Jumping Off Train Fearing Fire Is Self-Preservation, Not 'Self-Inflicted Injury': P&H High Court Holds Railways Liable To Pay Compensation
The Punjab and Haryana High Court has held that a passenger who jumps from a train under a bona fide apprehension that it has caught fire cannot be said to have suffered a "self-inflicted injury" within the meaning of the proviso to Section 124-A of the Railways Act, 1989, as his conduct is an instinctive act of self-preservation rather than self-destruction. [2026 LiveLaw (PH)...
The Punjab and Haryana High Court has held that a passenger who jumps from a train under a bona fide apprehension that it has caught fire cannot be said to have suffered a "self-inflicted injury" within the meaning of the proviso to Section 124-A of the Railways Act, 1989, as his conduct is an instinctive act of self-preservation rather than self-destruction. [2026 LiveLaw (PH) 269]
Justice Harkesh Manuja, allowing the appeal of the parents of the deceased and awarding statutory compensation of ₹8 lakh, observed,
"A passenger who, under a bona fide apprehension that the train has caught fire, jumps out in order to save his life cannot be attributed any intention to cause injury to himself. His conduct is an instinctive act of self-preservation and not self-destruction."
The Court added that human reaction to a perceived emergency is often instinctive, and that "the law cannot penalise a victim for acting in an attempt to preserve his life."
The appellants, the dependent parents of the deceased Mayank, had approached the Railway Claims Tribunal, Chandigarh Bench under Section 124-A of the Railways Act seeking statutory compensation.
It was contended that the deceased, after attending a Jagran at Aurangabad, was returning to Karnal with his companions by Train No. 12715 Sachkhand Express on a valid railway ticket. As the train approached Harsana Kalan Railway Station, a rumour spread inside the compartment that the train had caught fire, causing panic among the passengers. Several passengers, including the deceased, jumped out of the train, and the deceased was struck by another train moving on the adjacent track and succumbed to his injuries.
The Tribunal, by judgment dated 14.11.2025, recorded a categorical finding that the deceased was travelling on a valid ticket and was a bona fide passenger. Nevertheless, it held that he ceased to be a passenger the moment he deboarded after the train halted due to alarm chain pulling, and that his act of jumping out amounted to a self-inflicted injury and his own negligent act, attracting clauses (b) and (c) of the proviso to Section 124-A. The claim was accordingly dismissed.
At the outset, the High Court noted that the Tribunal's finding on the deceased being a bona fide passenger had attained finality, the Railways having neither challenged it nor produced material to dislodge it. The sole surviving question was whether the death fell within the ambit of an "untoward incident" under Section 123(c) read with Section 124-A, or was excluded by the proviso.
Rejecting the Tribunal's premise that the deceased ceased to be a passenger upon stepping out of the train, the Court held that such an interpretation defeats both the language and the object of the statute. The contract of carriage between the Railway Administration and the passenger, it was observed, does not terminate merely because the passenger is compelled to alight midway owing to extraordinary circumstances beyond his control. The deceased had admittedly not reached his destination, his journey remained incomplete, and his status as a passenger continued to subsist.
The Court relied on Union of India v. Prabhakaran Vijaya Kumar, (2008) 9 SCC 527, where the Supreme Court held that the provisions of Chapter XIII of the Railways Act are welfare provisions deserving liberal construction, and that where two interpretations are possible, the one advancing the remedy and extending the benefit to the victim ought to be preferred.
The Court further relied on Jameela v. Union of India, (2010) 12 SCC 443, in which it was held that even a passenger who negligently stands near the open door of a running train and accidentally falls does not thereby deprive his dependants of statutory compensation, negligence not being one of the exceptions carved out under the proviso.
Applying these principles, the Court held that the Tribunal had committed a patent error in treating the act as a self-inflicted injury, the expression in clause (b) of the proviso contemplating a deliberate or intentional act of injuring oneself. It was equally unjustified in invoking clause (c) relating to "his own criminal act", there being "not even a whisper of evidence" that the deceased had committed any offence preceding the occurrence, mere deboarding in a state of panic cannot be elevated to a criminal act, the exclusion being confined to cases where death is the direct consequence of an act amounting to an offence in law.
The Court also faulted the Tribunal for discarding the testimony of Tinku, the co-passenger accompanying the deceased, who consistently deposed to the outbreak of panic following the rumour of fire and to several persons jumping from the train, and whose testimony remained substantially unshaken in cross-examination.
By contrast, the Loco Pilot of the train that struck the deceased, admittedly had no occasion to witness events inside the Sachkhand Express; his testimony could establish only the circumstances in which he noticed passengers on the track and could not disprove the existence of panic inside the train.
The Tribunal, the Court held, erred in assigning overriding weight to the while ignoring the direct evidence of the co-passenger, particularly when it had itself noticed that the train had stopped on account of alarm chain pulling and that a number of passengers had deboarded. Once those foundational facts stood established, the surrounding circumstances probabilised the appellants' version, and such conduct "cannot be judged with the detachment of hindsight."
Holding that the Railways had failed to discharge the burden of establishing any statutory exception, and that the Tribunal had "imported notions of negligence and fault into a statutory scheme founded upon strict liability", the Court set aside the findings.
The appellants were held entitled to statutory compensation of ₹8,00,000 along with interest at 6% per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition till realisation, with the Railways directed to deposit the amount before the Tribunal within eight weeks, whereafter it is to be released to the appellants in accordance with law.
Title: Meena and another v. Union of India
Appearances: Mr. Sumit Singh Chahal, Advocate (through video conference) for the appellants;
Ms. Mansi Majoka, Advocate for the respondent-Union of India.