1. Cognizance Of Offence U/S 188 IPC Requires Complaint By Public Servant, Not FIR: Patna High Court Quashes Magistrate's Order Title: Bijay Kumar @ Bijay Kumar Bimal v. State of Bihar Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Pat) 3 The Patna High Court in a judgment delivered recently, quashed the cognizance taken by the Judicial Magistrate of offence under Section 188 of the Indian...
Title: Bijay Kumar @ Bijay Kumar Bimal v. State of Bihar
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Pat) 3
The Patna High Court in a judgment delivered recently, quashed the cognizance taken by the Judicial Magistrate of offence under Section 188 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). The court held that cognizance for the offence under Section 188 IPC cannot be taken on the basis of a police report and must adhere strictly to the requirements of Section 195(1)(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC).
Justice Jitendra Kumar, presiding over the case, observed, “The Magistrate is not competent to take cognizance of an offense punishable under Section 188 IPC on a police report. He can take cognizance of such offense only on the complaint of the public servant whose order has been violated or on the complaint of an administratively superior public servant.”
Title: Bihar Public Service Commission v. Dr. Eena Bahan & Ors
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Pat) 5
A Division Bench of the Patna High Court comprising Chief Justice K. Vinod Chandran and Justice Nani Tagia while setting aside a judgment of a Single Judge directing re-evaluation held that in cases related to re-evaluation, the court may permit such re-evaluation or scrutiny only if it is demonstrated very clearly, without any "inferential process of reasoning or by a process of rationalisation" and only in rare or exceptional cases where a material error is committed.
Title: Draupadi Kunwar @ Draupati Kunwar and Ors v. The State of Bihar and Anr
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Pat) 6
The Patna High Court held that those not charge-sheeted by the police can also be summoned to face trial under Section 319 of the Code of Criminal Procedure India, 1973 (Cr.PC) if strong and cogent evidence against them surfaces during the trial.
Title: M/s R.S. Contruction v. Building Construction Department
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Pat) 7
The Patna High Court Bench of Chief Justice K. Vinod Chandran held that a clause that allows one party to unilaterally appoint a sole arbitrator gives rise to justifiable doubts as to the independence and impartiality of the arbitrator.
The court relied on the judgment in Central Organisation for Railway Electrification v. M/s ECI SPIC SMO MCML (JV) A Joint Venture Company (2019) and held that a clause that allows one party to unilaterally appoint a sole arbitrator gives rise to justifiable doubts as to the independence and impartiality of the arbitrator. Further, such a unilateral clause is exclusive and hinders equal participation of the parties in the appointment process of arbitrators. Finally, the court rejected the request case.
Title: The State of Bihar v. M/s Baba Hans Construction Pvt. Ltd.
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Pat) 8
The Patna High Court Bench of Justice Ramesh Chand Malviya has held that procedural impediments in the government machinery are not a 'sufficient cause' for condoning the delay in filing the appeal.
Additionally, the court held that the conduct, behaviour and attitude of a party relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant factors in condoning delay.
6. Breath Analyzer Test Is Not Conclusive Proof Of Alcohol Consumption: Patna High Court Quashes FIR
Title: Narendra Kumar Ram v. The State Of Bihar and Ors
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Pat) 9
The Patna High Court has reiterated that a breathalyzer test alone is not conclusive proof of alcohol consumption and the same cannot be the sole basis of criminal prosecution under the Bihar Prohibition and Excise Act, 2016.
Justice Bibek Chaudhuri presiding over the case said, “This Court has no other alternative but to hold that the authorities failed to consider the observation of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, and based on a breath analyzer report, which cannot be said to be conclusive proof of consumption of alcohol, an F.I.R. has been registered.”
Title: Rakesh Rai v. The State of Bihar
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Pat) 11
The Patna High Court has reiterated that the involvement of a juvenile in an offense of serious nature is not, by itself, a ground for denying bail under the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection) Act, 2015.
Justice Jitendra Kumar overturned the order of the Children Court, which had rejected the bail petition of the appellant on the grounds that he was involved in a murder case, had bad company, and that his release would expose him to criminal influences and defeat the ends of justice.
Title: Ram Autar Rai v. The State Of Bihar and Ors
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Pat) 12
The Patna High Court has ruled that the Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007 does not empower the Maintenance Tribunal to entertain complaints that do not seek maintenance or challenge a property transfer.
Consequently, Justice Jitendra Kumar quashed the proceedings before the Maintenance Tribunal, while directing the Patna High Court Legal Services Committee to pay an honorarium of ₹10,000 to the amicus curiae for assisting in the case.
Title: Nand Jee Singh and Ors v. The State of Bihar and Ors
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Pat) 15
The Patna High Court has held that an Executive Magistrate is expected to invoke proceedings under Section 145 CrPC only when there is an apprehension of breach of public peace, adding that the condition precedent for initiating such proceedings is his satisfaction regarding such apprehension.
Justice Jitendra Kumar, presiding over the case, stated, “The condition precedent for initiating proceedings under Section 145 Cr.P.C. is the satisfaction of the Executive Magistrate regarding apprehension of breach of public peace on account of dispute relating to the actual possession of the subject property. Such satisfaction must be based on grounds mentioned in the preliminary order made under Section 145(1) Cr.P.C.”
Title: Ram Padarath Singh and Ors v. The State Of Bihar and Anr
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Pat) 20
The Patna High Court has held that parallel proceedings under Section 145 of the Cr.PC are unsustainable when a civil suit concerning the same property is already pending, and that an attachment order under Section 146(1) Cr.PC requires an “emergent situation” which is more than a mere apprehension of breach of peace.
Justice Jitendra Kumar observed, “It is also pertinent to point out that if a Civil Suit regarding title and possession is pending in regard to the property in question in a Civil Court, a parallel proceeding under Section 145 Cr.PC is not permissible. It would be sheer wastage of public time and money. The Civil Court is also competent to adjudicate the dispute regarding actual possession of the property between the parties and pass interim order during pendency of the Civil Suit.”
Title: M/s Pramila Motors Pvt. Ltd. v. M/s Okinawa Autotech International Pvt. Ltd.
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Pat) 21
The Patna High Court bench of Acting Chief Justice Ashutosh Kumar has held that in the absence of any clause in the agreement apart from Clause 36.3, which speaks of the “venue” being Delhi, there cannot be any other inference or intention of the parties for the “venue” and the “seat” being different.
Additionally, the court noted that the agreement in question does not mention the “seat” of arbitration but only mentions the “venue” for arbitration, which shall be at New Delhi. Thus, Delhi High Court only shall have the jurisdiction to adjudicate the present request.
Title: Sanjay Kumar Shaw v. Smt. Anjali Kumari Shaw
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Pat) 26
The Patna High Court has held that mere allegations of a mental disorder such as schizophrenia cannot justify a plea for divorce unless it is proved that the disorder is of such a kind and degree that the partner cannot reasonably be expected to live together.
The Division Bench of Justices Sunil Dutta Mishra and P. B. Bajanthri emphasised that vague or unsubstantiated claims regarding mental illness or cruelty are insufficient to attract the grounds for divorce under Section 13(1)(ia), (ib), or (iii) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955.
Title: Sanjeev Kumar Mishra v. The State of Bihar
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Pat) 27
The Patna High Court has upheld the constitutional and statutory validity of Rule 6(1) of Bihar Pharmacists Cadre Rules, 2014 (amended), making Diploma in Pharmacy (D. Pharma) from Institutions recognized by the Government along with a certificate, a compulsory requirement to be eligible for appointment as Pharmacist in State Health Department.
Dismissing a series of writ petitions, a division bench of Acting Chief Justice Ashutosh Kumar and Justice Partha Sarthy observed that while graduate and post-graduate degrees in Pharmacy are higher qualification but when the minimum qualification of Diploma in Pharmacy has been fixed in the cadre rules, it cannot be tinkered with only on the ground of it not being sound or wise. The court thus held that criteria was neither arbitrary nor beyond the scope of the Pharmacy Act, 1948 or the Pharmacy Practice Regulations, 2015.
Title: M/s JMD Alloys Ltd. v. Union of India & Ors.
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Pat) 30
The Patna High Court, while upholding the recovery of ₹8,62,566 as ineligible CENVAT credit, held that transitional credit under the GST regime cannot be availed for capital goods received after 1st July 2017.
The Division Bench of the High Court comprising Justices Rajeev Ranjan Prasad and Ramesh Chand Malviya held, “The distinction in the matter of giving benefit of CENVAT credit on capital goods during the transitional period may be found in Section 140 of the CGST Act. While this provision enables an assessee to carry forward and take credit of unutilized CENVAT credit paid on inputs as well as on capital goods, in the manner as may be prescribed and subject to the conditions contained in the provisions, sub-section (5) of Section 140 makes a distinction between the capital goods and inputs. This provides that a registered person would be entitled to take credit of eligible duties and taxes in respect of inputs or input services received on or after the appointed date but the duty on tax in respect of which has been paid by the supplier under the existing law…”
Case Title: Ganesh Prasad Singh v. Union of India & Ors.
LL Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Pat) 31
The Patna High Court has held that the Enforcement Directorate (ED) cannot invoke its powers under Section 19 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (PMLA) to arrest an accused after cognizance has been taken by the Special Court, if the accused was not arrested during the course of investigation.
Justice Satyavrat Verma, presiding over the case, stated, “The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Enforcement Directorate is not in a position to rebut the submission of the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner that ED during the course of investigation never felt the need of arresting the petitioner and after cognizance is taken of the offence punishable under Section 4 of the PMLA based on a complaint under Section 44(1)(b) of the PMLA, the ED and its officers are powerless to exercise power under Section 19 of the PMLA to arrest a person shown as an accused in the complaint.”
Title: Amit Anand v. Bihar Information Commission and Ors
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Pat) 34
While dismissing a petition filed by an individual seeking compensation for delayed information under the Right to Information Act 2005, the Patna High Court has reiterated that compensation under Section 19(8)(b) of the Act can only be granted when the applicant demonstrates actual loss or detriment suffered due to the delay in receiving the requested information.
Justice Rajesh Kumar Verma presiding over the case observed, “this Court has come to the conclusion that the petitioner has not produced/demonstrated the extent of loss or detriment suffered by him for award of compensation under Section 19(8)(b) of the RTI Act, 2005 and apart from that, the petitioner has not challenged the order dated 16.08.2019 by which the appeal of the petitioner was disposed of by the State Information Commission without awarding the compensation under Section 19(8)(b) of the RTI Act, 2005.”
Title: Pushpa Devi v. The State of Bihar Patna and Ors
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Pat) 40
The Patna High Court has ruled that at the stage of framing charges under Section 307 of the Indian Penal Code, it is not necessary to prove by direct evidence that the accused had intention or knowledge to cause death; instead, it is sufficient if the materials show either intention or knowledge, which can be inferred from the surrounding circumstances.
Justice Bibek Chaudhuri, presiding over the case, observed, “At the, prima facie, stage of consideration of charge and even during trial, it is very difficult, if not impossible, to prove intention or knowledge of the accused by way of direct evidence, because intention and knowledge comes from culpable state of mind and there cannot be a direct evidence of such culpable intention. Intention can be gathered from the surrounding circumstances, from the nature of wound received by the victim, from the manner of assault inflicted by the accused, from the nature of weapon used etc.”
Title: M/s Sri Sai Food Grain and Iron Stors v. The State of Bihar & Ors.
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Pat) 43
The Patna High Court, while allowing a petition challenging a tax demand of ₹88,64,550.50, has observed that an inspection conducted under the BGST/CGST regime is legally unsustainable if not carried out in compliance with Section 67 of the BGST/CGST Act, 2017 read with Section 100 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
Presiding over the ruling, a Division Bench comprising Justice P. B. Bajanthri and Justice Alok Kumar Sinha, stated, “Section 67 of BGST/CGST Act, 2017 specifically mandates an inspection to be conducted in accordance with the Code of Criminal Procedure. Section 100 of the Code of Criminal Procedure stipulates that there shall be two witnesses when the inspection is conducted…The inspection report, therefore, does not contain the names and signatures of two independent witnesses which is the mandatory requirement of Section 67 of the BGST/CGST Act, 2017…Clearly this appears to be an afterthought done with the motive to simply cover-up the lacuna…”
Title: Awadh Kishore Sah v. The State of Bihar & Ors.
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Pat) 50
The Patna High Court has recently observed that isolated lapses or moral failings on the part of a wife do not automatically disqualify her from claiming maintenance under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.PC).
Justice Jitendra Kumar, presiding over the case, clarified that there is a difference between acts of adultery and “living in adultery.” He stated, “any physical relationship of a lady with any person prior to her marriage does not come within the definition of “adultery” because adultery is an offence against one's spouse. However, adulterous life of any wife subsequent to her marriage is undoubtedly a disqualification for any married wife to get maintenance from her husband. However, “Living in adultery” denotes a continuous course of conduct and not isolated acts of immorality.”
20. Assessee Is Permitted To Rectify GSTR 3B On Par With Contents Of GSTR 1: Patna High Court
Title: Om Traders v. Union Of India
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Pat) 55
The Patna High Court stated that the assessee is permitted to rectify GSTR 3B on par with contents of GSTR 1.
The Division Bench of Justices P.B. Bajanthri and S.B. PD. Singh observed that in the government, there is no system of rectification of any return once it is filed. However, the assessee had submitted application to rectify GST 3B on par with the GSTR 1 relating to certain total taxable value, total integrated tax, total CGST, total SGST. He had committed error insofar as mentioning total taxable value while submitting GSTR 3B and it is not in accordance with the GSTR 1.
Title - Nityanand Roy @Nityanand Rai v. State of Bihar
Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (Pat) 57
The Patna High Court has observed that merely voicing an apprehension that in case the candidate of a particular party wins the election, it may create the base of ISIS (a militant outfit) in the area, cannot be said to be 'provocative' speech in terms of Section 153 IPC.
Holding thus, a bench of Justice Chandra Shekhar Jha set aside an order of CJM, Araria, taking cognizance and issuing Summons to Union Minister of State for Home Affairs, Nityanand Rai in connection with offences under Section 153 IPC and Section 125 of the Representation of People Act.
Title: Navneet Kumar Singh v. State of Bihar
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Pat) 66
The Patna High Court held that Sessions Courts cannot ask accused seeking anticipatory bail to approach the police for relief under Section 41A of the CrPC/Section 35 BNSS. In doing so the court emphasized that the competent courts cannot shut their doors and refer the petitioners to go to other fora for protection of their liberty.
Justice Kumar thereafter observed that in view of Nausad Ansari case, an “impression” is doing the rounds among District Judiciary that in view of Section 41A Cr.PC/Section 35 BNSS anticipatory bail petitions are not required to be decided, if they are filed before sessions court, which is only required to refer the petitioners to the police for representation. The Court clarified that these provisions are not substitutes for one another but operate concurrently, each designed to safeguard liberty at different stages of the criminal process.
Title: Mangali Devi & Ors v. The State of Bihar
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Pat) 76
The Patna High Court has held that proceedings under Sections 82 (Proclamation for person absconding) and 83 (Attachment of property of person absconding) CrPC (Sections 84 and 85 of the BNSS) do not create an absolute bar on filing an anticipatory bail petition.
Justice Jitendra Kumar observed that, “the anticipatory bail petition of a Petitioner facing accusation is maintainable, even if the proceeding under Sections 82 and 83 Cr.PC/Sections 84 and 85 B.N.S.S, have been initiated against him. However, grant or rejection of anticipatory bail would depend upon the facts and circumstances of the case.”
Title: Rit Lal Yadav vs. State of Bihar and Ors
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Pat) 84
Rejecting the plea of Rashtriya Janata Dal (RJD) MLA Ritlal Yadav seeking interim bail to campaign for himself during the ongoing Bihar Assembly elections, the Patna High Court observed that a candidate's right to canvass and campaign is not a fundamental right, but only a statutory right on which restriction can be imposed by statutes.
A bench of Justice Arun Kumar Jha noted that Yadav is having antecedent of a number of cases and he has been suffering incarceration in two cases and had ample time to seek bail in those cases or to make the same prayer before the court concerned for his release on interim bail.
Title: Pushpraj Bajaj v. Union of India
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Pat) 85
The Patna High Court held that the proviso to Section 223(1) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS) is mandatory, emphasizing that a pre-cognizance hearing constitutes an essential procedural safeguard for the accused. The Court further observed that any opportunity granted to the accused during the summoning stage cannot cure the defect arising from non-compliance with this requirement.
A Single Judge Bench comprising Justice Arun Kumar Jha was hearing a criminal revision petition challenging an order of the Special PMLA Court that had taken cognizance against the petitioner under Sections 3 and 4 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, without giving him an opportunity of being heard.
Title: Neeraj Kumar @ Neeraj Singh v. State of Bihar
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Pat) 87
The Patna High Court recently awarded compensation of ₹2 lakh to an accused who was illegally detained for six days despite a court order granting him bail.
A Division Bench comprising Justice Rajeev Ranjan Prasad and Justice Sourendra Pandey directed the State to compensate the petitioner, who had been in custody for an alleged violation of the Bihar Prohibition and Excise Act, 2016.
27. 'Mere' Incarceration Of Two And A Half Years Not Grounds For Bail Under UAPA: Patna High Court
Title: Anwar Rashid v. Union Bank of India through the National Investigation Agency, Bihar
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Pat) 93
The Patna High Court recently held that cases involving threats to national security and public safety cannot be equated with ordinary criminal matters, and that “mere incarceration” of two and a half years cannot entitle an accused to bail where national security concerns are involved.
A Division Bench of Justice Rajeev Ranjan Prasad and Justice Sourendra Pandey made these observations while denying bail to an accused allegedly involved in planning to cause disturbance during the proposed visit of the Prime Minister to Patna.
Title: Jai Krishna Yadav v. State of Bihar
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Pat) 95
The Patna High Court has recently clarified that “external rubbing” does not fall within the statutory definition of penetrative sexual assault under the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (“POCSO”). The Court further held that in cases where medical evidence negates the possibility of penetration, a conviction cannot rest solely on the uncorroborated testimony of a child witness.
A Division Bench of the High Court, comprising Justice Rajeev Ranjan Prasad and Justice Sourendra Pandey made these observations while hearing an appeal arising from the conviction of the appellant under Section 6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012.
29. Specific Relief Act Has No Application To Proceedings Under Family Courts Act: Patna High Court
Title: Anjani Kumar @ Pappu Kumar v. Mamta Bharti and Another
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Pat) 99
The Patna High Court held that the Specific Relief Act, 1963 has no application to proceedings under the Family Courts Act, 1984, in view of the overriding effect of Section 20 of the latter statute.
A Division Bench comprising Justice Bibek Chaudhuri and Dr. Justice Anshuman made these observations while hearing an appeal under Section 19(1) of the Family Courts Act, in which the Family Court had declared the marriage between the parties null and void.
Title: Aashik Kumar Sah v. State of Bihar and Another
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Pat) 104
The Patna High Court has clarified that a Sessions Court having jurisdiction to decide an anticipatory bail application is duty-bound to adjudicate the same on merits by either allowing or rejecting it, and cannot dispose of such an application without doing either. The Court further clarified that there is no statutory bar on entertaining anticipatory bail applications merely because the alleged offence is punishable with imprisonment of seven years or more.
These observations were made by a Single Judge Bench comprising Justice Jitendra Kumar while hearing a criminal miscellaneous petition challenging an order of the trial court by which anticipatory bail had been denied to the petitioner. Upon considering the merits of the case, the High Court granted anticipatory bail to the petitioner. The Court further directed the Registrar General of the Patna High Court to circulate a copy of the order to all judicial officers across the district judiciary in Bihar.