High Courts Shouldn't Routinely Stay Trials : Supreme Court Flags Mechanical Invocation Of Revision Powers
The Supreme Court has disapproved the routine practice of High Courts staying trials while entertaining challenges to interlocutory orders, cautioning that such stays should be granted only where continuation of the trial would seriously and irreparably prejudice the revision proceedings or adversely affect the parties.
also flagged the mechanical invocation of revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC), holding that the High Court cannot exercise revision as though it were an appellate jurisdiction.
The Court aside the 117-page-long judgment of the Bombay High Court's Nagpur Bench, which had allowed revision applications under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) and rejected a plaint under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC. The Court noted that the High Court had exceeded its revisional jurisdiction and had “donned the hat of the trial court”.
A bench of Justice Dipankar Datta and Justice Satish Chandra Sharma passed the judgment in two connected appeals filed against a common judgment passed in 2024, by the Nagpur Bench, Bombay High Court.
The appellant had instituted a civil suit against the respondents seeking a declaration that two sale deeds, of 2015 and of 2017, as null and void, and that the respondents were in illegal possession of the suit property, along with damages and compensation.
Soon after the institution of the suit, the respondents filed applications under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC seeking rejection of the plaint, on the ground that it disclosed no cause of action and was barred under Sections 11 and 47 of the CPC. The trial court, however, dismissed the application, holding that the documents relied upon by the defendants could not be looked into at that stage, and that only the plaint and its accompanying documents were to be examined. It was also held that the issues of res judicata and limitation would have to be decided at trial.
Aggrieved by the trial court's holding, the respondents filed revision applications before the Nagpur Bench, Bombay High Court, which allowed the revision applications and rejected the plaint in respect of both of the respondents.
Thereafter, the plaintiff filed an appeal before the Supreme Court.
Perusing the High Court's judgment, the Supreme Court observed that, “reading of the impugned judgment, in between the lines, would surprisingly reveal complete absence of any discussion on one question in particular: where and/or how did the Trial Court err while rejecting the applications under Order VII Rule 11, CPC? This appears to be a unique case where not a single sentence in the 118 (one hundred eighteen) paragraphs of the judgment is devoted to the Trial Court's commission of an error justifying interference in exercise of revisional jurisdiction.”
The bench also recorded that the counsels for the respondents did not join the issue on this observation.
The Court relied on its earlier decision in Shiv Shakti Coop. Housing Society v. Swaraj Developers, to reiterate the settled position of Section 115 CPC, and clarified that unlike a right of appeal, “there is no such substantive right in making an application under Section 115,” and that the provision is “essentially a source of power for the High Court to supervise the subordinate courts”, not a right conferred on a litigant.
The bench traced the concerns over the misuse of revisional jurisdiction by referring to the 14th Report of the Law Commission of India, submitted by then Attorney-General MC Setalvad in 1958, which had flagged that a large number of revision applications against interlocutory orders “are lacking in substance and are filed with the sole object of delaying the proceedings.” It also observed that despite the concerns being raised nearly seven decades ago, “the situation has only turned from bad to worse,” which had also prompted the legislature to curtail the scope of revisional interference through the 1999 amendment and later with Section 8 of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015.
In the present case, the bench found that apart from failing to identify any error by the trial court, the High Court conducted itself as though it was the original court adjudicating the plea for rejection of the plaint. “The High Court while considering the revision applications before it, donned the hat of the trial court. If the identity of the court were undisclosed, bare reading of the judgment would unmistakably and inevitably lead a reader to the conclusion that it is a judgment of the original court rejecting a plaint,” it was observed.
It further observed that the High Court went beyond the limited scope of inquiry permissible under Order VII Rule 11 by making observations based on facts and documents that did not form part of the plaint. “With a deep sense of anguish, we cannot but observe that the very fundamentals of consideration of an application under Order VII Rule 11, CPC seem not to have been present in the mind of the High Court in the present case,” the bench stated.
The bench also flagged the disproportionate judicial time spent by the High Court in delivering a “lengthy judgment, albeit on an unworthy issue,” noting that “the same time could have well been devoted to a deserving lis,” and cautioning that such misconducted effort “does bring in its terrain more disservice than service to the institutional cause.”
Noting that the trial in the suit had remained stayed since the High Court's order and have not commenced even nine years after institution of suit, the bench criticised the routine practice of staying trial. “Routine practice of the high courts of granting a stay of trial while issuing notice in challenges to interlocutory orders has to be disapproved. Unless the high courts, on an examination deeper than prima facie, arrive at a finding that continuation of the trial would seriously and irreparably prejudice the outcome of the revision or adversely affect the parties, stay of the trial ought to be eschewed,” the bench lamented.
In the light of above, the appeals were allowed and the High Court's judgment was set aside, reviving the suit before the trial court. Considering that the trial had remained stayed for seven years, the Court granted liberty to the defendants to file written statements, if not already filed, within eight weeks, and urged the trial court to frame issues within a further six weeks thereafter. However, relying on High Court Bar Association Allahabad v State of Uttar Pradesh, the bench declined to fix a timeline for conclusion of trial.
It was further clarified that the trial court would proceed uninfluenced by any observations made either by the Supreme Court or the High Court.
Case: Madhav Vidarbha Estate Pvt Ltd v Praharsh Corporation Pvt Ltd & Ors (with connected matter Madhav Vidarbha Estate Pvt Ltd v Shri Sawan Nandkumar Bhatewara & Ors)
Citation : 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 870
Appearance:
For appellants: Dr Abhishek Manu Singhvi, Senior Adv.; and Mr Pravin Samdani, Senior Adv.
For respondents: Mr Ranjit Kumar, Senior Adv.; and Mr Jaydeep Gupta. Senior Adv.
Click Here To Read/Download Order