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The Punjab and Haryana High Court has held that where a disciplinary authority is dissatisfied with an enquiry report, Rule 9 of the Punjab Civil Services (Punishment and Appeal) Rules, 1970 permits it to remit the matter for further enquiry, but "does not authorize the appointment of a new Inquiry Officer for conducting a fresh or de novo enquiry on the same charges." [2026 LiveLaw...

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The Punjab and Haryana High Court has held that where a disciplinary authority is dissatisfied with an enquiry report, Rule 9 of the Punjab Civil Services (Punishment and Appeal) Rules, 1970 permits it to remit the matter for further enquiry, but "does not authorize the appointment of a new Inquiry Officer for conducting a fresh or de novo enquiry on the same charges." [2026 LiveLaw (PH) 283].

Allowing the writ petition of a retired District Programme Officer, Justice Sandeep Moudgil held the issue to be "no longer res integra", relying on K.R. Deb v. Collector of Central Excise, Shillong, (1971), in which the Supreme Court held that once an enquiry has been concluded the disciplinary authority cannot direct a fresh enquiry merely because it is dissatisfied with the Inquiry Officer's findings.

The petitioner was serving as District Programme Officer in the Department of Social Security and Women & Child Development, Punjab. Two charge-sheets dated 11.09.2014 were issued against him relating to his tenures at Mansa and Ludhiana. He replied to both on 07.10.2014, regular departmental enquiries followed, and by separate enquiry reports dated 11.01.2016 the Inquiry Officer held that none of the charges stood proved, exonerating him in both.

The disciplinary authority took no final decision on those reports for nearly two years and ten months. It then issued dissent notes expressing disagreement and sought the petitioner's explanation, to which he responded.

Meanwhile, due to superannuate on 30.04.2019 on attaining 58 years, the petitioner exercised his option for extension in service on 07.12.2018 under Government Instructions dated 08.10.2012 read with the clarification dated 30.04.2015, the department forwarding it on 13.03.2019. He was nonetheless retired on 30.04.2019, and by order dated 05.08.2019 his claim for extension was rejected on the ground that disciplinary proceedings were pending. By order dated 02.09.2019, a retired IAS officer was appointed as Inquiry Officer to conduct a de novo enquiry into the same charge-sheets.

Senior Advocate Vikas Chatrath, for the petitioner, contended that the appointment of a fresh Inquiry Officer was ex facie illegal and dehors Rule 9, which at best permits remitting the matter to the same Inquiry Officer for further enquiry, and that the respondents had themselves admitted in their written statement that the Rules do not contemplate a de novo enquiry. 

On extension in service, it was urged that on the date the claim fell for consideration there existed no finding of guilt, the petitioner having stood exonerated, and that the respondents were legally obliged to consider his claim on the facts as they then stood — relying on Jawahar Lal v. State of Punjab, CWP No. 5267 of 2019 decided on 22.04.2019, where the Court held that pendency of disciplinary proceedings cannot by itself deprive an employee of consideration for extension.

For the State, it was submitted that the appointment of the Inquiry Officer was in accordance with law; that the petitioner was ineligible for extension as two charge-sheets were pending before the disciplinary authority on the date of superannuation; and that the disciplinary authority is not bound by the Inquiry Officer's findings and is competent to disagree with them after following the prescribed procedure, so that the matter had not attained finality and no vested right accrued to the petitioner. It was also submitted that following the interim order of 20.09.2019, further proceedings stood adjourned and no final decision could be taken during the pendency of the writ petition.

Recording the undisputed position, two charge-sheets, enquiry reports exonerating the petitioner, no final order for almost two years and ten months, then dissent notes and the appointment of a fresh Inquiry Officer, the Court framed the question as whether, after submission of reports exonerating the petitioner, the disciplinary authority could appoint a fresh Inquiry Officer and order a de novo enquiry.

Holding that Rule 9 confers no such power and that the impugned action was contrary both to the Rule and to the settled position of law, the Court found the appointment unsustainable.

On extension in service, the Court held that on the date the petitioner's case fell for consideration he stood exonerated by virtue of the reports of 11.01.2016 and no order of punishment had been passed. The respondents could not rely on subsequently initiated proceedings to deny him consideration, an employee's entitlement having to be examined on the facts existing on the date of consideration and not on subsequent events, a proposition supported by Bank of India v. Degala Suryanarayana, (1999) and Nirmal Singh v. Food Corporation of India, 2000.

On the pleadings, the Court noted that several material averments in the writ petition were either not specifically denied or were admitted, including that the enquiry reports exonerated the petitioner, that there was considerable delay in deciding them, and that no provision exists under the Rules authorising a de novo enquiry. These admissions, the Court held, substantially fortified the petitioner's case.

Consequently, the order rejecting extension solely on the premise of pending charge-sheets was held equally unsustainable: once continuation of the proceedings through the de novo enquiry was found contrary to law, the consequential denial of extension could not survive.

The order dated 02.09.2019 appointing a new Inquiry Officer for a de novo enquiry and the consequential communication dated 05.09.2019 were quashed, and the order dated 05.08.2019 declining extension in service was set aside.

The respondents were directed to consider the petitioner's claim for extension in service and all consequential service benefits on the basis of the enquiry reports dated 11.01.2016, in accordance with the applicable Government instructions, with consequential monetary benefits, if found admissible to be released within three months of receipt of a certified copy of the order.

Title: Rakesh Walia v. State of Punjab and another

Appearances: Mr. Vikas Chatrath, Senior Advocate with Mr. Anirudh Malhan, Ms. Navdita Rathore and Mr. Abhishek Sharma, Advocates for the petitioner;

Mr. Siddharth Sandhu, AAG, Punjab.

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