Contractual Legal Aid Defense Counsel Have No Vested Right To Continue In Service: P&H High Court Upholds Premature Termination

The Punjab and Haryana High Court has dismissed two writ petitions by Legal Aid Defense Counsels (LADCs) in Haryana, challenging the termination of their contracts from September 30, 2026, although their engagements had been extended up to March 31, 2027.

Justice Nidhi Gupta held that the appointments were purely contractual and that the petitioners had “no vested right to demand continuation of Service.” The Court noted that both the appointment letter and the extension letter contained a clause allowing termination at any time on one month's notice, or payment of fee in lieu of notice.

The Court decided two petitions by a common order. In the second petition, the petitioners were serving as Chief and Deputy Chief Legal Aid Defense Counsels at DLSA Rohtak.

 The petitioners were appointed on contract by the respective District Legal Services Authorities under the Modified Legal Aid Defense Counsel Scheme, 2022. Clause (f) of the terms allowed either side to end the contract on one month's notice or one month's retainership fee in lieu of notice.

Their contracts were renewed up to 31.03.2027. The National Legal Services Authority (NALSA) directed that LADC contracts in Punjab, Haryana and the Union Territory of Chandigarh would not be renewed from September 2026 onwards.

Notices were issued terminating the petitioners' engagements with effect from 30.09.2026. and thereafter notices were withdrawn. On 24.09.2026, the withdrawal itself was withdrawn, which revived the earlier notices.

The petitioners argued that Once the 27.08.2026 notice was withdrawn, a fresh one-month notice under Clause (f) was mandatory. NALSA's direction against renewal could not, without a distinct legal act, retrospectively cancel a renewal already granted up to March 2027. In their words, non-renewal on expiry and premature termination are different acts.

The authority's conduct was incoherent and violated Article 14. It renewed the contracts, issued notice, withdrew the notice while assuring continued duties, and then revived it five days later.

Only those whose contracts were expiring in September 2026 could be removed, not those whose tenure ran until March 2027.

The State, appearing on advance notice, argued that the engagements were purely contractual. It also contended that under the 2022 Scheme, the services could be terminated at any time without prior notice.

The Court rejected the argument that Clause (f) had not been followed. It noted that the 27.08.2026 notice was itself issued expressly in compliance with Clause (f) and gave one month's advance notice.

On the fresh-notice argument, the Court relied on the wording of the 19.09.2026 letter. That letter said the notice was withdrawn “for the time being” and was deferred temporarily until further orders from the competent authority. The Court held:

“Thus, from a reading of the above it is crystal clear that notice dated 27.08.2026 (Annexure P-4) had only been temporarily withdrawn for the time being till further directions/orders were received from the competent authority in this regard.”

So, once the communication dated 24.09.2026 was received, the original notice stood revived. One month's advance notice had therefore been duly served, and no fresh notice was required.

The Court also rejected the argument that the tenure up to 31.03.2027 could not be cut short midway. It said the appointment letter itself provides for termination on notice, and due notice had already been served.

The Court further relied on an admission in the petitioners' own pleadings. In ground 19(b), they had stated that Clause (f) permits termination before 31.03.2027, and that their grievance was only against the manner in which it was exercised.

Finding no merit in the petitions, the Court dismissed both. Notably, the Court decided the matter on compliance with Clause (f). It did not rule on the State's wider contention that the 2022 Scheme permits termination without any notice. It also did not rule on whether NALSA's non-renewal direction could, by itself, end subsisting engagements.