonym for "breast."
“As per Oxford dictionary chest means 'the top part of the body between the neck and stomach'. Webster's dictionary defines the word chest as 'the upper front part of the body of humans and some animals, between the stomach and the neck, containing the heart and the lungs. Oxford dictionary defines the breast as either of the two soft protruding organs on the front of a woman's body that produce milk or the similar smaller and underdeveloped organs on a man's body.
Going by the definition a distinct medical and anatomical difference to be noticeable in between the two terms, though in sexual molestation case 'chest' is commonly used as a synonym for the word 'breast'. When considering the ingredients of the offence of sexual assault as defined u/s 7 of the POCSO Act, spoken by a victim stating that the accused grabbed on his chest with sexual intent the only inference to be drawn is that the accused grabbed on the Breast, which, in fact covers a larger area of the chest in between the neck and the abdomen.” Court noted
The Court therefore held that the anatomical distinction could not defeat the object of the statute.
"The contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellant merely relying on the medical and anatomical difference between "chest" and "breast" has no significant and is set at rest." Court held.
The counsel appearing for the accused argued that the solitary evidence of the victim has been relied on by the Special Judge to find the commission of offence under Section 9(1) of the POCSO Act. It was argued that the evidence was insufficient to prove the offence under Section 9(1) of the Act.
Section 9(1) of the Act provides that whoever commits sexual assault to the child more than once or repeatedly would be punished and the punishment for the said offence provided under Section 10.
The appellant stated that the child's testimony is that the accused grabbed his 'chest', The appellant argued that that "chest" and "breast" are anatomically distinct and that merely touching the chest would not constitute sexual assault under Section 7, which specifically refers to touching the "breast" with sexual intent.
However, the Court found that the prosecution had failed to prove the essential ingredient of Section 9(1), that the accused committed sexual assault "more than once or repeatedly." Although the victim referred to an earlier incident during trial, no particulars of that alleged occurrence were furnished, and it had not been disclosed in the victim's statement recorded under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Consequently, the evidence established only a single incident of sexual assault.
The Court thus held that the trial court had erred in convicting the accused for "aggravated sexual assault", and set aside the conviction under Sections 9(l) and 10. It instead convicted the accused under Section 7 read with Section 8 of the POCSO Act for sexual assault and sentenced him to three years' rigorous imprisonment with a fine of ₹5,000.
Case Title: Aboobacker v State of Kerala and Anr.
Case No: Crl.A 1853/ 2025
Citation: 2026 LiveLaw (Ker) 386
Counsel for Appellant: T.U.Sujith Kumar, (HCLSC Panel Advocate), Winston K.V
Counsel for Respondents: M.A. Shihab (PP)