Know The Law | When Can A Plaint Be Amended After Trial Has Begun? Supreme Court Explains Order VI Rule 17 CPC

A bench of Justice BV Nagarathna and Justice R Mahadevan explained the law while setting aside orders of the trial court and the Orissa High Court refusing an amendment.

Order VI Rule 17 provides that the Court may at any stage of the proceedings allow either party to alter or amend his pleadings in such manner and on such terms as may be just, and all such amendments shall be made as may be necessary for the purpose of determining the real questions in controversy between the parties: Provided that no application for amendment shall be allowed after the trial has commenced, unless the Court comes to the conclusion that in spite of due diligence, the party could not have raised the matter before the commencement of trial.

Perusing Order VI Rule 17, the bench stated that the rule confers a discretionary power upon the court to permit amendments which are necessary for determining the real questions in controversy between the parties. “The object of the provision is to enable the Court to effectively and completely adjudicate upon the dispute between the parties, while at the same time, ensuring that a party does not introduce at a belated stage, matters which could, with due diligence, have been raised earlier,” it added.

The bench also observed that where the application is made after the trial has commenced, the proviso of Order VI Rule 17 is attracted pursuant to which the party must show due diligence. It, however, clarified that “the fact that the amendment was sought at a belated stage is, by itself, not determinative. The principal question is whether, the appellants have shown that despite due diligence, the matters now sought to be introduced could not have been raised before the commencement of the trial.”

An explanation based on subsequent discovery cannot be characterised as a mere omission, inadvertence or negligence, the Court further explained.

Referring to AK Gupta & Sons Ltd v Damodar Valley Corporation, the bench distinguished between the amendment that sets up a new case or cause of action and the one that merely sets out a different or additional approach to the same facts. Reiterating Abdul Rahman v Mohd Ruldu, the bench observed that “a change in the nature of relief claimed shall not be considered as a change in the nature of suit and the power of amendment should be exercised in the larger interests of doing full and complete justice between the parties.”

Referring to Ravajeetu Builders and Developers v Narayanaswamy and Sons, the bench also reiterated that courts consider whether the amendment is imperative for proper and effective adjudication, whether the application is bona fide or mala fide, and whether it causes prejudice that cannot be compensated adequately in terms of money. They also ask whether refusing it would lead to injustice or multiple litigation, and whether it fundamentally changes the nature and character of the case. As a general rule, courts should decline amendments if a fresh suit on the amended claims would be barred by limitation on the date of the application.

Further reference was made to Life Insurance Corporation v. Sanjeev Builders and Akkiraju Panduranga Rao v Gunlapally Ranga Rao, to reiterate that the approach to amendments should be liberal, and the court “should avoid a hypertechnical approach, and is ordinarily required to be liberal especially where the opposite party can be compensated by costs.”

With regards to limitation, the Court observed that a claim clearly barred by limitation, particularly one whose introduction would defeat an accrued right of the opposite party, is a relevant factor, but where the question of limitation “is itself arguable and depends upon disputed facts, including the date or manner in which the plaintiff acquired knowledge of the relevant document or transaction, the amendment need not necessarily be rejected at the threshold.”

It further referred to Sampat Kumar v Ayyakannu wherein it was held that mere delay is not by itself a ground for refusal, and to Pankaja v Yellappa, which held that there is no absolute rule that an amendment must be rejected merely because the relief is alleged to be time-barred.

The Court also observed that at the amendment stage, it is concerned “with the permissibility of the amendment and not with the ultimate merits or maintainability of the reliefs sought to be introduced.” Such objections cannot be finally adjudicated unless the proposed claim is ex facie barred in law, and the opposite party remains free to raise them before the trial court.

Holding that fresh pleadings is not a ground to refuse an amendment, the Court observed that the prejudice arose mainly from the additional factual and legal issues the respondents would have to meet, which “can adequately be addressed by permitting the respondents to file an additional written statement and where necessary, by imposing appropriate costs.”

Considering the cost of refusal in the light of aforesaid, the Court observed that if the amendment is declined, the controversy over the same property could be fragmented into separate proceedings, with “the attendant possibility of inconsistent findings in respect of the same parcel of land.” Avoiding such multiplicity, while preserving the respondents' right to contest the amended pleadings on all grounds, was a relevant consideration. Balancing this against the considerable delay, the Court found allowing amendment as the appropriate course, subject to costs.

“At the same time, the considerable delay in seeking the amendment and the inconvenience that may be caused to the respondents cannot be disregarded. The appropriate course therefore is to permit the amendment subject to costs, while preserving the respondents' right to file their additional pleadings and to raise all objections available to them in law.”

However, it also clarified that allowing an amendment does not amount to acceptance of the averments incorporated therein, nor does it confer upon the appellants any declaration or substantive right, and that maintainability, limitation and the merits remain open for the trial court to decide in accordance with law.

In the aforesaid, the orders of the trial court and the Orissa High Court refusing an amendment, were set aside, and amendment was allowed subject to cost of Rs 25,000.

Appearance:

For Petitioner: Mr. Kedar Nath Tripathy, AOR; Mr. Aditya Narayan Tripathy, Adv.

For Respondent: Mr. Raj Singh Rana, AOR; Mr. Amarendra Bal, Adv.; Mr. Pankaj Kumar Singh, Adv.; Mr. Shyam Singh Chauhan, Adv.; Mr. Sk Warish Ali, Adv.; Ms Kanika, Adv.; Mr. VS Dubey, Adv.