Conviction Cannot Be Denied Merely Because DNA Test Was Not Conducted: Srinagar Court Convicts Railway Staff In Minor's Rape After 14 Years
A Srinagar Court Court held that the lapse or omission to carry out DNA profiling, by itself, cannot be permitted to decide the fate of trial for the offence of rape, and that the testimony of a prosecutrix in a sexual offence case stands on a higher footing and, if found trustworthy and reliable, does not require corroboration as a matter of rule, while convicting a railway employee for kidnapping and raping a 13-year-old girl in 2012.
The Court was hearing a case arising out of FIR registered at Police Station Railway Hamray for offences under Sections 363, 376 and 342 of the Ranbir Penal Code, wherein the accused, a railway employee, was charged with enticing a minor girl, keeping her confined in his railway quarter for two days and committing forcible sexual intercourse with her.
A Single Bench of Additional Sessions Judge Farooq Ahmad Bhat Srinagar, while observing that “the lapse or omission to carry out DNA profiling, by itself, cannot be permitted to decide the fate of trial for the offence of rape,” held that “the evidence of the prosecutrix is enough for conviction and it does not require any corroboration unless there are compelling reasons for seeking corroboration. The statement of the prosecutrix is more reliable than that of an injured witness as she is not an accomplice.”
The prosecution case was that in 2012, the accused, Imtiyaz Ahmad Rather, a railway employee posted at Hamray, enticed the prosecutrix, a minor girl studying in Class 9, from Hamray Railway Station, took her to his government residential quarter, and kept her wrongfully confined there for two days and two nights, during which he committed forcible sexual intercourse with her multiple times.
The prosecutrix managed to escape on 13.07.2012, reached Pattan, and lodged a written report at Police Station Pattan. The case was transferred to Police Station Railway Hamray, where an FIR was registered. After investigation, a charge-sheet was filed. The accused was charged under Sections 363, 376 and 342 RPC who pleaded not guilty, and claimed trial.
The prosecution examined 15 witnesses, including the prosecutrix (PW-1), medical officers, police officials, and school authorities to prove the age of the prosecutrix. The accused examined four defence witnesses, claiming that he was falsely implicated due to rivalry with the Investigating Officer and that he was performing duty at a distant gate during the alleged period.
The Court first addressed the issue of the prosecutrix's age. PW-14 (Principal) and PW-15 (Admission Clerk) proved that as per the admission registers, the prosecutrix's date of birth was 24.07.1999. The Court held,
“On the date of occurrence, the prosecutrix was admittedly below the age of majority and was approximately 13 years old. She, therefore, squarely fell within the definition of a minor under the relevant provisions of law.”
On the testimony of the prosecutrix, the Court observed that she narrated the sequence of events in a cogent, consistent, and unequivocal manner. The Court noted,
“.. During her cross-examination, the prosecutrix remained steadfast and substantially consistent with her earlier version. She specifically stated that she had left her home for a picnic on 10.07.2012 and reached Hamray Railway Station on the same day. She remained in the said quarter on 11.07.2012 and 12.07.2012, and ultimately escaped on 13.07.2012.” The Court also recorded that the prosecutrix wept in court during her testimony.
On the delay in lodging the FIR, the Court held that the FIR was lodged on 14.07.2012 while the victim filed a complaint before Police Station Pattan on 13.07.2012. Since the occurrence fell within the jurisdiction of Police Station Railway Hamray, some formalities were required. The Court relied on the Supreme Court's judgment in State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh, (1996) 2 SCC 384, which held that delay in filing FIR for sexual offences, if found natural, cannot give any benefit to the accused
.
On the medical evidence, PW-6 Dr. Rubina stated that she examined the prosecutrix on 13.07.2012 and found that one finger could be passed inside the vagina with pain, the hymen was ruptured, and the vaginal smear showed dead spermatozoa. In her opinion, intercourse appeared to have taken place approximately 8 hours prior to examination. The Court held that the medical evidence corroborated the testimony of the prosecutrix.
On the defence argument that no DNA test was conducted, the Court observed,
“.... Admittedly the DNA of the accused has not been conducted in the instant case. The lapse or omission to carry out DNA profiling, by itself, cannot be permitted to decide the fate of trial for the offence of rape. Even if such a flaw or defect has occurred in the investigation in the given case, the court has still a duty to consider whether the material and evidence available on the record before it is enough and cogent to prove the case of the prosecution.”
The Court further held that since the prosecution case was based on direct evidence of the victim who identified the accused, no prejudice was caused to the accused by non-conduct of DNA test.
On the defence claim of false implication due to rivalry with the Investigating Officer, the Court noted that all defence witnesses, during cross-examination, showed ignorance regarding the occurrence and could not raise any shadow of doubt on the narration of the victim.
The Court relied on Vijay @ Chinee v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2010 (3) Crimes (SC) 212, and State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh (supra) reiterating that the testimony of a prosecutrix in a sexual offence case stands on a higher footing and, if found trustworthy and reliable, does not require corroboration.
The Court also cited Bharwada Bhoginbhai Hirjibhai v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1983 SC 753, where the Supreme Court observed that refusal to act on the testimony of a victim of sexual assault in the absence of corroboration adds insult to injury.
The Court concluded that the prosecutrix's testimony was “consistent, cogent, natural and trustworthy,” that she remained firm and unwavering on all material particulars, and that nothing substantial was elicited in cross-examination to discredit her version.
The Court held that the prosecution had successfully established the guilt of the accused beyond all reasonable doubt and convicted the accused for offences punishable under Sections 363, 376 and 342 of the Ranbir Penal Code.
Case Title: State of J&K v. Imtiyaz Ahmad Rather