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Riya and Aman study in the same city. Both of their colleges offers free Wifi and both log the websites that students visit. One night, the data gets leaked from both the colleges.

Riya studies in a private college. Under the Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023, it must tell her about the breach and tell the Data Protection Board. If she files a complaint, the Board can inquire and the college has to answer.

Aman studies in a government run college. If the Central Government has notified it under Section 17(2)(a) of DPDP Act, none of the above applies. The Act stops applying to how the college handles his data. Aman has nothing to complain about under it, and nobody has to tell him anything.

Same Wifi, same leak. The only difference is a “notification”. A notification that nobody has to explain to Aman.

How the act is applied

Section 17(2)(a) of the Act lets the Central Government notify any “instrumentality of the state” and exempt it from the whole act. The grounds are the sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, public order, and preventing incitement to related offences. This is the only condition. The Government is not required to record its reasons. No one outside the executive to asked to look at the decision.

The Rules do not fill the gap either. The DPDP Rules, 2025 state nothing on how such a notification is made, reviewed or ended. The rules do set conditions for the research exemption right next to it in Section 17(2)(b). The exemption for State security got none.

Same Grounds, Different Rules

Parliament passed another law in 2023 that uses almost the same grounds. Section 20(2) of the Telecommunications Act allows interception of messages in the interest of the sovereignty and integrity of India, the defence and security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, public order, or preventing incitement to an offence. Tapping a phone is among the most intrusive things a State can do, and the Act still attaches conditions. The order has to be made 'for reasons to be recorded in writing' and subject to procedure and safeguards laid down in rules.

Those rules, notified in 2024, ask for more.

1. Each order must state its reasons and name the agency that will carry it out. The authority has to consider whether the information can be had by any other reasonable means.

2. An order lasts 60 days, can be renewed, and cannot run beyond 180. The agency has to keep records of what it intercepted and who saw it.

3. A Review Committee meets every two months and can set an order aside and have the intercepted messages destroyed.

None of this is perfect. The Software Freedom Law Centre pointed out while the rules were still in draft that neither the Act nor the rules provide for judicial oversight. But it is a system. A phone tap has an officer who can order it, a time limit, a record and a review. A Section 17(2)(a) notification has none of these.

The Ministry told the Joint Parliamentary Committee in 2020 that it had followed the precedent of the Information Technology Act and the Indian Telegraph Act. The Telegraph Act's interception power listed grounds almost word for word like those in Section 17(2)(a), and in PUCL v. Union of India (1997) 1 SCC 301 the Supreme Court had to read safeguards into it. Parliament's later telecom law wrote them in. The data law did not.

The Bill had a different story

The exemption in the DPDP Act has not always been this thin. The 2018 draft Bill that came with the Srikrishna Committee Report allowed processing for the security of the State only under a law made by Parliament, following a procedure set by that law, and only if it was necessary for and proportionate to that interest.

The 2019 Bill moved the power to the Executive. Critics rightly called Clause 35 a blanket exemption, but it still required the Government to record its reasons in writing, to specify the processing exempted and to follow a procedure with safeguards and oversight to be prescribed.

In December 2021, the Joint Parliamentary Committee said it was concerned about the possible misuse of the power and recommended that the procedure be “just, fair, reasonable and proportionate”. One member proposed that the Appellate Tribunal should decide an exemption before it took effect. None of that survived. The 2019 Bill was withdrawn in 2022 and replaced. The new draft, and then Section 17(2)(a), kept the grounds and dropped everything else.

Dr. John Brittas, in a note of dissent to the Standing Committee on Communications and Information Technology, asked whether the clause would meet the proportionality test in Puttaswamy. In the Rajya Sabha in August 2023, Dr. Amar Patnaik said the proportionality aspect of Puttaswamy was missing from the clause and that the restrictions should be tied to Article 19(2). S. Niranjan Reddy, who supported the Bill, called the power “a little sweeping” and said it could be misused in the future. The clause passed as it was.

Who can be exempted

Section 2(zb) defines 'State' through Article 12 of the Constitution, so the Article 12 cases would likely decide who counts. Under Ajay Hasia and Pradeep Kumar Biswas (2002), the question is whether a body is financially, functionally and administratively dominated by the Government. A government college, a government hospital or a public sector bank could meet that test. Nothing in Section 17(2)(a) requires a link between the body and the ground the Government cites. That is how Aman's college can end up in the same legal category as an intelligence agency.

The Supreme Court has read these grounds narrowly before. In Gujarat Mazdoor Sabha v. State of Gujarat (2020), it described 'security of the State' as the narrowest of three circles, inside public order, which sits inside law and order, and held that ordinary economic hardship does not reach it. That reading is available to a court once someone challenges a notification. Nothing in Section 17(2)(a) asks the Government to show, before it notifies, that it has cleared that bar.

No Checking Mechanism

The Data Protection Board cannot fill the gap. Once a body is notified, the Act no longer applies to it, so the Board has no power over it. For everyone else, the Central Government appoints the Board for two-year terms, with the possibility of reappointment. In May 2026, the Ministry was still inviting applications for the Chairperson and four Members of a body that its own circular calls an “independent adjudicatory authority”.

The Rules also let the Government demand information from a company and bar the company from telling the person affected. The only way around that secrecy is the written permission of an 'authorised person', and for a notified body that officer is one its own head chooses.

The Government's answer will be that a court can strike down a bad notification. A court can. But someone has to find out about the notification, sue and win, and the person most affected may never be told. That is the opposite of the telecom model, where the review happens every two months whether or not anyone complains.

At the end of the day, the DPDP Act leaves us with a glaring double standard. While invasive state actions like phone tapping come with clear expiration dates, mandatory records, and routine reviews, Section 17(2)(a) hands the government a blank check to opt out of privacy rules entirely. The fact that early drafts of the bill actually included procedural safeguards shows a deliberate pivot away from accountability. Until the courts step in to demand the same checks and balances we expect elsewhere, your digital rights essentially boil down to a lottery of who holds your data. Riya might get the transparency she deserves, but for Aman, the state can simply switch off the rules without a word of explanation. It is a chilling reminder that in the current landscape, the biggest threat to our data privacy might just be a silent notification.

Author is a 3rd Year B.A. LL.B. (Hons.) student at Gujarat National Law University. Views are personal.

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