Re-Investigation Can't Nullify Subsisting Acquittal, Even If Trial Court Pronounced Judgment In Breach Of Stay: P&H High Court
The Punjab and Haryana High Court has held that a judgment of acquittal cannot be ignored in collateral proceedings merely because it was pronounced in defiance of a stay order.The Court held that invalidity of such an acquittal must first be established before a competent forum and that a court-ordered re-investigation, without an express direction setting aside the acquittal or...
The Punjab and Haryana High Court has held that a judgment of acquittal cannot be ignored in collateral proceedings merely because it was pronounced in defiance of a stay order.
The Court held that invalidity of such an acquittal must first be established before a competent forum and that a court-ordered re-investigation, without an express direction setting aside the acquittal or directing re-trial, cannot be used to summon already-acquitted persons afresh under Section 300 Cr.P.C.
Justice Manisha Batra said, "The record indeed shows that such an order had been passed by this Court and that, notwithstanding the same, the learned trial Court proceeded to pronounce the judgment of acquittal on 04.08.2018. The subsequent proceedings before this Court also reflect the concern expressed regarding the circumstances in which the order dated 31.07.2018 was not acted upon. The question, however, is whether such circumstance, by itself and without the judgment of acquittal having been set aside in appropriate proceedings, enables this Court, while deciding the present petition, to treat the said judgment as non-existent for the purpose of Section 300 Cr.P.C.? In the considered view of this Court, the answer has to be in the negative."
The Court further clarified that, "a direction for re-investigation cannot, merely by implication, be treated as an order setting aside an already recorded judgment of acquittal. The order dated 06.12.2019 does not expressly set aside the judgment dated 04.08.2018."
The case arose from a 2014 FIR alleging that the complainant's son, Gurjant Singh, was murdered by an armed mob following an earlier dispute. Two accused were arrested; others were declared proclaimed offenders. During trial, the complainant repeatedly approached the High Court alleging faulty investigation, witness pressure, and threats to his family, resulting in multiple orders including one directing an IG-level inquiry.
On 31.07.2018, the High Court orally stayed pronouncement of the trial court's final judgment. Despite this, the trial court proceeded to acquit three accused — Gurdev Singh, Stalinjit Singh and Gurcharan Singh, on 04.08.2018, with the State later explaining that the stay order had not been uploaded on the website until 07.08.2018. The High Court subsequently directed, on 06.12.2019, a fresh re-investigation of the entire case by a senior IG-rank officer, citing serious concerns about the investigation and prosecution's conduct. The re-investigation led to a supplementary report under Section 173(8) Cr.P.C. again naming the three already-acquitted persons. However, upon committal, only the remaining (non-acquitted) accused were sent to trial.
The complainant's application before the Additional Sessions Judge, Tarn Taran, seeking to have the three acquitted persons summoned afresh on the basis of the supplementary report, was dismissed, prompting the present Section 482 Cr.P.C. petition.
The complainant argued that the 2018 acquittal was a nullity since it was pronounced in the teeth of a subsisting stay order passed in open court in the State's presence, and that the trial court's subsequent commission of that breach could not be allowed to defeat the effect of the re-investigation directed by the High Court. It was contended that the trial court had exceeded the scope of the summoning application by adjudicating on the validity of the supplementary report itself, and reliance was placed on Popular Muthiah, Dinesh Dutt Joshi, A.V. Papayya Sastry and Baldev Kaur.
The State and the acquitted respondents countered that the 04.08.2018 judgment had never been appealed or set aside, that the 2019 re-investigation order did not direct retrial of already-acquitted persons, and that the supplementary report disclosed no new evidence or offence against them — attracting the bar under Section 300 Cr.P.C.
The Court held that the relief sought was, in substance, premised on treating the 2018 acquittal as having ceased to operate — a course the statutory scheme does not permit without the judgment first being displaced through the specific appellate mechanism provided by the Code. Inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. could not be used as a substitute for that remedy, particularly where its exercise would expose a person to a second prosecution despite a subsisting acquittal.
On the "nullity" argument, the Court relied on Tayabbhai M. Bagasarwalla v. Hind Rubber Industries (1997), and State of Punjab v. Gurdev Singh (1991), to hold that even a void order remains presumptively valid and operative unless its invalidity is judicially established and it is set aside — the pronouncement of the judgment in breach of the stay order was "serious," but did not, without formal adjudication, render it a complete nullity for all purposes.
Applying the three-condition test from T.P. Gopalakrishnan v. State of Kerala (2022), for the double-jeopardy protection under Section 300 Cr.P.C. and Article 20(2), the Court found all conditions satisfied: a valid prior prosecution before a competent court, a subsisting acquittal on the same facts, and an attempt at a fresh proceeding for the same offence.
The Court noted its own 2019 re-investigation order did not expressly set aside the 2018 acquittal or direct retrial of the three respondents, and that the trial court had specifically found no new evidence or new offence against them in the supplementary report, a finding not displaced before the High Court. Reliance was also placed on Vinay Tyagi v. Irshad Ali, (2013) 5 SCC 762, on further investigation not automatically superseding a judicial adjudication already rendered, and on State of Bombay v. S.L. Apte, AIR 1961 SC 578, on comparing the ingredients of offences (rather than allegations) for double-jeopardy purposes.
The Court also rejected the argument that the trial court had exceeded the scope of the summoning application, holding that examining the Section 300 bar was a necessary threshold inquiry, and distinguished each authority cited by the petitioner — noting, among other things, that Popular Muthiah dealt with summoning under Section 319 Cr.P.C. of a person never previously tried, which occupies an entirely different field from Section 300.
Dismissing the petition, the Court held that the trial court committed no illegality in declining to summon the three acquitted respondents, since the 2018 acquittal continued to hold the field and had not been set aside by any competent forum. The Court clarified that the petitioner remained free to pursue appropriate remedies against the 2018 judgment, including on the ground of the breached stay order, before the competent forum, subject to questions of maintainability, limitation and delay being decided in accordance with law.
Case Title: Salwinder Singh v. State of Punjab and others