Burns Accidental As Per Dying Declaration: Punjab & Haryana High Court Acquits Man Of Dowry Death After 22 Years
The Punjab and Haryana High Court has acquitted a man who was convicted in a 1998 dowry death case, holding that the prosecution must first establish the foundational ingredients of Section 304-B IPC before the statutory presumption under Section 113-B of the Evidence Act can be invoked.
Justice Mandeep Pannu observed that where the deceased herself had consistently stated, immediately after sustaining burn injuries and subsequently in a dying declaration recorded by a Judicial Magistrate, that she had suffered burns accidentally, the prosecution was required to convincingly rule out the possibility of accidental death.
“The prosecution is also required to rule out the possibility of an accidental death before the statutory presumption can be invoked.”
The Court was dealing with an appeal filed by Bhanu Prakash, challenging his conviction under Section 304-B IPC by the Additional Sessions Judge, Jagadhri, which had sentenced him to seven years' rigorous imprisonment. The deceased's father had also filed a revision seeking enhancement of the sentence.
The case arose from the death of the appellant's wife, Geetika Sharma, who sustained 90% burn injuries at the matrimonial home on August 4, 1998 and died five days later.
According to the prosecution, Geetika had been subjected to harassment and cruelty in connection with dowry demands. Her father alleged that the appellant had poured kerosene oil on her and set her on fire.
However, the deceased's earliest account was materially different.
When she was brought to the hospital, she stated that she had sustained the burn injuries accidentally. She subsequently made a statement before a Judicial Magistrate after the Magistrate obtained the doctor's opinion regarding her fitness to make the statement.
In the dying declaration, she stated that she was painting the kitchen wall and, while soaking the paint brush in kerosene oil, the kerosene splashed onto her clothes and the floor. The bottle also fell down and, since the gas stove was switched on, her clothes caught fire.
The High Court noted that the deceased did not implicate her husband or any other member of her matrimonial family in either of these accounts.
The Court held that there was no convincing material to demonstrate that the Magistrate's statement had been recorded under any influence or that the deceased was incapable of understanding the questions and giving rational answers.
“In the present case, the position is somewhat different and, in fact, significant for the appellant. The dying declaration recorded by the Judicial Magistrate does not implicate the appellant. Rather, the deceased stated that she had sustained the burn injuries accidentally,” the Court said.
The Court also attached significance to the fact that Geetika survived for approximately five days after the incident. Her parents had reached PGI, Chandigarh, during this period and her mother was present with her. Yet, no complaint alleging dowry harassment or accusing the appellant of setting her on fire was made while she was alive.
The FIR was registered only after her death on August 9, 1998.
Justice Pannu clarified that delay in lodging an FIR is not, by itself, sufficient to discard a prosecution case. However, in the facts of the case, the delay assumed significance when considered alongside the deceased's two contemporaneous accounts of accidental burning.
The prosecution had also relied upon a note dated May 3, 1998, allegedly written by the deceased, in which she had accused her husband, father-in-law and brother-in-law of harassment and stated that they would be responsible in case of her death.
The Court emphasised that merely establishing that a woman died an unnatural death within the matrimonial home is not sufficient to attract Section 304-B IPC. The prosecution must establish that she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by the accused for, or in connection with, a demand for dowry and that such cruelty or harassment occurred “soon before” her death. The expression “soon before”, the Court said, incorporates a requirement of proximity and there must be a “proximate and live link” between the alleged dowry-related cruelty and the death.
The Court further held that the statutory presumption under Section 113-B of the Evidence Act does not arise automatically merely because the death was unnatural. “The statutory presumption under Section 113-B of the Evidence Act, therefore, cannot be invoked mechanically,” the Court said. It explained that the presumption arises only after the prosecution establishes the necessary ingredients of Section 304-B IPC.
In the present case, the prosecution failed to establish beyond reasonable doubt the foundational fact that the deceased had been subjected to dowry-related cruelty or harassment by the appellant soon before her death.
The Court noted that the evidence supporting accidental burning included the deceased's earliest statement to the doctor and her subsequent statement before the Magistrate. The prosecution had failed to produce reliable evidence sufficient to render these statements unworthy of belief.
Rejecting this reasoning, the High Court observed that such a possibility could not constitute the basis of a criminal conviction. “A conviction cannot rest upon a possibility or conjecture, particularly when the deceased herself had given a version of accidental burning.”
The Court also reiterated that the burden does not shift to the accused to establish innocence unless the prosecution first establishes the foundational facts constituting the offence.
Holding that the prosecution evidence did not cross the threshold of proof beyond reasonable doubt, the Court allowed the appeal and set aside the judgment of conviction and order of sentence passed by the trial court.
Case Title: Bhanu Parkash v. State of Haryana & Anr.