Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987

Importance of legal representation and particularly for those economically or socially less fortunate – Discussed. (Para 23) Sovaran Singh Prajapati v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 213 : 2025 INSC 225

Sections 21 and 22E — Challenge to Lok Adalat Award — Maintainability of Writ Petition — Held, the statutory finality attached to a Lok Adalat award leaves no room for an appellate or plenary civil remedy - The validity of such an award cannot be reopened through an ordinary civil suit or by treating execution proceedings as a vehicle for setting it aside - The only recognized avenue of challenge is the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India, which is supervisory and exceptional in nature - This applies equally to a party to the award and a third party affected by it. [Relied on State of Punjab v. Jalour Singh, (2008) 2 SCC 660; Bhargavi Constructions v. Kothakapu Muthyam Reddy, (2018) 13 SCC 480; Paras 8-14] Dilip Mehta v. Rakesh Gupta, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1188

Section 22(c)(1) provides that the permanent Lok Adalat shall not have jurisdiction in matters where the value of the property in dispute exceeds 10 lakh rupees. (Para 9) Rutu Mihir Panchal v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 503 : 2025 INSC 593

Limitation Act, 1963

Limitation Act, 1963; Schedule Article 61(a) — Transfer of Property Act, 1882; Section 52 — Usufructuary Mortgage — Right of Redemption — Limitation Period - Held that in the case of a usufructuary mortgage, the period of limitation for redemption does not commence from the date the mortgage is created - Instead, the right to seek redemption arises only when the mortgagor pays or tenders the mortgage money, or when the debt is discharged from the usufruct of the property - Mere expiry of the prescribed period does not extinguish the mortgagor's right to redeem - The right of the mortgagee to seek a declaration of title remains unaffected until such payment or discharge occurs – Appeal dismissed. [Relied on Singh Ram (Dead) through legal representatives Vs. Sheo Ram and Others (2014) 9 SCC 185; Paras 7-12] Dalip Singh v. Sawan Singh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1252 : 2025 INSC 1498

Limitation Act, 1963 - Article 65 and Article 59 - Suit for possession - Void v. Voidable document – Held, an instrument of sale is not executed by the owner, it is void ab initio and considered a nullity - If a sale deed is executed without the payment of price, it is not a sale at all in the eyes of law, and would be void - In such a case, the owner is not required to seek cancellation of the instrument or a declaration that it is void - A suit for possession based on title can be filed, and it will governed by Article 65 of the Limitation Act, which provides a limitation period of 12 years from the date the defendant's possession becomes adverse to the plaintiff - Article 59, which provides a 3 year limitation period, applies to fraudulent transactions that are voidable, not void - High Court erred in applying Article 59 of the Limitation Act - When sale deed is void, suit possession governed by limitation period of 12 years under Article 65 instead of Article 59 - Appeal allowed. [Paras 28-31; 34, 39, 40] Shanti Devi v. Jagan Devi, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 900 : 2025 INSC 1105

Limitation Act, 1963 - Section 5 - Condonation of delay - State instrumentalities - Public interest - “within such period” – Held, the expression 'within such period' under Section 5 of Limitation Act means the entire period from the date the cause of action accrued until the date of actual filing, not just the period after prescribed limitation expired - A party seeking condonation of delay must explain what prevented them from filing the appeal or application within the statutory period of limitation - If the period of limitation is 90 days, and the appeal is filed belatedly on the 100th day, then explanation has to be given for the entire 100 days - Total lethargy or utter negligence on the part of officers of the State and its agencies should not be given a premium - Condonation of delay is not a matter of right - while a liberal approach is preferred to achieve substantial justice, negligence and inaction cannot be ignored - A delay should not be condoned merely because doing so would benefit the State - the principle of 'public interest' cannot be used to justify the State's inaction and lethargy - The law of limitation is founded on public policy and is based on the maxims interest reipublicae up sit finis litium and vigilantibus non dormientibus jura subveniiunt. [Paras 41-50, 59-61, 71] Shivamma v. Karnataka Housing Board, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 899 : 2025 INSC 1104

Limitation Act, 1963 - Section 18 - Acknowledgment of Liability - Whether an amount or liability more than the amount or liability acknowledged can be claimed under Section 18 - Appellant claimed entire suit claim and High Court in appeal granted benefit of Section 18 of the Act but limited the recovery to the acknowledged sum of Rs. 27,874/- (amount acknowledged by respondent) – Held, there must be an 'acknowledgement of liability in respect of the property or right in question' and even if such an acknowledgement is accompanied by refusal to pay, it would mean that the period of limitation would have to be computed from the time when such acknowledgment is signed - An acknowledgment extends limitation for the liability that was acknowledged, not for new, additional, or time-barred claims - The respondent asserted a lower contract value and acknowledged only a specific lesser amount, so extending the period of limitation for the entire suit claim of appellant did not arise - Upheld order of High Court - Appeal dismissed. Airen and Associates v. Sanmar Engineering Services Ltd; 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 745

Need for legislative reform to ensure uniformity in limitation periods across statutes. Suggested that courts should have broader discretion to condone delays beyond the fixed condonable periods, especially in cases of genuine hardship. My Preferred Transformation & Hospitality Pvt. Ltd. v. Faridabad Implements Pvt. Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 49 : 2025 INSC 56 : AIR 2025 SC (Civil) 612

Section 5 - Condonation of Delay - Dispute over Government Land - Liberal Approach - Substantial Justice - Although a delay cannot be condoned without sufficient cause, the case's merit cannot be discarded solely on the technical grounds of limitation. A liberal approach should be taken in condoning delays when the limitation ground undermines the merits of the case and obstructs substantial justice. (Para 14) Inder Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 339 : 2025 INSC 382

Articles 58, 59 and 65 - Suit for cancellation of a sale deed and recovery of possession - Limitation period is determined by the primary relief of cancellation, which is 3 years under Article 59 of the Act, from the date the right to sue first accrues. The 12-year limitation for possession under Article 65 is ancillary and does not apply when cancellation is the core relief. The suit, filed in 2003 for a 1992 sale deed, was deemed time-barred, as the right to sue accrued in 1992. (Referred: Rajpal Singh v. Saroj (2022) 15 SCC 260, Sopanrao v. Syed Mehmood (2019) 7 SCC 76 (Held not good law); Para 23, 30 & 31) Rajeev Gupta v. Prashant Garg, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 471

Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007

Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007 (2007 Act) - Section 22-24 – Held, the Tribunal under the 2007 Act, has the power to order the eviction of a child from the property of the senior citizen, if there is a breach of obligation to maintain senior citizen - The High Court erred in allowing the appeal on the ground that the respondent was also a senior citizen as per Section 2(h) of the 2007 Act because at the time of filing the application before the Tribunal, the respondent was not yet a senior citizen (Respondent's age was 59 years at that time) - The relevant date is the date of filing of the application - 2007 Act being a welfare legislation should be construed liberally to advance its beneficent purpose of protecting senior citizens - It is well settled that the Tribunal can order eviction of a child or relative from the property of the senior citizen where there is a breach of obligation to maintain the senior citizen - The respondent, despite being financially sound, did not allow the appellant to reside in his properties, thereby frustrating the object of the Act - High Court's decision was untenable and erroneous - Appeal allowed. [Paras 6, 7] Kamalakant Mishra v. Additional Collector, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 947

The Act does not mandate automatic eviction of children from parents' homes. Eviction orders are not obligatory in every case under the Act. The primary objective is to ensure maintenance and welfare of senior citizens, with eviction permissible only in exceptional circumstances to safeguard their well-being. The Tribunal must exercise discretion judiciously, ordering eviction only when necessary. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision to set aside an eviction order in a case where an elderly mother sought to evict her son from their ancestral home, citing insufficient grounds for eviction and pending civil disputes over property shares. The Court expressed concern over declining family unity and the increasing prevalence of disputes between elderly parents and their children. [Referred: S. Vanitha v. Commissioner, Bengaluru Urban District, (2021) 15 SCC 730; Urmila Dixit v. Sunil Sharan Dixit, (2025) 2 SCC 787; Paras 32 & 33] Samtola Devi v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 445 : 2025 INSC 404

Eviction Authority of Tribunal - Self-Acquired Property - A 75-year-old appellant sought eviction of his son and daughter-in-law (Respondents 8 and 9) from his selfacquired property, used as a rest house, alleging encroachment, harassment, and threats of false criminal cases - Maintenance Tribunal ordered eviction; Single Judge upheld, but Division Bench set aside, suggesting rent determination - Held, Tribunal has authority under the Act to order eviction to ensure senior citizens' maintenance and protection, as affirmed by S. Vanitha v. Deputy Commissioner and Rule 21 (2) (i) of the Bihar Senior Citizens Rules, 2012 - Property was self-acquired, not ancestral - Respondents' worsening behavior justified eviction - The appeal was allowed, and the Division Bench's order was set aside. The Tribunal's eviction order was restored. (Para 10 – 12) Rajeswar Prasad Roy v. State of Bihar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 418

Section 23 - Requirements - Scope and interpretation of - Beneficial Legislation - Breakdown of Relations - Senior Citizens' Rights - Conditions in property transfers involving senior citizens - Tribunal's Power - Whether the High Court was correct in setting aside the Tribunal's order granting relief under Section 23 - Held, the Act is a welfare-oriented statute aimed at protecting the rights of senior citizens. It must be interpreted liberally to further its objectives. For a property transfer to be void under Section 23, it must be shown that the transfer was conditional upon the transferee maintaining the transferor and that the transferee failed to fulfill these conditions. The Court noted the appellant's allegations of neglect and abuse by the respondent, holding that such behavior violated the conditions implied in the Gift Deed and related promissory note. The Court reaffirmed the Tribunal's authority under the Act to cancel property transfers and order possession transfer if necessary to protect senior citizens. The appeal was allowed, setting aside the Division Bench judgment of the High Court, and the respondent was directed to restore possession of the property to the appellant. It restored the orders of the Single Judge and the Tribunal, quashing the Gift Deed executed by the appellant in favor of the respondent. The judgment reinforced the Act's purpose of providing senior citizens with simple, expedient remedies against neglect or abuse. Tribunal Powers. Urmila Dixit v. Sunil Sharan Dixit, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 3 : (2025) 2 SCC 787

Major Port Trusts Act, 1963

Major Port Authorities Act, 2021 - Supreme Court recommends creation of appellate body of Orders of Tariff Authority for Major Ports (TAMP) for tariff determination, in place of current practice of filing appeals directly before Supreme Court - This will make remedy of appeal more effective and meaningful - Since fixation of tariff by expert bodies like TAMP is a highly technical procedure involving knowledge of law, engineering, finance, commerce, economics and management - Set aside order - Appeal allowed. [Paras 31-33, 48-54, 58] Paradip Port Authority v. Paradeep Phosphates Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 802 : 2025 INSC 971 : AIR 2025 SC 3835

Media

The Delhi High Court directed the deletion of a Wikipedia page titled "Asian News International v. Wikimedia Foundation," stemming from ANI's defamation suit against Wikimedia, on grounds that the page's content—allegedly citing media reports and user contributions—was prima facie contemptuous and interfered with ongoing proceedings. Wikimedia challenged this order before the Supreme Court, arguing it violated principles of open justice and free speech. Whether a court may order the removal of online content reporting on sub judice judicial proceedings without establishing contempt or substantial risk of prejudice to the trial. Held, the Supreme Court set aside the Delhi High Court's order, holding that courts, as open public institutions, cannot lightly curb media or public reporting on judicial proceedings, including sub judice matters. Directions to delete or take down content are impermissible absent proof of contempt or real prejudice; such measures must satisfy the twin tests of necessity and proportionality under Sahara India Real Estate Corpn. Ltd. v. SEBI, (2012) 10 SCC 603. The High Court's broadly worded injunctions to remove "false, misleading, and defamatory content" were vague and unimplementable. Reaffirming Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1967 SC 1, the Court emphasized that public scrutiny via debate and criticism fosters judicial accountability and public confidence, serving as a check against caprice. Judiciary and media, as democratic pillars, must supplement each other; courts should welcome constructive criticism but act only on proven contempt. It is not the judiciary's duty to micromanage content removal, as judges cannot respond to critiques, and robust discourse—even on pending cases—is essential for systemic improvement. The order's enforcement was stayed, preserving Wikipedia's user-generated, media-sourced content as protected speech. Wikimedia Foundation Inc. v. ANI Media, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 550 : 2025 INSC 656

Medical Education

Medical Education – Bachelor of Dental Surgery (BDS) Admissions 2016-17 – National Eligibility-cum-Entrance Test (NEET) – Lowering of qualifying percentile – Authority of State Government – The Supreme Court examined the legality of BDS admissions in Rajasthan for the academic year 2016-17, where the State Government lowered the minimum NEET percentile by 10% and an additional 5%- held that the power to lower minimum marks for BDS admissions is vested exclusively with the Central Government, in consultation with the Dental Council of India (DCI), as per the proviso to sub-regulation 5(ii) of Regulation II of the Revised BDS Course Regulations, 2007- The State of Rajasthan had no authority to unilaterally lower these standards, and the Central Government's communication to take "necessary action as deemed fit" did not amount to a delegation of such statutory power. Siddhant Mahajan v. State of Rajasthan, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1220 : 2025 INSC 1458

Educational Maladministration – Conduct of Dental Colleges – Private dental colleges admitted students beyond the 15% relaxation granted by the State, even enrolling candidates with zero or negative percentiles solely based on 10+2 marks- Supreme Court characterized this as a "blatant illegality" and "willful violation" of regulations, noting that such actions undermine the high and uniform standards of medical education. Siddhant Mahajan v. State of Rajasthan, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1220 : 2025 INSC 1458

Constitutional Law – Article 142 – Regularization of Degrees – While the admissions were "manifestly illegal", Supreme Court invoked its extraordinary powers under Article 142 to regularize the degrees of students who had already completed the BDS course- This relief was granted as a one-time measure to prevent the loss of years of effort and resources, but with a condition: benefited students must file an undertaking to provide pro-bono services to the State for up to two years during public health emergencies or natural calamities- Students who had not yet cleared the course or exceeded the 9-year completion limit were denied relief. [Relied on Sankalp Charitable Trust and Anr. v. Union of India and Ors., (2016) 7 SCC 487; Rishabh Choudhary v. Union of India and Ors., (2017) 3 SCC 652; Priya Gupta v. State of Chhattisgarh and Ors., (2012) 7 SCC 433; Paras 15-18, 42, 43, 45, 51, 52, 57, 58] Siddhant Mahajan v. State of Rajasthan, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1220 : 2025 INSC 1458

Scheduled Tribe Claim – Dismissal of claim after completing medical education – Petitioner admitted to MBBS course against a Scheduled Tribe seat on the basis of a 'Mannervarlu' Tribe claim – Scrutiny Committee dismissed the claim while proceedings were pending and education was completed – Whether the completed education should be protected - Held that considering the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, and particularly taking into account that the precious medical education would go waste if protection is not granted, the Supreme Court was inclined to protect the education undertaken by the petitioner - The education undertaken for the MBBS Degree shall stand protected as he had already completed course during pendency of proceedings - It was clarified that the petitioner shall not hereinafter claim any benefit on the basis of him belonging to the Scheduled Tribe category. [Paras 4, 5] Vedkumar v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1133

Qualitative Distinction in Work - Supreme Court noted the finding in Dr. P.A. Bhatt case that Allopathy practitioners deal with critical care, immediate life-saving measures, invasive procedures including surgeries, and postmortem, none of which can be performed by practitioners of indigenous systems of medicine - This fundamental distinction, along with the dissimilar diagnostic methods, contrasting treatment philosophies, and disparate medicine composition, puts allopathy doctors in a different class who can be classified differently for service conditions - The classification of different retirement ages and better pay scales for allopathy doctors has a reasonable nexus with the object sought to be achieved: the sufficiency of qualified and experienced MBBS doctors with longer service and better pay, addressing the concern of the dearth of allopathy doctors - The "footfalls" in allopathy institutions are also noted to be far more than in institutions administering indigenous systems of medicine. [Relied on: State of Gujarat & Ors. v. Dr. P.A. Bhatt & Ors. 2023 SCC OnLine SC 503; Dr. Solamon A. v. State of Kerala and Ors. Special Leave Petition (C) No.3946 of 2023; Paras 7-11] State of Rajasthan v. Anisur Rahman, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1017

AYUSH Admissions—NEET-UG Requirement—Retention of Degrees Post-Completion of Course - Where undergraduate students were admitted to AYUSH courses without qualifying the NEET-UG 2019 examination due to lack of notice regarding the mandatory requirement, and a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court set aside a Single Judge's order permitting such admissions on grounds of inadequate publication of the NEET mandate (noting a 2018 newspaper notice and compliance by other candidates), the Supreme Court, in allowing the students to retain their degrees after course completion, held: Admissions without NEET qualification were irregular and impermissible; however, withholding examination results or degrees after students had fully completed the prescribed course would occasion immense hardship disproportionate to the initial procedural lapse. Vacating an interim order suspending result declaration, the Court emphasized equity in balancing regulatory compliance with completed academic investment, directing release of results and conferral of degrees without prejudice to regulatory actions against the admitting institution. Ebtesham Khatoon v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 219

Constitutional Law - Equality Principle - Disability Rights - Rights of Persons with Disabilities (RPwD) Act, 2016 - MBBS Admission - Reasonable Accommodation - Ableism - Functional Assessment - Whether the National Medical Commission's (NMC) guideline requiring candidates with disabilities to have “both hands intact, with intact sensations, sufficient strength, and range of motion” for MBBS admission is arbitrary and violative of the RPwD Act and Article 41 of the Constitution. Held, NMC's “both hands intact” condition is arbitrary, antithetical to the RPwD Act, and promotes ableism, violating the equality principle and the concept of reasonable accommodation. The Court allowed the appellant, a candidate with a 58% locomotor and speech disability, to secure admission to the MBBS course at Government Medical College, Sirohi, Rajasthan, and directed a functional assessment by a five-member AIIMS committee, including Professor Dr. Satendra Singh. Anmol v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 236 : 2025 INSC 256

Medical Admissions - NEET-PG Counselling - Seat-Blocking - Transparency and Fairness - Uniform Counselling Code - Aadhaar-Based Seat Tracking - Third-Party Oversight - Penalties for Violations Issues - Large-scale seat-blocking in NEET-PG counselling causing inequity and undermining merit-based selection; lack of synchronization between All India Quota (AIQ) and State counselling rounds; absence of transparent fee disclosure and uniform regulatory framework; challenge to High Court's 2018 order addressing NEET-PG aspirants' grievances from 2017-18 regarding mop-up round seat allotments. The Allahabad High Court (2018) addressed grievances of NEET-PG aspirants alleging less meritorious candidates, including those allotted seats in earlier rounds, were allowed in mop-up rounds, securing better seats (e.g., Radiology). The Court ordered Rs. 10 lakh compensation per petitioner, inquiry into admission lapses, and reforms to curb seat-blocking. The Supreme Court stayed these directions in April 2018, noting subsequent reforms, including a four-round AIQ counselling scheme (2021) following Nihila P.P. v. Medical Counselling Committee (2021 SCC OnLine SC 3283). (Paras 7, 8, 12 & 16) State of U.P. v. Miss Bhavna Tiwari, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 607 : 2025 INSC 747

Medical Admissions - NEET-PG Counselling - Directions - Synchronize AIQ and State counselling rounds to prevent seat-blocking. Mandate private/deemed universities to disclose tuition, hostel, caution deposit, and miscellaneous fees before counselling. Establish a Centralized Fee Regulation Framework under the National Medical Commission (NMC). Permit admitted candidates to upgrade seats without reopening counselling to new entrants. Publish raw scores, answer keys, and normalization formulae for multi-shift exams. Impose penalties for seat-blocking: forfeiture of security deposit, disqualification from future NEET-PG exams for repeat offenders, and blacklisting of complicit colleges. Prevent multiple seat holdings and misrepresentation. Hold State authorities and institutional DMEs liable for contempt or disciplinary action for rule/schedule violations. Standardize eligibility, mop-up rounds, seat withdrawal, and grievance timelines across States. Mandate NMC to conduct annual audits of counselling data, compliance, and admission fairness. (Para 16) State of U.P. v. Miss Bhavna Tiwari, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 607 : 2025 INSC 747

Medical Admissions - Seat-Blocking - NEET-PG Counselling - Seat-blocking distorts seat availability, disadvantages higher-ranked aspirants, and undermines merit-based selection. Systemic issues include fragmented governance, lack of transparency, and weak policy enforcement. Reforms require structural coordination, technological modernization, and robust regulatory accountability. The Supreme Court upheld the need for reforms to ensure merit, fairness, and transparency in NEET-PG counselling, reducing the High Court's compensation from Rs. 10 lakh to Rs. 1 lakh per petitioner. Noted that post-2018 reforms, including the 2021 AIQ counselling scheme, addressed some concerns but required further implementation. Established a comprehensive framework to curb seat-blocking, enhance transparency, and ensure equitable access to postgraduate medical seats. (Paras 7, 8 & 16) State of U.P. v. Miss Bhavna Tiwari, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 607 : 2025 INSC 747

MBBS Admission - Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 - Reasonable Accommodation - Petitioner, an SC/PwBD candidate with congenital absence of multiple fingers and left foot involvement (42% disability), secured rank 176 in NEET UG 2024. Denied disability certificate and deemed ineligible for MBBS under National Medical Commission (NMC) guidelines. Held, denial of admission unjustified per Om Rathod, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 770 and Anmol, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 236, which mandate assessment of disabilities with assistive devices and reasonable accommodations, and declare restrictive NMC guidelines arbitrary. The medical Board and the High Court failed to consider vital factors such as the academic excellence of the petitioner, his performance in the NEET examination, the high placement in merit and that there are assistive devices which could be used by the petitioner as a matter to ensure reasonable accommodation. NMC's ongoing guideline revision no basis to defer relief. Directed fresh assessment by five-member AIIMS Medical Board, including locomotor disability specialist and neuro-physician. (Para 19 & 20) Kabir Paharia v. National Medical Commission, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 406 : 2025 INSC 623

Medical Council Act, 1956; Sections 13(4B), 33 - Foreign Medical Institution Regulation, 2002; Clause 8(iv) - Constitutional Validity - The Supreme Court upheld the Medical Council of India's (now National Medical Commission) regulations mandating that candidates seeking to pursue MBBS from foreign medical institutions must qualify the National Eligibility-cum-Entrance Test (NEET) to obtain an Eligibility Certificate. The requirement, introduced through Section 13(4B) of the Indian Medical Council Act, 1956 (amended in 2001) and Clause 8(iv) of the Foreign Medical Institution Regulation, 2002 (amended in 2018), was deemed constitutional, fair, and transparent. The Court rejected the petitioners' challenge, holding that the regulations, issued under Section 33 of the Act, were neither ultra vires nor arbitrary. The petitioners' request for a one-time exemption from the NEET requirement was also dismissed, as candidates who sought admission in foreign institutions post-amendment were bound by the regulations. The Court clarified that the regulations do not restrict the right to practice medicine outside India but set essential eligibility criteria for practicing within the country. (Para 4, 5) Arunaditya Dubey v. Medical Council of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 225

Medical Education - Directions - The appellant was permitted to secure MBBS admission based on a proper functional assessment. The NMC was directed to file an affidavit on the status of revised guidelines by March 3, 2025, in compliance with prior judgments. The matter was listed for further hearing on March 3, 2025, to monitor NMC's compliance. (Para 20, 21, 25, 28, 29, 34-36, 45, 46) Anmol v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 236 : 2025 INSC 256

National Board of Examination (NBE)- NEET PG 2025 - Held, directed NBE to make arrangements to hold NEET PG 2025 in a single shift ensuring transparency. Holding exam in two shifts creates arbitrariness and also does not keep all the candidates at the same level. Any two question papers can never be said to be of an identical level of difficulty or ease. The exam is to be held all over the country, not just one city and contention that examining body could not find enough centres to hold the examination and one shift could not be accepted, considering technological advancements. Hefty examination fees of Rs. 3,500/- from general category and Rs. 2,500/- from SC/STPWD category candidate, therefore, commission has more than enough funds to hold examination in one shift in sufficient number of centres. Process of Normalisation may be applied in exceptional cases but not in a routine manner year after year. Directed Respondents to make arrangements for holding examination in one shift and also ensure that full transparency is maintained and secured centres are identified. (Para 9, 10) Dr. Aditi v. National Board of Examination in Medical Sciences, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 665

Natural Justice - Pharmacy Education - Arbitrary Rejection of Approvals by Pharmacy Council of India (PCI) - Held, statutory bodies must comply with principles of natural justice and non-arbitrariness. Approvals cannot be rejected without conducting inspections or providing an opportunity to rectify deficiencies. PCI's arbitrary actions lead to increased litigation. The Court directed the Registrar to forward the order to the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare to curb such litigation, emphasizing that arbitrary rejections harm students' careers. PCI's rejection orders set aside. (Para 3, 5 & 7) Shree Ram College of Pharmacy v. Pharmacy Council of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 621

NEET-PG 2024 - The Supreme Court granted interim relief to a NEET-PG 2024 candidate denied admission to ICARE Institute of Medical Sciences and Research, Haldia, despite paying Rs. 27 lakh in fees, due to delayed reporting. The Court directed the college to allow the petitioner, a validly counselled candidate allotted a seat under the Private Management Quota in the Special Stray Vacancy Round, to commence classes from June 26, 2025. The petitioner had paid the fees online before the March 20, 2025, admission deadline, despite disputes over additional fee demands and non-issuance of a Medical Counselling Committee (MCC) card. The High Court had previously dismissed the petitioner's plea, citing late reporting on March 27, 2025. The Supreme Court's order was issued after confirming the seat remained vacant, ensuring no third-party rights were affected. (Para 13) Kadam Girish Shriram v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 688

Residence-based reservation in PG Medical Courses is constitutionally impermissible. Such reservations violate Article 14 of the Constitution, which guarantees equality before the law. The concept of regional or provincial domicile is alien to the Indian legal system. All citizens of the country carry a single domicile, which is the "domicile of India". Institutional preference is permissible to a reasonable extent. The Court upheld the reservation of 32 seats for students who completed their MBBS from the same institution, as it creates a reasonable classification with a nexus to the object sought to be achieved. State Quota seats must be filled strictly based on merit in the National Eligibility cum Entrance Test (NEET). The Court clarified that its decision would not affect students already admitted under the residence-based reservation, as they had completed their courses or were in the process of doing so. Higher education, especially in specialized fields like medicine, must prioritize merit to maintain national standards and development. Dr. Tanvi Behl v. Shrey Goel, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 122

Medical Negligence - Hospital's Vicarious Liability for Doctor's Negligence - The Supreme Court upheld the NCDRC's ruling holding a hospital vicariously liable for a doctor's medical negligence causing a patient's death. There was sufficient evidence (medical records, treatment history) to conclude negligence, and the hospital failed to disprove negligence despite claiming adherence to standard care. The Court confirmed ₹10 lakh compensation (with accrued interest) as sufficient, considering the deceased's age and modest earnings. (Paras 10 & 15) Kamineni Hospitals v. Peddi Narayana Swami, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 453 : 2025 INSC 527

Medical Negligence

National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (NCDRC) overstepped its jurisdiction by creating a new case that was not based on original complaint - Complainant had not alleged any deficiency in antenatal care, rather, he had asserted that tests were prescribed and undergone - A decision must be based on the case pleaded and that a party cannot travel beyond its pleadings - Multiple medical boards, constituted at the request of the complaint, had reviewed the case and found no 'gross medical negligence' in the management of the patient by the treating doctors - The doctor cannot be held liable for an unfavourable outcome without strong evidence of negligence, and that Courts and Consumer Forums should not substitute their own views for those of medical specialists - Appeal allowed and directed complainant to return Rs. 10 lakhs. [Paras 23-30] Deep Nursing Home v. Manmeet Singh Mattewal, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 883 : 2025 INSC 1094

Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development Act, 2006 (MSMED Act)

The MSMED Act, as a special statute, prevails over the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, to facilitate expeditious dispute resolution for MSMEs. Private contractual clauses specifying an arbitration seat (Bengaluru) cannot override the mandatory jurisdiction of the MSME Facilitation Council under Section 18(4) of the MSMED Act, determined by the supplier's location (Delhi). The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's interference with MSMED proceedings in Delhi, restoring arbitration under the Delhi Arbitration Centre, as the supplier was registered in Delhi. No arbitration agreement can restrict reference to the Facilitation Council under Section 18(1) of the MSMED Act. Harcharan Dass Gupta v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 567 : 2025 INSC 689 : AIR 2025 SC 2800

Section 18(3) - Eventuality of failure of settlement - Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 - Section 43 - Whether time-barred claims can be referred to arbitration under section 18(3) of the MSMED Act - Conflict between MSMED Act and Arbitration and Conciliation Act - Arbitration is an adjudicatory proceeding initiated upon filing of the application, making the limitation act applicable on it - Section 18(3) of the MSMED Act, being a special law with an overriding effect prevails over section 2(4) of the Arbitration Act - Section 18(3) provides for applicability of all provisions of Arbitration Act as would apply if there were an arbitration agreement, which includes Section 43 - Upheld order of High Court on applicability of Limitation Act on arbitration proceedings and, held, the Limitation Act applies to arbitration proceedings under section 18(3) of the MSMED Act - The statutory deeming fiction in section 18(3) of MSMED Act, ensures applicability of Section 43 of the Arbitration and conciliation Act, attracting Limitation Act. Appeals partly allowed. [Relied on Silpi Industries v. Kerala SRTC (2021) 18 SCC 790; Paras 35, 41-43, 48-49] Sonali Power Equipments Pvt. Ltd. v. Chairman, Maharashtra State Electricity Board, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 721 : 2025 INSC 864

Sections 18(2) - Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (ACA) - Sections 2(4), 43 - Limitation Act, 1963 - Whether time barred claims can be referred to conciliation under Section 18(2) of the MSMED Act - Limitation Act won't apply to Conciliation process under MSMED Act but applies to arbitration – Held, MSME suppliers may pursue time-barred debts through conciliation proceedings under the Act, such claims cannot be enforced through arbitration, as the Limitation Act applies to arbitration proceedings initiated under MSMED framework - Conciliation is a voluntary and settlement driven process, out of court procedure, not adjudicatory in nature - Limitation Act applies only to suits, appeals and applications filed before Courts - the Limitation Act bars remedy under the Act but does not extinguishes the right, hence time barred debt can be recovered vide other remedies through a court of law - The Limitation Act does not apply to conciliation proceeding under section 18(2) of the MSMED Act. A time barred debt can be referred to conciliation - Set aside order of High Court to the extent of applicability of Limitation Act to conciliation proceedings under MSMED Act. Relied on State of Punjab v. Jalour Singh, (2008) 2 SCC 660; Para 25, 26, 31, 33, 51, 52] Sonali Power Equipments Pvt. Ltd. v. Chairman, Maharashtra State Electricity Board, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 721 : 2025 INSC 864

Section 18 and 19 - Maintainability of a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution against an order passed by the Micro and Small Enterprises Facilitation Council (MSEFC) under Section 18 of the Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development Act, 2006 (MSMED Act). The Court examined conflicting judgments, including Jharkhand Urja Vikas Nigam Limited v. State of Rajasthan, 2021 LiveLaw SC 753 and Gujarat State Civil Supplies Corporation Limited v. Mahakali Foods Private Limited, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 893 regarding whether the MSEFC, after acting as a conciliator, could also act as an arbitrator, and whether a writ petition could be entertained against its orders. The Court also considered the mandatory pre-deposit requirement under Section 19 of the MSMED Act, which mandates a 75% deposit of the awarded amount for challenging an award. The Court expressed reservations about the absolute bar on writ jurisdiction and referred the following questions to a larger Bench of five Judges: (i) Whether the judgment in M/s India Glycols Limited, 2023 LiveLaw (SC) 992 completely bars writ petitions against MSEFC orders. (ii) If not absolute, under what circumstances the principle of alternative remedy would not apply. (iii) Whether MSEFC members, after conciliation, can act as arbitrators under Section 18 of the MSMED Act, despite Section 80 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The Court emphasized that writ jurisdiction under Article 226 is a constitutional right and part of the basic structure, and its exercise is not precluded by statutory remedies, especially in cases involving violations of natural justice, jurisdictional errors, or challenges to the vires of a statute. The matter was referred to a larger Bench for further consideration. Tamil Nadu Cements Corporation Ltd. v. Micro and Small Enterprises Facilitation Council, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 95

Section 8 - Filing of a memorandum under Section 8 is discretionary. Section 8 of the MSMED Act grants discretion to micro and small enterprises to file a memorandum. The Act does not mandate registration as a precondition for availing the benefits or remedies under the Act. The Court also referred to the Expert Committee Report on MSMEs, which highlighted that many MSMEs operate in the informal sector and that registration is not mandatory for availing benefits under the Act. NBCC (India) Ltd. v. State of West Bengal, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 46 : (2025) 3 SCC 440

Section 8 and 18 - Whether an MSME (Micro, Small, and Medium Enterprise) can refer a dispute to the Facilitation Council under Section 18 of the Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development Act, 2006 (MSMED Act) if it was not registered under Section 8 of the Act before the execution of the contract with the buyer. Interpretation of the term "any party to a dispute" under Section 18 of the MSMED Act and whether it is restricted to a "supplier" registered under Section 8. Held, registration under Section 8 is not a precondition for referring a dispute under Section 18. The phrase "any party to a dispute" in Section 18 is not restricted to a "supplier" registered under Section 8. The text, context, and purpose of Section 18 indicate that it is an open-ended remedy for dispute resolution, available to any party involved in a dispute regarding delayed payments under the MSMED Act. The Court rejected the appellant's argument that the term "any party" must be interpreted as a "supplier" registered under Section 8, emphasizing that such an interpretation would defeat the purpose of the Act, which is to provide an effective remedy for MSMEs. NBCC (India) Ltd. v. State of West Bengal, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 46 : (2025) 3 SCC 440

Section 8 and 18 - Distinction from previous judgments - Reference to a larger Bench - The applicability of previous judgments, including Silpi Industries v. Kerala State Road Transport Corporation, (2021) 18 SCC 790 and Gujarat State Civil Supplies Corporation Ltd. v. Mahakali Foods Pvt. Ltd., 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 893, to the present case. The Court distinguished the present case from Silpi Industries and Mahakali Foods, noting that the issue of whether registration under Section 8 is a precondition for invoking Section 18 was not directly addressed in those cases. The observations in those cases were made in different contexts and did not involve a detailed analysis of the statutory provisions. The Court emphasized that the decisions in Silpi Industries and Mahakali Foods were not binding precedents on the issue at hand, as the issue was neither raised nor fully considered in those cases. While the Court expressed a clear opinion on the interpretation of Section 18, it deemed it appropriate to refer the matter to a larger Bench of three Judges for an authoritative pronouncement, given the need for clarity and legal certainty on the issue. NBCC (India) Ltd. v. State of West Bengal, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 46 : (2025) 3 SCC 440

Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957

Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 2016 (Odisha) - Rule 27(4)(iv) - Interpretation of 'Previous Financial Year' - Scope of Judicial Review in Tender Matters - Natural Resources Allocation - Maximization of Public Revenue – Held, a public tender is an instrument of governance to maximize public value, not a private bargain - The obligation of the Tendering Authority is to interpret its terms consistently and to ensure the interpretation advances the object of the tender - The Court must intervene when an interpretation is a demonstrable misconstruction of a tender condition or is irrational, especially when it narrows competition and excludes the highest bidder on a ground unsupported by law, thereby vitiating the decision-making process - The interpretation must serve the purpose of the tender, which is mainly to maximize the revenue to the State when dealing with a natural resource - The constitutional duty to interfere is beyond question when an authority misinterprets a condition that diminishes competition and deprives the State of its legitimate revenue - The successful bidder was held entitled to a refund of the deposited amount along with interest at 6% per annum from the date of deposit on the principle of restitution - Appeal allowed. [Relied on TATA Cellular v. Union of India (1994) 6 SCC 651; Michigan Rubber (India) Ltd. v. State of Karnataka & Others (2012) 8 SCC 216; Paras 9-16] Shanti Construction Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Odisha, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1077 : 2025 INSC 1295

Whether the State Government is entitled to levy royalty on the excavation of brick earth from private lands leased by brick kiln owners, even if the ownership of the land is not vested in the State. Whether the declaration of brick earth as a minor mineral under the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957, empowers the State to levy royalty irrespective of land ownership. The respondents, brick kiln owners, leased private lands and excavated brick earth for brick manufacturing. They challenged the State's imposition of royalty, contending that brick earth did not vest in the State under the Wajib-ul-arz (village land records) and that no provision in the Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887, or the Punjab Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 1964, authorized such levies. The Trial Court and First Appellate Court dismissed the suits, holding that brick earth, declared a minor mineral, vested in the State under Section 42 of the Land Revenue Act. The High Court, however, ruled in favor of the respondents, holding that mere declaration of brick earth as a minor mineral did not confer ownership or royalty rights on the State. Held, the State's right to levy royalty on brick earth is independent of land ownership. Once brick earth is declared a minor mineral under the 1957 Act, the State is empowered to levy royalty under the Mineral Rules. The ownership of the land is irrelevant for royalty purposes, as the Mineral Rules require a certificate of approval (Form “B”) for mining operations, and royalty is payable on the production and disposal of minor minerals. The High Court erred in focusing on land ownership rather than the State's statutory right to levy royalty under the Mineral Rules. The appeals were allowed, and the Trial Court's dismissal of the suits was restored. The Court clarified that it made no adjudication on the ownership of the lands in question. The State Government is entitled to levy royalty on the excavation of brick earth, irrespective of land ownership, once brick earth is declared a minor mineral under the 1957 Act. The impugned judgment of the High Court was set aside, and the Trial Court's decision was reinstated. State of Punjab v. Om Prakash Brick Kiln Owner, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 93

Mohammedan Law

Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986 - Section 3(1)(d) - Right of divorced Muslim woman to recover properties given at the time of marriage - Purposive Construction of Act – Issue - Whether goods given to a daughter or the bridegroom at the time of marriage could be returned to the daughter after divorce under the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986 (1986 Act) - Held that the 1986 Act must be given a purposive construction, keeping the goals of equality, dignity, and autonomy in mind, especially to secure the financial protection of a Muslim woman post-divorce, which aligns with her rights under Article 21 of the Constitution of India - Held that the High Court erred by treating the matter purely as a civil dispute and missing the 'purposive construction goalpost' - observed that Section 3(1)(d) of the 1986 Act entitles a divorced woman to receive "all the properties given to her before or at the time of marriage or after her marriage by her relatives or friends or the husband or any relatives of the husband or his friends" - This section clears the way for a woman to set up a claim against her husband, or claim back properties given, as the case may be - directed Respondent to remit the amount directly to the wife's bank account, the non-compliance of which would attract interest at 9% per annum - Appeal allowed. [Relied on Daniel Latifi v. Union of India, (2001) 7 SCC 740; Paras 7-10] Rousanara Begum v. S.K. Salahuddin @ Sk Salauddin, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1160 : 2025 INSC 1375

Matruka Property (Inheritance) - Held that Matruka property is the property (both movable and immovable) left by a deceased Muslim - It simply refers to property left behind by the deceased person and nothing more - The scheme for distribution of matruka property first requires separating the part covered by a valid will (maximum one-third of the total matruka, and not in favor of an heir without other heirs' consent) - The balance is distributable among heirs as per Mohammedan Law rules of intestate succession – Held, the scheme for distribution of matruka property first requires separating the part covered by a valid will (maximum one-third of the total matruka, and not in favor of an heir without other heirs' consent) - Sharers are entitled to a prescribed share of the inheritance and wife being a sharer is entitled to 1/8th the share but where there is no child or child of a son how low so ever, the share to which the wife is entitled is 1/4th. [Relied on Trinity Infraventures Ltd. v. M.S. Murthy, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 738; Paras 8-15] Zoharbee v. Imam Khan, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1014 : 2025 INSC 1245

Validity of an oral gift (Hiba) - Succession rights - Limitation pertaining to declaratory suits regarding immovable property – Held, an oral gift (hiba) under the Muslim Law cannot be projected as a “surprise instrument” to stake claims over a property - To constitute, a valid Hiba, all its necessary ingredients - i. declaration by donor, ii. acceptance by donee and iii. taking possession of land - are done publicly rather than secretly - Oral gift (hiba) is permissible in Mohammedan law, the evidence of acting under the gift - such as collecting rent, holding title, or effecting mutation is essential to substantiate the claim of possession - Oral gift was not proved by contemporaneous delivery of possession - The registered sale deeds and mutations carry presumption of validity and unchallenged possession by the defendants - Lack of effecting mutation in revenue records can be a crucial factor invalidating such a claim of gift, in the absence of other evidence of possession - Set aside order - Appeal allowed. [Relied on: Mansoor Saheb v. Salima 2023 SCC OnLine SC 3809; Rasheeda Khatoon v. Ashiq Ali, (2014) 10 SCC 459; Paras 34-42, 49] Dharmrao Sharanappa Shabadi v. Syeda Arifa Parveen, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 973 : 2025 INSC 1187

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988

Assessment of Compensation – Deceased Employed in Foreign Country – Divergent Views on 'Double Deduction' and Moderation of Foreign Income - The Supreme Court referred the issue of assessing compensation in motor accident cases where the deceased was employed in a foreign country to a Larger Bench, noting divergent judicial views on the application of "double deduction" - Held that the issue had “wide ramifications” given the growing number of Indians working overseas, especially in the IT sector, the Bench stated that there being divergent views on the application of double deduction, the issue deserves to be resolved by a larger Bench. [Paras 11 - 15] Tharunoju Eshwaramma v. K. Ram Reddy, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1053

Assessment of contributory negligence in a motor accident claim - Contributory negligence cannot be presumed on mere allegations of high-speed driving without direct or corroborative evidence. Contributory negligence must be established through direct or corroborative evidence. Tribunal's assessment of negligence, based on evidence and spot inspection, should be upheld unless demonstrably erroneous. (Para 10 & 11) Prabhavathi v. Bangalore Metropolitan Transport Corporation, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 266 : 2025 INSC 293

Assessment of Income - Income assessment in compensation cases should consider proven income as per payslips and bank statements, and not be arbitrarily reduced. The High Court had reduced the deceased's monthly income from Rs. 62,725/- (as determined by the Tribunal) to Rs. 50,000/-. The Supreme Court restored the Tribunal's assessment, holding that the deceased's last drawn salary of Rs. 62,725/- (as per pay slip) was the correct basis for calculating compensation. (Para 14) Prabhavathi v. Bangalore Metropolitan Transport Corporation, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 266 : 2025 INSC 293

Central Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989, Rule 9 - Whether the absence of the endorsement in the driver's license to drive a vehicle carrying a hazardous vehicle absolved the insurer from honouring the claim because of a breach of condition? Held, Insurer can 'pay and recover' if driver of vehicle meant to carry hazardous substance did not have endorsement under Rule 9. An endorsement under Rule 9 is mandatory in the driving license for driving a vehicle carrying any dangerous or hazardous goods. Rule 9 mandates specialized training (including defensive driving, emergency handling, and product safety) and an endorsement for drivers of vehicles carrying hazardous goods. This training is integral to safe operation, rejecting arguments that the endorsement is a mere formality. The absence of such training directly relates to driving competence, especially for vehicles designed for hazardous cargo. (Para 12, 15 & 17) Chatha Service Station v. Lalmati Devi, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 408 : 2025 INSC 468 : AIR 2025 SC 2324

Compensation - Directions for Direct Bank Transfer of Compensation to Road Accident Victims and Workmen - The Supreme Court, in a suo motu case initiated based on a letter from a retired District Judge, issued comprehensive directions to ensure direct bank transfer of compensation to claimants under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, and the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923. Noting that over Rs 282 crores and Rs 6.61 crores remain unclaimed in Motor Accident Claims Tribunals (MACTs) and Labour Courts in Gujarat, respectively, with similar issues in other states, the Court emphasized the need to address the serious concern of unclaimed compensation. The directions include mandatory submission of claimants' bank account details, Aadhar, PAN, and email IDs; verification of bank accounts by MACTs; and direct transfer of compensation to claimants' accounts. The Court also mandated High Courts to issue practice directions, create dashboards for tracking deposited amounts, and initiate drives with Legal Services Authorities to trace claimants. These directions apply until states frame relevant rules, with compliance reports due by July 30, 2025. (Para 9) In Re Compensation Amounts Deposited with MACT and Labour Courts, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 455 : 2025 INSC 530

Constitutional Law—Legislative Competence and Repeal of Statutes—Delegation of Quasi-Judicial Powers—Motor Vehicles Act, 1988—Karnataka Motor Vehicles Taxation and Certain Other Law (Amendment) Act, 2003. The Supreme Court upheld the constitutional validity of Section 3 of the Karnataka Motor Vehicles Taxation and Certain Other Law (Amendment) Act, 2003 ("2003 Amendment Act"), which repealed the Karnataka Contract Carriages (Acquisition) Act, 1976 ("1976 Act"). The 1976 Act, previously upheld by the Court, had nationalized private contract carriages under state control. The repeal, aimed at liberalizing the transport sector and addressing public transport shortages, fell within the State Legislature's plenary powers and did not require fresh Presidential assent, as a repeal extinguishes prior provisions without recreating a new framework or overriding judicial precedents. The Court further validated the delegation under Section 68(5) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 ("MV Act"), read with Rule 56(1)(d) of the Karnataka Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 ("KMV Rules"), empowering the Secretary of the State Transport Authority ("STA") to grant non-stage carriage permits (including contract, special, tourist, and temporary permits). Rejecting claims that such delegation undermined the quasi-judicial nature of permit-granting—requiring a multi-member body—the Court held that administrative law permits express statutory delegation of routine quasi-judicial functions to a single officer for efficiency, provided it is calibrated (e.g., excluding complex stage carriage permits) and subject to oversight. This delegation prevents STA overload, reduces delays, and aligns with the MV Act's intent to enhance public transport delivery without arbitrary discretion. Appeal allowed; Karnataka High Court's declaration of the 2003 Amendment Act as unconstitutional set aside. No infringement of legislative competence or delegation doctrines; repeal and delegation constitutionally sound as policy-driven reforms. S.R.S. Travels v. Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation Workers, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 166 : 2025 INSC 152 : (2025) 3 SCC 491

Contributory Negligence – Learner's License - In a motor accident claim, contributory negligence cannot be presumed merely from the driver's possession of a learner's license. The collision at the trailer's tail-end did not inherently indicate negligence by the driver. Negligence must be proved by evidence, with preponderance of probabilities as the standard. (Para 12 & 13) Srikrishna Kanta Singh v. Oriental Insurance Company Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 352 : 2025 INSC 394

Determination of compensation – Monthly income of deceased fruit seller – Multiplier – Deduction for personal expenses – Inclusion of father and sister as dependents – Liability of insurer to pay and recover from driver and owner - Deceased, aged 24, died in a motor vehicle accident. Tribunal awarded compensation based on a notional income of Rs. 4,500 per month, deducting 1/3rd for personal expenses, and excluding the deceased's father and sister as dependents - High Court affirmed - Whether the Tribunal and High Court correctly assessed the monthly income, applied the appropriate multiplier, made the correct deduction for personal expenses, and rightly excluded the father and sister as dependents – Held, the Supreme Court disagreed with the lower courts' assessment of the deceased's monthly income. Considering the deceased's occupation as a fruit seller, the Court adopted the minimum wage for an unskilled worker (Rs. 6,500 per month) as a basis. The multiplier of 18, as applied by the High Court, was upheld as per National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Pranay Sethi, (2017) 16 SCC 680. The father and sister, being financially dependent, were legal representatives under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, entitling them to compensation. Therefore, the deduction for personal expenses was reduced to 1/4th. The insurance company must first pay the award and then recover from the driver and owner of the offending vehicle, as the driver lacked a valid license. The total compensation was enhanced from Rs. 9,77,200 to Rs. 17,52,500. The appeals was allowed, and the tribunals order was modified. (Para 16 & 17) Sadhana Tomar v. Ashok Kushwaha, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 309

Determination of just compensation - The claimants (dependents of the deceased) sought ₹3,00,00,000 as compensation before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal (MACT). The Tribunal awarded ₹75,97,060 with 9% interest per annum, based on a monthly income of ₹62,725. The High Court modified the Tribunal's findings, attributing 25% contributory negligence to the deceased and reducing the assessed income to ₹50,000 per month, awarding ₹77,50,000 at 6% interest per annum. The claimants challenged the High Court's assessment of contributory negligence and reduction of income. The Supreme Court recalculated the compensation, awarding a total of Rs. 1,20,84,925/- to the appellants (claimants). This included future prospects (40% of income), deductions (1/4th for personal expenses), and application of a multiplier of 15 (based on the deceased's age of 38 years). The Tribunal's award of 9% interest per annum was upheld. The appeals were allowed, and the compensation was enhanced from Rs. 77,50,000/- (as awarded by the High Court) to Rs. 1,20,84,925/-. The impugned judgments of the High Court and Tribunal were modified accordingly. (Para 15 & 16) Prabhavathi v. Bangalore Metropolitan Transport Corporation, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 266 : 2025 INSC 293

Direct Bank Transfer of Compensation - Streamlining Payment Process – Directions issued. (Para 17 - 21) Parminder Singh v. Honey Goyal, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 318 : 2025 INSC 361 : AIR 2025 SC 1713 : (2025) 9 SCC 539

Disability Assessment - Compensation for Pain and Suffering - The appellant, a diamond cutter by profession, suffered grievous injuries, including complete loss of vision in one eye, due to a collision caused by the negligence of an auto-rickshaw driver. The Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, had awarded Rs. 8,70,000/- as compensation, which was later enhanced to Rs. 10,57,500/- by the High Court. The Supreme Court, however, found the High Court's computation of disability at 65% insufficient, given the nature of the appellant's profession, which requires precise vision. The Court held that the functional disability should be assessed at 100%, considering the appellant's inability to continue his vocation as a diamond cutter. Additionally, the Court enhanced the compensation for "pain and suffering" from Rs. 50,000/- to Rs. 1,50,000/-, recognizing the profound impact of the accident on the appellant's life and career. The total compensation awarded by the Supreme Court was Rs. 15,98,000/-, with an interest rate of 8% from the date of the claim petition. Appeal was allowed modifying the compensation awarded by the High Court. Jayanandan v. Varkey, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 44

Disability Certified by Medical Board – Held, a disability certificate issued by a Medical Board, being expert evidence, is binding unless a reassessment is ordered by the court. The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's decision reducing the appellant's disability from 100% to 50% without ordering a reassessment, as such re-determination lacks legal basis. The appellant, rendered comatose due to multiple injuries from a vehicular collision, was awarded Rs.48,70,000/- in compensation, reversing the High Court's enhancement from Rs.16,29,465/- to Rs.19,39,418/-. Tribunals or courts questioning a Medical Board's disability certificate must order a reassessment rather than substituting their own judgment. (Para 9) Prakash Chand Sharma v. Rambabu Saini, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 186 : 2025 INSC 180

Discrepancy in the make of the vehicle cannot be a ground to deny a rightful claim when the vehicle's registration number and other key details are consistent and correctly mentioned. (Para 4) Parameshwar Subray Hegde v. New India Assurance Co. Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 334

Enhancement of Compensation - 100% Disability – The Supreme Court enhanced compensation awarded to a 21-year-old claimant who suffered 100% permanent disability (quadriplegia) in a motor vehicle accident. The Court reassessed the claimant's income, considering his qualifications and potential, and granted future prospects. Additional compensation was awarded for attendant charges, special diet, pain and suffering, future medical expenses, loss of marriage prospects, and physiotherapy. (Para 8 - 13) Parminder Singh v. Honey Goyal, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 318 : 2025 INSC 361 : AIR 2025 SC 1713 : (2025) 9 SCC 539

Foreign Earnings - Multiplier in motor accident claims cannot be reduced on the ground that the deceased was earning in foreign currency. The multiplier is fixed on the basis of the age of the victim and cannot be altered based on the ground of foreign income. The exchange rate prevailing as on the date of the filing of the petition has to be adopted. (Para 9 & 10) Shyam Prasad Nagalla v. Andhra Pradesh State Board Transport Corporation, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 351 : 2025 INSC 193

Insurance Claim - National Permit - The appellant's truck, registered in Bihar and covered under a valid insurance policy, suffered an electrical short-circuit fire on June 8, 2014, while operating within Bihar. The insurer repudiated the claim, contending that the national permit (valid from October 14, 2012, to October 13, 2017) was invalidated due to non-payment of the state authorization fee beyond October 14, 2013. The State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Bihar, allowed the claim, but the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission set it aside, holding no valid permit existed. Whether non-payment of the state authorization fee for a national permit invalidates an insurance claim when the vehicle is used solely within its home state and a valid national permit subsists. Held, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the NCDRC order and restoring the State Commission's decision. A valid national permit remains operative for insurance purposes even without payment of the state authorization fee, provided the vehicle operates within its registered state. Such fee is required only for inter-state movement. Here, the incident occurring in Bihar rendered the repudiation frivolous, entitling the appellant to the claim. The Court emphasized that the national permit, issued by Bihar authorities, complied with policy terms absent any out-of-state travel. Binod Kumar Singh v. National Insurance Company, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 171 : 2025 INSC 154

Insurer of registered owner liable to compensate third-party losses arising out of vehicle, if vehicle's registration was not changed after transfer - Agreement between the registered owner and the appellant clearly indicated that registration would only be transferred after full sale consideration was paid, which had not occurred - The registered owner remained the owner and thus liable to compensate the victims, a liability to be indemnified by the insurer - The insurer was not absolved of its liability- Appeal dismissed. [Paras 7-11] Brij Bihari Gupta v. Manmet, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 787 : 2025 INSC 948

Insurer's Liability - Tractor and Trailer - Third-Party Liability - Negligence - Compensation - Whether the insurer of a tractor is liable for the death of a passenger in an uninsured trailer caused by the tractor's negligence. Held, the insurer of a tractor is liable for an accident involving an uninsured trailer if the accident results from the tractor's negligence and not from any independent fault of the trailer. A trailer, when attached to and towed by an insured tractor, is deemed an extension of the tractor, requiring no separate insurance. The Court dismissed the insurer's appeal, upholding the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal's (MACT) order directing the insurer to compensate the claimants for the death of a woman in a trailer that overturned due to the negligent driving of the insured tractor. The Court endorsed the High Court's ruling in United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Koduru Bhagyamma, 2007 SCC OnLine AP 830, confirming that a trailer attached to an insured tractor does not require separate insurance. The quantum of compensation and the insurer's liability were upheld. (Para 11 & 14) Royal Sundaram Alliance Insurance v. Honnamma, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 533 : 2025 INSC 625 : AIR 2025 SC 2641

Inter-State Stage Carriage Permits on Notified Intra-State Routes – Override of Chapter VI over Chapter V (Section 98) – Validity of Permits on Overlapping Routes – Judicial Precedents – Issue - Whether a stage carriage permit can be granted to a private operator on an inter-State route, in terms of an InterState Reciprocal Transport (IS-RT) Agreement executed under Section 88 of the 1988 MV Act, when a portion of that inter-State route is common to an intra-State route which has been notified in terms of a scheme approved under Chapter VI of the Act – Held, Chapter VI of the 1988 MV Act, containing special provisions for state transport undertakings, has an overriding effect on Chapter V (which includes Section 88 concerning IS-RT Agreements) and any other inconsistent law or instrument, by virtue of Section 98 - An IS-RT Agreement, being merely an agreement between two States and not a law under the relevant MV Act, cannot override the provisions of an approved scheme and notified routes under Chapter VI - If there is a prohibition to operate on a notified route or routes (under an approved scheme), no permits can be granted to any private operator whose route traverses or overlaps any part or whole of that notified route - Substantial question of law is no longer res integra in view of the decisions of larger/Constitution Benches, which are equally binding - The grant of relief to private operators becomes "well-nigh impossible" - Supreme Court directed the Principal Secretaries of the Transport Departments of the States of Madhya Pradesh (MP) and Uttar Pradesh (UP) to meet within 3 months to discuss modalities for fully working out the IS-RT Agreement - The States may explore whether partial exclusion of interState routes from the approved scheme can be permitted to further public interest - Appeals allowed. [Relied on Adarsh Travels Bus Services v. State of Uttar Pradesh [(1985) 4 SCC 557; Paras 23, 26, 40-42, 45, 49, 50] U.P. State Road Transport Corporation v. Kashmiri Lal Batra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1062 : 2025 INSC 1281

Legal Representative - A legal representative is one, who suffers on account of death of a person due to a motor vehicle accident and need not necessarily be a wife, husband, parent or child. The term 'legal representative' under the Motor Vehicle Act should not be given a narrow interpretation to exclude those persons as claimants who were dependent on the deceased's income. The father and sister, being financially dependent, were legal representatives under the Act entitling them to compensation. (Para 13 – 15) Sadhana Tomar v. Ashok Kushwaha, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 309

Loss of Dependency - Unemployed Husband - Held, unemployed husband can be presumed to be partially dependent on deceased wife's income. In determining insurance compensation, the deceased's husband cannot be excluded as a dependent merely because he is an able-bodied man. In the absence of proof of the husband's employment status, his dependency on the deceased's income cannot be disregarded and would be treated as partially dependent on his wife's income. (Para 7) Malakappa v. Iffco Tokio General Insurance Company, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 511 : 2025 INSC 590

Motor Accident Claim - Future Prospects - Awarding Interest - Appellant-Insurance Company assailed the award and amount of interest granted at rate of 9% to be paid to claimant – Held, no illegality in awarding interest on future prospects in motor accident compensation claim cases - Due to pendency of matter before Tribunal or in appeal before higher forums, claimants are deprived of compensation for future prospects - Compensation is not paid in time, so claimants are forced to source their livelihood from somewhere else - This delay is sought to be compensated at least by award of interest which is generally only simple interest - If amounts are disbursed to claimants on a rough calculation by Insurance companies, upon intimation of the accident, subject to award of the Tribunal, then there would not have been any interest liability at least to the extent of amount already paid - Directed to pay entire award amount with 9% interest from date of filing of the claim till date of disbursement - Appeal dismissed. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Niru @ Niharika, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 693 : 2025 INSC 822

Motor Accident Compensation – Conventional Heads - The appeals arose from a motor vehicle accident resulting in the death of the appellant's parents and younger brother. The appellant, the legal heir of the deceased, sought enhancement of compensation awarded by the Motor Vehicles Accident Tribunal, while the insurer (respondent) sought reduction of the compensation. The Tribunal had awarded Rs. 14,78,000/- for the father's death, Rs. 13,33,936/- for the mother's death, and Rs. 2,45,000/- for the brother's death. The High Court enhanced the compensation to Rs. 30,58,000/-, Rs. 16,34,000/-, and Rs. 5,00,000/- respectively. Whether the High Court erred in awarding compensation exceeding the limits set under conventional heads. The Court upheld the High Court's award under conventional heads, noting that the judgment was delivered prior to the Pranay Sethi decision, which capped such awards at Rs. 70,000/-. However, the Court declined to reduce the compensation, as the difference was not excessive and the appellant had suffered significant loss. The Supreme Court dismissed all appeals, upholding the High Court's enhanced compensation, finding it just and reasonable in light of the appellant's tragic loss and the principles of just compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act. New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Sonigra Juhi Uttamchand, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 18 : (2025) 3 SCC 23

Motor Accident Compensation – Deduction for Personal Expenses - The High Court erred in not deducting one-third of the deceased's income towards personal expenses. New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Sonigra Juhi Uttamchand, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 18 : (2025) 3 SCC 23

Motor Accident Compensation - Enhancement - Minor Victim (77.1% Disability) - The Supreme Court enhanced the compensation awarded to a minor victim from Rs. 7.48 Lakhs to Rs. 15.13 Lakhs - Held, compensation must be favourably addressed considering the severity of injuries and disability - Awarded Rs. 3 Lakhs towards 'Pain and Suffering' and Rs. 3 Lakhs towards 'Loss of Marriage Prospects'- Supreme Court added 40% for future prospects, a multiplier of 15 and calculating for 77.1 % disability, loss of future earnings was calculated at Rs. 7, 03,337/-; lumpsum of Rs. 50,000/- was awarded for medical expenses; attendant charges at Rs. 40,000/- and loss of amenities at Rs. 80,000/-; Appeal allowed. [Relied on Sona (minor) vs. Manual C.M. (Civil Appeal No. 002316 of 2025); Paras 5, National Insurance Company Limited vs. Pranay Sethi & Others (2017) 16 SCC 680; Kajal vs. Jagdish Chand (2020) 4 SCC 413; K.S. Muralidhar v. R. Subbulakshmi & Anr. (2024 SCC Online SC 3385); Paras 4-6] Riyas v. P.N. Shinosh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1094 : 2025 INSC 1303

Motor Accident Compensation – Income Assessment - Xerox copies of Income Tax Returns - Whether the High Court erred in assessing the deceased's income without proper proof - The Tribunal rightly disregarded xerox copies of Income Tax Returns and made a reasonable estimation of income based on surrounding circumstances. The High Court's assessment of the deceased's income, though based on assumptions, was reasonable given the circumstances and the age of the deceased. New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Sonigra Juhi Uttamchand, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 18 : (2025) 3 SCC 23

Motor Accidents Claim - The insurance company contended that the vehicle involved was not the one insured and challenged the liability. The MACT found the insurance company, driver, and owner jointly and severally liable. The Supreme Court upheld the findings of the MACT and the High Court that the insured vehicle was involved in the accident, rejecting the insurance company's claim of ambiguity regarding the vehicle's registration number. Insurance coverage is effective from the date of premium payment, irrespective of policy issuance timing. The insurance policy was deemed effective from the date of premium payment, even if the issuance was delayed, thus covering the accident. An insurance company bears the burden of proving a breach of policy conditions to avoid liability. The allegation of fraud by the insurance company was dismissed as unproven, reiterating that fraud must be specifically pleaded and proven with evidence. Allegations of fraud require specific pleading and proof. The appeals were dismissed, affirming the compensation awarded by the MACT and upheld by the High Court. The insurance company was held liable to indemnify the owner and compensate the claimants. National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Maya Devi, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 58

Motor Vehicle Accident Claim - Appellant, a 20-year-old student, suffered amputation of his left leg in a motor accident - Accident occurred when a car ahead suddenly applied brakes, causing appellant to collide with it and subsequently being run over by a bus - MACT awarded Rs. 91 lakhs initially, which was reduced to Rs. 73 lakhs due to 20% contributory negligence by appellant - High Court further reduced the compensation to Rs. 58 lakhs, while modifying the liability for negligence: car driver 40%, bus driver 30% and appellant 30% - Supreme Court modified High Court's order and held that driver must give signal before stopping on Highway and awarded Rs. 91 lakhs compensation to victim who lost his leg in a motor accident, re-evaluating contributory negligence and notional income - Held that the appellant is 20% liable for contributory negligence (for not maintaining sufficient distance and driving without a valid license), the car driver 50% liable and the bus driver 30% liable - Supreme Court enhanced the notional monthly income from Rs. 15,000/- to Rs. 20,000/- considering appellant's future prospects as an engineering student - Applied a multiplier of 18 and 40% for future prospects - Attendant charges of Rs. 18 lakhs reinstated due to 100% functional disability and compensation for loss of marital prospects increased to Rs. 5 lakhs - Set aside order of High court and modified compensation. [Paras 8-11] S. Mohammed Hakkim v. National Insurance Co. Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 749 : 2025 INSC 905

Motor Vehicles Accident – Compensation – Held, minimum wages cannot be determined solely on the basis of a person's educational qualification, without reference to the nature of work carried on - Taking into account that victim that the victim would reasonably have been employed as an accountant upon graduation, fixed a monthly income of Rs. 5,000/- in 2001, with 40% addition towards future prospects, including medical expenses, attendant charges, pain and suffering, loss of amenities and marriage prospects - Supreme Court enhanced the compensation to Rs. 40.34 lakhs besides directing the insurer to pay an additional Rs. 20 lakhs towards verified medical expenses incurred by victim's parents during his lifetime - Considering victim's bright prospects, minimum wages unsuitable for income estimation. [Paras 4-7] Sharad Singh v HD Narang, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 964 : 2025 INSC 1164

Negligence in Motor Accident Cases - Reliability of Police Records - Fraud Allegations Unsubstantiated - Negligence is to be determined on the basis of preponderance of probabilities, not beyond a reasonable doubt. Police records, including FIRs and charge sheets, are admissible evidence for determining negligence. The Tribunal and High Court were justified in relying on such documents to conclude that the driver of the offending vehicle was rash and negligent. The appellant's contention that the respondents connived with the police to prepare a fraudulent charge sheet was rejected due to lack of evidence. The appeal was dismissed, upholding the compensation awarded by the Tribunal and affirmed by the High Court. ICIC Lombard General Insurance Co Ltd v. Rajni Sahoo, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 9

Pay and Recover Principle – Breach of Policy Conditions – Held, even where there is a breach of insurance conditions (such as overloading or carrying gratuitous passengers), the insurer can be directed to satisfy the award with liberty to recover the same from the vehicle owner– Insurance companies cannot evade their obligation to compensate victims in motor accident cases, even when there is a breach of a policy condition- Insurers retain the right to recover the compensation amount from the vehicle owner thereafter - Appeal allowed to the extent of applying the 'pay and recover' principle. [Relied on National Insurance Company Limited v. Swaran Singh 2004 3 SCC 297; Rama Bai v. Amit Minerals 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2067; Para 8-12] Akula Narayana v. Oriental Insurance Company Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1095 : 2025 INSC 1301

Principles of Evidence - Standard of proof in motor accident claim cases - In motor accident claims, the standard of proof is based on the preponderance of probability, not the strict standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt used in criminal trials. (Para 13) Prabhavathi v. Bangalore Metropolitan Transport Corporation, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 266 : 2025 INSC 293

Right to Safe Pedestrian Infrastructure – Right to unobstructed, accessible, and disabled-friendly footpaths forms an integral part of the right to life under Article 21 of the Constitution – Supreme Court directs all States and Union Territories to formulate and implement guidelines for pedestrian safety, ensuring compliance with Indian Roads Congress standards and High Court directives – States and Union Territories to file compliance reports within two months – Union of India to submit policies on pedestrian rights within two months – National Road Safety Board under Section 215B of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, to be constituted within six months. (Paras 1 - 6) S. Rajaseekaran v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 643

Road Accidents – Issue - Whether the State and roadowning authorities are constitutionally and statutorily obligated to ensure pedestrian safety, enforce lane discipline, mandate helmet usage, and curb misuse of dazzling lights and unauthorized sirens to mitigate alarming rates of road fatalities in India - Supreme Court emphasized that safe, encroachment free and well-maintained footpaths constitute a judicially recognized right under Article 21 of the constitution – Held; The State, National Highways Authority of India (NHAI), and municipal authorities are duty-bound to ensure the construction, maintenance, and safety of pedestrian infrastructure in accordance with statutory mandates and standards laid down by the Indian Roads Congress (IRC) and the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 - The Court noted that in 2023 alone, 1,72,890 lives were lost in road accidents—35,221 of them pedestrians- Footpaths are vital for pedestrians' right to safe mobility - Pedestrian deaths indicate grave governance and planning failure - The Ministry of Road Transport and Highways (MoRTH) must strictly implement IRC Guidelines 103–2022 to make roads safe - The right to safe pedestrian access flows from precedents - Pedestrian safety is an essential part of the fundamental right to life under Article 21. Non-compliance with prescribed road safety standards constitutes a violation of that right. State inaction regarding pedestrian infrastructure amounts to dereliction of constitutional duty, warranting judicial intervention and binding directives. [Relied on Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation, (1985) 3 SCC 545; Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation v. Nawab Khan Gulab Khan, (1997) 11 SCC 121; Sudhir Madan v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi, (2009) 17 SCC 332; M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, (2019) 10 SCC 614; Paras 7-14, 18-24] S. Rajaseekaran v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 976 : 2025 INSC 1189

Road Accidents - Protocols for Road Accident Victims - 8-Hour Work Limit for Drivers - The Supreme Court mandated all states and union territories to establish swift response protocols within six months to ensure immediate assistance for road accident victims, addressing delays in medical and rescue services. The Court highlighted the need for state-specific mechanisms to deliver timely aid. Additionally, under Section 91 of the Motor Vehicles Act and the Motor Transport Workers Rules, 1961, the Court directed the Ministry of Road Transport and Highways to work with states/UTs to enforce an 8-hour daily work limit for transport vehicle drivers to prevent fatigue-related accidents. The Ministry is tasked with holding meetings, considering penal measures for non-compliance, and submitting a consolidated compliance report by August 2025. (Paras 1 & 9) S. Rajaseekaran v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 487

Section 149 (Insurance of Motor Vehicles against Third Party Risks) – 'Pay and Recover' Principle – Applicability when a vehicle deviates from the prescribed route as per its permit - Whether a deviation from the prescribed route in a transport vehicle's permit impacts the Insurance Company's liability for an accident occurring on the deviated route – Held, insurance companies cannot deny compensation to accident victims merely because the vehicle involved had deviated from its permitted route- Emphasising the social purpose of motor vehicle insurance, held that to deny compensation on such a technical ground would be “offensive to the sense of justice”- to deny compensation to the victim's dependents because the accident occurred outside the bounds of the permit would be offensive to the sense of justice, as the accident was not their fault; thus, the Insurance Company must pay - Since the contract of insurance operates within certain bounds, expecting the insurer to pay compensation for an incident clearly outside the bounds of the agreement (violation of the permit condition) would be unfair to the insurer - Balancing the need for compensation to the victim with the interests of the insurer, the Supreme Court upheld the High Court's order applying the 'pay and recover' principle in cases of deviation from the permitted route, finding it entirely justified and requiring no interference. [Relied on National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Swaran Singh (2004) 3 SCC 297, New India Assurance Co. v. Kamla (2001) 4 SCC 342, Parminder Singh v. New India Assurance Co. Ltd (2019) 7 SCC 217, S. Iyyapan v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd (2013) 7 SCC 62; M/s Chatha Service Station v. Lalmati Devi & Ors. 2025 SCC OnLine SC 756; Paras 7 - 10] K. Nagendra v. New India Insurance Co. Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1044 : 2025 INSC 1270

Section 149(2) - Insurance - Breach of Policy Condition - Fake Driving Licence - Owner's Liability - 'Pay and Recover' Directions - Proof of Wilful Breach by Insured – Held, the owner of a vehicle, an employer, is not expected to verify the authenticity of the driving licence from the licensing authority; they can only rely on the licence produced by the prospective driver seeking employment - For the insurance company to avoid liability or get 'pay and recover' rights against the insured-owner on the ground of a fake driving licence, the insurance company must establish that the breach was on the part of the insured, meaning the insured had deliberately committed a breach in entrusting the vehicle to a driver who had a fake licence or that the owner did not employ due diligence at the time of entrustment - The mere production of the driving licence by the owner before the Court, or the driver keeping away from the witness box, does not lead to a valid inference of collusion between the employer and the employee - In the absence of pleading or substantiation that the owner allowed the driver to drive the vehicle knowing the licence was fake, or failed to employ due diligence in the driver's employment/entrustment, the High Court erred in issuing 'pay and recover' directions against the insured-owner - The insurance company must prove the insured's wilful breach of the policy condition (entrusting the vehicle to a driver without a valid licence) to be entitled to the right of recovery against the insured, even if the driver's licence is fake - Appeal allowed. [Relied on: IFFCO Tokio General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Geeta Devi, 2023 LiveLaw (SC) 938; United India Insurance Company v. Lehru and Ors., (2003) 3 SCC 338; Paras 6-10] Hind Samachar Ltd. v. National Insurance Company Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 987 : 2025 INSC 1204

Section 15 (as amended by Act 32 of 2019) – Eligibility for Recruitment – Driving Licence Validity – The Supreme Court held that the 2019 Amendment to Section 15 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, which allows for the renewal of a driving licence within one year before or after its expiry, does not create a "grace period" during which an expired licence remains valid for the purpose of professional eligibility- upheld the Telangana State Level Police Recruitment Board's interpretation of eligibility conditions for driver posts, ruling that candidates whose driving licences had expired and were renewed after a gap cannot be treated as having held a licence “continuously” for the prescribed period, even if the renewal was within one year of expiry. Telangana State Level Police Recruitment Board v. Penjarla Vijay Kumar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1235 : 2025 INSC 1452

Section 15(1) Proviso – Statutory Interpretation –Supreme Court clarified that if an application for renewal is made within one year after expiry, the renewal is effective only from the date of renewal and not retrospectively from the date of expiry - candidates whose licences had expired during the two-year period preceding the recruitment notification were not "continuously" holding a valid licence as required by the notification terms, even if they renewed them within the one-year statutory window – Appeal allowed. [Relied on The Divisional Manager New India Assurance Company Ltd. v Shaanabasappa & Ors., SLP (Civil) Nos. 19830-19832 of 2022; Ram Babu Tiwari v United India Insurance Co. Ltd., (2008) 8 SCC 165; Ishwar Chandra v Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., (2007) 10 SCC 650; Paras 22-24, 32, 33] Telangana State Level Police Recruitment Board v. Penjarla Vijay Kumar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1235 : 2025 INSC 1452

Section 162 - Implementation of - Scheme for cashless treatment of road accident victims during the "golden hour" (the critical one-hour period following a traumatic injury) - Motor Vehicle Accident Fund - Directions Issued - Despite the provision being in force since April 1, 2022, no such scheme has been formulated. The Court emphasized the importance of the golden hour in saving lives and noted that delays in treatment due to financial or procedural reasons often lead to fatalities. The Court referred to Parmanand Katara v. Union of India, (1989) 4 SCC 286 which underscored the duty of hospitals to provide immediate medical aid to accident victims. The Court expressed concern over the lack of a scheme under Section 162(2) despite the creation of the Motor Vehicle Accident Fund under Section 164-B and the framing of related rules in 2022. The draft concept note submitted by the Central Government proposed a maximum treatment limit of ₹1,50,000 and coverage for only seven days, which the Court found inadequate to achieve the objective of saving lives during the golden hour. The Court noted that 1,026 claims under the hit-and-run compensation scheme were pending as of August 31, 2024, due to documentation deficiencies. The Central Government was directed to frame and implement the scheme under Section 162(2) by March 14, 2025, and submit an affidavit detailing the implementation plan by March 21, 2025. The General Insurance Council (GIC) was directed to process pending claims based on seven essential documents and to develop a portal for streamlined claim processing by March 14, 2025. The judgment reinforces the right to life under Article 21 of the Constitution and highlights the statutory obligation of the Central Government to ensure timely medical treatment for road accident victims during the golden hour. The Court's directions aim to address systemic delays and ensure the effective utilization of the Motor Vehicle Accident Fund. The Central Government is mandated to expedite the formulation of a scheme for cashless treatment during the golden hour, with strict compliance deadlines set by the Court. S. Rajaseekaran v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 36

Section 162 - Implementation of - Scheme for cashless treatment of road accident victims during the "golden hour" (the critical one-hour period following a traumatic injury) - Statutory Provisions - Section 162 (1) requires insurance companies to provide cashless treatment for road accident victims, including during the golden hour. Section 162 (2) obligates the Central Government to create a scheme for cashless treatment during the golden hour, which may include provisions for a dedicated fund. Section 164B establishes the Motor Vehicle Accident Fund to provide compulsory insurance cover and compensation for road accident victims, including those involved in hit-and-run cases. S. Rajaseekaran v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 36

Section 163A - Special provisions as to payment of compensation - No-fault liability - Supreme court referred to a larger bench the issue of whether a claim under Section 163A of MV Act, can be maintained by the owner/insurer of a vehicle, or their legal representatives, for death or injury arising from a motor vehicle accident – Held, Section 163A is a special provision with a non-obstante clause, overriding other provisions of MV Act, other laws in force, and any instrument having the force of law, including insurance policy terms that confine claims for an owner-driven to a fixed sum - Supreme Court distinguished claims under Section 163A (no-fault liability) from those under Section 166, where proof of negligence is necessary - Section 163A is a beneficial provision - Claims survive against the insurer even if the insured dies after the accident, the liability shifts to the owner's estate and the insurance company must pay if the policy is valid - Supreme Court expressed disagreement with previous two-judge bench decisions that restricted such claims to third party risks and indicated that section 163A should cover liability with respect to death of an owner or a driver, even if it goes beyond the statutory liability under section 147 or contractual liability in the insurance policy. [Paras 13-17] Wakia Afrin (Minor) v. National Insurance Co. Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 764 : 2025 INSC 919

Section 166 — Compensation— Multiplier— Application of Split Multiplier – Held, the practice of applying a split multiplier for calculating compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, is generally foreign to the Act and is not to be used by Tribunals and/or Courts in the calculation of compensation - A split multiplier is only to be used in exceptional circumstances, and such circumstances must be recorded - The deceased's superannuation from service hardly qualifies as an 'out of the ordinary,' 'exceptional,' and 'cogent' reason to justify the use of a split multiplier, as retirement is a natural progression - The age of the deceased is the criterion to be utilized for the multiplier - The Supreme Court noted the divergent opinions on the application of the split multiplier, both intracourt and inter-court, which deprives Tribunals of guidance and creates a concerning situation for judicial discipline - The Supreme Court calculated the compensation based on the principles in Pranay Sethi Case, applying a multiplier of 11 for the age of 51 years, 15% future prospects, and conventional heads with 10% enhancement every three years - Appeal allowed. [Relied on National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Pranay Sethi ((2017) 16 SCC 680; Sarla Verma v. DTC 2009 6 SCC 121; Paras 12-19] Preetha Krishnan v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1073 : 2025 INSC 1293

Section 166 — Motor Accident Compensation — Denial of 'Future Prospects' Benefit – Held, deceased being a self-employed person in a foreign country (USA), the law laid down by the Constitution Bench in National Insurance Company v. Pranay Sethi, (2017) 16 SCC 680 must be followed and applied to determine just compensation - As the deceased was 31 years old (below 40) at the time of the accident and was self-employed, an addition of 40% of the established income must be made towards future prospects as per the principles in Pranay Sethi - The multiplier of 16 applied by the High Court (having regard to the deceased's age of 31 years) was correctly applied and is in consonance with Pranay Sethi - The amounts awarded under conventional heads must be rectified as per Pranay Sethi - i. Loss of Estate: Rs. 15,000/- (Revised from Rs. 10,000/-); ii. Funeral Expenses: Rs. 15,000/- (Revised from Rs. 25,000/-); iii. Loss of Consortium: Rs. 40,000/- per claimant. (Four dependents—wife, daughter, son, and parents —were considered for consortium, totalling Rs. 1,60,000/-) - The High Court's award of Rs. 1,00,000/- for loss of consortium and love and affection was set aside - Total compensation enhanced from Rs. 1,17,20,200/- to Rs. 1,60,15,280/-, granting an additional compensation of Rs. 42,95,080/- with 6% interest. [Relied on National Insurance Company v. Pranay Sethi, (2017) 16 SCC 680; Paras 4-6] Kulwinder Kaur v. Prashant Sharma, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1052 : 2025 INSC 950

Section 2(34) - Andhra Pradesh Motor Vehicle Taxation Act, 1963 (A.P. Act, 1963) - Section 3(1) - Andhra Pradesh Vehicles Taxation Rules, 1963 - Rule 12A - Section 3(1) levies tax on every motor vehicle 'used or kept for use, in a public place in the State' - Expression 'in a public place' not only describes but also limits the words 'used' and 'kept for use' - The liability to pay tax is not on ownership or registration, but on the use or keeping for use in a 'public place' - 'Public place' is a road, street, way or other place to which the public have a right of access – Held, if the public has no right of access to a place, it is not a 'public place' - The liability to pay tax under Section 3(1) of the A.P. Act, 1963, is contingent on the vehicle being used or kept for use in a 'public place' - A motor vehicle could not be subjected to tax for the period it was exclusively used or kept within the restricted premises, even if intimation of non-use was not given under Rule 12A - The vehicles operating exclusively within the enclosed premises of a factory or plant are not liable to pay motor vehicle tax, as such areas do not constitute a 'public place' - Motor Vehicle tax is compensatory in nature - It has a direct nexus with the end use - If a motor vehicle is not used in a 'public place' or not kept for use in a 'public place' then the person concerned is not deriving benefit from the public infrastructure, therefore, he should not be burdened with the motor vehicle tax for such period - Appeal allowed. [Paras 28, 29, 31, 33, 45-50] Tarachand Logistic Solutions v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 852 : 2025 INSC 1052

Sections 140, 166, 168 MV Act - Entitlement of a married daughter and an elderly mother to compensation in a motor accident claim as dependents of the deceased. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision denying compensation for loss of dependency to the married daughter, holding that she is presumed to be financially supported by her husband or his family unless proven otherwise. The married daughter is entitled only to compensation under Section 140 as a legal representative, not as a dependent. The Court set aside the High Court's order denying compensation to the deceased's elderly mother, aged approximately 70 years, who was solely dependent on the deceased with no independent income. Recognizing the duty of a child to maintain their parent in old age, the Court awarded ₹19,22,356/- as compensation to the elderly mother, considering her dependency and potential future hardship. Appeal partly allowed. Compensation denied to the married daughter for loss of dependency but granted to the elderly mother. [Para 13 - 20] Deep Shikha v. National Insurance Company Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 561 : 2025 INSC 675 : AIR 2025 SC 2929

Sections 163A, 166 MV Act – The Supreme Court referred Deepal Girishbhai Soni v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd., (2004) 5 SCC 385 to a larger bench for reconsideration. The precedent held that claimants cannot pursue compensation under Section 163A (no-fault liability) if their claim under Section 166 (fault-based liability) is dismissed. Recognizing the beneficial purpose of Section 163A, the Court questioned the precedent and referred the issue to the Chief Justice for constituting a three-judge bench. Section 163A, a social security provision, does not require proof of negligence, unlike Section 166. In this case, arising from a fatal accident, the Tribunal and High Court dismissed the claimants' Section 166 petition due to the driver's negligence and rejected their request to convert the claim to Section 163A, relying on Deepal Girishbhai Soni. The Supreme Court held that tribunals should permit conversion of claims to Section 163A in suitable cases and noted that no-fault liability could be enforced against the insurer as a third-party claim. The matter awaits reconsideration by a larger bench. (Paras 8 - 12) Valsamma Chacko v. M.A. Titto, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 271

The appellant suffered severe injuries in a motor accident resulting in 60% permanent disability. The Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal (MACT) awarded compensation of Rs. 19,43,800/- with 7% interest. The High Court partially allowed the appellant's appeal, enhancing the compensation for loss of income from Rs. 11,23,200/- to Rs. 27,21,600/- but did not address other heads of compensation adequately. The appellant argued that the MACT and High Court failed to consider the doctor's recommendations and the long-term impact of his disabilities. The Respondent contended that the High Court correctly assessed the notional income and future prospects, and that the compensation under other heads was adequate based on the evidence. The Court reiterated the principles laid down in Sarla Verma, Pranay Sethi, and other precedents regarding the assessment of compensation in motor accident cases, emphasizing the multiplier method and the need for uniformity. The Court found that the High Court correctly enhanced the compensation for loss of income but failed to adequately address other heads of compensation, such as future medical expenses, speech therapy, physiotherapy, and attendant charges, which were not in line with medical recommendations. The Court also noted that the compensation under non-pecuniary heads was insufficient and needed enhancement. The Supreme Court emphasized the need for a comprehensive and just assessment of compensation in motor accident cases, ensuring that all heads of compensation, including future medical needs and non-pecuniary damages, are adequately addressed. The Court enhanced the compensation to Rs. 48,00,000/- to reflect the appellant's long-term needs and the impact of his disabilities. Atul Tiwari v. Oriental Insurance, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 26 : (2025) 3 SCC 6

The appellants, daughters of the deceased, filed claims for compensation after their parents died in a road accident involving a bus owned by Tamil Nadu State Transport Corporation and a Tempo Traveler insured by Oriental Insurance Company. The Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal awarded Rs. 58,24,000/- for the father and Rs. 93,61,000/- for the mother. The High Court reduced the compensation to Rs. 26,68,600/- for the father and Rs. 19,22,680/- for the mother. Whether the High Court erred in reducing the compensation awarded by the Tribunal, particularly in light of the appellants' contention that the business run by their deceased parents suffered a significant loss due to their inexperience. Held, the takeover of the deceased persons' business by dependents does not justify reducing motor accident compensation. The deceased persons' contribution to the business must be considered in assessing compensation claims. The Tribunal's award was well-considered and based on reliable evidence, including Income Tax Returns. The High Court's reduction of compensation was unjustified, as it failed to consider the appellants' lack of experience and the consequent decline in business profitability. The Court emphasized that the transfer of business ownership to the appellants did not automatically mean they could run the business as effectively as their parents. The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgment and restored the Tribunal's award, holding that the compensation was just and reasonable. S. Vishnu Ganga v. Oriental Insurance, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 132

Tribunal and High Court failed to consider the appellant's monthly income while calculating compensation - When a minor child suffers a permanent disability, compensation for the loss of income should be based on, at minimum, the minimum wages of a skilled worker in the relevant state at the time of the accident - Minimum wage for a skilled worker in Gujarat in 2012 (the year of accident) was Rs. 227.85 per days, which rounds to a monthly income of Rs. 6,836, added 40% towards future prospects and applied multiplier of 18 - Upheld the High Court's finding that the appellant's permanent functional disability was 90% - When a child is involved in an accident, the loss of income must be calculated using the minimum wages for a skilled worker in that state - Directed that if a claimant fails to provide proof of income, the opposing party, specifically the insurance company, is obligated to provide the tribunal with the applicable minimum wage as issued by the government - This directive be distributed to all Motor Accident Claim Tribunals via the Registrar Generals of the High Courts - Total compensation of Rs. 35,90,489/- is to be paid with 9% interest p.a. from the date of claim petition - Appeal allowed. [Paras 9-16] Hitesh Nagjibhai Patel v. Bababhai Nagjibhai Rabari, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 871 : 2025 INSC 1070

Municipal Laws

Public Interest Litigation — Judicial Review of Economic and Fiscal Policy — Revision of Property Tax — Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgment that had quashed the Akola Municipal Corporation - Appellant's decision to revise property tax rates – Held, the High Court exceeded the well-settled tenets of judicial review by substituting its own opinion for that of the Municipal Corporation in a matter of economic policy - Supreme Court questioned the locus of the respondent-writ petitioner, noting he was a sitting corporator of the Municipal Corporation and appeared to be agitating an individual grievance or a conflict of business interest under the garb of a PIL - Observed that the PIL was a "subterfuge" to avoid filing statutory appeals under Section 406 of the Maharashtra Municipal Corporations Act, 1949 - Held that Writ Jurisdiction can't be exercised to question economic or fiscal reforms. [Paras 12-14] Akola Municipal Corporation v. Zishan Hussain Azhar Hussain, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1179 : 2025 INSC 1398

Scope of Judicial Interference in Policy Matters - Financial Autonomy of Municipal Bodies - Judicial review of policy decisions is limited to assessing the legality of the decision-making process, not the substantive merits or wisdom of the policy itself. Unless a policy is ex-facie arbitrary, perverse, unconstitutional, or in blatant derogation of statutory provisions, Held that the Courts must exercise judicial restraint - In the absence of constitutional or legal violations, Courts should respect the policy choices made by the executive - Municipal bodies are autonomous institutions with extensive responsibilities (urban planning, sanitation, infrastructure) that require independent revenue generation- Periodic revision of taxes is essential to match rising costs; failing to do so would render these bodies defunct and non-functional - Noted that the tax rates in Akola had not been revised for nearly 16 years, making the revision not only justified but a statutory obligation- Appeal allowed. [Relied on Shri Sitaram Sugar Co. Ltd. v. Union of India (1990) 3 SCC 223; Kirloskar Ferrous Industries Ltd. v. Union of India (2025) 1 SCC 695; Paras 19-22, 26, 27] Akola Municipal Corporation v. Zishan Hussain Azhar Hussain, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1179 : 2025 INSC 1398

Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 (Delhi MC Act) – Section 347A Building Plans – Deemed Sanction– Mixed Use Regulations– Mandatory Commercial Use - Appeal against an order of the High Court affirming the grant of deemed sanction to building plans for the construction of a residential house by the Appellate Authority - MCD/Tribunal and the District Judge - The original house was 85 years old and in a dilapidated condition - The Corporation did not take a decision on the plans, leading to the Tribunal granting deemed sanction - The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and held that the owner of a residential property in an area notified for mixed land use cannot be compelled to develop the property with a commercial unit on the ground floor, especially when the owner wants to use the property only for residential purpose - Held that a bare perusal of the relevant Circular dated 27.05.2009 makes it clear that the High Court correctly held that owners cannot be compelled to convert the ground floor of their residential accommodation to a commercial unit; they may choose to do so - Clause 1 of the Circular states that Building Plans on notified commercial streets/roads can be sanctioned for commercial use/partly commercial/partly residential/fully residential as per the choice of the applicant - The MPD-2021 provision permitting shops on the ground floor in notified areas does not imply that owners are compelled to develop the property in that manner - The new provision is an enabling provision for those who want to use it for mixed purpose - Considering the arbitrary and high-handed manner in which the appellant harassed the respondents over the past 15 years, the Supreme Court imposed costs of Rs. 10,00,000/- on the appellant, payable to the respondents- Appeal dismissed. [Relied on M.C. Mehta v. Union of India and Ors; Paras 7, 10-14, 19, 20] South Delhi Municipal Corporation v. Bharat Bhushan Jain, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1121 : 2025 INSC 1324

Municipalities Act, 1961 (Madhya Pradesh) - Section 22(1)(d)(iii) - The Madhya Pradesh Nagar Palika Nirvachan Niyam, 1994 - Rule 24-A(1) - Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 - Section 138 - Representation of the People Act, 1951 - Section 100(1)(d)(i) & (iv) - Constitution of India - Article 19(1)(a) & Article 136 – Held, candidate convicted under Section 138 of the N.I. Act, 1881, and sentenced to one year's rigorous imprisonment - Failed to disclose this conviction in the affidavit filed along with the nomination form as mandated by Rule 24-A(1) of the Rules of 1994 - Rule 24-A(1) mandates every candidate to furnish information regarding "any disposed criminal case in which he has been convicted" - The format of the affidavit requires disclosure of conviction and sentence of imprisonment for a duration of one year or more - Failure to furnish such information results in non-compliance with the Rules - The requirement to furnish information, including criminal antecedents, is in furtherance of the electorate's right to information under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India - Non-disclosure or suppression of material information deprives voters of making an informed and advised choice - By failing to disclose the conviction, the candidate furnished false and incorrect information, making the acceptance of the nomination form improper - This constitutes a breach of Rule 24-A of the Rules of 1994 and attracts the ground under Section 22(1)(d)(iii) of the Act of 1961 for declaring the election void - When there is non-disclosure of criminal antecedents, the question of whether the election was materially affected does not arise, as such non-disclosure amounts to undue influence - The wrongful acceptance of the nomination form of the returned candidate renders the election void and, by itself, indicates the result was materially affected - In the absence of a provision in the Rules to condone such non-compliance, adopting such a course would do violence to the Act of 1961 and the Rules of 1994 - The eligibility of a candidate is determined as on the date of submission of the nomination form; thus, the subsequent acquittal in appeal after the election was of no consequence - Petition dismissed. [Relied on Krishnamoorthy Vs. Shivakumar and others 2015 INSC 960; Kisan Shankar Kathore vs. Arun Dattatray Sawant & Others 2014 INSC 384; Paras 22-25] Poonam v. Dule Singh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1068 : 2025 INSC 1284

Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957- Master Plan for Delhi (MPD) 2021 -Shop-cum-Residence (LSC) Conversion - Misuse and Unauthorised Construction - The Supreme Court rejected the applicant's Interlocutory Application (I.A.) for de-sealing of Shop/Plot situated in New Rajinder Nagar Market, New Delhi and the prayer for permitting the use of upper floors as commercial – Held, the applicant's property was sanctioned as a “shop-cum-residence”, permitting commercial use only on the ground floor, while the upper floors, which the applicant himself had sought and obtained for residential use, were being illegally utilized for commercial purposes - The classification of New Rajinder Nagar Market as a "designated Local Shopping Centre (LSC)", a shop-cum-residence complex where only the ground floor is meant for commerce, and the upper floors are residential - Directed the MCD to conduct a fresh inspection of the premises and to issue a detailed order identifying non-compoundable violations that must be demolished, calculating the requisite conversion charges for changing the land use, and imposing penalty charges for the excess construction - The applicant was permitted to seek de-sealing of the property only after removing non-compoundable constructions and paying all prescribed charges in full. [Paras 21 - 24] M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1050

National Highway

National Highways Act, 1956 - Control of National Highways (Land and Traffic) Act, 2002; Section 23 - Highway Administration Rules, 2004; Rule 3 (amended 2019) - Duty of Central Government to maintain National Highways free from encroachments - Ineffective enforcement of statutory provisions for encroachment removal - Safety hazards due to encroachments and lack of enforcement - Petition highlighted 53,181 deaths on Indian highways in 2017 (per “Road Accidents in India – 2017” report), attributing unsafe conditions to encroachments and enforcement failures. Previous orders noted absence of mechanisms for detecting unauthorized occupations and mandated inspection and grievance redressal systems. Section 23 of the 2002 Act designates highway land as Central Government property, imposing duties to maintain highways, prevent encroachments, and ensure safety. Noted deficiencies in enforcement, unclear grievance redressal processes via Rajmargyatra app and toll-free number, and non-compliance with Rule 3 of the 2004 Rules. Directions: (i) Highway Administration to file affidavit within three months detailing compliance with Rule 3 duties; (ii) Union of India and Highway Administration to widely publicize Rajmargyatra app through print, electronic, and social media within three months; (iii) MoRTH and NHAI to report on complaints received, actions taken, and creation of grievance redressal portal within three months; (iv) Highway Administration to issue detailed SOP for highway inspection teams; (v) Union Government to form surveillance teams with State Police for highway patrolling, with compliance reported within three months; (vi) Highway Administration to consider and implement Amicus Curiae suggestions, including inspection team circulars, surveillance teams, CCTV installation, and enhancements to Rajmargyatra app and grievance portal. (Paras 6, 14) Gyan Prakash v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 608 : 2025 INSC 753 : (2025) 7 SCC 189

Supreme Court issued key directions to ensure safety - i. Pedestrian Safety Audits: NHAI and road-owning agencies in 50 major cities to audit existing footpaths and prioritize vulnerable areas; ii. Compliance with IRC Guidelines: All pedestrian crossings to conform to IRC 103-2022 standards; iii. Encroachments: Phased removal of obstruction from footpaths with GIS monitoring; iv. Foot Overbridges & Subways: Audits on safety aspects—lighting, CCTV, and panic alert systems; v. High-Risk Zones: Application of data to identify accident-prone pedestrian stretches—especially near schools, hospitals, and transit zones; vi. Online Grievance System: Municipal and highway authorities to create complaint portals for encroachments and maintenance lapses; vii. Helmet Enforcement: States and UTs directed to ensure mandatory wearing of helmets under Sections 128–129 and 194-D of the Motor Vehicles Act; viii. Lane Discipline: Curb wrong-lane driving through automated cameras and fines; ix. Dazzling Lights & Unauthorized Hooters: Ban on non-compliant LED beams, illegal sirens, and strobes; penalties and awareness campaigns mandated; x. Framing of State Rules: States and UTs to frame rules under Sections 138(1A) and 210-D of the MV Act within six months. [Para 35] S. Rajaseekaran v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 976 : 2025 INSC 1189

Citizen's right to unhindered roads - Toll suspension – Held, NHAI or its agents can't levy toll if road is pothole ridden - Public's obligation to pay a user fee for roads is based on assurance that their travel will be free of hindrances - When public pays a toll, they acquire a corresponding right to safe, unhindered and regulated access to the road - Upheld order of High Court's decision to suspend toll collection for 4 weeks - High Court's approach was 'citizen centric approach' and that hardship faced by citizens such as long waits in traffic, strained environment and waste fuel was of greater concern - Supreme Court refused to order a proportionate reduction in toll, noting that the issue was a total lock jam and not just minor repairs in patches - Appeal dismissed and held that citizens should be free to travel on roads for which they have already paid taxes 'without further payment to navigate the gutters and pot-holes, symbols of inefficiency'. [Paras 11, 12, 17] National Highway Authority of India v. O.J Janeesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 819

Narcotics Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (NDPS)

Section 52A - Evidence Act, 1872 - Section 65B(4) – Held, non-production of contraband in trial not fatal if seizure, sample-drawing duly recorded as per Section 52A NDPS Act - Retrial may be ordered only in exceptional circumstances to prevent a miscarriage of justice, and that non-production of contraband cannot justify such a course where electronic evidence, duly certified under Section 65B of Evidence Act, along with records - Once an electronic evidence was certified under Section 65B(4) of the Evidence Act, it is admissible in evidence and there's no requirement that the evidence must be supplied to each witness - If clarification was needed, Appellate Court could have recalled witnesses or admitted further evidence under Section 391 CrPC, instead of ordering a fresh trial - Appeal allowed. [Paras 21, 25, 29, 31 - 33] Kailas Bajirao Pawar v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 914 : 2025 INSC 1117

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 - Section 52A – Sampling and Seizure – Mere non-compliance or delayed compliance with Section 52A is not fatal to the prosecution – Held, sampling at the spot, rather than before a Magistrate, does not automatically void the prosecution - If the oral or documentary evidence inspires confidence regarding the seizure and conscious possession, the conviction can be upheld - Emphasized that procedural irregularities are not fatal unless they create discrepancies affecting the integrity of the seized substance or render the prosecution case doubtful - A reduction in the weight of the sample (from "about 50g" to 40.6g) was found to be sufficiently explained by the loss of moisture and natural drying of the ganja (leaves and seeds) over a 40-day period between seizure and analysis - Slight differences in weight do not undermine the prosecution case if they are not "enormous" - Held that it lacks the discretion to reduce a sentence below the statutory minimum mandated by the legislature for the possession of a commercial quantity under Section 20(b)(ii)(C) - While humanitarian considerations (age, family status) may be relevant for executive remission, they cannot override statutory mandates - Appeal dismissed. [Relied on Surinder Kumar v. State of Punjab, (2020) 2 SCC 563; Jarnail Singh v. State of Punjab, (2011) 3 SCC 521; Noor Aga v. State of Punjab & Anr., (2008) 16 SCC 417; Paras 23, 27, 29, 30, 32] Jothi @ Nagajothi v. State, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1197 : 2025 INSC 1417

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (NDPS Act) - Section 37(1)(b) – Grant of Bail in Offences Involving Commercial Quantity – Twin Conditions – The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's orders granting bail, holding that the High Court failed to properly apply the statutory bar under Section 37 - The twin conditions—recording a satisfaction that there are reasonable grounds to believe the accused is not guilty and that he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail—must be demonstrably complied with - Held that the High Court's conclusion that there was no material to show knowledge was arrived at without discussion of the respondent's statements under Section 67 of the NDPS Act and circumstances relied upon by the prosecution, such as the respondent placing orders, controlling logistics, coordinating with the overseas supplier, and being present when the consignment was opened - Noted that High Court did not examine whether the circumstances, taken at face value, could prima facie indicate conscious control or involvement sufficient to attract the presumption of culpable mental state under Section 35 of the NDPS Act - Matter remitted to the High Court for fresh consideration of the prayer for bail, requiring a complete and fair appraisal of the rival contentions based on the material, and adhering to the parameters of Section 37. [Paras 15-22] Union of India v. Vigin K Varghese, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1101 : 2025 INSC 1316

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (NDPS Act) - Section 37 - Mandatory Conditions for Bail - Release on bail for offences involving commercial quantity is the exception, and negation of bail is the rule – Held, the provisions of the NDPS Act must be interpreted literally and not liberally to prevent frustrating the object, purpose, and preamble of the Act - The issue of long incarceration or delay in trial (accused in custody for 1 year and 4 months and charges not framed) does not dispense with the mandatory requirement of Section 37 in a case involving a commercial quantity and prima facie evidence of organized drug trafficking - Since the accused was charged with offenses punishable with ten to twenty years rigorous imprisonment, it could not be said that the Respondent has been incarcerated for an unreasonably long time - An undertaking given by the accused's brother (a Sepoy in the Indian Army) to ensure compliance with bail conditions is of no relevance because the brother cannot be imprisoned if the accused absconds - Despite long custody and delayed framing of charges, the allegations are serious, as the recovery was much in excess of the commercial quantity and the accused allegedly got cavities ingeniously fabricated below the trailer to conceal the contraband - Appeal allowed. [Relied on Narcotics Control Bureau vs. Kashif (2024 SCC OnLine SC 3848; Paras 11-15] Union Of India V. Namdeo Ashruba Nakade, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1109

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (Seizure, Storage, Sampling and Disposal) Rules, 2022 – Held, NDPS Act does not divest the Special Courts under the NDPS Act of their jurisdiction to entertain an application for interim custody or release of a seized conveyance under Section 451 & 457 CrPC - The Rules of 2022, being subordinate legislation, are only supplemental to the scheme of disposal contemplated under the NDPS Act and cannot supersede the provisions of the parent legislation - The Rules are notably silent on the rights of persons whose property (like a conveyance) is affected by the disposal process - A conjoint and holistic reading of Sections 60(3) and 63 of the NDPS Act makes it abundantly clear that the power to determine whether a seized conveyance is liable to confiscation vests in the Special Court, not in any administrative or executive authority such as the DDC- i. Section 60(3) provides a defence to the owner to prove that the conveyance was used without their knowledge or connivance and that they had taken all reasonable precautions; ii. Section 63 mandates that no final order of confiscation can be passed without affording an opportunity of hearing to the person claiming ownership - Mere fact that a vehicle may be liable to confiscation under Section 60 cannot, by itself, operate to deny interim custody to a bona fide owner in the absence of an express bar under the NDPS Act - Confiscation is a measure resulting in deprivation of property and must be preceded by a prior hearing to ensure an innocent owner is not subjected to undue hardship - When the owner of a vehicle establishes that it was used for transporting narcotics substances without his knowledge or connivance, he cannot be denied interim custody of the vehicle pending trial- Appeal allowed. [Relied on Bishwajit Dey v. State of Assam 2025 INSC 32; (Criminal Appeal No. 1305 of 2025) Paras 13-19, 24- 34] Denash v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1032 : 2025 INSC 1258

Section 32B - Factors to be taken into account for imposing higher than the minimum punishment - Appellant was convicted under Section 21(c) of NDPS Act and was sentenced to 12 years of rigorous imprisonment - High Court reduced the sentence to 10 years and held that without keeping aggravating factors as provided in clause (a) to (f) of Section 32B, Trial Court can't impose a higher sentence than prescribed minimum – Held - that Section 32B does not restrict Trial Court's power in awarding a sentence higher than the minimum of ten years - that in addition to various relevant factors, Court may also take into account the factors prescribed in Section 32B and consider quantity of contraband, nature of the narcotic or psychotropic substance, the antecedents etc, it may deem fit to impose punishment which can be more than the minimum - Held that in Rafi Qureshi vs. Narcotic Control Bureau Eastern Zonal Unit (2019) 6 SCC 492, it was held that section 32B inherently preserves the Court's discretion to consider other relevant factors beyond those listed warranting a sentence higher than the statutory minimum, despite the absence of any aggravating factors - Held High Court did not correctly interpret Section 32B, still Court did not interfere with the order of High Court reducing sentence - Petition dismissed. [Relied Gurdev Singh v. State of Punjab (2021) 6 SCC 558; Para 13-15, 17-19] Narayan Das v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 729 : 2025 INSC 872

Section 8 r/w. 15 and 54 – Conscious Possession – Presumption under Section 54 – Burden of Proof - The appellant was convicted under Section 8 read with Section 15 of the NDPS Act for possession of 50 kg of poppy husk. The prosecution's case rested on the recovery of the contraband from the appellant's possession while he was traveling on a train. The appellant argued that he was not in conscious possession of the contraband, claiming the cartons could have belonged to any passenger. The Supreme Court upheld the conviction, holding that the prosecution had established conscious possession. The Court emphasized that "possession" under the NDPS Act implies not just physical possession but also awareness of the nature of the substance possessed. Once physical possession is established, the burden shifts to the accused to explain how they came into possession and prove lack of awareness of the contraband's nature. The Court noted that the appellant's explanation for being found with the cartons was unconvincing. The Court further relied on Section 54 of the NDPS Act, stating that when the accused is found in possession of a prohibited article and fails to provide a satisfactory explanation, a presumption arises that the accused has committed an offense under the Act. The Court rejected the appellant's arguments and dismissed the appeal. Rakesh Kumar Raghuvanshi v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 100 : 2025 INSC 96

Section 8(c) of the NDPS Act applies to all substances listed in the NDPS Act's Schedule, irrespective of their omission in the NDPS Rules. The accused must prove that their dealing was for authorized medical or scientific purposes and complied with the NDPS Act, Rules, or orders to avoid liability. (Para 90) Directorate of Revenue Intelligence v. Raj Kumar Arora, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 434 : 2025 INSC 498

Section 8(c) - Whether dealing with a psychotropic substance listed in the Schedule to the NDPS Act, but not in Schedule I of the NDPS Rules, constitutes an offence under Section 8(c) of the NDPS Act. Held, dealing in a psychotropic substance like Buprenorphine Hydrochloride, listed in the NDPS Act's Schedule but not in Schedule I of the NDPS Rules, constitutes an offence under Section 8(c) of the NDPS Act unless done for medical or scientific purposes, in accordance with the Act, Rules, or orders, and with proper authorization. The Court overruled the trial court and High Court's reliance on State of Uttaranchal v. Rajesh Kumar Gupta, (2007) 1 SCC 355, affirming Union of India & Anr. v. Sanjeev V. Deshpande, (2014) 13 SCC 1, which held that all substances in the NDPS Act's Schedule are prosecutable. The charges under the NDPS Act against the Respondent were reinstated, and the High Court's decision was set aside. (Para 38, 54, 90, 156) Directorate of Revenue Intelligence v. Raj Kumar Arora, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 434 : 2025 INSC 498

Sections 8(C), 21 and 29 - Respondent was arrested by the Narcotics Control Bureau (NCB) in a joint operation where 1280 grams of brown powder (allegedly heroin) was seized. Two samples sent for testing to the Central Revenues Control Laboratory (CRPL) returned negative for narcotic substances. Despite this, the NCB sought re-testing of a second set of samples, which also tested negative. The respondent was released after four months of confinement, and the NCB filed a closure report. The High Court, while adjudicating the bail application that had become infructuous, awarded Rs. 5,00,000/- as compensation for wrongful confinement. Held, the High Court overstepped its jurisdiction by awarding compensation in a bail application, especially since the bail application had become infructuous due to the respondent's release from custody. Re-testing of samples, despite the first negative report, was improper, but compensation claims should be pursued under appropriate legal avenues, not in bail proceedings. The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's order granting compensation, holding it to be beyond the scope of Section 439 CrPC. Appeal partly allowed; compensation order set aside. (Para 2 & 7) Union of India v. Man Singh Verma, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 265 : 2025 INSC 292

Section 20 – Absence of evidence linking accused to contraband - Acquittal – The appellant, a taxi driver, was convicted under the NDPS Act for the recovery of 20 kilograms of ganja from his vehicle after two passengers fled upon interception by the police. The appellant argued that he was unaware of the contraband as it belonged to the fleeing passengers. No incriminating material was found on his person, and he did not attempt to flee. Held, merely failing to provide details of the passengers, did not establish the appellant's connection to the contraband, especially since no effort was made to trace the passengers. It was unreasonable to expect a taxi driver to know the details of his passengers. The conviction was set aside as the prosecution failed to establish any direct link between the appellant and the contraband. The appeal was allowed, and the appellant was acquitted of all charges under the NDPS Act. Sri Shankar Dongarisaheb Bhosale v. State of Karnataka, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 64

Sections 22 and 29 - Appeal against rejection of anticipatory bail - Allegation of recovery of 550 tablets of Tapentadol Hydrochloride from a vehicle – Tapentadol Hydrochloride is not included in the list of psychotropic substances under the NDPS Act – Accused was entitled to pre-arrest bail - Appeal allowed. (Para 7) Kulwant Singh v. State of Punjab, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 387

Section 37 - Held, bail or suspension of sentence may be granted to a convict under the NDPS Act, despite Section 37's stringent conditions, if the convict has served a significant period of incarceration and the appeal is unlikely to be heard soon. The Court dismissed the Narcotics Control Bureau's appeal, upholding the High Court's order suspending a 10-year sentence after 4.5 years of imprisonment, emphasizing that prolonged denial of bail could violate Article 21 rights. No rigid rule requires a convict to serve half their sentence for bail or sentence suspension during an appeal's pendency. Appellate courts retain discretion to grant relief based on the case's merits, as a rigid approach in fixed-term sentence cases could result in convicts serving their entire sentence before the appeal is heard, infringing Article 21 rights. [Para 5 - 7] Narcotics Control Bureau v. Lakhwinder Singh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 191 : 2025 INSC 190

Section 42 - Search and Seizure – Competency of In-Charge SHO - Held: In the absence of the designated Station House Officer, the In-Charge Station House Officer is competent to exercise powers under Section 42 of the NDPS Act, including conduct of search, seizure and arrest without warrant, provided he belongs to the category of officers empowered by the State Government notification issued under the said provision. The Supreme Court set aside the High Court order quashing the FIR on the ground that the search was conducted by an unauthorised officer (In-Charge SHO). The Court clarified that Section 42 does not require the search to be carried out exclusively by the officer actually posted as SHO; an officer holding temporary charge as SHO, duly authorised under the notification, is equally competent. State of Rajasthan v. Gopal, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 552

Section 52A - Principles - Burden of Proof - Chain of Custody - Substantial Compliance - Procedural safeguards for inventorying, photographing, and sampling seized narcotics must be substantially complied with. Non-compliance alone is not fatal unless it casts doubt on the prosecution's case. The accused must first establish non-compliance with Section 52A on a preponderance of probabilities. The prosecution must then prove substantial compliance or show that non-compliance does not affect the case. Proper sealing and handling of samples are critical. Any discrepancy in the chain of custody can lead to an adverse inference against the prosecution. Minor procedural lapses do not automatically vitiate the trial if the prosecution's case is otherwise credible. Rajwant Singh v. State of Haryana, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 102

Section 52A - Whether non-compliance with Section 52A of the NDPS Act vitiates the trial and conviction, especially when the seized contraband was allegedly mixed before sampling. Held; Section 52A of the NDPS Act is primarily for the safe disposal of seized contraband but also introduces procedural safeguards, including inventorying, photographing, and sampling in the presence of a magistrate. The procedure under Section 52A and related rules requires substantial, not strict, compliance. Non-compliance alone does not vitiate the trial unless it renders the prosecution's case doubtful. Inventory, photographs, and samples certified by a magistrate under Section 52A(4) are treated as primary evidence, even if the bulk contraband is not produced. The initial burden lies on the accused to show non-compliance with Section 52A. Once foundational facts are established, the prosecution must prove substantial compliance or that non-compliance does not affect the case. Procedural lapses under Section 52A do not automatically lead to acquittal. Courts must consider the overall evidence, including discrepancies, and ensure that the prosecution proves its case beyond reasonable doubt. Non-compliance may lead to an adverse inference, but it depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. The Court found no procedural lapse in the sampling process and upheld the conviction, emphasizing that the prosecution had established the recovery and possession of the contraband beyond reasonable doubt. The appeal was dismissed. Bharat Aambale v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 84 : 2025 INSC 78 : (2025) 8 SCC 452

Section 52A - The appellant was convicted under Section 15 of the NDPS Act for possessing poppy straw. The Special Court sentenced him to 10 years of rigorous imprisonment and imposed a fine of Rs. 1 lakh. The High Court upheld the conviction. The prosecution's case was based on the recovery of poppy straw from a car driven by the appellant, following a tip-off about his involvement in drug peddling. The co-accused was acquitted by the High Court. Whether the conviction was vitiated due to non-compliance with Section 52A of the NDPS Act, which mandates procedural safeguards for the disposal, inventorying, and sampling of seized narcotics. Held, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the appellant failed to establish non-compliance with Section 52A of the NDPS Act. The Court emphasized that the initial burden lies on the accused to show non-compliance on a preponderance of probabilities. In this case, no questions were raised during cross-examination regarding Section 52A, and no evidence was presented to prove procedural lapses. The Court also distinguished the case from Mohammed Khalid vs. State of Telangana, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 183 where the conviction was set aside due to multiple loopholes in the prosecution's case, including tampering concerns. Here, the samples were properly sealed, and the chain of custody was intact. The appellant was directed to surrender to serve the remaining sentence. Appeal dismissed. Rajwant Singh v. State of Haryana, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 102

Section 51 - Interim release of vehicles involved in NDPS cases - No Specific Bar under NDPS Act - Whether a vehicle seized under the NDPS Act can be released to its owner during the pendency of the trial. The appellant owned a truck purchased on an EMI basis, which was his sole source of income. The truck was stopped at a police checkpoint, and 24.8 grams of heroin were found concealed in the vehicle. The main accused was arrested, but the appellant and his driver were not implicated in the crime. The appellant sought the release of the truck, which had been lying unused at the police station, citing natural wear and tear. The High Court dismissed the appellant's petition, leading to the present appeal before the Supreme Court. Appellant relied on Sections 451 and 457 of Cr.P.C. and precedents to argue for the interim release of the vehicle, emphasizing that the appellant was not involved in the crime and that the vehicle was deteriorating in police custody. The State contended that the NDPS Act is a special law that does not permit interim release of vehicles used in drug trafficking, as they are critical evidence and may be reused for illegal activities. Held, the Court found no explicit prohibition in the NDPS Act against the interim release of seized vehicles. Section 51 of the NDPS Act allows the application of Cr.P.C. provisions, including Sections 451 and 457, for the custody and disposal of property. Bishwajit Dey v. State of Assam, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 30 : 2025 INSC 32 : AIR 2025 SC 549 : (2025) 3 SCC 241

Section 51 - Interim release of vehicles involved in NDPS cases - Four Scenarios of Seizure - The Court identified four scenarios where contraband is seized from a vehicle: (i) Owner or agent is the accused. (ii) Vehicle is stolen by the accused. (iii) Contraband is found with a third-party occupant without the owner's knowledge. The Court held that in the third and fourth scenarios, where the owner is not implicated, the vehicle should normally be released on interim custody with appropriate conditions. The Court rejected the State's argument that vehicles should not be released due to the risk of reuse, noting that such a stance would lead to absurd outcomes, such as seizing private planes or ships used unknowingly in drug trafficking. Keeping the vehicle in police custody would serve no purpose and only lead to its deterioration. Bishwajit Dey v. State of Assam, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 30 : 2025 INSC 32 : AIR 2025 SC 549 : (2025) 3 SCC 241

Section 51 - Interim release of vehicles involved in NDPS cases - The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and directed the trial court to release the vehicle to the appellant on interim custody under the following conditions: (i) The vehicle must be videographed and photographed, with the inventory authenticated by the Investigating Officer, owner, and accused. (ii) The appellant must furnish an undertaking not to sell or transfer the vehicle until the trial concludes. (iii) The appellant must surrender the vehicle or pay its value if directed by the court after the trial. The Court emphasized that the release of the vehicle would benefit the owner, the financier, and society at large, while ensuring that the vehicle remains available for trial purposes if needed. This judgment clarifies that vehicles seized under the NDPS Act can be released to their owners during the pendency of the trial, provided the owner is not implicated in the crime and appropriate conditions are imposed to safeguard the interests of justice. The decision balances the stringent provisions of the NDPS Act with the practical need to prevent unnecessary hardship to innocent vehicle owners. Bishwajit Dey v. State of Assam, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 30 : 2025 INSC 32 : AIR 2025 SC 549 : (2025) 3 SCC 241

Section 69 - Protection of action taken in good faith - The Court refrained from commenting on the protection afforded to NCB officers under Section 69 of the NDPS Act, which shields officers acting in good faith from prosecution. (Para 8) Union of India v. Man Singh Verma, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 265 : 2025 INSC 292

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (NI Act)

Section 138 and 139 - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Section 482 – Quashing of Complaint – Statutory Presumption – The Supreme Court set aside a High Court order that quashed a Section 138 proceeding on the grounds that the cheque was not issued for the discharge of a debt or liability - held that under Section 139 of the N.I. Act, there is a legal presumption that the holder of a cheque received it for the discharge of a debt or liability - This presumption is rebuttable only during trial through evidence – Held that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC by conducting a "roving enquiry" into disputed questions of fact at the pre-trial stage - When a complaint prima facie discloses the necessary ingredients of an offence under Section 138, it cannot be scuttled at the threshold- Appeal allowed. [Relied on Maruti Udyog Ltd. v. Narender and others (1999) 1 SCC 113; Rangappa v. Sri Mohan (2010) 11 SCC 441; Rajeshbhai Muljibhai Patel v. State of Gujarat (2020) 3 SCC 794; Rathish Babu Unnikrishnan v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2022) 20 SCC 661; Paras 11-18] Sri Om Sales v. Abhay Kumar @ Abhay Patel, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1236 : 2025 INSC 1474

Sections 138, 141, and 148 – Appellate Deposit – Vicarious Liability – The Supreme Court referred to a larger bench the question of whether a convicted director or authorized signatory can be directed to make the 20% appellate deposit under Section 148, or if such deposit is strictly confined to the juristic "drawer" (the company) in all scenarios. Bharat Mittal v. State of Rajasthan, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1223 : 2025 INSC 1459

Section 148 NI Act – Mandatory Nature and Discretion – Following the ratio in Surinder Singh Deswal v. Virender Gandhi, the requirement under Section 148 is generally mandatory ("may" construed as "shall")- clarified in Jamboo Bhandari v. M.P. State Industrial Development Corporation Ltd., the Appellate Court retains limited discretion to exempt an appellant from this deposit in "exceptional circumstances," provided specific reasons are recorded. Bharat Mittal v. State of Rajasthan, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1223 : 2025 INSC 1459

Interpretation of "Drawer" vs. Vicarious Liability – Noted a conflict between a literal interpretation of "drawer" (restricted to the entity whose account the cheque is drawn on) and a purposive interpretation that aligns with the legislative intent of the 2018 Amendment to prevent dilatory tactics- While Shri Gurudatta Sugars Marketing P. Ltd. v. Prithviraj Sayajirao Deshmukh and Bijay Agarwal v. Medilines held that authorized signatories are not "drawers" for the purpose of pre-trial/appellate deposits, the current Bench expressed difficulty in concurring with these views, emphasizing the compensatory and quasi-criminal nature of Section 138 proceedings- Reaffirming Aneeta Hada v. Godfather Travels & Tours Pvt. Ltd., held that while a company must generally be arrayed as an accused for vicarious liability to attach to directors under Section 141, an exception exists where a "legal snag" (like winding up or liquidation) prevents the company's prosecution- In such cases, the prosecution may proceed solely against the individuals in charge. [Relied on Aneeta Hada v. Godfather Travels & Tours Pvt. Ltd., (2012) 5 SCC 661; Surinder Singh Deswal v. Virender Gandhi, (2019) 11 SCC 341; Anil Hada v. Indian Acrylic Ltd., (2000) 1 SCC 1; 15-30, 61-63, 71-74] Bharat Mittal v. State of Rajasthan, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1223 : 2025 INSC 1459

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (NI Act) - Section 138 - Income Tax Act, 1961 (IT Act) - Supreme Court set aside the order of High Court wherein it was held that a debt created by a cash transaction above Rs. 20,000 in violation of the IT Act, cannot be considered as a 'legally enforceable debt' under Section 138 NI Act - Held that an accused need not be heard at the pre-cognizance stage of complaints filed for dishonour of cheque as per section 138 of NI Act - Noted that the massive backlog of cheque bouncing cases and the fact that service of summons on the accused in a complaint filed under section 138 NI Act continues to be one of the main reasons for the delay in disposal of the complaints as well as the fact that punishment under NI Act is not a means of seeking retribution but is more a means to ensure payment of money and to promote credibility of cheques as a trustworthy substitute for cash payment - Held that approach of some courts below to not give effect to the presumptions under section 118 and 139 of NI Act is contrary to mandate of Parliament - Appeal allowed. [Relied on Indian Bank Association vs. Union of India, (2014) 5 SCC 59; Damodar S. Prabhu vs. Sayed Babalal H., (2010) 5 SCC 663; Paras 15-18, 22-24] Sanjabij Tari v. Kishore S. Borcar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 952 : 2025 INSC 1158

Supreme Court issued guidelines for speedy trial of cheque bounce cases - i. Summons shall not only be served by the usual prescribed modes but also dasti; ii. Electronic service of summons via email, mobile, WhatsApp is mandated under the Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS); iii. District Courts must operationalize secure online payment options (QR codes/UPI links) so accused can pay cheque amount immediately at the early stage; iv. Courts shall provide directions for release of the money received and may pass compounding orders accordingly; v. Complainant must file an affidavit of service; false affidavits invite action; vi. Courts should conduct summary trials unless cogent reasons for summary trial conversion to summons trial are recorded; vii. Courts may ask accused pertinent questions on cheque ownership, signature, liability, and defence at initial post-cognizance stage - Responses should be recorded on the order sheet visibly; viii. Powers to order interim deposits early must be exercised - Post service of summons, cases to be listed before physical courts (pre-service may be digital); ix. Dedicated dashboards for pendency, disposal, settlements, adjournments to be maintained - Monthly reviews by District and Sessions Judges - Quarterly consolidated reports to High Courts; x. Various graded cost regimes depending on stage of compounding application and timely payment of cheque amount - Courts may suggest Probation of Offenders Act relief or acceptance of guilty plea to facilitate early closure. [Relied on P. Mohanraj vs. Shah Brothers Ispat Pvt Ltd., (2021) 6 SCC 258; Para 33-39] Sanjabij Tari v. Kishore S. Borcar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 952 : 2025 INSC 1158

Transfer of Section 138 - Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (NI Act) Cases – "David versus Goliath" Battle – Comparative Inconvenience vs. Statutory Jurisdiction — The Supreme Court observed that the power to transfer criminal cases under Section 406 CrPC (now Section 446 BNSS) remains intact notwithstanding the non-obstante clause in Section 142 of the N.I. Act - While Section 142(2) facilitates the payee's convenience by locating jurisdiction at their bank, this statutory inclination does not override the Court's duty to ensure a "level-playing field" and prevent an "unfair battle" between unequal parties - Spatial distance is not merely about physical exertion; it involves the potential "eclipse of fair trial rights," including the right to legal representation and the preparation of a defense - noted that for a small borrower to traverse over 1,000 km to defend a case instituted by a large corporation with nationwide branches impacts the fundamental right to adequate legal assistance - Supreme Court differed from the view in Shri Sendhur Agro & Oil Industries vs. Kotak Mahindra Bank Ltd., which held that "mere inconvenience" is insufficient for transfer - Considering the "comparative inconvenience" and the "relative status and wherewithal of parties," the matter is referred to a Larger Bench for a definitive opinion - held that notwithstanding the specific jurisdictional mandates of Section 142(2) N.I. Act, the Supreme Court's power to transfer cases under Section 406 CrPC remains intact if expedient for the ends of justice - Shifting the situs of a trial in a quasi-criminal case (Section 138) may be judged primarily on the relative convenience of the parties - When a large bank sues a small-time borrower, a transfer to secure adequate legal representation for the accused hardly impacts the corporation's right to access justice - Noted that Section 139 N.I. Act creates a statutory presumption against the accused, while Sections 145 and 146 give an "evidentiary head start" to the complainant - Held that this makes the task of an accused defending themselves in a far-off court even more "herculean”. [Relied on Yogesh Upadhyay v. Atlanta Ltd. (2023) 19 SCC 404; Dashrath Rupsingh Rathod v. State of Maharashtra (2014) 9 SCC 129; Nahar Singh Yadav v. Union of India (2011) 1 SCC 307; Paras 16-19, 22-24] Golla Naraesh Kumar Yadav v. Kotak Mahindra Bank, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1172 : 2025 INSC 1387

Distinction between 'delivery' and 'presentation' illustrated - Supreme Court distinguished delivery (Section 46 NI Act) from presentment (Section 64 NI Act) - Held that delivery involves the drawer handing the cheque to the payee, and, in case of account-payee cheques, the payee delivering it to his own bank - This stage is covered by Section 142(2)(a) - Presentment is the act of presenting the cheque to the drawee bank for payment; this stage is relevant for Section 142(2)(b). [Relied on Bijoy Kumar Moni v. Paresh Manna 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3833; Paras 42-50] Jai Balaji Industries Ltd. v. Heg Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1149 : 2025 INSC 1362

Section 138, 142(2) & 142A — Territorial Jurisdiction — Transfer of Pending Cases — Effect of Amendment Act, 2015 - Jurisdiction Post-2015 Amendment - Held that Supreme Court reiterates that the jurisdiction to try a complaint under Section 138 of the NI Act is vested in the court within whose local jurisdiction the bank where the payee or holder in due course maintains an account (and where the cheque is delivered for collection) is situated. [Para 76] Jai Balaji Industries Ltd. v. Heg Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1149 : 2025 INSC 1362

Transfer of Cases where Evidence Commenced (Section 145(2) Stage) - Held that a complaint which was originally filed in a court (MM, Kolkata) that later lacked jurisdiction due to the 2015 Amendment, but had already reached the stage of recording of evidence under Section 145(2) of the Act before it was returned, should be transferred back to that original court - Allowing the parties to contest the complaint afresh in the court of proper jurisdiction (JMFC, Bhopal) would amount to a procedural impropriety detrimental to the accused - The Supreme Court applies the exception carved out in Dashrath Rupsingh Rathod Case; principle laid down in paragraph 22 of this judgment, which allowed cases that had reached the stage of Section 145(2) or beyond to continue in the court where they were pending, is applied to meet the ends of justice - Held that cases where the trial had reached the stage of summoning, appearance of the accused, and the recording of evidence had commenced as per Section 145(2) Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, should continue in the same court where the trial was ongoing - Petition is allowed. [Relied on Dashrath Rupsingh Rathod v. State of Maharashtra, (2014) 9 SCC 12; Paras 76-82] Jai Balaji Industries Ltd. v. Heg Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1149 : 2025 INSC 1362

Section 138 – Dishonour of Cheque – Settlement at Revisional Stage – Acquittal subject to condition of depositing cost with Legal Services Authority – Held, the direction imposing costs on the appellant, to be paid to the Legal Services Authority, cannot be sustained in the eye of law, particularly when the complainant does not want any further amount, and the appellant has expressed inability to comply with the same, which is not in dispute - Held that the case Damodar S. Prabhu v. Sayed Babalal H. [(2010) 5 SCC 663 which provide for imposition of costs in NI Act depending on at which stage the case was compounded, could not be treated as binding. [Para 5-7] Rajeev Khandelwal v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1103

Sections 138, 141 - Criminal Liability - Maintainability of Complaint without arraying Trust as Accused - Indian Trusts Act, 1882 - Sections 3, 13 - Issue - Whether a criminal complaint under Section 138 of the NI Act is maintainable against the Chairman/a Trustee of a Trust, who signed the dishonoured cheque on behalf of the Trust, without arraying the Trust itself as an accused – Held, cheque dishonour complaint maintainable against trustee without arraying trust as accused-  Trust is not a Legal Entity/Juristic Person - A 'Trust' under the Indian Trusts Act, 1882, is defined as an obligation annexed to the ownership of property, and not a legal entity with a separate existence capable of suing or being sued - It is the Trustee(s) who are legally bound to maintain and defend all suits for the preservation of the trust property-  Therefore, a Trust is not like a corporation or 'body corporate' - Liability of Cheque Signatory - Held that the signatory of a cheque that is dishonoured is clearly responsible for the incriminating act and will be covered under sub-section (2) of Section 141 (by analogy to a company officer) - For such a person, there is no need to make a specific averment that he was in charge of and responsible to the entity for the conduct of its business - Appeal allowed. [Relied on SMS Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. Neeta Bhalla, (2005) 8 SCC 89; K K Ahuja v. V K Vora, (2009) 10 SCC 48; Paras 18, 22, 23, 25- 27] Sankar Padam Thapa v. Vijaykumar Dineshchandra Agarwal, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 991 : 2025 INSC 1210

Sections 138, 142(2)(a) - Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 - Section 200, 482 - Territorial Jurisdiction - Dishonour of Cheque - Place of filing complaint – Held, Section 142(2)(a) which was amended in 2015, specifies that an offence under Section 138 should be inquired into and tried by a Court within whose local jurisdiction 'if the cheque is delivered for collection through an account, the branch of the bank where payee maintains the account is situated”- Jurisdiction vests in Court where the payee maintains their account and the cheques delivered for collection - Set aside High Court's Order - Appeals allowed. [Paras 7-9] Prakash Chimanlal Sheth v. Jagruti Keyur Rajpopat, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 769 : 2025 INSC 897

Section 138 - dishonour of cheque - 141- offence by companies - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Quashing of an FIR – Issue - Whether compliant under section 138 NI Act maintainable if only partners of firm are arrayed as accused and partnership firm itself is not arrayed - High Court quashed complaint citing non arraignment of partnership firm as an accused – Held, Section 141 is a deeming provision and a firm without reference to its partners has no juristic identity by law - Partnership firm is not distinct from partners who comprise partnership - if the complainant had proceeded only against partnership firm and not the partners it possibly could have been held that the partnership firm in absence of its partner is not a complete juristic entity and cannot be proceeded against. [Para 6.9] Dhanasingh Prabhu v. Chandrasekar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 708 : 2025 INSC 831

Section 138 - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Sections 2(wa), 372, 378 (4), 378 (6) - Dishonour of Cheque - Special Leave to Appeal - Appeal against order of acquittal – Victim's right to appeal - Whether an appeal would be maintainable under the proviso to section 372 of CrPC against an order of acquittal passed in a case instituted upon a private complaint under section 138 by treating complainant in such a proceeding as a victim under section 2(wa) CrPC – Held, a complainant in a cheque dishonour case for the offence under section 138 of Negotiable Instrument Act is a “victim” within the meaning of section 2(wa) of CrPC. The complainant can proceed as per the proviso to section 372 CrPC. Complainant need not invoke section 378(4) CrPC and could file appeal as 'victim' as per section 372 proviso. (Para 7.11) Celestium Financial v. A Gnanasekaran, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 666 : 2025 INSC 804

Section 141 – Dishonour of Cheque – Liability of Company Directors – Held, a complaint under Section 141(1) does not require specifying the precise administrative role of directors to establish liability for cheque dishonour. General averments that a director was "in charge of and responsible for" the company's business are sufficient at the complaint stage, without needing verbatim statutory language. The complainant must only plead the accused's role generally, as specific administrative details are within the special knowledge of the company or director. The burden lies on the director to prove they were not in charge during the trial. Magistrate's order issuing process upheld; High Court's order quashing proceedings set aside. [Paras 34–38] HDFC Bank Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 624 : 2025 INSC 759 : AIR 2025 SC 2707 : (2025) 9 SCC 653

Section 138 - Application of Res Judicata in Criminal Proceedings - The principle of res judicata applies to criminal proceedings, barring re-litigation of issues conclusively determined in earlier proceedings. Factual findings by a criminal court are binding on both parties in subsequent proceedings involving the same issue. However, res judicata does not apply to proceedings dismissed as withdrawn or not decided on merits. The Court quashed subsequent cheating case under Section 420 IPC, as prior proceedings under the NI Act established that demand drafts were issued for distinct liabilities, unrelated to the dishonoured cheques, rendering the new prosecution an abuse of process. [Paras 19 & 20] S.C. Garg v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 436 : 2025 INSC 493

Section 138 - Complainant has no onus to prove financial capacity at the threshold. Once the drawer admits to signing the cheque, the presumption under Section 139 of the NI Act cannot be rebutted merely by questioning the complainant's debt-giving capacity, especially when such a defence was not raised in the reply notice by the accused. The High Court wrongly imposed an initial burden on the complainant to prove financial capacity and loan details. (Para 21 & 22) Ashok Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 383 : 2025 INSC 427 : AIR 2025 SC 1931

Section 141 - A signatory of a cheque, if in charge of a firm's affairs, can be prosecuted without impleading the firm. Since the accused was the signatory and a partner in charge, the complaint was maintainable without impleading the firm. (Para 19 & 20) Ashok Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 383 : 2025 INSC 427 : AIR 2025 SC 1931

Section 138 - Reply to the Statutory Notice - This was a case where very material documents in the form of two letters addressed by the appellant were suppressed in the complaint and the statement on oath under Section 200. In the statement on oath, the respondent-complainant vaguely referred to a 'false notice reply', but a copy of the reply was not produced by the respondent along with the complaint. Setting criminal law in motion by suppressing material facts and documents is nothing but an abuse of the process of law. Hence, the High Court ought to have interfered and quashed the complaint. Complaint and cognizance order set aside, leaving civil remedies open. (Para 20 - 23) Rekha Sharad Ushir v. Saptashrungi Mahila Nagari Sahkari Patsansta Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 355 : 2025 INSC 399 : AIR 2025 SC 1857

Section 138 – Return of a dishonoured cheque simpliciter does not create an offence under Section 138 NI Act. The cause of action arises only when a demand notice is served and payment is not made within the stipulated fifteen-day period. (Para 9) Vishnoo Mittal v. Shakti Trading Company, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 314 : 2025 INSC 346 : AIR 2025 SC 1741 : (2025) 9 SCC 417

Section 138 – Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016; Section 14 & 17 - Where the cause of action for an offence under Section 138 NI Act arises after the imposition of a moratorium under Section 14 IBC, proceedings under Section 138 of the NI Act cannot be initiated against the Director of the Corporate Debtor. Upon the imposition of a moratorium and the appointment of an Interim Resolution Professional (IRP) under Section 17 of the IBC, the management of the Corporate Debtor vests in the IRP, and the powers of the Board of Directors are suspended. Consequently, the Director lacks the capacity to fulfil the demand raised by a notice under Section 138 NI Act. The judgment in P. Mohan Raj v. M/s Shah Brothers Ispat Pvt. Ltd. (2021) 6 SCC 258 is distinguishable, as in that case, the cause of action under Section 138 NI Act arose before the imposition of the moratorium. Proceedings under section 138 of the NI Act are quashed, when the cause of action arises after the imposition of moratorium, and the director of the company has been suspended from his duties, and the IRP has taken over the management of the company. (Para 11 - 13) Vishnoo Mittal v. Shakti Trading Company, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 314 : 2025 INSC 346 : AIR 2025 SC 1741 : (2025) 9 SCC 417

Section 138 - Whether a complaint under Section 138 of the N.I. Act can be transferred under Section 406 Cr.P.C. on grounds of lack of territorial jurisdiction? Held, a complaint under Section 138 of the N.I. Act cannot be transferred under Section 406 Cr.P.C. for lack of territorial jurisdiction. Power to transfer cases under Section 406 Cr.P.C. is discretionary and must be exercised sparingly. Mere inconvenience or hardship to the accused, such as travel or language barriers, does not justify transfer unless there is a reasonable apprehension of injustice. (Para 49 & 65) Shri Sendhuragro and Oil Industries v. Kotak Mahindra Bank, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 292 : 2025 INSC 328

Section 138 - Whether the phrase “expedient for the ends of justice” in Section 406 Cr.P.C. encompasses cases where the court lacks territorial jurisdiction under Section 138 of the N.I. Act? Held, the phrase “expedient for the ends of justice” in Section 406 Cr.P.C. does not include cases where the court lacks territorial jurisdiction. (Para 65) Shri Sendhuragro and Oil Industries v. Kotak Mahindra Bank, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 292 : 2025 INSC 328

Section 138 - Transfer of Trial – Principles - Whether the Supreme Court can transfer a case under Section 406 Cr.P.C. if the court where the complaint is filed lacks territorial jurisdiction? Held, lack of territorial jurisdiction alone not sufficient ground. Broad factors to be considered include: (i) Prosecution acting in collusion with the accused. (ii) Likelihood of accused influencing witnesses or causing harm to complainant. (iii) Comparative inconvenience and hardship to parties and witnesses. (iv) Communally surcharged atmosphere affecting fair trial. (v) Hostile persons interfering with the course of justice. These factors are illustrative, not exhaustive. Ensuring a fair trial is the paramount consideration. (Para 49) Shri Sendhuragro and Oil Industries v. Kotak Mahindra Bank, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 292 : 2025 INSC 328

Section 138 and 142 (2) - Petitioner sought the transfer of a criminal complaint filed under Section 138 of the N.I. Act by Kotak Mahindra Bank Ltd. from the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Chandigarh, to the Metropolitan Magistrate, Coimbatore, Tamil Nadu. The petitioner argued that the entire transaction, including the loan processing, EMI deductions, and SARFAESI proceedings, occurred in Coimbatore, and no cause of action arose in Chandigarh. The petitioner also cited inconvenience, language barriers, and harassment as grounds for transfer. The Supreme Court reiterated that under Section 142(2) of the N.I. Act, as amended in 2015, the jurisdiction for complaints under Section 138 lies with the court where the cheque is delivered for collection through the payee's bank account. The court in Chandigarh had jurisdiction as the cheque was presented for collection there, even if the transaction occurred in Coimbatore. The petitioner's grievances did not meet the threshold for transfer, as the Chandigarh court had valid jurisdiction under Section 142(2) of the N.I. Act. The Supreme Court dismissed the transfer petition, holding that no case was made out for transferring the proceedings from Chandigarh to Coimbatore. It is always open for the petitioner accused to pray for 2 exemption from personal appearance or request the Court that he may be permitted to join the proceedings online. (Para 65) Shri Sendhuragro and Oil Industries v. Kotak Mahindra Bank, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 292 : 2025 INSC 328

Section 138 - Territorial Jurisdiction - Transfer Petition – Maintainability - The issue of lack of territorial jurisdiction in complaints filed under Section 138 of the N.I. Act is a matter to be raised before the Trial Court. The Magistrate has the power to return the complaint for presentation to the proper court if satisfied that the court lacks territorial jurisdiction. Therefore, the issue of territorial jurisdiction cannot be adjudicated in a transfer petition. (Para 2 & 3) Kamal Enterprises v. A. K. Constructions Co, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 289

Section 138 r/w. 141 – Vicarious Liability of NonExecutive Directors – Quashing of Criminal Proceedings – Held, Non-executive and independent directors cannot be held vicariously liable under Section 141 of the NI Act for dishonor of cheques unless specific allegations demonstrate their direct involvement in the company's affairs at the relevant time. Mere designation as a director or attendance at board meetings does not create automatic liability. The complaint must contain specific averments establishing a direct nexus between the directors and the financial transactions in question. In the absence of such specific allegations and where records confirm a non-executive role without financial decision-making authority, criminal proceedings under Section 138 read with Section 141 of the NI Act against non-signatory, non-executive directors are liable to be quashed. (Para 16 & 18) K.S. Mehta v. Morgan Securities and Credits Pvt. Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 286 : 2025 INSC 315 : AIR 2025 SC 1607 : (2025) 7 SCC 615

Section 141 - Vicarious Liability of Directors - Twin Requirements for Prosecution – Held, for an offence under Section 141 of the N.I. Act, 1881, involving dishonour of a cheque by a company, the complaint must allege that the accused person was both in charge of and responsible to the company for the conduct of its business. These are distinct requirements, and both must be explicitly stated in the complaint. Only the signatory of the cheque can be held liable, and in the absence of allegations that the appellant was in charge of the company's business, prosecution under Section 141(1) cannot be sustained. The Court set aside the High Court's order dismissing the appellant's plea to quash the complaint and allowed the appeal, without commenting on the merits of the case against other accused. (Para 5) Hitesh Verma v. Health Care at Home India Pvt. Ltd;, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 176 : (2025) 7 SCC 623

Section 138 – Dishonour of cheque – Liability of Director – Resignation before issuance of cheque – Quashing of complaint – Held, where the appellant had resigned from the post of Director prior to the issuance of post-dated cheques by the company, and the cheques were signed by another competent person, the appellant could not be held liable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. It was undisputed that the appellant resigned on 21.06.2019 and the resignation was acknowledged by the Registrar of Companies on 26.06.2019, whereas the cheques were issued on 12.07.2019. Therefore, the appellant was not in charge of or responsible for the affairs of the company at the relevant time. The judgment of Malva Cotton and Spinning Mills Ltd. v. Virsa Singh Sidhu (2008) 17 SCC 147 was distinguished on facts, as in that case, the resignation was submitted after the issuance of the cheques. The appeals were allowed, and the impugned order of the High Court dismissing the petitions under Section 482 Cr.P.C. was set aside. The complaints under Section 138 NI Act against the appellant were quashed. Appeals Allowed. Adhiraj Singh v. Yograj Singh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 75

Section 142 - Whether the High Court was justified in quashing the complaint under Section 138 NI Act on the ground of lack of specific averments regarding the personal knowledge of the power of attorney holder in the complaint and supporting documents. The High Court relied on the decision in A.C. Narayanan v. State of Maharashtra, (2014) 11 SCC 790 to hold that the power of attorney holder lacked personal knowledge of the facts giving rise to the proceedings, as there were no specific pleadings to that effect in the Letter of Authority or affidavits. However, a conjoint reading of the Letter of Authority, the verifying affidavit, and the affidavit of evidence under Section 200 of the Cr.P.C. demonstrated that the manager and power of attorney holder of the appellant-firm, had personal knowledge of the transactions and was duly authorized to file the complaint. The complaint satisfied the requirements of Section 142 of the NI Act as it was filed by the payee through its authorized representative. The High Court's reliance on inherent powers under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. to quash the complaint was unwarranted and contrary to the settled principle that such powers should be exercised sparingly and not interfere with a fair trial. The High Court erred in quashing the complaint based on incorrect reasoning and lack of due consideration. The appeal was allowed, and the complaint was restored to the file of the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate for adjudication on merits. Appeal allowed. Judgment and order of the High Court quashed and set aside. Complaint restored for fresh adjudication. Naresh Potteries v. Aarti Industries, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1 : 2025 INSC 1 : AIR 2025 SC 886

Promissory Note - Suit of Recovery of amount - Onus of Proof - Supreme Court set aside a High Court order that reduced the amount recoverable under a promissory note from Rs. 35,29,690 to Rs. 22,00,000 and restored the Trial Court's decree - High Court reduced the amount citing a lack of documentary proof for the cash portion of the loan – Held, once a promissory note is accepted, the onus is on the respondent to disprove the debt, not on the appellant to provide documentary evidence for cash payments - It is not uncommon for money transactions to include a cash component and that the absence of a receipt or bank transaction is not sufficient to negate the payment, especially when a promissory note exists - Initial presumption of legally enforceable debt comes from NI Act - High Court's view was erroneous and unsustainable - Appeal allowed. Georgekutty Chacko v. M.N. Saji, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 878

Negotiable Instrument Act, 1881 (NI Act) - Section 138 Proviso (b) - Principle of strict construction of penal statutes - Whether notice is valid where demanded amount differs from the cheque amount – Held, compliant under Section 138 is not maintainable if demand notice didn't mention exact cheque amount and typo error cannot be a defence - If the amount mentioned in the demand notice varies from the cheque amount, then the complaint is not maintainable - The notice in terms of proviso being a provision in penal statute and a condition for the offence, it has to be precise while mentioning of the amount of the cheque which is dishonoured - Quashed complaint filed under Section 138 of NI Act on the above ground as the amount mentioned in the notice was not same as per the cheque - Even if the cheque number mentioned in the notice was correct but amount was different, it created an ambiguity and differentiation about the 'said amount' - Notice stood bad in law - Section 138 being penal, must be strictly construed, no leniency allowed for errors in amount mentioned in legal notice as the offence is technical and procedural compliance is mandatory. [Paras 5-8] Kaveri Plastics v. Mahdoom Bawa Bahruden Noorul, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 927 : 2025 INSC 1133

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (NI Act) - Whether a compromise reached between parties in a case under Section 138 of NI Act can be a basis for setting aside a conviction, especially after the matter has been upheld by multiple courts – Held, the offence under Section 138 of the NI Act is 'mainly civil wrong' and is specifically made compoundable under Section 147 of NI Act - A settlement, once voluntarily entered into by the parties, allows them to save themselves from the litigation process, and courts should not override such a compromise - The compromise deed dt. April 6, 2025 and an affidavit from respondent confirmed that a settlement had been reached - Respondent had accepted payment in full and final settlement of debt - Since a voluntary compromise was reached, the proceedings under Section 138 of NI Act could no longer be sustained and conviction had to be set aside - Set aside High Court's order. Appeal allowed. [Paras 6-12] Gian Chand Garg v. Harpal Singh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 865

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 - Section 138, proviso to section 142 - Supreme Court quashed complaint, citing that there cannot be an 'automatic or presumed condonation' of a complaint filed beyond the statutory time limit - When a complaint is filed beyond the mandatory time limit, a proper application or affidavit must be filed by complainant disclosing the reasons for delay - Held that the High Court's opinion that a separate application for condonation of delay is not a 'statutory mandate' under Section 142(b) of the Act was also erroneous - Court is obligated to take note of a complaint being filed beyond the limitation period, consider the reasons disclosed for the delay, and come to a 'judicious conclusion' that condonation is justified before taking cognizance and issuing summons. [Paras 6-9] H.S. Oberoi Buildtech Pvt. Ltd. v. MSN Woodtech, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 889