'Panchayat Not Court Of Law', Can't Settle Sexual Offences Through Promise Of Marriage: Orissa High Court
In a powerful reminder to village institutions, the Orissa High Court has unequivocally held that neither Panchayat is a Court of law nor Sarpanch is a Magistrate holding judicial power to deal with serious criminal cases like child sexual abuse and to broker settlement in such heinous cases through securing a promise of marriage from the abuser.While upholding the conviction of a man accused...
In a powerful reminder to village institutions, the Orissa High Court has unequivocally held that neither Panchayat is a Court of law nor Sarpanch is a Magistrate holding judicial power to deal with serious criminal cases like child sexual abuse and to broker settlement in such heinous cases through securing a promise of marriage from the abuser.
While upholding the conviction of a man accused of repeatedly having sexual intercourse with a minor girl, the Bench of Dr. Justice Sanjeeb Kumar Panigrahi highlighted a 'disturbing' pattern prevalent especially in rural societies where village gentries put endeavour to settle abhorrent crime like sexual assault upon a minor by holding mediative panchayat discussions, often making the parties to put quietus to dispute by agreeing to marry. The Judge cautioned against such approach by remarking –
“It must be remembered that no panchayat is a court of law. A Sarpanch does not exercise the authority of a magistrate, nor do village elders acquire jurisdiction over criminal offences merely by convening a meeting. The adjudication of crime belongs to the institutions of the legal system alone. When village bodies assume to themselves the task of deciding or “settling” such allegations, they step beyond their lawful role and act in clear disregard of the authority of law.”
Case Background
This case stemmed from an incident which occurred on 18.07.2016 in Phiringia, Kandhamal. The appellant on that date allegedly visited the house of victim, who was then a minor, in the absence of her parents and purportedly committed forcible sexual intercourse with her, threatening her not to disclose the incident.
The victim subsequently informed her mother about such incident. As the issue was raised by her family in the village circle, a meeting was convened by village gentries where the appellant allegedly admitted to have had sexual intercourse with the victim, and the parties decided that the appellant would marry the victim once she attains majority.
They ultimately got married on 12.05.2021, but throughout the intervening years the appellant allegedly kept sexual relationship with the victim repeatedly. The appellant left the victim just 10-15 days after their marriage and desisted from maintaining any contact with her. It was also alleged that the parents of the appellant attempted to kill the victim. Therefore, an FIR was registered on 30.01.2024, after a gap of almost eight years from the initial incident.
Upon trial, the Ad-hoc Additional District & Sessions Judge (FTSC), Kandhamal, Phulbani concluded that the prosecution had proved beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant repeatedly committed sexual intercourse with the victim when she was a minor, thereby attracting Section 6(1) POCSO Act read with Section 376(2)(n) IPC, for which he was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 20 years with fine of ₹20,000/-. Being aggrieved, he preferred this criminal appeal.
Court's reasoning to uphold conviction
In order to determine minority of the victim on the date of first occurrence, the Court relied upon the school admission register which reflected her date of birth as 05.02.2000. Therefore, no semblance of doubt was left regarding minority of the victim on 18.07.2016. The Court was not convinced by the argument of the defence that when source of her date of birth was not collected, it is risky to rely upon school admission register.
It was vehemently submitted on behalf of the appellant that eight years delay in lodging the FIR is a serious defect which significantly weakens the prosecution case. Again, the Court nixed such contention by observing that the delay has been sufficiently explained.
“In the present case, the delay in lodging the FIR, though significant, cannot by itself be treated as fatal to the prosecution. The record indicates that the matter was initially dealt with within the family and through a village meeting, where the appellant is said to have agreed to marry the victim after she attained majority. These circumstances provide some context to the delayed reporting. The delay must therefore be assessed alongside the overall evidence on record, rather than viewed as a ground to discard the prosecution case outright.”
The appellant further submitted that material witnesses such as the victim's father and the scribe of the FIR were not examined, creating gaps in the prosecution case. It contended that the prosecution failed to investigate crucial aspects such as the alleged village meeting or documentary proof of such resolution, thereby weakening the prosecution narrative. However, the Court did not find force in such arguments, which were discarded by observing–
“Only if it is shown that prejudice to the accused resulted from the lapse will it tilt the balance. In the present case, no material prejudice is shown from any investigative gap; the available evidence (medical report, scene witnesses, etc.) sufficed to establish guilt. The lapses noted by the defence were either immaterial or were adequately explained at trial, and therefore do not compel acquittal.”
The Court was of the firm view that the testimony of the victim provides bedrock to the prosecution case which is supplemented by the testimonies of her mother and other witnesses who testified regarding the holding of panchayat to settle the dispute through marriage.
Lastly, a plea of juvenility was raised in favour of the appellant. It was contended that he might have been a juvenile at the time of first occurrence. However, the Court did not appreciate such defence premised upon conjectures. It thus held–
“The law provides a defined statutory mechanism for raising and determining juvenility; but a mere suggestion, absent legally admissible foundational material, cannot unsettle a finding otherwise supported by the record. In any event, such a plea, where not duly proved, cannot be permitted to operate as a blanket answer to a conviction resting on proved facts.”
The appellant even tried to borrow succour from the fact that he subsequently married the victim. Nevertheless, the Court did not consider it a ground to cause eclipse of the criminal liability fastened upon the appellant.
“A later marriage may be a biographical fact, but it is not a legal solvent. If the offence is proved to have commenced when the victim was below eighteen, the subsequent marriage cannot retrospectively cleanse the initial illegality or bar the operation of criminal law. To hold otherwise would be to create, by judicial tolerance, an escape route that the statute has consciously not provided.”
On the above premise, the Court found no reason to interfere with the finding of guilt and order of sentence imposed by the trial Court. Thus, the same were affirmed.
Panchayats can't 'settle' sexual abuse cases
Before concluding, Justice Panigrahi flagged a disturbing pattern widely prevalent in India's rural societies where panchayats and sarpanches often step in to resolve serious criminal offences through discussions, not allowing parties to take shelter of lawful authorities empowered to deal with such cases. He, therefore, astutely held–
“This Court cannot treat such conduct lightly. A sexual offence against a minor is a grave crime. When a group of local notables sits in judgment and decides that the issue can be resolved through assurances of marriage, they behave as though the criminal law stops at the boundary of the village. The law does not recognise any such boundary.”
The Court made it clear that the position of Sarpanch is not license to interfere in criminal cases. It reminded the mandate under the POCSO Act (Section 19 and 21) to report case of child sexual abuse to either the Special Juvenile Police Unit (SJPU) or the local police. It therefore held–
“Courts cannot remain silent in the face of such conduct. If those who claim to speak for a village use that standing to stifle a child's complaint and keep the police away, they are not preserving harmony but are protecting the wrongdoer and leaving the victim unheard. They are simply an attempt to keep a serious crime out of the reach of the law…. Those who occupy positions of leadership in a community must remember that their authority carries responsibility. A Sarpanch Page village elder has no mandate to decide whether a crime against a child should reach the police. Their duty is to ensure that the law takes its course, not to obstruct it by convening meetings or brokering compromises within the village.”
The Bench further ordered the concerned District Magistrate and the Superintendent of Police to ensure appropriate sensitisation at the district and village levels to make community functionaries, including Sarpanches, ward members and other local representatives, clearly understand that allegations of sexual offences against minors are not matters capable of private settlement and must be reported to the lawful authorities without delay.
Case Title: Sanat Kumar Pradhan v. State of Odisha
Case No: CRLA No. 1145 of 2025
Date of Judgment: February 13, 2026
Counsel for the Appellant: Mr. Satya Narayan Mishra-4, Advocate
Counsel for the State: Ms. Gayatri Patra, Addl. Standing Counsel
Citation: 2026 LiveLaw (Ori) 32