A retired banker in his late seventies lost an amount of ₹22.92 crore to a "digital arrest" during the months of August and September 2025. Upon the RBI ombudsman's decision in his complaint, it was found that the banks from which the funds were transferred did not do anything as the funds were all transferred by the complainant himself. However, the banks to which the funds were transferred (and subsequently routed through numerous mule accounts) were found to have lapses in their KYC and transaction monitoring protocols. They were ordered to compensate the complainant an amount of ₹1.31 crore (6% of funds lost).

In In Re: Victims of Digital Arrest Related to Forged Documents, a bench comprising Chief Justice Surya Kant, Justices Joymalya Bagchi and V Mohana noted on October 29, 2026 that the RBI's future actions must require financial institutions to compensate victims for an amount equal or greater than the amount lost, where fraud was caused due to lapses in due diligence. The Chief Justice noted that without a punitive action, the banks would not alter their practices. Justice Bagchi also noted that there was strict liability. The status report noted that over 21,900 complaints were filed relating to digital arrests, with over ₹647 crore lost between January and August 2026.

The Court is correct in noting that compensation must be paid by the banks. However, this raises the question of which bank and what evidence to show. If the principle of due diligence is still applied to the victim's bank, then most victims of digital arrests will not receive any compensation. As the customer was forced to authorise the RTGS transfer themselves, the remitting bank will not have any lapses. It is the recipient's account that has the lapse enabling these frauds. This must be clearly stated in the RBI framework currently being considered.

What The Existing Framework Covers, And What It Does Not

The amended guidelines issued by the RBI on Electronic Banking Frauds in June 2026 (effective from January 1, 2027) are an improvement. The new guidelines define any transaction conducted under duress or coercion as a fraud and put the onus on the bank to prove that the customer was responsible. There will be no loss to the customer if there was negligence on the part of the bank or a breach by a third party reported within five calendar days. There is also a one-time compensation of 85% of the net loss, with a maximum of ₹25,000, for losses of up to ₹50,000 even if there was negligence by the customer.

However, none of this applies in the case of digital arrests. Losses are typically in lakhs or crores so the ₹25,000 does not apply. There is no breach by a third party as no one stole the victim's login details. Therefore the only way to have zero liability is to prove that there was negligence by the bank. The Supreme Court decided in State Bank of India v. Pallabh Bhowmick (2025 LiveLaw (SC) 22) that if there were unauthorised transactions reported within a day, the bank would be responsible as they have the best technology to identify fraud. This protects the customer in the case that their account was compromised. However, this does not provide much protection to a customer who went in person to a branch or logged in and moved funds themselves whilst an imposter officer watched via video.

Where Does The Due Diligence Failure Actually Lie?

The order passed by the ombudsman in the ₹22.92 crore case provides a clear answer. The funds were transferred across 4,236 different transactions across 811 mule accounts (in nearly 47 banks). The remitting banks were absolved of any fault. The beneficiary banks were found lacking in KYC procedures, lack of proper monitoring of transactions and not adhering to anti-money laundering procedures. One bank was penalised more as they had a larger share of the money and did not monitor their dormant and mule accounts.

This is a pattern of how these frauds operate. To make money from a digital arrest you need an account which can receive large amounts of funds suddenly and send them on quickly. All of these accounts would have been opened by a bank who verified the customer, assessed their risk profile and failed to identify any transactions that were massively out of line with their risk profile. This is a failure to perform due diligence.

The ombudsman's decision also highlights the second gap. As it identified there had been a failure, it awarded a percentage of the funds transferred as it had no guidance on how much to award. However, the Court has directed that compensation should be awarded for an amount equal to or greater than the loss. All that needs to be decided is what needs to be targeted.

Defining Due Diligence Before The Fraud, Not After

The Court's guidance was that fraud must be found to have occurred as a result of a failure to carry out due diligence. However, this could not happen until the criminal investigation began and so the victim would be left waiting for years. The Malhotra case has now been passed to the CBI.

Instead, a list of objective criteria should be set out. This could then be applied with the presumption that there has been a breach. For the recipient bank, this could be easily identified as large discrepancies in the credits to the account, new accounts or recently opened dormant accounts receiving large sums and money being removed shortly after being received. For the originating bank, the Court identified this as a large transaction to a new beneficiary which is significantly out of line with the customer's usual activity and no temporary freeze or verification call was made. If there was a trigger and the bank failed to act, they should pay a set amount within a set timeframe and seek their own remedies. If they can prove that there was no trigger or that they did act, the presumption should be dropped.

This fits with the direction the RBI has taken to put the onus on the banks. It also provides a clear framework for the banks to create systems around.

The Case For Splitting The Bill

The United Kingdom has also had issues with authorised push payment fraud. Since October 7, 2024 there is a statutory compensation scheme which requires the sending bank to compensate the victim within five working days. The receiving bank will pay half of this. There is a maximum claim amount of £85,000 and compensation will not be provided if the fraud was due to fraud or gross negligence by the customer. This does not apply to vulnerable customers.

India does not need a maximum amount as this would not make much sense when losses can be in the crores. The key here is that there is a division between the sending and receiving bank. This means the victim will have one point of contact and a fast refund. It also means there is a real cost to the bank that opened and operated the mule account. Victims of digital arrest are often elderly and are acting out of prolonged fear. This is exactly the situation that the UK has exempted from the negligence exception. Coercion should be treated in the same way.

Is Strict Liability The Right Tool?

The concept of strict liability raised by Justice Bagchi does not sit well with the condition that compensation will be made if the bank did not exercise due diligence. If strict liability is imposed upon the remitting bank, they will effectively become insurers for all scams. This will result in limiting high value transfers for elderly customers. By imposing a presumption based on specific triggers, we can achieve most of what strict liability offers without this drawback. Any criminal liability of bank officials who collude with fraudsters, as mentioned by the Attorney General as being considered by the RBI, is a separate issue and should be kept as such.

The RBI is expected to provide notice of its KYC Amendment Directions, 2026 by November 30. However, the Court has said it will look at these first. As a mule account is a breach of KYC requirements long before it becomes a fraud, it makes sense to include within the KYC requirements that the bank that onboards and manages the mule account will be liable. Earlier this year the RBI informed the Court that it would consider introducing a liability framework. The Court now has a draft in front of it and can ensure that liability is placed on the bank that could have prevented the money from leaving.

Author is a final-year B.B.A. LL.B. (Hons.) student at Jindal Global Law School. Views are personal.

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