'Parameters For Sections 156(3) & 200 CrPC Are Different': Supreme Court Sets Aside HC Order Allowing Second 156(3) Plea

The Court also said that a liberty to file a private complaint cannot be used to reinvoke Section 156(3) when an earlier application seeking FIR registration was dismissed.

Update: 2026-05-05 09:26 GMT
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The Supreme Court has held that the parameters governing the invocation of Sections 156(3) and 200 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 operate in distinct fields, setting aside a High Court order that had upheld a Magistrate's direction to register an FIR on a second application under Section 156(3) CrPC.

The second 156(3) CrPC application was filed by the complainant pursuant to the liberty granted by the High Court to file a private complaint under S.200 CrPC against the police closure report. The Supreme Court stated that when liberty was granted to file S.200 private complaint, an application under S.156(3) cannot be filed, as if both are the same.

A Bench of Justice M.M. Sundresh and Justice Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh observed that the complainant's second recourse to Section 156(3), after an earlier rejection and closure of proceedings pursuant to a preliminary inquiry, was impermissible in law.

The case arose from a prolonged procedural history involving repeated attempts by the complainant to invoke Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. The complainant initially filed an application under Section 156(3) before the Judicial Magistrate in 2022, which was dismissed. The complainant then approached the Madras High Court, which directed a preliminary police inquiry. Following this, the police filed a closure report in December 2022.

Aggrieved with the closure report, the complainant again approached the High Court in 2023, which dismissed the challenge but granted liberty to file a private complaint under Section 200 Cr.P.C. Instead of availing this remedy, the complainant filed a fresh application in May 2024, again under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. Acting on this, the Magistrate directed registration of an FIR.

The accused challenged the FIR before the High Court, but the petition to quash the FIR was dismissed, leading to the filing of an SLP before the Supreme Court.

Before the Supreme Court, the accused argued that by upholding the Magistrate's direction to register an FIR, the High Court had effectively converted the remedy of a private complaint into one under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C., which is impermissible, particularly once the initial application under that provision had already been dismissed.

Setting aside the impugned order, the Court observed that the High Court erred in upholding the magistrate's order to direct FIR registration in a second round, overlooking the fact that an earlier application seeking FIR registration was dismissed.

The Court noted that in an earlier round of litigation, the High Court had expressly granted the complainant liberty to approach the Magistrate by filing a private complaint under Section 200 CrPC. However, disregarding this direction, the Magistrate entertained and allowed a second application under Section 156(3) CrPC, a course later wrongly upheld by the High Court.

The Court held that this amounted to an impermissible attempt by the Magistrate to effectively review the High Court's earlier order, which had confined the complainant's remedy to Section 200 and not Section 156(3).

“…the fact remains that the second round of resorting to Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. is nothing but an attempt to review the earlier order passed by the High Court. It is also pertinent to state that the liberty given by the High Court to the respondent-complainant was only for the purpose of invoking Section 200 of the Cr.P.C. Maybe it is an oversight which made the respondent–complainant to invoke Section 156 (3) of the Cr.P.C., once again, instead of filing a private complaint under Section 200 of the Cr.P.C. Suffice it to state that the parameters for the invocation of both the aforesaid sections are quite different.”, the court observed.

The Court added :

“we set aside the impugned order…passed by the High Court and the order of the learned Magistrate…which directed the registration of an FIR, with a specific direction to the concerned Magistrate to treat the application filed by the respondent–complainant invoking Section 156 (3) of the Cr.P.C. as a private complaint under Section 200 of the Cr.P.C and, thereafter, proceed in accordance with law."

In terms of the aforesaid, the petition was disposed of.

Cause Title: MOHAN KARTHIK & ORS. VERSUS STATE OF TAMIL NADU, & ANR.

Citation : 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 458

Click here to download order

Appearance:

For Petitioner(s) Mr. M.P. Parthiban, AOR

For Respondent(s) Mr. Amit Anand Tiwari, Sr. A.A.G. Mr. Sabarish Subramanian, AOR Mr. K. Shiva, AOR Mr. Pm Duraiswamy, Adv.

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