Victim's Appeal Against Grant Of Probation To Convict Not Maintainable Under S.372 CrPC: Rajasthan High Court
The Rajasthan High Court has held that a victim's statutory right to appeal against grant of probation to the convict is not maintainable under Section 372 CrPC.In doing so the court observed that a victim's appeal challenging the convict's probation was jurisdictionally wrong as its foundation laid in the victim's dissatisfaction with the sentence imposed. The bench of Justice Farjand Ali...
The Rajasthan High Court has held that a victim's statutory right to appeal against grant of probation to the convict is not maintainable under Section 372 CrPC.
In doing so the court observed that a victim's appeal challenging the convict's probation was jurisdictionally wrong as its foundation laid in the victim's dissatisfaction with the sentence imposed.
The bench of Justice Farjand Ali held that allowing of such appeal by the trial court amounted to unwarranted assumption of jurisdiction and serious mis-appreciation of statutory limits of appellate jurisdiction that resulted in manifest prejudice to the accused.
"The right of appeal in criminal matters is entirely statutory and must be traced to the provisions of the Cr.P.C. The proviso to Section 372 Cr.P.C. confers a limited right upon a victim to prefer an appeal only against an order of acquittal, conviction for a lesser offence, or imposition of inadequate compensation. A case where the accused stands convicted and is granted the benefit of probation does not fall within the ambit of any of these categories. An order granting probation is a part of the sentencing process following conviction and cannot be equated with an acquittal or a conviction for a lesser offence. The proviso does not confer upon a private complainant a general right to seek enhancement of sentence. Such power vests exclusively in the State under Section 377 Cr.P.C".
The court further observed that the complainant's appeal was "clearly beyond the scope of the proviso to Section 372 Cr.P.C", as the foundation of the appeal laid only in dissatisfaction with the sentence imposed by the trial court.
"Entertaining such an appeal had the effect of permitting a private complainant to seek enhancement of sentence, a course not sanctioned by the statutory scheme. The impugned appellate judgment, therefore, suffers from a fundamental jurisdictional error," the court added.
The Court was hearing a plea filed by an accused who was convicted by the trial court under IPC for an offence arising out of a local altercation.
The trial court, after satisfying itself regarding the voluntariness of the plea and taking into consideration the attendant circumstances–such as nature of allegations, absence of criminal antecedents, delay occasioned due to prosecution default and the possibility of reformation–recorded the conviction but extended the benefit of Sections 4 and 12 of the Probation of Offenders Act.
Being dissatisfied with the sentence, complainant filed an appeal under Section 327 CrPC before the appellate (sessions) court. The sessions court set aside the conviction and remanded the matter back to the trial court for fresh trial. In doing so the sessions court withdrew the benefit of probation granted to the accused by the trial court.
The appellant argued that the appellate court exceeded its jurisdiction in interfering with a lawful conviction, and the order of remand amounted to unjustified reopening of a concluded trial.
After hearing the contentions, the Court highlighted that the right to appeal in criminal matter was entirely statutory, and proviso to section 372, CrPC conferred a limited right upon a victim to prefer an appeal.
On the appellate court's order the high court said:
"The manner in which the learned appellate court entertained an appeal that was plainly not maintainable in law and proceeded to set aside a lawful conviction and a reasoned sentencing order reflects a serious misappreciation of the statutory limits of appellate jurisdiction. Without recording any finding of perversity, illegality or procedural infirmity in the order of the trial court, the learned Sessions Judge directed a de novo trial, thereby unsettling a concluded adjudication. Such an exercise amounts to an unwarranted assumption of jurisdiction not conferred by statute and has resulted in manifest prejudice to the accused. The approach adopted in the impugned judgment cannot be countenanced...Interference by a superior court is warranted only where the exercise of such discretion is shown to be illegal, perverse or vitiated by non-application of mind, or where it results in miscarriage of justice…The direction for a fresh trial, thus, appears to have the effect of granting the prosecution a second opportunity rather than correcting any legal infirmity, which is impermissible.”
The high court said that the trial court order reflection consideration of all relevant factors and there was nothing on record to indicate that the trial court acted arbitrarily or without application of mind.
Meanwhile, the appellate court, while setting aside the conviction and directing retrial, has not recorded any finding demonstrating perversity or illegality in the sentencing discretion exercised by the trial court, the high court said.
"The accused had voluntarily admitted guilt, stood convicted and had been extended the benefit of probation by a reasoned order. Requiring the accused to face a second trial solely because the complainant was dissatisfied with the sentence, particularly when the prosecution had earlier failed to lead evidence despite repeated opportunities, cannot be justified. Appellate intervention must be corrective in nature and not punitive so as to undermine substantive fairness," it added.
In this light, the Court allowed the accused's petition and set aside the order of the appellate court.
Title: Sumitra v Ashish
Citation: 2026 LiveLaw (Raj) 95