Section 2(1)(k) - InquirySection 2(1)(k) and Section 531(2)(a) — Definition of "Inquiry" — Saving of pending proceedings — Purely ministerial or administrative acts prior to taking cognizance – Held A mere ministerial act, such as a Special Court directing a prosecution complaint to be registered/numbered and fixing a future date for a hearing on cognizance, does not constitute...
Section 2(1)(k) - Inquiry
Section 2(1)(k) and Section 531(2)(a) — Definition of "Inquiry" — Saving of pending proceedings — Purely ministerial or administrative acts prior to taking cognizance – Held A mere ministerial act, such as a Special Court directing a prosecution complaint to be registered/numbered and fixing a future date for a hearing on cognizance, does not constitute an "inquiry" under Section 2(1)(k) of the BNSS - An inquiry is a judicial act requiring a positive, conscious application of the judicial mind, which commences only when the Court takes judicial notice of an offence - Where a PMLA complaint was filed prior to the commencement of the BNSS but the Special Court took cognizance after the said date without hearing the accused, the saving clause under Section 531(2)(a) of the BNSS cannot be invoked to apply the old CrPC - Because no "inquiry" or "trial" was pending immediately before the commencement of the BNSS, the substantive right of being heard under the first proviso to Section 223(1) of the BNSS must prospectively ensure to the benefit of the accused. [Relied on Kushal Kumar Agarwal v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1221; Yash Tuteja & Ors. v. Union of India, (2024) 8 SCC 46; Tarsem Lal v. Enforcement Directorate, (2024) 7 SCC 61; Hardeep Singh v. State of Punjab, (2014) 3 SCC 92; Paras 27-36] Parvinder Singh v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 522 : 2026 INSC 519
Section 2(1)(r) - "officer in charge of a police station".
Section 2(s) and 2(o) Cr.P.C. – Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 - The Supreme Court set aside a High Court of Andhra Pradesh judgment that had quashed several FIRs registered by the Anti-Corruption Bureau (ACB), Vijayawada – Held that the High Court had erroneously held that the ACB office in Vijayawada was not a notified "police station" under Section 2(s) of the CrPC following the state's bifurcation - The Supreme Court clarified that under the 2014 Reorganisation Act, existing laws and notifications (including G.O.Ms. No. 268 of 2003) continue to apply to successor states to prevent a legal vacuum - A "police station" under Section 2(s) includes a "post" held by a police officer and does not strictly require a specific physical building declaration in every instance - a subsequent 2022 clarificatory Government Order by the State of Andhra Pradesh did not have retrospective application but merely confirmed the existing legal position under the Reorganisation Act - Section 2(s) of the CrPC is exhaustive and inclusive, meaning any "post" or "place" declared by the State - A post held by a police officer can constitute a police station - Sections 100-102 of the 2014 Act ensure that laws (including notifications) in force before the appointed day continue to apply to the territories of the successor states until altered or repealed - A subsequent Government Order (G.O.Ms. No. 137 of 2022) issued as a clarification does not constitute retrospective application but merely reiterates the statutory position to avoid legal ambiguity. [Relied on Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, Ranchi and Another vs. Swarn Rekha Cokes and Coals (P) Ltd. and Others (2004) 6 SCC 689; State of Punjab and Others vs. Balbir Singh and Others (1976) 3 SCC 24; Paras 21-24, 26-29] Anti-Corruption Bureau v. Dayam Peda Ranga Rao, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 24 : 2026 INSC 37 : 2026 CriLJ 708
Section 4 - Trial of offences under Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita and other laws
Section 4 and 156 Cr.P.C. — Jurisdiction of State Anti-Corruption Bureau (ACB) over Central Government Employees — The Supreme Court upheld the Rajasthan High Court's finding that the State ACB has the jurisdiction to register criminal cases, investigate, and file charge-sheets against Central Government employees for offences committed within the State's territorial jurisdiction - Noted that the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act (DSPE Act), 1946, is permissive and does not expressly or impliedly divest regular State police authorities of their power to investigate offences under the PC Act - While an internal arrangement exists where the CBI typically handles Central Government employees and the ACB handles State employees to avoid duplication, this does not exclude the State's legal power to investigate - The only mandatory requirement is that the investigating officer must hold the rank specified under Section 17 of the PC Act – Key findings by Supreme Court – i. CrPC as Parent Statute: Unless a special law provides a separate, exclusive procedure for investigation, the general provisions of Section 156 CrPC (powers of police to investigate cognizable offences) prevail; ii. Non-Exclusivity of CBI: The DSPE Act (which governs the CBI) does not impair any other law empowering State police authorities to investigate offences - It is incorrect to claim that only the CBI has the authority to institute such prosecutions; iii. Validity of Charge-sheet: A charge-sheet filed by a State agency against a Central Government employee without the prior consent or approval of the CBI is valid in law – Appeal dismissed. [Relied on A.C. Sharma v. Delhi Administration (1973) 1 SCC 726; Paras 3-9] Nawal Kishore Meena @ N.K Meena v. State of Rajasthan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 68 : 2026 INSC 71 : 2026 (1) Crimes (SC) 172
Section 35 - When police may arrest without warrant
Quashing of FIR – Validity of interim directions to follow arrest procedures – The Supreme Court set aside an order of the High Court of Telangana which, while disposing of a petition to quash an FIR on the very first day, directed the Investigating Officer to follow the procedure under Section 35(3) of the BNSS (previously Section 41-A Cr.PC) and the Arnesh Kumar guidelines without hearing the defacto complainant. Practical Solutions Inc. v. State of Telangana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 74
Section 35 BNSS — Arrest — Mandatory issuance of notice for offences punishable with imprisonment up to 7 years — Interplay between Section 35(1)(b) and Section 35(3) to 35(6) — Discretionary nature of arrest - Core Principles and Rulings – i. Rule of Notice vs. Exception of Arrest - The Supreme Court held that for offences punishable with imprisonment up to 7 years, issuing a notice under Section 35(3) of the BNSS is the rule, whereas effecting an arrest under Section 35(6) read with Section 35(1)(b) is a clear exception; ii. Mandatory Checklist for Arrest - For an arrest to be legally justified in the specified category of offences, compliance with Section 35(1)(b)(i) (reason to believe) along with at least one condition mentioned in Section 35(1)(b)(ii) is a sine qua non; ii. No Automatic Arrest on Non-Compliance - Even if an individual fails to comply with the terms of a notice under Section 35(3) or is unwilling to identify themselves, arrest is not a matter of course - The Investigating Agency must still form an opinion that the arrest is an objective necessity for the investigation; iii. Fresh Materials Required for Subsequent Arrest - If a police officer decides to arrest an individual after having already issued a notice under Section 35(3), such an arrest must be based on materials and factors that were not available at the time the notice was issued; iv. Judicial Scrutiny - Magistrates must not authorize detention in a casual or mechanical manner - They are required to peruse the report and checklist furnished by the police officer to ensure the necessity of arrest is justified under the statutory parameters. [Relied on Arnesh Kumar v. State of Bihar & Anr, (2014) 8 SCC 273; Satender Kumar Antil v. Central Bureau of Investigation, (2022) 10 SCC 51; State of Uttar Pradesh v. Bhagwant Kishore Joshi, (1964) 3 SCR 71; Paras 20-33] Satender Kumar Antil v. Central Bureau of Investigation, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 114 : 2026 INSC 115
Section 84 - Proclamation for person absconding
Section 82 Cr.P.C. – Delay in Surrendering after Bail Cancellation – Effect of Pending Review Petition - The filing of a Review Petition before the Supreme Court does not operate as an automatic stay of a surrender direction - Evading arrest for 42 days, necessitating the issuance of a Non-Bailable Warrant (NBW) and initiation of proclamation proceedings under Section 82 CrPC, constitutes contumacious conduct that heavily weighs against the fresh grant of bail. [Para 26-27] Mohseen v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 536 : 2026 INSC 526
Section 168 - Police to prevent cognizable offences
Section 168 BNSS – Statutory Obligation of Police to Prevent Offences – Shifting of Burden via Bail Conditions – Section 168 of the BNSS casts a vital, primary statutory duty squarely upon the police and the State to prevent the commission of cognizable offences - Imposing a bail condition that ousts the accused from their residence to maintain peace effectively shifts this preventive burden from the law enforcement machinery onto the accused, thereby weakening the State's core obligation to prevent crime - Courts must remind the police of their statutory obligations to ensure no one breaches peace, rather than relying on disproportionately restrictive bail conditions to achieve situational harmony. [Relied on State of NCT of Delhi vs. Sanjay, (2014) 9 SCC 772; Paras 17-28] Sachin Yadav v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 451
Section 173 - Information in cognizable cases.
Section 173(1), Section 173(4), and Section 175(3) BNSS [erstwhile Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 — Section 154(1), Section 154(3), and Section 156(3)] — Sequential Mechanism for Criminal Prosecution — Held - The BNSS provides a structured, sequential mechanism for initiating criminal prosecution - If an officer-in-charge of a police station refuses to register an FIR under Section 173(1) BNSS, the informant's recourse lies first in approaching the jurisdictional Superintendent of Police under Section 173(4) BNSS, and subsequently, the competent Magistrate under Section 175(3) BNSS - Rushing directly to the High Court under Article 226 without exhausting these structured statutory steps renders the writ petition premature and unfit to be entertained. [Relied on Radha Krishan Industries v. State of H.P. (2021) 6 SCC 771; Thansingh Nathmal v. Superintendent of Taxes AIR 1964 SC 1419; Sakiri Vasu v. State of U.P. (2008) 2 SCC 409; Sudhir Bhaskarrao Tambe v. Hemant Yashwant Dhage (2016) 6 SCC 277; Paras 5-11] Sujal Vishwas Attavar v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 453 : 2026 INSC 442
Section 154 & Section 173 Cr.P.C. – Registration of Multiple FIRs for the Same Transaction / Occurrence – Permissibility of Parallel Investigations – Clubbing and Transfer of FIRs – The petitioners sought the clubbing and transfer of multiple FIRs registered against them across Delhi and Haryana, arising out of the same real estate project ("Brahma City/Krrish World") on identical allegations of cheating, non-delivery of plots/flats, and siphoning of homebuyer funds – Held - There cannot be multiple FIRs and parallel investigations in different jurisdictions concerning the same transaction or occurrence giving rise to cognizable offences - The scheme of the CrPC mandates a single, comprehensive investigation - Permitting parallel and overlapping investigations on identical facts leads to an avoidable multiplicity of proceedings, potential for conflicting findings, and manifest prejudice to the accused - the subsequent FIR registered in Gurugram, Haryana, was ordered to be clubbed and transferred to be investigated alongside the primary FIR in Delhi - A blanket protective order restraining coercive steps for potential future FIRs was declined. [Relied on T.T. Antony v. State of Kerala, (2001) 6 SCC 181; Paras 21 - 28] Amit Katyal v. State of Haryana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 516 : 2026 INSC 509
Section 173(3) BNSS – Registration of FIR – Preliminary Inquiry – Safeguard against mechanical registration – The Supreme Court quashed an FIR registered against a media executive, holding that the allegations were "absolutely vague," "speculative," and "inherently improbable" – Noted that Section 173(3) BNSS provides an additional safeguard for offences punishable between three and seven years - Unlike Section 154 CrPC, where a preliminary inquiry is limited to ascertaining if a cognizable offence is disclosed, Section 173(3) BNSS empowers police to conduct an inquiry to determine if a prima facie case exists even if the information ostensibly discloses a cognizable offence - The legislative intent is to prevent the registration of frivolous cases. In the instant case, the police acted with "unusual expediency" and registered the FIR in a mechanical manner without exercising the option of a preliminary inquiry despite the indeterminate nature of the allegations. [Paras 23-25] Ashish Dave v. State of Rajasthan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 258 : 2026 INSC 244
Section 154 & Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. - Mandatory Duty to Register FIR — Non-Registration Remedied by Efficacious Multi-Tiered Architecture - Where information discloses the commission of a cognizable offence, the registration of an FIR under Section 154 of the CrPC is mandatory, and the police hold no discretion to refuse it at the threshold - If the police fail or refuse to register an FIR, the CrPC provides a complete and comprehensive statutory architecture to address the grievance - The aggrieved person must first approach the Superintendent of Police under Section 154(3), and if the grievance persists, invoke the wide supervisory jurisdiction of the Magistrate under Section 156(3) to order registration and monitor the investigation. [Relied on Lalita Kumari v. Government of Uttar Pradesh (2014) 2 SCC 1 and Sakiri Vasu v. State of U.P. (2008) 2 SCC 409; Paras 47-56, 164] Ashwini Kumar Upadhyaya v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 437 : 2026 INSC 432
Section 154 Cr.P.C. — First Information Report — Delay in lodging FIR — Delay cannot be used as a ritualistic formula to discard the prosecution's case - It merely puts the court on its guard to search for a satisfactory explanation - If the delay is explained or understandable within the totality of the circumstances, it is not fatal - In cases where witnesses face fear, threats, or require time to regain tranquillity after a traumatic event, a mere delay of a few hours does not weaken the prosecution. [Paras 9, 10] Adalat Yadav v. State of Bihar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 415 : 2026 INSC 403
Section 154, 218, 219, 220, and 223 Cr.P.C. – Registration of FIR and Joinder of Charges– Whether multiple acts of cheating against numerous investors in a criminal conspiracy require separate FIRs or can be clubbed into a single FIR – Held: Where a criminal conspiracy is alleged leading to multiple acts of cheating against different individuals, registering one FIR and treating subsequent complaints as statements under Section 161 CrPC is a correct course of action - The "triple tests" to determine if acts form the 'same transaction' are: (1) unity of purpose and design; (2) proximity of time and place; and (3) continuity of action - If the Magistrate finds the acts constitute the 'same transaction', consolidated charges can be framed under Sections 220(1) and 223(a) & (d) CrPC. State (NCT of Delhi) v. Khimji Bhai Jadeja, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 11 : 2026 INSC 25 : 2026 CriLJ 625
Section 174 - Information as to noncognizable cases and investigation of such cases.
Social Media Posts & Political Speech – Guidelines for Registration of FIRs – Supreme Court refuses to interfere with the Telangana High Court's judgment quashing criminal proceedings and issuing mandatory operational guidelines for police and Magistrates when dealing with complaints based on social media posts – Noted that the High Court's guidelines (Para 29) aim to safeguard fundamental rights and prevent the mechanical or arbitrary invocation of the criminal process - Key Guidelines Upheld – i. Verification of Locus Standi - Police must verify if a complainant is a "person aggrieved" before registering FIRs for defamation or similar offences; ii. High Threshold for Media-Related Offences - Cases involving intentional insult, public mischief, or threat to public order shall not be registered unless there is prima facie material disclosing incitement to violence or hatred; iii. Protection of Political Speech: Constitutional protections under Article must be scrupulously enforced; mechanical registration of cases for harsh or critical political speech is prohibited; iv. Defamation Procedure - As a non-cognizable offence, police cannot directly register an FIR; complainants must be directed to a Magistrate, and action may only follow an order under Section 174(2) of the BNSS; v. Prior Legal Scrutiny: In sensitive cases involving expression, police must obtain a prior legal opinion from the Public Prosecutor before registration. [Relied on Kedar Nath Singh v. State of Bihar, 1962 Supp (2) SCR 769; Shreya Singhal v. Union of India, (2015) 5 SCC 1; Arnesh Kumar v. State of Bihar, (2014) 8 SCC 273; Paras 6,7] State of Telangana v. Nalla Balu @ Durgam Shashidhar Goud, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 113
Section 175 - Police officer's power to investigate cognizable case.
Section 175(3) and Section 175(4) BNSS – Interplay and Procedural Safeguards - The Supreme Court clarified that Section 175(4) is not an independent or standalone provision, nor is it a mere proviso to Section 175(3) - the two sub-sections must be read harmoniously. Section 175(4) acts as a procedural adjunct and an additional protective layer for public servants - Supreme Court held that although Section 175(4) uses the term "complaint" (which under Section 2(1)(h) can include oral allegations), in the context of proceedings against public servants, it must be interpreted as a written complaint supported by an affidavit - It is illogical to require an affidavit for allegations against private individuals under Section 175(3) but exempt it for public servants under Section 175(4). [Relied on Priyanka Srivastava v. State of U.P. 2015 6 SCC 287; Lalita Kumari v. Govt. of U.P 2014 2 SCC 1; Radhe Shyam v. Chhabi Nath 2015 5 SCC 423; Pradnya Pranjal Kulkarni v. State of Maharashtra 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1948; Paras 20-29, 37-39, 45-48] xxx v. State of Kerala, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 85 : 2026 INSC 88
Two-Tier Protection for Public Servants – Noted that BNSS provides a dual-protection mechanism for public officials: i. Threshold Stage: Under Section 175(4), a Magistrate must call for a report from the superior officer and consider the assertions of the accused public servant before ordering an investigation; ii. Cognizance Stage: Under Section 218(1), prior government sanction is required before the Court takes cognizance. xxx v. State of Kerala, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 85 : 2026 INSC 88
Section 156(3) and 200 Cr.P.C. - The parameters and fields of operation of Section 156(3) CrPC (direction for registration of FIR) and Section 200 CrPC (private complaint) are distinct and different. Once an application under Section 156(3) CrPC has been dismissed and the High Court, while dealing with a subsequent challenge, grants liberty to the complainant to file a private complaint under Section 200 CrPC, the complainant cannot file a second application under Section 156(3) CrPC by taking advantage of such liberty. Filing a second Section 156(3) application in such circumstances amounts to an impermissible attempt to review or override the earlier order of the High Court and is not maintainable in law. The Supreme Court set aside the orders of the High Court and the Magistrate directing registration of an FIR on a second application under Section 156(3) CrPC. The Court held that after the High Court had expressly granted liberty to file a private complaint under Section 200 CrPC against the police closure report, the Magistrate could not have entertained a fresh application under Section 156(3). The Court directed the Magistrate to treat the said second application filed under Section 156(3) CrPC as a private complaint under Section 200 CrPC and proceed in accordance with law. Mohan Karthik v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 458
Section 156(3) & Sections 196, 197 Cr.P.C. - Prior Sanction is NOT a precondition for directing registration of an FIR or conducting an investigation at the pre-cognizance stage - The Supreme Court set aside the Delhi High Court's view and ruled that the statutory requirement of obtaining prior sanction under Sections 196 and 197 of the CrPC operates strictly at the stage of "taking cognizance" by a Court - It does not extend to the anterior, pre-cognizance stage of registering an FIR or directing a police investigation under Section 156(3) - An order passed by a Magistrate directing an investigation under Section 156(3) does not amount to "taking cognizance" within the meaning of Section 190 of the CrPC - To condition the registration of an FIR upon prior sanction would invert the sequential statutory scheme and render investigative provisions unworkable. [Relied on State of Karnataka v. Pastor P. Raju (2006) 6 SCC 728; Sakiri Vasu v. State of U.P. (2008) 2 SCC 409; Paras 101-164] Ashwini Kumar Upadhyaya v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 437 : 2026 INSC 432
Section 176 - Procedure for investigation
Section 157 Cr.P.C. – Procedural Lapses – Alleged non-compliance with the requirement of sending the FIR to the Magistrate under Section 157 CrPC is not, by itself, fatal to the prosecution case - Such procedural lapses are insufficient to overturn a conviction when the overall evidence establishes the guilt of the accused - The movement of multiple accused persons, arriving together armed with firearms and chasing the deceased into a private residence to execute the killing, is sufficient to draw an inference of a common object - The recovery of 40 pellets from the body and multiple entry/exit wounds corroborated the involvement of multiple shooters. [Paras 13, 17 - 20] Dablu v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 238 : 2026 INSC 224 : AIR 2026 SC 1319
Section 180 - Examination of Witnesses by Police
Criminal Procedure – Grant of Bail – Judicial Discretion and Duty to Consider Material Evidence - The Supreme Court observed that while the judicial discretion to grant bail is wide, it must be exercised in a judicious, reasoned manner by adverting to the settled parameters, especially where accusations are grave - The High Court erred in isolating the omission in the inquest proceedings while completely ignoring vital material collected during the investigation - A specific overt act attributed to the accused in the FIR, the corroborative post-mortem report showing firearm injuries, the recovery of the weapon at the instance of the accused, and the statements of witnesses recorded under Section 180 of the BNSS, 2023 constitute material circumstances that cannot be brushed aside - Assigning reasons not in consonance with settled bail principles in serious offences renders the order unsustainable. [Paras 14-16] Bhagat Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 535 : 2026 INSC 527
Section 181 - Statements to police and use thereof
Section 162 Proviso CrPC r/w Section 145 of Evidence Act – Impeaching Credibility vs. Omissions in FIR – Defense merely cross-examined the prosecutrix by suggesting that the details of the videography threat were not mentioned in her initial complaint/FIR – Held: The FIR is primarily meant to set the criminal investigation into motion and is not an encyclopedia of all relevant facts - An omission in the FIR is not fatal unless it goes to the root of the case - To properly contradict and discredit a witness under the proviso to Section 162 CrPC, the defense must draw the witness's attention to significant omissions or contradictions in their previous statements recorded by the police under Section 161 CrPC during investigation - Suggestions of oral denial and reference only to the FIR do not invoke the statutory mechanism required to shake the veracity of the deposition. [Relied on Tahsildar Singh v. State of U.P., AIR 1959 SC 1012 and Balu Sudam Khalde v. State of Maharashtra, (2023) 13 SCC 365; Paras 74, 76, & 77, 90-100] Vijayakumar v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 531 : 2026 INSC 525
Section 183 - Recording of confessions and statements
Section 164 Cr.P.C. — Confessional Statements — Retracted and Exculpatory Confessions — Legal Aid — Held: A confession must be a direct acknowledgment of guilt to form the basis of a conviction – noted that in the present case, the confession of A1 was exculpatory (accusing the co-accused), and A2's statement did not admit to murder; thus, they could not be relied upon - the Magistrate failed to inform the accused of their right to legal aid before recording the statements, violating mandatory duties. [Paras 23-28] Bernard Lyngdoh Phawa v. State of Meghalaya, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 84 : 2026 INSC 85 : 2026 (1) Crimes (SC) 230
Section 187 - Procedure when investigation cannot be completed in 24 hours
Section 167(2) Cr.P.C. read with Section 43-D(2) of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 — Extension of time for investigation — Right to Default Bail — Mandatory requirement of production and notice to the accused - The Supreme Court set aside the orders extending the time for completing the investigation and granted default bail to the accused - held that the initial order extending the time to file the chargesheet was passed without procuring the presence of the accused (either physically or virtually) and without giving him an opportunity of being heard or raising objections - This constitutes a gross illegality that violates the fundamental rights of the accused under Article 21 of the Constitution of India – Supreme Court reiterated that the extension of time for completing an investigation is not an empty formality - Any direction to extend the period for filing a chargesheet encroaches upon personal liberty and must be preceded by due application of mind by recording justifiable, cogent, and valid reasons - Extension orders passed in an absolutely mechanical or perfunctory manner merely noting that "investigation is still pending" are legally unsustainable - Since the first extension order was declared illegal and arbitrary, the subsequent chargesheet filed after the expiry of the statutory period of 90 days could not defeat the right of the accused - The appellant's right to claim default bail stood crystallized upon the filing of his application under Section 167(2) CrPC before the chargesheet was submitted. [Relied on Jigar v. State of Gujarat, (2023) 6 SCC 484; Paras 24 - 36] Md. Ariz Hasnain @ Ariz Hasnain v. State of Jharkhand, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 475 : 2026 INSC 456
Section 193 - Report of police officer on completion of investigation
Section 193 BNSS – Stay of Investigation/Charge-sheet – Interim Orders in Writ Jurisdiction – The Supreme Court set aside a High Court's interim direction that restrained the police from filing a charge-sheet while allowing the investigation to continue - Supreme Court held that while a High Court can exercise discretion to grant protection from coercive steps during the pendency of a petition under Article 226, a blanket stay on filing the report under Section 193(3) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) is "wholly unjust" when the facts involve repeated fraudulent sale of society lands. Shrikant Ojha v State of U.P., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 493 : 2026 INSC 482
Section 173(8) Cr.P.C. - In the absence of express permission from the concerned Magistrate, the police cannot proceed with further investigation after filing a closure report/final report. The requirement of obtaining leave of the Court/Magistrate, though not expressly provided in the statute, has been read into Section 173(8) CrPC as a necessary safeguard through consistent judicial pronouncements. [Relied on: Rama Chaudhary v. State of Bihar, (2013) 5 SCC 762, Vinay Tyagi v. Irshad, (2013) 5 SCC 762, Peethambaran v. State of Kerala, 2023 LiveLaw (SC) 402, Robert Lalchungnunga Chongthu v. State of Bihar, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2511] Paliniswamy Veeraraja v. State of Karnataka, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 557 : 2026 INSC 561
Section 194 - Police to enquire and report on suicide, etc.
Section 194 BNSS – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Section 174 – Scope and Purpose of Inquest Proceedings – Bail Parameters - The Supreme Court held that the scope of an inquiry under Section 174 of the Cr.P.C. (now corresponding to Section 194 of the BNSS, 2023) is a preliminary enquiry of a limited and specific character, strictly confined to ascertaining the apparent cause of death - It is neither intended nor required to record a detailed account of the incident or register the names of the accused persons who might have caused the death - The High Court was not justified in drawing an adverse inference to grant bail to the accused merely because the informant and another panch witness had not made specific allegations against the accused during the inquest proceedings - Non-mention of the author of the crime in the inquest report cannot, by itself, be a valid reason to doubt the involvement of an accused who is subsequently named. [Relied on Pedda Narayana v. State of A.P., (1975) 4 SCC 153; Amar Singh v. Balwinder Singh, (2003) 2 SCC 518; Paras 12-14] Bhagat Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 535 : 2026 INSC 527
Section 215 - Prosecution for contempt of lawful authority of public servants
Section 195 read with Section 340 Cr.P.C. – Prosecution for Perjury in Matrimonial Disputes – Scope of – Application filed by husband seeking prosecution of wife for making allegedly false statements on oath during interim maintenance proceedings - Held: The allegations do not disclose the necessary ingredients of the offence of perjury - The husband's grievances stem from a hyper-technical dissection of the material on record and appear to be instigated by personal vendetta, anger, and pent-up frustration arising out of escalated matrimonial acrimony - Recourse to criminal prosecution under Section 340 CrPC cannot be permitted to satisfy a spiteful approach. Special Leave Petition filed by the husband dismissed. [Paras 36, 37] Ann Saurabh Dutt v. Lieutenant Colonel Saurabh Iqbal Bahadur Dutt, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 489 : 2026 INSC 475
Section 218 - Prosecution of Judges and public servants.
Section 197(1) Cr.P.C. – Protection of Public Servants – Protection under Section 197(1) is only available to public servants who are "not removable from his office save by or with the sanction of the Government." - Subordinate rank police officers who can be dismissed by an Inspector General of Police or other departmental heads without State Government sanction do not fall under this category. Samarendra Nath Kundu v. Sadhana Das, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 314 : 2026 INSC 304
Section 197(3) Cr.P.C. – State Government Notification – While the State Government has the power to extend Section 197(2) protection to members of forces charged with maintaining public order via notification, such protection only applies to the act of "taking cognizance." - If no bar existed on the date the court took cognizance, the trial can proceed despite a later notification. [Relied on Nagraj v. State of Mysore (AIR 1964 SC 269); Fakhruzamma v. State of Jharkhand (2013 15 SCC 552); Paras 10-15] Samarendra Nath Kundu v. Sadhana Das, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 314 : 2026 INSC 304
Section 197 Cr.P.C. – Sanction for Prosecution – Applicability of subsequent notification to prior cognizance – Held that the bar under Section 197 of Cr.P.C. applies at the stage of taking cognizance - A notification issued under Section 197(3) extending protection to subordinate police officers does not have a retrospective effect on proceedings where cognizance was already validly taken before the issuance of such notification - A post-cognizance sanction or a subsequent bar cannot nullify a validly passed cognizance order. Samarendra Nath Kundu v. Sadhana Das, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 314 : 2026 INSC 304
Section 197 Cr.P.C. – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023; Section 217 – Delay in Sanction – Reference to Larger Bench - While addressing the "lethargy and/or apathy" of competent authorities in granting sanction for prosecution, Supreme Court noted that the High Court of Madras had issued a direction stating that if no decision is taken on a sanction request within one month, "sanction will be deemed to have been granted." - Given the recurring nature of these grievances and existing proceedings before a Bench presided over by the Chief Justice of India, Supreme Court referred the matter for consideration by a Larger Bench – Held that the High Court's direction regarding "deemed sanction" remains stayed pending further orders. [Relied on Suneeti Toteja Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Anr. (2025) SCC OnLine SC 433; Paras 5-8 ] State v. M. Muneer Ahmed, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 167
Sanction for Prosecution – Concept of Deemed Sanction – Deemed Sanction not recognized in Subramanian Swamy vs. Manmohan Singh - The Supreme Court observed that the lead judgment in Dr. Subramanian Swamy vs. Manmohan Singh (2012) 3 SCC 64, does not refer to or discuss the concept of "deemed sanction" - While paragraph 81 of the said judgment part of the concurring opinion by Hon'ble A.K. Ganguly, is often cited, a Coordinate Bench in Suneeti Toteja Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh (2025) SCC OnLine SC 433 has already repelled arguments for deemed sanction, noting that even the Subramanian Swamy decision does not lend credence to such an argument. State v. M. Muneer Ahmed, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 167
Section 223 - Examination of complainant
Section 223(1) first proviso BNSS — Applicability to Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (PMLA) proceedings — Right of the accused to be heard prior to taking cognizance — Nature of provision – Held that the first proviso to Section 223(1) of the BNSS, which prohibits a Court from taking cognizance of an offence on a complaint without giving the accused an opportunity of being heard, is substantive and mandatory in nature - It confers a vital right upon the accused that forms an integral part of the right to a fair trial enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution of India - The procedural framework governing complaint cases under the erstwhile CrPC (Sections 200 to 205) and the corresponding provisions of the BNSS (Sections 223 to 228) apply to prosecution complaints filed under Section 44(1)(b) of the PMLA, as they are not inconsistent with the special statute - Non-compliance with the mandate of the first proviso to Section 223(1) of the BNSS is not a mere procedural irregularity but an illegality that renders the order taking cognizance void ab initio. Parvinder Singh v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 522 : 2026 INSC 519
Section 225 - Postponement of issue of process.
Section 225 BNSS - A Magistrate must conduct an inquiry himself or direct an investigation under Section 225 BNSS before issuing process against an accused who resides outside the territorial jurisdiction of the Court. Direct issuance of summons or process without complying with the mandatory procedure under Section 225 BNSS is impermissible. Rajeev Mehta @ Rajiv Kishor Kirtilal Mehta v. Param Bir Singh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 411
Section 202 Cr.P.C. - Once a Magistrate takes cognizance and issues process (summons), the accused is only required to appear before the Court and participate in the proceedings. Police have no authority to arrest the accused in a complaint case unless the Court issues a non-bailable warrant along with or in place of summons. Even when a Magistrate directs a police inquiry under Section 202 Cr.P.C. before issuing process, the police have no power to arrest the accused during the course of such inquiry. Om Prakash Chhawnika v. State of Jharkhand, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 419
Section 202(1) CrPC vs. Proviso to Section 200 CrPC – Postponement of issue of process – Accused residing beyond territorial jurisdiction – Mandatory inquiry under Section 202(1) CrPC vs. Proviso to Section 200 CrPC – Public Servant Exemption - The Supreme Court held: The mandatory requirement of conducting an inquiry or investigation under Section 202(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) in cases where the accused resides beyond the Magistrate's territorial jurisdiction must be construed harmoniously with the proviso to Section 200 CrPC - When a complaint is filed in writing by a public servant acting in the discharge of their official duties, the Magistrate is exempted from examining the complainant and witnesses on oath - the legislature has placed public servants on a "different pedestal," and the lack of a specific Section 202 inquiry does not vitiate the summoning order when the complaint is lodged by a competent official authority (such as a Drugs Inspector). State of Kerala v. Panacea Biotec Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 206 : 2026 INSC 200 : AIR 2026 SC 1270 ; 2026 (1) Crimes (SC) 285
Section 232 - Commitment of case to Court of Session when offence is triable exclusively by it.
Sections 209 and 323 of CrPC — Jurisdiction — Magistrate's Power to Commit — Noted that High Court's assumption that the case was triable by a Magistrate was premature. Even if a case is initially before a Magistrate, it can be committed to the Court of Sessions under Section 209 or Section 323 of the CrPC if the offences (such as Section 409 or 467 IPC, which carry sentences up to life imprisonment) warrant such a trial – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Dolat Ram and others vs. State of Haryana (1995) 1 SCC 349; Neeru Yadav vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and another (2014) 16 SCC 508; Sudha Singh vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and another (2021) 4 SCC 781; Paras 15-21] Rakesh Mittal v. Ajay Pal Gupta, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 170 : AIR 2026 SC 1117
Section 258 - Judgment of acquittal or conviction
Section 235(2) and Section 386(a) Cr.P.C. — Procedure on reversing an acquittal — Appellate Court's power and obligation to sentence — When an Appellate Court reverses a judgment of acquittal and convicts an accused for the first time, it has a bounden duty to hear the convict on the question of sentence and impose an appropriate sentence itself - The Appellate Court cannot abdicate its judicial function or relegate the matter to the Trial Court solely for the purpose of pronouncing and imposing a sentence - Such a course of remanding the matter for sentencing is alien to the scheme of Section 386(a) of the Cr.P.C - The Supreme Court partly allowed the appeals, setting aside the High Court's direction to the Trial Judge to impose the sentence - The matter was remitted back to the High Court with a direction to fix a date, hear the convict on the issue of sentence, and pass an appropriate sentence in accordance with law. [Relied on Kumar Exports v. Sharma Carpets, (2009) 2 SCC 513; Dagdu and Others v. State of Maharashtra, (1977) 3 SCC 68; Allauddin Mian and Others Sharif Mian and Another v. State of Bihar, (1989) 3 SCC 5; Kamalakar Nandram Bhavsar and Others v. State of Maharashtra, (2004) 10 SCC 192; Paras 14 - 20] Mukesh Kumar Yadav v. State, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 546 : 2026 INSC 559
Section 238 - Effect of errors.
Section 215, 228, 464, and 465 Cr.P.C. — Framing of Charge — Procedural Irregularity vs. Fundamental Illegality — De Novo Trial — The Supreme Court set aside a High Court order directing a fresh trial due to an unsigned formal charge-sheet - held that the purpose of framing a charge is to provide the accused with precise notice of accusations to enable an effective defense, rather than being a "mere ritualistic formality" - Where the record indicates that charges were read over and explained to the accused in the presence of counsel, and the accused subsequently participated in the trial for over fourteen years by extensively cross-examining witnesses, there is substantial compliance with Section 228 Cr.P.C. - A procedural lapse, such as the omission of a signature on a formal charge document, constitutes a curable irregularity under Sections 215 and 464 Cr.P.C. unless it is demonstrated that the accused was misled or that a "failure of justice" was occasioned. Sandeep Yadav v. Satish, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 296 : 2026 INSC 301
Exceptional Nature of De Novo Trials — A direction for a de novo trial is an exceptional measure and should not be resorted to for mere procedural lapses, especially when a trial has substantially progressed and key prosecution witnesses have since expired - Ordering a fresh trial in the absence of demonstrated prejudice irretrievably prejudices the prosecution and defeats the interests of timely justice. [Relied on Willie (William) Slaney v. State of Madhya Pradesh (AIR 1956 SC 116); Main Pal v. State of Haryana (2010) 10 SCC 130; Ajay Kumar Ghoshal v. State of Bihar (2017) 12 SCC 699; Paras 14-17] Sandeep Yadav v. Satish, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 296 : 2026 INSC 301
Section 241 - Separate charges for distinct offences
Rights of Complainants/Witnesses – Concern that treating complainants as witnesses in a single FIR deprives them of legal remedies – Held: Complainants treated as witnesses are entitled to file protest petitions if a closure report is filed or if the Magistrate intends to discharge the accused. The Magistrate is bound to consider such petitions on merits – Held: Requiring registration of individual FIRs for every victim in mass-cheating cases would lead to an unnecessary multiplicity of proceedings, which is not in the larger public interest or the interest of the State – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Mish Devgan vs. Union of India and others (2021) 1 SCC 1; Andhra Pradesh vs. Cheemalapati Ganeswara Rao (1964) 3 SCR 297; Paras 15-22] State (NCT of Delhi) v. Khimji Bhai Jadeja, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 11 : 2026 INSC 25 : 2026 CriLJ 625
Section 250 - Discharge
Sections 227 and 482 Cr.P.C. — Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 — Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) — Indian Penal Code, 1860 — Sections 471, 477-A, and 120-B — Orissa Forest Act, 1972 — Section 27 — Discharge — Vague and General Allegations — Principle of Parity - Held, that the presence of general allegations without any overt act or specific imputations against the accused is insufficient to proceed to trial - While a detailed appreciation of evidence is not warranted at the stage of framing charges, Supreme Court must be satisfied that there exists a sufficient ground or grave suspicion against the accused - Broad and joint accusations cast in a wide net, without defining individual roles or culpability, are impermissible under law - Held, that when similarly situated co-accused persons prominently placed in the administrative chain have already been discharged under similar allegations, the principle of parity requires that the Appellant be treated alike - Continuing proceedings against one accused while discharging others on indistinguishable facts would be arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India - Continuation of such vague criminal proceedings would amount to an abuse of the process of law - The High Court's order dismissing the application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is set aside, and the Appellant is discharged. [Relied on Neelu Chopra and another Vs. Bharti, (2009) 10 SCC 184 State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335; Yogesh v. State of Maharashtra, (2008) 10 SCC 394; Paras 15-24] Susanta Kumar Dalei v. State of Odisha, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 518 : 2026 INSC 510
Sections 227 and 228 – Discharge and Framing of Charge – Noted that a Judge has the power to sift and weigh evidence for the limited purpose of finding a prima facie case, they cannot conduct a "mini-trial" or a roving inquiry at the threshold stage - If two views are possible and one gives rise to only suspicion (as distinguished from "grave suspicion"), the Trial Judge is empowered to discharge the accused - Supreme Court noted that "the process itself can become the punishment" if responsibility at the framing stage is not exercised with care. [Paras 12 - 21] Dr. Anand Rai v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 136 : 2026 INSC 141 : AIR 2026 SC 1069
Section 330 - No formal proof of certain documents.
Section 294 CrPC — Scope and Distinction – Admissibility of documents without formal proof vs. Evidence of formal character on affidavit – The High Court dismissed the application under Section 294 Cr.P.C. by erroneously relying on a precedent concerning Section 296 Cr.P.C. – Held: Section 294 Cr.P.C. deals with documentary evidence where the court calls upon parties to admit or deny the genuineness of documents to dispense with formal proof - In contrast, Section 296 Cr.P.C. relates to evidence of a formal character given by affidavit - The ratio of a judgment concerning Section 296 cannot be applied to reject an application under Section 294 - It is the duty of the Court to uphold the spirit of Section 294 by ascertaining the genuineness of documents through admission or denial. [Relied on State of Punjab Vs. Naib Din (2001) 8 SCC 578; Para 6-9] R. Ganesh v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 471
Section 294 CrPC — Admissibility of Post-Mortem Report — The non-examination of the medical officer who conducted the post-mortem is not fatal to the prosecution if the defense admits the genuineness of the report under Section 294 CrPC - Once admitted, the report serves as substantive evidence of the correctness of its contents - Intention — Intention is a state of mind gathered from the cumulative effect of circumstances: nature of weapons, body parts targeted, force used, premeditation, and prior enmity - Even if weapons like lathis are used, their lethality is determined by the manner of use and the multiplicity of injuries on vital parts – Appeals allowed. [Relied on Daya Nand v. State of Haryana (2008) 15 SCC 717; Pulicherla Nagaraju v. State of A.P. (2006) 11 SCC 444; Akhtar v. State of Uttaranchal (2009) 13 SCC 722; Vinubhai Ranchhodbhai Patel v. Rajivbhai Dudabhai Patel (2018) 7 SCC 743; Paras 41-45, 61-67, 69, 70] Sitaram Kuchhbedia v. Vimal Rana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 189 : 2026 INSC 178
Section 337 - Person once convicted or acquitted not to be tried for same offence
Criminal Prosecution vs. Disciplinary Proceedings — Interplay and Effect of Exoneration - Whether exoneration in a departmental enquiry automatically results in the quashing of parallel criminal proceedings? –Supreme Court discussed following points and held that - i. Standard of Proof: reiterated that disciplinary proceedings and criminal prosecutions are independent, governed by different standards of proof: preponderance of probabilities for the former and proof beyond reasonable doubt for the latter; ii. Distinction between Fact-patterns: distinguished between cases where the very "substratum of the allegation" is found non-existent on merits (as in Radheshyam Kejriwal) and cases where exoneration is based on a lack of evidence or technical grounds; iii. Effect of Independent Entities: Where the prosecuting agency (e.g., Anti-Corruption Bureau/Lokayukta) and the disciplinary authority are different entities not in the same hierarchy, the findings of the departmental enquiry do not bind the criminal court; iv. Nature of Exoneration: Exoneration in a departmental proceeding ipso facto does not result in the quashing of criminal prosecution - Quashing is only permissible if the exoneration is on merits, where the allegation is found to be unsustainable and the person is held innocent; v. Specific Findings in This Case: In the present case, the "exoneration" was deemed a "discharge for lack of diligence" because the Inspector who conducted the trap was not examined, rather than a finding that the bribe was never demanded - Supreme Court found sufficient evidence (complainant testimony and independent witnesses) to justify the continuation of the criminal trial – Appeal allowed. [Relied on State (NCT of Delhi) v. Ajay Kumar Tyagi (2012) 9 SCC 685; Radheshyam Kejriwal v. State of W.B. (2011) 3 SCC 581; P.S. Rajya v. State of Bihar (1996) 9 SCC 1; Paras 12-17] Karnataka Lokayukta Bagalkote District v. Chandrashekar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 15 : 2026 INSC 31
Section 351 - Power to examine the accused.
Section 313 Cr.P.C. – Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 – Section 21 – Opportunity to Lead Defense Evidence – The appellant contended he was not afforded an opportunity to examine himself as a defense witness - Supreme Court rejected this, noting that the trial record showed the appellant's statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C. was recorded and he had the opportunity to avail himself of Section 21 of the P.C. Act but failed to do so during the trial. Raj Bahadur Singh v. State of Uttarakhand, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 242 : 2026 INSC 239 : AIR 2026 SC 1506
Section 313 Cr.P.C. – Examination of the Accused – Failure to put specific material circumstances – Prejudice to the Accused – The underlying object of Section 313 is based on the principle of audi alteram partem to enable the accused to explain incriminating circumstances - a generalized presumption of prejudice cannot be made merely because of inadequate or general questions - To vitiate a trial, the accused must demonstrate that the non-examination on a particular circumstance actually and materially prejudiced them, resulting in a failure of justice - In the present case, while questions were general, the incriminating circumstances were put to the appellants, and no specific prejudice was shown - Held, the testimony of eye-witnesses cannot be discarded merely because they are related to the deceased. If their presence at the site is natural and their testimony remains consistent under cross-examination, minor inconsistencies do not weaken the prosecution's. [Relied on Rakesh and Anr. Vs. State of U.P. and Anr. (2021 INSC 321; Suresh Chandra Bahri vs. State of Bihar (1995 Suppl (1) SCC 80); Om Pal and Ors. Vs. State of U.P. (now State of Uttarakhand) (2025 INSC 1262); Para 5-9] Ghanshyam Mandal v. State of Bihar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 201 : 2026 INSC 194 : AIR 2026 SC 1445
Section 313 Cr.P.C. - Examination of Accused – Duty of Court and Prosecutor – Impact of Inadequate Questioning - Held: It is the solemn duty of both the Trial Court and the Prosecutor to ensure all incriminating circumstances (motive, dying declarations, medical evidence) are put to the accused during their Section 313 examination - A casual or "scanty" examination that omits material circumstances falls short of the legal standard and can lead to the failure of the entire prosecution. Sanjay Kumar Sharma v. State of Bihar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 230 : 2026 INSC 223
Section 313 CrPC — Adverse Inference — Failure to Explain Incriminating Circumstances - Held: When an accused gives incorrect or false answers or maintains complete denial regarding facts within their exclusive knowledge during a Section 313 CrPC statement, the court is entitled to draw an adverse inference - In this case, the Appellant-Accused denied his relationship with the deceased and even his admission to the hospital despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary - Such conduct fails to meet the explanation expected of a person of normal prudence and tilts the case in favor of the prosecution. Gudipalli Siddhartha Reddy v. State C.B.I., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 166 : 2026 INSC 160 : AIR 2026 SC 950
Section 358 - Power to proceed against other persons appearing to be guilty of offence.
Section 319 CrPC – Subsequent Summoning of Quashed Accused – Doctrine of Double Jeopardy (Article 20(2) of the Constitution of India & Section 300 CrPC) – Held - Quashing of proceedings under Section 482 CrPC at the threshold does not amount to an acquittal on merits and does not trigger the bar of 'double jeopardy' - Supreme Court clarified that if strong and cogent evidence emerges during the trial of the husband implicating the present appellants, the trial court remains fully competent to exercise its powers under Section 319 CrPC to summon them to face trial. [Relied on State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335; Anand Kumar Mohatta v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2019) 11 SCC 706; Hardeep Singh v. State of Punjab, (2014) 3 SCC 92; MCD v. Ram Kishan Rohtagi, (1983) 1 SCC 1; Paras 22-57] Arti Mehta v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 539 : 2026 INSC 533
Section 319 Cr.P.C. – Principles for Granting Bail to Accused Added via Section 319 – High Standard of Evidence Required - The Supreme Court held that when a person is added as an accused under Section 319 Cr.P.C. and subsequently arrested, the court considering a bail plea must apply a test higher than a mere prima facie case - The relevant consideration is whether there is "strong and cogent evidence" of complicity, rather than a mere probability - While this standard is shorter than the satisfaction required for a conviction if the evidence goes unrebutted, it is significantly higher than the standard required for framing charges against original accused persons - In exercising discretion for bail for an accused summoned under Section 319, the Court must weigh the nature of the offence, the quality of evidence against the newly added accused, and the likelihood of the person absconding or tampering with evidence. [Para 13, 14] Md Imran @ D.C. Guddu v. State of Jharkhand, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 23 : 2026 INSC 36
Section 319 Cr.P.C. – Summoning of additional accused – Standards of Evidence – Three-Tier Threshold – Supreme Court noted three distinct levels of evidence assessment: (i) Prima facie standard(lowest) for framing formal charges; (ii) Strong and cogent evidence (middle) for summoning additional accused under Section 319 CrPC, where evidence must be reliable and reasonably persuasive but not beyond reasonable doubt; and (iii) Proof beyond reasonable doubt (highest) required for conviction. Mohammad Kaleem v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 251 : 2026 INSC 251 : AIR 2026 SC 1426
Section 319 Cr.P.C. – Scope of Judicial Scrutiny – Mini-Trial prohibited – The Supreme Court observed that while Section 319 is an extraordinary power to be exercised sparingly, the Trial Court must not conduct a "mini-trial" or a threadbare credibility assessment of minor contradictions at this stage - In the instant case, the Trial Court erred by overemphasizing minor inconsistencies in witness accounts, the absence of jail records, and the physical plausibility of the complainant escaping injury. Mohammad Kaleem v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 251 : 2026 INSC 251 : AIR 2026 SC 1426
Section 319 Cr.P.C. – Criminal Trial – Appreciation of Evidence – Fragmented vs. Cumulative Approach – Held, the Trial Court misdirected itself by treating inconsistencies in isolation rather than assessing the cumulative weight of testimonies and circumstances - Testimony on oath by three witnesses, including the complainant, is sufficient to meet the "strong and cogent" standard for summoning additional accused, even if minor inconsistencies exist which are matters for trial. [Relied on Hardeep Singh v. State of Punjab (2014) 3 SCC 92; Neeraj Kumar v. State of UP 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2639; Paras 7-12] Mohammad Kaleem v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 251 : 2026 INSC 251 : AIR 2026 SC 1426
Section 395 - Order to pay compensation
Sentencing Policy — Principle of Proportionality — Modification of Sentence to "Period Already Undergone" — Grounds of Lapse of Time and Victim Compensation — Held: The High Court erred in reducing the sentence of the Private Respondents from three years rigorous imprisonment to the period already undergone (two months) based on the lapse of time (10.5 years) and the willingness of the accused to pay compensation - Punishment must be commensurate with the gravity of the crime and the manner of its commission to maintain public confidence in the efficacy of law - Undue sympathy in awarding inadequate sentences undermines the justice system and fails to respond to society's cry for justice. Parameshwari v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 169 : 2026 INSC 164 : 2026 (1) Crimes (SC) 307
Section 403 - Court not to alter judgment
Section 362 Cr.P.C. - Bar on Alteration or Review of Signed Orders – The Supreme Court set aside an order of the Patna High Court which had recalled its earlier grant of bail to the appellant - The High Court had reversed the bail order on the grounds of a clerical error by the Court Master, who recorded the petition as "allowed" despite the operative portion allegedly being "rejected" - The Supreme Court held that under Section 362 CrPC, no alteration or review of a signed judgment or order is permissible except to correct clerical or arithmetical errors – Noted that no such error justified the recall, rendering the High Court's action unsustainable in law. Rambali Sahni v. State of Bihar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 61
Section 413 - No appeal to lie unless otherwise provided.
Sections 372 and 378 Cr.P.C. – Appeal against Acquittal – Right of Complainant as 'Victim' – Conflict of Judgments – Reference to Larger Bench – The Supreme Court observed a conflict between a recent co-ordinate Bench decision in Celestium Financial vs. A. Gnanasekaran (2025 INSC 804) and earlier decisions in Satya Pal Singh vs. State of M.P. and Subhash Chand vs. State (Delhi Administration) regarding whether a complainant in a Section 138 NI Act case must seek special leave to appeal under Section 378(4) CrPC or can appeal directly as a 'victim' under the proviso to Section 372 CrPC. Everest Automobiles v. Rajit Enterprises, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 155
Section 415 - Appeals from convictions
Convicts on Bail – Duty of Appellant – Supreme Court noted that convicts often neglect to cooperate with the court once their sentence is suspended - Appellants enlarged on bail have a responsibility to keep track of their appeals; they cannot blame the court or an Amicus Curiae for not raising specific grounds if they failed to engage with the proceedings for decades. [Relied on Anokhi Lal vs. State of Madhya Pradesh (2019) 20 SCC 196; Paras 17 - 23] Bhola Mahto v. State of Jharkhand, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 265 : 2026 INSC 257 : 2026 CriLJ 1869
Criminal Administration of Justice – Fair Trial vs. Expeditious Disposal – Appointment of Amicus Curiae – The Supreme Court emphasized that while fast-tracking criminal appeals is necessary, it must not occur at the expense of basic fairness - Noted that in cases where an appeal is listed after a significant delay (two decades in this instance) and the appellant's counsel is absent, it is a "desirable precaution" for the High Court to issue notice to the appellant regarding the appointment of an Amicus Curiae - While the High Court's intention to render legal assistance is genuine, justice is better served if the convict is informed so they may provide instructions for a "real and meaningful" defence rather than a "token gesture". Bhola Mahto v. State of Jharkhand, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 265 : 2026 INSC 257 : 2026 CriLJ 1869
Practice of the Court and Interests of Justice — Supreme Court observed that while the general practice is not to release a person sentenced to life imprisonment on bail, such practice cannot prevail if it operates to cause injustice - The underlying postulate of denying bail is that the appeal should be disposed of within a "measurable distance of time" - Keeping a person in jail for 5-6 years for an offence that may ultimately be found not to have been committed is a "travesty of justice" - Section 374(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 — Supreme Court noted that the right of appeal is a statutory right - Serious failure of justice ensues if an appellant remains incarcerated for over a decade only to have their appeal eventually succeed - Unless there are cogent grounds to the contrary, and where the delay is not attributable to the accused, the Court should ordinarily release the accused on bail if the appeal cannot be heard within a reasonable period. [Relied on Kashmira Singh vs. State of Punjab (1977) 4 SCC 291; Paras 5-13] Muna Bisoi v. State of Odisha, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 176
Section 419 - Appeal in case of acquittal
Appeal Against Acquittal — Circumstantial Evidence — Reversal of Acquittal by High Court — Held: The High Court erred in reversing the well-reasoned acquittal by the Trial Court without recording a clear finding that the Trial Court's view was not a possible view - An acquittal reinforces the presumption of innocence, which should not be displaced lightly by substituting inferences - The "golden principles" for circumstantial evidence were not satisfied as there was no complete chain of incriminating circumstances. Bernard Lyngdoh Phawa v. State of Meghalaya, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 84 : 2026 INSC 85 : 2026 (1) Crimes (SC) 230
Section 378 Cr.P.C. – Appeal against Acquittal – Grounds for Reversal – Noted that an order of acquittal may be reversed if the High Court rejects incontrovertible evidence based on unrealistic suspicion or surmises, or if it discounts the testimony of relatives solely on the ground of being 'interested' witnesses – Held that High Court wrongly placed undue reliance on the testimonies of hostile witnesses and contradictory defence evidence while ignoring the cogent testimonies of independent public servants – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar (2022) 3 SCC 471; Sadhu Saran Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2016) 4 SCC 35; State of Madhya Pradesh v. Phoolchand Rathore 2023 SCC OnLine SC 537; State of Uttar Pradesh v. Ajmal Beg 2025 SCC OnLine SC 280; Surajdeo Mahto v. State of Bihar (2022) 11 SCC 800; Paras 14-26] State of Himachal Pradesh v. Chaman Lal, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 48 : 2026 INSC 57 : 2026 1 Crimes (SC) 131 : 2026 CriLJ 823
Section 378 Cr.P.C. – Appeal against Acquittal – Scope of Interference by Appellate Court – The Supreme Court reiterated that an appellate court must exercise caution before reversing an order of acquittal - While the appellate court has full power to review and reappreciate evidence, it should not disturb the findings of the Trial Court if two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record - Interference is only justified if the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity, is based on a misreading or omission of material evidence, or if the Trial Court's view is "clearly unreasonable" - The acquittal further strengthens the double presumption of innocence in favor of the accused. [Paras 27 - 31] Tulasareddi @ Mudakappa v. State of Karnataka, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 59 : 2026 INSC 67 : 2026 (1) Crimes (SC) 121 ; 2026 CriLJ 534
Section 378(4) & (5) CrPC – Statutory Interpretation – Supreme Court noted that Section 378(4) and (5) were preserved in the Code, making it incumbent upon a complainant who initiated prosecution to obtain leave before filing an appeal against acquittal in the High Court - Supreme Court expressed disagreement with the interpretation that the proviso to Section 372 overrides the requirement of seeking leave under Section 378(4) - Noting the "far-reaching consequences" of the issue and the conflicting precedents, the Bench directed the matter to be placed before the Hon'ble Chief Justice of India for an authoritative pronouncement by a larger Bench. [Paras 2-4] Everest Automobiles v. Rajit Enterprises, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 155
Section 427 - Powers of the Appellate Court.
Appellate Jurisdiction – Interference with Order of Acquittal – Principles Reiterated – The Supreme Court observed that there is no absolute restriction in law on the appellate court to review and reappreciate the entire evidence upon which an order of acquittal is founded - While an appellate court is ordinarily slow to interfere with an acquittal, it must do so if the judgment is manifestly erroneous, perverse, or based on a misreading of evidence or incorrect application of law - Where the High Court adopts a wholly erroneous process of reasoning and ignores vital circumstances resulting in a grave miscarriage of justice, interference is imperative. State of Himachal Pradesh v. Chaman Lal, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 48 : 2026 INSC 57 : 2026 1 Crimes (SC) 131 : 2026 CriLJ 823
Section 430 - Suspension of sentence pending the appeal; release of appellant on bail
Attendance of Accused during Appeal/Revision – Suspension of Sentence – Validity of requiring physical presence on every hearing date – The Supreme Court held that once a sentence has been suspended and bail has been granted by an Appellate or Revisional Court, it is "unwarranted" and "burdensome" to require the accused to be present on every date of hearing - Such a practice serves no purpose, as the jurisdictional magistrate remains empowered to secure the accused's presence should the appeal or revision eventually be dismissed - noted that even if the prevalent practice is driven by the terms of Form No. 45 (Schedule II of the CrPC/BNSS) regarding bail bonds, it does not justify mandatory attendance for proceedings that may remain pending for years. [Paras 6 - 8] Meenakshi v. State of Haryana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 60
Suspension of Sentence — Grant of Bail pending Appeal — Long Incarceration — Life Imprisonment — The Supreme Court set aside an order of the High Court of Orissa which had declined the suspension of sentence for an appellant convicted under Sections 302/34 IPC and Section 27 of the Arms Act - The appellant had suffered incarceration for over 11 years while his appeal, filed in 2016, remained pending before the High Court. Muna Bisoi v. State of Odisha, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 176
Section 433 - Procedure where Judges of Court of appeal are equally divided
Section 392 Cr.P.C. – Anomalous and Irrational Consequences – The Supreme Court pointed out that a mechanical application of Sajjan Singh could lead to highly undesirable or discriminatory results under Article 14 - if a Division Bench unanimously decides to acquit two convicts but divides on the third, sending the entire composite appeal to a third Judge could put the unanimously acquitted persons at risk of conviction - in a State appeal against acquittal, it could risk the conviction of individuals whose acquittals were unanimously favoured by the Division Bench - Expressing its respectful disagreement with the coordinate bench ruling in Sajjan Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (1999) 1 SCC 315, the Bench referred the question of whether Sajjan Singh lays down the correct law to a larger Bench to be constituted by the Hon'ble Chief Justice of India. [Paras 35-41] Dr. Rakesh Kumar Gupta v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 615 : 2026 INSC 632
Section 392 Cr.P.C. – scope of referee judge's jurisdiction in composite appeals – difference of opinion – Whether a third Judge, upon a reference under Section 392 CrPC due to a division of opinion regarding one co-accused, can reopen and examine the case of other co-accused whose convictions were unanimously upheld by the Division Bench – Supreme Court doubted the correctness of its two-judge bench decision in Sajjan Singh v. State of M.P. (1999) – Matter referred to a larger Bench - Statutory Interpretation of Section 392 CrPC – "An Appeal" vs "The Appeal" – The Supreme Court highlighted the significant linguistic shift from Section 429 of the 1898 Code (which used "the case") to Section 392 of the 1973 Code (which uses "an appeal" and "the appeal") - Highlighting the anaphoric use of the definite article, the Supreme Court observed that while the indefinite article "an appeal" triggers the provision for any appeal resulting in a divided opinion, the definite article "the appeal" limits the referee Judge's jurisdiction strictly to the specific instance or individual appeal where the division occurred - Merely because multiple convicts file a composite joint appeal, it cannot mean that a unanimous decision dismissing the appeal against some convicts can be reopened by the third Judge if the division of opinion relates only to another co-accused. [Relied Bhagat Ram v. State of Rajasthan, (1972) 2 SCC 466; Paras 29 – 32] Dr. Rakesh Kumar Gupta v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 615 : 2026 INSC 632
Section 442 - High Court's powers of revision.
Section 442 BNSS (erstwhile Section 401 of CrPC) — Revisional Jurisdiction of the High Court — Judicial Restraint vs. Indulgence — High Court's order permitting the accused to travel to the USA for medical treatment, on the ground that he appeared before the Magistrate on 12 previous occasions and undertook to return within 6 months, held to be an unsustainable exercise of indulgence rather than judicial restraint - The Supreme Court observed that the trial had not commenced even after 10 years of filing the chargesheet due to the proactive role of the accused in initiating multifarious proceedings and securing interim protections, including the misuse of an order suspending a Look Out Circular (LoC) to leave the country without court permission - comparable medical facilities exist domestically in India. [Paras 8, 9] Seesa Santosh v. State of Telangana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 603 : 2026 INSC 628
Section 473 - Power to suspend or remit sentences
Section 432 Cr.P.C. (now Section 473 of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023) – Premature Release / Remission – Automation of Process – Automatic Triggering of Eligibility - It is the bounden obligation of the appropriate Government to consider the cases of all convicts for the grant of premature release as and when they become eligible for consideration in terms of the state policy - It is not necessary for the convict or their relatives to file a specific application for permanent remission; instead, the process must be automatically triggered and initiated a few months prior to their date of eligibility – Held that endorsing the implementation of the National Legal Services Authority's (NALSA) Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) of 2022, the Supreme Court directed the State of Uttar Pradesh to roll out the 'E-Prisons Early Release Processing Module' (developed by the NIC) as a pilot project in Central Jail, Agra, and District Jail, Lucknow to automate premature release processing, eradicate administrative delays, and eliminate the physical movement of files. [Relied on: In Re: Policy Strategy for Grant of Bail, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 349; Paras 14 - 22] Surendra @ Sunda v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 563 : 2026 INSC 414
Criminal Procedure – Remission / Premature Release – Rejection of Remission Proposal by Central Government – Investigation by CBI – Requirement of Concurrence – Speaking Order – Application of Mind – Parity – Reformative Theory of Punishment – Writ Petition challenging the letter dated 09.07.2025 issued by the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA), Union of India, which disallowed the recommendation of the State of Uttarakhand for the premature release of the petitioner who had been incarcerated for over 22 years in a murder case investigated by the CBI – Held that i. Cryptic and Non-Speaking Orders Invalidation: The impugned letter issued by the MHA rejecting the remission recommendation was ex-facie non-speaking, cryptic, and failed to disclose any reasons for its disagreement with the State Government's proposal - Recording of reasons is an essential safeguard against arbitrariness, ensures transparency, and reflects due application of mind - Absence of reasons violates the principles of natural justice and frustrates the convict's right to seek effective judicial review; ii. Heinousness of Offence Not the Sole Ground for Denial: Denial of remission cannot rest solely on the gravity or heinous nature of the original crime - The heinousness of the offence stands exhausted at the stage of sentencing and judicial determination of punishment - Remission is a distinct executive function concerned with the present and the future specifically the prisoner's conduct, evidence of reformation, and prospects of reintegration into society - Permanent incarceration under the shadow of a past worst act is impermissible in a liberal constitutional order; iii. Principle of Parity: Where a co-accused in the very same offence and incident has already been granted premature release after a lesser period of actual incarceration (17 years), denying similar consideration to the petitioner without any cogent, rational, and discernible distinguishing circumstances violates the constitutional requirements of fairness and non-arbitrariness under Article 14; iv. Futility of Remand: While a non-speaking order is ordinarily remanded for fresh consideration, a mechanical remand is unnecessary where the authority has already fully articulated its firm stand on merits before the Court - Relegating a convict who has served over 22 years to another round of administrative proceedings would prolong incarceration unnecessarily and fail the interests of justice - The impugned letter is quashed - The Writ Petition is allowed, and the petitioner (already on interim bail) is directed to be treated as prematurely released without requiring him to surrender. [Relied on Laxman Naskar v. State of W.B., (2000) 7 SCC 626; State (NCT of Delhi) v. Prem Raj, (2003) 7 SCC 121; Satish v. State of U.P., (2021) 14 SCC 580; Bilkis Yakub Rasool v. Union of India, (2024) 5 SCC 481; Sarat Chandra Rabha v. Khagendranath Nath, AIR 1961 SC 334; Paras 5 - 10] Rohit Chaturvedi v. State of Uttarakhand, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 501 : 2026 INSC 490 : AIR 2026 SC 2380 ; 2026 (2) Crimes SC 287
Section 480 - When bail may be taken in case of non-bailable offence
Section 480 (3) BNSS – the conditions stipulated under Section 480(3) BNSS are not applicable to non-bailable offences punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to seven years. Narayan v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 426
Section 482 - Direction for grant of bail to person apprehending arrest.
Section 482 BNSS (corresponding to Section 438 of CrPC) – Guidelines for Anticipatory Bail – Shifting of Burden – Scope of Judicial Discretion – The High Court erred in refusing anticipatory bail by shifting the burden of proof onto the accused to prove beyond doubt that the allegations made by him in a press conference were true - making observations regarding an offence under Section 339 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS), without it being alleged in the FIR and merely on the oral statement of the Advocate General, is incorrect - Anticipatory bail cannot be denied on a rigid or inexorable rule; instead, courts must weigh multiple considerations, including the nature and seriousness of the charges, the context of events, the flight risk, and the possibility of tampering with evidence. [Relied on Shri Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia and Others v. State of Punjab, (1980) 2 SCC 565; Pradip N. Sharma v. State of Gujarat and Another, 2025 SCC OnLine 457; Paras 15 – 27] Pawan Khera v. State of Assam, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 443 : 2026 INSC 437
Section 482 BNSS – Grant of Anticipatory Bail – The Supreme Court granted anticipatory bail to a businessman accused of sexual harassment and rape under Sections 351(2), 64, 74, 75, and 79 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS) and Section 67A of the IT Act - Noted that the FIR lodged by the complainant appeared to be a "counter-blast" to an earlier FIR filed by the appellant alleging extortion. Venu Gopalakrishnan v. State of Kerala, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 378 : 2026 INSC 373 : AIR 2026 SC 1995 : 2026 (2) Crimes SC 263
Section 482 BNSS – Grant of Anticipatory Bail – The Supreme Court granted anticipatory bail to a businessman accused of sexual harassment and rape under Sections 351(2), 64, 74, 75, and 79 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS) and Section 67A of the IT Act - Supreme Court observed that the FIR lodged by the complainant appeared to be a "counter-blast" to an earlier FIR filed by the appellant alleging extortion - noted that prior to the FIR, the parties had engaged in meetings where a financial settlement of ₹30 crores was discussed to bring a "quietus" to the allegations - The appellant had previously filed FIR against the complainant and her husband for extortion, leading to their arrest, prior to the filing of the rape allegations - Noted that had the financial settlement reached its logical conclusion, criminal proceedings likely would not have been initiated - The complainant's FIR was filed only after the appellant refused the settlement and initiated criminal action against the couple- The Supreme Court set aside the High Court of Kerala's order - The appellant is to be released on bail in the event of arrest, subject to – i. Furnishing a cash security of ₹1,00,000/- with two sureties; ii. Complete cooperation with the ongoing investigation; iii. Non-interference with witnesses or evidence. [Paras 10-16] Shankar Mahto v. State of Bihar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 379 : 2026 INSC 369
Addition of Graver Offences — Procedure for Arrest — Where an accused is already on bail and new, more serious, cognizable, and non-bailable offences are added, the accused does not automatically lose their liberty but the court must apply its mind afresh. In such cases – i. The accused may surrender and apply for bail for the newly added offences; ii. The investigating agency must obtain an order from the Court that granted bail to arrest the accused; a routine arrest without such an order is not permissible. [Relied on Sushila Aggarwal & Ors. vs. State (NCT of Delhi) & Anr. (2020) 5 SCC 1; Bharat Chaudhary and Anr. vs. State of Bihar and Anr. 2003) 8 SCC 77; Siddharth vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr. (2022) 1 SCC 676; Shri Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia vs. State of Punjab (1980) 2 SCC 565; Paras 12-25, 31-34] Sumit v. State of U.P., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 147 : 2026 INSC 145 : AIR 2026 SC 905
Section 438 Cr.P.C. - Anticipatory Bail - Cancellation of - Abuse of Authority by Law Enforcers - The Supreme Court set aside the order of the High Court granting anticipatory bail to three police officers accused of extorting cash from a citizen in exchange for a gold bar recovered during a search. The anticipatory bail granted by the High Court was cancelled. When police officers, who are duty-bound to protect citizens, themselves indulge in extortion, it creates a serious dilemma for citizens who have no option but to seek protection from the very authority that is abusing its power. The Court expressed strong disapproval of such uniformed excesses. State of Maharashtra v. Rahul Datta Bhosale, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 592 : 2026 INSC 596
Section 438 Cr.P.C. — Anticipatory Bail — Duration of Protection — The Supreme Court reiterated that once anticipatory bail is granted, it should not invariably be limited to a fixed period or restricted to the stage of filing a charge-sheet - The protection should ordinarily enure in favor of the accused without restriction on time and can continue until the end of the trial, unless specific facts or features necessitate a limited tenure. Sumit v. State of U.P., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 147 : 2026 INSC 145 : AIR 2026 SC 905
Section 438 Cr.P.C. — Anticipatory Bail – Non-Cooperation with Investigation – Scope of Section 438 CrPC / Section 482 BNSS – The Supreme Court held that the mere act of an accused not answering specific questions posed by the Investigating Officer (IO) does not automatically constitute "non-cooperation" with the investigation - Noted that if an accused has appeared before the IO pursuant to interim protection, the failure to provide specific answers is not a sufficient ground ipso facto to deny bail. Shally Mahant @ Sandeep v. State of Punjab, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 146
Section 438 Cr.P.C. — Anticipatory Bail — Absconding Accused — An absconder is not entitled to the relief of anticipatory bail as a general rule - The power to grant pre-arrest bail to an absconder may only be exercised in exceptional cases where, upon perusal of the FIR and case diary, the Court is prima facie satisfied that the accusation is false or over-exaggerated - In the present case, the Accused remained untraceable for over six years, a reward was announced for his arrest, and he allegedly threatened a key witness; such conduct makes it an unfit case for the exercise of judicial discretion under Section 438. Balmukund Singh Gautam v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 158 : 2026 INSC 157: 2026 (2) Crimes SC 112
Section 438 Cr.P.C. – Anticipatory Bail – Held that where co-accused summoned under Section 319 Cr.P.C. have already been granted anticipatory bail and have been appearing regularly before the trial court, no case for cancellation is made out unless specific grounds for such cancellation are established by the State. [Para 15, 18, 19] Md Imran @ D.C. Guddu v. State of Jharkhand, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 23 : 2026 INSC 36
Section 438 Cr.P.C. — Effect of Co-accused's Acquittal — The acquittal of co-accused persons during the period an accused was absconding does not automatically entitle the absconder to anticipatory bail on the ground of parity. In a trial against co-accused, the prosecution is not expected to adduce evidence against an absconding party; therefore, findings from that trial have no bearing on the absconder's independent trial - An accused cannot be permitted to "encash" on an acquittal achieved while they were making a mockery of the judicial process by fleeing. Balmukund Singh Gautam v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 158 : 2026 INSC 157: 2026 (2) Crimes SC 112
Sections 438 & 439 Cr.P.C. — Appeal Against Grant of Bail vs. Cancellation of Bail — The considerations for an appellate court assessing the correctness of a bail order are distinct from those governing an application for cancellation of bail - While cancellation is based on "supervening circumstances" (e.g., misuse of liberty), an appeal tests whether the original order was perverse, illegal, or unjustified at the time of its passing - the post-bail conduct of an accused is irrelevant when determining the legality of the initial grant of bail in an appeal – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Lavesh vs. State (NCT of Delhi), (2012) 8 SCC 730; Sushila Aggarwal vs. State (NCT of Delhi), (2020) 5 SCC 1; Vipan Kumar Dhir v. State of Punjab, (2021) 15 SCC 518; Ashok Dhankad v. State of NCT of Delhi, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1690; Paras 37-51] Balmukund Singh Gautam v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 158 : 2026 INSC 157: 2026 (2) Crimes SC 112
Section 438 Cr.P.C. (Section 482 BNSS, 2023) — Impact of Charge-sheet — The mere filing of a charge-sheet, taking of cognizance, or issuance of summons does not automatically terminate the protection granted under Section 438 Cr.P.C. - There is no restriction on granting or continuing anticipatory bail even after a charge-sheet is filed, as the primary objective is to prevent undue harassment through pre-trial arrest. Sumit v. State of U.P., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 147 : 2026 INSC 145 : AIR 2026 SC 905
Section 438 Cr.P.C. - Anticipatory Bail – Conditional Orders for Deposit: The Supreme Court criticized the Jharkhand High Court for making the grant of anticipatory bail contingent upon the deposit of a specific sum – Noted that High Court had directed the petitioners to file a supplementary affidavit showing payment of Rs. 9,12,926.84/- to the complainant, failing which the bail application would stand dismissed - Held, that the grant of regular or anticipatory bail should not be subject to the deposit of any amount - If a case for bail is made out, the court should pass an appropriate order; if not, it may decline - the court should not pass a conditional order for deposit and then exercise its discretion. [Relied on: Gajanan Dattatray Gore vs. State of Maharashtra & Another [(2025) SCC Online 1571; Paras 8 - 10] Prantik Kumar v. State of Jharkhand, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 131
Section 438 Cr.P.C. - Anticipatory Bail – Grounds for Grant – Civil Dispute and Parity – In a case involving alleged trespass and theft under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, Supreme Court found the appellant entitled to anticipatory bail based on three key factors- i. The appellant appeared before the IO as directed by the interim protection order; ii. The nature of the dispute appears to be a civil matter regarding immovable property (possession based on an agreement to sell); iii. Other co-accused in the same FIR had already been granted bail, establishing a ground for parity – Appeal allowed. [Paras 6, 7] Shally Mahant @ Sandeep v. State of Punjab, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 146
Section 438 Cr.P.C. - Anticipatory Bail — Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 — Section 18 — Cancellation of Anticipatory Bail - The Supreme Court allowed the appeals and cancelled the anticipatory bail granted to the respondents, observing that a prima facie case under the SC/ST Act was established - noted that while the High Court relied on the absence of casteist slurs in the initial FIR (lodged by a police official based on a social media video), it failed to exercise sufficient caution in examining other records - an affidavit filed by the Deputy Superintendent of Police and statements of various persons clearly alleged the use of casteist slurs and violence by the upper-caste respondents against marginalized community members over a drainage dispute – noted that the bar under Section 18 of the SC/ST Act, which precludes the grant of anticipatory bail, is applicable when the ingredients of the offence are prima facie disclosed - In this case, investigation reports indicated offences under the SC/ST Act, the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, and the Arms Act - noted that mere attempts at reconciliation by the police cannot prevent the taking of cognizance for criminal acts - Supreme Court found that the High Court erred in concluding there was no prima facie culpability, as subsequent investigation reports and affidavits by high-ranking police officials corroborated allegations of caste-based abuse and firearm discharge – Appeals allowed. [Relied on Shajan Skaria v. State of Kerala, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2249; Paras 8-15] Kuldeep Singh v. State of Punjab, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 239
Section 483 - Special powers of High Court or Court of Session regarding bail.
Section 483 BNSS (Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Section 437/439) – Bail Conditions – Recovery Proceedings – The Supreme Court reiterated that the jurisdiction of a Court while considering bail is limited to assessing whether an accused should be released pending trial and imposing conditions to ensure a fair trial - It does not extend to adjudicating civil rights or directing the recovery of alleged dues - held that neither the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 nor the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 enables a Court, at the stage of bail, to direct the sale of an accused's immovable property to settle alleged claims. Feroze Basha v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 389
Section 439 Cr.P.C. (also Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023; Section 483) — Successive Bail Petitions — Material Disclosures and Candour - A court entertaining a successive bail petition under a special statute is strictly bound to refer to the fate of the earlier petition and explicitly record what change in circumstances justifies a fresh consideration - A petitioner invoking the discretionary jurisdiction of the court must approach it with clean hands and full candour - Merely mentioning past case numbers without explicitly disclosing their nature or the factum of their dismissal falls well short of the expected candour and is calculated to obscure rather than illuminate. [Relied on Narcotics Control Bureau v. Kashif, (2024) 11 SCC 372; State of Meghalaya v. Lalrintluanga Sailo and Another, (2024) 15 SCC 36; Union of India v. Ajay Kumar Singh, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 346; Paras 11 – 14] State of Punjab v. Sukhwinder Singh @ Gora, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 421 : 2026 INSC 411 : AIR 2026 SC 2109 : 2026 (2) Crimes SC 130
Section 439 Cr.P.C. — Bail – Cancellation of Bail – Dowry Death – Sections 103(1) and 80 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS) – Appeal by the mother of the deceased challenging the High Court's order granting bail to the husband of the deceased – The deceased died within 1.5 years of marriage in suspicious circumstances with multiple external and internal injuries – Allegations of dowry harassment and threats by the accused prior to the death – High Court granted bail primarily noting the absence of criminal antecedents and the period of custody – Held: The High Court adopted a "mechanical approach" and failed to consider the gravity of the offence and the nature of the accusations – While criminal antecedents are a factor, they cannot outweigh the seriousness of a crime like dowry death where circumstantial evidence strongly points toward the accused – The Supreme Court emphasized that an appellate court can interfere with a bail order if relevant materials were ignored or the gravity of the offence was not considered. [Relied on P v. State of M.P., (2022) 15 SCC 211; Paras 14-27] Lal Muni Devi v. State of Bihar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 298
Section 439 Cr.P.C. — Bail Cancellation — POCSO Act — Heinous Offences — Allegations of Gang-rape of a Minor — Grant of bail by High Court without considering the nature and gravity of the offence, the statutory rigour under the POCSO Act, and the filing of the chargesheet — The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's order granting bail, observing that the exercise of discretion was "manifestly erroneous"- Noted that while the filing of a chargesheet does not preclude bail, the Court is duty-bound to consider the gravity of the offence and the material collected – Noted that the allegations involved repeated penetrative sexual assault under armed intimidation and blackmail via recorded acts, which have a "devastating impact on the life of the victim and shakes the collective conscience of society" - The High Court failed to apply settled parameters, including the vulnerability of the victim and the likelihood of witness intimidation – Held that the bail order was perverse, unreasonable, and ignored the relevant material – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Bhagwan Singh v. Dilip Kumar @ Deepu @ Depak and another (2023) 13 SCC 549; State of Bihar v. Rajballav Prasad @ Rajballav Pd. Yadav @ Rajballabh Yadav (2017) 2 SCC 178; Deepak Yadav v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2022) 8 SCC 559; Paras 12-18] X v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 36 : 2026 INSC 44
Section 439 Cr.P.C. — Bail - Condition of Upfront Deposit or Undertaking to Pay Arrears/Siphoned Amounts as a Pre-condition for Bail Deprecated - High Courts Must Decide Bail on Merits Rather Than Deferring Due to Non-Payment - The Supreme Court of India has reiterated that the practice of courts insisting on upfront deposits, or undertakings for such deposits, as a condition for considering a bail prayer on merits is improper - Such practices have the potential to derail the criminal justice delivery system by becoming a tool for complainants to extort settlements and forcing the accused to give up their right of defense - In the present case, the appellant was denied an extension of interim bail by the High Court solely because he failed to fulfill an undertaking to deposit the remaining balance of an alleged siphoned subsidy amount (approx. ₹4.10 crore), despite having already deposited over 50% of the amount - The Supreme Court held that – i. In offences under Section 409 IPC, there is no automatic presumption regarding the culpability of a Director; it must be established during the trial; ii. An inability to comply with a financial undertaking is not a valid ground to defer the consideration of a bail prayer on its merits, especially when the investigation is complete and the accused has already suffered significant incarceration; iii. The appropriate course for the High Court was to decide the regular bail application on its own merits rather than keeping the matter pending through repeated interim extensions tied to upfront deposits. [Relied on Gajanan Dattatray Gore vs. State of Maharashtra and Anr. 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1571; Paras 11-14] Rakesh Jain v. State, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 81
Section 439 Cr.P.C. — Bail - Disclosure of Material Facts — Duty of the Accused: The Court emphasized that an applicant seeking bail has a "solemn obligation" to make a full, fair, and candid disclosure of all material facts, specifically criminal antecedents. Suppression of such facts constitutes "fraud on the court," attracting the maxim suppressio veri, expressio falsi(suppression of truth is equivalent to expression of falsehood). [Relied On Kusha Duruka v. State of Odisha (2024) 4 SCC 432; Saumya Chaurasia v. Enforcement Directorate (2024) 6 SCC 401] Zeba Khan v. State of U.P., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 139 : 2026 INSC 144 : AIR 2026 SC 1006 : 2026 CriLJ 1113
Section 439 Cr.P.C. — Bail — Doctrine of Parity — Non-application to History-sheeters — Noted that the High Court erred in blindly extending the principle of parity to the respondent based on the bail granted to co-accused without considering his specific and distinctive features, including his use of 8 to 10 aliases, forged Aadhaar cards, and a history of absconding – Noted that when there is a likelihood of offences being repeated or justice being thwarted, discretion must be exercised cautiously. Rakesh Mittal v. Ajay Pal Gupta, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 170 : AIR 2026 SC 1117
Section 439 Cr.P.C. — Bail – Foreign Nationals – Article 21 of the Constitution of India – Financial Constraints in furnishing Surety –The Respondent, a 32-year-old Ugandan national, was granted bail by the High Court on 15.09.2025 in a case involving the NDPS Act - Despite the Trial Court reducing the surety amount progressively from ₹1,00,000 to ₹25,000, the accused remained in Tihar Jail for months due to her inability to furnish a solvent surety - Held: Article 21 of the Constitution, which protects the right to life and personal liberty, applies equally to foreign nationals prosecuted in India - Once an accused has established a case for bail, financial difficulties or the inability to provide a solvent surety should not act as a barrier to their release - In cases where a foreign national cannot meet surety requirements due to financial constraints, they may be released on a personal bond and subsequently housed in a detention center to ensure they do not leave the country - Supreme Court explicitly grounded its reasoning in the constitutional mandate of Article 21 of the Constitution of India, emphasizing its universal application to any person within the territory of India, regardless of nationality. [Paras 4-13] Customs v. Faridah Nakanwagi, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 278
Section 439 Cr.P.C. — Bail - Judicial Discretion — Impact of Criminal History: While a history-sheeter is not automatically disentitled to bail, criminal antecedents are a significant factor in judicial discretion, especially when the allegations involve systematic and organized crime (e.g., educational fraud rackets) - that once an investigation is complete and a chargesheet is filed, transfer to a special agency like the CBI should only be directed in exceptional circumstances showing bias, mala fides, or involvement of high-ranking officials – Appeal allowed. [Relied On Ash Mohammad v. Shiv Raj Singh @ Lalla Babu and another (2012) 9 SCC 446; Paras 28-33, 35- 41] Zeba Khan v. State of U.P., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 139 : 2026 INSC 144 : AIR 2026 SC 1006 : 2026 CriLJ 1113
Section 439 Cr.P.C. — Bail Jurisprudence — Distinction between Annulment and Cancellation of Bail - The Supreme Court clarified that an appeal against the grant of bail (annulment) stands on a different footing than an application for cancellation due to post-bail misconduct - While courts are generally slow to interfere with liberty, a bail order is liable to be set aside if it is perverse, illegal, or based on irrelevant material, such as documents whose genuineness is the subject of the trial. [Relied On State of Karnataka v. Sri Darshan Etc. (2025) SCC OnLine SC 1702; Yogendra Pal Singh v. Raghvendra Singh @ Prince and another (2025) scc OnLine SC 2580; Paras 13-14, 16-19] Zeba Khan v. State of U.P., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 139 : 2026 INSC 144 : AIR 2026 SC 1006 : 2026 CriLJ 1113
Section 439 Cr.P.C. — Bail - Mandatory Disclosure Framework - To streamline bail proceedings and prevent abuse, the Court provided an illustrative disclosure framework(recommendatory) for all bail applications, which includes – i. Case Details: FIR number, sections, and maximum punishment; ii. Custody Status: Date of arrest and total period of incarceration; iii. Status of Trial: Stage of proceedings and number of witnesses examined; iv. Criminal Antecedents: Detailed list of all FIRs (Pending/Acquitted/Convicted); v. Previous Bail Applications: Details of all prior applications and their outcomes; vi. Coercive Processes: Whether the applicant was ever declared a proclaimed offender or issued Non-Bailable Warrants. [Para 49] Zeba Khan v. State of U.P., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 139 : 2026 INSC 144 : AIR 2026 SC 1006 : 2026 CriLJ 1113
Section 439 Cr.P.C. — Bail — POCSO Act — Age Determination — Section 439 CrPC vs. Section 94 JJ Act — Mini-Trial at Bail Stage — The Supreme Court set aside the Allahabad High Court's directions mandating medical age determination tests in all POCSO cases at the commencement of investigation - held that while exercising bail jurisdiction under Section 439 CrPC, a High Court cannot conduct a "mini-trial" by entertaining challenges to the veracity of age-related documents or ordering roving inquiries. State of Uttar Pradesh v. Anurudh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 29 : 2026 INSC 47
Section 439 Cr.P.C. — Bail - The Supreme Court granted regular bail to an accused in the alleged multi-crore Andhra Pradesh liquor scam, invoking its plenary powers under Article 142 of the Constitution. Muppidi Avinash Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 274
Section 439 Cr.P.C. — Grant and Cancellation of Bail – Unlawful Assembly (Sections 143, 147, 148, 149 IPC) – SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 – Murder (Section 302 IPC) - Bail – Parameters for interference by Superior Court – Distinction between 'cancellation of bail' for misconduct and 'reversal' of an erroneous bail order – Supreme Court held that while cancellation under Section 439(2) CrPC (Section 483(3) BNSS) typically involves the accused misusing liberty, a superior court can reverse a bail order if it ignores relevant material, is based on extraneous considerations, or fails to consider the gravity of the offence. [Para 20] Shobha Namdev Sonavane v. Samadhan Bajirao Sonvane, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 188 : 2026 INSC 181 : 2026 (1) Crimes (SC) 278
Section 439 Cr.P.C. — Grant of Bail — Cancellation/Setting aside of bail order — Factors to be considered — Criminal Antecedents and Conduct — The Supreme Court set aside the Allahabad High Court's order granting bail to the first respondent, a "habitual offender" and "career criminal" involved in large-scale cheating and forgery - held that while liberty is a cardinal value, it is not absolute and must be balanced against the potential threat to society and the economic well-being of its members. Rakesh Mittal v. Ajay Pal Gupta, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 170 : AIR 2026 SC 1117
Section 439 Cr.P.C. — Grant of Bail – Delay in Trial – Incarceration without trial amounts to punishment – The Supreme Court granted bail to the appellant who had been in custody since April 13, 2024, for offenses under Sections 386, 307, 506, 120-B, 482, and 411 of the IPC, and Sections 25(6) and 27 of the Arms Act - Supreme Court observed that despite the prosecution proposing to examine 23 witnesses, none had been examined after almost two years of incarceration - Noted that when a trial is unlikely to conclude in the near future and the accused has undergone significant pre-trial detention, further detention is unnecessary as incarceration without trial amounts to punishment. [Paras 5-11] Pardeep Kumar @ Banu v. State of Punjab, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 302
Section 439 Cr.P.C. — Scope of Bail Jurisdiction — The jurisdiction of a Court under Section 439 is limited to granting or refusing bail based on prima facie evidence - It is coram non judice for a bail court to issue general mandatory directions to investigating authorities that contravene express legislative intent - Determination of age is a matter of trial and not a "matter of course" step during bail proceedings. [Relied on Chandrapal Singh v. State of U.P. (2022 SCC OnLine All 934); State v. M. Murugesan (2020) 15 SCC 251; Abuzar Hossain @ Gulam Hossain v. State of West Bengal (2012) 10 SCC 489; Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb (2021) 3 SCC 713; Paras 13-19] State of Uttar Pradesh v. Anurudh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 29 : 2026 INSC 47
Section 510 - Effect of omission to frame, or absence of, or error in, charge
Section 464 Cr.P.C. — Defect, Omission, or Irregularity in Charge — Absence of Prejudice - No finding or sentence is invalid due to an error, omission, or defect in the framing of charges unless a failure of justice has been occasioned - Where the accused's name was initially included in the charge framing order for offenses under Sections 302/120-B IPC, and the accused pleaded not guilty and claimed trial, they were fully cognizant of the case against them - If the witnesses were thoroughly cross-examined by the defense counsel regarding the murder charge, no prejudice is caused to the accused, and the trial is not vitiated. [Paras 41 - 43] Gopi Chand @ Pappu v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 609 : 2026 INSC 598
Section 528 - Saving of inherent powers of High Court.
Section 482 Cr.P.C. — Civil and Criminal Remedies – Parallel Proceedings – Inordinate Delay in Filing FIR - A long, unexplained delay in lodging an FIR in a case arising from a civil dispute raises strong suspicion of mala fide intent, vengeance, or an attempt to harass the other party after failing or anticipating failure in the civil proceedings. A frustrated litigant cannot be permitted to use criminal machinery as a weapon of harassment. The absence of a limitation period for criminal prosecution does not justify inordinate delay when the facts were known to the complainant for decades. Appeal allowed. Criminal proceedings quashed. [Relied on: Kishan Singh v. Gurpal Singh, (2010) 8 SCC 775] Nazibul Rahim Khan v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 608 : 2026 INSC 619
Section 482 Cr.P.C. — Civil and Criminal Remedies – Parallel Proceedings – Inordinate Delay in Filing FIR - Where civil and criminal remedies are available on the same cause of action and based on the same set of facts, both proceedings can be maintained. However, if an aggrieved person elects to invoke both remedies, there must not be an unreasonable or inordinate delay between the institution of the civil suit and the lodging of the FIR. An unexplained delay of 23 years in filing the FIR after instituting a civil suit on identical allegations is sufficient ground to quash the criminal proceedings. The Supreme Court quashed the FIR registered in 2024 against the appellants in respect of a property dispute involving an allegedly forged Power of Attorney and sale deed, when the respondent-complainant had already filed a civil suit in 2001 raising the very same allegations. Nazibul Rahim Khan v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 608 : 2026 INSC 619
Section 482 Cr.P.C. — Quashing of FIR — Civil Dispute Given a Criminal Colour — Extraordinary Delay — Improvement in Subsequent Complaint - Criminal proceedings cannot be permitted to become a weapon of harassment and coercion in disputes predominantly concerning title over immovable property - High Court erred in refusing to exercise its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the CrPC where a long-standing property dispute pending before civil courts since the year 2000 was converted into criminal proceedings - In frivolous or vexatious proceedings, the Supreme Court owes a duty to look into attending circumstances emerging from the record over and above the averments in the FIR - Where the initial complaint dated 21.05.2009 did not contain any allegation of extortion, demand of money, or criminal intimidation, but a subsequent FIR lodged after seven months introduced these grave allegations for the first time, such material improvements support the contention that the criminal proceedings are an afterthought to criminalize a civil dispute - An unexplained and extraordinary delay of nearly eight to nine years in registering the FIR (incidents pertaining to 2001, FIR registered in 2009), coupled with circumstances creating serious doubt about the genuineness of the prosecution, warrants quashing - A State Government Circular discouraging registration of FIRs in civil disputes cannot justify the complete inaction of the complainant who was actively litigating before civil courts and had alternative legal remedies available under Sections 154(3), 156(3), and 200 of the CrPC. [Relied on Mohd. Wajid v. State of U.P., (2023) 20 SCC 219; State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, AIR 1992 SC 604; Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 315; Paras 30-60] Bhikhubhai Govindbhai Patel v. State of Gujarat, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 593 : 2026 INSC 532
Section 528 BNSS [Inherent Powers / Quashing of Criminal Proceedings] – Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO Act) – Sections 3 & 4 – Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS) – Sections 65, 74, 115, 351, 352 – Vexatious and Frivolous Matrimonial Litigation - Appeal against the High Court's refusal to quash criminal proceedings involving grave allegations of rape and sexual assault under the POCSO Act and BNS filed by the wife/complainant against her estranged husband, brother-in-law, mother-in-law, and sister-in-law - The Supreme Court observed that the parties were heavily embroiled in multiple civil and criminal matrimonial disputes, with more than ten cases pending between them - Supreme Court noted that the allegations of rape against the father (appellant No. 1) and uncle (appellant No. 4) were completely generic, blanket statements lacking specific factual details or chronological backing - a close inspection of the statements of the complainant and the minor daughter revealed that they were virtually identical and reproduced verbatim, indicating a strong probability of tutoring and concoction due to pre-existing bad blood - highlighted the total absence of any medical examination or report, which was fatal to the prosecution's case given the gravity of the alleged physical injuries (such as the insertion of a hammer handle) - Held, allowing the continuation of such a trial on the basis of vague, omnibus, and improbable allegations would tantamount to an abuse of the process of law - The impugned order of the High Court was set aside, and the entire criminal proceedings arising out of the complaint case were quashed. [Paras 7 – 11] Ishwar Chand Sharma v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 566 : 2026 INSC 587
Section 482 Cr.P.C. – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) – Section 304-A – Medical Negligence – Quashing of Criminal Proceedings – Exoneration on Merits in Civil/Consumer Proceedings – Effect on Parallel Criminal Prosecution – The appellant, a senior anaesthetist, challenged the criminal prosecution initiated against her under Section 304-A read with Section 34 of the IPC for alleged gross negligence leading to the death of a patient post-surgery - The prosecution alleged that the appellant orally instructed an inexperienced staff nurse to administer a specialized analgesic injection ('sensorcaine') instead of doing it personally, which allegedly did not enter the epidural space, failing to alleviate pain and triggering a fatal cardiac event - Held, allowing the appeal and quashing the criminal proceedings, that for a criminal charge under Section 304-A of the IPC to survive, the negligence or recklessness must be of such a high degree as to be "gross" - An anaesthetist whose duty hours have concluded cannot be held criminally liable for a subsequent procedural error committed by a staff nurse in the mechanical execution of a standard post-operative pain management instruction - the family of the deceased pursued a parallel civil claim before the District Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum, which categorically exonerated the appellant on merits, finding that she had not given instructions to the nurse to administer the injection - This exoneration remained unchallenged and attained finality. Once an accused is exonerated on merits in civil proceedings, allowing a criminal prosecution to continue on identical allegations and facts constitutes a gross abuse of the process of law, as the standard of proof required in criminal cases is higher than that in civil cases. [Paras 18, 21-29] Supriya Kumari M.C. v. State of Kerala, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 540 : 2026 INSC 537
Section 482 Cr.P.C. – Inherent Powers of High Court – Quashing of Criminal Proceedings – Banking and Commercial Disputes – Approved Compromise Settlement – Impact on Prosecution - A criminal prosecution initiated under Sections 420 and 471 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) cannot be allowed to continue after a full and final settlement of the loan account by way of an approved compromise that has received the imprimatur of the Debts Recovery Tribunal (DRT) - Banking transactions arising out of loan facilities are commercial transactions having an overwhelmingly and predominantly civil flavour - Where the dispute has been amicably resolved, the settlement amount has been fully deposited, a "No Dues Certificate" has been issued, and recovery proceedings before the DRT have been consequently withdrawn, the possibility of a conviction becomes remote and bleak - In such circumstances, allowing the belated criminal prosecution to continue would cause grave prejudice, oppression, and injustice to the accused, and would amount to an abuse of the process of the court. Vijay Kumar Kela v. Central Bureau of Investigation, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 565 : 2026 INSC 588
Section 482 Cr.P.C. – Quashing of FIR and Criminal Proceedings – Matrimonial Disputes – Omnibus and Generalised Allegations against In-laws – Criminal proceedings under Section 498A/34 IPC, Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, and Section 12 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (DV Act) quashed against the sister-in-law, mother-in-law, and brother-in-law of the complainant – Held - While criminal law protects women from domestic abuse, it cannot be weaponised against every relative of the husband based on sweeping, vague, and omnibus allegations lacking specific factual foundation - A close reading of the FIR and the complainant's own divorce petition revealed that the core allegations of physical assault, verbal abuse, and surveillance were exclusively directed against the husband at his place of posting (Sheopur), while the appellants resided separately at Shivpuri - Mere familial association or failure to intervene in a marital discord does not automatically attract criminal culpability without active, specific involvement in the alleged offences. Arti Mehta v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 539 : 2026 INSC 533
Criminal Procedure – Inherent Powers – Quashing of Proceedings – Right to Speedy Trial as a Fundamental Right under Article 21 - The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and quashed the criminal proceedings pending against the appellant for 35 years arising out of a dispute over food in a police mess involving minor offences under Sections 147, 323, and 504 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and Section 120 of the Railways Act - Supreme Court emphasized that a quick trial is a sine qua non of Article 21 of the Constitution of India - Keeping a public servant in suspended animation for 35 years without any fault on his part runs completely contrary to the spirit of the "procedure established by law" - Right to speedy trial is not an abstract or illusory safeguard; it is a fundamental right and a human right that no civilized society can deny to an accused - If the continuation of proceedings amounts to a violation of Article 21, the High Court should not hesitate to exercise its inherent powers under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) or its writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. [Paras 30 - 42] Kailash Chandra Kapri v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 487 : 2026 INSC 473
Criminal Administration – Special Investigation Team (SIT) – Land Scams – In view of organized criminal activities involving the forgery of documents and unauthorized sale of a spiritual society's freehold lands across multiple states, Supreme Court directed the constitution of an SIT supervised by the Chief Secretary of Uttar Pradesh - The SIT, including the Registrar of Societies, is mandated to conduct a fact-finding inquiry into the alienation of society lands and submit a report to the police for further action. [Relied on Pradnya Pranjal Kulkarni v. State of Maharashtra (2025) SCC Online 1948; Neeharika Infrastructure (P) Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra (2021) 19 SCC 401; Pratibha Manchanda & Anr. Vs. State of Haryana & Anr. (2023) 8 SCC 181; Paras 14 -19] Shrikant Ojha v State of U.P., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 493 : 2026 INSC 482
Section 482 Cr.P.C. - Key Findings & Observations – i. Settlement Negotiations as Context - Supreme Court noted that prior to the FIR, the parties had engaged in meetings where a financial settlement of ₹30 crores was discussed to bring a "quietus" to the allegations; ii. Preceding Extortion Case - The appellant had previously filed FIR No. 1041/2025 against the complainant and her husband for extortion, leading to their arrest, prior to the filing of the rape allegations; iii. Sequence of Events - Supreme Court highlighted that had the financial settlement reached its logical conclusion, criminal proceedings likely would not have been initiated - The complainant's FIR was filed only after the appellant refused the settlement and initiated criminal action against the couple. [Paras 21-28] Venu Gopalakrishnan v. State of Kerala, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 378 : 2026 INSC 373 : AIR 2026 SC 1995 : 2026 (2) Crimes SC 263
Quashing of Proceedings – Matrimonial Dispute – Sections 498A, 323, 354 IPC and Sections 3 & 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act – Appeals filed by sister-in-law and parents-in-law assailing High Court order refusing to quash FIR and Chargesheet - Marriage solemnized in 2017; FIR lodged in 2023 – Held, law protects those who are vigilant about their rights (Vigilantibus non dormientibus jura subveniunt) – In matrimonial cases, a delay of nearly seven years can be fatal when not properly explained, as material evidence may disappear and it suggests an abuse of process. Charul Shukla v. State of U.P., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 307 : 2026 INSC 297
Section 482 Cr.P.C. - Maintainability of second quash petition – Dismissal of earlier petition as withdrawn without merits – Held - There is no inviolable rule that a second quash petition under Section 482 CrPC is not maintainable - Where the earlier petition was withdrawn without any discussion on the merits, the second petition cannot be thrown out purely on the ground of maintainability, especially when the facts reveal that the alleged offence is not made out. [Paras 15 - 22] Shaileshbhai Govindbhai Makwana v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 459
Section 482 Cr.P.C. — Quashing of FIR and Chargesheet — Absence of necessary ingredients - An FIR is liable to be quashed if its bare reading does not disclose the necessary ingredients to constitute the alleged offences - When the basic constituents of the offences under Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) of the SC/ST Act (i.e., occurrence in a place within public view) and Section 506 IPC (i.e., intent to cause alarm) are conspicuously missing from the contents of the FIR and the chargesheet, the framing of charges is unsustainable in the eyes of law. [Relied on Swaran Singh and Others vs. State through Standing Counsel and Another (2008) 8 SCC 435; Karuppudayar vs. State represented by the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Lalgudi Trichy and Others 2025 SCC OnLine SC 215; State of Haryana and Others vs. Bhajan Lal and Others 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335; Amar Nath Jha vs. Nand Kishore Singh and Others (2018) 9 SCC 137; Ramesh Chandra Vaishya vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Another (2023) 17 SCC 615; Paras 9 - 11] Gunjan @ Girija Kumari v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 484 : 2026 INSC 468
Section 482 Cr.P.C. (Section 528 of BNSS, 2023) - Quashing of Chargesheet - Scope of Inherent Powers - Reliance on CCTV Footage at the Quashing Stage – The Supreme Court quashed the criminal proceedings against the appellants facing charges under Sections 143, 341, 323, 324, 504, 506, 509, 427, and 354 IPC – Held: The CCTV footage, which formed part of the prosecution's own record (Chargesheet), clearly demonstrated that the appellants were not present during the actual assault and had only arrived later to pacify the situation – Where electronic evidence of "sterling and impeccable quality" completely belies the ocular version and indicates that the proceedings are maliciously instituted due to personal animosity, the High Court must exercise its inherent power to prevent abuse of the process of law. Sajal Bose v. State of West Bengal, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 335 : 2026 INSC 322
Section 482 Cr.P.C. – Inherent Powers vs. Revisional Jurisdiction – Noted that High Court's inherent power under Section 482 is not barred simply because a revision petition under Section 397 was maintainable or previously dismissed - Section 482 remains available to prevent the miscarriage of justice or abuse of the process of the court, even where a second revision is prohibited under Section 397(3). [Relied on S.M.S. Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. Neeta Bhalla (2005) 8 SCC 89; Krishnan & Anr. v. Krishnaveni & Anr (1997) 4 SCC 241; Paras 10, 11] Saroj Pandey v. Govt of NCT of Delhi, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 349 : 2026 INSC 324
Section 482 Cr.P.C. – Quashing of Proceedings – Scope of Interference – High Court quashed criminal proceedings involving allegations of fraud and forgery in the execution of a sale deed belonging to The Church of South India Trust Association (C.S.I.T.A.) - Supreme Court set aside the High Court order, holding that the High Court erred in conducting what amounted to a mini-trial and evaluating the sufficiency of evidence at the quashing stage - High Court held that a private complainant had no locus standi in the internal affairs of a registered body (C.S.I.T.A.) - Supreme Court reversed, reaffirming that criminal law can be set motion by any person having knowledge of an offence unless expressly barred by statute - Supreme Court emphasized that trust property held for the benefit of a community is a matter of legitimate public concern. State of Andhra Pradesh v. B. Reddeppa Reddy, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 308
Section 528 BNSS - Delineation of the "Four-Step Test" for Quashing – Supreme Court reiterated the structured test to determine the veracity of a prayer for quashing: i. Is the material relied upon by the accused of sterling and impeccable quality? ii. Does it rule out/overrule the factual assertions in the complaint? iii. Has the material remained unrefuted by the prosecution? iv. Would continuing the trial result in an abuse of process? iv. If all steps are answered in the affirmative, judicial conscience should persuade the Court to quash the proceedings. [Relied on Pradeep Kumar Kesarwani v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1947; State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335; Paras 22-29, 32-36] Sajal Bose v. State of West Bengal, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 335 : 2026 INSC 322
Section 528 BNSS - Differential Treatment of Co-accused - Lack of Reasoning – Noted that High Court had quashed proceedings against two co-accused but declined similar relief to the appellants based on the same set of allegations without assigning any cogent or discernible rationale – Held: In the absence of a clear rationale justifying differential treatment for similarly placed persons, the approach is legally and factually unsustainable. Sajal Bose v. State of West Bengal, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 335 : 2026 INSC 322
Section 482 Cr.P.C. - Quashing of Criminal Proceedings - Medical Negligence vs. Consent - Allegation of Forgery in Medical Consent Form – Supreme Court quashed proceedings against a pediatric surgeon accused of performing an Orchidectomy (removal of testicle) without specific consent instead of the agreed Orchidopexy(repositioning of testicle) – Supreme Court observed that while issues of tampering/interpolation are generally matters of trial, the High Court can exercise Section 482 powers to prevent abuse of process when the medical procedure itself is found to be appropriate by an expert board and there is no prima facie evidence of forgery – Held: Continuance of criminal proceedings would be an abuse of the process of the court where the Medical Board found the procedure to be an appropriate alternative to meet medical exigency. [Paras 18, 20] Dr. S. Balagopal v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 331 : 2026 INSC 319
Section 482 Cr.P.C. — Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) — Section 420 — Cheating — Criminal Conspiracy — Forgery of Will — Quashing of Criminal Proceedings against Bona Fide Purchaser — Criminal prosecution against a purchaser of property for valuable consideration cannot be sustained merely because the vendor allegedly used a forged Will to establish ownership and execute the registered sale deed - To attract the offence of cheating under Section 420 IPC, there must be a fraudulent inducement by the accused causing the complainant to deliver property or part with valuable security - Where there is no privity of contract or allegation that the purchaser deceived or fraudulently induced the third-party complainant, no offence of cheating is made out against the purchaser - If a vendor sells a property by creating a false document of ownership, the person defrauded/aggrieved is the purchaser whose title lands in dispute, not a third party who is not a party to the deed - In the absence of any tangible material showing the purchaser's involvement in the fabrication of the Will or knowledge of the forgery, allowing the prosecution to continue against him would amount to a gross abuse of the process of Court - Proceedings qua the appellant-purchaser quashed. [Relied on Mohammed Ibrahim and Others v. State of Bihar and Another, (2009) 8 SCC 751; Paras 20 - 25] S. Anand v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 429 : 2026 INSC 418
Section 528 BNSS (corresponding to Section 482 CrPC) – Quashing of FIR – Abuse of Process – Supreme Court observed that the FIR was a "glaring example" of an influential media house managing to register a case against its own executive following a fallout - The complaint lacked specific victim names, dates, or instances of the alleged extortion and cheating - If the allegations, even taken at face value, do not constitute an offence or are so absurd that no prudent person could reach a conclusion of sufficient grounds for proceeding, the FIR must be quashed to prevent the abuse of the process of law – Appeal allowed. [Relied on State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335; Lalita Kumari v. Govt. of U.P., (2014) 2 SCC 1; Imran Pratapgadhi v. State of Gujarat, (2026) 1 SCC 721; Paras 19-28] Ashish Dave v. State of Rajasthan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 258 : 2026 INSC 244
Section 528 BNSS — Quashing of Proceedings — Informant's Right to Hearing — The Supreme Court set aside a High Court order that quashed an FIR and consequential criminal proceedings without issuing notice to the informant - The High Court had quashed the case based on a general observation in a previous election-related writ petition suggesting parties withdraw all proceedings - The Supreme Court held that since the FIR disclosed a cognizable offence and a charge-sheet had already been submitted following investigation, the proceedings could not be quashed "straight-away" without giving the informant an opportunity to be heard - Matter restored for fresh consideration. [Relied on District Bar Association and Another vs. Bar Council of India Writ (C) No. 5973 of 2025; Paras 11-13] Suman Kumar Raghav v. Ravindra Kumar Sharma, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 279
Section 482 Cr.P.C. - Quashing of Proceedings - Suicide Note – Held that criminal proceedings quashed where the suicide note lacked material particulars regarding the nature, time, and place of alleged threats – Noted that where a suicide note indicts multiple creditors (nine in this case) without specifying individual roles or showing they acted as a group, a trial based on such a note would be a "futile exercise" and an "abuse of the process of the Court" – Held that Mere evidence of frequency of calls (40 calls in six months) without audio recordings or records of the content of those calls to indicate threats is insufficient to sustain a prosecution under Section 306 IPC – Appeal allowed. [Paras 10-15] Dhirubhai Nanjibhai Patel Lotwala v. State of Gujarat, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 270
Section 482 of CrPC / Section 528 of BNSS – Quashing of Proceedings – Offences under Sections 341, 323, 498A, and 34 of the IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act – General and Omnibus Allegations – Parity in Relief – The High Court quashed proceedings against the sister-in-law but refused to extend the same relief to the father-in-law and mother-in-law (appellants) despite identical allegations. Held: The Supreme Court found that the allegations against the appellants were general and omnibus, lacking specific dates, places, or overt acts – Held that Relatives of the husband cannot be prosecuted based on vague and general allegations without any specific overt act attributed to them - Supreme Court observed that since the allegations against the appellants and the sister-in-law were identical in substance, the High Court erred in applying different standards. Quashing the proceedings against the appellants - noted that criminal proceedings should not be used as a tool for harassment through improved and supplemental versions of events – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Preeti Gupta & Anr. v. State of Jharkhand & Anr., (2010) 7 SCC 667; Geeta Mehrotra & Anr. v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr., (2012) 10 SCC 741; Kahkashan Kausar @ Sonam & Ors. v. State of Bihar & Ors., (2022) 6 SCC 599; Paras 7 - 11] Dr. Sushil Kumar Purbey v. State of Bihar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 220 : 2026 INSC 212 : AIR 2026 SC 1299
Section 482 Cr.P.C. - Quashing of Proceedings – Summoning of Accused – Copyright Infringement – Appeal against High Court order refusing to quash criminal proceedings for alleged copyright infringement of a film script - The Supreme Court observed that summoning an accused is a serious matter and should not be done as a matter of course - The Magistrate's order must reflect an application of mind to the facts and law, involving a careful scrutiny of the evidence to determine if an offence is prima facie made out - In the present case, the Chief Judicial Magistrate (CJM) failed to record satisfaction regarding any specific similarities between the appellant's film 'Kahaani-2' and the complainant's script 'Sabak' - The summoning order was passed in a mechanical manner. Sujoy Ghosh v. State of Jharkhand, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 271 : 2026 INSC 267 : AIR 2026 SC 1552
Section 482 Cr.P.C. – Quashing of FIR – Forgery and Fraud – High Court quashed FIR at the threshold while investigation was ongoing and vital forensic evidence was awaited - Supreme Court held that when allegations of forgery are made and documents have been sent to a handwriting expert, quashing the FIR without awaiting the report is unjustified - Once the Court is apprised that the genuineness of signatures is under SFSL analysis, there is no reason to exercise jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC to stifle the probe - Supreme Court's Observations – i. The High Court prematurely terminated the proceedings despite clear allegations establishing fraud, falsification of documents, and criminal breach of trust; ii. Subsequent SFSL reports confirmed that the signatures on bank nomination documents and sale deeds were forged/facsimile stamps and did not match the admitted signatures of the deceased; iii. The High Court's reliance on Mir Nagvi Askari v. CBI (2009) 15 SCC 643 was misplaced and irrelevant to the facts of the present case, as the proof of forgery was dependent on the then-pending handwriting expert's report - Held: The impugned judgment of the High Court was set aside - The Investigating Officer was directed to conclude the investigation and file the result before the concerned Court – Appeals allowed. [Relied on Mir Nagvi Askari v. CBI, (2009) 15 SCC 643; Paras 16-23] Sharla Bazliel v. Baldev Thakur, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 256 : 2026 INSC 252
Section 482 Cr.P.C. – Quashing of Criminal Proceedings – Civil Dispute vs. Criminal Offence – Commercial Risk in Movie Production – Supreme Court observed that movie making is a high-risk business where fulfilment of a promise (sharing profits) is not entirely in the control of the promisor - If a transaction involves inherent risk and the conduct of the parties does not reflect dishonest intention from the beginning, the High Court should exercise its inherent powers to quash criminal proceedings and relegate the parties to civil remedies - In the present case, since the movie was actually completed and released, the promise to make the movie was not false, and the dispute regarding profit-sharing remains a civil cause of action. V. Ganesan v. State, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 269 : 2026 INSC 265 : AIR 2026 SC 1547
Quashing of FIR – Penal Code, 1860 – Sections 406, 420, 467, 468, and 471 – Civil Dispute given a criminal cloak – Abuse of process of law – The Supreme Court quashed an FIR lodged 11 years after the execution of a Joint Venture Agreement (JVA), holding that the dispute was essentially of a civil nature - While considering a prayer to quash an FIR, allegations are ordinarily taken at face value to assess if a prima facie cognizable offence is made out - where the cause is essentially civil, the Court must assess whether it has been given a "cloak of criminal offence." - In such cases, the Court is not restricted to the FIR's contents but may consider admitted facts and documents recited therein, such as the JVA - A delay of 11 years in lodging the FIR (JVA dated 2010; FIR lodged 2021) indicates the absence of dishonest intention from the inception. If a stark dishonest intention existed, it would have been reported promptly. [Relied on: Paramjeet Batra v. State of Uttarakhand and others, (2013) 11 SCC 673; Para 15, 25-27] Vandana Jain v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 200 : 2026 INSC 192
Discharge in Police Case vs. Statutory Complaint – A discharge order passed by a Magistrate in a criminal case arising from an FIR (Police Investigation) has no bearing on a separate complaint filed by the Appropriate Authority under Section 28 of the PCPNDT Act - The Act mandates cognizance only upon a complaint by the authorized authority, and police investigation is generally discouraged for these specialized offences – appeal dismissed. [Relied on Ravinder Kumar v. State of Haryana, 2024 SCC Online SC 2495; Federation of Obstetrics and Gynaecological Societies of India (FOGSI) v. Union of India, (2019) 6 SCC 283; Pooran Mal v. Director of Inspector (Investigation), New Delhi, (1974) 1 SCC 345; Radha Kishan v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1963 SC 822; Paras 28, 37, 54] Dr. Naresh Kumar Garg v. State of Haryana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 186 : 2026 INSC 176 : 2026 (1) Crimes (SC) 329
Transfer of Cases – Allegation of Bias – Matrimonial Disputes – Conduct of Parties – Deceitful Litigation – Held that the High Court's order of transfer, based on allegations that the wife's relatives (a Head Constable and a District Court staff member) could exert influence, cannot be sustained - Bias on the part of a Judge cannot be lightly inferred merely because a party's relative is a police officer within the jurisdiction or a staff member in the same District Court - Litigation – Noted that the husband surreptitiously obtained a divorce decree while a compromise was being reached in criminal proceedings, without informing the wife - Such reprehensible conduct by the husband should have restrained the High Court from granting a transfer that increased the travails of a woman with two children – Held that to address the husband's alleged threat to life, he is permitted to seek appearance through counsel or video conferencing - If physical presence is required, the Magistrate may provide necessary protection – Appeal allowed. [Para 5 - 12] Prasanna Kasini v. State of Telangana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 16 : 2026 INSC 30