Every Section 498A IPC Conviction Can't Automatically Translate To Offence Of Moral Turpitude: Punjab & Haryana High Court
The Punjab and Haryana High Court has observed that there is no general rule that every offence under Section 498-A IPC due to its very nature must automatically translate into an offence involving moral turpitude for the purpose of civil consequences in employment, promotion or higher education.
In doing so the court granted relief to a former SBI branch manager who was discharged from service following his conviction for cruelty, on the ground that conviction under Section 498A IPC amounts to offence involving moral turpitude. The petitioner had challenged his discharge from 14.12.2018 and for directing the respondents to grant all consequential benefits from 15.12.2018.
Justice Sandeep Moudgil in his order said:
"With all humility at my command, a careful distinction becomes necessary, on the one hand, between the genuine cases of egregious dowry-related cruelty which shock the collective conscience of the society as a whole, and, on the other hand, prosecutions arising out of essentially personal disputes within the precincts of the matrimonial home, which may culminate in compromise, acquittal, or even conviction based on findings of only technical or marginal cruelty.
Categorisation of a particular case under Section 498-A IPC may or may not involve moral turpitude depends on its own facts and is always debatable, and reasonable people may differ on that question. What cannot be accepted, however, is any general rule that every offence under Section 498-A IPC, by its very nature, must automatically be translated into an offence involving moral turpitude for the purpose of civil consequences such as employment, promotion or higher education".
Referring to the language of Section 498-A IPC, the high court said that the gravamen of the offence is cruelty inflicted upon a wife by her husband or his relatives.
The court said that its "axis is the matrimonial relationship and the conduct within that intimate sphere".
Thus to "elevate every prosecution" under Section 498-A, irrespective of its factual substratum, into an 'offence against society' and, on that "abstract footing" brand it in all cases as an offence involving moral turpitude is a proposition which cannot withstand legal scrutiny, the court emphasized. The court said that if the same is done then almost every criminal offence could easily be described as dealing with a "societal problem" and almost every conviction would have to be treated as one involving moral turpitude.
"This would wipe out the important difference between ordinary criminal offences and only those acts which are so base, vile, depraved or so shocking to the public conscience, that they deserve to be characterised against involving 'moral turpitude'. The law does not proceed on sweeping generalities of this kind. It demands a fact-sensitive inquiry into the nature, degree and context of the cruelty actually proved in a given case, and it is only where those facts disclose genuine moral depravity, rather than merely a strained matrimonial relationship, that the label of an offence involving moral turpitude can legitimately be imposed," the court highlighted.
Background
The petitioner was working as Branch Manager at Panipat and while in service, an FIR was lodged against him and his family in 2000 under IPC Sections 304-B(dowry death), 406(criminal breach of trust), 498-A(cruelty). The FIR contained allegations of dowry demand and abetment for committing suicide by the deceased-wife.
The petitioner's counsel submitted that the Sessions Court vide judgment dated 28.10.2002 acquitted the petitioner under Sections 304-B and 406 IPC but was held guilty under Section 498-A IPC and was sentenced to under imprisonment for 3 years with fine of Rs.5000.
Resultantly, the Bank in its order dated 19.06.2019 discharged the petitioner from service on the ground that the conviction under Section 498-A IPC amounts to offence involving moral turpitude. The discharge was ordered with effect from 14.12.2018 the date on which the trial court judgment assailed by the petitioner was upheld by a Division Bench of the High Court.
Findings
The court noted that the discharge order of the bank was silent on any charge-sheet, show cause notice, or consideration of the petitioner's explanation, service record or mitigating circumstances and contained only a "bald recital" that the conviction involves “moral turpitude”.
The court noted that the expression “moral turpitude” has not been defined in the Banking Regulation Act or the service rules governing the parties. However, the Courts have consistently held “moral turpitude” to be a concept dependent upon the nature of the act, the surrounding circumstances, and its bearing upon the duties of the employee.
The court referred to various judgments and said that it becomes evident that the disciplinary authority cannot simply reproduce the phrase “conviction involving moral turpitude” and proceed to terminate service. The court said that the authority is "obligated" to evaluate the nature of the offence, its nexus with official duties, the surrounding circumstances, the employee's service record, and the proportionality of the proposed punishment and absence of such analysis renders the decision mechanical and arbitrary.
It referred to Supreme Court's decision in Pawan Kumar v. State of Haryana, (1996) where it was observed that moral turpitude implies conduct which is inherently base, depraved or contrary to accepted standards of morality, but its determination must depend upon the facts of each case and the impact of the act on the duties discharged by employee.
Meanwhile the counsel for the Bank referred to judgments of various high courts where an offence committed by an employee under Section 498‑A IPC has been treated as an offence involving moral turpitude.
The counsel submitted that these Courts have taken the view that cruelty to a married woman is, by its very nature, conduct which society regards as unethical and morally unacceptable, and therefore falls within the category of moral turpitude. On the strength of these precedents, the counsel argued that, since the charge under Section 498‑A IPC stands proved against the petitioner in the present case, his conduct must also be so characterised and the same consequences should follow.
The court however said, "There is, at present, no uniform judicial consensus on whether every conviction under Section 498-A IPC constitutes an offence involving moral turpitude. Certain High Courts, such as the Kerala High Court in Vincent Varghese v. State Bank of India, 1999 and the Andhra Pradesh High Court in J.Ranga Raju v. State of Andhra Pradesh & Ors., W.P. No. 7735 of 2019 decided on 01-10-2019, have held that an offence under Section 498-A IPC constitutes an offence involving moral turpitude, on the reasoning that harassment of a married woman and subjecting her to cruelty would, in societal parlance, be regarded as unethical and immoral conduct and would be treated as the commission of a heinous crime in the estimation of right-thinking members of society".
The court said that in the present case the petitioner has been acquitted of offences under Sections 304-B and 406 IPC and was convicted only under Section 498-A IPC arising out of matrimonial discord.
"Such offence, though punishable, is rooted in a domestic dispute and does not by its very nature satisfy the tests of inherent baseness or depravity so as to automatically fall within the category of offences involving moral turpitude," the court said.
The court quashed the bank's order whereby services of the petitioner have been discharged from 14.12.2018 and directed the Bank to grant all consequential benefits to the petitioner from 15.12.2018 along with interest @ 6% p.a. within a period of 2 months.
The petition was allowed.
Case title: Brahmjeet Kaushal v/s Union of India & Ors.
CWP-24038-2021