Punjab & Haryana High Court Quashes Rape FIR Filed With 16-Year Delay, Says Relationship Was Consensual

Update: 2026-05-01 06:00 GMT
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The Punjab and Haryana High Court has quashed an FIR registered under Sections 376 and 506 of the IPC, holding that a prolonged consensual relationship, coupled with an unexplained delay of over 16 years in lodging the complaint, failed to satisfy the ingredients of rape on the pretext of marriage.Justice N.S. Shekhawat said, "petitioner was married to...in the year 2001, when the respondent...

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The Punjab and Haryana High Court has quashed an FIR registered under Sections 376 and 506 of the IPC, holding that a prolonged consensual relationship, coupled with an unexplained delay of over 16 years in lodging the complaint, failed to satisfy the ingredients of rape on the pretext of marriage.

Justice N.S. Shekhawat said, "petitioner was married to...in the year 2001, when the respondent No. 2/complainant was aged about 16 years and was not even of marriageable age. Even, she admits that she was aware of the marriage of the petitioner with Simranjit Kaur since the year 2001-2002, but surprisingly, she lodged the present FIR on 29.07.2017, i.e., after a delay of about 16 years. Even, it is unbelievable that the respondent No. 2/complainant permitted the petitioner to make physical relations with her for last several years only on the basis of false assurance by the petitioner to marry her."

In fact, it is unbelievable that respondent No. 2/complainant, who is grown up and well-educated lady, believed the false promise of the petitioner and continued to have sexual relationship with him for the last several years. It is equally impossible to believe that she was unable to discover the deceitful behaviour of the petitioner for a period of almost sixteen years, the Court added.

Thus, the Court concluded that it can be easily held that the petitioner and respondent No.2 had developed a consensual physical relation with each other and the ingredients of the offences under Sections 376 and 506 of IPC are completely missing in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the present case.

The petition was filed under Section 528 of the BNSS seeking quashing of FIR No. 0128 dated July 29, 2017, registered at Police Station City Rupnagar.

The FIR was based on allegations by the complainant that the petitioner had established physical relations with her over several years on the false promise of marriage, subjected her to threats, and involved his family members in acts of harassment and confinement.

The petitioner, a serving police official, argued that the allegations were inherently improbable, including the claim that the relationship began when the complainant was allegedly 10–11 years old.

There was an unexplained delay of nearly two decades in registering the FIR and the complainant was aware of his marriage since 2001–02, yet continued the relationship, it was submitted.

The State and the complainant opposed the plea, arguing that the allegations were substantiated during investigation and the relationship was based on a false promise of marriage, vitiating consent.

The High Court examined the legal position on “consent” under Section 375 IPC and the concept of “misconception of fact” under Section 90 IPC, referring to Supreme Court cases.

Reliance was also placed on High Court's decision in Jai Dhupar v. State of Haryana and another, CRM-M-51121-2024 (O&M) wherein it was observed that,

"Specifically in the context of a promise to marry this Court has observed that there is a distinction between a false promise given on the understanding by the maker that it will be broken, and the breach of a promise which is made in good faith but subsequently not fulfilled . 

Where the promise to marry is false and the intention of the maker at the time of making the promise itself was not to abide by it but to deceive the woman to convince her to engage in sexual relations, there is a "misconception of fact" that vitiates the woman's "consent". On the other hand, a breach of a promise cannot be said to be a false promise. To establish a false promise, the maker of the promise should have had no intention of upholding his word at the time of giving it. The "consent" of a woman under Section 375 is vitiated on the ground of a "misconception of fact" where such misconception was the basis for her choosing to engage in the said act."

In the light of the above, the FIR was quashed.

Ms. Samridhi Sareen, Advocate for the petitioner.

Mr. Bhanu Pratap Singh, Addl. A.G., Punjab.

Mr. S.S. Sarwara, Advocate for respondent No.2.

Title: XXX v. XXX

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