Can't Turn Plea Against PMLA Arrest Into Surrogate Bail Hearing: Telangana High Court Denies Relief To Doctor In Illegal Surrogacy Case

Update: 2026-05-18 05:15 GMT
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The Telangana High Court refused to interfere with the arrest of fertility doctor under the PMLA in a case containing allegations of cheating and illegal surrogacy, holding that a writ petition challenging arrest under PMLA cannot be converted into a “surrogate bail hearing” or a “mini-trial” on the correctness of the investigation.A Division Bench of Justice P. Sam Koshy and...

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The Telangana High Court refused to interfere with the arrest of fertility doctor under the PMLA in a case containing allegations of cheating and illegal surrogacy, holding that a writ petition challenging arrest under PMLA cannot be converted into a “surrogate bail hearing” or a “mini-trial” on the correctness of the investigation.

A Division Bench of Justice P. Sam Koshy and Justice Narsing Rao Nandikonda said that at this stage, judicial review is confined to legality, jurisdictional facts and procedural fairness, and not to an appellate reassessment of the material collected by the Enforcement Directorate.

"We find that the petitioner invoked the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court to nullify an arrest under Section 19 of the PMLA and the consequent remand at a stage when investigation is stated to be in progress. While we are conscious that personal liberty is a prized constitutional value, it is equally bound to recognize that the PMLA is enacted to combat laundering of proceeds generated from serious criminality and that the statute adopts a distinct architecture of investigation, attachment, adjudication and prosecution.
Therefore, this Court cannot convert a writ petition challenging arrest into a surrogate bail hearing or a mini-trial on the correctness of the investigative narrative as judicial review is directed to legality, jurisdictional facts and fairness of procedure and not an appellate reassessment of the material and the petitioner's submissions, howsoever carefully framed as procedural infirmities in substance seek a merit evaluation of the 'reasons to believe' the money trail and the scheduling of predicate offences, which is beyond the permissible contours of writ jurisdiction at this stage". 

Noting that the petitioner had sought to invalidate an arrest and remand in an ongoing PMLA investigation, the court said that writ jurisdiction being discretionary, it is not to be invoked to short-circuit statutory remedies–i.e., the petitioner had an  efficacious avenue before the Special Court to seek regular bail and to urge all permissible defences.

The petitioner had sought quashing of her arrest dated 12 February 2026, the remand orders passed by the Sessions Court under the PMLA, and her immediate release from custody, contending that the ED had acted in violation of Section 19 of the PMLA and Articles 14, 21 and 22 of the Constitution.

The matter stemmed from an FIR alleging criminal conspiracy, Criminal Breach of Trust, cheating, making a false document, Forgery etc under BNS followed by several other FIRs on similar allegations. Later additional provisions of the Surrogacy (Regulation) Act, 2021 and the Juvenile Justice Act, 2015 were invoked.

The High Court held that the petitioner's challenge, though framed as one of procedural illegality, in substance sought a merits review of the “reasons to believe,” the alleged money trail and the scheduled offences.

That, the Court said, fell outside the permissible contours of writ jurisdiction at this stage. The Bench emphasized that the PMLA creates a distinct statutory architecture of investigation, attachment, adjudication and prosecution, and that extraordinary jurisdiction is not meant to displace that framework unless illegality is manifest, jurisdiction is clearly absent, or constitutional safeguards are demonstrably breached.

On Section 19 specifically, the Bench held that the statute requires some objective material and a rational link between that material and the belief recorded by the authorised officer. It rejected the argument that the ED must already possess evidence proved to the standard required at trial before making an arrest. The Court said that to insist on trial-ready proof at the arrest stage would wrongly equate the threshold for arrest with the standard for conviction.

The Court also refused to accept the submission that the arrest became illegal merely because the “reasons to believe” and the “grounds of arrest” were similar. It held that narration of material facts in both documents does not by itself negate independent satisfaction. Likewise, the plea that there was “no material collected” was rejected in view of the investigative steps asserted by the ED, which the writ court said it could not re-evaluate through a roving inquiry into the case file.

As to the remand, the Bench held that the remand court is only required to prima facie satisfy itself that the arrest is in compliance with the statutory safeguards and is not manifestly illegal on its face. It is not expected to write a detailed judgment or undertake an elaborate scrutiny of each item of investigative material. Therefore, the plea of “mechanical remand” could not be accepted merely because the order was brief.

The Bench also noted that the questions of what exactly was served on the petitioner, what material was placed before the remand court, and whether intimation was effectively communicated to her son were all disputed factual issues not suited for determination in writ jurisdiction. It added that the constitutional requirement is that the arrestee be informed of the grounds of arrest; it does not oblige the authorities to furnish the entire investigation file at the threshold stage.

It further said:

"This Bench is also conscious of the wider societal and emotional dimensions that accompany allegations of illegal surrogacy/child trafficking and manipulation of parenthood. In many cases couples who are medically unable to conceive approach fertility centres with deep vulnerability and legitimate hope, investing substantial emotional, physical and financial resources in a process that they believe is lawful, ethical and medically regulated. Medical institutions, particularly fertility Page 66 of 67 clinics and hospitals occupy a position of heightened trust as they are expected to function with professional integrity, transparent counselling, informed consent, strict record-keeping and rigorous compliance with statutory safeguards because the procedure does not involve merely “treatment” but implicates identity, lineage and the legal status of a child.
If the allegation is that such institutional trust is exploited through deception, substitution of babies, fabrication of records, manipulation of birth registrations or routing of procedures through informal agents, the harm is not confined to a private dispute between individuals but also undermines public confidence in the medical system, weakens the credibility of regulatory oversight and creates a climate where even lawful, medically necessary surrogacy is viewed with suspicion. The resultant distress often extends beyond the immediate parties and these acts, if established, carry stigma and trauma that can persist for years and can irreparably affect the child's sense of identity and belonging. Therefore, while the Bench remains vigilant to protect liberty through procedural safeguards, yet must be equally vigilant that the extraordinary writ jurisdiction is not used to pre-emptively arrest the investigative process in cases having serious social ramifications".

The court dismissed the writ petition. 

Case Title: Dr. Pachipala Namratha @ Athaluri Namratha v. Union of India & Anr.

Case No.: W.P. No.6550 of 2026

Appearance: Mr. Naga Muthu, Senior Counsel, appearing on behalf of Mr. Y. Soma Srinath Reddy, for the petitioner; Mr. Dominic Fernandes, Senior Standing Counsel for ED, for the respondents.

Click Here To Read/Download Order

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