Amicus Curiae Suggestions - Policy strategy for bail and speedy disposal of criminal appeals - Model Action Plan for Baseline Report of NCMS (National Case Management System) - which has been approved by Chief Justice of India and forwarded to all High Courts for adoption - Vacancies in High Courts directly impact and corelate with the pendency of criminal appeals - Video Conferencing...
Amicus Curiae Suggestions - Policy strategy for bail and speedy disposal of criminal appeals - Model Action Plan for Baseline Report of NCMS (National Case Management System) - which has been approved by Chief Justice of India and forwarded to all High Courts for adoption - Vacancies in High Courts directly impact and corelate with the pendency of criminal appeals - Video Conferencing and roster rationalization by having dedicated benches for criminal appeals to improve disposal of old appeals - Adjournments and legal aid - Relied on Bani Singh v. State of U.P. (1996) 4 SCC 720 - If counsel for accused is not cooperating, recourse must be taken by appointing legal aid lawyer for accused - Automatic calling of soft copy records of Trial Court by the Registry - This Court directed High Courts to consider above suggestions and place their action plans on record. [Paras 3-15] In Re Policy Strategy for Grant of Bail (Collegium & HC Practice Directions), 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 671
Anticipatory Bail - Condition for Automatic Custody Upon Charge-Sheet Submission - Such a specific direction, mandating coercive steps for custody, was improper. When granting anticipatory bail, the court should leave it open for the trial court to decide on bail after the charge-sheet is filed and the accused appears. (Para 3) Ritesh Kumar v. State of Bihar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 326
Anticipatory Bail – Investigation was completed and the charge sheet was filed - Investigating Officer did not arrest the petitioner during the investigation phase, and the Court had issued summons for the petitioner's appearance. The Court expressed disapproval of the practice in Uttar Pradesh where arrests are made post-charge sheet filing and cognizance by the Court, deeming it illogical. The Court held that once the investigation is complete and the charge sheet is filed, the accused should appear before the trial court and furnish bail. Musheer Alam v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 83
Anticipatory Bail – Investigation was completed and the charge sheet was filed - Investigating Officer did not arrest the petitioner during the investigation phase, and the Court had issued summons for the petitioner's appearance. The Court expressed disapproval of the practice in Uttar Pradesh where arrests are made post-charge sheet filing and cognizance by the Court, deeming it illogical. The Court held that once the investigation is complete and the charge sheet is filed, the accused should appear before the trial court and furnish bail. Musheer Alam v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 83
Anticipatory Bail - Scheduled castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (SC/ST Act) - Section 18 - Applicability of Section 438 of CrPC – Held, anticipatory bail is permissible under SC/ST Act only if prima facie offence isn't made out - The bar under Section 18 of the SC/ST Act, which excludes the application of Section 438 CrPC, is not absolute - This requires a court to verify the complaint's averments and determine if a prima facie is established - The Court is not permitted to conduct a 'mini-trial' by evaluating evidence or other materials - The bar on anticipatory bail under Section 18 is intended to uphold the Act's objective of protecting vulnerable SC/ST communities and ensuring social justice - The denial of anticipatory bail for these offences is not considered unreasonable or a violation of Article 14 of Constitution, as these offences are a distinct class - The bar is not held to be violative of Article 21 - High Court committed a 'manifest error' and a 'jurisdictional error' by evaluating witness testimonies and concluding that no offence was made out - The incident occurred outside the complainant's house, which was a place 'within public view' - The caste nexus was established and the humiliation was clearly intentional - Anticipatory bail was granted by overlooking and disregarding the bar of Section 18 of the SC/ST Act, was a clear illegality - Appeal is allowed. [Paras 5-8] Kiran v. Rajkumar Jivraj Jain, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 869 : 2025 INSC 1067
Anticipatory Bail - Supreme Court criticises High Court for asking why accused was not arrested instead of deciding anticipatory bail plea - Held that petitioner was not arrested for 4 years by itself was a good ground for the High Court to exercise its discretion and grant anticipatory bail - Supreme Court disapproved of the manner in which the High Court dealt with the anticipatory bail plea by passing a 'very cryptic and unusual order' and seeking an affidavit from the Director General of Police (DGP) as to why the accused had not been arrested for 4 years - The High Court should either allow the application for anticipatory or decline it on its own merits. Gursewak Singh v. State of Punjab, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 873
Article 21, 22 - Duty of Courts to Uphold Fundamental Rights - The Court reiterated that when a court finds that the fundamental rights of an accused have been violated during or after arrest, it is the court's duty to release the accused on bail. The illegality of the arrest vitiates the detention, and bail cannot be denied based on the twin conditions under Section 45 of the PMLA. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the High Court's order granting bail to the respondent. The Court emphasized the importance of upholding constitutional rights and the rule of law in criminal proceedings. The appeal was dismissed, and the respondent's bail was upheld. Directorate of Enforcement v. Subhash Sharma, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 137 : 2025 INSC 141
Article 21, 22 - Illegal Arrest and Bail - Violation of Fundamental Rights - The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision to grant bail to the respondent in a case under PMLA. The High Court had found that the arrest was illegal due to a violation of Article 22(2) of the Constitution of India, which mandates that an arrested person must be produced before a magistrate within 24 hours of arrest. The respondent was detained at Airport pursuant to a Look Out Circular (LOC) issued by the Directorate of Enforcement (ED). The ED took physical custody of the respondent on March 5, 2022, but he was formally arrested only on March 6, 2022, and produced before a magistrate later that day. The Court found that the respondent was not produced before a magistrate within 24 hours of being taken into custody, rendering the arrest illegal. The Court emphasized that the failure to produce the respondent before a magistrate within 24 hours violated his fundamental rights under Articles 21 (right to life and personal liberty) and 22(2) of the Constitution. Consequently, the arrest was deemed vitiated, and the respondent was entitled to bail. Directorate of Enforcement v. Subhash Sharma, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 137 : 2025 INSC 141
Article 21 and 22 - Arrest and Detention - Communication of arrest grounds to a relative is not equivalent to informing the arrestee. Arrest memo contents (e.g., name, address, FIR details) do not include grounds of arrest. Vague or afterthought diary entries cannot substitute compliance with Article 22(1). (Paras 21, 27) Vihaan Kumar v. State of Haryana, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 169 : 2025 INSC 162 : (2025) 5 SCC 799
Article 21 and 22 - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Section 50 (Section 47 of the BNSS) - Person arrested to be informed of grounds of arrest and of right to bail - Non-compliance with Section 50 of the CrPC, requiring notification of arrest details to the accused's nominated persons, also vitiates the arrest. The Court overturned the High Court's decision and ordered the immediate release of the petitioner, due to failure to communicate the grounds of arrest. (Paras 21, 3) Vihaan Kumar v. State of Haryana, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 169 : 2025 INSC 162 : (2025) 5 SCC 799
Article 21 and 22 - Non-compliance with Article 22(1) of the Indian Constitution, which mandates informing an arrested person of the grounds of arrest in a clear and effective manner, renders the arrest illegal. Such violation constitutes a breach of fundamental rights under Articles 21 and 22, warranting the accused's immediate release or grant of bail, even in the presence of statutory restrictions. The Court emphasized the magistrate's duty to verify compliance with Article 22(1) during remand proceedings. (Paras 20, 21) Vihaan Kumar v. State of Haryana, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 169 : 2025 INSC 162 : (2025) 5 SCC 799
Article 21 – Kerala Anti-Social Activities (Prevention) Act, 2007 (KAAPA) – Preventive Detention – Distinction between 'Public Order' and 'Law and Order' – Bail Cancellation – Habeas Corpus – Held, preventive detention, an exceptional measure, must be exercised with utmost caution and strict adherence to constitutional safeguards under Article 21. It cannot be used as a substitute for criminal prosecution or to bypass bail orders. The detenu's actions, related to pending criminal cases under various statutes, did not amount to a disturbance of public order justifying detention. The detaining authority failed to substantiate how the detenu's conduct threatened public order, and the State should have sought bail cancellation instead. The detention order was quashed, emphasizing that preventive detention must strictly comply with legal and constitutional standards. [Para 17 - 22] Dhanya M. v. State of Kerala, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 681 : 2025 INSC 809 : AIR 2025 SC 2868
Article 21 - Right to Speedy Trial - Undertrial Accused - Prolonged Detention - Excessive Witnesses - Judicial Responsibility - Accused, charged under UAPA for alleged Naxalite activities, in custody since 2020. Prosecution planned to examine 100 witnesses, with 42 already examined, many providing repetitive testimonies. Bail granted due to excessive trial delays violating the fundamental right to a speedy trial under Article 21, irrespective of the offence's gravity. Prolonged detention (6-7 years) as an undertrial, coupled with unnecessary examination of excessive witnesses to prove a single fact, deemed unwarranted.. Delayed trials cause significant stress, financial loss, social stigma, and disruption to the accused's life, with no remedy for acquitted individuals. Such delays undermine justice for the accused, victims, society, and the judicial system's credibility. Courts must leverage Criminal Procedure Code provisions to ensure efficient trial progression. Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court's order denying bail, and granted bail to the accused. [Para 14, 15] Tapas Kumar Palit v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 211 : 2025 INSC 222 : AIR 2025 SC 940
Article 22(1) - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) - Section 50A – Held that requirement of communicating the grounds of arrest in writing is not merely a formality but is essential for actualising the fundamental right to liberty and life as guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution - The purpose of communicating the grounds of arrest to the detenue and their relatives is to enable them to take prompt actions to secure the release of the arrested person, which includes engaging lawyers and seeking bail at the earliest. [Relied on Pankaj Bansal v. Union of India & Ors. (2024) 7 SCC 576]; Prabir Purkayastha v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2024) 8 SCC 254] Ahmed Mansoor v. State, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1026
Article 22 (1) - Compliance with - Duty to inform an arrestee of the grounds of arrest - Held, informing an arrestee's relative (e.g., wife) about the arrest does not fulfill the constitutional obligation under Article 22(1) to directly inform the arrestee of the grounds of arrest. Recording arrest details in the arrest memo, remand report, or case diary does not constitute compliance with this mandate, as these documents merely note the fact of arrest, not the reasons for it. Reliance on vague or non-contemporaneous case diary entries was deemed insufficient. The Court declared the appellant's arrest illegal for non-compliance with Article 22(1) and set aside the High Court's decision. Appeal allowed. (Paras 21, 27) Vihaan Kumar v. State of Haryana, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 169 : 2025 INSC 162 : (2025) 5 SCC 799
Article 22 – Grounds of Arrest - Held, constitutional and statutory framework mandates that an arrested person must be informed of the grounds of arrest but it does not prescribe a specific form or insist upon written communication in every case. [Paras 20, 23] State of Karnataka v. Sri Darshan, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 801 : 2025 INSC 979
Articles 21 and 22 - Requirement to Communicate Grounds of Arrest under Article 22(1) in Warrant-Based and Warrantless Arrests - Held, Article 22(1) is a constitutional safeguard mandating that grounds of arrest be communicated to the arrestee. In warrantless arrests, non-compliance with Article 22(1) renders the arrest illegal, prohibiting further custody. Grounds must pre-exist, be documented, and conveyed meaningfully to the arrestee, preferably with notice to their family, to facilitate release arrangements. In arrests pursuant to a warrant, reading the warrant aloud to the arrestee satisfies Article 22(1), and no separate grounds are required. Police must prove compliance with Article 22(1) if non-communication is alleged, supported by diary entries or documents. Appeal dismissed, affirming compliance with Article 22(1) in warrant-based arrest. (Para 16, 36) Kasireddy Upender Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 628 : 2025 INSC 768
Bail Application – Moratorium of 1 year imposed by high court to apply for bail afresh - Such a restriction was impermissible. (Para 3) Md. Gulzar v. State of Bihar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 370
Bail Cancellation – Ground of non-appearance before Police Station – Sustainability of cancellation when Trial is in progress – Supreme Court set aside a High Court order that had cancelled the appellant's bail solely due to non-compliance with a condition requiring appearance at the police station on the 1st and 16th of every month- Supreme Court observed that the appellant had already undergone custody for 1 year and 11 months prior to the initial grant of bail and was regularly appearing before the Trial Court- Supreme Court laid down key principles- i. Police Presence vs. Trial Attendance: Once a chargesheet has been filed and the case is committed to the Court of Sessions for trial, a condition requiring the accused to appear at a police station is prima facie not tenable if the accused is already appearing regularly before the Trial Court; ii. Reasonableness of Grounds: Cancellation of bail merely on the "pretext" of non-appearance at a police station, without evidence of the accused failing to attend trial proceedings, is not a correct approach or a valid ground for revoking liberty- Appeal allowed. [Paras 7 - 9] Sheikh Irshad @ Monu v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1185
Bail Cancellation - Grounds for cancellation – Held, very cogent and overwhelming circumstances are necessary for cancelling bail that has already been granted - Grounds for cancellation include - i. misusing liberty by engaging in other criminal activities; ii. Interfering with the investigation or tampering with evidence; iii. Attempting to influence or threaten witnesses; iv. Evading court proceedings; v. any conduct by the accused after being granted bail that makes a fair trial no longer conducive. [Paras 55- 59] Phireram v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 872 : 2025 INSC 1074
Bail - Cancellation of - Dowry Death - Annulment of Bail Order - Perversity of High Court Order - The Supreme Court allowed the appeal filed by the deceased's father and annulled the bail granted to the accused-husband by the High Court, holding that the High Court's order was perverse and unsustainable as it failed to consider material evidence and settled legal principles - Supreme Court reiterated the distinction between the cancellation of bail (due to post-bail misconduct) and the annulment of bail (due to legal infirmity/perversity in the order) - Bail granted without due application of mind to relevant factors - such as the gravity of the offence, prima facie evidence, and statutory presumptions - may be annulled, even in the absence of post-bail misconduct - held that the High Court failed to appreciate the seriousness of the offence - the unnatural death of a young woman within four months of marriage - and the statutory presumption - Supreme Court held that he Court emphasized that dowry death is not merely an offence against an individual but a crime against society at large, necessitating strict judicial scrutiny and a firm deterrent judicial response to uphold the majesty of law and send an unequivocal message against this social evil - Such heinous offences strike at the very root of human dignity and violate the constitutional guarantees of equality and life with dignity under Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India - They corrode the moral fibre of the community, normalize violence against women, and erode the foundations of a civilized society - Appeal allowed. [Relied on R. Rathinam v. State by DSP 2000 2 SCC 391; State of Karnataka v. Sri Darshan, etc. 2025 INSC 979; Kans Raj v. State of Punjab ((2000) 5 SCC 207; Paras 17-25] Yogendra Pal Singh v. Raghvendra Singh @ Prince, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1150 : 2025 INSC 1367
Bail is a matter of judicial discretion and must be exercised in accordance with established principles rather than subjective considerations. The courts must avoid unnecessary incarceration, particularly when the alleged offense does not involve extreme violence or grave societal impact. The denial of bail in non-heinous offenses contributes to the overburdening of higher courts with bail applications. Maulvi Syed Shad Kazmi @ Mohd. Shad v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 114
Bail is a matter of judicial discretion and must be exercised in accordance with established principles rather than subjective considerations. The courts must avoid unnecessary incarceration, particularly when the alleged offense does not involve extreme violence or grave societal impact. The denial of bail in non-heinous offenses contributes to the overburdening of higher courts with bail applications. Maulvi Syed Shad Kazmi @ Mohd. Shad v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 114
Bail on medical grounds – Held, medical opinion is essential before granting medical bail, especially when claim lacks urgency or specificity - High Court erred in granting bail to accused on medical grounds without constituting a medical board to assess the genuineness of the claim, which was contrary to established law - Directed that Court must also consider the collective's cry for justice and societal concern, which should be given priority over individual liberty in a case involving a heinous crime - A court should not conduct a detailed examination of evidence or an elaborate documentation of the merits while passing bail orders - It should only be satisfied about a prima facie case - Post bail good conduct of the accused, while relevant to the question of continuation of bail, cannot retrospectively validate an otherwise unsustainable order. [Paras 20, 22] State of Karnataka v. Sri Darshan, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 801 : 2025 INSC 979
Bail - Requirement of Reasons for Granting Bail - While elaborate reasons may not be assigned for grant of bail, an order that is dehors reasoning or bereft of the relevant reasons cannot result in the grant of bail - Such an order is non-speaking and violates the principles of natural justice - Held that court must strike a balance and exercise discretion judiciously, considering factors like the nature of the allegations, severity of punishment, criminal antecedents, and a prima facie satisfaction. [Paras 19, 20] Sagar v. State of U.P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1155 : 2025 INSC 1370
Bail - Setting aside v. Cancellation of bail - Principles for setting aside bail orders - Supreme Court examines the correctness of the bail order itself, while latter pertains to the accused's conduct subsequent to the bail grant - Held that grant of bail is a discretionary judicial remedy that requires balancing the personal liberty of the accused and gravity of offence - Judicial discretion in bail matters must be informed by assessing the nature and seriousness of the charge - A superior court can set aside a bail order if it is found to be illegal, perverse, unjustified, arbitrary or based on irrelevant considerations - The court should conduct threadbare analysis of prosecution evidence or adjudicate its merits at bail stage - An order granting bail must reflect application of mind - Conduct of accused subsequent to grant of bail is generally not considered when reviewing an appeal against the grant of bail but rather in an application for cancellation of bail - An appeal against bail should not be used as a retaliatory measure - Accused, being a celebrated wrestler and Olympian with societal impact could have a domineering influence over witnesses or delay trial proceedings - The fact that accused remained absconding after the FIR and nonbailable warrants were issued - High Court granted bail without considering grievous nature of the crime - Appeal allowed. [Paras 19-25] Ashok Dhankad v. State NCT of Delhi, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 797 : 2025 INSC 974
Cancellation of Bail - Held, Personal liberty is a fundamental constitutional right, and courts must exercise caution before restricting it. No evidence was found of the accused misusing bail, influencing witnesses, tampering with evidence, or causing undue delay. The High Court's cancellation of bail was unjustified, as it erroneously conducted a mini-trial. Bail restored, with a direction for the appellant to appear before the Trial Court, failing which the bail may be cancelled. Appeal allowed. [Para 12, 13] Kailash Kumar v. State of Himachal Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 242
Case Delayed by 27 Adjournments in High Court - Prompt Adjudication in Matters of Personal Liberty - The Supreme Court granted bail to the petitioner, incarcerated for over four years, due to the High Court's repeated adjournment of the bail application on 27 occasions. The High Courts must not indefinitely delay matters concerning personal liberty. Noting that the complainant's evidence was recorded and only three of 365 witnesses had been examined, the Court deemed the pending High Court bail application infructuous and granted bail, despite opposition from the CBI citing the petitioner's involvement in 33 other cases. The Court emphasized the need for timely judicial action in cases impacting personal liberty. (Para 5) Lakshya Tawar v. Central Bureau of Investigation, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 612
Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 – Section 132 – Bail should be normally granted for offences u/s. 132 CGST Act unless extraordinary circumstances exists. Vineet Jain vs Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 513
Companies Act, 2013; Section 212 (6) and 447 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Sections 82, 204 and 438 –Serious Fraud Investigation Office (SFIO) investigated Adarsh Group for illegal loans worth Rs. 1700 crores, alleging fraud and siphoning of funds. Special Court issued bailable and non-bailable warrants and initiated proclamation proceedings against accused for non-compliance. High Court granted anticipatory bail, ignoring mandatory bail conditions under Section 212(6) and 2 accused's absconding conduct. High Court orders set aside as perverse for disregarding legal provisions and Special Court proceedings. Accused directed to surrender. (Para 23 - 30) Serious Fraud Investigation Office v. Aditya Sarda, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 414 : 2025 INSC 477
Companies Act, 2013; Section 212 and 447 - Punishment for Fraud - Investigation into affairs of company by Serious Fraud Investigation Office - Bail, including anticipatory bail, cannot be granted for an offence under Section 447 of the Act 2013 unless twin conditions are satisfied. Section 212 (6) of the Companies Act states that the offences covered under Section 447 are cognisable in nature and no person can be released on bail unless he satisfies the twin conditions, that are: (1) that a Public Prosecutor should be given an opportunity to oppose the application for such release; (2) where the Public Prosecutor opposes the application, the Court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the person is not guilty and is unlikely to commit any offence while on bail. Cryptic orders granting bail without adverting to the facts or the consideration of such restrictive conditions are perverse and liable to be set aside. (Relied: Vijay Madanlal Choudhary v. Union of India, (2023) 12 SCC 1; Union of India v. Kanhaiya Prasad, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 201; Para 23 – 25)) Serious Fraud Investigation Office v. Aditya Sarda, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 414 : 2025 INSC 477
Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 - Grounds for Detention - Non-application of Mind - Grant of Bail - Failure to Consider Bail Conditions – Effect - Where a person is detained under the COFEPOSA Act based on allegations that are the same as those in a criminal prosecution where the person has been granted bail with specific conditions, the detaining authority must consider the efficacy of those bail conditions. Failure of the detaining authority to examine whether the bail conditions imposed by the jurisdictional magistrate are sufficient to curb the alleged activities, which form the basis of the preventive detention, amounts to a non-application of mind. While courts cannot scrutinize the reasonableness of the detaining authority's subjective satisfaction, they must ensure that the authority has indeed applied its mind to relevant factors, including existing bail conditions. When there is a grant of bail with conditions, the detaining authority has to consider if those conditions are sufficient to prevent the detenu from indulging in the activities that the preventive detention is trying to prevent. The court allowed the appeal and set aside the detention order, directing the detenu's release, due to the detaining authority's failure to consider the bail conditions. (Para 16 - 21) Joyi Kitty Joseph v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 298 : (2025) 4 SCC 476
Constitution of India, 1950; Article 246A - Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 (CGST Act); Sections 69 and 70 - Constitutionality of - Power to Arrest and Summon - Legislative Competence under Article 246A - Incidental Powers for Tax Evasion. The constitutional validity of Sections 69 (power to arrest) and 70 (power to summon) of the CGST Act, and analogous provisions in State GST Acts, was challenged. Petitioners contended that Article 246A, which empowers Parliament and State Legislatures to levy and collect GST, does not authorize criminalization of violations, such as through arrest and summons. They argued these powers fall outside legislative competence, being neither ancillary to GST levy nor covered by Entry 93 of List I (offences against laws of the Union) in the Seventh Schedule. Whether Sections 69 and 70 of the CGST Act are constitutionally valid and within Parliament's legislative competence under Article 246A. Held, Provisions upheld as constitutionally valid. Challenge to vires rejected; provisions do not violate constitutional limits. (Para 75) Radhika Agarwal v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 255 : 2025 INSC 272 : (2025) 6 SCC 545
Constitution of India; Article 226 - Quashing of FIR - Blanket protection from arrest – Held, the High Court refused to exercise its jurisdiction to quash the FIR but simultaneously granted blanket protection from arrest to the accused until the filing of the charge sheet - Such orders are a “stark example in self-contradiction” and cause “grave prejudice to the investigation of the case” - While the High Court has wide powers under Article 226 to prevent miscarriage of justice, these powers must be exercised sparingly and cannot be used to mechanically grant what is effectively anticipatory bail while refusing to quash the proceedings - Passing "no coercive steps" or "no arrest" orders till the investigation is completed, after opining that no case is made out to quash the FIR, is wholly impermissible - Provisions of pre-arrest bail are applicable in the State of Uttar Pradesh. An accused seeking such protection must avail the appropriate remedy by approaching the competent Sessions Court at the first instance rather than seeking blanket protection in a criminal writ petition for quashing of FIR. [Relied on Neeharika Infrastructure (P) Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra, (2021) 19 SCC 401; Paras 5-11] Sanjay Kumar Gupta v. State of U.P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1170
Control of Organized Crime Act, 1999 (Maharashtra); Section 21(4) - Whether the High Court, while considering a bail application, transgressed into impermissible areas by making findings on the merits of the case, especially in light of the stringent conditions for bail under Section 21(4) of MCOCA. Whether the High Court failed to consider the rigors of MCOCA while granting bail to the accused. Held, the High Court had made observations akin to findings on the merits of the case, such as concluding that the accused had no direct or indirect contact with the gang leader (accused No. 4) and that they played no role in the shooting. Such findings are impermissible at the bail stage, as they could prejudice the trial. The High Court failed to adequately consider the stringent conditions for bail under MCOCA, particularly Section 21(4), which imposes specific requirements for granting bail in cases involving organized crime. Jayshree Kanabar v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 10
Criminal Appeal - Pendency in High Courts - Noted the significant pendency of criminal appeals across various High Courts in India with a total of 7,24,192 criminal appeals pending as of March 2025 - Noted that only 79 judges are there in Allahabad High Court (with pendency of over 2 lakh criminal appeals) out of sanctioned strength of 160 - In Bombay High Court, 66 judges out of 94 are functioning - Calcutta High Court has sanctioned strength of 72 but has only 44 judges - Delhi High Court has only 41 judges out of sanctioned strength of 60 - Court held that Central Government needs to act and ensure that the recommendations made by the Collegium for judge appointments are cleared without delay - Court expressed concern that 29 recommendations made by this Court Collegium since November, 2022 which are still pending. [Para 2] In Re Policy Strategy for Grant of Bail (Collegium & HC Practice Directions), 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 671
Criminal Law - Arrest - Defiance of Court Order - Grant of Bail - Police, with knowledge of the protection order, hastily added serious charges under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 and the Vishesh Jan Suraksha Adhiniyam, 2005 leading to the appellant's arrest. The Court deprecated this conduct, emphasizing that the police should have sought leave from the Court before arresting the appellant. The Court, considering the mala fide nature of the arrest, allowed the appeal, directing the appellant's release on bail, and made the interim order of protection absolute. (Para 5 & 7) Manish Rathore v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 325
Criminal Law – Bail - Juvenile Justice - Sexual Offences - Sex Education - Supreme Court reiterated its direction to the State of Uttar Pradesh to file an additional affidavit informing the Court on how sex education is provided as a part of the curriculum in higher secondary schools (Classes IX to XII) so that young adolescents are made aware of the hormonal changes that come with puberty and the consequences that may flow therefrom — Pursuant to the direction, an additional affidavit was filed detailing the curriculum provided by the Secondary Education Department, Uttar Pradesh, for classes IX to XII, which was stated to be in keeping with the directives of the National Council of Educational Research & Training (NCERT)— Need for earlier implementation — Supreme Court opined that sex education should be provided to the children from a younger age and not class IX onwards — It is for the authorities concerned to apply their mind and take corrective measures, so that children are informed of the changes that happen after puberty and the care and cautions to be taken in relation thereto — That aspect was left open for the authorities concerned to take necessary steps. [Para 7-10] Juvenile X v. State of U.P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 989
Criminal Law – Bail – Suspension of Sentence – Custodial Death – Expedited Appeal - Supreme Court refuses to suspend life sentence or grant bail to expelled IPS officer Sanjiv Bhatt in 1990 custodial death case; directs expeditious hearing of appeal. The Supreme Court holds no inclination to enlarge appellant on bail; observations limited to bail application with no bearing on merits of appeal. Conviction under Ss. 302, 323, 506(1) IPC upheld by High Court; death attributed to renal failure caused by custodial torture including forced sit-ups and crawling; victim died 10 days post-release after 9-day detention during 1990 Bharat Bandh riots. Petitioner's plea of no torture evidence and pre-existing conditions rejected; State highlights cogent medical evidence and appellant's prior 20-year sentence in separate drug-planting case. Appeal expedited. (Para 17) Sanjiv Kumar Rajendrabhai Bhatt v. State of Gujarat, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 573
Delhi Judicial Service - Judicial Officers - Perverse bail order - Supreme Court directed that two judicial officers in the Delhi Judicial Service must undergo special judicial training for a period of at least 7 days for the illegal and erroneous manner in which they granted bail to two accused- Directed Chief Justice of Delhi High Court has been requested to make arrangements, with a focus on sensitising judicial officers on how to conduct proceedings and the deference to be accorded to superior court rulings- Supreme Court referred judicial officers' approach as 'untenable' and bordering on 'perversity'- Noted that accused had misled High Court while enjoying four years of interim protection and later concealed the rejection of their anticipatory bail applications while seeking regular bail- Supreme Court expressed disappointment on having formally surrendered before the Court, the accused were permitted to leave the Court without any formal order of release- Criticized the Delhi High Court for overlooking the factual position and declining interference- Appeal allowed. [Paras 16-33, 40-42] Netisty Systems Pvt. Ltd. v. State Govt of NCT of Delhi, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 962 : 2025 INSC 1181
Duty of Courts to Uphold Fundamental Rights - The Court reiterated that when a court finds that the fundamental rights of an accused have been violated during or after arrest, it is the court's duty to release the accused on bail. The illegality of the arrest vitiates the detention, and bail cannot be denied based on the twin conditions under Section 45 of the PMLA. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the High Court's order granting bail to the respondent. The Court emphasized the importance of upholding constitutional rights and the rule of law in criminal proceedings. The appeal was dismissed, and the respondent's bail was upheld. Directorate of Enforcement v. Subhash Sharma, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 137
Filing of a fresh bail application, once an earlier bail application has been rejected or if granted and thereafter cancelled is a matter of right and solely on the ground that the Apex Court had not permitted filing of the fresh bail application, the High Court was not justified in dismissing the bail application. Vipin Kumar v. State of U.P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 209
Freedom of Religion Act, 2018 (Uttarakhand) - Sections 3/5 - Bhartiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 - Sections 318(4) and 319 - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Bail application - Supreme Court granted bail to appellant who was arrested by the police under anti-conversion law following his marriage to a woman belonging to another religion – Marriage was consensual with the approval of their respective families - State cannot object to appellant and his wife living together in consensual case - Pending criminal proceeding cannot come in the way of appellant and his wife residing together on their own volition - Granted bail to appellant - Set aside order of High Court and Appeal allowed. Aman Siddiqui @ Aman Chaudhary @ Raja v. State of Uttarakhand, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 678
Grant of bail in an alleged case of unlawful religious conversion under the Uttar Pradesh Prohibition of Unlawful Conversion of Religion Act, 2021. Judicial discretion in bail matters and the role of trial courts in exercising it. The petitioner, a Maulvi, was denied bail by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in connection with a case under Sections 504 and 506 IPC and Section 3 of the Uttar Pradesh Prohibition of Unlawful Conversion of Religion Act, 2021. The prosecution alleged that the petitioner forcibly converted a mentally challenged minor while keeping him in a Madarasa. The petitioner contended that the minor was abandoned and that he had only provided him shelter on humanitarian grounds. The trial had commenced, with seven witnesses examined. Held, the High Court erred in denying bail, as the allegations did not constitute a grave offence like murder or dacoity. The Court criticized the reluctance of trial courts to grant bail and emphasized that the High Court should have exercised its discretion judiciously. The Court observed that bail should not be denied based on personal perceptions about the seriousness of conversion but should be granted unless the offense is of an exceptionally grave nature. The petitioner was granted bail, subject to conditions imposed by the trial court, with a direction that the trial proceed expeditiously. Maulvi Syed Shad Kazmi @ Mohd. Shad v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 114
Grant of bail in an alleged case of unlawful religious conversion under the Uttar Pradesh Prohibition of Unlawful Conversion of Religion Act, 2021. Judicial discretion in bail matters and the role of trial courts in exercising it. The petitioner, a Maulvi, was denied bail by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in connection with a case under Sections 504 and 506 IPC and Section 3 of the Uttar Pradesh Prohibition of Unlawful Conversion of Religion Act, 2021. The prosecution alleged that the petitioner forcibly converted a mentally challenged minor while keeping him in a Madarasa. The petitioner contended that the minor was abandoned and that he had only provided him shelter on humanitarian grounds. The trial had commenced, with seven witnesses examined. Held, the High Court erred in denying bail, as the allegations did not constitute a grave offence like murder or dacoity. The Court criticized the reluctance of trial courts to grant bail and emphasized that the High Court should have exercised its discretion judiciously. The Court observed that bail should not be denied based on personal perceptions about the seriousness of conversion but should be granted unless the offense is of an exceptionally grave nature. The petitioner was granted bail, subject to conditions imposed by the trial court, with a direction that the trial proceed expeditiously. Maulvi Syed Shad Kazmi @ Mohd. Shad v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 114
Grounds of Arrest v. Reasons for Arrest – Held that there is a significant difference between the phrase "reasons for arrest" and "grounds of arrest" - Reasons for arrest are purely formal parameters and are general in nature (e.g., to prevent further offense, proper investigation, prevent tampering with evidence) - Grounds of arrest must be personal to the accused and required to contain all basic facts in the hand of the investigating officer which necessitated the arrest, to provide the accused an opportunity of defending himself against custodial remand and to seek bail. Ahmed Mansoor v. State, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1026
Guidelines - Petition alleging police high-handedness and violation of arrest guidelines under Arnesh Kumar v. State of Bihar (2014) 8 SCC 73 - Court finds evident police misconduct but closes proceedings as a related police case is pending - Cautions police officers and directs Director General of Police, Haryana, to prevent recurrence - Expresses concern over mechanical compliance with Section 41(1)(b)(ii) CrPC checklist - Reiterates Constitutional and statutory safeguards for individuals in custody, referencing D.K. Basu and Somnath v. State of Maharashtra, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 252 - Order circulated to all Directors General of Police and Commissioners for strict adherence to arrest and custody guidelines. (Para 6, 9 & 16) Vijay Pal Yadav v. Mamta Singh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 380
Illegal Arrest and Bail - Violation of Fundamental Rights - The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision to grant bail to the respondent in a case under PMLA. The High Court had found that the arrest was illegal due to a violation of Article 22(2) of the Constitution of India, which mandates that an arrested person must be produced before a magistrate within 24 hours of arrest. The respondent was detained at Airport pursuant to a Look Out Circular (LOC) issued by the Directorate of Enforcement (ED). The ED took physical custody of the respondent on March 5, 2022, but he was formally arrested only on March 6, 2022, and produced before a magistrate later that day. The Court found that the respondent was not produced before a magistrate within 24 hours of being taken into custody, rendering the arrest illegal. The Court emphasized that the failure to produce the respondent before a magistrate within 24 hours violated his fundamental rights under Articles 21 (right to life and personal liberty) and 22(2) of the Constitution. Consequently, the arrest was deemed vitiated, and the respondent was entitled to bail. Directorate of Enforcement v. Subhash Sharma, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 137
Interim Bail for Elections - Right to Campaign - Whether interim bail can be granted to an undertrial prisoner for the purpose of contesting elections and campaigning. Whether the right to campaign or canvass for elections is a fundamental, constitutional, or statutory right. The balance between an individual's right to participate in elections and the seriousness of criminal charges against them. The petitioner was in custody in connection with multiple cases, including rioting and murder during the Delhi riots of February 2020, and a PMLA case. He sought interim bail to contest the Delhi Assembly Elections 2025 from the Mustafabad Constituency. The High Court denied interim bail but granted conditional custody parole to file his nomination papers. The petitioner approached the Supreme Court, arguing that without the ability to campaign, his participation in the election would be meaningless. Pankaj Mithal, J.: Interim bail is not a statutory right but has been granted in exceptional circumstances. However, contesting elections or campaigning is not a recognized ground for interim bail. The right to campaign is neither a fundamental nor a constitutional right. It is not essential for the statutory right to contest elections. The petitioner is involved in serious crimes, including murder and rioting, with allegations of using his property as a base for criminal activities. Granting interim bail could lead to witness tampering. In Arvind Kejriwal v. Directorate of Enforcement, (2024) 9 SCC 577 interim bail was granted due to the petitioner's role as Chief Minister and national party president, which is not applicable here. Allowing interim bail for elections could open a floodgate of similar requests, undermining the judicial process and the integrity of elections. The High Court did not err in denying interim bail. The petition was dismissed, with liberty to pursue regular bail. Dissenting Opinion Ahsanuddin Amanullah, J. The petitioner, having been in custody for nearly five years and granted bail in most cases, should be allowed interim bail for a limited period to campaign, subject to strict conditions. Right to participate in elections, while not a fundamental right, the petitioner's statutory right to contest elections should be meaningfully exercised, including the ability to campaign. The petitioner's long incarceration and the delay in trial proceedings justify temporary release for campaigning, without prejudicing the ongoing criminal cases. The petitioner was granted interim bail with restrictions on movement, prohibition from discussing pending cases, and surrender of his passport. The decision in Arvind Kejriwal was distinguished, but the principles of temporary release in exceptional circumstances were upheld. The petition was allowed in part, granting interim bail for campaigning with stringent conditions. Held, the Supreme Court delivered a split verdict. The matter was referred to the Chief Justice of India for further consideration due to the differing opinions. This case highlights the tension between an individual's right to participate in democratic processes and the judiciary's duty to ensure that serious criminal charges are not undermined by temporary releases. It also underscores the evolving jurisprudence on interim bail and its application in exceptional circumstances. Mohd Tahir Hussain v. State of Nct of Delhi, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 106
Interim Bail for Elections - Right to Campaign - Whether interim bail can be granted to an undertrial prisoner for the purpose of contesting elections and campaigning. Whether the right to campaign or canvass for elections is a fundamental, constitutional, or statutory right. The balance between an individual's right to participate in elections and the seriousness of criminal charges against them. The petitioner was in custody in connection with multiple cases, including rioting and murder during the Delhi riots of February 2020, and a PMLA case. He sought interim bail to contest the Delhi Assembly Elections 2025 from the Mustafabad Constituency. The High Court denied interim bail but granted conditional custody parole to file his nomination papers. The petitioner approached the Supreme Court, arguing that without the ability to campaign, his participation in the election would be meaningless. Pankaj Mithal, J.: Interim bail is not a statutory right but has been granted in exceptional circumstances. However, contesting elections or campaigning is not a recognized ground for interim bail. The right to campaign is neither a fundamental nor a constitutional right. It is not essential for the statutory right to contest elections. The petitioner is involved in serious crimes, including murder and rioting, with allegations of using his property as a base for criminal activities. Granting interim bail could lead to witness tampering. In Arvind Kejriwal v. Directorate of Enforcement, (2024) 9 SCC 577 interim bail was granted due to the petitioner's role as Chief Minister and national party president, which is not applicable here. Allowing interim bail for elections could open a floodgate of similar requests, undermining the judicial process and the integrity of elections. The High Court did not err in denying interim bail. The petition was dismissed, with liberty to pursue regular bail. Dissenting Opinion Ahsanuddin Amanullah, J. The petitioner, having been in custody for nearly five years and granted bail in most cases, should be allowed interim bail for a limited period to campaign, subject to strict conditions. Right to participate in elections, while not a fundamental right, the petitioner's statutory right to contest elections should be meaningfully exercised, including the ability to campaign. The petitioner's long incarceration and the delay in trial proceedings justify temporary release for campaigning, without prejudicing the ongoing criminal cases. The petitioner was granted interim bail with restrictions on movement, prohibition from discussing pending cases, and surrender of his passport. The decision in Arvind Kejriwal was distinguished, but the principles of temporary release in exceptional circumstances were upheld. The petition was allowed in part, granting interim bail for campaigning with stringent conditions. Held, the Supreme Court delivered a split verdict. The matter was referred to the Chief Justice of India for further consideration due to the differing opinions. This case highlights the tension between an individual's right to participate in democratic processes and the judiciary's duty to ensure that serious criminal charges are not undermined by temporary releases. It also underscores the evolving jurisprudence on interim bail and its application in exceptional circumstances. Mohd Tahir Hussain v. State of Nct of Delhi, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 106
Interim Bail - High Courts must refrain from routinely or repeatedly granting interim bail to the same accused. Such relief should be reserved strictly as an exception for specific exigencies or contingencies, and not extended as a matter of course. Courts are instead obligated to either grant regular bail or deny bail outright upon merits. Asim Mallik v. State of Odisha, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 475
Issuance of bailable warrant - Proceedings under the D.V. Act are quasi-criminal and do not warrant such coercive measures unless there is a violation of a protection order. Alisha Berry v. Neelam Berry, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 33
Judicial Custody - Habeas Corpus petition for release of accused in judicial custody - When bail applications have been rejected - Scope of Writ Petition against Judicial Custody – Held, the custody of an accused person in a criminal case, where a First Information Report (FIR) is registered, a chargesheet is filed, and multiple bail applications have been dismissed by the High Court, cannot be held to be unlawful in a writ petition for habeas corpus - High Court's decision to allow a habeas corpus petition filed by the daughter of the accused, directing his release on bond, after the High Court itself had rejected four prior bail applications filed by the accused, is a "totally without jurisdiction" exercise of power and a "novel method" adopted to scuttle the due process of law - The process followed is "totally unknown to law" - The High Court, in the guise of hearing a habeas corpus petition, cannot examine the merits of the criminal case and direct release, effectively sitting as an appellate court over its own orders rejecting bail. Such action "shocks the conscience" of the Supreme Court - Appeal dismissed. [Paras 15 - 17] State of Madhya Pradesh v. Kusum Sahu, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1110
Judicial Impropriety - Bail Order - Supreme Court criticises High Court for modifying bail condition when bail order was under challenge before Apex Court – Held, while High Courts are not subordinate to the Supreme Court, as the highest appellate authority, can issue corrective directions binding on the lower forums - The High Court's action in modifying an order that was pending challenge before the Supreme Court ran contrary to the principles of judicial propriety and comity - When a matter is pending before the Supreme Court, a High Court should restraint and avoid passing orders that could 'circumvent, prejudice or render infructuous' the proceedings - High Court's conflicting exercise of jurisdiction should be strictly avoided - Supreme Court also expressed displeasure at the respondent's conduct, noting that respondent's counter-affidavit filed with the Supreme Court did not mention the application or High Court's orders - Set aside the High Court's order modifying bail and notice was issued to respondent. [Paras 8-13] Sreeja D.G. v. Anitha R. Nair, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 874
Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015; Sections 15 and 94(2) - Juvenile Justice Board — Lack of Review Jurisdiction — Contradictory Findings on Juvenility Impermissible - The Juvenile Justice Board (JJB) constituted under the JJ Act, 2015 possesses no power of review, either expressly or by necessary implication, over its prior orders determining juvenility. Once the JJB accepts documentary evidence such as a school certificate establishing the date of birth of a child in conflict with law (in this case, 08.09.2003), it cannot in subsequent proceedings disregard the same, adopt a contradictory stance, or resort to medical opinion (e.g., ossification test estimating age as 21 years) to reopen the issue. Such action amounts to an impermissible review of its earlier order. Under Section 94(2) of the Act, medical evidence is admissible only in the absence of conclusive documentary proof; school records carry superior evidentiary value and cannot be overridden by subsidiary ossification tests. The Supreme Court thus upheld the High Court's grant of bail to the juvenile respondent, holding that a preliminary assessment under Section 15 recommending trial as an adult does not negate the statutory right to bail absent evidence of threat to the juvenile or society. Appeal dismissed. (Para 29) Rajni v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 602 : 2025 INSC 737
Mandatory Disclosure of Criminal Antecedents – Every special leave petition (criminal) challenging orders under Sections 438/439 of CrPC or Sections 482/483 of BNSS must mandatorily disclose in the synopsis whether the petitioner has clean antecedents or details of involvement in criminal cases, including the stage of proceedings. Incorrect disclosure may lead to dismissal of the petition. Registry directed to circulate the order for compliance until relevant rules are amended. (Paras 12-14) Munnesh v. State of U.P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 389
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (NDPS Act); Sections 8(c), 21(c), 23(c), and 29 - Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (UAPA); Sections 17, 18, and 22C - Penal Code, 1860; Section 120B - Supreme Court refuses bail in 2,988 kg heroin seizure case at Mundra Port (2021) but holds NIA's allegation of terror-financing linkage with LeT as premature and speculative; no compelling evidence at this stage to connect the accused to the prescribed terrorist organizations; liberty granted to re-approach after 6 months or trial advancement. (Para 34) Harpreet Singh Talwar @ Kabir Talwar v. State of Gujarat, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 556 : 2025 INSC 662
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (NDPS Act) - Section 37(1)(b) – Grant of Bail in Offences Involving Commercial Quantity – Twin Conditions – The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's orders granting bail, holding that the High Court failed to properly apply the statutory bar under Section 37 - The twin conditions—recording a satisfaction that there are reasonable grounds to believe the accused is not guilty and that he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail—must be demonstrably complied with - Held that the High Court's conclusion that there was no material to show knowledge was arrived at without discussion of the respondent's statements under Section 67 of the NDPS Act and circumstances relied upon by the prosecution, such as the respondent placing orders, controlling logistics, coordinating with the overseas supplier, and being present when the consignment was opened - Noted that High Court did not examine whether the circumstances, taken at face value, could prima facie indicate conscious control or involvement sufficient to attract the presumption of culpable mental state under Section 35 of the NDPS Act - Matter remitted to the High Court for fresh consideration of the prayer for bail, requiring a complete and fair appraisal of the rival contentions based on the material, and adhering to the parameters of Section 37. [Paras 15-22] Union of India v. Vigin K Varghese, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1101 : 2025 INSC 1316
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (NDPS Act) -Section 37 - Held, bail or suspension of sentence may be granted to a convict under the NDPS Act, despite Section 37's stringent conditions, if the convict has served a significant period of incarceration and the appeal is unlikely to be heard soon. The Court dismissed the Narcotics Control Bureau's appeal, upholding the High Court's order suspending a 10-year sentence after 4.5 years of imprisonment, emphasizing that prolonged denial of bail could violate Article 21 rights. No rigid rule requires a convict to serve half their sentence for bail or sentence suspension during an appeal's pendency. Appellate courts retain discretion to grant relief based on the case's merits, as a rigid approach in fixed-term sentence cases could result in convicts serving their entire sentence before the appeal is heard, infringing Article 21 rights. [Para 5 - 7] Narcotics Control Bureau v. Lakhwinder Singh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 191 : 2025 INSC 190
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (NDPS Act) - Section 37 - Mandatory Conditions for Bail - Release on bail for offences involving commercial quantity is the exception, and negation of bail is the rule – Held, the provisions of the NDPS Act must be interpreted literally and not liberally to prevent frustrating the object, purpose, and preamble of the Act - The issue of long incarceration or delay in trial (accused in custody for 1 year and 4 months and charges not framed) does not dispense with the mandatory requirement of Section 37 in a case involving a commercial quantity and prima facie evidence of organized drug trafficking - Since the accused was charged with offenses punishable with ten to twenty years rigorous imprisonment, it could not be said that the Respondent has been incarcerated for an unreasonably long time - An undertaking given by the accused's brother (a Sepoy in the Indian Army) to ensure compliance with bail conditions is of no relevance because the brother cannot be imprisoned if the accused absconds - Despite long custody and delayed framing of charges, the allegations are serious, as the recovery was much in excess of the commercial quantity and the accused allegedly got cavities ingeniously fabricated below the trailer to conceal the contraband - Appeal allowed. [Relied on Narcotics Control Bureau vs. Kashif (2024 SCC OnLine SC 3848; Paras 11-15] Union Of India V. Namdeo Ashruba Nakade, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1109
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (NDPS Act) -Sections 22 and 29 - Appeal against rejection of anticipatory bail - Allegation of recovery of 550 tablets of Tapentadol Hydrochloride from a vehicle – Tapentadol Hydrochloride is not included in the list of psychotropic substances under the NDPS Act – Accused was entitled to pre-arrest bail - Appeal allowed. (Para 7) Kulwant Singh v. State of Punjab, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 387
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (NDPS Act) - Sections 8(C), 21 and 29 - Respondent was arrested by the Narcotics Control Bureau (NCB) in a joint operation where 1280 grams of brown powder (allegedly heroin) was seized. Two samples sent for testing to the Central Revenues Control Laboratory (CRPL) returned negative for narcotic substances. Despite this, the NCB sought re-testing of a second set of samples, which also tested negative. The respondent was released after four months of confinement, and the NCB filed a closure report. The High Court, while adjudicating the bail application that had become infructuous, awarded Rs. 5,00,000/- as compensation for wrongful confinement. Held, the High Court overstepped its jurisdiction by awarding compensation in a bail application, especially since the bail application had become infructuous due to the respondent's release from custody. Re-testing of samples, despite the first negative report, was improper, but compensation claims should be pursued under appropriate legal avenues, not in bail proceedings. The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's order granting compensation, holding it to be beyond the scope of Section 439 CrPC. Appeal partly allowed; compensation order set aside. (Para 2 & 7) Union of India v. Man Singh Verma, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 265 : 2025 INSC 292
Non-supply of an application for cancellation of bail, which was filed after the detention order was passed and not pursued by the department, does not render the detention order illegal. (Para 12) Joyi Kitty Joseph v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 298 : (2025) 4 SCC 476
Personal Liberty – Bail Order – Clerical Omission – Compensation for Unlawful Detention – Held, Personal liberty is a valuable constitutional right and cannot be curtailed due to minor technical errors in court orders. The Supreme Court directed the State to pay Rs 5 lakh as interim compensation to a prisoner detained for 28 days due to a clerical omission in a bail order, emphasizing that personal liberty cannot be denied on "useless technicalities" or "irrelevant errors." The prisoner, arrested under Section 366 IPC and Sections 3/5(i) of the UP Prohibition of Unlawful Conversion of Religion Act, 2021, was not released despite a clear bail order due to the omission of a sub-section (Section 5 instead of 5(i)). The Court criticized the prison authorities for "nitpicking" on minor errors and failing to implement the bail order, terming it a "serious dereliction of duty." The bench ordered a judicial inquiry by the Principal District Judge, to investigate the reasons for the delay, including any "sinister" motives or gross negligence, and to ascertain if similar issues affect other prisoners. The Court rejected the State's defense relying on a High Court judgment, clarifying that the omission was clerical and the bail order's substance was clear. The Director General (Prisons) assured sensitization of prison officials to prevent recurrence, which was recorded in the order. The Court warned that compensation could be increased to Rs 10 lakh if such attitudes toward personal liberty persisted and directed compliance reporting by 27 June 2025. The State was ordered to pay provisional compensation of Rs 5 lakh, with further action to be determined based on the judicial inquiry report. The Court stressed the importance of adhering to the substance of judicial orders and ensuring no prisoner languishes due to similar technicalities. (Paras 13 - 16) Aftab v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 687
Post-Poll Violence - Cancellation of Bail Granted by High Court to Five Accused in a Case Involving Rioting, Vandalism, Assault, and Attempted Rape - Allegations of targeted violence against a supporter of an opposition party by accused linked to the ruling party - Impact on democratic principles and fair trial concerns - The Supreme Court found the allegations grave, terming the incident a “concerted attack” to exact vengeance on the complainant for supporting the opposition, constituting an assault on democratic foundations. The Court noted the accused's influence over local police, evidenced by the initial refusal to register the FIR, and the complainant's reasonable apprehension of their clout. Prima facie evidence established that the accused formed an unlawful assembly, vandalized and looted the complainant's house, and attempted sexual assault. The trial's delay since 2022 was attributed to the accused's non-cooperation, raising concerns about potential tampering with evidence or witness intimidation. The gravity of the offences and the risk of interference with a fair trial justified bail cancellation. The High Court's bail orders were set aside. The accused were directed to surrender within two weeks, failing which coercive measures would be initiated. The trial court was ordered to conclude the trial within six months, with any stay on proceedings vacated. The Home Secretary and DGP were directed to ensure protection for the complainant and key witnesses, with any lapses to be reported to the Supreme Court. The incident reflected a “vengeful attitude” to suppress opposition supporters, undermining democratic principles. The Court held that bail cancellation is warranted when allegations shock judicial conscience or threaten fair trial integrity, with local police inaction reinforcing the complainant's fears of the accused's influence. (Paras 13–17) Central Bureau of Investigation v. Sekh Jamir Hossain, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 651
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988; Section 7 - Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023; Section 61(2) - Demand and Acceptance of Bribe - Denial of Anticipatory Bail – The petitioner, an audit inspector, was alleged to have demanded illegal gratification for conducting an audit. Co-accused was apprehended red-handed while accepting the bribe, and there was an audio recording corroborating the demand. Held, the High Court rightly denied anticipatory bail. Anticipatory bail in corruption cases should be granted only in exceptional circumstances, such as false implication or politically motivated allegations. The Court reiterated that mere demand or solicitation of a bribe constitutes an offense under Section 7 of the Act. The Court emphasized the severity of corruption and the need to uphold public justice, stating that liberty should be denied to accused persons to ensure a corruption-free society. (Para 12, 21 & 24) Devinder Kumar Bansal v. State of Punjab, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 291 : 2025 INSC 320 : (2025) 4 SCC 493
Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (PMLA); Section 44 - Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023; Section 218 / Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Section 197 - Bail – Cognizance - Sanction under CrPC s. 197 - Liquor Scam - The appellant was arrested pursuant to a complaint filed by the Enforcement Directorate (ED) under Section 44 of the PMLA, in connection with the alleged liquor scam. The Special Court took cognizance of the offence, however, the High Court quashed the cognizance order, holding that it was taken without obtaining the requisite sanction under Section 197 of the CrPC. The High Court's order remains unchallenged, leaving no valid cognizance order in force. The appellant has been in custody for approximately one year. The appellant sought bail before the Supreme Court, relying on the quashing of the cognizance order and the principles in V. Senthil Balaji v. Deputy Director, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 750. In a parallel matter, co-accused was granted bail by the Supreme Court under similar circumstances, with the Court criticizing the ED for continued detention absent a valid cognizance order. Whether the appellant is entitled to bail in the absence of a valid order taking cognizance under PMLA, following its quashing for want of sanction, and considering prolonged incarceration. Held: - Bail granted, subject to stringent conditions. The Central Government directed to expeditiously designate a Sessions Judge as presiding officer of the Special PMLA Court in Raipur under Section 43(1) PMLA, in consultation with the Chief Justice of the High Court. The Court applied the twin conditions under Section 45 PMLA but emphasized the V. Senthil Balaji principles, which favor bail where: (i) no cognizance order exists; (ii) the accused has undergone substantial pre-trial detention (here, 1 year); (iii) the trial involves 20 co-accused requiring separate hearings on charges; and (iv) over 30 prosecution witnesses are cited, with a maximum sentence of 7 years. The ED's opposition, citing the appellant's influence and risk of tampering, was countered by the imposition of rigorous bail terms. The Court noted the vacancy in the Special PMLA Court and directed interim bail formalities before the Principal District and Sessions Judge, with liberty to the ED to seek cancellation for non-cooperation. The judgment underscores that detention without a valid cognizance order is impermissible, directing the ED to ensure procedural compliance for future cognizance. Anil Tuteja v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 486
Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (PMLA); Section 44 - Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023; Section 218 / Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Section 197 - Bail – Cognizance - Sanction under CrPC s. 197 - Liquor Scam - The appellant was arrested pursuant to a complaint filed by the Enforcement Directorate (ED) under Section 44 of the PMLA, in connection with the alleged liquor scam. The Special Court took cognizance of the offence, however, the High Court quashed the cognizance order, holding that it was taken without obtaining the requisite sanction under Section 197 of the CrPC. The High Court's order remains unchallenged, leaving no valid cognizance order in force. The appellant has been in custody for approximately one year. The appellant sought bail before the Supreme Court, relying on the quashing of the cognizance order and the principles in V. Senthil Balaji v. Deputy Director, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 750. In a parallel matter, co-accused was granted bail by the Supreme Court under similar circumstances, with the Court criticizing the ED for continued detention absent a valid cognizance order. Whether the appellant is entitled to bail in the absence of a valid order taking cognizance under PMLA, following its quashing for want of sanction, and considering prolonged incarceration. Held: - Bail granted, subject to stringent conditions. The Central Government directed to expeditiously designate a Sessions Judge as presiding officer of the Special PMLA Court in Raipur under Section 43(1) PMLA, in consultation with the Chief Justice of the High Court. The Court applied the twin conditions under Section 45 PMLA but emphasized the V. Senthil Balaji principles, which favor bail where: (i) no cognizance order exists; (ii) the accused has undergone substantial pre-trial detention (here, 1 year); (iii) the trial involves 20 co-accused requiring separate hearings on charges; and (iv) over 30 prosecution witnesses are cited, with a maximum sentence of 7 years. The ED's opposition, citing the appellant's influence and risk of tampering, was countered by the imposition of rigorous bail terms. The Court noted the vacancy in the Special PMLA Court and directed interim bail formalities before the Principal District and Sessions Judge, with liberty to the ED to seek cancellation for non-cooperation. The judgment underscores that detention without a valid cognizance order is impermissible, directing the ED to ensure procedural compliance for future cognizance. Anil Tuteja v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 486
Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002 (PMLA) – Section 45(1)(ii) – Regular Bail – Prolonged Incarceration – Article 21 of the Constitution of India - Supreme Court allowed the appeal for regular bail to the Appellant, Mahesh Joshi, former Minister of Public Health and Engineering Department (PHED), Government of Rajasthan, in a case registered by the Directorate of Enforcement under the PMLA – Held, Constitutional Courts must intervene to safeguard the right to personal liberty under Article 21 where a trial cannot be reasonably concluded and incarceration becomes prolonged - Section 45(1)(ii) of the PMLA cannot be interpreted to justify indefinite detention, especially in cases with voluminous, document-heavy material where the trial is unlikely to begin promptly - The extraordinary powers to grant bail on the grounds of violation of Part III of the Constitution, notwithstanding statutory provisions like Section, can be exercised by the Constitutional Courts (under Article 32 or Article 226) if they conclude there is no possibility of a trial concluding in a reasonable time - Appellant had remained in custody for over seven months - Noted that case record is entirely documentary, involving 66 witnesses, 184 documents, and more than 14,600 pages, and the proceedings are still at the stage of supply of copy of the police report and other documents under Section 207, CrPC - These circumstances indicate that the commencement of the trial is not imminent and the trial itself is not likely to conclude in the near future, requiring closer scrutiny in light of constitutional considerations - Directed the appellant to be released on bail - Appeal allowed. [Relied on V. Senthil Balaji v. Deputy Director, Directorate of Enforcement 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2626; Paras 13-18] Sh Mahesh Joshi v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1166 : 2025 INSC 1377
Preventive detention should not be used merely to circumvent bail granted by a competent court when the ordinary criminal law is sufficient to address the situation. (Para 21) Joyi Kitty Joseph v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 298 : (2025) 4 SCC 476
Rule to list bail pleas from same fir before same bench won't apply if judge's roster changes. Shekhar Prasad Mahto v. Registrar General Jharkhand High Court, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 188
Section 15A(3) - Notice to victim before bail application - Cancellation of bail - Respondent No. 2-Superintendent of women protection home was accused for immoral trafficking, sexual exploitation and assault of inmates by administering intoxicating medicines - High Court allowed bail application filed by Respondent No. 2 – Held, Supreme Court cancelled bail application of Respondent No. 2 citing that that allegations against Respondent No. 2 shake the conscience of the Court as she is the officer-in-charge turned “rogue” and sexually exploited helpless women - Releasing Respondent No. 2 on bail would adversely affect the trial due to the imminent possibility of witness intimidation - Supreme Court reiterated that courts must consider factors like the gravity of the offence, the role of the accused, the probability of witness tampering and the likelihood of obstructing proceedings when granting bail in serious offenses - Supreme Court expressed disappointment regarding reinstatement in service of Respondent No. 2, which shows her influence with the administration - Order granting bail could be quashed merely on ground of non-compliance with section 15A(3) of SC/ST Act, citing appellant-victim was not impleaded depriving her of the right to be heard - Set aside order passed by High Court - Appeal allowed. [Paras 12, 13, 20-25] X v. State of Bihar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 733 : 2025 INSC 877
Section 161 Cr.P.C. - Statements of an accused recorded under Section 161 of the Cr.P.C. cannot be used against a co-accused at the stage of anticipatory or regular bail. Such statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, are subject to the provisions of the Evidence Act, 1872, and lack evidentiary value against co-accused at the bail stage. (Para 50, 53) P. Krishna Mohan Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 598 : 2025 INSC 725
Section 173 Cr.P.C. - Anticipatory Bail – Investigation was completed and the charge sheet was filed - Investigating Officer did not arrest the petitioner during the investigation phase, and the Court had issued summons for the petitioner's appearance. The Court expressed disapproval of the practice in Uttar Pradesh where arrests are made post-charge sheet filing and cognizance by the Court, deeming it illogical. The Court held that once the investigation is complete and the charge sheet is filed, the accused should appear before the trial court and furnish bail. Musheer Alam v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 83
Section 19, 45 - The Supreme Court in Pankaj Bansal v. Union of India, (2024) 7 SCC 576 interpreting Article 22(1) of the Constitution of India and Section 19 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (PMLA), held that the requirement to inform an arrested person of the grounds of arrest is a fundamental right and must be meaningfully fulfilled to serve its constitutional and statutory purpose. The Court emphasized two key aspects of Section 19(1): (1) the authorized officer must record in writing the reasons for believing the arrestee is guilty of an offence under the PMLA, and (2) the arrestee must be informed of these grounds as soon as possible. The Court clarified that providing written grounds of arrest to the arrestee is essential to avoid disputes over compliance and to enable the arrestee to seek legal counsel and challenge the arrest under Section 45 of the PMLA for bail. Failure to furnish written grounds could lead to immediate release, as seen in V. Senthil Balaji v. State, (2024) 3 SCC 51. The Court further noted that oral communication or mere reading of voluminous grounds is insufficient, as it does not allow the arrestee, often in a distressed state, to effectively comprehend or recall the grounds for pursuing legal remedies, thereby rendering the constitutional protection under Article 22(1) and statutory mandate under Section 19(1) ineffective. (Para 10) Vihaan Kumar v. State of Haryana, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 169 : 2025 INSC 162 : AIR 2025 SC 1388 : (2025) 5 SCC 799
Section 19 - Arrest under Special Acts – Judicial Review – Safeguards and Standards - In Vijay Madanlal Choudhary v. Union of India, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 929, held that arrests under the PMLA are subject to stringent safeguards under Section 19, ensuring accountability and preventing arbitrary actions by authorized officers. The officer must have material-based "reasons to believe" the person is guilty of money laundering, and the arrestee must be informed of the grounds of arrest promptly. Courts, when reviewing such arrests under special statutes like PMLA, UAPA, Customs Act, GST Acts, etc., should exercise judicial review sparingly, limiting scrutiny to compliance with statutory and constitutional safeguards, such as the officer's authorization, existence of material supporting the belief, and communication of arrest grounds. The sufficiency or adequacy of material forming the basis of the officer's belief is not subject to judicial review, as such arrests occur at a nascent stage of investigation. The scope of judicial review varies by case context, and parameters applicable to service-related cases do not extend to arrests under special statutes. Arrests under such Acts serve investigative purposes, including securing information, preventing interference, and maintaining law and order, as noted in Adri Dharan Das v. State of W.B., (2005) 4 SCC 303. Special Acts like PMLA aim to protect financial systems and national sovereignty, necessitating cautious judicial interference to avoid frustrating their objectives. Courts should avoid magnifying minor procedural lapses, as frequent interference may embolden offenders and undermine societal and national interests, particularly given the complex nature of modern crimes facilitated by technological advancements. (Para 9 -12) Radhika Agarwal v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 255 : 2025 INSC 272 : (2025) 6 SCC 545
Section 35 BNSS (Section 41A CrPC) - Service of notice - Electronic Communication - Safeguarding Liberty - Distinction between investigation and Judicial proceedings - Supreme Court dismissed an application seeking modification of its previous order and affirmed that notices issued by the Investigating Agency under Section 35 of BNSS, 2023, cannot be served through electronic communication such as WhatsApp – Held, Police summons under Section 35 BNSS can't be served electronically - The legislative intent of BNSS, 2023 consciously excludes investigations from procedures permissible through electronic means where an individual's liberty is at stake - BNSS, 2023 while recognizing electronic communication in certain contexts (like court summons, production of documents and forwarding investigation reports to magistrates), consciously omits electronic service for notices under section 35 - Non-compliance with a section 35 notice can lead to arrest, thus affecting personal liberty - Section 35(6) seeks to secure Article 21 from encroachment - Hence, service of such notices must be carried out in a manner that protects fundamental right - Application dismissed. [Paras 24-30, 42-43] Satinder Kumar Antil v. Central Bureau of Investigation, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 751 : 2025 INSC 909
Section 35 BNSS - Distinction between Court Summons and Investigating Agency Notices - Supreme Court distinguished between summons issued by a Court (under sections 63, 64 and 71 of BNSS, 2023) and notices issued by the Investigating Agency (under Section 35 of BNSS, 2023) – Held, Sections 63 & 64 allow for electronic service of court summons, particularly when they bear the image of the court's seal and Section 71 explicitly permits electronic service for summons to witnesses - non-compliance of a witness summons under Section 71 has no immediate bearing on the liberty of an individual - A notice under section 35, issued by the Investigating Agency, is an executive act, whereas a court summons is a judicial act - The procedure for a judicial act cannot be read into an executive act. [Paras 38, 39] Satinder Kumar Antil v. Central Bureau of Investigation, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 751 : 2025 INSC 909
Section 35 BNSS - The Supreme Court has directed that police should not serve notice for appearance to the accused/suspect as per Section 41A of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Section 35 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita) through WhatsApp or other electronic modes. The Court made it amply clear that the service of notice through WhatsApp or other electronic modes cannot be considered or recognised as an alternative or substitute to the mode of service recognised and prescribed under the CrPC, 1973/BNSS, 2023. The Court also directed that notices under Section 160 of CrPC/Section 179 of BNSS, 2023 and Section 175 of CrPC/Section 195 of BNSS to the accused persons or otherwise can be issued only through the mode of service as prescribed under the CrPC/BNSS. Satender Kumar Antil v. CBI, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 112
Section 389 Cr.P.C. - Suspension of Sentence and Bail - Supreme Court expressed dismay at an order passed by the Madhya Pradesh High Court which suspended the sentences of two murder convicts on the condition to plant 10 saplings each as a matter of social cause - Held that Order did not disclose any reason whatsoever as to the basis on which the bail had been granted - Noted that the High Court imposed a condition that the accused persons, convicted under Section 302 IPC, must "carry out plantation of saplings on the premise that it would serve social cause" - The Supreme Court expressed dismay and surprise, noting that the High Court seemed "to have got swayed to grant the prayer for suspension of sentence and grant of bail on the basis they (accused persons) would purge in their misdeeds" - Held that granting bail based on this condition, without considering the merits of the suspension of sentence, could not stand the test of law - Appeal allowed. [Paras 5, 6] Surajpal Singh Jadon v. Prashant Sikarwar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1049
Section 41 Cr.P.C. - Arrest of the Accused - Identification evidence, particularly dock identification, must be scrutinized rigorously, especially in night-time incidents. (Para 22 & 23) Wahid v. State Govt. of Nct of Delhi, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 154 : 2025 INSC 145 : AIR 2025 SC 1087 : (2025) 3 SCC 341
Section 41 Cr.P.C. - Evidence Act, 1872 - Section 9 - Arrest of the Accused - Test Identification Parade - Evidentiary Value - Nonexamination of Witness in Trial – Held, a Test Identification Parade (TIP) loses its evidentiary value for identification purposes if the witness who identified the accused during the TIP is not examined in court. Without the witness's testimony and cross-examination, the TIP report, which may corroborate or contradict the identification, becomes irrelevant, as there is a risk of the witness being tutored or exposed to the accused before the TIP. In this case, the appellant, convicted of dacoity and Arms Act offences by the trial court and High Court, was acquitted due to the non-examination of the three witnesses who identified him during the TIP. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the conviction, and granted the appellant the benefit of doubt. (Paras 14, 15) Vinod @ Nasmulla v. State of Chhattisgarh, 14 Feb 2025 [Evidence] 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 215 : 2025 INSC 220 : AIR 2025 SC 1194 : 2025 Cri LJ 1237 : (2025) 4 SCC 312
Section 41 Cr.P.C. - Penal Code, 1860; Sections 392, 397 and 411 - Arms Act, 1959; Section 25 – Arrest of the Accused - Robbery - Recovery of Weapons - In cases of robbery by unknown persons, where the accused are not known to witnesses, meticulous examination of evidence is crucial. Courts must scrutinize: (a) how the investigating agency identified the accused; (b) the manner of arrest; (c) the identification process; and (d) the discovery/recovery of looted articles. Mere proof of robbery is insufficient; credible evidence linking the specific accused to the crime is essential. (Para 13 & 14) Wahid v. State Govt. of Nct of Delhi, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 154 : 2025 INSC 145 : AIR 2025 SC 1087 : (2025) 3 SCC 341
Section 41 Cr.P.C. - The Supreme Court has directed that police should not serve notice for appearance to the accused/suspect as per Section 41A of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Section 35 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita) through WhatsApp or other electronic modes. The Court made it amply clear that the service of notice through WhatsApp or other electronic modes cannot be considered or recognised as an alternative or substitute to the mode of service recognised and prescribed under the CrPC, 1973/BNSS, 2023. The Court also directed that notices under Section 160 of CrPC/Section 179 of BNSS, 2023 and Section 175 of CrPC/Section 195 of BNSS to the accused persons or otherwise can be issued only through the mode of service as prescribed under the CrPC/BNSS. Satender Kumar Antil v. CBI, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 112
Section 437, 438 Cr.P.C. - Grant of Regular Bail or Anticipatory Bail on undertaking to deposit amount - Cancellation of Bail – Held, a practice has emerged where High Courts and Trial Courts grant regular bail or anticipatory bail subject to the accused depositing a certain amount, often based on an undertaking or affidavit filed by the accused - Accused persons frequently renege on such undertakings after obtaining bail, which amounts to making a mockery of justice and abusing the process of law - Directed that Trial Courts and High Courts shall not grant regular bail or anticipatory bail based on an undertaking that the accused or their family members might finish to deposit a particular amount - The plea for bail must be decided strictly on the merits of the case and in accordance with law - This practice must be stopped as litigants are taking the courts “for a ride” and undermining the dignity and honour of the Court - In case if High Court intends to release an appellant on bail with a deposit condition, it should have first asked for the deposit within a specific period and only upon such deposit, the appellant could have released - Bail shouldn't be granted solely based on any undertaking given by accused - Appeal dismissed. [Paras 15- 27] Gajanan Dattatray Gore v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 756 : 2025 INSC 913
Section 437 (6) Cr.P.C. - In the present case, involving economic offences (cryptocurrency-related cheating), the Court granted bail to the accused, in custody since December 2023, noting only one of 189 witnesses had been examined. The Court imposed a condition to deposit Rs. 35 lakh within six months, failing which bail would be automatically cancelled. Held, Applications under S.437(6) CrPC / S.480(6) BNSS should be approached liberally, particularly where there is no risk of evidence tampering, no fault of the accused in delaying the trial, no likelihood of absconding, and the trial is unlikely to conclude soon. The Court allowed the appeal, granting bail subject to conditions, emphasizing the protection of individual liberty under the Constitution. (Para 22, 23) Subhelal @ Sushil Sahu v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 223 : 2025 INSC 242: AIR 2025 SC 1483 : (2025) 5 SCC 140
Section 437 (6) Cr.P.C. - Liberal approach to bail when magistrate trial not concluded within 60 days - The Court outlined illustrative factors for deciding such applications: 1. Whether delay in trial is attributable to the accused. 2. Likelihood of evidence tampering or prejudice to prosecution. 3. Risk of the accused absconding. 4. Whether the accused was in custody for the entire period. Additional considerations include the nature of the offence, expected trial duration, volume of evidence, number of witnesses, court workload, and number of co-accused. (Para 12, 13, 17) Subhelal @ Sushil Sahu v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 223 : 2025 INSC 242 : AIR 2025 SC 1483 : (2025) 5 SCC 140
Section 437 (6) Cr.P.C. - Liberal approach to bail when magistrate trial not concluded within 60 days - The provision recognizes the accused's right to a speedy trial while balancing the Magistrate's discretion to refuse bail with recorded reasons. Normal bail parameters remain relevant but are applied with less rigour compared to regular bail applications. (Para 10, 17) Subhelal @ Sushil Sahu v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 223 : 2025 INSC 242 : AIR 2025 SC 1483 : (2025) 5 SCC 140
Section 437 (6) Cr.P.C. - Liberal approach to bail when magistrate trial not concluded within 60 days - The Supreme Court emphasized a liberal approach to bail applications under Section 437(6) of CrPC (corresponding to Section 480(6) of BNSS) when a trial before a Magistrate is not concluded within 60 days from the first date fixed for prosecution evidence, provided there is no risk of evidence tampering, absconding, or delay caused by the accused. (Para 17, 18) Subhelal @ Sushil Sahu v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 223 : 2025 INSC 242 : AIR 2025 SC 1483 : (2025) 5 SCC 140
Section 437 and 439 Cr.P.C. - Foreigners Act, 1946 - Whether a Foreign Registration Officer or Civil Authority must be impleaded in bail applications filed by foreigners under the Foreigners Act, 1946. The Court held that it is not necessary to implead such authorities in bail applications, as they have no locus to oppose bail unless the offence falls under Section 14 of the Foreigners Act. However, the Court directed that upon granting bail to a foreign national, the prosecuting agency or State must immediately inform the concerned Registration Officer, who will then notify the Civil Authority. This ensures compliance with the Foreigners Order, 1948, and allows authorities to take appropriate legal steps. The Court emphasized that this process avoids unnecessary delays in bail proceedings while safeguarding the interests of the State. Frank Vitus v. Narcotics Control Bureau, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 23 : 2025 INSC 30 : AIR 2025 SC 546 : (2025) 3 SCC 1
Section 438 Cr.P.C. – Anticipatory Bail – Ad Interim Relief – Legal Implications - The High Court granted interim protection with a condition that the accused join the investigation. Whether the nature of ad interim relief granted by the High Court amounted to the grant of final relief in anticipatory bail. The legality of directing the accused to join the investigation with an assurance of no arrest. Held, an ad interim order in anticipatory bail matters should not result in granting final relief, as it may hamper the investigation process and affect the prosecution's case. Courts must exercise caution and judicious discretion while granting such relief. Appeals Disposed of. Deepak Aggarwal v. Balwan Singh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 68
Section 438 Cr.P.C. - Anticipatory Bail - High Court allowed pre-arrest bail to Respondent 2 in FIR registered under Sections 498A, 323, 313, 506, 307 and 34 of IPC r/w Sections 3 & 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 – Held, condition imposed by High Court while granting bail to accused (resumption of conjugal life and maintenance with dignity and honour) is “beset with risk” and ought not to have been imposed - Pre-arrest bail deserved to be granted within the settled parameters and only conditions traceable to Section 438(2) of CrPC could be imposed. [Paras 4-8] Anil Kumar v. State of Jharkhand, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 762
Section 438 Cr.P.C. – Anticipatory Bail – Matrimonial Dispute - Imposition of Maintenance Condition – The appellant challenged the High Court's order granting him anticipatory bail with a condition to pay maintenance of ₹4,000 per month to his wife. Held, conditions imposed while granting anticipatory bail should be relevant to ensuring the accused's presence at trial and not extend to issues unrelated to bail considerations, such as maintenance obligations. The Court quashed the condition of maintenance imposed by the High Court, emphasizing that irrelevant conditions should not be attached to bail orders. Appeal allowed. Condition of maintenance quashed. Srikant Kumar @ Shrikant Kumar v. State of Bihar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 67
Section 438 Cr.P.C. - Anticipatory Bail - Political bias or vendetta alone is insufficient to grant anticipatory bail. Courts must assess whether allegations are frivolous or baseless, supported by prima facie evidence, before considering political vendetta as a factor. (Para 27) P. Krishna Mohan Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 598 : 2025 INSC 725
Section 438 Cr.P.C. - Bail and Anticipatory bail Applications – Held, while considering anticipatory bail, the Court must balance the liberty of individuals against the legitimate requirements of investigation - The gravity of allegations, abuse of official position, and non-cooperation with investigation can outweigh the ground of long delay in initiation of proceedings - Affecting personal liberty, particularly bail and anticipatory bail, should not be kept pending indefinitely - Bail courts must be sensitive to constitutional ethos and ensure expeditious disposal of such matters - An inordinate delay in passing an order related to a citizen's liberty is not in tune with the constitutional mandate under Article 21 - The allegations, including the abuse of official position and the appellants' failure to cooperate with the investigation despite a long period of interim protection, justified the denial of pre-arrest bail - The cancellation of the mutation entries did not efface the appellants' alleged initial role in certifying them - Supreme Court made strong observations on the inordinate delay by the High Court in disposing of the applications and underscored the importance of the expeditious disposal of bail and anticipatory bail applications and reiterated guidelines from Satendra Kumar Antil Case - Such applications should be disposed of within a stipulated time frame - Directed to dispose bail applications within 2 months - Appeals dismissed. [Paras 16-18] Anna Waman Bhalerao v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 901 : 2025 INSC 1114
Section 438 Cr.P.C. - Bail and Anticipatory bail Applications – Supreme Court passed following directions - i. High Courts shall ensure that applications for bail and anticipatory bail pending before them or before subordinate courts under their jurisdiction are disposed of expeditiously, preferably within a period of 2 months from date of filing; ii. High Court shall issue necessary administrative directions to subordinate courts prioritise matters involving personal liberty and to avoid indefinite adjournments; iii. Investigating agencies are expected to conclude investigations in long pending cases with promptitude so that neither the complainant nor the accused suffers prejudice on account of undue delay; iv. Being the highest constitutional for a in the States, High Courts must devise suitable mechanisms and procedures to avoid accumulation of pending bail/anticipatory bail applications and ensure that the liberty of citizens is not left in abeyance. [Paras 18] Anna Waman Bhalerao v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 901 : 2025 INSC 1114
Section 438 Cr.P.C. - Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023; Section 61(2) - Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988; Section 7 - Demand and Acceptance of Bribe - Denial of Anticipatory Bail – The petitioner, an audit inspector, was alleged to have demanded illegal gratification for conducting an audit. Co-accused was apprehended red-handed while accepting the bribe, and there was an audio recording corroborating the demand. Held, the High Court rightly denied anticipatory bail. Anticipatory bail in corruption cases should be granted only in exceptional circumstances, such as false implication or politically motivated allegations. The Court reiterated that mere demand or solicitation of a bribe constitutes an offense under Section 7 of the Act. The Court emphasized the severity of corruption and the need to uphold public justice, stating that liberty should be denied to accused persons to ensure a corruption-free society. (Para 12, 21 & 24) Devinder Kumar Bansal v. State of Punjab, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 291 : 2025 INSC 320 : (2025) 4 SCC 493
Section 439 Cr.P.C. - Anticipatory Bail - Interim protection made absolute - Supreme Court previously granted protection from arrest to the appellant, on condition that he join the investigation - State-respondent filed a counter affidavit, admitting that the appellant's implication was based on a confessional statement from a co-accused but alleging that appellant had not cooperated with investigation by claiming he threw his mobile phone into a river – Held, no grounds to support the allegations of non-cooperation, stating that merely because nothing incriminating was discovered does not mean the accused failed to cooperate - State's affidavit did not mention any efforts to trace the appellant's phone or collect call detail records - Appellant had been granted similar protection in a prior case, deemed it appropriate to make the interim anticipatory bail order absolute, subject to appellant cooperating with the investigation and furnishing bail bonds before Trial Court. Jugraj Singh v. State of Punjab, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 837
Section 439 Cr.P.C. - Anticipatory Bail - Supreme Court cautioned High Courts against directly entertaining anticipatory bail applications, stressing that litigants should ordinarily be directed to first approach the Sessions Court before invoking the High Court's concurrent jurisdiction - Held that this approach balances the interests of all the stakeholders, first by giving the aggrieved party a round of challenge before High Court, and this approach provides the High Court an opportunity to assess the judicial perspective so applied by the Sessions Court, in concurrent jurisdiction, instead of independently applying its mind from the first go - The High Court erred in granting anticipatory bail without valid reasons, ignoring aggravating factors including broad daylight contract killing and history of tense relations - Set aside bail order. [Paras 5-10] Jagdeo Prasad v. State of Bihar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 965
Section 439 Cr.P.C. - Bail Applications - Criminal Antecedents - disclosure by accused - Supreme Court suggested that all High Courts should consider incorporating a rule similar to Rule 5 of Chapter 1-A(b) Volume-V of the Punjab and Haryana High Court Rules, which mandates that petitioners in bail applications disclose their involvement in any other criminal cases previously registered and any similar bail applications made and result thereon - This would impose an obligation on the accused to make such disclosures. Appeal allowed. [Paras 22-24] Kaushal Singh v. State of Rajasthan, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 724 : 2025 INSC 871
Section 439 Cr.P.C. - Bail Applications - Strictures against Judicial Officer - Supreme Court expunged strictures issued passed by High Court against a judicial officer who had granted bail to an accused - Supreme Court reiterated that High Courts ordinarily refrain from passing strictures against judicial officers while deciding matters on judicial side - Adverse comments on the personal conduct and Caliber of a judicial officer should be avoided, especially without providing an opportunity to be heard. [Relied on Re: 'K', A Judicial Officer (2001) 3 SCC 54; Sonu Agnihotri v. Chandra Shekhar & Ors. 2024 SCC Online SC 3382; Paras 18-21] Kaushal Singh v. State of Rajasthan, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 724 : 2025 INSC 871
Section 439 Cr.P.C. – Bail - Cancellation of bail - Annulment of bail – Principles - Held, considerations for granting bail and for its cancellation are not identical - Granting bail involves a preventive evaluation of the likelihood of misuse of liberty, the cancellation of bail entails a review of the prior decision - Cancellation can be due to supervening circumstances or if the original order was legally flawed - A bail order can be set aside even in the absence of subsequent misconduct if it is found to be perverse, unjustified or legally untenable - An order granting bail can be annulled in an appeal if it is perverse, unjustified or passed in violation of settled legal principles - An order can be considered perverse if it is founded on irrelevant considerations or a non-consideration of material facts - Cancellation of bail is a serious matter involving deprivation of personal liberty - Set aside order of High Court - Appeals allowed. [Paras 16, 17, 18, 19, 22] State of Karnataka v. Sri Darshan, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 801 : 2025 INSC 979
Section 439 Cr.P.C. - Bail - Cancellation of - Factors - When considering bail in serious criminal offences, courts must consider factors such as the nature of accusations, gravity of the offence, role of the accused, criminal antecedents, probability of witness tampering, and likelihood of the accused being available for trial. Bail once granted should not be cancelled mechanically, but an unreasoned or perverse bail order is open to interference. Supervening circumstances, post-bail conduct, attempts to delay trial, threats to witnesses, or tampering with evidence are grounds for setting aside bail. Courts must avoid detailed reasons that may prejudice the accused, focusing on prima facie considerations. (Para 15) Shabeen Ahmed v. State of U.P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 278 : 2025 INSC 307 : (2025) 4 SCC 172
Section 439 Cr.P.C. - Bail - Compensation for wrongful confinement - Whether the High Court, while adjudicating a bail application under Section 439 CrPC, had the jurisdiction to grant compensation for alleged wrongful confinement - Held, jurisdiction of a court under Section 439 CrPC is confined to granting or refusing bail and does not extend to awarding compensation. While compensation can be granted for violation of fundamental rights under Article 32, this does not extend to bail proceedings under Section 439 CrPC. Compensation for wrongful detention should be sought through remedies under constitutional provisions or civil suits, not under bail jurisdiction. The High Court erred in awarding compensation in a bail proceeding, as such power is not vested under Section 439 CrPC. (Para 7 & 9) Union of India v. Man Singh Verma, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 265 : 2025 INSC 292
Section 439 Cr.P.C. - Bail - Parameters for granting and setting aside bail –The Supreme Court allowed the State's appeals, setting aside the High Court's order granting bail to the accused in a case involving alleged compromise of a public recruitment examination. The Court distinguished between setting aside an order of bail and cancellation of bail, emphasizing that setting aside challenges the legality of the grant order itself, while cancellation addresses misuse of bail or supervening circumstances. The Court reiterated that while granting bail, factors like the nature of the offense, severity of punishment, and prima facie involvement of the accused are crucial. The Court stressed the importance of maintaining the sanctity of public examinations and the impact of such offenses on society's faith in public administration. The High Court erred in granting bail based on factors like lack of criminal antecedents and period of custody, without adequately considering the gravity of the offense and its societal implications. The Court directed the accused to surrender and clarified that its observations were limited to the bail matter and should not be construed as remarks on the merits of the case. The court allowed the accused to reapply for bail before the trial court after the examination of material witnesses. (Para 8, 11 & 14) State of Rajasthan v. Indraj Singh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 300 : 2025 INSC 341
Section 439 Cr.P.C. - Cancellation of bail - Whether High Court can entertain a second application for cancellation of bail after rejection by the Sessions Judge – Held, there is no bar on the High Court exercising inherent powers under Section 482 r/w. 439(2) CrPC to entertain such application, even if one was rejected by the Sessions Judge - No restriction arises if the application is moved under the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court. [Para 14, 15] Abhimanue v. State of Kerala, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 929 : 2025 INSC 1136
Section 439 Cr.P.C. - Constitution of India, 1950; Article 20(3), Article 21 - Evidence Act, 1872; Section 27 – Narco-Analysis Test - Right to Voluntary Narco-Analysis - Prohibition on Involuntary Tests - Evidentiary Value - An accused may voluntarily undergo a narco-analysis test during the evidence stage of a trial, subject to court approval, free consent, and appropriate safeguards. However, this right is not absolute. Involuntary narco-analysis tests violate Articles 20(3) and 21, as held in Selvi v. State of Karnataka (2010), and their reports or derived information are inadmissible as evidence. Information obtained from a voluntary test may be admissible under Section 27 of the Evidence Act, but a report alone cannot sustain a conviction without corroborative evidence. The High Court erred in permitting narco-analysis tests during a bail hearing in a dowry death case, as bail decisions should focus on the nature of allegations, custody duration, and offense, not investigative methods. Courts must assess consent and safeguards before authorizing voluntary tests. The impugned order was set aside, reinforcing constitutional protections and procedural propriety. (Paras 8, 11, 12, 15, 20 & 21) Amlesh Kumar v. State of Bihar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 674 : 2025 INSC 810 : AIR 2025 SC 2753
Section 439 Cr.P.C. - Control of Organized Crime Act, 1999 (Maharashtra); Section 21(4) - Whether the High Court, while considering a bail application, transgressed into impermissible areas by making findings on the merits of the case, especially in light of the stringent conditions for bail under Section 21(4) of MCOCA. Whether the High Court failed to consider the rigors of MCOCA while granting bail to the accused. Held, the High Court had made observations akin to findings on the merits of the case, such as concluding that the accused had no direct or indirect contact with the gang leader (accused No. 4) and that they played no role in the shooting. Such findings are impermissible at the bail stage, as they could prejudice the trial. The High Court failed to adequately consider the stringent conditions for bail under MCOCA, particularly Section 21(4), which imposes specific requirements for granting bail in cases involving organized crime. Jayshree Kanabar v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 10 : 2025 INSC 13 : (2025) 2 SCC 797
Section 439 Cr.P.C. - Distinction between Cancellation and Revocation of Bail – Held, cancellation of bail is distinct from revocation of an order granting bail - Bail may be cancelled when the accused violates any of the conditions imposed - an order granting bail can be revoked if such an order is found to be perverse or illegal. [Para 17] Abhimanue v. State of Kerala, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 929 : 2025 INSC 1136
Section 439 Cr.P.C. - Penal Code, 1860; Sections 498A and 304B - Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961; Sections 3 and 4 - Dowry Death - A young woman died within two years of marriage with multiple ante-mortem injuries and evidence of dowry demands - Supreme Court cancelled the bail granted to the father-in-law and mother-in-law, citing their principal role in pressurizing the deceased. However, the bail granted to the sistersin-law, whose role appeared less direct and who had personal and educational circumstances warranting leniency, was upheld. The Court emphasized that the trial court should proceed uninfluenced by the observations made in the judgment and conclude the trial expeditiously. (Para 16 - 21) Shabeen Ahmed v. State of U.P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 278 : 2025 INSC 307 : (2025) 4 SCC 172
Section 439 Cr.P.C. - Penal Code, 1860; Sections 498A and 304B - Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961; Sections 3 and 4 - Dowry Death - Cancellation of Bail - Stringent Judicial Scrutiny Required - Granting bail in dowry death cases despite evidence of direct involvement shakes public confidence in judiciary. In cases of alleged dowry death, particularly where the death occurs within seven years of marriage and exhibits signs of severe physical violence and persistent dowry demands, stricter judicial scrutiny is imperative. Courts must be mindful of the broader societal impact and public confidence in the criminal justice system. Where evidence indicates direct involvement in fatal events, including persistent dowry demands and physical cruelty, bail should be cancelled to ensure a fair and unimpeded trial. The gravity of the offence necessitates a cautious approach, preventing the normalization of such heinous crimes. (Para 15) Shabeen Ahmed v. State of U.P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 278 : 2025 INSC 307 : (2025) 4 SCC 172
Section 439 Cr.P.C. - Role of Criminal antecedents – Held, mere criminal antecedents are not sufficient ground for denial or cancellation of bail absent other incriminating circumstances - antecedents may be a consideration but not sole ground to cancel bail, if the accused has long incarceration or satisfies other conditions for bail - Set aside order by High Court and restored bail to appellants - Appeal allowed. [Para 23] Abhimanue v. State of Kerala, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 929 : 2025 INSC 1136
Section 439 Cr.PC- Legal Maxims & Judicial Precedents – Finality of Judicial Verdicts – Judicial Discipline- Bail Cancellation –Article 141 of the Constitution- Supreme Court emphasized the fundamental importance of maintaining the sanctity and finality of judicial verdicts for the rule of law and public confidence- Held that the conclusive nature of judicial orders ensures the resolution of disputes and prevents endless litigation- The pronouncement of a verdict by a bench on a particular issue of law should settle the controversy, being final, and has to be followed by all courts as law declared by the Supreme Court- Allowing a verdict to be reopened because a later different view appears better would defeat the purpose of Article 141 and undermine the Court's authority- A subsequent bench of a different combination should defer to the view expressed by the earlier bench, unless there is a patent reason to interfere- Held that overturning a prior verdict by a later verdict does not necessarily mean that justice is better served.”, adding that any modification to the bail condition would violate the spirit of Article 141 of the Constitution to give finality to the decision of the Supreme Court- Application dismissed. [Relied on Brown v. Allen and referenced Rupa Ashok Hurra v. Ashok Hurra, (2002) 4 SCC 388; Paras 48-51] Sk. Md. Anisur Rahaman v. State of West Bengal, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1146 : 2025 INSC 1360
Section 45 - Bail - Trial Delay and Prolonged Custody - Prolonged detention under stringent laws like PMLA, coupled with delays violating the right to a speedy trial under Article 21, warrants bail. The Court distinguished Assistant Director v. Kanhaiya Prasad, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 201 where bail was canceled due to shorter custody (less than seven months) and no trial delay, clarifying that the twin conditions under Section 45 of PMLA were not universally overriding when trial delays and prolonged detention were evident. The appeal was allowed, and bail was granted. [Paras 4, 5] Udhaw Singh v. Enforcement Directorate, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 229 : 2025 INSC 247
Section 45 - Money Laundering is not an ordinary offence, having a transnational impact on financial systems, sovereignty, and integrity of nations. Casual or cryptic bail orders ignoring Section 45's rigours are unjustifiable. Twin conditions - i) reasonable grounds to believe the accused is not guilty, and (ii) the accused is not likely to commit any offence while on bail—are mandatory, even for bail applications under Section 439 of Cr.P.C. (Para 17, 21) Union of India v. Kanhaiya Prasad, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 201 : 2025 INSC 210 : AIR 2025 SC 1028
Section 45 - Production at Bail Stage - At the bail stage under Section 45 PMLA, the accused can invoke Section 91 CrPC to seek production of unrelied upon documents. The ED may object if disclosure prejudices ongoing investigations, but courts may deny production only if satisfied that disclosure would harm the investigation. (Para 52, 55) Sarla Gupta v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 541 : 2025 INSC 645 : (2025) 7 SCC 626
Section 47 BNSS - Grounds of Arrest - Mode of Communication - Mandatory Requirement – Held, to achieve the intended objective of the constitutional mandate under Article 22(1) of the Constitution of India, the grounds of arrest must be informed to the arrested person in each and every case without exception - The mode of communication of such grounds must be in writing in the language the arrested person understands - The constitutional safeguard would be rendered nugatory if authorities are merely permitted to read out the grounds and claim compliance - The constitutional mandate provided in Article 22(1) is a constitutional safeguard in the form of fundamental rights and is not a mere procedural formality - It is an unexceptional duty cast upon the State to provide the arrested person with the grounds of arrest to enable that person to defend himself by consulting a legal practitioner of his choice - If the grounds of arrest are not furnished to the arrestee in writing, this non-compliance results in a breach of the constitutional and statutory safeguards, rendering the arrest and subsequent remand illegal, and the person will be entitled to be set at liberty. [Relied on Pankaj Bansal v. Union of India and Others (2024) 7 SCC 576; Prabir Purkayastha v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2024) 8 SCC 254; Suhas Chakma v. Union of India & others 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3031; Paras 8, 22, 34-56] Mihir Rajesh Shah v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1066 : 2025 INSC 1288
Section 482 and 438 - Penal Code, 1860; Sections 409, 219 and 114 - Criminal Breach of Trust and Corrupt Practices - Misuse of Official Position - Anticipatory Bail - Quashing of FIR - The appellant, a retired IAS officer and former District Collector, was accused of misuse of official position in restoring government land to private allottees despite their ineligibility. The High Court rejected his plea for quashing the FIR and anticipatory bail, citing prima facie evidence of criminal breach of trust and abuse of power - Supreme Court dismissed appeal against refusal to quash, holding serious allegations warrant thorough investigation - The appellant's order condoning a seven-year delay and favoring private parties despite their absence from India raised serious concerns - Held, Courts must refrain from quashing FIRs at the investigation stage unless there is an evident abuse of process. Actions performed in an official capacity may still attract criminal liability if they indicate misuse of authority. In cases involving documentary evidence / official records, custodial interrogation may not always be required. Anticipatory bail granted. (Para 17 & 18) Pradeep N. Sharma v. State of Gujarat, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 263 : 2025 INSC 291
Section 482 BNSS - Anticipatory Bail - Hierarchy of Courts - The concurrent jurisdiction of the Sessions Court and the High Court for anticipatory bail under Section 482 of BNSS does not mean a person can directly approach the High Court, bypassing Sessions Court - The Hierarchy of Courts demands that a person seeking pre-arrest bail should not be allowed or encouraged to bypass the jurisdiction of the concerned Session court - Encouraging practice of directly approaching the High Court for anticipatory bail would flood the High Court with a large number of applications, creating a 'chaotic situation' - A significant number of applications would likely be granted at the Session Court level acting as a 'filtration process' before cases reach the High Court - In most states, there is a consistent practice requiring litigants to first approach the Session s Court for anticipatory bail and only if relief is denied, they can approach High Court. [Paras 6-9] Mohammed Rasal C. v. State of Kerala, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 884
Section 482 Cr.P.C. – Held, High Court cannot grant anticipatory bail by recalling initial order of dismissal - Such restoration is impermissible and contrary to law - the Court emphasized that once an application for anticipatory bail is rejected with reasons, proceedings for recall / restoration is not permissible in law - Supreme Court set aside the recall order and left it open for parties to avail remedies available in law - Appeal allowed. [Paras 4 - 7] Gurvinder Singh v. Jasbir Singh @ Jasvir Singh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 924
Section 483 (3) BNSS - Cancellation of Regular Bail - Propriety and Maintainability - Violation of Bail Conditions - Whether Trial Court can cancel bail granted by High Court or Supreme Court if there is violation of conditions - Respondent was granted bail by this Court and State-Appellant filed an application for cancellation of bail granted on ground of attempt to contact witnesses and approver through friends to depose against prosecution. Trial Court dismissed the application on ground of propriety and maintainability citing when an order is passed by a Superior Court, the Inferior Courts cannot pass any order contrary to the order passed by highest Courts of Law. Held, respondent was enlarged on bail on such conditions as Trial Court deemed appropriate. Hence, Trial Court was entitled to entertain an application under Section 439 (2) of CrPC seeking cancellation of bail on grounds of violation of bail conditions irrespective of fact that bail was granted by a Constitutional Court. Respondent has made attempts to either contact witnesses or influence them, so bail granted to Respondent ought to be cancelled. Appeal allowed. [Para 16 - 18] State of Karnataka v. Vinay Rajashekharappa Kulkarni, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 669
Section 50 Cr.P.C. – Mere arrest memo lacking detailed particulars does not satisfy the mandate under Section 50, violating Article 22(1) of the Constitution of India. Arrest and remand set aside. Ashish Kakkar v. UT of Chandigarh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 367
Section 50 Cr.P.C. - Person arrested to be informed of grounds of arrest and of right to bail - Non-compliance with Section 50 of the CrPC, requiring notification of arrest details to the accused's nominated persons, also vitiates the arrest. The Court overturned the High Court's decision and ordered the immediate release of the petitioner, due to failure to communicate the grounds of arrest. (Paras 21, 3) Vihaan Kumar v. State of Haryana, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 169 : 2025 INSC 162 : AIR 2025 SC 1388 : (2025) 5 SCC 799
Section 61(2) BNS - Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988; Section 7 - Demand and Acceptance of Bribe - Denial of Anticipatory Bail – The petitioner, an audit inspector, was alleged to have demanded illegal gratification for conducting an audit. Co-accused was apprehended red-handed while accepting the bribe, and there was an audio recording corroborating the demand. Held, the High Court rightly denied anticipatory bail. Anticipatory bail in corruption cases should be granted only in exceptional circumstances, such as false implication or politically motivated allegations. The Court reiterated that mere demand or solicitation of a bribe constitutes an offense under Section 7 of the Act. The Court emphasized the severity of corruption and the need to uphold public justice, stating that liberty should be denied to accused persons to ensure a corruption-free society. (Para 12, 21 & 24) Devinder Kumar Bansal v. State of Punjab, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 291 : 2025 INSC 320 : (2025) 4 SCC 493
Section 91 Cr.P.C. - Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 1988; Section 45 - Production at Bail Stage - At the bail stage under Section 45 PMLA, the accused can invoke Section 91 CrPC to seek production of unrelied upon documents. The ED may object if disclosure prejudices ongoing investigations, but courts may deny production only if satisfied that disclosure would harm the investigation. (Para 52, 55) Sarla Gupta v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 541 : 2025 INSC 645 : (2025) 7 SCC 626
Sections 161, 438 Cr.P.C. - Anticipatory Bail - Excise Policy scandal involving allegations of favoritism towards liquor brands, causing ₹3,000 crore loss to the state. The accused challenged the High Court's denial of anticipatory bail, which wrongly relied on co-accused statements under Section 161 Cr.P.C. The Supreme Court dismissed the accused's bail plea but criticized the High Court's reliance on inadmissible Section 161 Cr.P.C. statements. Courts must distinguish between witness and accused statements and apply Evidence Act provisions strictly at the bail stage. (Para 14, 53) P. Krishna Mohan Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 598 : 2025 INSC 725
Sections 17, 21, 25, 30 IEA - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Section 161 - Inadmissibility of Section 161 Cr.P.C. Statements Against Co-Accused at Bail Stage - Whether statements of an accused recorded under Section 161 of the Cr.P.C., implicating a co-accused, can be considered at the stage of regular or anticipatory bail. Held, statements recorded under Section 161 of the Cr.P.C. by an accused implicating a co-accused are inadmissible at the stage of regular or anticipatory bail. Such statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, cannot be used against a co-accused. (Para 28, 39, 47, 50, 53) P. Krishna Mohan Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 598 : 2025 INSC 725
Sections 17, 21, 25, 30 IEA - Penal Code, 1860 - Sections 409, 420 - Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 - Political Vendetta in Bail Considerations - The Court clarified that while political bias or vendetta is a relevant factor in bail pleas, it cannot be the sole ground for granting bail. Courts must assess whether allegations are frivolous or baseless, supported by prima facie evidence, before factoring in political motives. The case arose from an Excise Policy scandal in Andhra Pradesh involving allegations of favoritism towards select liquor brands, causing ₹3,000 crore in losses. The accused, charged under Sections 409, 420 of the IPC and the Prevention of Corruption Act, challenged the High Court's denial of anticipatory bail, which relied on co-accused statements. The Supreme Court dismissed the bail plea but clarified the legal position on Section 161 statements. (Para 27) P. Krishna Mohan Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 598 : 2025 INSC 725
Sections 22 and 29 - Appeal against rejection of anticipatory bail - Allegation of recovery of 550 tablets of Tapentadol Hydrochloride from a vehicle – Tapentadol Hydrochloride is not included in the list of psychotropic substances under the NDPS Act – Accused was entitled to pre-arrest bail - Appeal allowed. (Para 7) Kulwant Singh v. State of Punjab, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 387
Sections 390 and 401 Cr.P.C. - Arrest of accused in appeal from acquittal - High Court's powers of revision - Section 390 CrPC, applicable to revisions under Section 401 CrPC, allows the High Court to direct the arrest and production of a discharged accused. The object of Section 390 is to ensure the accused's availability for trial if the discharge is set aside. While exercising power under Section 390 in a revision against discharge, the normal rule is to direct the accused to be admitted to bail, rather than committing them to prison. Section 390 CrPC can be invoked in revision applications against orders of discharge, ensuring the accused's availability for further proceedings without directly staying the discharge order. Thus, the preferred course of action in a revision against discharge is to direct the discharged accused to appear before the trial court and be admitted to bail under Section 390 CrPC, rather than staying the discharge order outright. This ensures judicial control over the accused while upholding their right to liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution. (Para 18 - 20) Sudershan Singh Wazir v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 262 : 2025 INSC 281
Sections 392, 397 and 411 IPC - Arms Act, 1959; Section 25 – Arrest of the Accused - Robbery - Recovery of Weapons - In cases of robbery by unknown persons, where the accused are not known to witnesses, meticulous examination of evidence is crucial. Courts must scrutinize: (a) how the investigating agency identified the accused; (b) the manner of arrest; (c) the identification process; and (d) the discovery/recovery of looted articles. Mere proof of robbery is insufficient; credible evidence linking the specific accused to the crime is essential. (Para 13 & 14) Wahid v. State Govt. of Nct of Delhi, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 154 : 2025 INSC 145 : AIR 2025 SC 1087 : (2025) 3 SCC 341
Sections 438, 82, 204 Cr.P.C. - Anticipatory Bail - The law aids only the abiding and certainly not its resistants. When after the investigation, a chargesheet is submitted in the court, or in a complaint case, summons or warrant is issued to the accused, he is bound to submit himself to the authority of law. If he is creating hindrances in the execution of warrants or is concealing himself and does not submit to the authority of law, he must not be granted the privilege of anticipatory bail, particularly when the Court taking cognizance has found him prima facie involved in serious economic offences or heinous offences. Granting anticipatory bail is certainly not the rule. The accused, who have continuously avoided to follow the due process of law, by avoiding attendance in the Court, by concealing themselves and thereby attempting to derail the proceedings, would not be entitled to the anticipatory bail. If the Rule of Law is to prevail in the society, every person would have to abide by the law, respect the law and follow the due process of law. (Para 23, 27) Serious Fraud Investigation Office v. Aditya Sarda, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 414 : AIR 2025 SC 2431 : 2025 INSC 477
Sections 438, 82, 204 Cr.P.C. - Companies Act, 2013; Section 212 (6) and 447 – Serious Fraud Investigation Office (SFIO) investigated Adarsh Group for illegal loans worth Rs. 1700 crores, alleging fraud and siphoning of funds. Special Court issued bailable and non-bailable warrants and initiated proclamation proceedings against accused for non-compliance. High Court granted anticipatory bail, ignoring mandatory bail conditions under Section 212(6) and accused's absconding conduct. High Court orders set aside as perverse for disregarding legal provisions and Special Court proceedings. Accused directed to surrender. (Para 23 - 30) Serious Fraud Investigation Office v. Aditya Sarda, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 414 : AIR 2025 SC 2431 : 2025 INSC 477
Sections 438, 82, 204 Cr.P.C. - Companies Act, 2013; Section 212 and 447 - Punishment for Fraud - Investigation into affairs of company by Serious Fraud Investigation Office - Bail, including anticipatory bail, cannot be granted for an offence under Section 447 of the Act 2013 unless twin conditions are satisfied. Section 212 (6) of the Companies Act states that the offences covered under Section 447 are cognisable in nature and no person can be released on bail unless he satisfies the twin conditions, that are: (1) that a Public Prosecutor should be given an opportunity to oppose the application for such release; (2) where the Public Prosecutor opposes the application, the Court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the person is not guilty and is unlikely to commit any offence while on bail. Cryptic orders granting bail without adverting to the facts or the consideration of such restrictive conditions are perverse and liable to be set aside. (Para 23 – 25) Serious Fraud Investigation Office v. Aditya Sarda, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 414 : AIR 2025 SC 2431 : 2025 INSC 477
Sections 438, 82, 204 Cr.P.C. - It cannot be gainsaid that the judicial time of every court, even of Magistrate's Court is as precious and valuable as that of the High Courts and the Supreme Court. The accused are duty bound to cooperate the trial courts in proceeding further with the cases and bound to remain present in the Court as and when required by the Court. Not allowing the Courts to proceed further with the cases by avoiding execution of summons or warrants, disobeying the orders of the Court, and trying to delay the proceedings by hook or crook, would certainly amount to interfering with and causing obstruction in the administration of justice. (Para 27) Serious Fraud Investigation Office v. Aditya Sarda, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 414 : AIR 2025 SC 2431 : 2025 INSC 477
Sections 498A and 304B IPC - Bail - Cancellation of - Factors - When considering bail in serious criminal offences, courts must consider factors such as the nature of accusations, gravity of the offence, role of the accused, criminal antecedents, probability of witness tampering, and likelihood of the accused being available for trial. Bail once granted should not be cancelled mechanically, but an unreasoned or perverse bail order is open to interference. Supervening circumstances, post-bail conduct, attempts to delay trial, threats to witnesses, or tampering with evidence are grounds for setting aside bail. Courts must avoid detailed reasons that may prejudice the accused, focusing on prima facie considerations. (Para 15) Shabeen Ahmed v. State of U.P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 278 : 2025 INSC 307 : (2025) 4 SCC 172
Sections 498A and 304B IPC - Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961; Sections 3 and 4 - Dowry Death - A young woman died within two years of marriage with multiple ante-mortem injuries and evidence of dowry demands - Supreme Court cancelled the bail granted to the father-in-law and mother-in-law, citing their principal role in pressurizing the deceased. However, the bail granted to the sistersin-law, whose role appeared less direct and who had personal and educational circumstances warranting leniency, was upheld. The Court emphasized that the trial court should proceed uninfluenced by the observations made in the judgment and conclude the trial expeditiously. (Para 16 - 21) Shabeen Ahmed v. State of U.P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 278 : 2025 INSC 307 : (2025) 4 SCC 172
Sections 498A and 304B IPC - Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961; Sections 3 and 4 - Dowry Death - Cancellation of Bail - Stringent Judicial Scrutiny Required - Granting bail in dowry death cases despite evidence of direct involvement shakes public confidence in judiciary. In cases of alleged dowry death, particularly where the death occurs within seven years of marriage and exhibits signs of severe physical violence and persistent dowry demands, stricter judicial scrutiny is imperative. Courts must be mindful of the broader societal impact and public confidence in the criminal justice system. Where evidence indicates direct involvement in fatal events, including persistent dowry demands and physical cruelty, bail should be cancelled to ensure a fair and unimpeded trial. The gravity of the offence necessitates a cautious approach, preventing the normalization of such heinous crimes. (Para 15) Shabeen Ahmed v. State of U.P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 278 : 2025 INSC 307 : (2025) 4 SCC 172
The petitioners sought anticipatory bail involving allegations of corruption and fraudulent compensation payments by NOIDA officials. The Court noted that the interim protection granted to the petitioners had been confirmed as they had joined the investigation. The Court expressed dissatisfaction with the earlier Fact-Finding Committee's investigation, which had deviated from its mandate by questioning judicial orders on compensation. Consequently, the Court constituted a Special Investigation Team (SIT) comprising senior IPS officers from outside Uttar Pradesh to ensure transparency and fairness. The SIT was tasked with investigating: (1) whether compensation payments exceeded legal entitlements, (2) identifying responsible officials, (3) examining collusion between beneficiaries and NOIDA officials, and (4) assessing NOIDA's overall transparency and public interest commitment. The SIT was directed to submit its report within two months, and no coercive action was to be taken against landowners/farmers without the Court's prior permission. Virendra Singh Nagar v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 141
The Supreme Court disapproves of parties securing anticipatory or regular bail by voluntarily offering to deposit substantial amounts, only to later challenge the condition as onerous or claim lack of counsel's authority. Such tactics preclude merit-based consideration of bail applications and undermine judicial integrity. In a case involving alleged tax evasion of Rs. 13.7 crores, the petitioner's counsel offered to deposit Rs. 2.5 crores before the High Court, which granted bail subject to a Rs. 50 lakh deposit. The petitioner then challenged the condition as onerous before the Supreme Court, alleging lack of counsel's authority. The Court criticized this as “approbating and reprobating,” noting that while excessive bail conditions are impermissible, parties cannot manipulate the judicial process by retracting voluntary offers. The Court initially set aside the High Court's orders, directing the petitioner to surrender and remanding the matter for reconsideration on merits. However, considering the petitioner's personal circumstances, the Court permitted interim release to continue. (Paras 8 - 13) Kundan Singh v. Superintendent of CGST and Central Excise, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 686
The Supreme Court dismissed a Special Leave Petition challenging the dismissal of second anticipatory bail application by the High Court. The High Court had dismissed the bail petition as withdrawn after lengthy arguments. Subsequently, the petitioner filed another application in the disposed-of matter, prompting the High Court to issue directions to the police for a status report and personal appearance of the Deputy Commissioner of Police citing inaction in arresting the accused despite the rejection of anticipatory bail. The Supreme Court found that the petitioner was attempting to circumvent procedural law, as he had not surrendered despite two rejections of anticipatory bail. The Court imposed costs of Rs. 2,00,000 on the petitioner, to be deposited with the State Legal Services Authority, and directed the Commissioner of Police to arrest the petitioner within three days and file an affidavit of compliance. Parteek Arora @ Parteek Juneja v. State of Punjab, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 104
The Supreme Court dismissed a Special Leave Petition challenging the dismissal of second anticipatory bail application by the High Court. The High Court had dismissed the bail petition as withdrawn after lengthy arguments. Subsequently, the petitioner filed another application in the disposed-of matter, prompting the High Court to issue directions to the police for a status report and personal appearance of the Deputy Commissioner of Police citing inaction in arresting the accused despite the rejection of anticipatory bail. The Supreme Court found that the petitioner was attempting to circumvent procedural law, as he had not surrendered despite two rejections of anticipatory bail. The Court imposed costs of Rs. 2,00,000 on the petitioner, to be deposited with the State Legal Services Authority, and directed the Commissioner of Police to arrest the petitioner within three days and file an affidavit of compliance. Parteek Arora @ Parteek Juneja v. State of Punjab, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 104
Transfer of Investigation to CBI – Protection of Eyewitness – Bail Considerations - Supreme Court transfers investigation into alleged custodial torture and murder of 25-year-old to CBI, finding deliberate cover-up by the Police; no arrests despite FIR registered 8 months ago; omission of murder charge; prevention of initial FIR; and influenced post-mortem. Directs arrest of accused police officials within 1 month and completion of probe within 90 days thereof. Applies nemo judex in causa sua; holds local police shielding own officers. Grants liberty to sole eyewitness (co-accused) to seek bail before High Court; directs State authorities to ensure his safety under witness protection scheme; observes deliberate implication in multiple cases to break his spirit and prevent testimony. Criticizes medical board's failure to opine on cause of death despite multiple injuries; rejects police claim of heart attack. Strongly deplores systemic custodial violence and State's inaction. (Para 28 - 33) Hansura Bai v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 569 : 2025 INSC 711
Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 - Section 18-20 – Bail – Held, no UAPA offence over attending meeting of organization which isn't banned - Upheld the order of granting bail to the accused by High Court citing it to be fully justified and reasonable citing that allegations against him were related to his connections with an organization named AL-Hind, which is not a banned organization under UAPA - High Court's order was passed in April 2022, and it would not be 'just and proper to interfere with the same at this stage'- Charges had not been framed and the trial had not yet commenced, despite the accused having been in custody for 5.5 years - The trial had not commenced despite a lapse of 5.5 years and that 'accused cannot be allowed to languish in jail without being given a fair and speedy trial' - Directed Trial Court to expedite and conclude the trial within 2 years, noting that there were more than 100 witnesses to be examined - Appeals dismissed. [Paras 8-13] Union of India v. Saleem Khan, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 833 : 2025 INSC 1008
Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 - Section 43B - Arrest - Furnishing of Grounds of Arrest - Constitutional Mandate – Held that the explanation given by the jurisdictional Court at the time of remand, followed by the remand order which indicates that the grounds of arrest were explained, is not sufficient compliance with the mandatory requirement of furnishing the grounds of arrest at the time of securing the accused. Ahmed Mansoor v. State, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1026
Whether a Foreign Registration Officer or Civil Authority must be impleaded in bail applications filed by foreigners under the Foreigners Act, 1946. The Court held that it is not necessary to implead such authorities in bail applications, as they have no locus to oppose bail unless the offence falls under Section 14 of the Foreigners Act. However, the Court directed that upon granting bail to a foreign national, the prosecuting agency or State must immediately inform the concerned Registration Officer, who will then notify the Civil Authority. This ensures compliance with the Foreigners Order, 1948, and allows authorities to take appropriate legal steps. The Court emphasized that this process avoids unnecessary delays in bail proceedings while safeguarding the interests of the State. Frank Vitus v. Narcotics Control Bureau, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 23
Witness Protection Scheme, 2018 - Nature & Scope – Held, Witness Protection Scheme is a remedial and curative measure designed to neutralize the effects of threat that have already materialized - Bail cancellation is a preventive and supervisory function of the Court, aimed at ensuring the trial proceeds without being gendered by intimidation - The scheme addresses the psychological impact of fear on witnesses, but it does not displace or dilute the established law of bail - Substituting the scheme for a bail cancellation application would render the court's authority and bail conditions meaningless - Supreme Court expressed dismay at the practice of Allahabad High Court of passing 'cyclostyled template order' in at least forty recent cases - Matter remanded for fresh hearing - Appeal allowed. [Paras 18, 36-38, 47, 61] Phireram v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 872 : 2025 INSC 1074