Speedy Trial Also A Right Of Victim; Accused Cannot Use Pending Gangsters Act Case To Stall Other Trials : Supreme Court

Observing that a right to a speedy trial is not only the prerogative of the accused, but is also a valuable right of the victim, the Supreme Court on Monday (August 17) set aside the Allahabad High Court's order which had kept a murder trial against an accused in abeyance merely because a proceeding under the UP Gangsters Act was pending against him.

Allowing the complainant's appeal, a bench of Justice KV Viswanathan and Justice Arun Palli rejected the Respondent-accused's argument about the precedence of proceedings pending under the Uttar Pradesh Gangsters and Anti-Social Activities (Prevention) Act, 1986 (“Gangsters Act”) over other regular criminal proceedings. The Court said that if an argument of the accused is accepted, then it would severely prejudice the right to speedy trial of the victim.

The accused had relied on Section 12 of the Uttar Pradesh Gangsters and Anti-Social Activities (Prevention) Act, 1986, which gives precedence to cases pending under the Gangsters Act over regular criminal cases. He argued that since a case under the Gangsters Act was pending against him, until its adjudication, a regular criminal trial in a murder case cannot be proceeded with and has to be kept in abeyance.

Rejecting this argument, the judgment authored by Justice Viswanathan observed:

“…right to speedy trial is not only the prerogative of the accused but is also a valuable right of the victim and any inordinate delay in the conclusion of the trial, could have a deleterious effect on the society in general. If the interpretation canvassed by the respondent-accused is accepted, it will render Section 12 of the Gangsters Act ultra vires Article 21 of the Constitution of India. It will also give a handle to the accused to delay all other cases under the pretext that the proceedings are pending under the Gangsters Act…This Court cannot countenance any such interpretation which will make a mockery of the judicial process.”

Section 12 of Gangsters Act Grants Priority Not Freezes Other Proceedings

According to the Court, the true “purpose behind Section 12 was not to freeze the other proceedings against the accused till proceedings under the Gangsters Act were concluded. The purpose was only to indicate that in the event of clash of dates, the proceedings under the Gangsters Act were to get priority.”

The Court found the trial court's reliance on Dharmendra Kirthal vs. State of U.P. & Anr., (2013) 8 SCC 368 to be correct, where it was observed that “the legislature while enacting Section 12 did not intend to delay the trial proceedings for the cases under the Gangsters Act and further considering the progress that the trial has achieved for the offences under the IPC, held that Section 12 of the Gangsters Act would have no application and there was no justification for keeping the sessions trial in abeyance.”

In terms of the aforesaid, the appeal was allowed. The High Court's decision to stall the murder trial was set aside. Since the Sessions trial proceeded by way of an earlier interim order of the Court, resulting in the Respondent's conviction, the Sessions Court's decision of conviction attained finality.

Headnote

Public Tender / Procurement — Challenge to Eligibility Conditions — Delay and Laches — Accrual of Cause of Action — Judicial Review — Scope of Interference — High Court declining to interfere with tender conditions for procurement of sports goods and gymnasium equipment for government schools on the ground of delay, laches, and non-participation — Held - Assessment of Delay in Tender Matters - Delay in public procurement is not merely measured against the calendar for the purposes of limitation, but against the progression of the tender process Tender schedules operate within compressed and purpose-bound timelines; delay must be assessed with reference to what has transpired, whose rights/interests have arisen, and the public consequences of unsettling the ongoing process. [Paras 19, 20]

Accrual of Cause of Action for Challenging Tender Conditions - A challenge to a tender condition or eligibility criterion distinct from a challenge to bid evaluation or rejection of a bid accrues on the very day the condition is published - Nothing further is required to be discovered - A party finding itself ineligible must approach the court with utmost expedition - Approaching the Court four months after publication when bids have substantially advanced to technical/financial stages or contracts have been awarded disentitles the petitioner from discretionary relief under Article 226 - Merely making representations or issuing legal notices does not explain the lack of diligence. [Paras 22–25]

Third-Party Rights & Public Interest - Distinction of Precedent on Local Experience Restrictions - Entities that participated, complied with all criteria, and progressed through evaluation acquire legitimate interests - Stalling procurement intended for public welfare (such as sports infrastructure for school children) at the behest of non-participating "fence-sitters" who approach the Court belatedly is impermissible - Vinishma Technologies Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Chhattisgarh & Anr., held that restricting past performance strictly to past supplies made within a single State creates an arbitrary, exclusionary barrier - Such principle does not apply automatically to a operational clause requiring a fully functional local office/warehouse to ensure prompt delivery, servicing, and safety for government school equipment - The Supreme Court affirmed the Delhi High Court's refusal to interfere with the ongoing tenders due to unexplained delay and non-participation, leaving the larger question regarding the validity of Clause 2.17 open to be examined in an appropriate proceeding - Appeals dismissed. [Distinguished from Vinishma Technologies Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Chhattisgarh & Anr., 2025 INSC 1182; Paras 19 - 37]

Cause Title: Keshvendra Singh Versus Shankar Singh And Anr.

Citation : 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 815

Click here to download judgment

Appearance:

For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Aviral Kashyap, AOR Mr. Amit Kr. Singh, Adv. Mr. Prabhsharan Singh Mohi, Adv. Mr. Vikram Singh Srivastava, Adv.

For Respondent(s) No.1: Mr. Ashish Pandey, AOR

For Respondent No.2: Mr. Arup Banerjee, AOR Mr. Shiv Pratap Singh., Adv. Mr. Rajiv Agnihotri, Adv. Mrs. Noopur Dubey, Adv. Mr. R.K.Srivastava, Adv.