Mere Proximity In Time & Sameness Of Accused Can't Justify Joint Trial When Places Of Occurrence & Victims Are Different: Supreme Court
The Supreme Court has held that the mere fact that two alleged incidents occurred in close proximity in time and involved the same set of accused would not, by itself, justify a joint trial when the places of occurrence and the victims were different.
A bench of Justice Ujjal Bhuyan and Justice Atul S. Chandurkar set aside the Allahabad High Court's order directing a joint trial in two separate cases where the major offence of criminal trespass was common with the same set of accused persons, but the places of occurrence as well as the victims were different.
The dispute originated from two proceedings relating to alleged incidents in 2021, where an FIR was lodged by the Appellant's group, alleging that a group of persons armed with sharp-edged weapons, sticks and other weapons had trespassed into his house and assaulted the inmates.
The FIR was registered under Sections 147, 148, 149, 323, 308, 354, 354-B, and 506 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short, 'IPC').
Five days later, a complaint was lodged by the Respondent group before the Chief Judicial Magistrate alleging that the Appellant group and others had forcibly entered her house in the night and assaulted her and her husband.
The Respondent group sought a joint trial in both the FIR and complaint case under Section 223 of Cr.P.C., contending that since the alleged crimes were committed in proximity to each other, and involved the same set of accused persons, a joint trial may be warranted.
The trial court rejected the application for a joint trial, following which the Respondents approached the High Court, which in turn allowed their plea, directing the joint trial.
Aggrieved by the High Court's decision, the appellant moved to the Supreme Court, contending that the direction to order the joint trial was erroneous as the victims as well as the place of occurrence were different in both the crimes, despite they were committed in a close proximity and in a short time gap.
Finding force in the Appellant's contention, the Supreme Court noted that the FIR alleged trespass and assault at the appellants' residence, while the complaint alleged trespass and assault at the second respondent's residence.
Although the FIR placed the incident in proximity of time, the Court held that the temporal proximity did not establish that the incidents formed part of the same transaction.
"We have already noticed the facts leading to registration of the FIR and the complaint. We have also noted that while according to the appellants, the accused persons (represented by the second respondent) had trespassed into their residence and had assaulted them, as per the version of the second respondent, the accused persons (represented by the appellants herein) had forcibly entered into their residence and had assaulted him and others. While the time of the incident mentioned in the FIR is from 8:00 PM to 10:30 PM on 01.07.2021, the time mentioned in the complaint is about 10:00 PM of the same day. No doubt, the two alleged incidents occurred in close proximity of each other but the situs of the two incidents are different. The FIR refers to the trespass and assault in the residence of the appellants whereas the complaint refers to trespass and assault in the residence of the second respondent.”, the Court said.
The Supreme Court examined the statutory framework governing the joinder of charges and joint trials under the CrPC.
Section 218(1) CrPC provides that, for every distinct offence of which a person is accused, there shall be a separate charge and every such charge shall be tried separately, subject to the exceptions provided under the Code.
The Court also referred to Sections 219 and 220, which permit certain offences to be tried together in specified circumstances, including where offences of the same kind are committed within a period of 12 months or where multiple offences form part of the same transaction. Sections 221 to 223 deal with other circumstances involving alternative charges and the joint trial of persons.
Relying on Lakshmanan v. State, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1245, the Court reiterated the governing principles for deciding whether criminal proceedings should be tried jointly or separately.
The decision in Lakshmanan summarised the law as follows:
"(i) Separate trial is the rule under Section 218 Cr.P.C.; a joint trial may be permissible where the offences form part of the same transaction or the conditions in Sections 219-223 Cr.P.C. are satisfied, but even then it is a matter of judicial discretion;
(ii) The decision to hold a joint or separate trial must ordinarily be taken at the outset of the proceedings and for cogent reasons;
(iii) The two paramount considerations in such decision-making are whether a joint trial would cause prejudice to the accused, and whether it would occasion delay or wastage of judicial time."
A profitable reference may also be made to the recent case of Mamman Khan v. State of Haryana, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 904, where the Court laid down the following propositions regarding the joint trial.
Joint trial in sessions and complaint case may create a judicial imbalance
Another reason cited by the Court against the joint trial was that the nature of proceedings in both the Sessions and complaint case were different, where one being adjudicated by a Sessions Court, whereas another one was adjudicated by a magistrate, being placed in a lower hierarchy.
“Finally we note that one is a sessions triable case having serious consequences and the other is a complaint case ordinarily adjudicated by a court placed lower in the hierarchy. In such a situation, we are of the view that clubbing of the two proceedings is really not warranted. The High Court committed an error in interfering with the order passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge dated 09.09.2025 and directing consolidation.”, the Court observed.
In light of the aforesaid, the Court allowed the appeal and set aside the impugned order directing a joint trial.