Telling Employee to 'F*** Off' During Workplace Spat Without Sexual Intent Not Sexual Harassment: Punjab & Haryana High Court
The Punjab & Haryana High Court has held that use of the expression “f*** off” during a workplace dispute, though inappropriate, does not amount to sexual harassment in the absence of sexual intent or overtone.Justice Kirti Singh said, "It is also pertinent that the context of the communication in the present case prima facie arises out of a work related interaction. No doubt...
The Punjab & Haryana High Court has held that use of the expression “f*** off” during a workplace dispute, though inappropriate, does not amount to sexual harassment in the absence of sexual intent or overtone.
Justice Kirti Singh said, "It is also pertinent that the context of the communication in the present case prima facie arises out of a work related interaction. No doubt the standards of decorum ought to be maintained in every such correspondence, yet at the same time, a solitary instance of an abusive remark, in the absence of any element of sexual intent or pattern of conduct, would not meet the threshold of criminal culpability under the penal provision intended to address gender-based harassment."
The Court opined that expression attributed to the petitioner, even if taken at its face value and accepted in its entirety, lacks the essential ingredients of Section 354A IPC.
"Trite to say that where the uncontroverted allegations and the material collected fail to disclose the basic ingredients of the offences alleged, the continuation of criminal proceedings would not serve any useful purpose, but would amount to abuse of the process of law," it added.
The petitioner, Director of a private company, sought quashing of an FIR registered in 2019 at the Women Police Station, Gurugram under Section 354-A IPC.
The complainant, employed as a Business Manager, had applied for medical leave days before a scheduled company event in October 2018. A series of email exchanges followed between her and the petitioner regarding her absence.
During this exchange, the petitioner used abusive language, including the words “f*** off”. The complainant resigned the same day, and her resignation was accepted.
Subsequently, disputes arose between the parties regarding notice period, salary, and alleged breach of contract. Legal notices were exchanged. Around four months after resignation, the complainant lodged the FIR alleging harassment and use of derogatory language.
The petitioner argued that the FIR was a counter blast to legal notices issued for breach of contract. The alleged remark was made during a work-related disagreement, not with sexual intent. There were no allegations of physical contact, sexual advances, or demand for sexual favours. The essential ingredients of Section 354-A IPC were not attracted.
The Court examined whether the allegations, taken at face value, disclosed an offence under Section 354-A IPC. It noted that the provision covers acts such as:
Unwelcome physical contact or advances , Demand for sexual favours; Showing pornography. Making sexually coloured remarks.
No Sexual Overtone
The Court held that the expression used by the petitioner: Was “uncouth and discourteous”, but did not carry any sexual connotation or target the complainant's modesty or sexuality.
It emphasized that context is crucial, and the remark arose out of a professional disagreement regarding leave.
The Court also took note of the delay of over four months in lodging the FIR and the existence of prior contractual and monetary disputes, including legal notices exchanged between the parties.
Relying on principles governing quashing under Section 482 CrPC, including the landmark ruling in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, the Court reiterated that, "If allegations do not disclose the basic ingredients of an offence, proceedings must be quashed, Continuation of such proceedings would amount to abuse of process of law."
Accordingly, to secure the ends of justice and prevent the misuse of the criminal process, the present petition was allowed and FIR, under Section 354-A IPC and all subsequent proceedings arising therefrom, including challan under Section 354-A IPC were quashed qua the petitioner, albeit subject to payment of Rs. 20,000 to be deposited by the petitioner in the Poor Patient Welfare Fund, PGIMER, Chandigarh within a period of one month.
Mr. Kunal Dawar, Senior Advocate with Mr. Jagjot Singh, Advocate for the petitioner.
Mr. Anmol Malik, DAG, Haryana.
Mr. H.S.Randhawa, Advocate (Legal Aid Counsel) for respondent No. 2.
Title: Abhikshek Shah v. State of Haryana and another