1. Order XLI Rule 27 CPC | Appellate Courts Must First Examine Pleadings Before Allowing Additional Evidence : Supreme CourtThe Supreme Court held that appellate courts cannot permit additional evidence under Order XLI Rule 27 of the CPC unless such evidence is supported by proper pleadings. It emphasized that before allowing additional evidence at the appellate stage, courts must first...
The Supreme Court held that appellate courts cannot permit additional evidence under Order XLI Rule 27 of the CPC unless such evidence is supported by proper pleadings. It emphasized that before allowing additional evidence at the appellate stage, courts must first examine whether the party had pleaded the factual foundation for such evidence at the trial stage, as evidence inconsistent with or unrelated to the pleadings is inadmissible and serves no legal purpose.
In the present case, arising from a 1995 agreement to sell, the Court found that the High Court erred in allowing the defendant to introduce new documentary evidence to raise a defence not pleaded earlier, and in reversing the trial court's decree on that basis. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court's decision and remanded the matter for fresh consideration in accordance with law.
Cause Title: IQBAL AHMED (DEAD) BY LRS. & ANR. VERSUS ABDUL SHUKOOR, Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 831
The Supreme Court clarified that the bar under Order XXI Rule 102 of the CPC, which restricts pendente lite transferees of a judgment-debtor from resisting execution of a decree, does not apply to a person who has purchased the suit property from a third party who was not a party to the original suit. The Court held that such transferees are entitled to invoke Order XXI Rules 97 to 101 CPC and raise objections to execution, subject to satisfaction of the statutory conditions.
In the present case, the appellant had purchased the property from M/s Rizvi Estate and Hotels Pvt. Ltd., which had derived title from the original owner well before the suit, and not from the judgment-debtors. Therefore, even though the appellant's purchase occurred during the pendency of the suit, he could not be treated as a transferee pendente lite of the judgment-debtor, and the bar under Rule 102 was inapplicable. Setting aside the Bombay High Court's decision, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal and directed the executing court to adjudicate the appellant's objections in accordance with law, explaining that Rule 102 is intended to prevent judgment-debtors and their transferees from frustrating decrees, not to deny protection to bona fide purchasers claiming through independent third parties.
Cause Title: TAHIR V. ISANI VS. MADAN WAMAN CHODANKAR, (SINCE DECEASED) NOW THROUGH HIS LEGAL REPRESENTATIVES & ORS, Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 845
3.Res Judicata Can't Be Ground To Reject Plaint Under Order VII Rule 11 CPC : Supreme Court
The Supreme Court held that the plea of res judicata cannot be a ground for rejection of a plaint under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as the issue of res judicata involves mixed questions of fact and law which must be decided only after a full-fledged trial.
Setting aside the Madras High Court's order that had upheld rejection of the plaint on this ground, the Bench of Justice P.S. Narasimha and Justice Joymalya Bagchi clarified that such an objection cannot be summarily adjudicated at the threshold stage.
The Court observed that similarity of causes of action and the applicability of res judicata can be determined only after examining pleadings and documents from the earlier suit during trial. The Court emphasized that res judicata cannot be decided merely on assertions made in an application seeking rejection of the plaint. While expressly refraining from expressing any opinion on whether the earlier ex parte decree would ultimately operate as res judicata, the Supreme Court held that such an enquiry was impermissible under Order VII Rule 11 CPC, especially in light of the specific averments made in the plaint, and accordingly allowed the appeal.
Case : Pandurangan v. T. Jayarama Chettiar and another, Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 698
The Supreme Court held that failure to serve the mandatory notice under Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure before instituting a suit against a state-owned entity renders the resulting decree a nullity, which can be challenged even at the execution stage under Section 47 CPC. The Court clarified that while an executing court cannot go beyond the decree, it is duty-bound to examine objections questioning the decree's enforceability on grounds of jurisdictional defects. In the present case, the appellant was added as a party without being served the mandatory Section 80 notice, yet a money recovery decree was passed against it. Setting aside the findings of the executing court and the High Court, the Supreme Court ruled that non-compliance with Section 80 CPC strikes at the root of the trial court's jurisdiction, declared the decree unenforceable, and allowed the appeal.
Cause Title: ODISHA STATE FINANCIAL CORPORATION VERSUS VIGYAN CHEMICAL INDUSTRIES AND OTHERS, Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 772
The Supreme Court has settled the long-standing controversy under Order XLI Rule 5 CPC by holding that deposit of the decretal amount or furnishing security is not a mandatory precondition for granting a stay of execution of a money decree. Affirming the Delhi High Court's order, the Court clarified that the requirements under Order XLI Rule 1(3) and Rule 5(5) are directory and not mandatory, and while non-deposit may ordinarily justify refusal of stay, appellate courts retain discretion to grant stay in exceptional cases.
The Court emphasized that failure to deposit cannot result in dismissal of the appeal itself, and that the sole statutory requirement for stay is the existence of “sufficient cause.” For the first time, the Court also laid down clear criteria for granting an unconditional stay, such as when the decree is egregiously perverse, patently illegal, or facially untenable. Applying these principles to the facts, arising from an exorbitant and procedurally flawed damages decree against Amazon, the Supreme Court upheld the grant of an unconditional stay without deposit, underscoring that Order XLI Rule 5 applies uniformly to money and non-money decrees, though prudence generally favours deposit in money decrees.
Cause Title: LIFESTYLE EQUITIES C.V. & ANR. VERSUS AMAZON TECHNOLOGIES INC., Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 974
The Supreme Court clarified the correct procedural sequence under Order XXII Rule 4 CPC for substitution of legal heirs and revival of suits or appeals after the death of a party. It held that if a substitution application is not filed within 90 days of death, the suit or appeal abates, and the proper course thereafter is to file an application to set aside the abatement within the next 60 days, as prescribed under Articles 120 and 121 of the Limitation Act.
The Court cautioned that lawyers often err by filing an application for condonation of delay along with the substitution application, instead of attaching it to the application seeking to set aside the abatement. It explained that condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act arises only after the total period of 150 days has lapsed. Once sufficient cause is shown and abatement is set aside, substitution follows as a matter of course and the case proceeds on merits.
Case Title: OM PRAKASH GUPTA ALIAS LALLOOWA (NOW DECEASED) & ORS. VERSUS SATISH CHANDRA (NOW DECEASED) & Connected Matter, Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 194
7. Order VII Rule 11 CPC | Rejection Of Plaint To Be Decided Solely On Plaint Averments : Supreme Court
The Supreme Court reiterated that an application for rejection of a plaint under Order VII Rule 11 CPC must be decided solely on the basis of the averments contained in the plaint, without considering the defendant's defence or any external material. Setting aside the Punjab and Haryana High Court's decision, the Court held that the High Court committed an error by relying on the defendant's plea of a Will and old mutation entries to reject the plaint as time-barred, while ignoring the plaint averments which disclosed that mutation proceedings remained disputed and were finally settled only in 2017.
The Court clarified that issues such as the validity of a Will, adverse possession, or limitation involving disputed facts are mixed questions of law and fact and cannot be adjudicated at the threshold stage under Order VII Rule 11. Accordingly, the Supreme Court restored the trial court's order refusing to reject the plaint and allowed the appeal.
Cause Title: KARAM SINGH VERSUS AMARJIT SINGH & ORS., Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1011
The Supreme Court held that a property transferred through a registered sale deed prior to the institution of a suit cannot be subjected to attachment before judgment under Order XXXVIII Rule 5 CPC, as the essential condition for invoking the provision is that the property must belong to the defendant on the date of filing of the suit.
Setting aside the concurrent findings of the trial court and the Kerala High Court, the Court observed that attachment before judgment is an extraordinary and protective remedy and cannot extend to properties already alienated to a bona fide third party before the suit was filed. It clarified that allegations of a prior transfer being fraudulent cannot be examined under Order XXXVIII Rule 5 CPC, and the creditor's remedy in such cases lies exclusively under Section 53 of the Transfer of Property Act. Accordingly, the appeal was allowed and the purchaser's claim petition was held to be maintainable.
Cause Title: L.K. PRABHU @ L. KRISHNA PRABHU (DIED) THROUGH LRs VERSUS K.T. MATHEW @ THAMPAN THOMAS & ORS., Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1154
The Supreme Court held that an application filed under Section 47 CPC, if it raises questions relating to right, title, or interest in the property after the passing of a decree, must be treated as an application under Order XXI Rule 97 CPC.
The Court clarified that although Section 47 deals with execution, discharge, or satisfaction of a decree, and Order XXI Rule 97 specifically concerns resistance or obstruction to possession (including by third parties), the substance of the application is decisive.
If objections raised under Section 47 involve adjudication of property rights, the executing court is required to treat it as one under Order XXI Rule 97 and decide it in accordance with Order XXI Rule 101. Applying this principle, the Court held that the respondents' claim of being bona fide cultivating tenants raised after the decree was passed was rightly examined as an application under Order XXI Rule 97, and since they failed to establish an independent right to possession, their objections were rejected.
Case Details: PERIYAMMAL (DEAD THR. LRS.) AND ORS Versus V. RAJAMANI AND ANR. ETC, Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 293
The Supreme Court held that a defendant against whom an ex-parte decree has been passed cannot present evidence in their defense and is limited to cross-examining the plaintiff's witnesses to challenge the plaintiff's case. The Court clarified that exceptions may exist if legal issues, such as limitation or jurisdiction, are raised in the written statement, allowing the court to decide them based on pleadings without evidence. However, if the defendant does not cross-examine the plaintiff's witnesses, the ex-parte decree cannot be set aside.
The Court overturned the Kerala High Court's decision that had allowed setting aside the ex-parte decree, emphasizing that the absence of cross-examination justified upholding the decree. This ruling underscores the curtailed rights of a defendant once an ex-parte order attains finality.
Case Title: KANCHHU VS. PRAKASH CHAND & ORS. Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 460
The Supreme Court has clarified that courts possess the authority under Order XII Rule 6 of the Civil Procedure Code (CPC) to dismiss a suit based on the plaintiff's own admissions, even without a formal application from the defendant.
The Court upheld the trial court's suo motu dismissal of a suit where the plaintiff's admissions weakened their claim, emphasizing that the provision grants wide discretion to courts to pass judgments at any stage of proceedings. The ruling reinforces the principle that judicial admissions can be grounds for disposal, ensuring expedited resolution where the claim lacks merit or a cause of action. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, affirming the lower courts' decisions and underscoring the utility of Order XII Rule 6 in streamlining civil litigation.
Case Title: SAROJ SALKAN VERSUS HUMA SINGH & ORS., Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 538
In a significant procedural clarification, the Supreme Court held that a separate application to set aside the abatement of an appeal is not mandatory if an application for substitution of legal heirs under Order XXII Rule 4 of the Civil Procedure Code (CPC) has been filed. The bench emphasized a justice-oriented approach, ruling that a prayer for substitution inherently implies a prayer to set aside the abatement. The Court set aside the High Court's order, which had insisted on a separate application, and relied on the precedent in Mithailal Dalsangar Singh v. Annabai Devram Kini (2003) to affirm that allowing a substitution application effectively sets the abatement aside. This decision streamlines the process for legal heirs to be brought on record after the death of a party, ensuring that technicalities do not impede substantive justice.
Case Title: OM PRAKASH GUPTA ALIAS LALLOOWA (NOW DECEASED) & ORS. VERSUS SATISH CHANDRA (NOW DECEASED) & Connected Matter, Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 194
The Supreme Court reinforced the binding nature of interim court orders, holding that a party remains liable for wilful disobedience of an injunction under Order 39 Rule 2A of the CPC, even if the injunction order is subsequently set aside or the main suit is later dismissed.
The Court ruled that the act of disobedience committed while the order was in force is a separate offense that does not get erased by the later vacation of the order. Relying on the precedent in Samee Khan v. Bindu Khan (1998), the Court emphasized that upholding the sanctity of court directives during their operation is paramount for the administration of justice. In the instant case, the appellants had violated an undertaking not to alienate a property, given to the trial court. While the Supreme Court partly allowed the appeal by setting aside the sentence of imprisonment, it enhanced the compensatory amount payable by the appellants, thereby underlining that consequences for contempt of court persist independently of the final outcome of the litigation.
Case Title: SMT LAVANYA C & ANR VERSUS VITTAL GURUDAS PAI SINCE DESEASED BY LRS. & ORS., Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 290
The Supreme Court clarified the interplay between Order I Rule 10 (power to add/remove parties) and Order XXII Rule 4 (substitution of legal heirs) of the Civil Procedure Code (CPC). The Court ruled that a legal heir, once formally impleaded to a suit after a due inquiry under Order XXII Rule 4, cannot later seek deletion by invoking Order I Rule 10 if they had the opportunity to object during the substitution stage.
The Court held that the principle of res judicata applies to such impleadment proceedings, and allowing objections at a later stage would undermine judicial finality and fair play. In the instant case, the appellant had not objected to his substitution as a legal heir initially, and his subsequent application for deletion, based on an argument under Muslim personal law, was therefore barred. The judgment underscores that while courts have wide discretion under Order I Rule 10 to manage parties, this cannot be used to re-agitate an issue already conclusively determined, thereby ensuring procedural discipline and finality in civil litigation.
Case Title: SULTHAN SAID IBRAHIM VERSUS PRAKASAN & ORS., Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 622
The Supreme Court clarified the application of Section 80 of the Civil Procedure Code (CPC), which mandates a two-month prior notice to the government before filing a suit against it.The Court held that no fresh notice under Section 80 is required for amending a plaint to incorporate subsequent developments, provided the amendment relates to a continuous cause of action intrinsically linked to the original suit. The Court emphasized that a cause of action is "continuous" when the alleged wrongful act repeats over time. In the instant case, the respondent had challenged its initial debarment by a government department; subsequent debarment orders and claims for damages were held to be a continuation of the same core dispute. The ruling establishes that amendments merely updating facts within an ongoing suit, without altering its nature, do not constitute a new cause of action requiring a fresh Section 80 notice, thereby promoting procedural efficiency and preventing unnecessary multiplicity of litigation.
Case Title: THE STATE OF WEST BENGAL & ORS. VERSUS PAM DEVELOPMENTS PRIVATE LIMITED & ANR., Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 52
In a significant judgment, the Supreme Court expressed concern over the declining significance of Section 80 CPC notices, which require a two-month prior notice to the government before filing a suit against it. The Court emphasized that such notices should not be treated as empty formalities by public authorities. The Court held that the government must acknowledge these notices in all seriousness and inform the litigant of its stance within the statutory period, as the notice serves as an opportunity for the state to assess and potentially settle a just claim. Failure to do so, the Court ruled, may lead to an adverse inference being drawn against the government, with any defense raised later being considered an afterthought.
In the instant case, the Andhra Pradesh Government's complete failure to respond to the appellants' notice before they were compelled to file a suit was a key factor in the Court's decision to set aside the High Court's order, uphold the appellants' title based on long possession, and award them compensation of Rs. 70 lakhs. The ruling underscores the duty of public authorities to engage with statutory notices proactively to avoid unnecessary litigation.
Case Title: YERIKALA SUNKALAMMA & ANR. VERSUS STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH, DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE & ORS., Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 344
17. XII Rule 6 CPC | Judgment On Admission Can Be Passed Even Dehors Pleadings : Supreme Court
The Supreme Court clarified the expansive scope of Order XII Rule 6 of the Civil Procedure Code (CPC), which allows for a "judgment on admission."
The Court held that such a judgment can be passed at any stage of a suit based on admissions made "either in the pleading or otherwise," and these admissions may be oral or in writing, express or implied, and even dehors (outside) the pleadings.
The Court emphasized that the 1976 amendment to the rule explicitly broadened its application beyond written pleadings to include admissions in any document or even in statements recorded by the court. Furthermore, the ruling affirmed that a separate application by a party is not mandatory; courts can exercise their suo motu powers to pass a judgment on admission to expedite proceedings where clear admissions negate the need for a full trial. To ensure uniform application, the Supreme Court directed its registry to circulate the order to all High Courts, which shall further disseminate it to district judiciaries. The judgment reinforces the procedural tool as an efficient mechanism for early disposal of suits where facts are unequivocally admitted.
Case Title: Rajiv Ghosh Versus Satya Naryan Jaiswal, Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 415
18. Order VIII Rule 6-A CPC | Defendant Can't File Counter-Claim Against Co-Defendant: Supreme Court
The Supreme Court clarified a significant procedural point under Order VIII Rule 6-A of the Civil Procedure Code (CPC). The Court held that a counter-claim can be filed only against the plaintiff and cannot be directed solely against a co-defendant. The ruling set aside a Gujarat High Court order that had permitted one defendant to file a counter-claim for the specific performance of an agreement against a co-defendant. Relying on its precedent in Rohit Singh v. State of Bihar (2006), the Court reiterated that a counter-claim is a procedural tool meant for a defendant to raise a claim against the plaintiff, and it cannot be used to adjudicate disputes exclusively between defendants.
Cause Title: RAJUL MANOJ SHAH ALIAS RAJESHWARI RASIKLAL SHETH VERSUS KIRANBHAI SHAKRABHAI PATEL & ANR., Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 912
The Supreme Court clarified the scope of challenging auction sales under Order XXI Rule 90 of the Civil Procedure Code (CPC). The Court held that a judgment-debtor is barred from raising objections to an auction sale at a belated stage, especially after the sale is completed, if those objections could have been raised before the proclamation of sale was drawn up. The Court emphasized the mandatory bar under Order XXI Rule 90(3) CPC, which prevents a party from assailing a sale on grounds that were available but not raised at the appropriate earlier stage.
In the instant case, the judgment-debtor, despite having notice and opportunity, failed to object to the sale proclamation regarding the sufficiency of a part-sale to satisfy the decree. The Supreme Court set aside the Madras High Court's order that had allowed such a belated challenge, ruling that acquiescence to the proceedings precludes a subsequent attack on the sale's legality. This ruling reinforces procedural discipline in execution proceedings and ensures the finality of auction sales conducted by courts.
Cause Title: G.R. Selvaraj (Dead), through LRs. versus K.J. Prakash Kumar and others, Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1141
The Supreme Court observed that it is mandatory for the High Courts to record reasons while framing an additional question of law which was not originally raised in a second appeal in a civil case.
Proviso to Section 100(5) CPC grants power to the High Courts to frame an additional question of law, but this power cannot be routinely exercised, but only in exceptional circumstances, for which a reason needs to be recorded by the High Court, the court said.
Cause Title: C.P. FRANCIS VERSUS C.P. JOSEPH AND OTHERS, Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 870
The Supreme Court held that a plaint cannot be rejected at the threshold when the issue of limitation is a mixed question of law and fact that requires evidence to determine.
The Court set aside the Madras High Court's order, which had summarily dismissed a suit for cancellation of an instrument, finding it time-barred based on a prima facie assumption about the plaintiff's date of knowledge. It emphasized that, for the purpose of Order VII Rule 11, the averments in the plaint must be taken as true; since the plaint specifically pleaded discovery of fraud in 2011 and the suit was filed within three years in 2014, the High Court erred in preemptively concluding that the cause of action arose earlier in 1988. The ruling reiterates that when disputed facts, such as the date of knowledge triggering limitation, are central to the case, parties must be allowed to lead evidence, and the suit should proceed to trial rather than being dismissed summarily.
Cause Title: P. KUMARAKURUBARAN VERSUS P. NARAYANAN & ORS., Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 509
The Supreme Court held that the bar under Order II Rule 2 CPC does not apply when a subsequent suit is founded on a cause of action distinct from that of the first suit. The Court observed that the rule's true purpose is to prevent a plaintiff from instituting a second suit on the same cause of action for claims or reliefs that were available at the time of filing the first suit.
In the instant case, the plaintiff had initially filed a suit for a permanent injunction; a later suit for specific performance and cancellation of a subsequent sale deed was deemed to be based on a different cause of action, especially because a government order prohibiting registration of sale deeds had initially made the relief of specific performance impossible to claim. The Supreme Court affirmed the Madras High Court's decision, ruling that when a subsequent event creates a fresh cause of action or makes a previously unavailable relief feasible, a second suit is not barred.
Case Title: CUDDALORE POWERGEN CORPORATION LTD VERSUS M/S CHEMPLAST CUDDALORE VINYLS LIMITED AND ANR., Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 73
The Supreme Court has held that a legal heir formally impleaded in a lawsuit under Order 22 Rule 4 of the Civil Procedure Code (CPC) after a court inquiry cannot later be removed by filing an application under Order 1 Rule 10. The Court clarified that while the power to add or remove parties under Order 1 Rule 10 is broad and can be exercised at any stage, it does not allow a party to re-agitate an issue that has already attained finality. If a party had a sufficient opportunity to object to the impleadment at the initial stage under Order 22 Rule 4 but failed to do so, the principle of res judicata applies, barring a subsequent challenge.
Cause Title: SULTHAN SAID IBRAHIM VERSUS PRAKASAN & ORS., Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 622
In a significant ruling, the Supreme Court has held that if a joint and indivisible decree is passed by a court involving multiple parties, the entire appeal will abate if the legal representatives of any deceased party are not substituted in time. The Court emphasized that proceeding with the appeal only against the surviving parties in such cases risks creating inconsistent or contradictory decrees, which is impermissible. This principle prevents the enforcement of one decree from negating another. The decision came in a case where, following the death of one appellant, his legal heirs were not substituted, leading the High Court to declare the entire appeal abated. The Supreme Court affirmed this, summarizing key legal principles on abatement and reinforcing that in cases of inseparable decrees, failure to substitute a deceased party's heirs results in the abatement of the whole appeal.
Cause Title: SURESH CHANDRA (DECEASED) THR. LRS. & ORS. VERSUS PARASRAM & ORS., Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 728
The Supreme Court has held that an ex-parte interim injunction granted under Order 39 Rule 3 of the Civil Procedure Code (CPC) must be vacated if the plaintiff fails to comply with its mandatory conditions. The Court emphasized that while an injunction can be granted without notice to the opposite party in exceptional circumstances, this privilege comes with two mandatory obligations: the court must record its reasons for granting the ex-parte relief, and the applicant must serve copies of the injunction application, supporting affidavit, plaint, and relied-upon documents to the defendant. If these conditions are not met, the court is bound to vacate the ex-parte order, regardless of the merits of the case. The ruling affirms that compliance with these procedural safeguards is essential to balance the urgency of granting relief with the principle of audi alteram partem (hear the other side)
Cause Title: TIME CITY INFRASTRUCTURE AND HOUSING LIMITED LUCKNOW VERSUS THE STATE OF U.P. & ORS., Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 791
The Supreme Court clarified the scope of Order II Rule 2 of the Civil Procedure Code (CPC), stating that while it mandates including the entire claim arising from one cause of action in a single suit, it does not require combining all different causes of action stemming from the same transaction into one suit. The Court emphasized that multiple distinct causes of action can arise from a single transaction, and each may form the basis for separate suits. To invoke the bar under Order II Rule 2, a defendant must prove that the second suit is based on the same cause of action as the first, that the plaintiff was entitled to multiple reliefs from that cause, and that they deliberately omitted a relief without court leave.
In the case at hand, the Court held that a subsequent suit for specific performance was not barred because a government order preventing registration of sale deeds had made seeking that relief in the initial injunction suit impossible, thus creating a distinct cause of action.
Cause Title: CUDDALORE POWERGEN CORPORATION LTD VERSUS M/S CHEMPLAST CUDDALORE VINYLS LIMITED AND ANR., Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 73
The Supreme Court has held that a party remains liable for willfully violating an injunction order under Order 39 Rule 2A of the CPC, even if the injunction is subsequently set aside or the main suit is later dismissed. The Court clarified that the disobedience of a court order while it was in force is a separate offense, and its consequences are not erased by the eventual outcome of the case. In the matter at hand, the appellants had given an undertaking not to alienate property but sold it anyway during the injunction's operation. Citing the precedent in Samee Khan v. Bindu Khan, the Court upheld the High Court's finding of willful disobedience, affirming that penalties can be imposed for the breach. While it partly allowed the appeal by setting aside a three-month imprisonment term, it enhanced the compensation payable by the violators, reinforcing the principle that court orders must be respected during their currency.
Cause Title: SMT LAVANYA C & ANR VERSUS VITTAL GURUDAS PAI SINCE DESEASED BY LRS. & ORS., Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 290
The Supreme Court has ruled that a plaint cannot be rejected in its entirety under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC merely because one of the reliefs sought is legally untenable, provided that other reliefs are maintainable and arise from independent causes of action. The Court clarified that while considering such an application, the court must confine itself to the averments in the plaint and cannot selectively sever prayers or reject the plaint partially. If a plaint discloses a triable issue based on a distinct cause of action, the suit must proceed to trial. In the case at hand, the High Court had erroneously dismissed a suit seeking multiple reliefs after finding the first relief invalid, without adjudicating a separate, triable claim. The Supreme Court set aside this order, emphasizing that rejection of a plaint is warranted only when the entire claim, on its face, discloses no cause of action or is barred by law.
Case Title: VINOD INFRA DEVELOPERS LTD. VERSUS MAHAVEER LUNIA & ORS, Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 630
29. Dismissal Of Suit For Default Doesn't Bar Fresh Suit On Same Cause Of Action : Supreme Court
The Supreme Court has clarified that the dismissal of a suit for default under Order IX Rule 2 or 3 of the CPC does not bar the filing of a fresh suit on the same cause of action. The Court held that such a dismissal is neither an adjudication nor a decree, as it does not decide the merits of the case. Consequently, the principle of res judicata does not apply. In the matter at hand, after a previous suit was dismissed for non-appearance, the plaintiff filed a fresh suit under Order IX Rule 4, which permits a plaintiff to either apply for restoration or file a new suit (subject to limitation). The Court upheld the validity of the fresh suit, reasoning that a default dismissal is not a judgment on the merits and therefore does not preclude a plaintiff from seeking justice again on the same claim.
Cause Title: AMRUDDIN ANSARI (DEAD)THROUGH LRS & ORS. VERSUS AFAJAL ALI & ORS., Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 488
The Supreme Court has held that a plaint containing multiple reliefs cannot be rejected under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC merely because some of those reliefs are legally barred. The Court clarified that a plaint cannot be rejected partially; if at least one relief is maintainable and within the court's jurisdiction, the entire plaint must proceed to trial. In the specific case, while a relief for restoration of possession under the SARFAESI Act was barred from civil court jurisdiction, other reliefs concerning ownership and title of the property were valid. The Court emphasized that during a Rule 11 application, the court should not make adverse observations on barred reliefs but should leave those issues undecided, focusing only on whether the plaint as a whole discloses a cause of action. Therefore, the presence of one valid relief is sufficient to prevent the summary rejection of the plaint.
Cause Title: CENTRAL BANK OF INDIA & ANR. VERSUS SMT. PRABHA JAIN & ORS., Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 96
The Supreme Court has reaffirmed the principle under Section 21 of the CPC that objections to the place of suing (territorial jurisdiction) must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity in the court of first instance and cannot be entertained at a belated stage. The Court emphasized that failure to promptly object precludes a party from raising the issue later, barring cases of manifest injustice. In the matter, a corporate debtor had participated in insolvency proceedings before the NCLT, Kolkata without raising any jurisdictional objection despite having changed its registered office. When it later sought to recall the admission order on jurisdictional grounds, the Supreme Court held the objection was impermissibly delayed. The Court set aside the High Court's intervention under Article 227, noting that the High Court had overlooked the limited scope of supervisory jurisdiction and the consequences of setting aside an IBC admission order. The ruling underscores the necessity of diligence in raising jurisdictional challenges at the outset of litigation.
Cause Title: PUNJAB NATIONAL BANK VERSUS ATIN ARORA & ANR., Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 27
The Supreme Court has clarified that Order II Rule 2 of the CPC, which generally bars a second suit on the same cause of action if claims were omitted from the first, does not apply when a relief was legally or factually impossible to seek in the initial suit but becomes available due to a subsequent event. The Court held that such a subsequent event creates a fresh cause of action, allowing a new suit for the previously unavailable relief. In the case at hand, a government ban on registering sale deeds had prevented the plaintiff from seeking specific performance and recovery of possession in the first suit. Once the ban was lifted, it triggered a new cause of action, and the second suit for those reliefs was not barred. The ruling emphasizes that the bar under Order II Rule 2 should not be applied mechanically where obtaining a relief was initially impossible, ensuring that plaintiffs are not denied justice due to mere technicalities.
Case Title: CUDDALORE POWERGEN CORPORATION LTD VERSUS M/S CHEMPLAST CUDDALORE VINYLS LIMITED AND ANR. Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 73
The Supreme Court has held that an appellate court cannot invoke Order XI Rule 14 of the CPC to direct the production of documents in an appeal against the rejection of a plaint under Order VII Rule 11. The Court clarified that the power to order document production is confined to the pendency of a suit and cannot be exercised after the suit has been dismissed at the threshold. When a plaint is rejected, the suit terminates, and the appellate court's role is limited to examining the correctness of that rejection order based solely on the averments in the plaint. It cannot delve into the merits of the case or allow the introduction of new evidence. In the matter, the First Appellate Court and High Court had erroneously directed the production of a mutation register after the suit was rejected. The Supreme Court set aside these orders, emphasizing that such a direction was beyond the scope of Order XI Rule 14 and constituted an error in the exercise of jurisdiction.
Cause Title: SRI SHRIKANTH NS & ORS. VERSUS K. MUNIVENKATAPPA & ANR., Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 502
The Supreme Court has ruled that a society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 does not automatically lose its character as a public trust merely due to its registration. The Court held that a representative suit under Section 92 of the CPC can be maintained against such a society if it functions as a constructive trust. The mere fact of registration does not alter the nature of properties already dedicated to public charitable purposes. The judgment provides a test to determine if a society qualifies as a constructive trust, examining factors such as the method of property acquisition, whether grants are conditioned for public benefit, complete dedication of property, public user rights, and the application of profits for charitable objectives. If these circumstances exist, the society can be treated as a public trust, and a suit alleging mismanagement or breach of trust remains maintainable under Section 92, ensuring accountability for entities using public funds for charitable purposes.
Cause Title: OPERATION ASHA VERSUS SHELLY BATRA & ORS., Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 775
The Supreme Court has clarified that the power under Order XVIII Rule 17 of the CPC to recall a witness vests solely with the court and is meant for the court to seek clarifications or remove ambiguities in the evidence. It does not confer a right upon the parties to recall witnesses for further examination, cross-examination, or re-examination to fill gaps in their case. The Court held that if a party wishes to recall a witness for such purposes, it must seek the court's leave under its inherent powers under Section 151 CPC. The ruling emphasizes that the provision is a judicial tool for clarification, not a means for parties to supplement their evidence after the fact.
Cause Title: SHUBHKARAN SINGH VERSUS ABHAYRAJ SINGH & ORS., Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 536