'Orphan' Means Both Parents Dead; Candidate With Surviving Mother Can't Be Given Recruitment Weightage: P&H High Court

Accepting this contention, the Single Judge held on May 16, 2023 that HSSC could not adopt a stricter interpretation when a similar clause had been interpreted differently in another recruitment process, and directed the Commission to re-frame the merit list.

That judgment was challenged in 51 connected Letters Patent Appeals by HSSC as well as by selected candidates who stood to lose their appointments if the revised merit list were implemented.

Before the Division Bench, the selected candidates and HSSC argued that the author of the recruitment clause was best placed to explain its meaning and that the interpretation adopted by certain District Selection Committees in an unrelated recruitment exercise could not override HSSC's own interpretation. They further relied on the definition of "orphan" under the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015, which contemplates the death of both parents, and submitted that the selected candidates whose appointments were liable to be disturbed had not even been impleaded before the Single Judge.

The original writ petitioners, on the other hand, contended that the clause referred only to the father's death and that a uniform interpretation ought to be adopted since the same clause had been construed more liberally in the Group-D recruitment. They also argued that even in the present recruitment some candidates whose mothers were alive had received the benefit.

The Division Bench held that where ambiguity exists, the interpretation given by the author of the clause must ordinarily be accepted unless it is contrary to the plain language of the provision. Relying upon B. Premanand v. Mohan Koikal, the Court reiterated that courts cannot rewrite or supplement recruitment conditions under the guise of interpretation.

The Bench found that the Single Judge had disregarded HSSC's own explanation of the clause and instead relied upon an erroneous interpretation adopted by certain District Selection Committees in an unrelated recruitment exercise. Such an approach, the Court held, amounted to judicial legislation, which is impermissible. It also referred to the Supreme Court's decision in Union of India v. Manpreet Singh Poonam to reiterate that courts cannot alter clear recruitment rules through interpretative exercises.

The Court further observed that the very object of granting additional marks to orphans was to compensate candidates deprived of parental care and support, a disadvantage that could not be equated with the situation of a candidate who continued to have the care of a surviving mother.

The Bench also relied upon Rule 3(k) of the Haryana Deceased Government Employees Rules, 2003, which defines an orphan as a child who loses both parents, observing that Haryana's statutory framework had consistently understood the expression in that manner.

Holding that the Single Judge's interpretation was contrary to both the factual position and the 2003 Rules, the Division Bench allowed all 51 appeals, set aside the impugned judgment, dismissed the writ petitions and held that only candidates whose both parents had died, along with fulfilment of the additional condition regarding the father's death, would be entitled to claim the five-mark orphan weightage. Any benefit already granted to ineligible candidates was held liable to be withdrawn and reconsidered.