120-Day Limit To File Written Statement In Commercial Suits Runs From Service Of Summons, Not Supply Of Documents: Telangana High Court
The Telangana High Court has held that in commercial suits, the 120-day period for filing defendant's written statement under the Civil Procedure Code (CPC) begins from the date of service of summons along with the plaint, and not from the later date when annexed documents are furnished to the defendant. Holding that the Commercial Court had rightly forfeited the defendants' right to file...
The Telangana High Court has held that in commercial suits, the 120-day period for filing defendant's written statement under the Civil Procedure Code (CPC) begins from the date of service of summons along with the plaint, and not from the later date when annexed documents are furnished to the defendant.
Holding that the Commercial Court had rightly forfeited the defendants' right to file written statements after expiry of the statutory period, a Division Bench of Justice Moushumi Bhattacharya and Justice Gadi Praveen Kumar observed:
“The discussion in the above paragraphs leads us to the inevitable view that the amended second proviso to Order V Rule 1 and the amended proviso to Order VIII Rule 1 read with Order VIII Rule 10 of the CPC cast a mandate on the defendant to file its Written Statement within 30 days from the date of service of summons on that defendant and thereafter within 90 days (i.e., a total of 120 days) from the date of service of summons. The gates stand closed after the period of 120 days since the right to file a Written Statement stands forfeited. The Court is also divested of its power to extend the time beyond 120 days for filing of the Written Statement for suits involving a commercial dispute.
The extension of time from 30 days to 120 days for filing a Written Statement is also not automatic and cannot be presumed since the Court retains discretion to grant such extension beyond 30 days only upon an application made by the defendant. The Court however loses its discretion in respect of any further extensions beyond 120 days from the date of service of summons on the defendant"
The Bench further made it clear that a defendant cannot “bifurcate the plaint into 'plaint' and 'annexed documents'” in order to recalculate limitation or seek more time to file a written statement.
The court was hearing revision petitions which arose from three money recovery suits filed by M/s B. Ram Reddy Infra against The Indian Hume Pipe Co. Ltd. and its officers before the Commercial Court at Hyderabad. The suits sought recovery of substantial amounts, including over Rs.1.01 crore in C.O.S. No.7 of 2025, over Rs.1.11 crore in C.O.S. No.8 of 2025, and over Rs.5.61 crore in C.O.S. No.9 of 2025, together with interest.
Summons in the suits were served on defendant Nos.1 and 4 on 04.02.2025, and on defendant Nos.2 and 3 on 07.02.2025. Vakalatnamas on behalf of all defendants were filed only on 19.03.2025, when memos were also filed seeking a complete set of documents. The documents were then furnished, and the suits were posted for filing of written statements. However, by orders dated 26.06.2025, the Commercial Court held that the statutory 120-day period had expired on 04.06.2025 for defendant Nos.1 and 4, and on 07.06.2025 for defendant Nos.2 and 3, and accordingly forfeited their right to file written statements.
Before the High Court, Senior Counsel for the defendant-company argued that the summons served in February 2025 did not amount to effective service in law since they were accompanied only by copies of the plaints and not the documents relied on by the plaintiff. It was contended that “meaningful service” took place only on 19.03.2025, when the complete set of documents was furnished, and that the 120-day period should therefore run only from that date.
The plaintiff, on the other hand, relied on the amended provisions of Order V Rule 1 and Order VIII Rule 1 CPC, as made applicable to commercial disputes by the Commercial Courts Act, 2015, and argued that the Court had no power to extend time beyond 120 days from the date of service of summons. It was also contended that the defendants had shown no diligence and could not now seek to split the plaint from the documents annexed to it in order to restart the limitation period.
The Bench agreed with the plaintiff's stand. Undertaking a detailed analysis of the scheme of the CPC, the Court held that a “plaint” is itself a complete pleading containing the concise statement of the material facts and relief claimed, and does not become incomplete merely because supporting documents are not served along with it. The Bench noted that where the legislature intended the plaint to be read with annexures and documents, it expressly said so—as in Order XI and Order XXXVII CPC. The absence of such language in Order V Rule 1 and Order VIII Rule 1, the Court held, was deliberate.
The Court thus rejected the defendants' attempt to treat service of the plaint and service of annexed documents as two distinct events for the purpose of computing limitation. It held that “the clock starts ticking (for the first and only time) when the summons is served on the defendant along with a copy of the plaint,” and that the hands of the clock cannot be turned back on subsequent service of annexed documents.
The Bench also emphasized that under the commercial disputes regime, the extension from 30 days to 120 days is not automatic. A defendant who misses the first 30-day window must seek the Court's leave, and even then the Court is statutorily denuded of power to extend time beyond 120 days from the date of service of summons. Referring to Order VIII Rule 10 CPC, the Court said that once the statutory window closes, the right to file the written statement stands forfeited and the Court cannot permit it to be taken on record.
It said that the Commercial Courts Act had brought in a special procedural regime designed for speedy disposal of high-value commercial disputes, and that courts could not introduce “procedural peculiarities” not contemplated by the statute. It added that “kindness cannot result in sugarcoating the strict timelines” introduced by the Commercial Courts Act, and invoked the maxim “dura lex sed lex”—the law is harsh, but it is the law.
Holding that no case was made out for interference, the bench observed that the Commercial Court had correctly applied the amended CPC provisions and that there was no grave procedural irregularity or miscarriage of justice.
All three revision petitions were dismissed.
Case Title: The Indian Hume Pipe Co. Ltd. v. M/s. B. Ram Reddy Infra & Ors.
Case No.: Civil Revision Petition Nos.4464, 4465 and 4466 of 2025
Bench: Justice Moushumi Bhattacharya and Justice Gadi Praveen Kumar
Appearance: Mr. Sunil B. Ganu, Senior Counsel representing Ms. Shireen Sethna Baria, for the petitioner; Mr. Vamsi Velagapudi, representing Mr. Suresh Bhaktula, for respondent No.1.