Breach Of Promise To Marry Not Cheating Unless Proved To Be Dishonestly Made At Inception: Orissa High Court Reiterates
The Orissa High Court has held that a man cannot be convicted of the charge of cheating under Section 417 of the IPC in an alleged case of sex on false promise of marriage, if it is not proved by the prosecution that his initial promise of marriage was dishonest or fraudulent and the same induced the victim to submit herself to the intercourse. [2026 LiveLaw (Ori) 91]Clarifying the...
The Orissa High Court has held that a man cannot be convicted of the charge of cheating under Section 417 of the IPC in an alleged case of sex on false promise of marriage, if it is not proved by the prosecution that his initial promise of marriage was dishonest or fraudulent and the same induced the victim to submit herself to the intercourse. [2026 LiveLaw (Ori) 91]
Clarifying the essential pre-requisites for the aforesaid charge, the Bench of Justice Sibo Sankar Mishra observed–
“Mere breach of a promise, without proof that the promise was false and was made dishonestly at the very inception, would not by itself constitute the offence of cheating. Thus, in a case founded upon an alleged promise of marriage, the mere fact that the promise was subsequently not fulfilled cannot, in itself, establish the offence of cheating. The prosecution must establish that the promise was false at the very inception and that the accused, at the time of making the promise, had no intention to honour it.”
The case emanated from the alleged physical relationship between the appellant and the victim. As per the prosecution version, the appellant had established sexual intercourse with the victim by assuring her of marriage. However, when the villagers came to know of the relationship, the appellant fled away.
Subsequently, the parents of the victim arranged her marriage with another person. On the scheduled date of marriage, the appellant allegedly contacted the groom's family and apprised them of his relationship with the victim. Resultantly, the groom's family called off the marriage. When the victim requested the appellant to marry her, he denied. Accordingly, an FIR was registered against him under Sections 376 (rape) and 417 (punishment for cheating) of the IPC.
The trial Court was of the opinion that the appellant and the prosecutrix were deeply in love and the latter duly consented to the sexual intercourse with the former, knowing well the consequences of such act. Therefore, it did not find any evidence for recording conviction under Section 376, IPC. However, it found the appellant guilty under Section 417 IPC for cheating as he denied to marry the victim even though he had assured her of marriage while having sex.
The question which arose before the High Court for consideration was whether the appellant can be held guilty for the charge under Section 417, IPC merely because he established sexual relationship with the victim by giving promise of marriage, which he subsequently breached.
In order to determine the appellant's culpability for such act, the Court relied upon the decision of the Apex Court in Pramod Suryabhan Pawar v. State of Maharashtra (2019), which held that to establish that the consent was vitiated by a misconception of fact arising from a promise to marry, it must be shown that the promise of marriage was a false promise, given in bad faith and with no intention of being adhered to at the time it was made.
Further, such false promise itself must have the immediate relevance or a direct nexus to the woman's decision to engage in the sexual act. The mere failure to fulfil a promise subsequently, the Court had held, cannot automatically lead to the conclusion that the promise was false when it was initially made. The aforesaid position was reiterated by the Gauhati High Court in Guluk Kathar v. State of Assam (2025).
Having regard for the aforesaid principle, Justice Mishra was of the view that conviction of the appellant under Section 417 IPC cannot be sustained since the evidence relied upon by the prosecution itself demonstrates that the appellant and the prosecutrix were in deep love.
“The learned trial Court, while acquitting the accused under Section 376 IPC, specifically accepted the position that the prosecutrix was a consenting party to the physical relationship and that the prosecution had failed to establish that the alleged assurance of marriage was the inducement which caused her to submit to sexual intercourse.”
The Court further held that there is no convincing evidence to demonstrate that the appellant, at the very inception of the relationship, had made a false promise of marriage with no intention whatsoever to marry the prosecutrix. Moreover, the conduct of the appellant in contacting the groom's family was also held to be relevant to show his intention to marry the victim. It also observed=
“This Court also finds that the learned trial Court's acquittal of the accused under Section 376 IPC, based upon its finding that the prosecutrix was a consenting party and that the prosecution failed to establish that her consent was obtained on account of the assurance of marriage, assumes relevance while considering the charge under Section 417 IPC. Although the two offences have distinct ingredients, the same evidence cannot be selectively relied upon to acquit the accused of rape on the ground that the relationship was consensual while simultaneously convicting him for cheating solely because the relationship subsequently failed, without establishing the independent ingredient of dishonest intention at the inception.”
As a result, the conviction of the appellant under Section 417 of the IPC was set aside.
Case Title: L v. State of Orissa
Case No: CRLA No. 393 of 2009
Date of Judgment: July 30, 2026
Counsel for the Appellant: Mr. Prabhav Behera, Advocate
Counsel for the State: Mr. Jateswar Nayak, Addl. Govt. Advocate
Citation: 2026 LiveLaw (Ori) 91