Civil Minor Acts - Supreme Court Quarterly Digest Jan - Mar, 2026

Advocates Act, 1961

Advocates Act, 1961 – Section 35 and Section 38 – Professional Misconduct – Withdrawal of Complaint – Sustainability of Disciplinary Action – The Supreme Court set aside the order of the Disciplinary Committee of the Bar Council of India (BCI) which had held an advocate guilty of professional misconduct and imposed a penalty of Rs. 1 Lakh – Noted that the BCI failed to consider that the complainant had filed a sworn affidavit seeking to withdraw the complaint, stating the initial grievance arose from a "misunderstanding" regarding the deposit of costs and expressing full satisfaction with the advocate's services. Monty Goyal v. Navrang Singh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 91 : 2026 INSC 94

Advocates Act, 1961 - The Supreme Court directed the Bar Council of India to reconsider its rule which bars office bearers of Bar Associations from contesting elections to State Bar Councils. With this direction, the Court disposed of a writ petition challenging Chapter III of the Bar Council of India Uniform Rules (and Mandatory Guidelines) for the Elections of Bar Councils, 2016. Dhanya Kumar Jain v. Bar Council of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 216

Advocates Act, 1961 - The Supreme Court disposed of a plea seeking reservation for advocates belonging to Other Backward Classes in appointments of government pleaders in Madhya Pradesh. While declining to issue binding directions in the absence of a statutory mandate, the Court through its order urged the Advocate General to ensure representation of lawyers from marginalised communities and women. OBC Advocates Welfare Association v. State of M.P., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 217

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996

Arbitration (Proceedings Before the Courts) Rules, 2001 (Karnataka) – Rule 9(4) – Harmonious Construction with Section 9(2) – Held that while Rule 9(4) uses the term "initiated" and Section 9(2) uses "commenced," the terms must be read harmoniously - "Initiated" in Rule 9(4) must be understood as "commenced" within the meaning of Section 21 to prevent the strict timelines of the parent Act from being rendered otiose. [Relied on Sundaram Finance Ltd. v. NEPC India Ltd. (1999) 2 SCC 479; Milkfood Ltd. v. GMC Ice Cream (P) Ltd. (2004) 7 SCC 288; Geo Miller and Company Private Limited v. Chairman, Rajasthan Vidyut Utpadan Nigam Limited (2020) 14 SCC 643; Arif Azim Company Limited v. Aptech Limited (2024) 5 SCC 313; Para 29] Regenta Hotels v. Hotel Grand Centre Point, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 21 : 2026 INSC 32

Arbitration Act, 1940 – Section 2(a) and Section 39 – Absence of Arbitration Agreement – Jurisdiction of State Government – The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision setting aside an arbitral award, holding that there was neither a valid arbitration agreement nor informed consent by the Municipal Council to resolve disputes through arbitration - Noted that Clause 22 of the contract, which provided for dispute referral to the Collector with subsequent appeals to the Divisional Commissioner and the State Government, constituted a departmental dispute-resolution mechanism and not an "arbitration agreement". Bharat Udyog Ltd. v. Ambernath Municipal Council, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 291 : 2026 INSC 288

Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2015 — Section 11(6A) — Paradigm Shift — The 2015 Amendment introduced Section 11(6A), which limited the Court's inquiry solely to the "existence" of an arbitration agreement, effectively overruling the Patel Engineering dictum for post-amendment cases – Noted for proceedings commenced prior to 23.10.2015, the broader judicial scrutiny and finality of the Section 11 order under the old regime continue to apply – Appeal allowed. [Relied on SBP & Co. v. Patel Engineering Ltd. & Anr. (2005) 8 SCC 618; Paras 22-32] Eminent Colonizers v. Rajasthan Housing Board, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 109 : 2026 INSC 116

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; Part III — Sections 61, 73, and 74 — Challenge to Conciliation Award and Partition Deed — Order VII Rule 11 of CPC — Rejection of Plaint — The Supreme Court set aside the rejection of a suit challenging a partition deed (KBPP) and a subsequent Conciliation Award - held that the Jegatheesan group's challenge based on coercion, undue influence, and misrepresentation regarding the KBPP, and the allegation of fraud/fabrication regarding the Conciliation Award, disclosed a real cause of action that could not be summarily dismissed – Noted that while an execution proceeding under Section 36 is pending, an Execution Court cannot examine the validity of a partition deed or family arrangement; such challenges must be resolved through a properly instituted civil suit. J. Muthurajan & Anr. v. S. Vaikundarajan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 135 : 2026 INSC 139

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; Section 11(6-A) — Appointment of Arbitrators — Scope of Judicial Review — The Supreme Court or High Court, while considering a Section 11 application, must strictly confine its examination to the existence of an arbitration agreement - The use of the word "examination" indicates a limit to the court's jurisdiction, intended for a prima facie determination rather than a "laborious or contested inquiry" - Noted that Section 11(6-A) continues to remain in full force as its omission (by the 2019 Amendment) has not yet been notified. [Paras 14–17] Motilal Oswal Financial Services v. Santosh Cordeiro, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 32 : 2026 INSC 5 : (2026) 2 SCC 801

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; Section 12(5) and Seventh Schedule – Ineligibility of Arbitrator – Unilateral Appointment – The principle of equal treatment of parties under Section 18 applies not only to arbitral proceedings but also to the procedure for appointment of arbitrators - Equal treatment entails that parties must have an equal say in the constitution of the arbitral tribunal - Any person whose relationship with the parties, counsel, or the dispute falls within the Seventh Schedule is ineligible to be appointed as an arbitrator by operation of law – Held a person who is statutorily ineligible to act as an arbitrator cannot nominate or appoint another person as an arbitrator - A unilateral appointment by one party, where that party has exclusive power to appoint a sole arbitrator, violates the principle of impartiality and neutrality. Bhadra International (India) Pvt. Ltd. v. Airports Authority of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 4 : 2026 INSC 6

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; Section 12(5) Proviso – Waiver of Ineligibility – “Express Agreement in Writing” – Held that the ineligibility of an arbitrator under Section 12(5) can only be waived by an "express agreement in writing" entered into by the parties subsequent to the disputes having arisen – Supreme Court laid down Parameters of Waiver- i. Mere participation in proceedings, filing a Statement of Claim, requesting an extension of time under Section 29A, or failing to object in the first procedural order does not constitute an "express agreement in writing" ii. Recording "No Objection": A procedural order recording that parties have "no objection" to the appointment is insufficient to satisfy the requirement of a conscious, written waiver under the proviso to Section 12(5). Bhadra International (India) Pvt. Ltd. v. Airports Authority of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 4 : 2026 INSC 6

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; Section 15(2), 15(3), and 15(4) — Substitution of Arbitrator — Validity of prior proceedings — The Supreme Court held that while appointing a substitute arbitrator under Section 15(2), the High Court cannot declare proceedings undertaken by the previous tribunal as a "nullity" on the grounds of an IBC moratorium - Held that Section 15 is a mechanism to preserve continuity; prior proceedings remain valid unless the parties agree otherwise or the substitute tribunal, in its discretion, decides to repeat hearings. Ankhim Holdings Pvt. Ltd. v. Zaveri Construction Pvt. Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 133 : 2026 INSC 137 : AIR 2026 SC 1042

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; Section 16 & 23 - Jurisdiction to decide disputes not specifically mentioned in invocation notice - Unless the arbitration agreement specifically restricts the tribunal to only decided "specifically referred disputes," the claimant is entitled to add or amend claims in the statement of claim, and the respondent is entitled to file counter-claims, provided they are arbitrable and within limitation - Where an arbitration clause is widely worded to cover "any matter arising out of or connected with the agreement," the tribunal has jurisdiction to entertain all such disputes once constituted. Bhagheeratha Engineering Ltd. v. State of Kerala, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 31 : 2026 INSC 4

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; Section 16 — Doctrine of Competence-Competence — Arbitrability of Disputes — The determination of the substantive existence and validity of an arbitration agreement, as well as the arbitrability of the dispute, is the domain of the Arbitral Tribunal under Section 16 - The Referral Court is not the appropriate forum to conduct a "mini-trial" regarding the validity of the agreement. [Paras 15–16] Motilal Oswal Financial Services v. Santosh Cordeiro, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 32 : 2026 INSC 5 : (2026) 2 SCC 801

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; Section 2(1)(e), Section 11, and Section 29A — Jurisdiction to extend the mandate of an Arbitral Tribunal — Held that the expression "Court" used in Section 29A for the extension of time or substitution of arbitrators refers strictly to the Court as defined under Section 2(1)(e) of the Act - This definition encompasses the Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction in a district and includes a High Court only if it exercises ordinary original civil jurisdiction - The Supreme Court or High Courts exercising power under Section 11 to appoint an arbitrator do not retain supervisory control and become functus officio once the appointment is made. Jagdeep Chowgule v. Sheela Chowgule, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 89 : 2026 INSC 92 : AIR 2026 SC 666

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; Section 21 & 23 - Object of Section 21 Notice - The object of Section 21 is primarily to determine the commencement of arbitral proceedings for reckoning limitation - It is a procedural rather than a jurisdictional requirement. Failure to issue a Section 21 notice is not fatal to a party's claim if the dispute is otherwise arbitrable and covered by the arbitration agreement - The claims raised in a Section 21 notice do not restrict or limit the claims that can be subsequently raised before the Arbitral Tribunal in the statement of claim under Section 23 - held that an arbitral tribunal cannot decide disputes beyond a specific issue referred to it and that a party cannot raise additional disputes without issuing a separate notice under Section 21 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. Bhagheeratha Engineering Ltd. v. State of Kerala, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 31 : 2026 INSC 4

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; Section 29A(4) & 29A(5) - Power of Court to extend mandate after rendering of award – The Supreme Court held that an application for extension of the arbitrator's mandate under Section 29A(5) is maintainable even if it is filed after the expiry of the statutory period (12 months plus optional 6 months) and even after the award has been rendered in the interim - Noted that an award passed after the mandate has expired is unenforceable under Section 36 and "non est," but the arbitrator's indiscretion in passing such an award does not denude or impair the Court's jurisdiction to entertain an extension application. C. Velusamy v. K. Indhera, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 105 : 2026 INSC 112

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; Section 29A(4) and Section 29A(6) — Extension of Mandate and Substitution of Arbitrator — The Supreme Court clarified that the expression "obligates" used in the Mohan Lal Fatehpuria case regarding the substitution of an arbitrator does not mean that substitution is an inevitable consequence when considering an extension of a mandate that has already expired - Substitution is only required "if the situation so warranted" and is not a mandatory inference following the termination of a mandate under Section 29A(4). Viva Highways Ltd. v. Madhya Pradesh Road Development Corporation Ltd; 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 145

Statutory Interpretation of Section 29A – The expression "if an award is not made" in Section 29A(4) does not create a threshold bar for cases where a late award has been delivered; rather, it empowers the Court to ensure proceedings reach their logical conclusion of a binding award - Termination of the mandate under Section 29A(4) is "conditional" and not "absolutistic," meaning it is subject to the Court's power to revive and extend the mandate retrospectively – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Rohan Builders (India) Pvt. Ltd. v. Berger Paints India Ltd., 2024 SCC Online SC 2494; Paras 13-23] C. Velusamy v. K. Indhera, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 105 : 2026 INSC 112

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; Section 29A and Section 11 — Jurisdiction — held that Section 11 has no bearing on the provisions of Chapters 5 and 6 (where Section 29A is located) - Noted, an application for extension of time under Section 29A(4) does not lie before the High Court. Viva Highways Ltd. v. Madhya Pradesh Road Development Corporation Ltd; 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 145

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; Section 29A vs. Section 11 — Separation of Appointment and Supervision — Held that the power of appointment under Section 11 is a "special and limited" jurisdiction - It is a misconception to assume a hierarchy where only the appointing Court can extend the mandate - The extension of a mandate or substitution under Section 29A is a measure of curial supervision, not an "appointment" under Section 11 – Held that applications for extending an arbitral tribunal's mandate under Section 29A (4) of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 must be filed exclusively before the 'Court' as defined in Section 2(1)(e) i.e., the principal civil court of original jurisdiction, regardless of which authority appointed the arbitrators - Interpretations based on a perceived "conflict of power" or "hierarchical difficulties" between a Civil Court and a High Court are untenable and opposed to the rule of law. Jagdeep Chowgule v. Sheela Chowgule, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 89 : 2026 INSC 92 : AIR 2026 SC 666

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; Section 31(7)(a) and 31(7)(b) — General Conditions of Contract (GCC); Clause 16(3) and 64(5) — Pre-award/Pendente lite Interest — Post-award Interest — The Arbitral Tribunal cannot award pre-award or pendente lite interest, even in the form of "compensation," if the contract expressly prohibits interest on amounts payable to the contractor - a contractual bar on pre-award interest does not automatically extend to post-award interest - Post-award interest is a statutory mandate under Section 31(7)(b) and is not subject to "contracting out" by parties unless the exclusion is explicit and unambiguous - The Court retains the power to modify the rate of post-award interest if it is deemed excessive or lacks justification - Key Findings and Relied-on Decisions: i. Contractual Supremacy in Pre-award Interest: Under Section 31(7)(a), the arbitrator's power to award pre-award interest is subordinate to the terms of the agreement. If a contract (like Clause 16(3) of the GCC) bars interest on "amounts payable to the contractor," the arbitrator lacks jurisdiction to grant it. Ii. Rejection of Ejusdem Generis: The phrase "amounts payable to the contractor under the contract" in Clause 16(3) is independent and distinct from "earnest money" or "security deposits." It cannot be read down to only include deposits; iii. Statutory Mandate of Post-award Interest: Section 31(7)(b) is not subject to party autonomy. The expression "unless the award otherwise directs" refers to the rate of interest, not the entitlement to it; iv. Power to Modify Interest Rate: Courts can modify post-award interest rates to avoid excessive financial burdens and ensure "just compensation" based on contemporary economic scenarios – Appeal partly allowed. [Relied on Union of India v. Manraj Enterprises (2022) 2 SCC 331; RP Garg v. Chief General Manager, Telecom Department 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2928; Gayatri Balasamy v. M/s ISG Novasoft Technologies Limited (2025) 7 SCC 1; Union of India v. Bright Power Projects (India) (P) Limited (2015) 9 SCC 695; Union of India v. Manraj Enterprises (2022) 2 SCC 331; Paras 30-60] Union of India v. Larsen & Tubro, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 214 : 2026 INSC 203

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; Section 42 — Inapplicability to Section 11 — Section 42, which mandates that subsequent applications be filed in the same Court where the first application was made, does not apply to Section 11 applications - The Chief Justice or their delegate exercising power under Section 11 is not a "Court" as defined by Section 2(1)(e); therefore, a Section 11 application does not fix the jurisdiction for Section 29A applications – Appeals allowed. [Relied on SBP and Co. v. Patel Engineering Ltd. (2005) 8 SCC 618; State of West Bengal v. Associated Contractors (2015) 1 SCC 32; State of Jharkhand v. Hindustan Construction Co. Ltd. (2018) 2 SCC 602; Chief Engineer (NH) PWD (Roads) v. BSC&C and C JV 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1801; Paras 15-26] Jagdeep Chowgule v. Sheela Chowgule, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 89 : 2026 INSC 92 : AIR 2026 SC 666

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; Section 5 and Section 15 — Scope of Judicial Interference — Supreme Court clarified that the jurisdiction under Section 15(2) is limited and must be read with the principle of minimal judicial intervention - A court acting under Section 15(2) cannot exercise powers barred to it under other sections, such as setting aside a Section 16 rejection order (which is not appealable) or interfering with Section 17 orders outside of a Section 37 proceeding. Ankhim Holdings Pvt. Ltd. v. Zaveri Construction Pvt. Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 133 : 2026 INSC 137 : AIR 2026 SC 1042

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; Sections 14 and 34 – Challenge to Jurisdiction – Stage of Objection – Constitution of India; Article 14 – Public-Private Contracts - Held that an arbitrator falling under the Seventh Schedule becomes de jure unable to perform his functions, and his mandate terminates automatically - An objection to the inherent lack of jurisdiction due to such ineligibility can be raised at any stage, including for the first time in an application under Section 34 for setting aside the award – Held that unilateral appointment clauses in public-private contracts violate Article 14 for being arbitrary and failing to provide the minimum level of integrity required for quasi-judicial functions - Such clauses also violate the nemo judex rule, which constitutes a part of the fundamental policy of Indian law – Appeals allowed. [Relied on TRF Ltd. v. Energo Engineering Projects Ltd. (2017) 8 SCC 377; Perkins Eastman Architects DPC v. HSCC (India) Ltd. (2020) 20 SCC 760; Bharat Broadband Network Ltd. v. United Telecoms Ltd. (2019) 5 SCC 755; Dharma Prathishthanam v. Madhok Construction (P) Ltd. (2005) 9 SCC 686; Paras 55-107] Bhadra International (India) Pvt. Ltd. v. Airports Authority of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 4 : 2026 INSC 6

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; Sections 8 and 11 — Arbitrability and Allegations of Fraud — Whether disputes can be referred to arbitration when the very existence of the arbitration agreement is seriously disputed on allegations of forgery and fabrication — Held: When allegations of fraud are made regarding the arbitration agreement itself, the dispute is generally recognized as non-arbitrable - Arbitration is founded upon consent, and a party can only be bound if it is shown, at least prima facie, that they agreed to the process - Where an arbitration clause is embedded in a document (such as the "Admission Deed") whose existence is stoutly denied and alleged to be forged, the controversy strikes at the root of arbitral jurisdiction – Noted that in such cases, the court must examine the issue as a jurisdictional inquiry rather than referring the matter to an arbitrator - While findings in Section 9 proceedings are prima facie, once they attain finality (e.g., via dismissal of an SLP), they cannot be ignored in subsequent proceedings under Sections 8 and 11 involving the same issue. Rajia Begum v. Barnali Mukherjee, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 101 : 2026 INSC 106

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 — Interpretation of Contracts — Arbitral Autonomy — Patent Illegality — Section 34(2A) - held that the interpretation of the terms of a contract is primarily the domain of the Arbitral Tribunal - Even if a second view is possible, an award cannot be set aside merely because the appellate court prefers an alternative interpretation – Held that the Tribunal's decision to award idling charges for a Backhoe Dredger (BHD) under Clause 51.1 of the License Agreement despite the respondent's claim that Clause 38 only specified charges for "major dredgers" was found to be a logical and reasonable construction of the agreement - For an award to be set aside for patent illegality, the error must be apparent on the face of the award - A speaking award based on logical reasoning and proper interpretation of clauses does not suffer from patent illegality - a mere contravention of substantive Indian law is no longer a standalone ground for setting aside an award – Appeal allowed. [Relied on MMTC Limited vs. Vedanta Limited (2019) 4 SCC 163; UHL Power Company Limited vs. State of Himachal Pradesh (2022) 4 SCC 116; Bombay Slum Redevelopment Corporation Private Limited vs. Samir Narain Bhojwani (2024) 7 SCC 218; National Highways Authority of India v. M/s Hindustan Construction Company Ltd. 2024 INSC 388; Larsen Air Conditioning and Refrigeration Company vs. Union of India & Ors. (2023) 15 SCC 472; Paras 30-46] Jan De Nul Dredging India Pvt. Ltd. v. Tuticorin Port Trust, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 47 : 2026 INSC 34 : AIR 2026 SC 536

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 — Section 11, Section 16, and Section 34 — Pre-2015 Amendment Regime — Binding Nature of Section 11 Order — Res Judicata — Held that in cases governed by the SBP & Co. v. Patel Engineering Ltd. regime (prior to the 23.10.2015 amendments), the Section 11 Court exercised judicial power to determine the existence and validity of an arbitration agreement - Such a determination, even if implied, is binding on the parties at all subsequent stages, including before the Arbitral Tribunal and the Section 34 Court – Noted that the respondents, having failed to challenge the appointment order in the Supreme Court, cannot subsequently argue that the clause (Clause 23) was not an arbitration agreement. Eminent Colonizers v. Rajasthan Housing Board, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 109 : 2026 INSC 116

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – Section 16, Section 4, and Section 34 – Appointment of Presiding Arbitrator – Improper Constitution of Tribunal – Waiver and Conduct – The Appellant challenged the arbitral award on the ground that the Presiding Arbitrator was appointed by the two nominee arbitrators beyond the 30-day period prescribed in Clause 8.3(b) of the Agreement - The Appellant contended that after 30 days, the power of the nominee arbitrators was extinguished, and only the Secretary General of ICSID could make the appointment - Held: Clause 8.3(b) is an enabling provision, not a restrictive one - It provides a "fail-safe" by permitting parties to approach ICSID if the nominee arbitrators reach an impasse, but it does not denude the nominee arbitrators of their power to appoint after the 30-day period unless a request is actually made to ICSID - Since neither party approached ICSID, the appointment by the nominee arbitrators was valid. [Paras 30-34] Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai v. R.V. Anderson Associates, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 235 : 2026 INSC 228

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – Section 21 – Interpretation of "Commencement" – Supreme Court emphasized that the commencement of arbitral proceedings is a statutory event defined exclusively under Section 21 - This definition is not limited to calculating limitation under Section 43 but applies to all provisions of the Act unless specifically excluded - The legislature deliberately delinked commencement from judicial proceedings to ensure clarity and party autonomy. [Paras 24, 28, 29] Regenta Hotels v. Hotel Grand Centre Point, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 21 : 2026 INSC 32

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – Section 34 & Section 37 – Scope of Judicial Review – Modification of Arbitral Awards – Power to Modify – The Supreme Court upheld the power of a Court under Section 34 to modify an arbitral award to a limited extent, particularly when applying contractually agreed clauses to admitted facts – Noted that a Section 37 Court cannot substitute its own view for a plausible view taken by a Section 34 Court regarding the determination of "reasonable compensation" unless that determination is arbitrary or perverse. Saisudhir Energy Ltd. v. NTPC Vidyut Vyapar Nigam Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 112 : 2026 INSC 103 : AIR 2026 SC 850

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 — Section 34 and Section 37 — Scope of Appellate Interference — The Supreme Court reiterated that the jurisdiction of an appellate court under Section 37 is extremely circumscribed and akin to the limited jurisdiction under Section 34 - An appellate court cannot undertake an independent assessment of the merits of the award or reappraise evidence as if it were an ordinary court of appeal - Its primary role is to ascertain whether the court exercising power under Section 34 acted within its prescribed limits or exceeded them - If an Arbitral Tribunal's interpretation of a contract is a "plausible view" and is upheld under Section 34, the Section 37 court has no authority to substitute it with a different interpretation. Jan De Nul Dredging India Pvt. Ltd. v. Tuticorin Port Trust, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 47 : 2026 INSC 34 : AIR 2026 SC 536

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – Section 36 – Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Order XXI Rule 58 and Rule 102 – Execution of Arbitral Award – Transferee Pendente Lite – The Supreme Court upheld the dismissal of a claim petition filed by a third-party purchaser who acquired property after an arbitral award (money decree) was passed against the vendor – held that an arbitral award is a "deemed decree" enforceable under Section 36 of the 1996 Act - Under Order XXI Rule 102 CPC, the protections for bona fide claimants do not extend to a transferee pendente lite—defined as one to whom property is transferred after the institution of the suit/proceeding. R. Savithri Naidu v. Cotton Corporation of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 151 : 2026 INSC 150 : AIR 2026 SC 913

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – Section 4 and Section 16(2) – Timelines for Objection vs. Past Conduct – Held that while an objection under Section 16(2) raised before the statement of defence is technically "timely" to prevent statutory waiver under Section 4, the prior conduct and acquiescence of the party remain relevant in adjudicating the merits of the jurisdictional challenge - A party cannot participate in the process, allow multiple appointments of presiding arbitrators without protest, and then "keep a jurisdictional ace up their sleeve" to challenge the final constitution - Supreme Court must respect arbitral autonomy and ensure minimum judicial interference - If the arbitrator's interpretation of a contractual clause is a plausible view, the Court cannot substitute it with another view merely because it is possible – Appeal dismissed. [Relied on Hindustan Construction Co. Ltd. v. Bihar Rajya Pul Nirman Nigam Ltd. (2025 SCC OnLine SC 2578; Consolidated Construction Consortium Limited v. Software Technology Parks of India (2025 INSC 574); Paras 36, 40-45, 51-54, 61, 66, 67] Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai v. R.V. Anderson Associates, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 235 : 2026 INSC 228

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 — Section 73 — Authentication of Settlement — A settlement agreement (KBPP) not authenticated by the Conciliator as mandated under Section 73(4) and not signed by the parties at the time of the alleged award (Annexure P-2) raises serious questions regarding its status as an award under the Act – noted that coercion within a family context may not always involve physical threats or "life threats"- It can arise from a feeling of subservience or manifest obedience to an elder's opinion, which are matters of evidence and cannot be peremptorily rejected at the threshold of a suit - The plea of constructive res judicata is not applicable when earlier rounds of litigation specifically reserved liberty for the parties to work out their remedies in accordance with law and challenge the partition deed in a Civil Court. [Relied on Dahiben v. Arvindbhai Kalyanji Bhanusali (Gajra) D. Thr. LRs and Ors. (2020) 7 SCC 366; Paras 23-31] J. Muthurajan & Anr. v. S. Vaikundarajan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 135 : 2026 INSC 139

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – Section 9(2) and Section 21 – Commencement of Arbitral Proceedings – Automatic Vacation of Interim Relief – The Supreme Court held that for the purposes of Section 9(2), arbitral proceedings "commence" on the date the respondent receives a request for the dispute to be referred to arbitration, as defined under Section 21 - set aside the High Court's finding that proceedings only commence upon the filing of a Section 11 petition - If a notice invoking arbitration is received by the respondent within 90 days of an interim order, the mandate of Section 9(2) is satisfied, and the interim relief does not stand automatically vacated under Rule 9(4) of the Arbitration (Proceedings Before the Courts) Rules, 2001. [Paras 23, 24, 31] Regenta Hotels v. Hotel Grand Centre Point, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 21 : 2026 INSC 32

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 - Supreme Court drew the following conclusions: i. The principle of equal treatment of parties provided in Section 18 of the Act, 1996, applies not only to the arbitral proceedings but also to the procedure for appointment of arbitrators - Equal treatment of the parties entails that the parties must have an equal say in the constitution of the arbitral tribunal; ii. Sub-section (5) of Section 12 provides that any person whose relationship with the parties or counsel, or the dispute, whether direct or indirect, falls within any of the categories specified in the Seventh Schedule would be ineligible to be appointed as an arbitrator - Since, the ineligibility stems from the operation of law, not only is a person having an interest in the dispute or its outcome ineligible to act as an arbitrator, but appointment by such a person would be ex facie invalid; iii. The words “an express agreement in writing” in the proviso to Section 12(5) means that the right to object to the appointment of an ineligible arbitrator cannot be taken away by mere implication - The agreement referred to in the proviso must be a clear, unequivocal written agreement; iv. When an arbitrator is found to be ineligible by virtue of Section 12(5) read with the Seventh Schedule, his mandate is automatically terminated - In such circumstance, an aggrieved party may approach the court under Section 14 read with Section 15 for appointment of a substitute arbitrator - when an award has been passed by such an arbitrator, an aggrieved party may approach the court under Section 34 for setting aside the award; v. In arbitration, the parties vest jurisdiction in the tribunal by exercising their consent in furtherance of a valid arbitration agreement - An arbitrator who lacks jurisdiction cannot make an award on the merits - an objection to the inherent lack of jurisdiction can be taken at any stage of the proceedings. Bhadra International (India) Pvt. Ltd. v. Airports Authority of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 4 : 2026 INSC 6

Arbitration – Jurisdiction – Excepted Matters – Rule of Law – Section 28 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 – Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – The Supreme Court held that one party to a contract cannot be the sole arbiter to decide whether the other party committed a breach when liability is disputed. Such an interpretation violates the fundamental principle that no party shall be a judge in its own cause - Supreme Court clarified that while certain matters may be "excepted" from arbitration, they cannot be "excluded" from judicial remedy entirely, as a vacuum in legal remedies is opposed to the Rule of Law. ABS Marine Services v. Andaman and Nicobar Administration, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 287 : 2026 INSC 274

Arbitration — Setting aside of Award — Patent Illegality and Public Policy — Interpretation of Contract: The Supreme Court affirmed that the construction and interpretation of contractual terms are primarily within the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal - If an arbitrator adopts one of two plausible interpretations, the court cannot substitute its own view merely because an alternative view is possible - An award is not "patently illegal" or against "public policy" simply because of a mere contravention of law; it must violate fundamental principles of justice. [Paras 26, 29, 33, 59] National Highways Authority of India v. Gammon Atlanta (JV), 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 71 : 2026 INSC 76

Armed Forces Tribunal Act, 2007

Armed Forces Tribunal Act, 2007 – Section 14 – Judicial Review of Show Cause Notice – Where a Show Cause Notice for termination (under Regulation 216 of Navy Regulations) is directly premised on the findings and recommendations of an ICC report, the Tribunal cannot dismiss the challenge as "premature" or "merely at the preliminary stage" - The Tribunal is duty-bound to adjudicate upon the correctness of the ICC report and recommendations which form the foundational basis of the termination notice. 42605-B CDR Yogesh Mahla v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 103 : 2026 INSC 107

Armed Forces Tribunal Act, 2007 – Section 22 – Limitation Act, 1963 – Disability Pension – Broad Banding – Arrears – Delay and Laches – The Supreme Court held that the benefit of arrears of disability pension, including the benefit of "broad banding," cannot be restricted to three years prior to the filing of the application before the Armed Forces Tribunal. Union of India v. Sgt Girish Kumar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 148 : 2026 INSC 149

Border Security Force Act, 1968

Border Security Force Act, 1968; Section 40, 48(1)(c) and 50 — Dismissal from Service — National Security — Proportionality of Punishment — The Supreme Court upheld the dismissal of a BSF Sub-Inspector with 36 years of service who was convicted of facilitating illegal cattle smuggling at the Indo-Bangladesh border - Noted that when national security is paramount, infractions by officers manning the borders cannot be viewed lightly - held that under Section 50 of the BSF Act, 1968, a Security Force Court is permitted to impose a composite sentence, including both imprisonment and dismissal, as contemplated under Section 48(1)(c). Bhagirath Choudhary v. Border Security Force, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 165

Central Excise Act, 1944

Central Excise Act, 1944 – Section 11A(1) Proviso – Extended Period of Limitation – Suppression of Facts – Revenue Neutrality – The Revenue invoked the extended period of five years alleging suppression of actual use of Naphtha - held that "suppression" requires a deliberate act to escape payment of duty - Where the assessee is a Public Sector Undertaking receiving subsidies from the Central Government, any excise duty paid would be reimbursed as a subsidy, making the entire exercise "revenue neutral" - In cases of revenue neutrality where no benefit is derived by the assessee from evading duty, the extended period of limitation cannot be invoked. [Relied on Steel Authority of India v. Collector of Central Excise (1996) 5 SCC 484; State of Haryana v. Dalmia Dadri Cement Limited 1987 Supp SCC 679; Pushpam Pharmaceuticals Company v. Collector of Central Excise (1995) Supp 3 SCC 462; Nirlon Limited v. Chief Commissioner of Excise (2015) 14 SCC 798; Paras 38-45, 52-54, 56-58] Rashtriya Chemicals and Fertilizers Ltd. v. Commissioner of Central Excise and Service Tax, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 295 : 2026 INSC 285

Central Excise Act, 1944 – Section 5A – Exemption Notifications (No. 75/84-CE and No. 4/97-CE) – Naphtha used in the manufacture of Fertilizer – Interpretation of "Intended Use" – The Supreme Court held that when an exemption notification is conditioned on the "intended use" of a product, the benefit is attracted if the goods are used for the purpose and with the intention of manufacturing the specified product (fertilizer/ammonia) – Noted that the mere fact that a fraction of the procured Naphtha was used for generating electricity (steam), a portion of which was used in a chemical plant or supplied to the electricity board, does not disentitle the assessee from the exemption - Once eligibility for exemption is established, the notification must be construed liberally. Rashtriya Chemicals and Fertilizers Ltd. v. Commissioner of Central Excise and Service Tax, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 295 : 2026 INSC 285

Civil Services (Pension) Rules, 1982

Rule 27 of Maharashtra Civil Services (Pension) Rules, 1982 – Mandatory Requirement of Sanction – Held that even if assumed that the 1982 Pension Rules were applicable through the residuary Clause 110 of the 1992 Regulations, observed that Rule 27(2)(b)(i) mandates prior sanction of the Government for instituting proceedings after retirement - rejected the Corporation's argument that a "general sanction" was accorded at the time the 1992 Regulations were originally approved, clarifying that the word 'shall' in the rule implies a mandatory safeguard for each specific case to prevent unwarranted proceedings against superannuated employees – Regulation 110 of the 1992 Regulations is a miscellaneous/residuary provision intended to cover silent areas - it does not confer automatic jurisdiction to initiate departmental enquiries against retired employees unless the Corporation has formally adopted the relevant Government rules at an appropriate level – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Bhagirathi Jena v. Board of Directors, O.S.F.C. and Others, (1999) 3 SCC 666; Girijan Cooperative Corporation Limited Andhra Pradesh v. K. Satyanarayana Rao, (2010) 15 SCC 322; Anant R. Kulkarni v. Y.P. Education Society and Others, (2013) 6 SCC 515; Paras 18-30] Kadirkhan Ahmedkhan Pathan v. Maharashtra State Warehousing Corporation, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 10 : 2026 INSC 16

Companies Act, 2013

Companies (Transfer of Pending Proceedings) Rules, 2016 – Rule 3 – Transfer of proceedings to NCLT – Where a "second motion" for a Scheme of Arrangement was pending and not "reserved for orders" at the time the 2016 Rules came into effect (December 15, 2016), the High Court was mandated to transfer the proceedings to the Tribunal - In this case, a second motion filed belatedly in 2009 and left pending for years should have been transferred to the NCLT. Omkara Assets Reconstruction v. Amit Chaturvedi, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 191 : 2026 INSC 189 : AIR 2026 SC 1205

Companies Act, 2013; Section 58(3) and Section 433 — Limitation Act, 1963; Section 5 — Condonation of Delay by Company Law Board (CLB) — Applicability of Limitation Act to Quasi-Judicial Bodies - The Supreme Court examined whether the CLB, as a quasi-judicial body, possessed the inherent or statutory power to condone delay in filing an appeal under Section 58(3) of the Act, 2013, particularly for appeals filed between 12.09.2013 and 01.06.2016 (before the constitution of NCLT/NCLAT) – Held that the settled principle that the Limitation Act, 1963, applies only to "courts" in the traditional sense and not to quasi-judicial bodies or tribunals unless expressly extended by statute - While Section 433 of the Act, 2013 now expressly applies the Limitation Act to proceedings before the NCLT and NCLAT, this power cannot be retroactively borrowed to signify a similar power for the erstwhile CLB - held that Section 58(3) is a simpliciter provision prescribing a mandatory limitation period - The absence of peremptory language such as "but not thereafter" does not render the prescribed period merely directory – Held that Regulation 44 of the CLB Regulations which saves the inherent power of the CLB would not enable the CLB to extend time for the filing of the appeal or the application itself, as the case may be. [Relied on Town Municipal Council, Athani v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Hubli (1969) 1 SCC 873, Paras 42-44, 69, 70, 90-93, 108, 161] Property Company (P) Ltd. v. Rohinten Daddy Mazda, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 19 : 2026 INSC 33

Companies Act, 2013 – Section 418A & 419 – Composition of NCLAT Benches – Validity of Technical Member Majority - Supreme Court rejected the challenge to a three-member NCLAT Bench comprising two Technical Members and one Judicial Member - held that while a Bench must have at least one Judicial Member, the current law does not mandate a majority of Judicial Members in larger Benches - Technical and administrative members are not to be treated with "disdain" or labeled lower in status, as their expertise aids in holistic adjudication - A notice is "tricky" if it is artfully framed to mislead or conceal material facts from shareholders - the disclosure of the exit price and the availability of valuation reports at the registered office satisfied the requirements of Section 102. [Relied on: Kaye v. Croydon Tramways & Co. Ltd.; Baillie v. Oriental Telephone and Electric Co. Ltd.; In Re: Cadbury India Limited; Mihir H. Mafatlal v. Mafatlal Industries Ltd. 2014 SCC Online Bom 4934; Paras 18-22, 23-37, 48, 50] Pannalal Bhansali v. Bharti Telecom, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 222 : 2026 INSC 213

Companies Act, 2013 – Section 66 – Reduction of Share Capital – Validity of Selective Reduction and Forced Exit of Minority Shareholders - The Supreme Court upheld the reduction of share capital under Section 66, even if selective and resulting in an involuntary exit of minority shareholders – Held that reduction of share capital is a domestic concern of the company decided by the majority - As long as the procedure is followed and the transaction is not unfair, inequitable, or against public interest, the majority has the right to decide how to carry out the reduction, including extinguishing certain shares while retaining others. [Relied on: Re: Reckitt Benckiser (India) Ltd.; British and American Trustee and Finance Corporation v. Couper 2005 SCC Online Del 674; Paras 42-47] Pannalal Bhansali v. Bharti Telecom, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 222 : 2026 INSC 213

Companies Act, 2013 – Section 66 – Requirement of Valuation Report – Statutory Interpretation – Held that unlike Sections 62, 230, and 232, Section 66 does not statutorily mandate a valuation report from a registered valuer for the reduction of share capital - The primary safeguards are a special resolution and confirmation by the Tribunal - The absence of a valuation report being sent with the notice does not constitute a "tricky notice" if the fair value and methodology are disclosed or made available for inspection. [Paras 24-37] Pannalal Bhansali v. Bharti Telecom, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 222 : 2026 INSC 213

Companies Act, 2013 — Sections 212(6), 447, 448, 451 — Cognizance of offences involving fraud — Bar on private complaints — Whether a Special Court can take cognizance of offences under Sections 448 (false statement liable to punishment for fraud) and 451 (repeated default) of the Companies Act, 2013 on the basis of a private criminal complaint. Held, an offence under Section 448 is an "offence covered under Section 447" within the meaning of Section 212(6), as it prescribes punishment in terms of fraud as defined and punishable under Section 447. Consequently, the second proviso to Section 212(6) bars the Special Court from taking cognizance of such offences except upon a written complaint by the Director of the Serious Fraud Investigation Office (SFIO) or an officer authorised in writing by the Central Government. This statutory bar serves as a safeguard against frivolous or motivated complaints by disgruntled shareholders, members, or competitors in corporate disputes. It rejected the contention that the 2015 amendment to Section 212(6) limited the bar solely to the offence under Section 447 itself, holding that offences inextricably linked to fraud (such as under Section 448) attract the same restriction. The ancillary offence under Section 451 was also held to be covered by the bar. However, aggrieved persons are not remediless: they may approach the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) under Section 213 for an order directing investigation into the affairs of the company by SFIO, upon satisfying the eligibility criteria under clauses (a) or (b) thereof. (Para 26, 35) Yerram Vijay Kumar v. State of Telangana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 28 : 2026 INSC 42

Companies Act, 2013 — Sections 212(6), 447, 448, 451 — The case arose from a management dispute in a Hyderabad-based real estate company, where the original promoter (complainant) filed a private complaint alleging that former directors (appellants), after removal, fraudulently convened an EGM, passed forged resolutions, appointed new directors, and filed false Form DIR-12 with the Ministry of Corporate Affairs. The Special Court took cognizance of offences under Sections 448 and 451 of the Companies Act and various IPC sections (including 420, 468, etc.). The High Court declined to quash the proceedings, leading to the appeal. Allowing the appeals in part, the Supreme Court quashed the proceedings and cognizance to the extent of offences under Sections 448 and 451 of the Companies Act. The Court directed transfer of the remaining complaint (IPC offences) to the appropriate court having territorial jurisdiction for trial on merits. It set aside the High Court's order. (Para 26, 35) Yerram Vijay Kumar v. State of Telangana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 28 : 2026 INSC 42

Companies Act, 2013 – Valuation – Discount for Lack of Marketability (DLOM) – Applicability in Unlisted Companies - held that the application of a Discount for Lack of Marketability (DLOM) is a valid accounting principle for valuing shares of unlisted or delisted companies - While DLOM may be declined in court-ordered buyouts involving "oppression," it is applicable in a standard Section 66 reduction where no oppression is proved and the shares lack liquidity - noted that "Fair Value" under Indian Accounting Standards (Ind AS 113) is a market-based measurement that accounts for restrictions on sale. [Relied on: Liew Kit Fah v. Koh Keng Chew [2020] 1 SLR 275; Paras 39-45] Pannalal Bhansali v. Bharti Telecom, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 222 : 2026 INSC 213

Company Law – Control and Management – "Head and Brain" Test – In determining the residence and commercial substance of the respondents, the AAR applied the "head and brain" test - It was found that though the companies were incorporated in Mauritius, the real control over transactions exceeding USD 250,000 rested with a non-resident individual in the USA – Held that if the board of directors of a subsidiary is reduced to "puppets" and the steering interference of the parent/owner is such that the subsidiary does not perform activities on its own authority, the corporate veil can be pierced - It held that the AAR's findings on the lack of commercial substance and the centralized control in the USA were sufficient to establish a prima facie case of tax avoidance - the applications for advance rulings were not maintainable. Authority For Advance Rulings v. Tiger Global International II Holdings, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 50 : 2026 INSC 60

Consumer Protection Act, 1986

Consumer Protection Act, 1986; Section 2(1)(d) and 2(1)(g) — Maintainability of Complaint — Commercial Purpose vs. Banking Service — Summary Proceedings — Fraud and Forgery - Commercial Purpose and Bank Deposits - The Supreme Court held that the mere earning of interest on a Fixed Deposit Receipt (FDR) does not automatically categorize the banking service as being for a "commercial purpose." - Parking surplus funds for safe custody or statutory compliance is not reflective of a commercial intent - if a deposit is made specifically to leverage credit facilities for business augmentation, it would have a direct nexus with profit-generating activity and thus fall under "commercial purpose." Sant Rohidas Leather Industries v. Vijaya Bank, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 267 : 2026 INSC 264

Consumer Protection Act, 1986; Section 2(1)(d) - Statutory Interpretation - Definition of "Consumer" - Commercial Purpose - Onus of Proof - The Supreme Court set aside the NCDRC's dismissal of a consumer complaint, holding that the mere act of leasing out a residential flat does not, by itself, classify the purchase as being for a "commercial purpose" – Noted that the onus of proving that a complainant falls within the exclusion clause of Section 2(1)(d) (i.e., that the goods or services were obtained for a commercial purpose) rests squarely upon the service provider and not the complainant - This burden must be discharged based on a "preponderance of probabilities". Vinit Bahri v. Mgf Developers Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 117 : 2026 INSC 114

Consumer Protection Act, 1986 - Dominant Purpose Test - To exclude a person from the definition of a 'consumer', it must be proved that the dominant intention or purpose behind the purchase was to facilitate profit generation through commercial activity, showing a close and direct nexus between the transaction and such profit-generating activity - The mere purchase of immovable property, or even multiple units, does not ipso facto attract the exclusion clause unless a commercial dominant purpose is established – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Lilavati Kirtilal Mehta Medical Trust vs. Unique Shanti Developers and Others (2020) 2 SCC 265; Shriram Chits (India) Private Limited vs. Raghachand Associates (2024) 9 SCC 509; Laxmi Engineering Works vs. P.S.G. Industrial Institute (1995) 3 SCC 583; Paras 11-17] Vinit Bahri v. Mgf Developers Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 117 : 2026 INSC 114

Consumer Protection Act, 1986 – Section 14 – Award of Interest beyond Contractual Terms – Supreme Court rejected the appellant's contention that compensation should be restricted to the nominal rate (Rs. 10/- per sq. ft.) specified in Clause 10(c) of the Flat Buyer Agreement - It held that where a clause is found to be unfair, one-sided, or oppressive especially when compared to the high interest (24% p.a.) charged to consumers for defaults—consumer fora are not bound to mechanically enforce it and may award higher interest to prevent manifest injustice. [Paras 15 - 18] Parsvnath Developers Ltd. v. Mohit Khirbat, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 178 : 2026 INSC 170 : AIR 2026 SC 1101

Consumer Protection Act, 1986 – Sections 13 and 22 – Procedure and Evidence – Applicability of Indian Evidence Act – Held that the Indian Evidence Act (now Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam) is not strictly applicable to Consumer Forums, the Principles of Natural Justice must be followed - If a party seeks to cross-examine a witness or expert whose affidavit is on record, the Commission should evolve a procedure to permit such cross-examination—via written questions, video conferencing, or a court-appointed Commission to ensure fair play. ITC Limited v. Aashna Roy, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 129 : 2026 INSC 135 : AIR 2026 SC 860

Consumer Protection Act, 1986 – Sections 2(1)(g), 2(1)(o), 2(1)(r), and 14 – Housing Construction and Delay in Possession – Held that housing construction falls within the ambit of "service" under Section 2(1)(o), and failure to deliver possession within the stipulated period constitutes "deficiency" under Section 2(1)(g) - held that the jurisdiction of consumer fora is statutory and not merely contractual; therefore, one-sided or oppressive contractual terms cannot curtail the power of the NCDRC to award just and reasonable compensation. [Paras 10 - 18] Parsvnath Developers Ltd. v. Mohit Khirbat, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 178 : 2026 INSC 170 : AIR 2026 SC 1101

Consumer Protection Act, 1986 - Summary Jurisdiction and Complex Facts – Noted that proceedings before Consumer Fora are summary in nature and not intended to adjudicate complex factual disputes involving criminal or tortious acts like fraud, cheating, or forgery - Where a Bank sets up a subsequent contract of pledge against an FDR which the complainant alleges is fraudulent or based on forged documents such a dispute must be addressed in a regular civil or criminal proceeding rather than under the 1986 Act - The burden to prove that services were availed for a "commercial purpose" lies on the respondent (Bank), whereas the burden to prove "deficiency in service" lies on the complainant. [Relied on Lilavati Kirtilal Mehta Medical Trust vs. Unique Shanti Developers and Others (2020) 2 SCC 265; Chairman and Managing Director, City Union Bank Limited and Another v. R. Chandramohan (2023) 7 SCC 775; Paras 21-31] Sant Rohidas Leather Industries v. Vijaya Bank, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 267 : 2026 INSC 264

Consumer Protection Act, 2019 – Section 71 – Execution of Orders – Liability of Directors/Promoters – The Supreme Court held that an order passed by a Consumer Forum against a company (Corporate Debtor) cannot be executed against its Directors or Promoters if they were not parties to the original complaint and no specific findings of liability were recorded against them - Noted that execution must strictly conform to the decree and cannot be used to enlarge liability to bind persons who were not parties to the adjudication. Ansal Crown Heights Flat Buyers Association v. Ansal Crown Infrabuild Pvt. Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 40 : 2026 INSC 51

Consumer Protection – Deficiency in Service – Quantum of Compensation – Evidence and Proof – Challenge to the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (NCDRC) order awarding ₹2,00,00,000/- compensation for a faulty haircut – Held that while the finding of deficiency in service was upheld in the first round of litigation, the quantum of compensation must be based on "material evidence and not on the mere asking" - Compensation to the tune of crores cannot be awarded based on unauthenticated photocopies of documents, especially when their authenticity is denied by the opposite party. ITC Limited v. Aashna Roy, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 129 : 2026 INSC 135 : AIR 2026 SC 860

Consumer Protection – Insurance Claim – Fraud and Arson – Repudiation of Claim – The Supreme Court set aside the NCDRC order that had partially allowed an insurance claim despite evidence of fraud - held that once a claim is established to be founded on fraud, the entire claim collapses, and no relief partial or equitable can be granted - Key Findings: i. Deliberate Arson: Forensic analysis (Truth Labs) identified hydrocarbon residues (kerosene) at the seat of the fire, while electrical examinations ruled out a short circuit; ii. Fabricated Evidence: The respondent relied on invoices from non-existent or unrelated suppliers and manipulated VAT returns to inflate the claim; iii. Suspicious Proximity: The enhancement of insurance coverage and procurement of an additional policy occurred in close proximity to the fire incident, raising serious doubts about the bona fides of the claim; iv. Legal Principle: Fraud vitiates all solemn acts - An insurance contract cannot be used as an instrument for unjust enrichment - directed the Commissioner of Police, Ahmedabad, to form a Special Investigation Team (SIT) to investigate the orchestrated fraud. [Relied on S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu v. Jagannath (1994) 1 SCC 1; A.V. Papayya Sastry v. Government of Andhra Pradesh (2007) 4 SCC 221; Paras 15-26] United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Sayona Colors Pvt. Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 303 : 2026 INSC 287

Consumer Protection – Joint Development Agreement (JDA) – Liability of Landowners for Delay in Construction – Held: Landowners cannot be held jointly and severally liable with the developer for deficiency in service arising from construction delays if the obligation to construct rests solely with the developer under the JDA and the General Power of Attorney (GPA) - The developer's right to enter into sale agreements and undertake construction for their share of the property, coupled with indemnity clauses protecting landowners from the developer's breaches, shifts the liability for delay compensation exclusively to the developer. Sriganesh Chandrasekaran v. Unishire Homes Llp, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 185 : 2026 INSC 172 : AIR 2026 SC 1081

Consumer Protection – Principal and Agent Relationship – General Power of Attorney – Held: The execution of a GPA by landowners in favor of a developer to facilitate sale agreements and title transfers does not automatically make the landowners liable for the developer's specific failures in construction, especially when no acts or omissions are attributed to the landowners regarding the delay - Held: While landowners are not liable for construction delay compensation, they remain jointly responsible with the developer to ensure the transfer of title and execution of sale deeds in favor of the flat buyers – Appeals dismissed. [Paras 12-16] Sriganesh Chandrasekaran v. Unishire Homes Llp, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 185 : 2026 INSC 172 : AIR 2026 SC 1081

Contempt of Courts Act, 1971

Contempt Jurisdiction – Interim Orders – Noted that the High Court's order directing the framing of charges in a contempt petition while a fresh, detailed government rejection order remained unchallenged was found improper - Contempt should not be a shortcut for relief when appealable orders exist - The Supreme Court permitted the respondents to challenge the latest government order via a fresh writ petition to be heard alongside the contempt proceedings - The High Court is directed to pass a final order on merits and strictly prohibited from remanding the matter back to the authorities for further reconsideration, given the government's clear stance. [Paras 14-18] Mahendra Prasad Agarwal v. Arvind Kumar Singh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 195 : 2026 INSC 175

Contempt Jurisdiction – Non-compliance with directions for payment of salary to part-time teachers – Opportunity of hearing - the Supreme Court allowed certain part-time teachers in the State of West Bengal to make a fresh representation before the School Education Department Secretary for pay parity with full-time teachers teaching in non-government aided higher secondary schools - ordered that the competent authority shall pass a reasoned order on the representations within 4 months - Failure of Due Process – Held that while deciding representations, the authorities failed to afford the petitioners an opportunity of hearing or summon relevant school records as directed by the High Court - Directions – The Supreme Court granted liberty to the petitioners to file fresh representations within six weeks and directed the Secretary, School Education Department, is directed to: i. Afford an opportunity of hearing to the petitioners (in person or through an advocate); ii. Summon and allow inspection of engagement records from respective schools; iii. Pass a detailed reasoned order within four months. [Paras 12-15] Gurupada Bera v. Binod Kumar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 9 : 2026 INSC 20

Contempt of Courts Act, 1971; Section 12 & 15 - Article 215 of the Constitution of India - Doctrine of Merger - Maintainability of Contempt Petition in High Court after Supreme Court affirmation - High Court's jurisdiction to punish for contempt of its own order does not cease to operate merely because said order has been affirmed by the Supreme Court in appeal - Even if the doctrine of merger applies, the order to be executed remains the directions issued by the High Court - Held: If contempt petitions were driven to the Supreme Court in every case of affirmation by a non-speaking order, the Apex Court would be flooded with such petitions - The legal provisions cannot be used to coerce a litigant to approach the Supreme Court without resorting to filing a Contempt Petition in the High Court. [Paras 13-14] United Labour Federation v. Gagandeep Singh Bedi, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 208 : 2026 INSC 204

Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 – Civil Contempt – Intentional Delays and Administrative Hurdles – The Supreme Court deprecated the practice of government departments seeking "guidance" or citing "administrative hurdles" and "internal correspondence" as excuses for the non-compliance of clear court orders - Supreme Court noted that such actions are often a "calculated strategy" to delay or defeat the implementation of judicial directions. Israr Ahmed Khan v. Amarnath Prasad, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 209 : 2026 INSC 209

Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 – Liability of Non-Parties – Reiterated that even a third party or an officer not originally impleaded in the main proceedings can be held liable for contempt if they have knowledge of the court's order and act in a manner that willfully prevents its compliance or aids and abets its violation - Supreme Court emphasized that in contempt proceedings, the court cannot traverse beyond the original order or supplement its directions - The focus remains strictly on whether the specific directions issued in the judgment have been willfully disobeyed. [Relied on Sita Ram v. Balbir, (2014) 13 SCC 489; J.S. Parihar v. Ganpat Duggar, (1996) 6 SCC 291; Snehasis Giri v. Subhasis Mitra, (2023) 18 SCC 529; Paras 9-29] Israr Ahmed Khan v. Amarnath Prasad, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 209 : 2026 INSC 209

Contract Act, 1872

Contract Act, 1872; Section 133 - Discharge of surety by variance in terms of contract - The Supreme Court held that any variance made in the terms of the contract between the principal debtor and the creditor without the surety's consent discharges the surety only as to transactions subsequent to the variance - The discharge of the surety is not absolute; they remain liable for the original amount for which they stood as guarantee before the unauthorized variance occurred. Bhagyalaxmi Co-Operative Bank Ltd. v. Babaldas Amtharam Patel, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 210 : 2026 INSC 205

Contract Act, 1872 - Error by Bank and Third-Party Decree – Held that the Bank committed a clear breach of duty by unilaterally remitting the amount to the vessel owner despite receiving specific instructions (Form A-2) to remit it to the Plaintiff - The Bank, not being a party to the underlying Charter Party Agreement, could not rely on its terms to ignore the customer's mandate - Under the third-party procedure (Order VIII-A CPC / Order V-A Madras High Court Original Side Rules), the Bank was held liable to indemnify the customer (Defendant No. 1) for this erroneous transfer. [Relied on Bank of Bihar Ltd. v. Damodar Prasad and others (1969) 1 SCR 620; Asset Reconstruction Co. Ltd. v. Electrosteel Castings Ltd. (2026) 264 Comp Cas 11; Mumbai International Airport (P) Ltd. v. Regency Convention Centre & Hotels (P) Ltd. (2010) 7 SCC 417; Paras 35, 36] Canara Bank Overseas Branch v. Archean Industries Pvt. Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 252 : 2026 INSC 247 : AIR 2026 SC 1566

Contract Act, 1872 - Liability of Guarantors - Bifurcation of Liability - Supreme Court set aside the High Court's finding that guarantors are either liable for the entire amount or not at all. It held that liability can be bifurcated; sureties are liable to the extent of their original engagement (plus applicable interest) but are not liable for excess amounts permitted to be withdrawn by the creditor in connivance with the principal debtor without the sureties' intimation or consent - The cardinal rule is that a guarantor must not be liable beyond the terms of his engagement – noted that unless there is bad faith, misrepresentation, or a material variation to the prejudice of the surety, the creditor's actions within the contract terms do not automatically discharge the surety – Appeal allowed. [Relied on State of Maharashtra vs. Dr. MN Kaul (D) by his LRs, AIR 1967 SC 1634; Syndicate Bank vs. Channaveerappa Beleri & Ors., (2006) 11 SCC 506; Paras 4-7] Bhagyalaxmi Co-Operative Bank Ltd. v. Babaldas Amtharam Patel, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 210 : 2026 INSC 205

Contract Act, 1872 - Necessary Parties and Dominus Litis - Supreme Court rejected the contention that the suit was bad for non-joinder of the vessel owner (principal debtor) - It reaffirmed that the plaintiff is the dominus litis and cannot be compelled to sue a person against whom they seek no relief, unless that person is an indispensable "necessary party" without whom no effective decree can be passed. [Paras 27-32] Canara Bank Overseas Branch v. Archean Industries Pvt. Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 252 : 2026 INSC 247 : AIR 2026 SC 1566

Contract Act, 1872 – Section 74 – Liquidated Damages – Public Utility Projects – Proof of Actual Loss –In projects involving public utility or public interest (such as solar power projects under the National Solar Mission), it is not mandatory to prove actual loss for the award of liquidated damages - The delay in commissioning such a utility itself constitutes a loss to the public. The burden shifts to the party in breach to prove that no loss was caused - Key Findings held – i. Admitted Breach - The Solar Power Developer (SEL) admitted to delays in commissioning the 20 MW project (two months for the first 10 MW and five months for the balance); ii. Public Interest - The project, executed under the Jawaharlal Nehru National Solar Mission (JNNSM), was a public utility activity aimed at promoting green energy; thus, the strict proof of financial loss by the nodal agency (NVVNL) was unnecessary; iii. Jurisdictional Error by Division Bench - The Division Bench, acting under Section 37, erred by recalculating and reducing the compensation from 50% of the contractual claim (as awarded by the Single Judge) to a lower amount, as this amounted to a merits-based substitution of a plausible view. [Relied on Gayatri Balasamy vs. ISG Novasoft Technologies Limited (2025 INSC 605); AC Chokshi Share Broker Private Limited vs. Jatin Pratap Desai and another (2025 INSC 174); Paras 12-18] Saisudhir Energy Ltd. v. NTPC Vidyut Vyapar Nigam Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 112 : 2026 INSC 103 : AIR 2026 SC 850

Contract Act, 1872 - Sections 126, 127, 128, and 140 - Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Order VIII-A – Key Issues – i. Whether a "Corporate Guarantee" issued by a charterer (Defendant No. 1) to a ship repairer (Plaintiff) to pay outstanding dues from freight amounts constitutes a valid, independent guarantee under Section 126 of the Contract Act; ii. Whether a bank is liable to indemnify its customer under third-party procedure when it erroneously remits funds to the wrong party contrary to express customer instructions – Held that the "Corporate Guarantee" (Exhibit P11) and related communications (Exhibit P10) constituted a valid, independent contract of guarantee under Section 126 of the Contract Act - It was not merely a freight-sharing arrangement as contended by the Appellant – Noted that a guarantee is a voluntary act of taking up the burden of a third party who failed to make payment - Under Section 128, the liability of the surety is co-extensive with that of the principal debtor - The creditor is entitled to proceed against the surety without first exhausting remedies against the principal debtor. [Paras 21-25] Canara Bank Overseas Branch v. Archean Industries Pvt. Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 252 : 2026 INSC 247 : AIR 2026 SC 1566

Contract Law - Procedural Prerequisites and Waiver - A party at fault cannot be permitted to set up a bar of non-performance of prerequisite obligations to exclude the operation of an arbitration clause - If a party's conduct such as failing to adhere to strict timelines for Engineer decisions or Adjudicator recommendations disables preceding steps, those procedural prerequisites are deemed waived. [Relied on M.K. Shah Engineers & Contractors vs. State of M.P. (1999) 2 SCC 59; ASF Buildtech Private Limited vs. Shapoorji Pallonji & Company Private Limited (2025) 9 SCC 76; State of Goa v. Praveen Enterprises (2012) 12 SCC 581; Paras 16-20] Bhagheeratha Engineering Ltd. v. State of Kerala, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 31 : 2026 INSC 4

Contract Law – Apartment Buyers' Agreement – Dominant Position and Fraud – The High Court's finding that flat owners were made to "sign on the dotted line" due to the developer's dominant position was held to be conjectural – Held - In the absence of foundational pleadings alleging fraud, misrepresentation, or coercion at the time of execution, a decade-old registered agreement cannot be disregarded or held to be executed under misrepresentation. [Paras 61, 62] Raj Singh Gehlot v. Amitabha Sen, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 72 : 2026 INSC 77

Contract Law - Interpretation of Contracts – Admissibility of Extrinsic Evidence – Sections 92 and 94 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 – Supreme Court emphasized that when the language of a contract is plain and applies accurately to existing facts, evidence cannot be given to show it was not meant to apply to such facts - under Section 92, factual context and correspondences between parties can be used to make ambiguous terms certain. [Paras 21-22] WB State Electricity Distribution v. Adhunik Power & Natural Resource, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 213 : 2026 INSC 202 : AIR 2026 SC 1340

Contract Law - Shortfall in Tapering Linkage – Indemnity Clauses – Supreme Court set aside the compensation awarded for the period prior to the coal block cancellation (pre-25.08.2014) - It held that Article 2.5 of the PPA/PSA acted as an indemnity clause, stipulating that if coal was procured from alternative sources (e-auction/import) to meet shortfalls in tapering linkage before the captive source became operational, such coal would be deemed to be from the captive source with no separate cost escalation allowed. [Paras 19-23, 25-26] WB State Electricity Distribution v. Adhunik Power & Natural Resource, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 213 : 2026 INSC 202 : AIR 2026 SC 1340

Contractual Interpretation – Harmonious Construction – Clauses 3.20 and 3.22 – Supreme Court noted that a widely worded arbitration clause (Clause 3.22) must be read in conjunction with restrictive default clauses (Clause 3.20) - Clause 3.20, which accorded finality to the Administration's decision and barred legal proceedings, was interpreted to apply only where liability is admitted and only the quantification is at issue - Where liability is disputed, the matter falls within the ambit of the arbitration clause. [Relied on State of Karnataka v. Shree Rameshwara Rice Mills Thirthahalli, (1987) 2 SCC 160; J.G. Engineers Private Limited v. Union of India, (2011) 5 SCC 758; Sri Vedagiri Lakshmi Narasimha Swami Temple v. Induru Pattabhirami Reddi, 1966 SCC OnLine SC 243; Paras 25-38] ABS Marine Services v. Andaman and Nicobar Administration, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 287 : 2026 INSC 274

Contractual Interpretation — Subsequent Legislation Clause: In contracts where the bid was submitted before the actual implementation of the BOCW machinery in a specific State, the introduction of cess collection via subsequent State Notifications/Rules qualifies as "subsequent legislation." - Contractors could not have factored in the 1% cess component in their bids when no mechanism for collection existed at the time of submission (28 days prior to the bid deadline). [Relied on A. Prabhakara Reddy and Company vs. State of Madhya Pradesh and others (2016) 1 SCC 600; Paras 38, 51, 52] National Highways Authority of India v. Gammon Atlanta (JV), 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 71 : 2026 INSC 76

Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970

Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 – Section 10 – Sham vs. Genuine Contracts – Following the Constitution Bench in SAIL, Supreme Court reiterated that the prohibition of contract labour does not lead to automatic absorption - if a contract is found to be a "sham" or "camouflage" intended to bypass labour laws, the workers are treated as de facto employees of the principal employer - Such a determination involves disputed questions of fact that must be adjudicated by the Industrial Tribunal/Court, not a Writ Court – Appeal dismissed. [Relied on Steel Authority of India Limited (SAIL) v. National Union Waterfront Workers (2001) 7 SCC 1; Shambu Nath Goyal v. Bank of Baroda (1978) 2 SCC 353; Paras 24-40] Premium Transmission v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 86 : 2026 INSC 87

Contract Labour – Sham Contracts and Regularization – If a contract is proved to be a "camouflage" or "sham" to hide a real employer-employee relationship where the principal employer retains full control, the workers must be treated as direct employees and regularized - determining whether a contract is "sham" or "genuine" involves disputed questions of fact that must be adjudicated by the Industrial Tribunal/Court, not by Writ Courts under Article 226 – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Steel Authority of India Ltd. and others v. National Union Waterfront Workers and others (2001) 7 SCC 1; Paras 8-11] Premium Transmission v. Kishan Subhash Rathod, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 87

Co-operative Societies Act, 1960

Co-operative Societies Act, 1960 (Maharashtra) — Section 154 — Revisional Powers — Maintainability — Supreme Court ruled that the revisional power under Section 154 is "extremely wide" and is not denuded by the availability of alternative remedies under Rule 107(13) or (14) - A revision to annul a sale confirmation that is void ab initio (due to violation of mandatory rules) does not require a pre-deposit of the decretal amount under Section 154(2A)- that Rule 107(11)(h) serves a larger public purpose beyond the interest of the creditor, ensuring the sanctity of public auctions and preventing price manipulation by non-serious bidders - Supreme Court set aside the auction sale dated 29.01.2005 and the confirmation order dated 18.03.2005, declaring them null and void - directed a fresh auction for the property and ordered the Bank to refund the auction purchaser's deposit with 6% interest per annum. [Relied on Shilpa Shares & Securities and others vs. National Co-operative Bank Ltd. and others (2007) 12 SCC 165; Paras 39-42, 55-58] Adishakti Developers v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 202 : 2026 INSC 197

Co-operative Societies Act, 1960 (Maharashtra) — Section 23(2) and Section 154 — Membership of Housing Society — Delay in Payment of Contribution — The Supreme Court set aside a High Court order that had quashed the grant of membership to the legal heirs of a long-term tenant - held that since the Society had passed a resolution in 2005 to admit the predecessor-in-interest as a member upon payment, and that resolution was never revoked, the heirs were entitled to membership upon depositing the amount with interest - Supreme Court noted that denying membership while the parties remained in peaceful, undisputed possession of the flat would create a "serious anomaly" and "subsisting tussle". [Paras 41-45] Shashin Patel v. Uday Dalal, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 125 : 2026 INSC 125

Cooperative Societies — Interplay between Reorganisation Act and 2002 Act — Legislative Continuity — Section 87 of the Uttar Pradesh Reorganisation Act, 2000, embodies the doctrine of legislative continuity, allowing for the adaptation of laws for two years following bifurcation - Actions taken during this transitional period to reorganize societies to fit single-state boundaries are valid and cannot be retrospectively invalidated by Section 103 of the 2002 Act. Registrar Cane Cooperative Societies v. Gurdeep Singh Narval, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 224 : 2026 INSC 216

Co-operative Societies — Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Rules, 1961 — Rule 107(11)(g) and (h) — Mandatory Nature of Deposit Timelines — The Supreme Court held that the requirement to deposit the remainder of the purchase money within fifteen days (as per the Rule at the relevant time) from the date of auction sale is mandatory - Failure to deposit the full purchase money within this prescribed period renders the auction sale a nullity and not a mere irregularity. Supreme Court clarified that the Recovery Officer has no discretion to extend the time for making payment of the remainder of the purchase money, unlike the extension permitted for the cost of stamp duty. [Paras 47-55] Adishakti Developers v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 202 : 2026 INSC 197

Cooperative Societies — Non-obstante Clause — Section 93 of the Reorganisation Act provides that its provisions shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent in any other law - The deeming fiction of Section 103 of the 2002 Act cannot override the express statutory scheme of the Reorganisation Act where reorganisation actions were already completed – Appeal allowed. [Relied on State of Uttar Pradesh through Principal Secretary and Others v. Milkiyat Singh and Others; 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2802; Paras 13-24] Registrar Cane Cooperative Societies v. Gurdeep Singh Narval, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 224 : 2026 INSC 216

Cooperative Societies — Uttar Pradesh Reorganisation Act, 2000 — Multi-State Cooperative Societies Act, 2002 — Section 103 — Status of Sugarcane Cooperative Societies upon State Bifurcation — The Supreme Court held that the Sugarcane Growers Cooperative Societies of Bajpur and Gadarpur are not Multi-State Cooperative Societies – Held that the deeming fiction under Section 103 of the 2002 Act is neither automatic nor universal; it requires a factual determination of whether a society's objects (distinguished from its area of operation) extend to more than one State. Registrar Cane Cooperative Societies v. Gurdeep Singh Narval, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 224 : 2026 INSC 216

Customs Act, 1962

Customs Act, 1962; Section 28, 46 — Customs Tariff Act, 1975; General Rules of Interpretation (GRI) — Classification of "Aluminium Shelving for Mushroom Growing" - The Supreme Court set aside the CESTAT order that had classified aluminium shelves as "parts of agricultural machinery" under CTI 84369900 - held that the subject goods are "Aluminium Structures" classifiable under CTI 76109010 - 1. Analysis of General Rules of Interpretation (GRI) – i. Sequential Application: The Court reiterated that GRIs 1 to 4 must be applied sequentially; ii. Primacy of GRI 1: Classification begins and often ends at GRI 1, which prioritizes the terms of headings and relevant Section or Chapter Notes; iii. GRI 3 (Specific vs. General): GRI 3 is a "tie-breaker" invoked only if GRI 1 and GRI 2 result in a tie between two or more headings - The CESTAT erred by jumping to GRI 3 to prefer a "specific" heading without first exhausting the mandatory sequential inquiry of GRI 1; iv. Reliance on HSN Explanatory Notes - These notes are the foundation for interpreting the HSN-based tariff - affirmed that HSN notes have binding force when the domestic tariff is aligned with HSN – Held that the 'Aluminum Shelves' imported for mushroom cultivation cannot be classified as 'parts of agricultural machinery' but are liable to be classified as 'aluminium structures', attracting a customs duty. [Relied on Commissioner of Central Excise, Salem v. Madhan Agro Industries (India) Private Ltd. (2024); Paras 117- 142] Commissioner of Customs (Import) v. Welkin Foods, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 17 : 2026 INSC 19

Customs Act, 1962 - Analysis of "End Use" and "Intended Use" – Held that the taxable event is the time of import - The condition of the article at import not its eventual use is the crucial factor – Held that holding that "use" is relevant only if the tariff entry itself explicitly refers to use or adaptation; iii. Objective Characteristics: Classification must be based on objective characteristics and properties to ensure legal certainty and prevent subjectivity. [Relied on Dunlop India Ltd v. Union of India (1976); Indian Aluminium Cables Ltd v. Union of India (1985), Paras 69-83, 87-93] Commissioner of Customs (Import) v. Welkin Foods, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 17 : 2026 INSC 19

Customs Act, 1962 - Analysis of the Common Parlance Test – i. Restrictive Application: The "common parlance" or "trade parlance" test is not a measure of first resort in the HSN era; ii. Conditions for Invocation - It can only be invoked if: (i) the statute/notes provide no explicit definition; (ii) the heading lacks scientific/technical terms; and (iii) it does not contradict the statutory framework; iii. Exceptions - Where a term is used in a scientific or technical sense, common parlance is irrelevant - held that technical meanings must prevail over commercial nomenclature if the statute implies a technical sense. [Relied on Akbar Badrudin Giwani v. Collector of Customs, Bombay (1990); Paras 63-68] Commissioner of Customs (Import) v. Welkin Foods, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 17 : 2026 INSC 19

Customs Act, 1962 - Definition and Characteristics of "Machine" – i. Essential Features: A machine must consist of moving parts and utilize power (mechanical or electrical) to perform a specific task; ii. Support Structures vs. Parts: Static structures that merely support a plant are not "parts" of the machine itself – Held that All of the individual machines are already complete and fully operational on their own; their mechanical and electrical functions do not rely on aluminium shelves - These shelves do not contribute to their operation; they merely serve as a surface for the devices to perform their functions. [Relied On Saraswati Sugar Mills v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Delhi-III (2014); Paras 124-140] Commissioner of Customs (Import) v. Welkin Foods, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 17 : 2026 INSC 19

Customs Act, 1962 – Section 135(1)(b)(i) – Smuggling of foreign wrist watches – Admissibility of Section 108 statements – Sentencing – Reduction of sentence to period already undergone – The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of the appellants for the illegal import and handling of 777 foreign-made wrist watches and 879 straps - upheld the High Court's finding that statements recorded by Customs Officers under Section 108 are substantive pieces of evidence and are not barred by Sections 24, 30, or 34 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, provided they are voluntary. Amad Noormamad Bakali v. State of Gujarat, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 190 : 2026 INSC 180

Customs Act, 1962 - Specific Application to Aluminium Shelves – Held that i. Heading 7610: The HSN Explanatory Notes characterize "structures" as items that generally remain in position once installed and are made of bars, rods, plates, etc., joined by riveting or bolting - The subject goods fulfilled all these criteria; ii. Heading 8436: The shelves lacked moving parts and independent mechanical functions - Integrating them post-import with watering systems did not change their character at the time of import into "agricultural machinery" – Held that the subject goods are correctly classifiable under CTI 7610 90 10 - The CESTAT judgment was set aside for misapplying the General Rules of Interpretation and over-relying on the end-use/common parlance tests in the face of clear statutory guidance – Appeal allowed. [Paras 96, 100, 117-130, 142] Commissioner of Customs (Import) v. Welkin Foods, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 17 : 2026 INSC 19

Customs Duty – Special Economic Zone (SEZ) – Electrical Energy – Supply to Domestic Tariff Area (DTA) – Levy of Customs Duty – The appellant challenged the levy of customs duty on electrical energy generated in its SEZ unit and supplied to the DTA for the period between 16 September 2010 and 15 February 2016 - The High Court of Gujarat had previously in 2015 struck down a similar levy for an earlier period (June 2009 to September 2010), holding that such a supply does not constitute an "import into India" under Section 12 of the Customs Act, 1962 - in the impugned 2019 judgment, the High Court declined to extend this relief to the subsequent period, reasoning that the later notifications (Notification Nos. 91/2010-Cus. and 26/2012-Cus.) were not specifically challenged - The Supreme Court held that the 2015 judgment had correctly identified that there was no identifiable charging event to attract customs duty under Section 12 for electricity generated within India in an SEZ and wheeled to the DTA - An SEZ is not a foreign territory, and the legal fiction in Section 30 of the SEZ Act ("as if imported") is for the purpose of determining the rate of duty and does not convert an intra-national supply into an act of import - Observed that Section 25 of the Customs Act is a power to relax or exempt duty, not a power to create or invent a new tax - The use of an "exemption" notification to introduce a fresh liability is a colourable exercise of delegated authority and is ultra vires – Appeal allowed. [Paras 45-85] Adani Power Ltd. v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 3 : 2026 INSC 1

Development and Regulation of Urban Areas Act

Development and Regulation of Urban Areas Act, 1975 (Haryana) – Section 3(3A) – De-licensing and Validation – Power to grant a license includes the implied power to withdraw, modify, or de-license, as supported by Section 21 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 – Held - The 2020 Amendment to the 1975 Act retrospectively validated de-licensing actions taken by the authorities. [Para 71, 72] Raj Singh Gehlot v. Amitabha Sen, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 72 : 2026 INSC 77

Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940

Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 – Section 34 – Vicarious Liability – Directors' Responsibility - The Supreme Court held: Whether Directors of a company were "in charge of" and "responsible to" the company for the conduct of its business at the time of the offense is a question of fact - Quashing a complaint at the threshold on the ground of insufficient compliance with Section 34 of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act is premature; such determinations are best left to the Trial Court to be decided at the appropriate stage based on evidence – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Cheminova India Limited v. State of Punjab, (2021) 8 SCC 818; Paras 32-59] State of Kerala v. Panacea Biotec Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 206 : 2026 INSC 200 : AIR 2026 SC 1270 ; 2026 (1) Crimes (SC) 285

Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940; Drugs and Cosmetics Rules, 1945 – Rule 49 – Power of the State Government to prescribe essential qualifications for the post of Drug Inspector (DI) or Drug Control Officer (DCO) - Key Issues – i. Whether the State Government, under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution of India (or State Acts), can prescribe "experience" as an essential qualification for appointment to the post of Drug Inspector when such qualification is absent in the Central Rules; ii. Applicability of the Doctrine of Occupied Field where the Central Government has already exercised its rule-making power under Section 33 of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act (D&C Act) – Held that when a field prescribing a qualification for a public post is occupied by the Union, then it is impermissible for the States to impose additional qualifications, observed the Supreme Court - Main Findings & Ratio – i. Doctrine of Occupied Field - The D&C Act is a "central law" that occupies the field regarding the prescription of qualifications for Inspectors under Section 33(2)(b) and Section 33(2)(n) - The State Government's power to appoint persons "as it thinks fit" under Section 21 does not extend to altering the "prescribed qualifications" set by the Central Government; ii. Interpretation of Rule 49 - The substantive part of Rule 49 of the Drug Rules, 1945, mandates specific educational degrees as the only essential qualifications for appointment - The 18-month experience mentioned in the proviso to Rule 49 is not a condition for eligibility for appointment; rather, it is a condition precedent for authorizing an already appointed Inspector to inspect the manufacture of substances listed in Schedule C; iii. Constitutional Supremacy - Rules framed by the State under the proviso to Article 309 or State enactments (like the Karnataka State Civil Services Act) cannot override or be inconsistent with the Central Drug Rules in an occupied field. [Relied on A.B. Krishna v. State of Karnataka (1998) 3 SCC 495; Paras 38 – 63] State of Haryana v. Krishan Kumar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 58 : 2026 INSC 63

Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 – Section 18(a)(vi) read with Rule 74, 18-B, 22(1)(cca), 27(d), and 28-A – Record Maintenance – Limitation for Filing Complaint – Jurisdiction of Courts – Held that i. Non-Maintenance of Records as a Substantive Offence: The Appellants were prosecuted for failing to maintain records as stipulated under Schedule M and Schedule U of the Drugs and Cosmetics Rules, 1945, specifically regarding the drug Pseudoephedrine - held that allegations regarding the contravention of Section 18(a)(vi) of the Act (manufacturing/stocking in contravention of rules) are punishable under Section 27(d); ii. Limitation Period for Prosecution: The Appellants argued that the offence fell under Section 18-B (punishable under Section 28-A), which carries a maximum punishment of one year, thus attracting a one-year limitation period under Section 468 of the Cr.P.C. - The Supreme Court rejected this, clarifying that since the allegations included violations of Section 18(a)(vi) punishable under Section 27(d) (imprisonment up to two years), the limitation period is three years as per Section 468 Cr.P.C; iii. Jurisdiction and Committal to Special Court/Sessions: Under Section 32(2), no court inferior to a Court of Session shall try an offence punishable under Chapter IV of the Act - While Section 36-A allows for summary trials by a Magistrate for certain offences, it explicitly excludes those triable by the Special Court or Court of Session - the committal of the case to the Special Judge-I (a Court of Session) was legally sound – Appeal dismissed. [Relied on Miteshbhai J. Patel Vs. Drug Inspector, 2025 SCC online SC 2203; Paras 27-32] SBS Biotech v. State of Himachal Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 181 : 2026 INSC 171

Drugs and Cosmetics Rules, 1945 – Directions issued by the Court – i. Selection Criteria - Public Service Commissions (HPSC and KPSC) must complete selections based strictly on educational qualifications in Rule 49, ignoring the "experience" requirement added by State Rules; ii. Redrawing Merit List - Lists must be redrawn within eight weeks; iii. Protection of Existing Appointees (Haryana) - Selected candidates who remain in the new merit list shall continue in service - Those who fall out of the merit list may be continued only at the State's discretion via supernumerary posts, placed at the bottom of the seniority list. State of Haryana v. Krishan Kumar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 58 : 2026 INSC 63

Drugs - Legal Definition of "Drugs" vs. "New Drugs" regarding Stem Cells - While autologous stem cells used in ASD treatments (not undergoing substantial manipulation) may not qualify as "new drugs" under the New Drugs and Clinical Trial Rules, 2019 (NDCT Rules), they fall under the broader definition of "drug" as "substances" under Section 3(b)(i) of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 - stem-cell derived products involving "substantial manipulation" are perpetually categorized as "new drugs" under Rule of the NDCT Rules. [Relied on Chimanlal Jagjivan Das Sheth v. State of Maharashtra 1962 SCC OnLine SC 16; Ishwar Singh Bindra and Others v. State of U.P. 1968 SCC OnLine SC 98; Paras 101 – 109] Yash Charitable Trust v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 93 : 2026 INSC 96

Electricity Act, 2003

Electricity Act, 2003 – Regulation as an "Enterprise" – Duty of Regulators – While SERCs possess plenary power, they must not act in silos - Supreme Court adopted the model of "Regulation as an Enterprise," where regulators act as "Governments in Miniature" to balance efficiency with distributive and environmental goals - Regulatory power must be exercised as a collaborative project with other stakeholders to subserve the purpose of the Act, including energy security and the transition to renewable energy. Southern Power Distribution Company v. Green Infra Wind Solutions, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 301 : 2026 INSC 294

Electricity Act, 2003 – Sections 61, 62, 64, and 86 – Tariff Determination – Generation Based Incentive (GBI) – Power and Jurisdiction of State Electricity Regulatory Commissions (SERCs) – Whether an SERC, while exercising its exclusive power to determine tariff, can "consider and factor in" the GBI granted by the Ministry of New and Renewable Energy (MNRE) to renewable energy generating companies (GENCOs) - Held, there is no unallocated regulatory residue left outside the SERC's jurisdiction; tariff determination is its exclusive province - The power of the Commission to determine tariff includes the authority to consider the impact of incentives or subsidies, such as GBI, that affect the economic position of a GENCO - This authority flows directly from the Electricity Act and relevant Regulations (e.g., Regulation 20 of APERC Regulations, 2015) and is not denuded by the mere existence of a Union grant under Article 282 of the Constitution. Southern Power Distribution Company v. Green Infra Wind Solutions, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 301 : 2026 INSC 294

Electricity Act, 2003 – Treatment of GBI – Mandatory Deduction vs. Contextual Application – Held, the requirement to "take into consideration" an incentive under Regulation 20 does not mechanically translate into a mandatory deduction from the tariff - If an incentive (like GBI) is designed as a "generator-focused incentive" to encourage investment in renewable energy and not as a "consumer subsidy," the Commission must respect its underlying objective - Factoring GBI into the tariff in a manner that effectively redirects the benefit from the generator to the consumer nullifies the policy intent of the grant. [Relied on State of Himachal Pradesh v. JSW Hydro Energy Ltd., 2025 INSC 857; Paras 15-46] Southern Power Distribution Company v. Green Infra Wind Solutions, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 301 : 2026 INSC 294

Electricity Duty Act, 1958 (Bombay); Section 5A — Exemption from Electricity Duty — Withdrawal of Exemption — Power of State Government — The State Government, having the statutory power to grant exemptions in the public interest under Section 5A, also possesses the inherent power to withdraw or modify such exemptions - The power to grant an exemption is a policy decision in the realm of fiscal administration, and the State must retain flexibility to recalibrate such policies based on changing economic circumstances and public finance management. State of Maharashtra v. Reliance Industries Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 304 : 2026 INSC 296

Electricity – Power Purchase Agreement (PPA) – Change in Law – Cancellation of Coal Blocks – The Supreme Court upheld the grant of compensation to the power generator (APNRL) for additional costs incurred due to "Change in Law" events resulting from the cancellation of the Ganeshpur captive coal block – Noted that the judgment in Manohar Lal Sharma v. Principal Secy. & Ors. (2014) 9 SCC 516 and the subsequent enactment of the Coal Mines (Special Provisions) Act, 2015 constituted a "Change in Law" under Article 10 of the PPA - These events altered the legal regime for coal allocation, thereby entitling the generator to be restored to the same economic position as if the Change in Law had not occurred. [Para 24] WB State Electricity Distribution v. Adhunik Power & Natural Resource, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 213 : 2026 INSC 202 : AIR 2026 SC 1340

Electricity - Reasonable Notice Period — Fiscal Implications — Where captive power generators have made significant investments based on duty exemptions, a sudden withdrawal can be disruptive - In the interest of justice, a "reasonable notice period" must be granted to allow affected industries to adjust their financial planning - A period of one year from the date of the notifications is considered a reasonable notice period. [Relied on Shri Bakul Oil Industries & Anr. v. State of Gujarat & Anr., (1987) 1 SCC 31; Kasinka Trading and Anr. v. Union of India and Anr., (1995) 1 SCC 274; State of Rajasthan & Another v. J K Udaipur Udyog Ltd. & Another, (2004) 7 SCC 673; Paras 15-24] State of Maharashtra v. Reliance Industries Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 304 : 2026 INSC 296

Employees' Compensation Act, 1923

Employees' Compensation Act, 1923; Section 4A(3)(b) — Liability to pay Penalty — The Supreme Court reiterated that while an Insurance Company is liable to indemnify the employer for the principal compensation amount and interest, it cannot be fastened with the liability to pay the penalty component - Noted that the penalty under Section 4A(3)(b) is imposed due to the "personal fault and negligence" of the employer for failing to deposit compensation within the stipulated one month. New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Rekha Chaudhary, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 187 : 2026 INSC 177

Employees' Compensation Act, 1923 - Statutory Interpretation — Section 4A — Following the 1995 Amendment, the components of compensation/interest (Clause 'a') and penalty (Clause 'b') have been severed - The legislative intent behind this severance was to ensure that the burden of penalty which is not a natural corollary of the indemnity contract remains a deterrence for the employer rather than being passed onto the insurer - The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's order regarding the penalty. It held that the employer (Respondent No. 4) is solely liable to pay the penalty amount of Rs. 2,57,838/- within eight weeks. [Relied on Ved Prakash Garg v. Premi Devi (1997) 8 SCC 1; Paras 10-22] New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Rekha Chaudhary, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 187 : 2026 INSC 177

Employer-Employee Relationship – Sham or Camouflage – Held that mere fact that the same individuals continued to work for the principal employer despite periodic changes in contractors does not, by itself, establish a direct relationship or prove a "sham" arrangement - Contractors may retain existing personnel to ensure continuity and prevent complaints from the principal employer - Regularization – Despite allowing the appeals, the Supreme Court exercised its discretion to direct the appellant to consider the respondents' cases for regularization on a sympathetic basis, given their decades of uninterrupted service in jobs that appear perpetual in nature - This direction was issued under the "special facts and circumstances" of the case and is not to be treated as a precedent. Municipal Council v. K. Jayaram, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 38

Environment (Protection) Act, 1986

Environment (Protection) Act, 1986 – Section 5 – Directions for Implementation – To bridge significant implementation gaps and ensure readiness for the 2026 Rules, Supreme Court issued nationwide directions: i. Three-Tier Enforcement: Failure to comply shall be treated as more than an administrative lapse, involving: Tier 1 (immediate fines), Tier 2 (criminal prosecution), and Tier 3 (prosecution of responsible officials for neglect of oversight duties); ii. Role of Elected Representatives: Mayors, Councillors, and Ward Members are designated as lead facilitators for source-segregation education; iii. Infrastructure and Monitoring: Mandated infrastructure audits by District Collectors and the establishment of multi-tier monitoring task forces by 15.03.2026; iv. Bulk Waste Generators (BWGs): Must register on a centralized portal and operate on-site wet waste processing facilities or procure EBWGR certificates by 31.03.2026. [Paras 12-19] Bhopal Municipal Corporation v. Dr. Subhash C. Pandey, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 182

Environmental Law – CPCB Methodology for Environmental Compensation – Scope and Applicability – The Central Pollution Control Board (CPCB) is a facilitative and indicative tool, not a rigid or exhaustive code - While primarily designed for industrial sectors, its adoption by the NGT for residential projects is not legally impermissible, especially when the resulting quantification is not arbitrary or disproportionate. Rhythm County v. Satish Sanjay Hegde, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 98 : 2026 INSC 102 : AIR 2026 SC 1523

Environmental Law – Principle of Correlation – Actual Damage vs. Statutory Violation – While mere violation of law without demonstrable harm may not automatically warrant compensation in all cases, activities with the potential to degrade the environment or those involving "flagrant violations" (such as continuing construction despite stop-work orders) justify the imposition of deterrent and restorative damages – Appeal dismissed. [Relied on M/s. Goel Ganga Developers India Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India (2018) 18 SCC 257; Deepak Nitrite Ltd. v. State of Gujarat (2004) 6 SCC 402; Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai v. Ankita Sinha (2022) 13 SCC 401; Research Foundation for Science (18) v. Union of India (2005) 13 SCC 186; Paras 21-46] Rhythm County v. Satish Sanjay Hegde, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 98 : 2026 INSC 102 : AIR 2026 SC 1523

Environmental Law – Siting Norms – Proximity to Schools and Habitations – Mandatory nature of buffer zones and siting distances. Held: Preventive safeguards and siting norms (e.g., PPCB notification dated 02.09.1998) are designed to operate in advance to prevent avoidable risk to sensitive receptors - Demonstrable compliance based on objective, verified measurements of emission sources is required at the threshold; assumptions of compliance to be tested at a later stage (Consent to Operate) are legally insufficient. [Relied on Vellore Citizens' Welfare Forum v. Union of India (1996) 5 SCC 647; K. Ramadas Shenoy v. Town Municipal Council, Udipi (1974) 2 SCC 506; A.P. Pollution Control Board v. Prof. M.V. Nayudu (1999) 2 SCC 718; Paras 26-33] Harbinder Singh Sekhon v. State of Punjab, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 162 : 2026 INSC 159

Essential Commodities Act, 1955

Essential Commodities Act, 1955 – Sections 3 and 7 – Prosecution for cement black-marketing – Effect of decontrol – The appellants were convicted for the unauthorized possession and intended sale of government-quota cement in 1994, allegedly violating the Maharashtra Cement (Licensing and Control) Order, 1973 - The Supreme Court held that since the Central Government had substantially withdrew price and distribution control over cement via S.O. 168(E) dated 01.03.1989 and rescinded state licensing powers via S.O. 624(E) dated 07.08.1990, no valid control order under Section 3 was in force on the date of the alleged offense (24.03.1994) - In the absence of a subsisting statutory order, a conviction under Section 7 is legally impermissible. Manoj v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 157 : 2026 INSC 152

Estates Acquisition Act, 1953

Estates Acquisition Act, 1953 (West Bengal) – Sections 6(1)(j), 53, 57A, and 57B – Power of Review – Jurisdiction of Revenue Officer – Quasi-Judicial Authorities – Separation of Powers - Whether a Revenue Officer, as a quasi-judicial authority under the West Bengal Estates Acquisition (WBEA) Act, 1953, possesses the inherent or statutory power to review a vesting order that has attained finality, especially in the absence of an express legislative mandate - Key Findings of the Court – i. No Inherent Power of Review - Supreme Court reiterated that the power of review is not an inherent power; it must be expressly conferred by statute or by necessary implication - Quasi-judicial authorities can only exercise those powers specifically bestowed upon them by law; ii. Interpretation of Section 57A - held that Section 57A, which allows the State to invest authorities with the "powers of a Civil Court," does not amount to a blanket conferment of the power of substantive review - Such an interpretation would conflict with Section 57B(3), which expressly prohibits Revenue Officers from reopening matters already decided or determined; iii. Separation of Powers & Basic Structure - Conferring judicial functions like the power of review upon executive functionaries (like Revenue Officers), who lack judicial training or independence from executive control, blurs the demarcation between the executive and judiciary - This encroaches upon the Separation of Powers, which is part of the Basic Structure of the Constitution; iv. Failure on Merits of Review – Held that even if jurisdiction existed, the 2008 review failed the criteria under Order XLVII Rule 1 of the CPC - The respondent-company failed to prove it was "exclusively engaged in farming" as of January 1, 1952, despite ample opportunities in 1971 - Subsequent economic considerations or "amicable settlements" are not legally sustainable grounds for review – v. Nullity of Orders without Jurisdiction - An order passed by an authority lacking inherent jurisdiction is void ab initio and a nullity. Its invalidity can be challenged at any stage, including collateral proceedings. [Relied on: Patel Narshi Thakershi v. Pradyuman Singhji, (1971) 3 SCC 844; Kalabharati Advertising v. Hemant Vimalnath Narichania, (2010) 9 SCC 437; Union of India v. Madras Bar Assn., (2010) 11 SCC 1; Balvant N. Viswamitra v. Yadav Sadashiv Mule, (2004) 8 SCC 706; Paras 31-89] State of West Bengal v. Jai Hind Pvt. Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 126 : 2026 INSC 132

Exam Rules, 2013

Exam Rules, 2013 & Cadre Allocation Policy – Rule 1, 13, 14, and 17 of Exam Rules read with Paragraph 9 of the Policy – Interpretation of "General Standards - Emphasized that the IFS examination is a "two-tier" process where the Preliminary Examination is an integral stage - Under the proviso to Rule 14(ii), a reserved category candidate can only be adjusted against unreserved vacancies if they have been recommended without resorting to any relaxation/concession in eligibility or selection criteria at "any stage of the examination" – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Deepa E.V. v. Union of India and Ors. (2017) 12 SCC 680; Gaurav Pradhan v. State of Rajasthan (2018) 11 SCC 352; Niravkumar Dilipbhai Makwana v. Gujarat Public Service Commission (2019) 7 SCC 383; Union of India v. Sajib Roy (2025) SCC OnLine SC 1943; Paras 25-36] Union of India v. G. Kiran, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 8

Factories Act, 1948

Factories Act, 1948; Section 59(2) — Overtime Wages — Definition of "Ordinary Rate of Wages" — Inclusion of Compensatory Allowances — The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision that compensatory allowances such as House Rent Allowance (HRA), Transport Allowance (TA), Small Family Allowance (SFA), and Clothing and Washing Allowance (CWA) must be included in the "ordinary rate of wages" for the purpose of calculating overtime wages - noted that Section 59(2) provides for only two specific exclusions: bonus and wages for overtime work - In the absence of statutory rules, the Executive cannot use Office Memorandums to read additional exclusions into the Act that the Legislature did not contemplate - Noted that different Ministries cannot assign different meanings to the same statutory provision, noting that the Ministry of Railways was already including such allowances in its calculations. [Paras 14, 15] Union of India v. Heavy Vehicles Factory Employees Union, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 70

Factories Act, 1948; Sections 64, 65, 112, & 113 — Rule-making Power — Jurisdiction of Central Government — Under Chapter VI and Chapter XI of the 1948 Act, the power to frame exempting rules or general rules is vested primarily with the State Governments - The Central Government's role is limited to issuing directions to State Governments for the execution of the Act's provisions - various Ministries (Defence, Labour, and Finance) lack the legal authority to issue clarifications or Office Memorandums that modify the definition of "ordinary rate of wages" under Section 59(2) – Held that The Factories Act, 1948, is a beneficial legislation intended to protect workers from exploitation and ensure their health and safety - Any interpretation that restricts or curtails benefits admissible to workers under the Act must be avoided - Executive instructions that lack statutory force cannot override the law or run contrary to literal statutory mandates – Appeals dismissed. [Relied on Gujarat Mazdoor Sabha & Anr. v. State of Gujarat (2020) 10 SCC 459; Paras 9 - 13] Union of India v. Heavy Vehicles Factory Employees Union, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 70

Finance Act, 1994

Service Tax — Finance Act, 1994 — Sections 65(40), 65(41), 65(105)(zu), 66A — Reverse charge — “Event Management Service” — Fees paid to foreign booking agencies for procuring speakers for Hindustan Times Leadership Summit — HELD: Not taxable as Event Management Service — Booking of speakers is distinct from managing, organizing, planning, or presenting an event — Mere procurement of speakers does not amount to “event management” — Presence of speakers being essential to the Summit does not convert booking agents into “event managers” — Tax cannot be imposed by stretching the statutory definition — Strict interpretation of taxing statutes must prevail – Further held that i. The contracts with Washington Speakers Bureau and Harry Walker Agency were speaker-booking contracts, not contracts for event management; they did not involve management of venue, logistics, stage, publicity, sound, light, security, invitations, or coordination of the event; ii. “Event management” under Section 65(40) requires services relating to planning, promotion, organizing, or presentation of an event; mere facilitation of a speaker's appearance does not satisfy this test; iii. The CBIC/TRU Circular dated 08.08.2002 supports the assessee, as it contemplates an event manager as one who manages venue, stage, artists, logistics, and production of the event — functions absent in the present case; iv. Even if speakers are central to the Summit, participation in the event is not equivalent to managing the event; booking agents cannot be treated as “event managers”; v. Applying the principle of strict interpretation of taxing statutes, tax cannot be imposed by analogy or inference if the service does not fall squarely within the statutory entry; vi. Applying the common parlance test, ordinary understanding of “event management” does not cover speaker-booking services – Appeals allowed. [Relied on: Shiv Steels v. State of Assam, 2025 SCC Online SC 2006; CST v. Jaswant Singh Charan Singh, 1967 SCC Online SC 154 (Para 46); Indo International Industries v. CST, (1981) 2 SCC 528; Paras 28, 37-41, 44-48] HT Media Ltd. v. Principal Commissioner Delhi South Goods and Service Tax, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 55 : 2026 INSC 66 : AIR 2026 SC 560

Foreign Trade (Development and Regulation) Act, 1992

Foreign Trade (Development and Regulation) Act, 1992 – Section 3 – Minimum Import Price (MIP) – Commencement of Delegated Legislation – The Supreme Court held that a Notification issued under Section 3 of the Act acquires the force of law only upon its publication in the Official Gazette - The expression "date of this Notification" used in such instruments must necessarily be construed as the date of its publication in the Gazette (in this case, 11.02.2016), rather than the date it was signed or uploaded on a website (05.02.2016). Viraj Impex Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 76 : 2026 INSC 80

Foreign Trade Policy (2015-2020) – Paragraph 1.05(b) – Transitional Protection – Importers who opened irrevocable Letters of Credit prior to the actual date of Gazette publication (11.02.2016) are entitled to the transitional protection under Para 1.05(b) of the FTP - Supreme court rejected the argument that "uploading" a notification on a website constitutes sufficient notice to curtail rights before formal Gazette publication – Appeal allowed. [Relied on B.K. Srinivasan & Ors. v. State of Karnataka & Ors. (1987) 1 SCC 658; Paras 16-23] Viraj Impex Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 76 : 2026 INSC 80

Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980

Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980 – Ecological Balance vs. Invasive Species – Held that the mere presence of dense vegetation does not automatically signify a natural forest ecosystem, especially if the growth consists primarily of invasive alien species like Prosopis juliflora (Vilayati Kikar), which can disrupt native biodiversity - Environmental management should prioritize the restoration of native/indigenous species over the protection of harmful invasive monocultures - reiterated that tribunals and courts should not interfere with the implementation of a long-approved Master Plan under the guise of environmental principles once that plan has attained statutory finality - Harmonizing the right to a clean environment under Article 21 with the right to development, the Court noted that integrated transport projects (like the Bijwasan Railway Station redevelopment) serve public interest by decongesting urban zones and optimizing land use. [Relied on The Auroville Foundation v. Navroz Kersasp Mody and Others (2025) 4 SCC 150; Paras 42-65] Naveen Solanki v. Rail Land Development Authority, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 277 : 2026 INSC 270

Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980 – Section 2 – Deemed Forest – Interplay between Statutory Master Plan and Subsequent Vegetation Growth – The Supreme Court held that land earmarked for a project under an approved Master Plan, which was not recorded as forest or deemed forest at the time the Plan came into force, cannot be subsequently declared a "deemed forest" due to the natural proliferation of vegetation or invasive species over time - Noted that the statutory binding force and sanctity of a Master Plan must prevail to ensure certainty and stability in urban planning - The relevant date for determining whether a parcel of land qualifies as a "deemed forest" is the date of the coming into force of the Master Plan, not the date when project work actually commences on the ground. Naveen Solanki v. Rail Land Development Authority, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 277 : 2026 INSC 270

Forest Rights – Recognition of Legal Occupation – Supreme Court noted that certain residents, such as those in "Forest Villages" listed in the 'Jamabandi Register' or title holders under the Scheduled Tribes and Other Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights) Act, 2006, are legally authorized and not liable for eviction - directed the parties to maintain status quo regarding the land in occupation until a speaking order is passed and the subsequent 15-day notice period expires. [Paras 9-13] Abdul Khalek v. State of Assam, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 134 : 2026 INSC 140 : AIR 2026 SC 933

General Provident Fund (Central Service) Rules, 1960

General Provident Fund (Central Service) Rules, 1960 – Rule 33(ii) – Provident Funds Act, 1925 – Sections 4 & 5 – Rights of Nominee – Release of GPF Dues – The Supreme Court dismissed a Special Leave Petition filed by the Union of India challenging a High Court order that directed the release of GPF amounts to the nominee of a deceased employee - The Government argued that under Section of the Provident Funds Act, 1925, amounts exceeding Rs. 5,000/- require a succession certificate/probate even for a nominee – Supreme Court rejected this, holding that the Rs. 5,000/- threshold established in 1925 has lost relevance due to inflation - held that Rule 33(ii) of the 1960 Rules, framed by the Government itself, stipulates that GPF amounts shall be payable to the nominee regardless of the amount – Held that Section 5(1) of the Act contains a non-obstante clause giving primacy to a valid nominee to receive the funds to the exclusion of others - Sections 4 and 5 of the Act and Rule 33(ii) must be construed harmoniously to avoid rendering the nomination process "otiose" – Noted that a nominee is a "mere trustee" to collect funds and not the beneficial owner - Releasing funds to a nominee does not bar other legal heirs from claiming their share in a competent court – Noted that the Government should not involve itself in protracted litigation regarding the estates of deceased employees, as requiring probate in cases of valid nominations unnecessarily makes the state a party to private disputes – Petition dismissed. [Relied on CIT vs. Hindustan Bulk Carriers, (2003) 3 SCC 5; Sarbati Devi vs. Usha Devi, (1984) 1 SCC 424; Paras 9-15] Union of India v. Paresh Chandra Mondal, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 42

Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956

Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956; Sections 21(vii) and 22 — Maintenance of Dependants — Whether a daughter-in-law who becomes a widow after the death of her father-in-law is a 'dependant' entitled to claim maintenance from his estate? - Held that a plain and literal reading of Section 21(vii) makes it crystal clear that "any widow of his son" is a dependant - The legislature deliberately avoided using the word "predeceased" before "son" in this section, unlike other statutes – At the time of the son's death, whether before or after the father-in-law's demise is immaterial for determining the status of the widow as a dependant - When the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, it must be given its natural meaning – Held that Courts cannot "add, and mend" or supply assumed omissions to the text of the law - Departure from the literal rule is only permissible in rare cases, as the exclusive domain to legislate lies with the legislature. Kanchana Rai v. Geeta Sharma, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 41 : 2026 INSC 54

Hindu Marriage Act, 1955

Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 – Section 25 – Permanent Alimony – Enhancement Of Maintenance – The Supreme Court Enhanced The Permanent alimony awarded to the appellant-wife from ₹15,000/- to ₹30,000/- per month - Noted that the initial amount was inadequate considering the respondent-husband's profession as a doctor with an approximate monthly income of ₹1,60,000/-, the current cost of living, and the impact of inflation – Held that a woman Is Entitled To Live A life consistent with the standard of living she was accustomed to during the subsistence of the marriage - The obligation of the husband to ensure the wife lives with dignity does not end merely because she is educated or has parental support - Sustenance does not mean mere survival; it means leading a life in a similar manner as she would have lived in the house of her husband. Anamika Jain v. Dr. Atul Jain, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 111

Income Tax Act, 1961

Income Tax Act, 1961 – Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement (DTAA) – India-Mauritius Treaty – Tax Residency Certificate (TRC) – Held that the limited evidentiary role of a TRC in proceedings under Section 245R(2) - While a TRC establishes residency, it does not prevent the Revenue from examining whether an entity is a mere "conduit" or a "see-through entity" used as a device for tax avoidance – Held that the applications were rightly rejected by the AAR as being hit by the threshold jurisdictional bar under proviso (iii) to Section 245R(2) – Supreme Court concluded that capital gains arising from transfers effected after the cut-off date of 01.04.2017 are taxable in India under the Income Tax Act read with the DTAA – Appeals allowed. [Relied on Vodafone International Holdings BV v. Union of India (2012) 6 SCC 613; Balvir Singh v. State of Uttarakhand (2023) SC 5551; Union of India v. Azadi Bachao Andolan (2004) 10 SCC 1; LIC v. Escorts Ltd. (1986) 1 SCC 264; McDowell & Company Ltd v. Commercial Tax Officer (1985) 3 SCC 230; Paras 12-25; 40-50] Authority For Advance Rulings v. Tiger Global International II Holdings, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 50 : 2026 INSC 60

Income Tax Act, 1961 – Section 245R(2) Proviso (iii) – Advance Rulings – Chapter X-A (GAAR) – General Anti-Avoidance Rules - Rejection of application on the ground of being prima facie designed for the avoidance of tax – held that the use of the term "prima facie" in Section 245R(2) implies that the Authority for Advance Rulings (AAR) needs only an initial examination of documents to be satisfied that a transaction is for tax avoidance - The level of satisfaction for a prima facie conclusion is much lower than what is required for final proof – Held that that where evidence prima facie establishes that transactions do not qualify as lawful and are impermissible tax-avoidance arrangements, Chapter X-A becomes applicable. Authority For Advance Rulings v. Tiger Global International II Holdings, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 50 : 2026 INSC 60

Income Tax Act, 1961 – Section 260A – Jurisdiction of High Court – Substantial Question of Law – Whether the High Court can decide an issue (taxability under Section 28) not specifically framed as a substantial question of law – Held: Issues incidental or collateral to the main formulated question, on which parties have been heard and which go to the root of the matter, can be considered by the High Court - The absence of a formal formulation does not vitiate the judgment if no prejudice is caused and parties had the opportunity to address the dispute – Appeal dismissed. [Para 9] Jindal Equipment Leasing Consultancy Services Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax Delhi – II, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 37 : 2026 INSC 46

Income Tax Act, 1961 – Section 28 and Section 47(vii) – Amalgamation – Substitution of Shares held as Stock-in-Trade – Whether the receipt of shares of an amalgamated company in lieu of shares of an amalgamating company held as stock-in-trade gives rise to taxable business income – Held: Amalgamation is a statutory process of substitution - While Section 47(vii) exempts capital gains arising from such substitution if the shares are "capital assets," it does not apply if they are held as "stock-in-trade" - Taxable business income under Section 28 arises when an assessee receives a real and presently realisable commercial benefit - In the context of amalgamation, the charge under Section 28 crystallises only upon the allotment of new shares, as this is when the assessee receives realisable instruments capable of valuation in money's worth - At the stages of the "appointed date" or "date of court sanction," no such benefit accrues or is received - The profit arising on receipt of the amalgamated company's shares may be taxed under Section 28 where the shares allotted are tradable and possess a definite market value - This is a fact-sensitive test to be determined based on the realisability of the shares in each case. [Relied on Commissioner of Income-tax, Cochin v. Grace Collis and others (2001) 3 SCC 430; Orient Trading Company Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Calcutta (1997) 3 SCC 340; R. Nagaraj v. Rajamani 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 416; Shiv Raj Gupta v. Commissioner of Income-Tax, Delhi (2020) 425 ITR 420 (SC); Paras 18 - 31] Jindal Equipment Leasing Consultancy Services Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax Delhi – II, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 37 : 2026 INSC 46

Income Tax Act, 1961 – Section 90 – Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement (DTAA) – India-Mauritius Treaty – Tax Residency Certificate (TRC) – Supreme Court clarified that while a TRC is a valid piece of evidence to establish residence in a contracting state, it does not act as a complete bar to further enquiry by the Revenue - If the Revenue establishes that a Mauritian company was interposed merely as a "conduit" or a "device" to avoid tax, the tax authorities are entitled to "look through" the entity and discard the device to tax the real transaction - The dispute involved the sale of shares of a Singapore-based entity (Flipkart) that derived its value substantially from assets located in India - held that even if the transfer involved shares of a non-resident company (Singapore), the capital gains are taxable in India if the value is derived from Indian assets - The AAR found that the exemption under the India-Mauritius DTAA was intended for the alienation of shares of an Indian company and did not automatically extend to shares of a company resident in a third country (Singapore). Authority For Advance Rulings v. Tiger Global International II Holdings, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 50 : 2026 INSC 60

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947; Section 2(j) – Definition of "Industry" – Temple/Charitable Trust – The Supreme Court declined to interfere with the findings of the Labour Court and High Court which held that the respondent-Trust, being a temple and a charity-based institution with no object of earning profit or manufacturing activity, does not fall within the definition of "industry". Indravadan N. Adhvaryu Pipala Fali Modhvada v. Laxminarayan Dev Trust, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 102

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 – Section 2(k), Section 10(1), and Section 12 – Existence of Industrial Dispute – Requirement of Prior Demand – The Supreme Court held that a formal written demand by a workman/Union to the employer is not a sine qua non (indispensable condition) for an industrial dispute to exist under Section 2(k) - The ID Act does not prescribe a specific manner for a dispute to arise - Supreme Court distinguished between an existing dispute and an "apprehended" dispute, noting that under Section 10(1), the appropriate Government has the administrative power to refer a matter if it forms an opinion that a dispute is either existing or apprehended – Held that the initiation of conciliation proceedings via a representation to the Conciliation Officer without a prior demand notice to the Management is not ex-facie illegal. Premium Transmission v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 86 : 2026 INSC 87

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 – Section 33(1) – Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 – Interim Relief – Status of Workman – The Supreme Court set aside the orders of the Industrial Court and the High Court which had directed the Management to provide work and pay wages to contract labourers during the pendency of a dispute - held that the restrictions under Section 33 of the ID Act against changing service conditions are attracted only if the relationship of "workman" and "management" is established - Where workers are engaged through a registered contractor, their status as direct employees of the management is a matter of adjudication - Granting interim relief that directs continuation or regularization at the preliminary stage amounts to a "virtual pre-judgment" of the main dispute. Premium Transmission v. Kishan Subhash Rathod, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 87

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 – Section 33(1) – Interim Relief for Contract Labour – Supreme Court set aside interim orders directing the Management to provide work and pay wages to contract labourers during the pendency of a dispute regarding their status - held that the restrictions under Section 33(1) regarding changes to service conditions are only attracted if a direct master-servant relationship is established - Granting such interim relief amounts to a "virtual pre-judgment" of the main dispute where the workers' status as "workmen" of the principal employer is still under adjudication. Premium Transmission v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 86 : 2026 INSC 87

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 – Termination – Grant of Monetary Compensation – Where a permanent employee (Accountant) was orally terminated after twelve years of unblemished service without an inquiry, the Court directed the payment of a lump-sum compensation of ₹12,00,000/- in full and final settlement, even without deciding on the merits of the "industry" status, to lay the entire issue to rest. [Relied on Bangalore Water Supply & Sewerage Board vs. A. Rajappa and Others (1978) 2 SCC 213; Paras 2-5] Indravadan N. Adhvaryu Pipala Fali Modhvada v. Laxminarayan Dev Trust, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 102

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 vs. CLRA Act, 1970 – Comparative Scope of "Workman" – Supreme Court observed that while the definition of "workman" in Section 2(1)(i) of the CLRA is textually derived from Section 2(s) of the ID Act, they differ in juridical scope - The ID Act requires a direct master-servant relationship (privity of contract), whereas the CLRA recognizes a tripartite relationship where the workman is hired through a contractor - Unlike the ID Act, the CLRA specifically excludes "out-workers" and does not extend the definition to include terminated employees for the purpose of locus standi in disputes. Premium Transmission v. Kishan Subhash Rathod, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 87

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016; Section 14 — Moratorium — Appropriation of Security Deposit against pre-CIRP dues — Held: The appropriation of a cash security deposit available with a creditor after the initiation of the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) towards dues that arose prior to the CIRP is impermissible and contrary to the moratorium imposed under Section 14 of the IBC - Such a deposit remains the property of the Corporate Debtor until a valid adjustment is made - While payments for maintaining the supply of goods and services during the moratorium period (post-CIRP) to keep the Corporate Debtor as a going concern are permissible under Section 14(2A), the recovery of pre-CIRP dues must strictly follow the claim procedure envisaged in the IBC. Central Transmission Utility of India v. Sumit Binani, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 289 : 2026 INSC 284

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016; Section 14 — Moratorium vs. Arbitral Continuity — Noted that the High Court erred in nullifying arbitral orders passed during a moratorium period while exercising jurisdiction under the Arbitration Act - The Supreme Court used its powers under Article 142 to declare transactions (sale of flats) made pursuant to such arbitral orders as lawfully valid to protect third-party homebuyer rights. [Relied on Yashwith Constructions Pvt. Ltd. v. Simplex Concrete Piles India Ltd. & Anr. (2006) 6 SCC 204; Interplay Between Arbitration Agreements under Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 & Stamp Act, 1899, In re, (2024) 6 SCC 1; Hindustan Construction Co. Ltd. v. Bihar Rajya Pul Nirman Nigam Ltd., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2578; Official Trustee v. Sachindra Nath Chatterjee, 1968 SCC Online SC 103; Paras 28-47] Ankhim Holdings Pvt. Ltd. v. Zaveri Construction Pvt. Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 133 : 2026 INSC 137 : AIR 2026 SC 1042

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016; Section 31(1) — Arbitral Proceedings — Counterclaim vs. Set-off — 'Clean Slate' Principle — Whether a respondent can raise a plea of set-off in arbitration proceedings after the approval of a Resolution Plan, even if its counterclaim was not part of the plan and stands extinguished - Held, that once a Resolution Plan is approved under Section 31(1) of the IBC, all claims not included in the plan stand extinguished - a respondent cannot seek any affirmative relief through a counterclaim that was not part of the approved plan - if the specific terms of the Resolution Plan only bar payments or settlements and do not expressly or impliedly exclude the plea of set-off as a defense, such a plea can be raised to defend against the appellant's claim - The plea of set-off is permitted only as a defensive tool to prevent the appellant from succeeding entirely or in part - If the amount due to the respondent exceeds the amount awarded to the appellant, the surplus is not recoverable. If the appellant's proceedings are withdrawn, the counterclaim/set-off defense fails. [Relied on Ghanashyam Mishra & Sons (P) Ltd. v. Edelweiss Asset Reconstruction Co. Ltd. (2021) 9 SCC 657; Bharti Airtel Ltd. v. Aircel Ltd. & Dishnet Wireless Ltd. (Resolution Professional) (2024) 4 SCC 668; Paras 21-27] Ujaas Energy Ltd. v. West Bengal Power Development Corporation Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 272 : 2026 INSC 268 : AIR 2026 SC 1541

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016; Section 61(3)(ii) — Material Irregularity — Seeking clarifications from resolution applicants by the Resolution Professional (RP) under the specific instructions of the CoC does not constitute "material irregularity." - The RP acts as a communicator for the CoC's queries to ensure a comprehensive evaluation of the feasibility and viability of resolution plans - Such conduct does not amount to an independent or unilateral modification of the process by the RP. Torrent Power v. Ashish Arjunkumar Rathi, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 207 : 2026 INSC 206 : AIR 2026 SC 1347

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016; Section 7(2) and 7(5)(b) — Adherence to Form — An application under Section 7 is not liable to be rejected for insignificant omissions or technical errors if it is substantially in conformity with Form 1and discloses the essential ingredients: (a) applicant is a financial creditor, (b) existence of a financial debt, (c) occurrence of default, and (d) default meets the threshold under Section 4 - The Adjudicating Authority may allow the rectification of applications and the filing of additional documents at any time before the final order. B. Prashanth Hegde v. State Bank of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 156 : 2026 INSC 155

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016; Section 7 and Section 31 — Contract Act, 1872; Section 126 — "See to it" Guarantee — Distinction between an Undertaking to Infuse Funds and a Contract of Guarantee — Extinguishment of Debt against Third-Party Sureties - Contract of Guarantee vs. Deed of Undertaking - A "Deed of Undertaking" requiring a promoter to arrange for the infusion of funds into the borrower to comply with financial covenants does not, by itself, constitute a contract of guarantee under Section 126 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 - To constitute a guarantee, there must be a direct and unambiguous promise to the creditor to perform the promise or discharge the liability of the third person in case of default - An obligation to facilitate the borrower's compliance with covenants is not equivalent to a promise to discharge the borrower's liability to the lender. [Para 20-22] UV Asset Reconstruction Company v. Electrosteel Castings, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 33 : 2026 INSC 14 : AIR 2026 SC 439

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016; Section 7 — Effect of Counterclaims and Criminal Proceedings — Mere pendency of a counterclaim for damages or the institution of criminal proceedings against the officials of a Financial Creditor does not bar the initiation of CIRP - Such proceedings have no bearing on the existence of the financial debt or the right of the creditor to invoke IBC – Appeal dismissed. [Relied on Asset Reconstruction Company (India) Ltd. v. Bishal Jaiswal & Anr. (2021) 6 SCC 366; Dena Bank v. C. Shivakumar Reddy (2021) 10 SCC 330; M. Suresh Kumar Reddy v. Canara Bank (2023) 8 SCC 387; Paras 31, 37-40, 45-51, 54, 55] B. Prashanth Hegde v. State Bank of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 156 : 2026 INSC 155

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016; Section 7 — Limitation Act, 1963; Section 18 and Article 137 — Acknowledgement of Debt — The Supreme Court upheld the NCLAT's finding that a Section 7 application was within limitation despite the initial default occurring years prior - held that entry of debt in the Corporate Debtor's (CD) balance sheets serves as a valid acknowledgement under Section 18 of the Limitation Act, 1963, provided it is signed by a director (who acts as an agent of the company) – Noted that how a bank classifies its debt for asset classification (NPA) under RBI norms is not a determining factor for the starting point of limitation if the debt is subsequently restructured and acknowledged in fresh agreements. B. Prashanth Hegde v. State Bank of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 156 : 2026 INSC 155

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016; Sections 30(2), 31, 61(3), and 62 — Doctrine of Commercial Wisdom — Scope of Judicial Review — The Supreme Court reaffirmed that the commercial wisdom of the Committee of Creditors (CoC) is paramount and non-justiciable - The Adjudicating Authority (NCLT) and Appellate Authority (NCLAT) have limited jurisdiction to interfere with the CoC's decision, restricted strictly to ensuring compliance with statutory requirements under Section 30(2) and identifying material irregularities under Section 61(3) – Held that courts cannot act as courts of equity or substitute their commercial assessment for that of the CoC, which comprises financial creditors who bear the economic consequences of the corporate debtor's failure. Torrent Power v. Ashish Arjunkumar Rathi, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 207 : 2026 INSC 206 : AIR 2026 SC 1347

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 — Debenture Trust Deed (DTD) — Modification of Terms — Procedure for Restructuring — Supreme Court observed that the Corporate Debtor's claim of an existing moratorium was based on unilateral e-mail exchanges with only one debenture holder (ECLF) – Held that such negotiations could not bind other debenture holders or the Debenture Trustee in the absence of express authorization - Any modification, amendment, or waiver of the DTD terms must strictly adhere to the procedure prescribed within the deed itself—specifically requiring a "Special Resolution" passed by a three-fourths majority of debenture holders and a written document signed by all parties. [Paras 13-15, 18] Catalyst Trusteeship Ltd. v. Ecstasy Realty Pvt. Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 192 : 2026 INSC 186 : AIR 2026 SC 1311

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Discretion of Adjudicating Authority (NCLT) – Section 7 vs. Section 9 – Held: The use of the word "may" in Section 7(5)(a) confers a degree of discretion upon the NCLT to admit a financial creditor's application, whereas "shall" in Section 9(5)(a) for operational creditors is mandatory - this discretion must be exercised reasonably and not arbitrarily – Noted that the NCLT should admit a Section 7 application upon satisfaction of financial debt and default, unless there are "good reasons" to the contrary. [Relied on BRS Ventures Investments Ltd. v. SREI Infrastructure Finance Ltd. & Anr. (2025) 1 SCC 456; Maitreya Doshi v. Anand Rathi Global Finance Ltd. (2023) 17 SCC 606; Axis Bank Ltd. v. Vidarbha Industries Power Ltd. (2022) 8 SCC 352; Paras 77-104] ICICI Bank v, Era Infrastructure, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 203 : 2026 INSC 201 : AIR 2026 SC 1371

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Doctrine of Election – Applicability to IBC Claims – Held: The doctrine of election is not attracted in the context of filing claims against both the debtor and the guarantor - Restricting a creditor to elect between the two would defeat the purpose of a guarantee and potentially lead to the loss of rights under the "clean slate" principle if the full debt is not claimed in a concluding CIRP - There is no statutory proscription in the IBC against filing such simultaneous claims. ICICI Bank v, Era Infrastructure, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 203 : 2026 INSC 201 : AIR 2026 SC 1371

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Double Enrichment – Safeguards under 2016 Regulations – Held: While concerns regarding double enrichment (recovering more than the total debt) are well-founded, they do not justify a bar on simultaneous proceedings - Sufficient safeguards exist in Regulation 12A (obligation of the creditor to update claims upon partial satisfaction from any source) and Regulation 14 (duty of the Resolution Professional to revise admitted claim amounts based on new information) of the IBBI (Insolvency Resolution Process for Corporate Persons) Regulations, 2016. ICICI Bank v, Era Infrastructure, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 203 : 2026 INSC 201 : AIR 2026 SC 1371

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 - Extinguishment of Debt under Resolution Plan - The approval of a Resolution Plan under Section 31 of the IBC does not ipso facto result in the extinguishment of the entire debt against third-party sureties or security providers unless expressly provided for in the plan - Where a Resolution Plan (specifically Clause 3.2(ix) in this case) explicitly reserves the rights of financial creditors to proceed against third parties or promoters for the "unsustainable debt" portion, the discharge of the Corporate Debtor does not bar claims against such third-party security providers – Appeal dismissed. [Relied on Lalit Kumar Jain v. Union of India (2021) 9 SCC 321; Paras 23-25] UV Asset Reconstruction Company v. Electrosteel Castings, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 33 : 2026 INSC 14 : AIR 2026 SC 439

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Interaction between IBC and Benami Act – Overriding Effect – Held: While the IBC is a later and special enactment, it does not displace the statutory mechanism of the Benami Act regarding the determination of "tainted" assets - The "residuary jurisdiction" of the NCLT under Section 60(5) cannot be used to "short-circuit" the specialized adjudicatory hierarchy (Adjudicating Authority, Appellate Tribunal, and High Court) established under the Benami Act. S. Rajendran v. Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 199 : 2026 INSC 187 : AIR 2026 SC 1323

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Key Directions issued by the Supreme Court – i. Engagement of NBCC: NBCC is directed to complete the pending projects within stipulated timelines using its own resources and 70% of project receivables; ii. Protection for Home Buyers: Existing allottees shall not be subjected to any cost escalation beyond the original Builder Buyer Agreements; iii. Administrative Oversight: Constitution of an Apex Court Committee and Project-wise Court Committees to monitor progress and approve fund transfers between projects; iv. No Judicial Interference: No Court or Tribunal shall pass interim orders stopping projects commenced by NBCC; any grievances must be brought directly to the Supreme Court; v. Appointment of Amicus Curiae: Mr. Rajiv Jain, Senior Counsel, and Mr. Amarendra Kumar are appointed as Amicus Curiae to assist the Tribunal and monitor ongoing projects. [Paras 15-22] Apex Heights Pvt. Ltd. v. Ram Kishor Arora, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 142

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Liquidation Estate and Beneficial Ownership – Section 36 IBC – Held: Only assets beneficially owned by the corporate debtor form part of the liquidation estate - Since a benamidar (the corporate debtor in this case) possesses no beneficial interest and holds property in a fiduciary capacity, such property is expressly excluded from the liquidation estate under Section 36(4)(a)(i) and cannot be distributed to creditors. S. Rajendran v. Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 199 : 2026 INSC 187 : AIR 2026 SC 1323

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Moratorium – Section 14 IBC – Scope – Held: The moratorium under Section 14 is intended to protect the corporate debtor from "creditor actions" for debt recovery -It does not act as an automated stay against sovereign in rem proceedings initiated for the attachment or confiscation of property under penal statutes like the Benami Act - The protection under Section 32A is "event-based" and only triggered upon the approval of a resolution plan or a liquidation sale to an unconnected third party -It does not validate a defective title or retrospectively convert benami property into assets of the corporate debtor during the pendency of proceedings. [Relied on Embassy Property Developments (P) Ltd. v. State of Karnataka (2020) 13 SCC 308; State Bank of India v. Union of India (2026 INSC 153); Gujarat Urja Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Amit Gupta (2021) 7 SCC 209; Controller of Estate Duty, Lucknow v. Aloke Mitra (1981) 2 SCC 121; Paras 13-24] S. Rajendran v. Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 199 : 2026 INSC 187 : AIR 2026 SC 1323

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Object of Code – Resolution vs. Recovery – The fundamental object of the IBC is resolution and revival, not mere recovery - the concept of revival does not exclude recovery altogether; it only excludes the abuse of insolvency as a pressure tactic - Alternative remedies under SARFAESI or RERA remain available, but the presence of such recovery proceedings does not bar the initiation of CIRP under Section 7. [Para 10, 12] Elegna Co-Op. Housing and Commercial Society v. Edelweiss Asset Reconstruction, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 51 : 2026 INSC 58

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Protection of Homebuyers – Specific Directions – To ensure transparency and safeguard homebuyer interests during CIRP - issued mandatory directions: (i) The Information Memorandum must disclose comprehensive details of all allottees; (ii) The CoC must record specific written reasons if they find it not viable to approve handover of possession under Regulation 4E; and (iii) Any recommendation for liquidation must be accompanied by a reasoned justification. [Relied on Innoventive Industries Ltd. v. ICICI Bank (2018) 1 SCC 407; Pioneer Urban Land and Infrastructure Ltd v. Union of India (2019) 8 SCC 416; GLAS Trust Co. LLC v. BYJU Raveendran (2025) 3 SCC 625; Swiss Ribbons (P) Ltd. v. Union of India (2019) 4 SCC 17; Para 15] Elegna Co-Op. Housing and Commercial Society v. Edelweiss Asset Reconstruction, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 51 : 2026 INSC 58

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Real Estate Project – Default in Possession – Completion Certificate – Where a developer fails to obtain a final completion certificate and fails to execute tripartite sublease deeds as required by the lessor (UPSIDA), physical delivery of possession without such legal formalities has no legal import - The existence of a financial debt and default is established when units are not made ready or delivered in a fit state for occupation despite payment of consideration. [Relied on Manish Kumar vs. Union of India (2021) 5 SCC 1; Surendra Trading Company vs. Juggilal Kamlapat Jute Mills Company Limited (2017) 16 SCC 143; Edelweiss Asset Reconstruction Company Limited vs. Sachet Infrastructure Private Limited (2019) SCC OnLine NCLAT 592; Paras 31 - 37] Satinder Singh Bhasin v. Col. Gautam Mullick, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 100 : 2026 INSC 104 : AIR 2026 SC 818

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 — Resolution Plan — Modification vs. Clarification — Clarifications that reaffirm existing terms of a Resolution Plan—such as confirming the treatment of Bank Guarantees or the Net Present Value (NPV) of deferred payments—do not amount to an unauthorized enhancement or modification of a commercial offer after the conclusion of negotiations. Torrent Power v. Ashish Arjunkumar Rathi, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 207 : 2026 INSC 206 : AIR 2026 SC 1347

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Section 12A – Recall of Order – Maintainability – Commercial Wisdom of CoC - The Supreme Court dismissed a Miscellaneous Application (MA) seeking to recall a prior order dated 25.02.2025 that had dismissed a Special Leave Petition (SLP) - The applicant sought recall based on subsequent events, specifically a settlement reached under Section 12A of the IBC and the withdrawal of the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) - Supreme Court reiterated that the decision to accept a settlement or a commercial course of action under Section 12A falls within the "collective commercial wisdom" of the Committee of Creditors (CoC) - held that a higher offer by an applicant does not, by itself, provide a ground to unsettle steps taken within the insolvency framework or to reopen the dismissal of an SLP. Lamba Exports Pvt. Ltd. v. Dhir Global Industries Pvt. Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 286 : 2026 INSC 275

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Section 14 – Moratorium – Liability of Natural Persons – While a moratorium under Section 14 shields the corporate debtor, it does not extend to its directors or promoters - the mere absence of a moratorium-related bar does not automatically make directors liable in execution proceedings unless their independent liability was established during the adjudicatory process - A company is a distinct legal entity from its shareholders and directors - The doctrine of "piercing the corporate veil" is an exceptional measure that requires specific pleadings and a determination of fraud or dishonest misuse of the corporate personality, which cannot be introduced for the first time at the execution stage. [Relied on Rajbir v. Suraj Bhan (2022) 14 SCC 609; Electronics Corpn. of India Ltd. v. Secy., Revenue Deptt., Govt. of A.P. (1999) 4 SCC 458; Paras 11-20] Ansal Crown Heights Flat Buyers Association v. Ansal Crown Infrabuild Pvt. Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 40 : 2026 INSC 51

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Section 60(5)(c) – Jurisdiction of Adjudicating Authority (NCLT) – Declaration of Title to Assets – Held, the NCLT cannot exercise its residuary jurisdiction under Section 60(5)(c) to adjudicate upon complex disputes of title to property (such as trademarks) that are dehors the insolvency proceedings - The nexus with the insolvency of the Corporate Debtor must exist for the NCLT to exercise power under this section – Noted that in the present case, where the approved Resolution Plan itself recognized rival claims and "beliefs" regarding the ownership of the "Gloster" trademark rather than an undisputed assertion of title, the NCLT exceeded its jurisdiction by recorded a finding that the trademark was an asset of the Corporate Debtor. Gloster Cables Ltd. v. Fort Gloster Industries Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 80 : 2026 INSC 81 : AIR 2026 SC 748

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Section 7(1) Second Proviso – Threshold of 100 Allottees – Relevant Date for Calculation – The Supreme Court reaffirmed that the crucial date for ascertaining whether the minimum threshold of 100 allottees (or 10% of total allottees) is met is the date of filing of the petition, and not the date of its admission or hearing - Any subsequent settlements or withdrawals during the pendency of the proceedings do not render the petition non-maintainable if the threshold was met at the time of presentation. [Para 9, 21] Satinder Singh Bhasin v. Col. Gautam Mullick, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 100 : 2026 INSC 104 : AIR 2026 SC 818

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Section 7 – Admission of CIRP – Mandatory Nature – Discretion of Adjudicating Authority – Supreme Court issued a set of directions regarding the functioning of the Committee of Creditors (CoC) under the Insolvency & Bankruptcy Code, noting that while the commercial wisdom of the CoC is paramount, such power must be exercised with responsibility, transparency and proper application of mind, particularly in real estate insolvencies where homebuyers' interests are deeply involved - Held, the inquiry under Section 7(5)(a) is confined strictly to the determination of debt and default - Once the Adjudicating Authority is satisfied that a financial debt exists and a default has occurred, it must admit the application unless it is incomplete - Considerations such as project viability, business status (going concern), stage of completion, or perceived prejudice to homebuyers are extraneous and irrelevant at the admission stage. [Para 12] Elegna Co-Op. Housing and Commercial Society v. Edelweiss Asset Reconstruction, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 51 : 2026 INSC 58

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Section 7 – Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) – Real Estate Projects – Role of Third-Party Entities – National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT) Jurisdiction – Article 142 of the Constitution of India – The Supreme Court upheld the NCLAT's direction to engage NBCC India Ltd., a Government of India entity, to complete 16 stalled residential projects of M/s. Supertech Limited - held that the primary consideration in insolvency proceedings involving real estate companies is to protect the interests of home buyers who have waited decades for shelter - Claims of secured creditors, operational creditors, and land authorities (Noida, Greater Noida, and Yamuna Expressway) are, for the time being, considered secondary to the delivery of units with basic amenities – Held that such an equitable mechanism, aimed at completing construction on a "war footing," does not violate the IBC and warrants protection under the umbrella of Article 142 of the Constitution. Apex Heights Pvt. Ltd. v. Ram Kishor Arora, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 142

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 — Section 7 — Initiation of Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) — Admissibility of Application — Existence of Debt and Default — The Supreme Court set aside the concurrent findings of the NCLT and NCLAT which had refused to initiate CIRP against the Corporate Debtor - held that for admission of an application under Section 7, the adjudicating authority is only required to examine and satisfy itself that a financial debt exists and there is a default in relation thereto - The concept of a "pre-existing dispute," relevant for operational creditors under Section 9, has no bearing on applications filed by financial creditors under Section 7. [Para 12] Catalyst Trusteeship Ltd. v. Ecstasy Realty Pvt. Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 192 : 2026 INSC 186 : AIR 2026 SC 1311

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Section 7 – Locus Standi of Homebuyer Societies – Held, a society or Resident Welfare Association (RWA) does not possess locus standi to intervene in Section 7 proceedings at the pre-admission stage - At this stage, proceedings are in personam between the applicant creditor and the corporate debtor - While individual allottees are "financial creditors" under the Explanation to Section 5(8)(f), this status does not automatically extend to a society unless it is a creditor in its own right or a statutorily recognized authorized representative. [Para 13] Elegna Co-Op. Housing and Commercial Society v. Edelweiss Asset Reconstruction, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 51 : 2026 INSC 58

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Section 7 – Maintainability of Joint Petition – Multi-Corporate Entities – Threshold Requirement – Supreme Court upheld the maintainability of a single Section 7 application against two separate corporate entities (Grand Venezia Ltd. and Bhasin Ltd.) where they were found to be "intrinsically linked" in the construction and implementation of a real estate project -Noted that interlinkage of related corporate debtors is beneficial for value maximization and for continuing companies as going concerns. [Para 11 - 16, 20 - 26] Satinder Singh Bhasin v. Col. Gautam Mullick, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 100 : 2026 INSC 104 : AIR 2026 SC 818

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Section 7 vs. Companies Act, 1956 – Sections 391-394 – Overriding effect of IBC – Redundancy of Scheme of Arrangement (SOA) due to gross delay – The Supreme Court held that proceedings under Section 7 of the IBC cannot be stalled on the grounds of "judicial discipline" due to a pending Scheme of Arrangement under the Companies Act, especially when such a scheme has become defunct and inoperative due to a decade-long delay and non-compliance with statutory timelines - Noted that the IBC is a special statute aimed at the revival of companies, and its provisions prevail over inconsistent provisions in other laws by virtue of Section 238. Omkara Assets Reconstruction v. Amit Chaturvedi, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 191 : 2026 INSC 189 : AIR 2026 SC 1205

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Sections 14, 36, 60(5), and 238 – Prohibition of Benami Property Transactions Act, 1988 – Sections 24 and 27 – Jurisdiction of NCLT/NCLAT over Benami Proceedings – Held: The National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) and the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT) do not have the jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the legality or validity of provisional attachment orders or confiscation proceedings initiated under the Benami Act - Such proceedings fall within the realm of public law and sovereign functions of the State, which are distinct from private proprietary disputes or debt recovery actions. S. Rajendran v. Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 199 : 2026 INSC 187 : AIR 2026 SC 1323

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Sections 18(f) and 36(4) – Applicability to Spectrum – Ownership vs. Right to Use – Held, Spectrum allocated to Telecom Service Providers (TSPs) cannot be subjected to proceedings under the IBC - While spectrum may be recorded as an "intangible asset" in the TSPs' books of account for accounting purposes in compliance with AS 26 and Ind AS 38, such recognition is not determinative of ownership - The IBC explicitly excludes assets owned by a third party but held by the corporate debtor under contractual arrangements from the insolvency/liquidation estate - Since the Union of India retains exclusive privilege and ownership over spectrum as a trustee for the public, the TSPs hold only a limited, conditional, and revocable "right to use". [Paras 60, 61, 63, 69] State Bank of India v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 152 : 2026 INSC 153

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Sections 31, 43, and 45 – Modification of Resolution Plan – Avoidance Transactions – Noted that the NCLT cannot, while adjudicating a miscellaneous application, grant rights to a Successful Resolution Applicant (SRA) that are better than or different from those recognized in the Committee of Creditors (CoC) approved Resolution Plan - Any such declaration amounts to an impermissible modification of the approved plan - the NCLT cannot suo motu or "by a sidewind" neutralize transactions as preferential (Section 43) or undervalued (Section 45) without a formal application by the Resolution Professional (or under Section 47 by a creditor) and without providing the affected party clear notice and a fair opportunity to respond - Such summary findings are perverse and violate principles of natural justice. Gloster Cables Ltd. v. Fort Gloster Industries Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 80 : 2026 INSC 81 : AIR 2026 SC 748

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Sections 7, 60(2), and 60(3) – Simultaneous Proceedings – Maintainability of Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) against Principal Debtor and Corporate Guarantor – Held: Simultaneous proceedings for CIRP under the IBC against both the principal debtor and its corporate guarantor (or vice-versa) are maintainable - The liability of a surety is co-extensive with that of the principal debtor under Section 128 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 - The IBC permits separate or simultaneous proceedings to be initiated by a financial creditor against both entities. ICICI Bank v, Era Infrastructure, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 203 : 2026 INSC 201 : AIR 2026 SC 1371

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 — Set-off in CIRP — Pari Passu Principle — Held - The principle of insolvency set-off as permitted in liquidation regulations cannot be applied to CIRP - Set-off of dues payable by the Corporate Debtor for a period prior to the commencement of the CIRP cannot be made from dues (or assets) payable to or belonging to the Corporate Debtor post the commencement of the CIRP - Allowing such a set-off would mitigate against the pari passu principle essential to the scheme of the IBC. [Relied on Bharti Airtel Ltd. v. Aircel Ltd. & Dishnet Wireless Ltd. (Resolution Professional), (2024) 4 SCC 668; Paras 15-25] Central Transmission Utility of India v. Sumit Binani, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 289 : 2026 INSC 284

Interest Act, 1978

Interest Act, 1978; Section 3(3) - Code of Civil Procedure, 1908; Section 34 - Contractual Bar on Interest - Sustainability of interest on delayed payments when specifically excluded by contract – The Supreme Court set aside a High Court order that had granted interest for delayed payments to a government contractor - held that when parties explicitly agree via a contract clause (such as Clause 5 of the preliminary agreement) that no interest or damages shall be claimed for belated settlement of bills, such terms are binding - The Interest Act, 1978, mandates interest only in the absence of an agreement or where terms are contrary to law - Section 3(3) of the Interest Act, 1978, ensures that contractual prohibitions on interest are respected, and Section 34 of the CPC does not have an overriding effect on this provision. [Paras 6 - 10] Kerala Water Authority v. T.I. Raju, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 172

Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968

Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968 – Section 3(2) First Proviso – Interpretation – Joint Committee – Supreme Court dismissed the writ petition filed by Justice Yashwant Varma of the Allahabad High Court challenging the Lok Sabha Speaker's decision to form an inquiry committee as per the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968, in the impeachment motion moved against him in relation to the discovery of unaccounted cash at his official residence - The first proviso to Section 3(2) of the Inquiry Act mandates the constitution of a Joint Committee only in the specific situation where notices of motion are given in both Houses of Parliament on the same day and are subsequently admitted by both Houses - The proviso is situational and not exhaustive; it does not contemplate or govern scenarios where a notice is admitted in one House but rejected in the other - Rejection of a motion in one House does not render the other House incompetent to proceed independently - To hold otherwise would allow for the scuttling of proceedings through the deliberate introduction of defective notices in one House to frustrate a valid motion in the other. [Relied on Sub-Committee on Judicial Accountability v. Union of India, (1991) 4 SCC 699; Tribhovandas Haribhai Tamboli v. Gujarat Revenue Tribunal, (1991) 3 SCC 442; Amina Marwa Sabreen v. State of Kerala, (2018) 14 SCC 193; Paras 12, 14-22, 29- 45] X v. Speaker of the House of the People, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 53 : 2026 INSC 65

Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968 – Section 3 – Role of the Secretariat – The Secretariat of a House should exercise restraint and confine its role to administrative scrutiny, such as verification of procedural compliance (e.g., signature verification) - It cannot assume quasi-adjudicatory functions by performing a substantive assessment of the merits of allegations or the correctness of facts pleaded in a notice of motion - The final decision on the admission of a motion rests solely with the Speaker or the Chairman as the case may be. [Paras 49 - 54] X v. Speaker of the House of the People, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 53 : 2026 INSC 65

Land Acquisition (Special Railway Projects) Rules, 2016

Land Acquisition (Special Railway Projects) Rules, 2016 — Railways Act, 1989 — Section 20-F — Setting aside of Award — Scope of judicial interference — Representative Capacity — The Supreme Court held that the setting aside of a compensation award on grounds of excessive payment, collusion, or "colourable exercise of powers" against specific land owners does not ipso facto result in the entire acquisition award being set aside for all beneficiaries - Noted that out of 550 land owners, only a few were specifically impleaded and alleged to have received unjust enrichment - Since the appellant was not part of the inquiry report, not arrayed as an accused in the FIR, and his specific award was not challenged by the Railways, the High Court erred in applying a blanket cancellation of his award based on a separate judgment involving different parties - noted that the Railways Act, 1989, does not confer any power of review on the Competent Authority or the Arbitrator appointed under the Rules of 2016 - The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's orders and restored the initial award and the arbitral enhancement in favor of the appellant, directing disbursement within three months with interest and solatium – Appeal allowed. [Paras 10-14] Niraj Jain v. Competent Authority-cum-Additional Collector, Jagdalpur, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 83 : 2026 INSC 86

Land Acquisition Act, 1894

Land Acquisition Act, 1894; Section 28-A - Delay and Redetermination – Noted that the fact that landowners received compensation based on an earlier Section 28-A application is irrelevant to their right to seek further parity with enhanced awards passed by higher courts for similarly placed landowners - The purpose of Section 28-A is to remove inequality between affluent landowners who can afford litigation and poor landowners who cannot - Acquisition – When an appeal is preferred against an award of the Reference Court, the High Court's decision becomes the operative award - The principle of merger ensures that the finality of the compensation is determined by the highest court that has adjudicated the matter. [Relied on Union of India v. Pradeep Kumari (1995) 2 SCC 736; Bharatsing v. State of Maharashtra (2018) 11 SCC 92; Paras 15-27] Andanayya v. Deputy Chief Engineer, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 300 : 2026 INSC 293

Land Acquisition Act, 1894; Section 28-A - Re-determination of Compensation - Maintainability of second application - Doctrine of Merger – The Supreme Court held that landowners are entitled to seek re-determination of compensation based on a subsequent High Court award even if they had previously filed an application based on a Reference Court award – Noted that once a Reference Court's award is challenged and decided by the High Court, the lower award merges into the High Court's judgment - there is no legal bar for appellants to seek re-determination based on the High Court's award, as the earlier Reference Court award no longer exists independently. Andanayya v. Deputy Chief Engineer, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 300 : 2026 INSC 293

Land Acquisition – Disparity in Compensation Mechanism – National Highways Act, 1956 vs. Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 – Supreme Court observed a lack of "intelligible differentia" in the treatment of land owners whose land is acquired under the 1956 Act compared to those under the 2013 Act - While 2013 Act acquisitions involve judicial oversight by District Judges, the 1956 Act relies on administrative officers (Collectors/Commissioners) acting as arbitrators who may lack a "judicially trained mind" to adjudicate complex market value issues – Noted that the Union of India to revisit the legislative scheme to bring parity in the mechanism for determining market value with reference to Article 300-A of the Constitution – Supreme Court directed that the Interim orders to continue; Registry directed to forward the order to the Attorney General and Solicitor General of India for consideration. [Relied on Union of India & another vs. Tarsem Singh & others, (2019) 9 SCC 304; Para 5-12] Riar Builders Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 65

Limitation Act, 1963

Limitation Act, 1963; Section 5 — Condonation of Delay — State/Government Litigants — The Supreme Court dismissed a Special Leave Petition filed by the State of Odisha, refusing to condone a delay of 123 days in filing and 96 days in re-filing – Held that while a liberal approach and certain latitude ("play at the joints") are traditionally extended to the State due to procedural red tape, there is a limit to such indulgence – Noted that the State's explanation—citing "procedural delay in obtaining approval from the higher authority"—as a "lame excuse" rather than a "sufficient cause." – Noted that condonation of delay is not a matter of right but a discretionary power, and the State had shown "utter lethargy" throughout the proceedings in both the High Court and the Supreme Court. State of Odisha v. Managing Committee of Namatara Girls High School, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 161 : 2026 INSC 148

Limitation Act, 1963; Section 5 — Sufficient Cause vs. Bureaucratic Indifference — Relying on its previous observations in Amateur Riders Club, reiterated that "there is a point beyond which even the courts cannot help a litigant even if the litigant is Government which is itself under the shackles of bureaucratic indifference." - noted that despite decades of judicial optimism that governmental promptitude would improve, there has been no conspicuous change, leading to the exhaustion of judicial patience regarding stereotyped explanations for delay. [Relied on Commissioner of Wealth Tax, Bombay v. Amateur Riders Club, Bombay, 1994 Supp (2) SCC 603; Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Mst Katiji, (1987) 2 SCC 107; G. Ramegowda v. Land Acquisition Officer, (1988) 2 SCC 142; Postmaster General v. Living Media India Limited, (2012) 3 SCC 563; Paras 12-20] State of Odisha v. Managing Committee of Namatara Girls High School, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 161 : 2026 INSC 148

Limitation Act, 1963 – Article 135 of the Schedule – Execution of Decree for Mandatory Injunction – Period of Limitation – The Supreme Court upheld the dismissal of an execution application filed beyond the prescribed three-year period - Under Article 135, the limitation for enforcing a decree granting a mandatory injunction is three years, commencing from the date of the decree or the date fixed for performance - Where the decree does not specify a particular date for performance, the limitation period begins from the date of the decree itself - The petitioners sought to execute a mandatory injunction part of a decree dated 06.01.2005 - The execution application was filed on 12.08.2010 - As the decree did not specify a performance date, held that the application was barred by limitation under Article 135, as it was filed more than three years after the decree was passed. [Paras 4, 5] Babu Singh v. Jalandhar Improvement Trust, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 175

Limitation Act - Distinction Between Section 5 and Section 14 of Limitation Act — Supreme Court highlighted a "vital distinction": Section 5 involves a discretionary power to extend time based on "sufficient cause," whereas Section 14 is a mandatory provision for the exclusion of time if specific conditions are met - Principles of Section 14 may be applied by analogy to tribunals to prevent manifest injustice, but the discretionary power under Section 5 must be specifically granted by the legislature - Procedural laws like limitation can have substantive effects by depriving a party of an accrued right to plead a time-bar - Since the respondent's remedy was already time-barred under the old regime before Section 433 of the Act, 2013 came into force, the change in law cannot ensure to their benefit – Held that The High Court erred in affirming the CLB's order condoning a 249-day delay - The CLB lacked the authority to apply Section 5 of the Limitation Act to an appeal under Section 58(3) of the Act, 2013 – The mechanism envisaged under Section 5 is proximally bound and tethered to the discretion with which a civil court is empowered and that under Section 14 is anchored on restoring the right of a litigant to institute an appeal or application, as the case may be, within the prescribed period of limitation - Both provisions work in the interest of the litigant and seek to further the cause of substantive justice, the kind and nature of the power exercised under the two provisions, as well as the mechanism envisaged therein, are quite distinct - Appeal allowed. Property Company (P) Ltd. v. Rohinten Daddy Mazda, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 19 : 2026 INSC 33

Limitation and Accrual of Right – The right to approach the Tribunal for broad banding of disability pension effectively accrued on 10.12.2014 (the date of the Ram Avtar judgment), which removed previous legal impediments – noted that claims filed thereafter are not barred by the Limitation Act or Section 22 of the Armed Forces Tribunal Act - Supreme Court maintained its consistent stance that the right to receive disability pension is a valuable right, and once found due, the benefit must be granted from the date it became due without being curtailed by a three-year limitation period. [Relied on Union of India & Others v. Ram Avtar, 2014 SCC Online SC 1761; Paras 15-22]. Union of India v. Sgt Girish Kumar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 148 : 2026 INSC 149

Limitation – Commencement of Period – Identity of Offender – Section 468 & 469(1)(c) CrPC - The Supreme Court held: In cases involving misbranded or substandard drugs where an investigation is necessary to establish the exact chain of supply and the identity of the manufacturers/distributors, the limitation period for taking cognizance commences from the date the identity of the offender is known to the aggrieved person or the investigating officer, as per Section 469(1)(c) of the CrPC - The three-year limitation period under Section 468(2)(c) is computed from the date the identity of all accused persons is clearly established by the competent authority, not necessarily from the date of the initial tip-off or the date of the offense. State of Kerala v. Panacea Biotec Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 206 : 2026 INSC 200 : AIR 2026 SC 1270 ; 2026 (1) Crimes (SC) 285

Maternity Benefit Act, 1961

Maternity Benefit – Adoptive Mothers – Constitutional Validity of Section 60(4) of the Code on Social Security, 2020 (pari materia with Section 5(4) of the Maternity Benefit Act, 1961) – Age Limit for Adoption – The Supreme Court struck down the three-month age limit prescribed for an adopted child to entitle the adoptive mother to maternity benefits - held that the distinction between women adopting a child below three months and those adopting an older child lacks a rational nexus with the object of the legislation, which is to dignify motherhood and ensure child welfare - Key Findings noted – i. Motherhood vs. Childbirth: Supreme Court emphasized that maternity benefit is associated with the process of motherhood rather than the biological process of childbirth - Motherhood is a gradual process that takes shape in the heart, and the bond formed outside the womb is as crucial as that formed inside; ii. Article 14 (Equality): The three-month cap was found to be discriminatory and under-inclusive - Adoptive mothers are similarly situated regardless of the child's age, as the need for emotional bonding, nurturing, and family integration remains constant; iii. Article 21 (Reproductive Autonomy): Adoption is an expression of reproductive and decisional autonomy - Denying benefits based on an arbitrary age threshold violates the mother's right to a dignified life and the child's right to holistic care; iv. Practical Unworkability: noted that the legal procedure to declare a child "legally free for adoption" under the Juvenile Justice Act and CARA Regulations typically exceeds two to three months - Thus, the age limit rendered the statutory benefit illusory and otiose in practice; v. Best Interest of the Child: The principle of "best interest" is a continuing obligation that persists throughout the integration period; vi. Judicial Redrafting of Section 60(4): directed that the provision must now be meaningfully read as: "A woman who legally adopts a child or a commissioning mother shall be entitled to maternity benefit for a period of twelve weeks from the date the child is handed over"; vii. Paternity Leave: Supreme Court urged the Union of India to recognize paternity leave as a social security benefit, noting that shared parenting is essential for a child's development and for dismantling gendered roles. [Relied on Municipal Corpn. of Delhi v. Female Workers (Muster Roll), (2000) 3 SCC 224; Deepika Singh v. PGIMER, Chandigarh, (2023) 13 SCC 681; State of Gujarat v. Shri Ambica Mills Ltd., (1974) 4 SCC 656; State of Gujarat v. Shri Ambica Mills Ltd., (1974) 4 SCC 656; Lakshmi Kant Pandey v. Union of India, (1984) 2 SCC 244; State of Kerala v. Unni, (2007) 2 SCC 365; Paras 66-69, 75-82, 131-136, 146-152, 155-158, 166] Hamsaanandini Nanduri v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 250 : 2026 INSC 246

Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act, 1971

Medical Termination of Pregnancy – Reproductive Autonomy and Bodily Integrity – Right to Life and Liberty under Article 21 – Supreme Court allowed the medical termination of a 30-week pregnancy of a girl who conceived as a minor – Supreme Court set aside the Bombay High Court's order which had declined termination on the grounds of foetal viability and the possibility of adoption - Key Principles Established – i. Priority of Maternal Rights: held that the reproductive autonomy and bodily integrity of the pregnant woman must be given sufficient emphasis over the rights of an unborn foetus; ii. Decisional Autonomy: A woman's right to choose whether to carry a pregnancy to term is firmly rooted in her right to bodily autonomy – Noted that forcing a woman to continue an unwanted pregnancy causes "visceral" trauma and ignores the physical and mental transformations a woman's body undergoes; iii. Irrelevance of Foetal Viability: When a pregnant woman is determined to terminate and has detached herself from the pregnancy, considerations such as whether the child would be born healthy or is viable are not relevant; iv. Status of the Mother: The fact that the daughter had crossed 18 years of age by the time of the High Court order was deemed "irrelevant," as she was a minor at the time of conception and the pregnancy resulted from a relationship outside of wedlock. [Relied on X vs. Health & Family Welfare Department, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1321; Paras 15-17] A (Mother of X) v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 160

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988

No-Fault Liability – Principle and International Precedent – Supreme Court emphasized that requiring proof of negligence through civil courts or consumer fora imposes an "onerous burden" on families in complex scientific matters - Relying on the principle of no-fault liability (similar to Section 164 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988), Supreme Court noted that global jurisdictions, including Australia, the UK, and Japan, have implemented dedicated COVID-19 vaccine injury compensation schemes - Supreme Court declined to appoint an independent medical board, finding the existing National and State AEFI Committees adequate for scientific assessment - it reaffirmed the state's duty to maintain transparent surveillance and ensure AEFI data is accessible in the public domain. [Relied on Jacob Puliyel v. Union of India (2022 SCC OnLine SC 533); In re: Distribution of Essential Supplies and Services During Pandemic (2021 SCC OnLine SC 372); Gaurav Kumar Bansal v. Union of India (W.P.(C) No. 539/2021); Paras 27-37] Rachana Gangu v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 225 : 2026 INSC 218

Motor accident compensation — Procedural Lapses — Non-joinder of driver — Held: The provision for compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act is a beneficial piece of legislation intended to enhance social justice, the rigours of procedure, such as not adding a driver as a party, cannot be allowed to defeat the purpose of the Act, especially as the trial is summary in nature. [Relied on Helen C. Rebello & Ors. Vs. Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation (1999) 1 SCC 90; Sebastiani Lakra vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd. (2019) 17 SCC 465; United India Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Patricia Jean Mahajan & Ors. (2002) 6 SCC 281; Paras 12-17] Managing Director, KSRTC v. P. Chandramouli, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 245 : 2026 INSC 241 : AIR 2026 SC 1441

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988; Section 2(28) — Gujarat Motor Vehicles Tax Act, 1958; Section 3 — Constitution of India; Seventh Schedule, List II, Entry 57 — Taxability of Heavy Earth Moving Machinery/Construction Equipment Vehicles - The Supreme Court held that heavy earth moving machinery and construction equipment vehicles (such as Dumpers, Loaders, Excavators, etc.) designed for off-road use within factory or enclosed premises are excluded from the definition of "motor vehicle" under the second part of Section 2(28) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 – Supreme Court made following findings- i. Definition of Motor Vehicle: While such vehicles may fall under the inclusive first part of Section 2(28), they are specifically excluded by the second part of the definition, which omits "a vehicle of a special type adapted for use only in a factory or in any other enclosed premises"; ii. Constitutional Limitation: Entry 57 of List II of the Seventh Schedule only permits states to tax vehicles "suitable for use on roads”- Noted that if a vehicle is designed for off-road operations and does not derive benefit from public road infrastructure, it cannot be burdened with motor vehicle tax; iii. Gujarat Tax Act Deficiency: noted that Schedule I of the Gujarat Motor Vehicles Tax Act, 1958, mentions construction equipment vehicles but prescribes no corresponding rate of tax for them - no tax can be levied or collected from such vehicles; iv. Status of Registration: Merely because such vehicles are registered under the Act does not estop the owner from challenging the liability to pay road tax if the vehicles do not ply on public roads – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Bolani Ores Ltd. vs. State of Orissa (1974) 2 SCC 777; Tarachand Logistic Solutions Limited vs. State of Andhra Pradesh 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1851; Paras 37-39, 42-45, 55] Ultratech Cement Ltd. v. State of Gujarat, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 27 : 2026 INSC 43

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 – Assessment of Disability and Loss of Earning Capacity – Functional Disability vs. Physical Disability – The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's decision to reduce the functional disability of the appellant-claimant from 63% to 30% - held that the High Court failed to provide cogent reasons for disregarding the Medical Board's certificate and the neuropsychological report which evidenced severe cognitive impairment, partial blindness, and intellectual disability resulting from a head injury - Noted that for a professional like a Manager, whose role depends on memory and analytical skills, such neurological deficits lead to a profound erosion of faculties essential for employment - the Supreme Court enhanced the functional disability to 100% for the purpose of computing compensation - Supreme Court increased the compensation from ₹35.61 lakh (as fixed by the Madras High Court) to ₹97.73 lakh, restoring and expanding the approach adopted by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal (MACT). [Paras 21 - 30] R. Halle v. Reliance General Insurance Company, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 261 : 2026 INSC 260 : AIR 2026 SC 1511

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 – Conventional Heads – Loss of Consortium vs. Loss of Love and Affection – Subsumption of Heads – Held: Compensation in death cases is restricted to three conventional heads: loss of estate, loss of consortium, and funeral expenses. "Loss of love and affection" is not a distinct head of compensation and is comprehended within the broader head of "consortium," which encompasses spousal, parental, and filial consortium. [Paras 22 - 29] V. Pathmavathi v. Bharthi Axa General Insurance Co. Ltd, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 132 : 2026 INSC 131 : AIR 2026 SC 840

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 – Duties of Appellate Courts – When an appellate court interferes with the findings of fact recorded by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal (MACT), especially regarding disability assessment, it must undertake a thorough reappreciation of evidence and assign clear, convincing reasons - Mechanical reductions of compensation without independent analysis of medical records are not sustainable in law – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Raj Kumar v. Ajay Kumar (2011) 1 SCC 343; Paras 22 - 35] R. Halle v. Reliance General Insurance Company, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 261 : 2026 INSC 260 : AIR 2026 SC 1511

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 – Procedural Safeguards for Deductions – Proof of Receipt – Deductions from MVA compensation cannot be made based on mere assumptions of eligibility - The Tribunal must first determine the full compensation; claimants must then file an affidavit/declaration regarding the receipt of benefits under the 2006 Rules before the executing court - Adjustments to prevent double recovery are to be made only after receipt is established – Appeals allowed. [Relied on Reliance General Insurance v. Shashi Sharma (2016) 9 SCC 627; Jayalakshmi Coelho v. Oswald Joseph Coelho (2001) 4 SCC 181; State of Punjab v. Darshan Singh (2004) 1 SCC 328; Paras on 6, 7, 8] Reliance General Insurance v. Kanika, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 196 : 2026 INSC 188 : AIR 2026 SC 1188

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 – Quantum of Compensation – Evidence of Income – Salary Certificate – Held: Determination of income must be founded on proof placed on record and cannot rest on conjecture. Where a salary certificate (Exhibit P-14) and corroborating employer affidavit (PW-3) establish a fixed monthly salary, it is impermissible for courts to assess income at a lower figure without evidence impeaching such documents - Held: Considering the dependents had been pursuing legal proceedings for 15 years since the death of the victim in 2011, the Court enhanced the interest rate to 9% p.a. from the date of filing the claim petition till realization. [Para 32] V. Pathmavathi v. Bharthi Axa General Insurance Co. Ltd, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 132 : 2026 INSC 131 : AIR 2026 SC 840

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — Section 147 — Liability of Insurer — Gratuitous Passenger in Goods Vehicle — "Pay and Recover" Principle — The Supreme Court restored the Tribunal's order directing the Insurance Company to first pay the compensation to the claimants and subsequently recover the same from the vehicle owner – Noted that the deceased had hired a tempo primarily to transport a Ganesh idol for immersion, making the act of travelling incidental to the transport of goods - In such circumstances, the deceased is treated as a gratuitous passenger travelling with his goods - Supreme Court distinguished this from cases where a vehicle is hired solely for passenger travel, reaffirming that the benevolent object of the Act justifies the "pay and recover" direction even when the insurer is not otherwise liable under the policy – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Manuara Khatun & Ors. v. Rajesh Kumar Singh & Ors. (2017) 4 SCC 796; National Insurance Company Limited v. Saju P. Paul & Anr. (2013) 2 SCC 41; Paras 10-13] Kaminiben v. Oriental Insurance, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 174

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 – Section 166 and 168 – Just Compensation – Future Prospects – Held: The addition of future prospects to the established income of the deceased is not a matter of judicial discretion but a mandatory legal requirement. For a deceased who was self-employed or on a fixed salary and below the age of 40 years, an addition of 40% towards future prospects is compulsory. The High Court erred in failing to apply this binding precedent. [Relied on National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Pranay Sethi (2017) 16 SCC 680; Sarla Verma v. DTC (2009) 6 SCC 121; Magma General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Nanu Ram (2018) 18 SCC 130; Paras 17, 18, 19] V. Pathmavathi v. Bharthi Axa General Insurance Co. Ltd, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 132 : 2026 INSC 131 : AIR 2026 SC 840

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — Section 166 — Compensation — Deduction of Group Insurance Scheme (GIS) benefits — Held: Amounts received by the dependents of a deceased under an employer-provided group insurance scheme or other contractual/social security benefits cannot be deducted from the compensation awarded under the Motor Vehicles Act - These benefits arise from an independent contractual relationship and lack the requisite nexus with the statutory compensation payable for death in a motor vehicle accident - The principle of balancing loss and gain cannot be invoked to diminish the statutory entitlement to "just compensation." [Paras 14 - 16] Managing Director, KSRTC v. P. Chandramouli, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 245 : 2026 INSC 241 : AIR 2026 SC 1441

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — Section 173 — Appeal against Award — Dismissal on ground of Undertaking — Legality of — High Court dismissed the Insurance Company's appeal merely because a local manager had given an undertaking to the Executing Court to satisfy the award - Held: An undertaking to comply with an award, often given under pressure of execution proceedings (such as attachment of office furniture), does not deprive the insurer of its statutory right to challenge the award on merits - The High Court, as the First Appellate Court, is duty-bound to consider the appeal on both law and facts, especially when patent errors in compensation calculation are alleged - Dismissed an appeal without touching the merits caused grave injustice. National Insurance Company Ltd v. Rathlavath Chandulal, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 149 : 2026 INSC 146

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 – Section 173 – Compensation – Deduction of Compassionate Financial Assistance – Haryana Compassionate Assistance to Dependents of Deceased Government Employees Rules, 2006 – Rule 5 – The Supreme Court reiterated that financial assistance received under the 2006 Rules which directly replaces "pay and allowances" (loss of income) must be deducted from the compensation awarded under the Motor Vehicles Act to prevent double recovery - components such as family pension, life insurance, and provident fund are not deductible as they do not correspond to the specific head of loss of income. Reliance General Insurance v. Kanika, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 196 : 2026 INSC 188 : AIR 2026 SC 1188

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 – Sections 2(30) and 147 – Requisition of Vehicle for Election Duty – Determination of Liability – Whether the registered owner/insurer or the requisitioning authority (State) is liable for compensation in case of an accident involving a vehicle requisitioned under statutory orders - Held: When a public authority requisitions a privately owned vehicle for public purposes (such as Gram Panchayat Elections), the nature of possession and control changes entirely - The registered owner is divested of custody and decision-making power, and the vehicle is placed at the disposal of the State for governmental functions – Held that the requisitioning authority assumes the role of the "owner" for the period of requisition. District Magistrate v. National Insurance Company, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 280 : 2026 INSC 279

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 – Shifting of Liability from Insurer to State – The insurance policy obtained by the owner covers "regular and lawful use" in the ordinary course - Compelled deployment under statutory command cannot be characterized as "regular use" within the usual contemplation of the insurance contract - To fasten liability on the insurer for risks generated exclusively by governmental action would be to extend the contract beyond the agreed risk - responsibility for accidents occurring during the requisition period rests with the requisitioning authority (State) and not the insurer – Although Section 160 of the Representation of the Peoples Act, 1950, does not expressly authorize requisitioning manpower, if the authority utilizes the services of the driver provided with the vehicle, it implicitly recognizes the driver's competence to operate the vehicle under its control - The liability remains with the State even if the driver is an employee of the original owner, as the driver operates under official directions during the requisition period. [Relied on National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Deepa Devi (2008) 1 SCC 414; Purnya Kala Devi v. State of Assam (2014) 14 SCC 142; Paras 8-12] District Magistrate v. National Insurance Company, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 280 : 2026 INSC 279

Municipal Councils, Nagar Panchayats and Industrial Townships Act, 1965

Municipal Councils, Nagar Panchayats and Industrial Townships Act, 1965 (Maharashtra) – Section 143-A(3) – The State Government lacks the authority under Section 143-A(3) to unilaterally "foist" arbitration on parties governed by a concluded contract - The power of the State to issue directions under this section is limited to regulating the manner and procedure of octroi collection and does not extend to appointing an arbitrator for the Municipal Council and its agent. Bharat Udyog Ltd. v. Ambernath Municipal Council, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 291 : 2026 INSC 288

National Company Law Tribunal Rules, 2016

National Company Law Tribunal Rules, 2016 – Rule 28 – Amendment of Petition before Registration – Abuse of Process – held that alterations or substitutions in the memorandum of parties (names of allottees) made after the initial filing but before formal "registration" by the Registrar do not constitute an abuse of process - Under Rule 28(3), a party is allowed to rectify and amend a returned petition - An application is only treated as "validly filed" once it is complete in every respect and registered under Rule 28(4). [Paras 23, 24] Satinder Singh Bhasin v. Col. Gautam Mullick, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 100 : 2026 INSC 104 : AIR 2026 SC 818

National Green Tribunal Act, 2010

National Green Tribunal Act, 2010; Section 14, 2(m) and Schedule I - Jurisdiction of NGT - Removal of Encroachment - The Supreme Court set aside an NGT order directing the removal of a temple and associated structures allegedly built on land earmarked for a park/open space - held that for the NGT to exercise jurisdiction under Section 14, there must be a "substantial question relating to environment" involving the implementation of specific enactments listed in Schedule I of the Act - Since the dispute involved alleged violations of Municipal Laws and Town Planning Acts which are not included in Schedule I, the NGT lacked the jurisdiction to order the removal of the encroachment. Narender Bhardwaj v. 108 Super Complex R.W.A., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 249

National Green Tribunal Act, 2010; Section 2(m) - Substantial Question Relating to Environment - Definition includes instances of direct violation of specific environmental statutory obligations affecting the community at large, substantial damage to environment/property, or measurable damage to public health. Jurisdiction is strictly limited to the seven central environmental laws specified in Schedule I. [Paras 7-10] Narender Bhardwaj v. 108 Super Complex R.W.A., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 249

National Green Tribunal Act, 2010 – Section 14 – Jurisdiction – Substantial Question Relating to Environment –The NGT's jurisdiction is limited to civil cases involving a "substantial question relating to environment" arising from enactments in Schedule I - Held: Issues intrinsically connected to building plan violations and land-use disputes already under adjudication by the High Court do not qualify as substantial environmental questions for NGT intervention - Every dispute pertaining to the environment is not a "substantial question" under Section 2(1)(m) of the Act. [Relied on Bharat Singh v. State of Haryana, AIR 1988 SC 534; Auroville Foundation v. Navroz Kersasp Mody, (2025) 4 SCC 150; State of M.P. v. Centre for Environment Protection Research & Development, (2020) 9 SCC 781; Paras 104 - 106] Raj Singh Gehlot v. Amitabha Sen, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 72 : 2026 INSC 77

National Green Tribunal Act, 2010 – Section 15 – Remedial Jurisdiction – Enhancement of Compensation – The NGT is competent to enhance compensation recommended by a Joint Committee if it finds the amount inadequate to reflect the scale and impact of violations - Such an exercise of informed discretion, where expert findings are filtered and integrated into a reasoned outcome, does not amount to an abdication of adjudicatory functions. Rhythm County v. Satish Sanjay Hegde, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 98 : 2026 INSC 102 : AIR 2026 SC 1523

National Green Tribunal Act, 2010 – Sections 15 and 20 – Environmental Compensation – Quantification Metrics – Project Cost and Turnover – The Supreme Court upheld the power of the National Green Tribunal (NGT) to use project cost or turnover as a relevant yardstick for calculating environmental compensation - held that while a uniform formula is not prescribed by statute, linking the scale of operations to environmental harm is a permissible exercise of discretion under the 'Polluter Pays' principle - Larger operations signify a larger environmental footprint, and it is logical for companies profiting from scale to bear higher responsibility for environmental costs. Rhythm County v. Satish Sanjay Hegde, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 98 : 2026 INSC 102 : AIR 2026 SC 1523

National Highways Act, 1956

National Highways Act, 1956; Section 3-J — Entitlement to Solatium and Interest — Nature of Application of Tarsem Singh-I — The Supreme Court clarified the temporal application of its decision in Union of India v. Tarsem Singh (2019) 9 SCC 304 - While the declaration of Section 3-J as unconstitutional operates from the inception of the provision, Supreme Court issued specific directions to prevent the reopening of long-settled cases and to manage the financial implications on the public exchequer – Key Points – i. Settled Cases: Landowners whose claims were concluded prior to the date of the Tarsem Singh-I judgment (September 19, 2019) without any pending litigation (Appeals, Writ Petitions, or SLPs) are not entitled to reopen their cases to claim solatium or interest; ii. Pending Litigation: In cases where litigation was pending as of September 19, 2019, landowners are entitled to 'solatium' and 'interest' as per the 1894 Act standards; iii. Interest on Solatium: Landowners are entitled to 'interest on solatium' only from the date such specific claims were raised; iv. No Recovery: The Supreme Court clarified that these directions do not authorize the NHAI or the Union of India to seek refunds or recovery of solatium or interest already paid to landowners. [Relied on Union of India v. Tarsem Singh (2019) 9 SCC 304; Paras 13-17] National Highways Authority of India v. Tarsem Singh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 293 : 2026 INSC 291

Navy Act, 1957

Navy Act, 1957 – Section 15(2) read with Regulation 216 of Navy (Discipline and Miscellaneous Provisions) Regulations, 1967 – Termination of Service – While the Government/Chief of Naval Staff has the power to terminate services for misconduct, such power must be exercised based on specific foundational facts: (i) meaningful consideration of misconduct reports, (ii) satisfaction that a court-martial is inexpedient, and (iii) an opinion that further retention of the officer is undesirable – Appeal allowed. [Paras 20 - 27] 42605-B CDR Yogesh Mahla v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 103 : 2026 INSC 107

Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972

Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 – Jurisdictional Fact – Applicability of Statutes – The applicability of the PG Act depends on "jurisdictional facts" - facts that must exist before an authority can assume jurisdiction - If an employee falls under the exclusionary clause of Section 2(e), the Controlling Authority lacks jurisdiction to award benefits under the PG Act - – Section 14, which provides an overriding effect to the PG Act over other enactments, can only be invoked by those who first qualify as "employees" under Section 2(e) – Noted that since the appellants were excluded by the definition itself, the overriding clause cannot be applied to defeat the specific exclusion. N. Manoharan v. Administrative Officer, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 137 : 2026 INSC 143 : AIR 2026 SC 1061

Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 – Section 2(e) – Definition of "Employee" – Exclusionary Clause – Employees of Heavy Water Plant (HWP), Tuticorin – The Supreme Court held that retired employees of the Heavy Water Plant (HWP), which functions under the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE), are not covered under the Payment of Gratuity Act (PG Act) - Noted that HWP is an adjunct or ancillary of the DAE and is not a separate corporate entity or PSU - Since the appellants held civil posts under the Central Government and were governed by the Central Civil Services (Pension) Rules, 1972, they fall squarely within the exclusionary limb of Section 2(e) of the PG Act – Appeals dismissed. [Relied on Arun Kumar v. Union of India, (2007) 1 SCC 732; Mahalakshmi Oil Mills v. State of A.P., (1989) 1 SCC 164; Paras 12, 13] N. Manoharan v. Administrative Officer, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 137 : 2026 INSC 143 : AIR 2026 SC 1061

Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 – Statutory Interpretation – Section 2(e) of PG Act – Use of "Means" and "Does Not Include" – The use of "means" coupled with "does not include" signifies exclusionary language that strictly removes certain classes from the scope of the provision – Noted that a person holding a post under the Central or State Government who is governed by any other Act or Rules providing for gratuity is excluded at the threshold from the definition of "employee". N. Manoharan v. Administrative Officer, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 137 : 2026 INSC 143 : AIR 2026 SC 1061

Pension Regulations for the Army, 1961

Pension Regulations for the Army, 1961 – Regulation 125 & 266 – Pension Regulations for the Army, 2008 – Regulation 44, 173 & 175 – Defence Security Corps (DSC) – Second Service Pension – Condonation of Deficiency in Service – The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals filed by the Union of India, holding that personnel of the Defence Security Corps (DSC) are entitled to seek condonation of shortfall in their qualifying service (up to one year) for the purpose of a second service pension - Key Findings – i. DSC as Part of Armed Forces: DSC constitutes a "Corps" of the Indian Army under the Army Act, 1950, and its personnel are recognized as "Armed Forces personnel"; ii. Applicability of General Rules: Paragraph 266 (1961 Regulations) and Paragraph 173 (2008 Regulations) stipulate that pensionary awards for DSC shall be governed by the same rules applicable to the Regular Army, unless specifically inconsistent; iii. No Inconsistency: There is no "inconsistency" or express prohibition in the DSC - specific chapters against the condonation of shortfall provided in Regulation 125 (1961) or Regulation 44 (2008); iv. Calculation of Service: Before applying condonation, the length of service must be determined by treating a fraction of a year between 3 to 6 months as a completed half-year, as per Note 5 of the MoD letter dated 30th October 1987; v. Executive Letters vs. Regulations: The Government cannot override or amend statutory Pension Regulations through administrative letters (such as those dated 20th June 2017 and 22nd March 2022) to bar condonation benefits. [Relied on Union of India v. Surender Singh Parmar, (2015) 3 SCC 404; Paras 31-48] Union of India v. Balakrishnan Mullikote, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 292 : 2026 INSC 286

Pension Regulations for the Army, 1961 – Regulation 173 – Guide to Medical Officers, 2002 – Paragraph 6 – Supreme Court noted that compensation cannot be awarded for any disablement or death arising from intemperance in the use of alcohol, tobacco, or drugs, as these are matters within the member's own control – Appeal dismissed. Sarevesh Kumar v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 163

Pharmacy Act, 1948

Pharmacy Act, 1948 – Pharmacy Practice Regulations, 2015 – Repugnancy – Classification and Equality – Articles 14 and 16 - Supreme Court ruled out repugnancy between the State Cadre Rules and Central legislation/regulations - While the Pharmacy Act and 2015 Regulations govern professional standards and create a "pool" of registered pharmacists, they do not mandate that every registered pharmacist must be considered for public employment. The State Cadre Rules operate in the distinct domain of public recruitment – The prescription of a Diploma as an essential qualification is not arbitrary or irrational - noted a valid "intelligible differentia" based on:i. Course Structure: Diploma holders undergo 500 hours of compulsory hospital training compared to 150 hours for B.Pharma students; ii. Employment Avenues: Diploma holders have more limited career opportunities compared to degree holders, who can apply for higher posts like Drug Inspectors or industrial roles. [Relied on Zahoor Ahmad Rather & Ors. v. Sheikh Imtiyaz Ahmad & Ors. (2019) 2 SCC 404; Maharashtra Public Service Commission v. Sandeep Shriram Warade & Ors. (2019) 6 SCC 362; &K Service Selection Recruitment Board & Anr. v. Basit Aslam Wani & Ors. (2020); Paras 47-55, 59 – 64] MD. Firoz Mansuri v. State of Bihar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 57 : 2026 INSC 68

Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, 1882

Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, 1882; Section 41 — Non-arbitrability and Public Policy — Merely because a statute (like Section 41 of the 1882 Act) confers exclusive jurisdiction on a specific court for certain types of disputes (licensor-licensee/landlord-tenant), it does not ex proprio vigore (by its own force) neutralize arbitration clauses in private agreements. The Court distinguished the present case - where possession had already been handed over and the dispute was purely a monetary claim from cases requiring special statutory protection - Arbitration clauses find their roots in Section 28 of the Contract Act - Exceptions 1 and 2 to Section 28 expressly provide that a contract to refer disputes to arbitration is not rendered illegal or void as a restraint of legal proceedings – Appeal dismissed. [Relied on In re Interplay Between Arbitration Agreements under Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 & Stamp Act, 1899, (2024) 6 SCC 1; Paras 19–26] Motilal Oswal Financial Services v. Santosh Cordeiro, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 32 : 2026 INSC 5 : (2026) 2 SCC 801

Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993

Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 – Auction Sale – Finality of Sale vs. Adequacy of Valuation – Limited Remand – The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's direction to remit the matter to the Debts Recovery Tribunal (DRT) for the limited purpose of reconsidering the valuation of properties, even after the auction sale was confirmed - While the rights of a bona fide auction purchaser deserve protection, this protection is not absolute - If credible issues regarding the adequacy of valuation or the fairness of the reserve price fixation arise, the court may invoke its supervisory jurisdiction to ensure the recovery process realized the maximum possible value for the secured asset. Om Sakthi Sekar v. V. Sukumar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 240 : 2026 INSC 237 : AIR 2026 SC 1460

Regional and Town Planning and Development Act, 1995

Regional and Town Planning and Development Act, 1995 (Punjab) – Sections 70, 75, 76, 79, 80 and 81 – Master Plan – Change of Land Use (CLU) – Legality of granting CLU for a 'Red' category industry in a 'Rural Agricultural Zone' contrary to the notified Master Plan. Held: A Master Plan is a statutory instrument, not a mere policy document. Once published in the Official Gazette, it binds both authorities and the public - Land use permissibility must be determined with reference to operative zoning; it cannot be displaced by ad hoc permissions or internal administrative file notings. Harbinder Singh Sekhon v. State of Punjab, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 162 : 2026 INSC 159

Representation of the People Act, 1951

Representation of the People Act, 1951 – Section 8A, Section 99, and Section 123 – Corrupt Practices – Power of Disqualification – Issue- Whether the High Court, while setting aside an election on the grounds of corrupt practices, has the jurisdiction to directly disqualify a candidate for a specific period? - Held: No, The power to pass an order of disqualification under the Representation of the People Act, 1951, rests solely with the President of India and not with the High Court – Held that - i. Statutory Procedure for Disqualification - Under Section 8A of the RP Act, 1951, once a person is found guilty of a corrupt practice by an order under Section 99, the case must be submitted to the President of India for determination of whether the person shall be disqualified and for what period; ii. Role of the President and Election Commission - The President must obtain the opinion of the Election Commission before making a decision and is bound to act according to such opinion; iii. Excess of Jurisdiction - In the instant case, the High Court erred by directly disqualifying the appellant for six years in its operative order - By doing so, the High Court exercised powers and jurisdiction that are statutorily reserved for the President of India; iv. Operative Portion Set Aside - The Supreme Court set aside Clause 2 of the High Court's order which had disqualified the appellant for six years - noted that since the 2016-2021 term had already lapsed, the challenge to the setting aside of the election was no longer a "live issue". [Paras 7-12] K.M. Shaji v. M.V. Nikesh Kumar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 107 : 2026 INSC 111

Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009

Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 – Five Duty Bearers – Supreme Court identified five core duty bearers responsible for the realization of the right to education: (i) the appropriate government, (ii) local authority, (iii) neighbourhood schools, (iv) parents/guardians, and (v) primary school teachers. [Para 6, 15] Dinesh Biwaji Ashtikar v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 45 : 2026 INSC 56

Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 – Section 12(1)(c) – Admission of children from weaker sections and disadvantaged groups – Constitutional Mandate and Fraternity – The Supreme Court issued a slew of directions for the effective implementation of Section 12(1)(c) of the Right to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 (RTE Act) - Noted that the 25% reservation in unaided neighbourhood schools is a deliberate constitutional strategy to operationalize equality of status and social integration - It seeks to concretize the principle of fraternity by creating shared institutional spaces where children from diverse socio-economic backgrounds can form solidaristic bonds and "lose suspect identities" based on caste or class. [Paras 7–10] Dinesh Biwaji Ashtikar v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 45 : 2026 INSC 56

Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 – Section 12(1)(c) – Implementation Hurdles – Digital Literacy and Transparency – Supreme Court noted significant barriers to accessing the 25% quota, including digital illiteracy regarding online application processes, language barriers, and a lack of information on seat availability - Noted that despite RTI information showing vacant seats, eligible children are often turned away due to procedural technicalities. [Paras 5-7] Dinesh Biwaji Ashtikar v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 45 : 2026 INSC 56

Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 – Section 38 – Direction to Frame Rules –Finding that the Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) issued by the NCPCR are merely guidelines and lack the character of enforceable rules, Supreme Court directed "appropriate authorities" to prepare and issue necessary rules and regulations under Section 38 of the Act - Such subordinate legislation must prescribe the specific method and manner for admissions under Section 12(1)(c) to ensure the statutory policy does not remain a "dead letter." [Paras 15–16] Dinesh Biwaji Ashtikar v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 45 : 2026 INSC 56

Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 – Section 7(5) and Rule 20(3) – The State Government has an "onerous duty" to provide funds for the Act's implementation - Under Rule 20(3), instructors must be paid at par with regular teachers having similar qualifications and experience - The State cannot deny payment citing the Central Government's failure to release its 60% share; the State must "pay and recover" the balance from the Union - Reaffirmed that the existence of an alternative remedy (under Section 24(3) of the Act) is a rule of "prudence and self-restraint," not an absolute bar - Since the matter was already adjudicated on merits by the High Court, relegating parties to an alternative forum would defeat the ends of justice - directed the State of Uttar Pradesh to pay an honorarium of ₹17,000/- per month to all instructors with effect from 2017-18. [Relied on Rajasthan State Electricity Board v. Union of India (2008) 5 SCC 632; Harbanslal Sahnia v. Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. (2003) 2 SCC 107; Jaggo v. Union of India and Ors. 2024 SCC Online SC 3826; People's Union For Democratic Rights v. Union of India (1982) 3 SCC 235; Paras 41-69] U.P. Junior High School Council Instructor Welfare Association v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 110

Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 — Sections 3 and 19 — Mandatory Norms and Standards — Held that "Free education" under Section 3 includes the removal of any financial or gender-specific barrier, such as the cost of sanitary napkins, that prevents a child from pursuing education - The provision of separate toilets and "barrier-free access" under Section 19 and the Schedule is a mandatory constitutional and statutory obligation that cannot be avoided by pleading a paucity of funds - Key Directions Issued by the Court: i. Toilets - Provision of functional, gender-segregated toilets with usable water and hand-washing facilities in all schools; ii. Menstrual Absorbents - Free distribution of oxo-biodegradable sanitary napkins and the establishment of "MHM Corners" with spare uniforms and innerwear; iii. Disposal - Installation of safe, hygienic, and environmentally compliant disposal mechanisms; iv. Awareness - Integration of gender-responsive curricula by NCERT/SCERT and sensitization of both male and female teachers; v. Monitoring - Periodic inspections by District Education Officers (DEO) including anonymous student feedback. [Relied on: Right to Education: Mohini Jain (Miss) v. State of Karnataka (1992) 3 SCC 666; Unni Krishnan, J.P. v. State of A.P.(1993) 1 SCC 645; Joseph Shine v. Union of India (2019) 3 SCC 39; Janhit Abhiyan v. Union of India (2023) 5 SCC 1; Gaurav Kumar v. Union of India (2025) 1 SCC 641; Common Cause v. Union of India (2018) 5 SCC 1; Rajiv Raturi v. Union of India (2024) 16 SCC 654; Vikash Kumar v. UPSC (2021) 5 SCC 370; Society for Unaided Private Schools of Rajasthan v. Union of India (2012) 6 SCC 1; State of Orissa v. Mamata Mohanty(2011) 3 SCC 436; Paras 159 – 172, 173-180] Dr. Jaya Thakur v Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 94 : 2026 INSC 97

Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016

Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 – Appointment to Public Posts – Suitability of Posts for Mental Illness and Specific Learning Disabilities (SLD) – Change in Rule Position during Pendency of Litigation – The Supreme Court directed the Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) to accommodate candidates suffering from 'mental illness' and 'Specific Learning Disability' (SLD) in Group 'C' posts - Although the posts of 'Auditor' were initially identified as unsuitable for these specific benchmark disabilities in 2018, a subsequent Gazette Notification dated 04.01.2021 by the Ministry of Social Justice and Empowerment expressly identified Group 'C' posts as suitable for such categories – Supreme Court directed the Staff Selection Commission (SSC) to forward the dossiers of the candidates within two weeks - It further ordered that if the posts advertised in 2018 are already filled, the respondents must create supernumerary posts to accommodate the candidates. [Paras 17-21] Sudhanshu Kardam v. Comptroller and Auditor General of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 237 : 2026 INSC 232

Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 – Intersectionality and Gender Justice – Supreme Court highlighted that disability-based discrimination is often intersectional, particularly for women, who face multiple axes of discrimination. Redressal of disadvantage must account for these intersecting identity markers to ensure substantive equality is not rendered unworkable by a "parochial understanding of discrimination." - Disability inclusion is a vital component of the "Social" dimension in the Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) framework - Enterprises have an obligation to view disability rights from a non-discrimination angle and as a strategic advantage rather than just a compliance issue. Sujata Bora v. Coal India Ltd; 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 46 : 2026 INSC 53 : AIR 2026 SC 454

Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 – Section 2(y) and Section 2(s) – Concept of Reasonable Accommodation – Intersectionality of Disability and Gender – The Supreme Court set aside the Division Bench order of the Calcutta High Court which had denied employment to a female candidate with 57% disability (visual impairment and partial hemiparesis) on the technical grounds of the recruitment panel having expired - held that "reasonable accommodation" is a fundamental "gateway right" rooted in Articles 14, 21, and 41 of the Constitution, essential for substantive equality - Technicalities such as the expiry of a recruitment panel cannot obstruct "complete justice" when the denial of employment was due to the employer's failure to recognize multiple disabilities and provide necessary adjustments. Sujata Bora v. Coal India Ltd; 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 46 : 2026 INSC 53 : AIR 2026 SC 454

Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 – Sections 2(r) and 33 – Constitution of India – Articles 14 and 16 – Arbitrary Ceiling on Disability – Validity of fixing a 60% maximum disability limit for the post of Assistant District Attorney (ADA) - Held: The Supreme Court set aside the High Court judgment that upheld the denial of appointment to a candidate with 90% locomotor disability – Held that the RPwD Act, 2016 establishes a "floor" (minimum 40%) for benchmark disability but does not empower the State to create an arbitrary "ceiling" that excludes those with higher degrees of disability, provided they can perform the functional requirements through reasonable accommodation - Key Principles – i. Arbitrariness of Disability Caps: Prescribing an upper limit of 60% disability for a legal professional role (ADA) has no rational nexus with the nature of duties, which primarily require mental alacrity and legal acumen; ii. Reasonable Accommodation: The State has a positive obligation to make necessary modifications to ensure persons with disabilities enjoy rights on an equal basis - A candidate's capability must be assessed on actual functional competence rather than an abstract medical percentage; iii. Statutory Misinterpretation: By fixing a maximum limit, the respondents essentially "rewrote" the statutory definition of "benchmark disability" to the detriment of the protected class – Directed Respondent No. 1 directed to issue an appointment letter to the appellant within two weeks and the State of Himachal Pradesh is directed to pay Rs. 5 lakhs in costs to the appellant for unjust denial of appointment and prolonged litigation – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Vikash Kumar v. U.P.S.C. (2021 5 SCC 370); Paras 22-40] Prabhu Kumar v. State of Himachal Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 254 : 2026 INSC 253

Rights of Persons with Disabilities – All India Bar Examination (AIBE) and Common Law Admission Test (CLAT) – Provision of Scribes – Eligibility Criteria for Scribes - The Supreme Court directed the Bar Council of India and the Consortium of NLUs to revisit and modify existing policies regarding the provision of scribes for specially-abled candidates - Supreme Court accepted the petitioners' suggestion that specially-abled candidates (specifically those with visual impairment) are entitled to scribe assistance, provided the scribe is an undergraduate not pursuing law or humanities – Noted that there is no bar on using a scribe who possesses qualifications higher than 10+2 schooling - Key Directives: i. Implementation: The Bar Council of India and the Consortium of NLUs must implement and formally notify these modifications well before the next examination cycle; ii. Compliance: A compliance affidavit is required to be filed within two weeks. [Paras 2-4] Yash Dodani v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 150

Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013

Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (2013 Act) – Statutory Interpretation - Interplay with Limitation Act, 1963 - Applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act to Section 74 of the 2013 Act – i. The Supreme Court held that Section 74 of the 2013 Act, which provides for appeals to the High Court, does not "expressly exclude" the application of Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act, 1963 - Section 5 of the Limitation Act (Condonation of Delay) is applicable to appeals filed under Section 74 of the 2013 Act; ii. Mandatory nature of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act – Supreme Court emphasized that for a special law to oust the Limitation Act, the exclusion must be "clear, apparent and manifest." Mere prescription of a specific period of limitation in a special statute does not amount to an express exclusion of the 1963 Act; iii. Interpretation of Section 103 of the 2013 Act - Section 103, which states the Act is "in addition to and not in derogation of any other law," facilitates borrowing from the Limitation Act to ensure the 2013 Act functions as a complete code - Barring the application of the 1963 Act would render Section 103 redundant and otiose; iv. Nature of the Authority under the 2013 Act - The Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Authority is treated as a "Civil Court" and its proceedings are "judicial proceedings" - An award passed by the Authority under Section 69 partakes the character of a "decree" and a "judgment" under the CPC - This reinforces the judicial nature of the appellate remedy under Section 74; iv. Land Acquisition Initiated under 1894 Act (Section 24(1)(a)) - In cases where proceedings began under the 1894 Act but no award was passed before January 1, 2014, all provisions of the 2013 Act relating to the determination of compensation apply - This includes the appellate mechanism under Section 74 of the 2013 Act - The Supreme Court allowed the appeals, condoned the delays, and directed the High Courts to adjudicate the first appeals on their merits. [Relied on Mangu Ram v. Municipal Corporation Delhi (1976) 1 SCC 392; Indore Development Authority v. Manoharlal (2020) 8 SCC 129; H.S.I.I.D.C. Ltd. v. Deepak Agarwal (2023) 6 SCC 51; Paras 59-85] Deputy Commissioner and Special Land Acquisition Officer v. S.V. Global Mill Ltd, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 130 : 2026 INSC 138

SEBI (Prohibition of Fraudulent and Unfair Trade Practices Relating to Securities Market) Regulations, 2003

Securities Law – SEBI (Prohibition of Fraudulent and Unfair Trade Practices Relating to Securities Market) Regulations, 2003 (PFUTP) – Regulations 3 and 4 – Fraudulent Diversion of Funds – Ratification by Shareholders – Legality of Post-Facto Approval - Core Issue: Whether a company that raises funds through preferential allotment for specific disclosed objects can, after immediately diverting those funds for unauthorized purposes, legitimize the illegality through a subsequent shareholders' resolution – Supreme Court noted the following – i. PFUTP and Fraud: The definition of "fraud" under PFUTP Regulations is expansive and does not require a strict "deceit" element as per common law - Diversion of funds raised for a specific object to an undisclosed purpose constitutes a breach of Regulation 3 and Regulations 4(2)(f), (k), and (r); ii. Irregularity vs. Illegality: Supreme Court distinguished between an "irregularity," which can be regularized, and an "illegality," which cannot - An act that is "ultra vires" or violates statutory regulations impacting public interest and multiple stakeholders cannot be ratified even if all shareholders agree; iii. Public Interest Dimensions: SEBI Regulations have public law dimensions designed to protect the integrity of the market - A private resolution by shareholders cannot wipe off a crystallized liability or waive rights involving public policy; iv. Parallel Proceedings: Held, that the Whole Time Member (WTM) and the Adjudicating Officer (AO) operate in separate fields the former for protective measures/disgorgement and the latter for imposing penalties and both proceedings are maintainable on the same set of facts. [Relied on SEBI v. Kanaiyalal Baldevbhai Patel (2017) 15 SCC 1; Shri Lachoo Mal v. Shri Radhey Shyam (1971) 1 SCC 619; Government of Andhra Pradesh v. K. Brahmanandam (2008) 5 SCC 241; SEBI v. Kishore R. Ajmera (2016) 6 SCC 368; Paras 41-66] Securities and Exchange Board of India v. Terrascope Ventures, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 248 : 2026 INSC 245

Solid Waste Management Rules, 2026

Solid Waste Management Rules, 2026 – Statutory Nature and Enforcement – Supreme Court observed that the SWM Rules, 2026 (effective from 01.04.2026), framed under Sections 3, 6, and 25 of the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986, and placed before Parliament as per Section 26, are not mere delegated legislation but represent the "will expressed by the parliament" - The transition to a "digital-first circular economy framework" introduces Extended Bulk Waste Generator Responsibility (EBWGR) and mandates a four-stream waste segregation (Wet, Dry, Sanitary, and Special Care). Bhopal Municipal Corporation v. Dr. Subhash C. Pandey, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 182

Special Courts Act, 2009

Special Courts Act, 2009 (Bihar) — Confiscation of Property — Death of Public Servant during pendency of Appeal — Effect on Confiscation Proceedings against spouse/relative - The Supreme Court held that confiscation proceedings initiated under the Bihar Special Courts Act, 2009 (BSCA) do not automatically abate or get set aside upon the death of the public servant if the property is held by a relative or spouse who was also put to notice – Noted that "abatement" in criminal proceedings discontinuation due to the death of the accused is distinct from "acquittal" and does not constitute a comment on the merits of the case - Under Section 19 of the BSCA, confiscated property can only be returned in two specific scenarios: (a) modification or annulment of the order by the High Court, or (b) acquittal by the Special Court - Since the Act does not account for the death of a public servant as a ground for returning property, and because non-public servants can be proceeded against for holding illegally acquired assets, the High Court is required to decide such appeals on their merits rather than dropping them due to the death of the primary accused. [Relied on Yogendra Kumar Jaiswal v. State of Bihar (2016) 3 SCC 183; Gurmail Singh v. State of U.P. (2022) 10 SCC 684; P. Nallammal v. State (1999) 6 SCC 559; Para 8-12] State of Bihar v. Sudha Singh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 276 : 2026 INSC 272

Specific Relief Act, 1963

Specific Relief Act, 1963; Section 41(h) — Injunction when refused — Maintainability of suit for injunction simpliciter when title and possession are in dispute — The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court's decision that a suit for a bare mandatory injunction is not maintainable when there is a serious cloud over the title and possession of the property - the appropriate and efficacious remedy is to seek a decree for possession and declaration of title, rather than mere injunction - A suit for mandatory injunction without seeking possession is barred under Section 41(h) as an equally efficacious relief can be obtained through the usual mode of a suit for possession. [Para 13, 16, 22, 23] Sanjay Paliwal v. Bharat Heavy Electricals Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 54 : 2026 INSC 61

Specific Relief Act, 1963 – Sham and Nominal Documents – Loan Transaction vs. Sale Agreement – Probative Value of Contemporaneous Documents – Held that where a registered sale agreement and a separate MoU are executed on the same day, purchased from the same stamp vendor, and witnessed by the same individuals, such facts strongly probablize the defense that the sale agreement was merely security for a loan transaction rather than a genuine sale. [Paras 10-12] Muddam Raju Yadav v. B. Raja Shanker, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 223 : 2026 INSC 214

Specific Relief Act, 1963 – Specific Performance – Discretionary Relief – Bona Fides of Plaintiff – Suppression of Material Facts – The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision to dismiss a suit for specific performance where the plaintiff suppressed the existence of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) executed on the same day as the sale agreement - held that specific performance is an equitable and discretionary relief that must be denied if there is even a slight doubt regarding the plaintiff's bona fides or if material facts have been withheld from the Court - A plaintiff approaching the Court with "unclean hands" by failing to mention a contemporaneous document that characterizes the sale agreement as a sham/nominal document for a loan transaction is not entitled to relief. Muddam Raju Yadav v. B. Raja Shanker, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 223 : 2026 INSC 214

Specific Relief Act, 1963 – Specific Performance – Necessary Parties – While a lis pendens transferee is not a necessary party, the vendor remains a necessary party in a suit for specific performance to fulfill contractual obligations and special covenants - if the vendor's estate is represented by multiple substituted heirs, the death of one such heir without timely substitution of their own LRs does not lead to the abatement of the entire appeal if other heirs of the vendor are still on record – Appeals allowed. [Relied on Mahabir Prasad v. Jage Ram & Others (1971) 1 SCC 265; Bhurey Khan v. Yaseen Khan (Dead) by LRs & Ors. 1995 Supp (3) SCC 331; Satyadhyan Ghosal & Ors. v. Deorajin Debi (Smt.) & Anr. AIR 1960 SC 941; Lala Durga Prasad and Others v. Lala Deep Chand and Others (1953) 2 SCC 509; Shivashankara v. H.P. Vedavyasa Char 2023 LiveLaw SC 261; Paras 36 - 44] Kishorilal v. Gopal, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 39 : 2026 INSC 48

Specific Relief Act, 1963 – Specific Performance – Readiness and Willingness – Equitable Relief – Refund and Restitution – Complete Justice - In a suit for specific performance concerning an Agreement to Sell from 2008, the Supreme Court upheld the High Court's finding that the appellant failed to prove readiness and willingness as he lacked the financial wherewithal to pay the balance consideration of Rs. 5.21 crores on the due date and failed to visit the Sub-Registrar's office - Noted that the respondents also failed to fulfill contractual obligations regarding property mutation and conversion - Holding that the grant of specific performance is not an equitable relief after a passage of seventeen years – Supreme Court emphasized that equity must prevent unjust enrichment and restore parties to their original positions when both are at fault - To adjust equities and bring quietus to a dispute protracted for over a decade, the Supreme Court modified the High Court's order (which had allowed forfeiture of Rs. 60 lakhs earnest money) and directed the respondents to pay a lumpsum amount of Rs. 3,00,00,000/- (Rupees Three Crores) to the appellant for full restitution – Appeal partly allowed. [Paras 5-8] Subhash Aggarwal v. Mahender Pal Chhabra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 6 : 2026 INSC 11

Stamp Act, 1922

Stamp Act - Agreement to Sell - Stamp Duty - Possession - Relationship between Landlord and Tenant - Andhra Pradesh Stamp Act, 1922 - The Supreme Court addressed whether an agreement to sell, entered into by a tenant who had been in possession of the property for fifty years, should be treated as a "conveyance" for the purpose of charging stamp duty under Explanation I to Article 47A of Schedule I-A of the Andhra Pradesh Stamp Act, 1922 – Supreme Court noted Key Findings – i. Nexus of Possession: For Explanation I to Article 47A to apply, the delivery of possession must have a nexus to the agreement to sell meaning it must "follow" the agreement or be "evidenced" by it as a result of the sale transaction; ii. Continuance of Tenancy: Supreme Court noted that the appellant's possession remained that of a tenant and was not converted to that of a vendee - This was evidenced by the fact that the respondent successfully pursued an eviction order against the appellant as a tenant even after the agreement to sell was executed; iii. Nature of Agreement: Since the possession was not "followed by" or "evidenced" as a result of the agreement to sell, but rather preceded it by fifty years due to a pre-existing tenancy, the agreement did not constitute a "deemed conveyance" - The Supreme Court set aside the orders of the Trial Court and High Court, ruling that the appellant was not liable for additional stamp duty or penalty and directing the Trial Court to mark the agreement as an Exhibit. [Distinguished from Ramesh Mishrimal Jain vs. Avinash Vishwanath Patne, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 329; Paras 6-12] Vayyaeti Srinivasarao v. Gaineedi Jagajyothi, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 49 : 2026 INSC 59 : AIR 2026 SC 637

Telegraph Act, 1885

Telegraph Act, 1885 – Section 4 – Nature of Telecom License – The Central Government possesses the exclusive privilege of establishing and operating telecommunications - A license granted under the proviso to Section 4 is a contract between the licensor and licensee but is not an ordinary commercial agreement; it is a statutory grant shaped by public law obligations. [Paras 18, 32] State Bank of India v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 152 : 2026 INSC 153

Trademarks Act, 1999

Trademarks Act, 1999 – Title and Registration – The Supreme Court clarified that the NCLT and NCLAT are not the appropriate fora to decide highly contentious issues of trademark title involving technical collaboration agreements, contingent assignments, and the effect of BIFR restraint orders - Supreme Court set aside findings on title from both the NCLT and NCLAT, leaving the parties free to litigate the issue of title before a competent civil court or authority. [Relied on Gujarat Urja Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Amit Gupta (2021) 7 SCC 209; Tata Consultancy Services Ltd. v. SK Wheels (P) Ltd. (2022) 2 SCC 583; SREI Multiple Asset Investment Trust Vision India Fund v. Deccan Chronicle Marketeers (2023) 7 SCC 295; Ebix Singapore (P) Ltd. v. Educomp Solutions Ltd. (CoC) (2022) 2 SCC 401; Paras 26- 47] Gloster Cables Ltd. v. Fort Gloster Industries Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 80 : 2026 INSC 81 : AIR 2026 SC 748

Transfer of Property Act, 1882

Transfer of Property Act, 1882; Section 105 and Section 108 — Indian Easements Act, 1882; Section 52 — Lease vs. Licence — Interpretation of Deeds — The Supreme Court set aside a High Court judgment that had re-characterized a registered 99-year lease deed as a licence - held that when the nomenclature, text, and context of a document clearly indicate a "lease simpliciter," courts should not resort to purposive construction or ex-post facto circumstances to infer a different intention - A unilateral cancellation of such a registered lease deed, without bilateral agreement or meeting conditions under Section 111 of the Transfer of Property Act, is illegal and non-est. General Secretary, Vivekananda Kendra v. Pradeep Kumar Agarwalla, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 204 : 2026 INSC 199

Transfer of Property Act, 1882 – Section 52 – Doctrine of Lis Pendens – Specific Performance – Execution of Decree – Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Order XXI Rules 35, 97, 98, 101, and 102 – Specific Relief Act, 1963 – Section 19(b) – The Supreme Court reaffirmed that a purchaser who acquires property during the pendency of litigation, as a transferee pendente lite, has no right to obstruct the execution of the decree and remains bound by the outcome of the proceedings, holding the transfer strictly subservient to the decree - Key findings held i. Doctrine of Lis Pendens and Transferee Pendente Lite: The principle of lis pendens enshrined in Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, is based on equity, good conscience, justice, and public policy - A transferee pendente lite is bound by the ultimate decree of the court, irrespective of whether they had notice of the pending suit or acted in good faith; ii. Registration of Lis Pendens (Bombay Amendment): Under the Maharashtra amendment to Section 52, once a notice of lis pendens is registered, the property cannot be transferred or dealt with so as to affect the rights of any party under a subsequent decree - The lack of knowledge of the proceedings is not a valid defense against the application of this doctrine; iii. Execution against Obstructionists: In execution proceedings for the delivery of immovable property, the Executing Court has the mandate under Order XXI Rule 97 and Rule 98 CPC to remove any person bound by the decree, including a transferee pendente lite, who resists or obstructs possession; iv. Adjudication of Rights in Execution: All questions relating to the right, title, or interest of an obstructionist arising under Order XXI Rule 97 must be determined by the Executing Court under Rule 101 and not by a separate suit - For transferees pendente lite, their title is subservient to the decree and is effectively extinguished by the court-executed sale deed; v. Interplay between Specific Relief Act and Transfer of Property Act: While Section 19(b) of the Specific Relief Act protects subsequent transferees for value without notice at a stage prior to the institution of a suit, it must give way to Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act once a suit is instituted – Appeals dismissed. [Relied on Celir LLP v. Somati Prasad Bafna (2024 SCC Online SC 3727); Sanjay Verma v. Manik Roy (2006) 13 SCC 608; Guruswamy Nadar v. P. Lakshmi Ammal (2008) 5 SCC 796; Jayaram Mudaliar v. Ayyaswami (1972) 2 SCC 200; Danesh Singh v. Har Pyari (2025 SCC OnLine SC 2805); Paras 41-64] Alka Shrirang Chavan v. Hemchandra Rajaram Bhonsale, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 44 : 2026 INSC 52

Transfer of Property Act, 1882 – Section 58(c) – Mortgage by Conditional Sale vs. Outright Sale – No transaction shall be deemed a mortgage by conditional sale unless the condition for reconveyance is embodied in the document that effects or purports to effect the sale - In the absence of such a clause in the registered Sale Deed, the transaction cannot be construed as a mortgage by conditional sale. [Paras 44 - 49] Hemalatha v. Tukaram, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 79 : 2026 INSC 82

University Grants Commission (UGC) Act, 1956

University Grants Commission (UGC) Act, 1956 — Direction to Universities — Respondent – Supreme Court directed the Universities to furnish information to the UGC regarding students who obtained questionable degrees in technical branches - The UGC shall then take decisions based on the principles laid down in Orissa Lift Irrigation Corporation Ltd. v. Rabi Sankar Patro - Order passed in the exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction to do complete justice in the specific facts and circumstances of the case. [Relied on Orissa Lift Irrigation Corporation Ltd. VS. Rabi Sankar Patro & Ors., (2018) 1 SCC 468; Paras 6-8] University Grants Commission v. Annamalai University, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 183

University Grants Commission (UGC) Act, 1956 — Distance Education — Technical Degrees — Validity of Degrees — Primacy of Statutory Bodies — The Supreme Court upheld the primacy of the UGC in making regulations for distance education - it modified a High Court order that had validated technical degrees obtained via distance learning through interim orders – Held that technical education (Engineering) requires practical, hands-on training and cannot be conducted via distance mode without express AICTE approval - Following the precedent in CMJ Foundation & Ors. vs. State of Meghalaya & Ors., Supreme Court held that the UGC is the appropriate statutory authority to consider the consequences of its orders and take necessary actions regarding the annulment of illegal degrees. University Grants Commission v. Annamalai University, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 183

Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976

Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 (ULC Act) — Section 10(3), 10(5) and 10(6) — Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Repeal Act, 1999 — Sections 3 and 4 — Mandatory requirement of notice for taking possession - The Supreme Court examined whether the mere "paper possession" recorded by the State, without serving the mandatory notice under Section 10(5) to the actual possessors of the land, would prevent the abatement of proceedings under Section 4 of the Repealing Act – Supreme Court of India has held that proceedings under the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 would abate under the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Repeal Act, 1999 if the State failed to take actual physical possession of the excess land in accordance with law, including by serving mandatory notice on the persons in possession under Section 10(5) of the ULC Act - Held that section 10 of the ULC Act distinguishes between the "vesting" of land (acquisition of title/interest) and the "taking of possession." Under Section 10(3), what vests is de jure possession, not de facto (actual physical) possession – For the State to acquire de facto possession, it must follow one of three methods: i. Voluntary surrender by the landholder; ii. Peaceful surrender following a mandatory written notice under Section 10(5) served upon the person in possession; iii. Forceful dispossession under Section 10(6) only if the person fails to comply with the Section 10(5) notice - In the absence of evidence showing actual physical possession was taken after serving notice on the appellants (who were in actual possession), the State's claim of "paper possession" is insufficient. Consequently, the proceedings relating to the land abate by operation of law under Section 4 of the Repealing Act – Appeal allowed. [Relied on State of Uttar Pradesh vs. Hari Ram, (2013) 4 SCC 280; AP Electrical Equipment Corporation vs. Tahsildar, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 447; Paras 19-23] Dalsukhbhai Bachubhai Satasia v. State of Gujarat, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 20 : 2026 INSC 21

Urban Premises Rent Control Act, 2021

Urban Premises Rent Control Act, 2021 (UP); Section 38(2) - Jurisdiction of Rent Authority - Judicial Discipline - The Supreme Court censured the Rent Authority for entertaining a restoration application and staying eviction after the Supreme Court had already dismissed the tenant's Special Leave Petition and Review Petition with a direction to vacate - Supreme Court emphasized that under Section 38(2), the Rent Authority's jurisdiction is limited to tenancy agreements and does not extend to questions of title or ownership. An order passed without jurisdiction is a nullity. Rajesh Goyal v. Laxmi Constructions, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 297 : 2026 INSC 299

Value Added Tax Act, 2008

Value Added Tax Act, 2008 (UP) – Schedule II, Part A, Entry 103 vs. Schedule V, Entry 1 (Residuary Entry) – Classification of "Sharbat Rooh Afza" - The Supreme Court held that "Sharbat Rooh Afza" is classifiable as a "fruit drink" under Entry 103 of Schedule II, Part A of the UPVAT Act, taxable at the concessional rate of 4%, rather than as an unclassified item under the residuary entry taxable at 12.5%; held that - 1. Inclusive Nature of Entry 103 - Supreme Court observed that Entry 103 is an inclusive and umbrella entry covering "processed or preserved vegetables and fruits, fruit drink and fruit juice."- Since the entry does not prescribe a minimum quantitative threshold for fruit content, it is improper to read a rigid percentage requirement into it that the Legislature did not provide; 2. Essential Character Test - Supreme Court applied the "Essential Character Test" as embodied in Rule 3(b) of the HSN Explanatory Notes - It held that while invert sugar syrup constitutes 80% of the volume, it merely acts as a carrier and preservative - The flavor, aroma, and beverage identity are derived from the 10% fruit juice and herbal distillates, which impart the product's distinctive character as a refreshing drink; 3. Common Parlance vs. Regulatory Classification - Supreme Court clarified that regulatory classifications under food safety laws (like the Fruit Products Order, 1955) are intended for quality control and safety, not fiscal classification - A fiscal statute must be interpreted based on how the product is understood in common or commercial parlance; 4. Burden of Proof on Revenue for Reclassification - Supreme Court reiterated that the burden of proof lies squarely on the Revenue to establish that a product falls within a residuary entry or an entry different from that claimed by the assessee - In this case, the Revenue failed to produce trade inquiries or market evidence to displace the appellant's classification; 5. Avoidance of Residuary Clause - Recourse to a residuary entry is impermissible when a commodity can reasonably be brought within the ambit of a specific entry. Denying a product "parentage" in a specific entry and consigning it to the "orphanage of the residuary clause" is against the principles of classification – Appeals allowed. [Relied on Dunlop India Ltd v. Union of India (1976) 2 SCC 241; Reserve Bank of India v. Peerless General Finance & Investment Co. Ltd. (1987) 1 SCC 424; Hindustan Ferodo Ltd v. Collector of Central Excise (1997) 2 SCC 677; CCE v. Connaught Plaza Restaurant (P) Ltd (2012) 13 SCC 639; Paras 16, 19-22, 24-27, 30] Hamdard (Wakf) Laboratories v. Commissioner of Commercial Tax, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 197 : 2026 INSC 195

Waqf Act, 1995

Waqf Act, 1995 – Effect of 2013 Amendment – Overruling of Precedents – Noted that the 2013 Amendment removed the sub-stratum of the decision in Ramesh Gobindram v. Sugra Humayun Mirza Wakf only regarding the Tribunal's lack of power to remove encroachers (now covered under Section 54) - the larger principle that the Tribunal's jurisdiction is limited to specific statutory powers remains valid - Supreme Court found the expansive interpretation of Section 83 in Rashid Wali Beg v. Farid Pindari to be divergent from the correct legal position established in Ramesh Gobindram. Habib Alladin v. Mohammed Ahmed, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 88 : 2026 INSC 90

Waqf Act, 1995 – Sections 6, 7, 83, and 85 – Jurisdiction of Waqf Tribunal vs. Civil Court – Ouster of Civil Court Jurisdiction – Rejection of Plaint under Order VII Rule 11 CPC – The Supreme Court reaffirmed that the jurisdiction of the Waqf Tribunal to determine whether a property is a waqf property or not is limited to properties specified in the "list of auqaf" - The "list of auqaf," as expanded by the 2013 Amendment, includes both lists published after a survey under Chapter II and registrations made under Chapter V (Section 37) - Section 83 is not an omnibus provision conferring expansive jurisdiction on the Tribunal for any dispute relating to waqf; rather, it enables the constitution of the Tribunal for matters specifically required "under the Act" to be determined by it - The ouster of Civil Court jurisdiction under Section 85 is not absolute and is confined only to matters expressly conferred upon the Tribunal by the statute. Habib Alladin v. Mohammed Ahmed, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 88 : 2026 INSC 90