Acquittal In Criminal Case No Ground To Reinstate Trainee Judge Discharged For Unsuitability: Telangana High Court

The Telangana High Court dismissed a trainee judicial officer's plea challenging his discharge from service over misconduct, while holding that his subsequent acquittal in a separate sexual assault case does not automatically invalidate the order of discharge which was based on unsuitability in service. 

The court further reasoned that the initial discharge was based on an overall assessment of the trainee's suitability and conduct during his probationary training period as a judge, and not based on a specific allegation against him alone.

The division bench comprising Acting Chief Justice P. Sam Koshy and Justice Narsing Rao Nandikonda noted that the discharge was a 'termination simpliciter' on the ground of unsuitability. According to the court, it was not a punitive order founded on specific misconduct, hence not attracting the protection of Article 311 of the Constitution [Dismissal, removal or reduction in rank of persons employed in civil capacities under the Union or a State]

“…Upon further perusal of the resolution of the Administrative Committee, it is evident that no specific allegations of a stigmatic nature were incorporated therein. The mere reference to the petitioner's conduct and behaviour, in the context of assessing his suitability for continuation of service, does not render the order punitive in nature…. Further, G.O.Ms.No.74, dated 31.12.2018, which is also one of the impugned orders, reiterates the report submitted by the Director of the Judicial Academy. However, the said Government Order does not incorporate any specific findings or imputations of misconduct against the petitioner or his co-officer that would render their discharge stigmatic or attract the protection under Article 311 of the Constitution of India….”, the court observed in the order.

For context, the petitioner was appointed as a Civil Judge Trainee in 2016 and was placed on probation. During his training at the Judicial Academy, he was asked to observe proceedings in the High Court in July 2018. During the said visit, he allegedly conversed in a loud voice with a fellow trainee woman officer, thereby disturbing court proceedings.

It was allegedly followed by another incident during a practical field training in August 2018, wherein the same two officers, despite belonging to separate groups were found together constantly.

Pertinently, a criminal complaint was lodged against the ex- trainee judge by another woman, leading to the registration of FIR for offences including rape and cheating.

Taking note of these incidents and crime reports, the trainee judge was suspended. He was called upon to explain why his probation as a Civil Judge (Junior Division) should not be terminated.

After hearing the ex- trainee judge's version, the Administrative Committee of the High Court decided to discharge him from service under Rule 11 of the State Judicial Service Rules, in December 2018.

Before the High Court, the petitioner challenged the discharge from service saying that it was punitive in nature, based on allegations against him that required a departmental enquiry. It was further stated that the aspersions cast against him were unrelated to his judicial functions, and his explanation about the incidents allegedly occurred was not given due consideration.

The petitioner further argued that he was acquitted in the criminal case pertaining to rape in 2024, and that the Andhra Pradesh High Court had set aside the discharge of his co-trainee too.

The court, after hearing the petitioner, noted that there was a clear distinction between punitive termination founded on misconduct and a simpliciter discharge based on unsuitability.

“…where a simple order of termination is founded upon allegations of misconduct, it may be liable to be set aside. However, where no inquiry is conducted, no findings are recorded and the employer does not intend to continue the employee against whom complaints have been received, the allegations may constitute merely the motive for termination rather than its foundation. In such circumstances, an order of termination simpliciter would not be rendered invalid. The same principle applies where the employer does not wish to inquire into the truth of the allegations owing to the delay involved in conducting regular departmental proceedings or doubts regarding the availability of sufficient evidence….”, the court opined referring to apex court judgments.

The court further observed that the petitioner was a probationer, and he was found unsuitable for the post based on his overall conduct, including multiple incidents, and not just an isolated act.

The Administrative Committee, before taking a decision, had perused the reports from the Judicial Academy regarding his behaviour in the High Court and during field training, along with the pendency of criminal proceedings, the court inferred.

“…In such circumstances, the allegations constitute the motive for termination rather than its foundation, and the order of termination simpliciter would remain valid…”, the court noted.

The court inferred that termination is not vitiated even in the absence of a regular departmental inquiry, citing the Supreme Court's principles in Dipti Prakash Banerjee v. Satyendra Nath Bose National Centre for Basic Sciences [1999] and Chandra Prakash Shahi v. State of U.P.[2000]

Applying the aforesaid principles, the court further noted:

“…The resolution of the Administrative Committee does not specifically refer to the allegations levelled against the petitioner. Instead, upon consideration of the material placed before them, the Committee concluded that the petitioner was unsuitable for continuation in the post and accordingly ordered his discharge from service. Therefore, the allegations against the petitioner constituted merely the motive for the discharge and cannot be regarded as the foundation of the impugned order.

Hence, the court concluded that a mere reference to his conduct in the context of assessing suitability does not render the order punitive.

About the acquittal in the criminal case, the Court noted that the trial court judge had merely disbelieved the complainant'-survivor's version for want of proof. The High Court also said that the allegations denoted matters touching upon the moral turpitude of the petitioner.

“…The subsequent acquittal of the petitioner in the criminal case is a circumstance which may require separate consideration, but such subsequent development cannot, by itself, retrospectively convert the assessment of suitability made on the basis of the material available at the relevant point of time into a disciplinary finding of guilt…”, the court added.

Hence, the high court concluded that the ex-trainee judge failed to establish grounds warranting interference in discharge owing to his alleged conduct in the court room and during training.

“…A judicial officer is expected to maintain a minimum standard of decency, decorum and propriety, and his conduct must not be improper or objectionable in a public forum. The petitioner's conduct in the public court was such as to render him unworthy of being appointed as a judicial officer…”, the court held,

Accordingly, the writ petition was dismissed.