Supreme Court Half Yearly Digest Jan - Jun, 2026

Administrative Law

Administrative Law – Departure from Competitive Tendering – Requirement of Reasons – While competitive tendering is the ordinary method to secure public interest, any departure must be justified by rational and recorded reasons - Non-production of core records like tender documents and vouchers by the State is a serious concern, as the State is the custodian of public records - Physical execution of work does not validate an unconstitutional or arbitrary procurement process - Held – Supreme Court directed the CBI to register a preliminary enquiry into the award of public works in Arunachal Pradesh from 01.01.2015 to 31.12.2025 - Observed that missing records and allegations against high constitutional functionaries warrant an investigation by an agency institutionally independent of the State executive. [Relied on State of W.B. v. Committee for Protection of Democratic Rights (2010) 3 SCC 571; Sachidanand Pandey v. State of W.B. (1987) 2 SCC 295; Akhil Bhartiya Upbhokta Congress v. State of M.P. (2011) 5 SCC 29; Centre for Public Interest Litigation v. Union of India (2012) 3 SCC 1; Paras 12-18, 25-30, 33-44] Save Mon Region Federation v. State of Arunachal Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 333 : 2026 INSC 320

Administrative Law – Doctrine of Substantive Legitimate Expectation – Limitation – Legitimate expectation is not a legal right but an expectation based on a promise or practice of a public authority - It cannot override illegalities or serve as an independent basis for judicial review unless the denial leads to a violation of Article 14 - No legitimate expectation arose in favor of GDCL to claim ownership of JUL's assets simply because it cleared company debts, especially given its failure to revive the unit over two decades. [Paras 150–160] Bhartiya Mazdoor Sangh, v. State of U.P., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 373 : 2026 INSC 364

Administrative Law — Judicial Review of Contractual Actions — Distinction between Termination and Blacklisting — Standards of Legality and Natural Justice — While exercising judicial review over State actions regarding contracts, Courts must apply distinct standards of legality, rationality, and proportionality for termination and blacklisting - Blacklisting is stigmatic and exclusionary, acting as an "instrument of coercion" that involves civil consequences - It is not an automatic or logical consequence of contract termination - Even after termination, the Department retains a choice to exercise the power of blacklisting, which operates in a future dimension by debarring the contractor from potential contracts. A.K.G. Construction and Developers Pvt. Ltd v. State of Jharkhand, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 321 : 2026 INSC 312: AIR 2026 SC 1884

Relief — Moulding of Relief — Where a blacklisting order is found to be patentely infirm for lack of mind application and violation of audi alteram partem, but considerable time has passed (one and a half years) without a stay, Supreme Court may mould the relief - Instead of remanding for a fresh show-cause notice which may lead to further litigation, Supreme Court can direct the blacklisting to cease operating from the date of the judgment. [Relied on Erusian Equipment & Chemicals Ltd. v. State of West Bengal, (1975) 1 SCC 70; UMC Technologies Pvt Ltd v. Food Corporation of India, (2021) 2 SCC 551; Nasir Ahmad v. Custodian General, Evacuee Property, (1980) 3 SCC 1; Kulja Industries Ltd. v. Chief General Manager, Western Telecom Project BSNL, (2014) 14 SCC 731; Paras 15- 25] A.K.G. Construction and Developers Pvt. Ltd v. State of Jharkhand, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 321 : 2026 INSC 312: AIR 2026 SC 1884

Administrative Law — State Liability and Governance Failure — Supreme Court criticized the "lackadaisical approach" and "systemic failure" of the state machineries in preventing illegal mining - held that a State cannot plead helplessness due to inadequate equipment or weaponry to justify inaction against organized crime - Personal accountability was fixed on officials for any further dereliction of duty – Supreme Court issued following directions – i. • Surveillance: Installation of high-resolution, Wi-Fi enabled CCTV cameras on elevated masts at all frequent mining routes; ii. GPS Tracking: Mandatory installation of GPS devices on all mining vehicles and heavy machinery (dredgers, excavators, etc.) in District Morena (MP) and District Dholpur (Rajasthan) on a pilot basis; iii. Enforcement: Constitution of well-equipped joint patrol teams (Police and Forest departments) provided with modern surveillance gear, protective equipment, and appropriate arms; iv. Standard Operating Procedure (SOP): States directed to formulate a uniform, inter-state SOP to handle organized and violent resistance by mining operators. [Relied on Deepak Kumar v. State of Haryana, (2012) 4 SCC 629; State (NCT of Delhi) v. Sanjay, (2014) 9 SCC 772; Naveen Sharma v. State of Rajasthan, 2017 SCC Online SC 2087; Bajri Lease Lol Holders Welfare Society v. State of Rajasthan, 2020 SCC OnLine SC 1295; Paras 9-21] In Re: Illegal Sand Mining in the National Chambal Sanctuary, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 386 : 2026 INSC 380

Administrative Law — Subordinate Legislation — Ultra Vires — Bye-laws framed under Section 8 read with Schedule B (Clauses da and v) are intra vires - The power to prescribe norms for "minimum essential utilisation of services" (Clause da) and to "send a representative to another society" (Clause v) provides a direct statutory source for conditions requiring minimum milk supply and operational continuity for contesting elections to District Milk Unions. [Relied on State of T.N. v. P. Krishnamurthy (2006) 4 SCC 517; Naresh Chandra Agrawal v. ICAI (2024) 13 SCC 241] Ram Chandra Choudhary v. Roop Nagar Dugdh Utpadak Sahakari Samiti Ltd; 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 361 : 2026 INSC 347

Adherence to SOPs & Extension to Public Spaces - Strict compliance with the Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) issued by the Animal Welfare Board of India (AWBI) on 27th November, 2025 is mandatory - Competent authorities must make informed decisions on extending these safety protocols to other high-footfall areas like religious sites, public parks, and tourist locations - Universal availability of anti-rabies vaccines and immunoglobulin must be ensured across all Government medical and healthcare facilities - The National Highways Authority of India (NHAI) cannot divest itself of road safety obligations by citing dependence on local state machinery - NHAI must proactively deploy specialized transport vehicles and create holding facilities to safely handle and relocate stray cattle/animals from National Highways and Expressways - In areas where canine populations are highly aggressive and pose an active, continuing hazard to public safety, authorities are legally permitted to carry out euthanasia for rabid, incurably ill, or demonstrably dangerous dogs, strictly in accordance with the protocols of the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act, 1960 and the ABC Rules, 2023. [Paras 83 - 108] In Re : City Hounded by Strays, Kids Pay Price v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 515 : 2026 INSC 506

Administration of Justice – Guidelines on Procedural Timelines for High Courts – i. General Timeline - High Courts must endeavour to pronounce reasoned judgements promptly, within a maximum of 3 months from the date of reserving; ii. Personal Liberty & Bail - Extra promptitude must be shown in matters of personal liberty - Bail orders should preferably be pronounced and uploaded on the same day or the next day if reserved - Orders granting bail, suspension of sentence, or acquittal must be immediately communicated to jail authorities and Trial Courts for release on the same or next day; iii. Clarifications: If a judgement is reserved, clarifications from advocates must be sought within 7 days in criminal appeals/death references (where the appellant is in custody) and within 1 month in all other matters; iv. Operative Part & Reasoned Judgement - Where urgent orders are required to prevent irreparable loss, the operative part may be pronounced, but the reasoned judgement must be uploaded within 7 to 15 days - judgements pronounced in open court must be uploaded within 24 hours; v. Accountability & Monitoring - Automated monthly emails of pending reserved judgements must be sent to the Chief Justice of the High Court and the concerned Bench - If a judgement is delayed beyond 3 months, the Registrar General shall place it before the Chief Justice, who shall direct the Bench to pronounce it within 2 weeks, failing which the Chief Justice should re-assign the case to another Bench for a fresh hearing; vi. Remedies for Litigants - Parties can file an application for early judgement if it is not pronounced within 3 months of reserving - If the judgement remains unpronounced for 3.5 months, the party can apply to the Chief Justice for withdrawal and re-assignment of the case to another Bench for a fresh hearing - Similar remedies apply if a reasoned judgement is not uploaded within 15 days or 1 month respectively, after the pronouncement of the operative part. [Relied on Anil Rai v. State of Bihar, (2001) 7 SCC 318; Ratilal Jhaverbhai Parmar v. State of Gujarat, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2985; Paras 12-24] Pila Pahan @ Peela Pahan v. State of Jharkhand, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 571 : 2026 INSC 604

Administrative Law – Doctrine of Proportionality – Legitimate Purpose and Least Restrictive Measure – ECI's order directing a Special Intensive Revision after a gap of over two decades (since 2003) satisfies the four-pronged proportionality test - The restoration of the accuracy and purity of electoral rolls is a legitimate purpose embedded in Articles 325 and 326 - House-to-house verification and documentary scrutiny bear a rational nexus to this goal - A state-wide systemic issue cannot be remedied by piecemeal constituency-specific revisions, making the comprehensive SIR necessary. [Relied on Vivek Narayan Sharma v. Union of India, (2023) 3 SCC 1; Paras 69 - 82] Association For Democratic Reforms v. Election Commission of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 549 : 2026 INSC 564

Administrative Law — Doctrine of Legitimate Expectation - Policy decisions of the State coupled with formal undertakings before the High Court gave rise to a legitimate expectation in the minds of left-out workers that their cases would be considered fairly - Although legitimate expectation does not create an absolute vested right, it is firmly rooted in the principles of fairness and non-arbitrariness under Article 14 - Policy statements cannot be applied selectively or disregarded unfairly. [Paras 68 – 70] Sukhendu Bhattacharjee v. State of Assam, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 529 : 2026 INSC 523

Administrative Law — Separation of Powers — Executive Authority - Regularization is an executive function falling within the domain of policy and administration - Courts do not grant prior approval to executive actions - The action of the State in seeking prior permission from the High Court to implement its own validly passed 2005 Cabinet decision amounted to an unwarranted surrender of its executive authority. [Paras 31, 71, 72, 88-95] Sukhendu Bhattacharjee v. State of Assam, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 529 : 2026 INSC 523

Administrative Law — State Liability and Complete Justice — When the primary administrative action taken by an official is found to be lawful, technicalities cannot impede the Supreme Court from doing complete justice to protect the public exchequer - Even if the State fails to file an independent appeal against an adverse cost order, the Court can exercise its powers to set aside the cost imposed on the State, keeping in view its role as the custodian of public funds - The Supreme Court observed that a government servant cannot be expected to take a stand against the Government - Since the appellant merely followed the rule of law existing at that point in time, no adverse personal liability could be fastened onto him - exercising its power to do complete justice, the Supreme Court extended the benefit to the State of Tamil Nadu and set aside its share of the ₹25,00,000/- cost as well, noting that the State failed to actively defend its own officer despite the officer having acted strictly in accordance with the law. [Paras 8 – 10] C. Poorna Chandran v. Government of Tamil Nadu, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 508

Administrative Law — Public Trust Doctrine — Prospective Regularisation based on Market Value — Reference date for valuation – Held that accepting the Banthia Committee's methodology, once an allotment is judicially declared illegal, the original concessional price becomes entirely irrelevant - Regularisation is not a continuation of the original transaction but a prospective fresh grant of legal legitimacy - The entity seeking regularisation must bear the full cost of legality based on the fair market value (Ready Reckoner rate) as on the date of the High Court's judgment declaring the illegality (November 2014), along with interest, rather than a discounted historical price. [Paras 34 - 37] K. Raheja Corp. v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 575 : 2026 INSC 551

Administrative Law — Regularisation Terms and Pricing — Methodology for Financial Restitution — Rejection of Parity Principle — Computation of regularisation premium for an illegal allotment - Developer sought parity with other co-operative housing societies and individual allottees regularised under a 2005 policy based on historical rates – Held - The principle of equality under Article 14 does not require unequals to be treated as equals - A large commercial enterprise developing a 10,50,000 sq. feet complex cannot claim parity with housing societies or individuals - historical valuations frozen at the time of the irregular allotment (2005 Sankaran Committee methodology) cannot form the baseline for regularisation decades later, as it allows the wrongdoer to benefit from frozen lower land values. [Paras 30 - 33] K. Raheja Corp. v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 575 : 2026 INSC 551

Administrative Law — Doctrine of Legitimate Expectation — Policy Change — Lack of Probity and Transparency - Service/Education Law — Alteration of the "Rules of the Game" - Supreme Court found that the policy modification was prompted by an undisclosed representation from the father of a high-ranking candidate who failed to disclose his private interest - Such a change, introduced after the issuance of the prospectus and the submission of applications, violates the principle of fairness and predictability - Reiterated the well-settled principle that the criteria for selection/admission cannot be altered by the authorities once the process has commenced - Noted that the State adopted "double standards" as the expanded criteria were not applied to other allied medical courses during the same session – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation vs. Rajendra Bhimrao Mandve (2001) 10 SCC 51; K. Manjusree vs. State of Andhra Pradesh (2008) 3 SCC 512; Tej Prakash Pathak vs. Rajasthan High Court (2025) 2 SCC 1; Mandeep Singh vs. State of Punjab (2025) INSC 834; Paras 20-40] Divjot Sekhon v. State of Punjab, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 12 : 2026 INSC 26

Administrative Law – Interest Liability – Delay by Government Authority: The Supreme Court upheld the TDSAT's finding that the Department of Telecommunications (DoT) could not levy interest for the period during which it "slept over the matter." - Interest is only payable from the expiry of the notice period stipulated in the show-cause notice (December 8, 2014), rather than the date of the Court's order in 2013, as the delay in issuing the demand was attributable solely to the DoT - For successful bidders in the fresh auction, the liability to pay the interim reserve price ceases on the date the Letter of Intent (LoI) is issued, as the LoI stipulates the commencement of the new 20-year term – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Centre for Public Interest Litigation and others vs. Union of India and others (2012) 3 SCC 1; Paras 14-17] Union of India v. Sistema Shyam Teleservices, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 184 : 2026 INSC 174 : AIR 2026 SC 1123

Administrative Law – Publication and Promulgation – Noted that Law, to bind, must first exist and be made known in the manner ordained by the legislature - The requirement of publication in the Official Gazette for delegated legislation is not an "empty formality" but a dual-purpose constitutional requirement to ensure accessibility to the governed and accountability in the exercise of executive power - Until publication, a Notification is merely an "intention" and has not crossed the threshold to become a legal "obligation." Viraj Impex Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 76 : 2026 INSC 80

Administrative Law – Retrospective Validation – Ex Post Facto Approval – Whether subsequent Board approval can cure a jurisdictional defect in a CLU issued without statutory backing. Held: When a statute prescribes a particular manner for doing an act, it must be done in that manner and no other - A CLU that is unlawful on the date of its grant for want of statutory authority does not become lawful merely because of a later administrative decision, unless the statute expressly confers power for retrospective validation. [Paras 41-48, 53-59] Harbinder Singh Sekhon v. State of Punjab, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 162 : 2026 INSC 159

Administrative Remedy – Representation to Chief Justice – Re-employment – Supreme Court granted liberty to the petitioner to make a representation before the Chief Justice of the High Court - The Chief Justice is requested to gather information regarding disparities in superannuation ages across States and engage with the State Government on the administrative side - Decisions regarding re-employment and continuation in service must be taken by the Chief Justice in consultation with puisne Judges. [Paras 3-5] Ranjeet Kumar v. State of Jharkhand, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 123

Advocates Act, 1961

Professional Ethics of Advocates – An advocate, as an officer of the Court, has a heightened obligation to maintain the dignity of the legal profession and the institutional sanctity of the judicial process - Addressing a press conference to publicly voice allegations against a sitting Judge regarding a pending judicial controversy is wholly inconsistent with professional discipline - Grievances against judicial orders must be ventilated through established legal remedies, not through public commentary intended to sensationalize proceedings. [Relied on Shanti Bhushan v. Supreme Court of India (2018) 8 SCC 396; State of Rajasthan v. Prakash Chand (1998) 1 SCC 1; Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Assn. v. Union of India, (1993) 4 SCC 441; Paras 25-36] Nilesh C. Ojha v. High Court of Judicature at Bombay, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 396 : 2026 INSC 390

Bar Council - The Supreme Court has approved the amendment carried out by the Bar Council of India to Chapter III of the Bar Council of India Uniform Rules (and Mandatory Guidelines) for the Elections of Bar Councils, 2016, thereby allowing office bearers of Bar Associations to contest elections to State Bar Councils. Shyam Lal Thakur v. Bar Council of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 417

Advocates - Members of the judiciary at all levels must show patience, compassion, and a spirit of encouragement towards lawyers, particularly young members of the Bar. The Court emphasized that the responsibility to nurture discipline, professional ethics, integrity, and a sense of duty among lawyers — viewing them as officers of the Court — lies not only with senior members of the Bar but equally with the Bench. Bar Council of India v. High Court of Andhra Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 500

Advocates Act, 1961 - Section 35 and Section 38 - Professional Misconduct - Deletion of Adverse Observations/Warning – Appeal filed by advocate against the Bar Council of India's (BCI) order issuing a warning despite affirming the dismissal of the complaint against him - The respondent-complainant (brother-in-law of the appellant) filed a frivolous complaint alleging threats due to matrimonial discord - The State Bar Council dismissed the complaint as false and motivated, imposing Rs.25,000/- cost. On appeal, the BCI affirmed that there was no cogent evidence of professional misconduct but waived the cost and issued a warning to the appellant to not intimidate the complainant - Held: The Supreme Court observed that both the State Bar Council and the BCI concurrently found no merit in the complaint, concluding it was filed for oblique motives and to wreak vengeance - Despite this, the BCI proceeded to issue a warning without any justification and set aside the cost without assigning any justifiable reasons - Since the complaint was concurrently found to be frivolous and motivated, the BCI's adverse observations and warning against the advocate cannot be sustained - The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and quashed/struck off the warning recorded against the appellant-advocate. [Paras 12 - 14] Prem Pal Singh v. Disciplinary Committee of the Bar Council of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 482

Advocates Act, 1961 – Section 35 and Section 38 – Professional Misconduct – Withdrawal of Complaint – Sustainability of Disciplinary Action – The Supreme Court set aside the order of the Disciplinary Committee of the Bar Council of India (BCI) which had held an advocate guilty of professional misconduct and imposed a penalty of Rs. 1 Lakh – Noted that the BCI failed to consider that the complainant had filed a sworn affidavit seeking to withdraw the complaint, stating the initial grievance arose from a "misunderstanding" regarding the deposit of costs and expressing full satisfaction with the advocate's services. Monty Goyal v. Navrang Singh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 91 : 2026 INSC 94

Advocates Act, 1961 - The Supreme Court directed the Bar Council of India to reconsider its rule which bars office bearers of Bar Associations from contesting elections to State Bar Councils. With this direction, the Court disposed of a writ petition challenging Chapter III of the Bar Council of India Uniform Rules (and Mandatory Guidelines) for the Elections of Bar Councils, 2016. Dhanya Kumar Jain v. Bar Council of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 216

Advocates Act, 1961 - The Supreme Court disposed of a plea seeking reservation for advocates belonging to Other Backward Classes in appointments of government pleaders in Madhya Pradesh. While declining to issue binding directions in the absence of a statutory mandate, the Court through its order urged the Advocate General to ensure representation of lawyers from marginalised communities and women. OBC Advocates Welfare Association v. State of M.P., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 217

Air Force Act, 1950

Air Force Act, 1950 — Section 19 — Air Force Rules, 1969 — Rule 16 — Administrative Action following Criminal Discharge — Maintainability — The Supreme Court held that once a person subject to the Air Force Act is discharged by a criminal court, administrative action or disciplinary proceedings on the same facts are not sustainable - Supreme Court clarified that "Discharge" stands on a better footing than "Acquittal" because it signifies a lack of sufficient material even to initiate a trial - Where the authorities exercise discretion under Section 124 to have an accused tried by a criminal court rather than a Court Martial, they cannot later fall back on administrative action once that criminal process concludes in a discharge or acquittal. [Paras 18 - 27] Ex. Sqn. Ldr. R. Sood v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 376 : 2026 INSC 366

Amicus Curiae

Amicus Curiae - Procedure for Appointing Amicus Curiae for Absentee Appellants – Guidelines – To prevent technical pleas of unfairness, the Supreme Court directed that when appointing an Amicus Curiae due to the absence of a convict's counsel, the Registry should issue notice to the convict's address via the jurisdictional police station - If the convict remains dormant despite service (including service by pasting on the premises), the Supreme Court may proceed to decide the appeal - This process ensures the Court knows if the appeal survives or has abated after long periods. Bhola Mahto v. State of Jharkhand, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 265 : 2026 INSC 257 : 2026 CriLJ 1869

Animal Birth Control Rules, 2023

Animal Birth Control Rules, 2023 - Rule 7(2) & Rule 11(19) — Classification of Street Dogs and Mandate of Re-release — Inapplicability to Institutional and Restricted-Access Premises - Held, a harmonious and purposive construction of the ABC Rules, 2023, read with the parent Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act, 1960, does not support the proposition that stray dogs possess an absolute right to occupy or remain within all categories of spaces - Rule 7(2), which includes a "gated campus" within the classification of street dogs, is merely descriptive for the purpose of canine population regulation - It cannot be expansively construed to legitimize or perpetuate the presence of stray dogs in sensitive, high-risk, and controlled-access environments such as schools, colleges, hospitals, sports complexes, airports, and railway stations - Such premises are functionally required to maintain a sterile, secure, and hygienic environment to safeguard vulnerable populations like children, patients, and the elderly - Therefore, stray dogs captured from these institutional areas are ineligible for re-release into the same locations under Rule 11(19) - The directions issued in the order dated 7th November, 2025, banning their re-release into such institutional precincts, are valid and consistent with the statutory framework. [Paras 41–43, 48–49, 75] In Re : City Hounded by Strays, Kids Pay Price v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 515 : 2026 INSC 506

Appeal

Appeal - The High Court cannot assume the role of a statutory appellate authority and decide a matter on merits merely because of delay in the disposal of the statutory appeal. Statutory remedies and the hierarchical appellate mechanism provided under law cannot be bypassed or rendered nugatory on account of delay. Premal Pratap Joisher v. Vikram Jethlal Joisher, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 404

Arbitration

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; Section 11(6) and Section 43 — Limitation Act, 1963; Article 137 and Article 18 — Appointment of Arbitrator — Dead Claims — The period of limitation for filing a petition seeking appointment of an arbitrator cannot be conflated with the limitation period applicable to the substantive claims under the underlying contract - While Courts must generally leave intricate evidentiary inquiries regarding limitation to the Arbitrator, they have a duty to prima facie examine and reject "dead claims" that are ex-facie and hopelessly time-barred to protect parties from costly and frivolous arbitration. [Paras 4, 5, 6] State of West Bengal v. B.B.M. Enterprises, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 369 : 2026 INSC 358

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; Section 11(6) — Code of Civil Procedure, 1908; Order 23 Rule 1 — Maintainability of fresh application for appointment of an arbitrator — Abandonment of proceedings - The Supreme Court held that the principles of Order 23 Rule 1 of the CPC, which prohibit the institution of fresh proceedings on the same cause of action without seeking leave of the court, apply to proceedings under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. A litigant who has effectively abandoned previous arbitration proceedings or withdrawn an application without liberty to file afresh is barred from seeking a subsequent appointment of an arbitrator for the same cause of action. The Court emphasized that this bar is founded on Public Policy to prevent the abuse of the process of law. In the present case, the respondent's refusal to participate in the initial arbitral proceedings constituted abandonment. Furthermore, the dismissal of a third-party appeal regarding the underlying property did not create a "fresh cause of action" for the respondent, as the internal dispute between the parties was not the subject matter of that appeal. [Relied on HPCL Bio-Fuels Ltd. v. Shahaji Bhanudas Bhad; 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3190; Paras 15-19] Rajiv Gaddh v. Subodh Parkash, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 310 : 2026 INSC 302 : AIR 2026 SC 1701

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; Section 11(6A) — Scope of Judicial Review — While the court's jurisdiction at the Section 11 stage is confined to the examination of the existence of an arbitration agreement and the principle of "When in doubt, do refer" applies, the court can reject an application if, even on a prima facie view, there appears to be no existence of an arbitration agreement. [Relied on NBCC (India) Ltd. v. Zillion Infraprojects Pvt. Ltd. (2024) 7 SCC 174; Himachal Pradesh v. OASYS Cybernatics Pvt. Ltd. 2025 SCC OnLine SC 253; Paras 20-40] Maharashtra State Electricity Distribution Company Limited (MSEDCL) v. R.Z. Malpani, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 356 : 2026 INSC 342

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; Section 21 — Commencement of Proceedings — Arbitration proceedings commence on the date the request for initiation of arbitration is received by the respondent - Where a contractor completes work in July 2000 but issues the notice seeking arbitration only in June 2022 (after 21 years), the claim is hopelessly time-barred under the Limitation Act - The failure of the Engineer-in-Charge to issue a final measurement certificate does not indefinitely extend the limitation period; the contractor is expected to be diligent and initiate arbitration within the prescribed three-year period from the accrual of the cause of action. [Relied on Arif Azim Company Limited v. Aptech Limited (2024) 5 SCC 313; Vishram Varu and Company v. Union of India (2023) 12 SCC 588; Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited and Anr. v. Nortel Networks India Private Limited (2021) 5 SCC 738; Aslam Ismail Khan Deshmukh v. ASAP Fluids Private Limited (2025) 1 SCC 502; Paras 6, 7] State of West Bengal v. B.B.M. Enterprises, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 369 : 2026 INSC 358

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; Section 7 and 11 — Existence of Arbitration Agreement — Incorporation by Reference — Letter of Intent (LOI) — A Letter of Intent is generally a precursor to a contract and not the contract itself - It merely indicates a party's intention to enter into a contract in the future and does not create a binding legal relationship unless the intention to be bound is clear and unambiguous - A general reference in an LOI to terms and conditions of tender documents (which contain an arbitration clause) is a case of "reference" and not "incorporation" - For an arbitration clause from another document to be incorporated, there must be a specific reference to the arbitration clause itself - Where the LOI is contingent upon future acts (like issuance of a work order) and does not specifically incorporate the arbitration clause, no valid arbitration agreement exists. Maharashtra State Electricity Distribution Company Limited (MSEDCL) v. R.Z. Malpani, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 356 : 2026 INSC 342

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 - Definition and Continuity of Proceedings – Sections 2(1)(g), 35, and 40 – The Arbitration Act is a self-contained, complete Code that does not envision arbitration proceedings to cease upon the death of a party - By virtue of Section 40, an arbitration agreement is not discharged by the death of a party and remains enforceable by or against their legal representatives. Consequently, legal representatives step into the shoes of the deceased party for the purposes of the Act - Since an arbitral award is binding on and enforceable against the legal representatives of a deceased party under Sections 35 and 40, the corresponding statutory right to challenge that award under Section 34 must naturally flow to them - Denying them this right would leave them remediless under the statute while simultaneously making them liable to fulfil the award, defeating the very object of the Act. [Relied on Ravi Prakash Goel v. Chandra Prakash Goel, (2008) 13 SCC 667; Bhaven Construction v. Executive Engineer, Sardar Sarovar Narmada Nigam Limited and Anr., (2022) 1 SCC 75; Paras 13-22] V.K. John v. S. Mukanchand Bothra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 398 : 2026 INSC 393 : AIR 2026 SC 2041

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 - Section 16, Section 16(5), Section 16(6), Section 34, and Section 37(2) – Maintainability of Section 34 application against rejection of Section 16 plea – When an Arbitrator rejects an application filed under Section 16(2) or 16(3) challenging the jurisdiction of the Tribunal (such as on the ground of limitation), the aggrieved party cannot immediately file an application under Section 34 to set aside that order - The statutory drill under Section 16 dictates that upon rejection of a jurisdictional plea, the Arbitral Tribunal shall continue with the arbitral proceedings and make an arbitral award - The party aggrieved by such rejection can only test its validity after the final arbitral award is passed, by moving an application under Section 34 against the final award - Piecemeal challenges impermissible – Entertaining a Section 34 application or a subsequent Section 37 appeal against a pre-award rejection order under Section 16(2) is erroneous, unsustainable, and does violence to the scheme of the Arbitration Act - Under Section 37(2), an appeal lies directly only if the Arbitrator accepts/upholds the plea of lack of jurisdiction and puts an end to the proceedings. [Distinguished from Indian Farmers Fertilizer Cooperative Limited vs. Bhadra Products (2018) 2 SCC 534; Paras 8 – 17] MCM Worldwide v. Construction Industry Development Council, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 440 : 2026 INSC 425

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 - Section 34 vs. Article 227 of the Constitution of India / Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Remedy for Legal Representatives – Held that the appropriate statutory relief for a legal representative aggrieved by and seeking to challenge an arbitral award lies exclusively under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act and not via a revision petition under Article 227 of the Constitution or Section 115 of the CPC. V.K. John v. S. Mukanchand Bothra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 398 : 2026 INSC 393 : AIR 2026 SC 2041

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – Section 36 – Enforcement of Consent Award – Interpretation of Indemnity Clauses – Dispute regarding the timing of an indemnifier's obligation to discharge liability - The Supreme Court held that where a Consent Award contains an absolute obligation to "ensure" that no liability is recovered from the award-holder by a "Forum," such obligation is triggered as soon as a liability is crystallised and recovery is sought, regardless of whether a further appeal is pending. VPS Healthcare v. Prabhat Kumar Srivastava, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 393 : 2026 INSC 361

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – Section 7 and Section 11 – Validity of Arbitration Clause – Interpretation of the word 'can' – Held: An arbitration clause stating that disputes "can" be settled by arbitration does not constitute a mandatory or binding arbitration agreement - The word 'can' in this context signifies a factual possibility or a choice available to the parties, rather than a definitive mandate to refer all disputes to arbitration. Nagreeka Indcon Products Pvt. Ltd. v. Cargocare Logistics (India) Pvt. Ltd; 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 388 : 2026 INSC 384

Party Autonomy and Contractual Interpretation – Held: The written word is the foundation of legal obligation - To disregard the chosen language of the parties and impute a mandatory obligation where none was intended would compromise party autonomy - Since the respondent refused to refer the matter to arbitration and the clause provided a choice rather than a mandate, the High Court's dismissal of the Section 11 application is upheld. [Relied on Jagdish Chander v. Ramesh Chander (2007) 5 SCC 719; Paras 7-13] Nagreeka Indcon Products Pvt. Ltd. v. Cargocare Logistics (India) Pvt. Ltd; 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 388 : 2026 INSC 384

Mandatory vs. Permissive Clauses – Requirement of Fresh Consent – Held: For a clause to be a valid arbitration agreement, it must disclose a determination and obligation to go for arbitration - Clauses that require or contemplate further/fresh consent of the parties at the time a dispute arises indicated by language such as "parties can" or "if they so agree" are merely agreements to enter into an arbitration agreement in the future and are not enforceable as binding mandates. Nagreeka Indcon Products Pvt. Ltd. v. Cargocare Logistics (India) Pvt. Ltd; 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 388 : 2026 INSC 384

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 — Section 9 — Threshold for Grant of Interim Relief - While the remedy is available, the threshold for granting interim relief under Section 9 will be higher in the case of an unsuccessful party - In rare and compelling cases, permitting such a party to invoke Section 9 prevents irreversible or irreparable prejudice and preserves the efficacy of the challenge proceedings - Courts must exercise care, caution, and circumspection while dealing with such applications. [Paras 49 - 60, 62] Home Care Retail Marts Pvt. Ltd. v. Haresh N Sangavi, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 425 : 2026 INSC 415

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 — Section 9 vs Section 36 — Post-Award Interim Relief to Unsuccessful Party — Maintainability - A petition under Section 9 of the Act at the post-award stage, by a party that has lost in the arbitral proceedings and has no enforceable award in its favour, is maintainable in law - Any party to an arbitration agreement, including an unsuccessful party, may invoke Section 9 at the post-award stage before the award is enforced - The statutory framework under Section 9, commencing with the expression "a party", draws no distinction between a successful and an unsuccessful party, and its meaning cannot be contextually modulated or varied depending upon the outcome of the arbitral proceedings. [Paras 29 - 33, 50-62] Home Care Retail Marts Pvt. Ltd. v. Haresh N Sangavi, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 425 : 2026 INSC 415

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 — Section 9 vs Sections 34 & 36 — Distinct Spheres of Operation - Sections 34 and 36 provide remedies against an award or a stay thereof, whereas Section 9 ensures protection of the subject-matter or the amount in dispute - The mere availability of recourse under Section 34 or a stay under Section 36(2) cannot operate as a bar to seeking protection under Section 9 - Denying interim relief under Section 9 would leave an unsuccessful party entirely remediless, with no forum available to protect the subject-matter even if the award is stayed and potentially liable to be set aside. [Paras 42, 43] Home Care Retail Marts Pvt. Ltd. v. Haresh N Sangavi, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 425 : 2026 INSC 415

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1997 (J&K) — Seat as Exclusive Jurisdiction Clause — The designation of a seat operates as an exclusive jurisdiction clause, even if no part of the cause of action arose there - It serves as the "judicial anchor" and "juridical home" of the arbitration - The seat remains immutable unless expressly altered by a subsequent mutual agreement of the parties - A "stray recital" in the arbitral award recording a different place of arbitration is not determinative of the seat if the parties had previously agreed on a specific seat. [Relied on Bharat Aluminium Co. v. Kaiser Aluminium Technical Services Inc. (2012) 9 SCC 55; Indus Mobile Distribution Pvt. Ltd. v. Datawind Innovations Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. (2017) 7 SCC 678; BGS SGS Soma JV v. NHPC Ltd. (2020) 4 SCC 234; Enercon (India) Ltd. & Ors. v. Enercon GMBH & Anr. (2014) 5 SCC 1; Paras 18-24] J&K Economic Reconstruction Agency v. Rash Builders, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 377 : 2026 INSC 368 : AIR 2026 SC 1990

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1997 (J&K) — Section 34 — Juridical Seat vs. Venue — Exclusive Jurisdiction — The Supreme Court reaffirmed the settled distinction between the "seat" and "venue" of arbitration, holding that once a seat is designated by agreement, the courts of that seat alone possess exclusive supervisory jurisdiction - The mere fact that arbitral proceedings were conducted or the award was signed at a different geographical location (venue) for convenience does not alter the juridical seat. J&K Economic Reconstruction Agency v. Rash Builders, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 377 : 2026 INSC 368 : AIR 2026 SC 1990

Arbitration Act, 1940 – Section 47 Proviso – Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) – Order XXIII Rule 3 – Enforcement of Private Award in Pending Suit – Absolute Necessity of Post-Award Consent - The proviso to Section 47 acts as a limited saving mechanism for an award 'otherwise obtained' (i.e., outside the regular provisions of the 1940 Act or during the pendency of a suit without court intervention) - Such an award cannot proprio vigore (of its own force) be enforced, set up as a valid defense, or used to non-suit a plaintiff - It can only be taken into consideration by the court as a compromise or adjustment of the suit under Order XXIII Rule 3 of the CPC if allinterested parties explicitly give their mutual consent after the award has been made - This post-award consent is a strict sine qua non - In the absence of an express or implied post-award consent by a party to treat the award as a compromise, the court has no jurisdiction to enforce it or non-suit the parties on its basis, and must instead proceed to decide the suit on its independent merits. [Relied on Naraindas v. Vallabhdas & Ors., (1971) 3 SCC 642; Paras 49-69] Ashok v. Padam Chand, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 570 : 2026 INSC 591

Arbitration Act, 1940 – Sections 20, 21, and Chapter IV – Mutually Exclusive Modes of Arbitration – Mandatory Nature of Court Reference in Pending Suits - The statutory scheme of the 1940 Act envisions three distinct and mutually exclusive modes of arbitration through Chapters II, III, and IV - Once a civil suit is instituted and pending between the parties regarding a subject matter, any reference of the dispute to arbitration can only fall within the ambit of Chapter IV - Section 21 mandates an express, written application by all interested parties to the court where the suit is pending to seek a formal order of reference - Subjective 'knowledge' of the pendency of the suit by the parties is not a condition precedent or a determinative factor; the mere factual 'institution' or 'pendency' of the suit triggers the mandatory operation of Chapter IV - Any arbitral reference made or continued out of court after the institution of a suit, without obtaining a formal order of reference from the trial court under Section 21, bypasses the legislative intent and renders the subsequent arbitral award legally ineffective as a bar or defense against the pending suit. [Relied on M.P. Rajya Tilhan Utpadak Sahakari Sangh Maryadit v. Modi Transport Service, (2022) 14 SCC 345; Paras 34-64] Ashok v. Padam Chand, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 570 : 2026 INSC 591

Arbitration And Conciliation Act, 1996 - Principles of Natural Justice - Allegation of denial of procedural fairness – The appellant consistently engaged in dilatory tactics, failed to file point-wise replies, remained absent during scheduled meetings, and declined to attend a final hearing while merely expressing inability without seeking an adjournment - Held: The arbitrator was fully justified in treating the matter as heard and passing the award - A party cannot invoke the principles of natural justice to impugn an award when the delay and lack of presentation were substantially a result of its own conduct. [Paras 23–25] Gujarat Water Supply and Sewerage Board v. Saryu Plastics, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 547 : 2026 INSC 552

Arbitration And Conciliation Act, 1996 - Section 14 & Mandate of Arbitrator – Estoppel / Acquiescence - Contractual time limits for arbitral awards – The appellant board actively participated in the arbitration proceedings and failed to raise objections regarding the expiration of the arbitrator's mandate despite multiple unilateral extensions and subsequent hearing fixtures - Held that the grievance regarding the expiry of the mandate is governed by the contract and not by statute - Having participated and acquiesced in the continuation of the proceedings, the appellant is estopped from challenging the validity of the award on the ground of expired mandate after the award has been passed. [Para 18-21] Gujarat Water Supply and Sewerage Board v. Saryu Plastics, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 547 : 2026 INSC 552

Arbitration And Conciliation Act, 1996 - Section 33(1)(a) – Power to Modify Award – Scope of Review: Substitution of Interest – The Commercial Court, purporting to act under Section 33(1)(a), modified the arbitral award by substituting "simple interest" with "compound interest" for the pendente lite period, exponentially increasing the appellant's liability – Held that Section 33(1)(a) is strictly confined to the correction of computational, clerical, or typographical errors and does not contemplate a substantive review or material modification of the findings on merits - The choice between simple or compound interest represents a conscious, substantive assessment of equities by the arbitrator, not a clerical oversight. The Commercial Court manifestly exceeded its jurisdiction. [Relied on Gyan Prakash Arya v. Titan Industries Ltd., (2023) 1 SCC 153; Paras 30–32] Gujarat Water Supply and Sewerage Board v. Saryu Plastics, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 547 : 2026 INSC 552

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 - Section 34(2A) – Patent Illegality – Setting aside of Arbitral Award – An award that completely ignores the statutory directives of Section 26(1)(b) of the 2013 LA Act and its Explanations by adopting a single, completely dissimilar sale exemplar is vitiated by patent illegality appearing on the face of the record - The cloak of protection under the proviso to Section 34(2A) (which restricts interference on mere erroneous application of law or reappreciation of evidence) cannot be extended to such an award. [Relied on National Highways Authority of India vs. P. Nagaraju alias Cheluvaiah and another, (2022) 15 SCC 1; Madhya Pradesh Road Development Corporation vs. Vincent Daniel and others, (2025) 7 SCC 798; Para 12] Project Director, National Highways Authority of India v. Alfa Remidis Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 494 : 2026 INSC 480 : AIR 2026 SC 2415

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 — Section 7(5) — Arbitration Agreement by Incorporation — Incorporation vs. Mere Reference — Distinction Explained — The High Court rejected Section 11 applications on the ground that a generic reference to a Development Agreement (containing an arbitration clause) in the subsequent Permanent Alternate Accommodation Agreements (PAAAs) executed with individual society members was insufficient to bind them to arbitration – Held that there is a distinct legal difference between a mere reference to another document and the incorporation of another document by reference - Where a subsequent contract explicitly provides that all terms, conditions, and clauses of an earlier document shall form part of it and be binding on the parties, the earlier document gets incorporated in its entirety (body and soul) into the later agreement - In the present case, Clause 14 of the PAAAs unequivocally stated that all terms, conditions, and clauses of the Development Agreement shall form a part of and be binding on the parties - This went beyond a mere general reference and clearly demonstrated the intention of the parties to import the Development Agreement in its entirety, including its dispute resolution mechanism (Clause 36) - a valid arbitration agreement existed between the parties by incorporation under Section 7(5) of the Act. [Relied on M.R. Engineers and Contractors Private Limited vs. Som Datt Builders Limited, (2009) 7 SCC 696; NBCC (India) Limited. vs. Zillion Infraprojects Private Limited, (2024) 7 SCC 174; Paras 9-13] Hirani Developers v. Nehru Nagar Samruddhi CHS Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 499 : 2026 INSC 484

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; Section 16 – Indian Stamp Act, 1899 – Objection regarding stamping of agreement – Whether such objection can be entertained by Writ Court at a pre-arbitral stage – Held, non-stamping or inadequate stamping is a curable defect and does not render an agreement void – Any objection in relation to the stamping of the agreement falls within the ambit of the Arbitral Tribunal – The Writ Court ought not to embark upon an interpretation of the contract to decide the nature of the document while the arbitral proceedings are pending - Held, where a writ petition is filed invoking jurisdiction under both Articles 226 and 227, the maintainability of a Letters Patent Appeal depends upon the pleadings, the nature of the order, and the directions issued by the Single Judge – If the order is passed in a composite manner, the Division Bench has the jurisdiction to entertain the appeal. [Relied on Re: Interplay Between Arbitration Agreements Under The Arbitration And Conciliation Act, 1996 and The Indian Stamp Act, 1899 (2023 INSC 1066); Paras 18-26] Tarini Prasad Mohanty v. Sunflag Iron and Steel Company, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 561 : 2026 INSC 566

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; Section 16, 34, 37 – Constitution of India, Articles 226/227 – Challenge to order passed by Arbitral Tribunal under Section 16 – Maintainability of Writ Petition – Held, the scheme of the Act envisages minimal judicial interference in arbitral proceedings – Except in cases where the order is so perverse that a patent lack of inherent jurisdiction stares one in the face, the High Court should not entertain a challenge to a Section 16 order under Article 226/227 – The party must wait for the passing of the final award and avail the remedy under Section 34. Tarini Prasad Mohanty v. Sunflag Iron and Steel Company, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 561 : 2026 INSC 566

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 - Directions - Appeal by MPRDC against the arbitral award of ₹49 crores + 14.75% pre-award interest dismissed - High Court directed to release the deposited amount with interest to the respondent within two weeks. Appellant directed to pay the balance award amount with accrued interest within three months. Madhya Pradesh Road Development Corporation Ltd. v. Jabalpur Corridor Pvt. Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 580 : 2026 INSC 590

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 - Ease of Doing Business & Foreign Investment - Uniformity, predictability, certainty, and finality in arbitral proceedings and their enforcement are essential for improving India's ease of doing business and attracting foreign investment. Excessive judicial re-examination of evidence and contractual terms at Sections 34/37 undermines party autonomy and investor confidence. Madhya Pradesh Road Development Corporation Ltd. v. Jabalpur Corridor Pvt. Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 580 : 2026 INSC 590

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 - Finality and Res Judicata in Arbitration - Once a jurisdictional issue (here, arbitrability vis-à-vis the Madhya Pradesh Madhyastham Adhikaran Adhiniyam, 1983) has been raised, adjudicated by the arbitral tribunal, and affirmed through multiple judicial forums including the Supreme Court, it attains finality between the parties. A subsequent change in law (e.g., *LG Chaudhary II*) cannot be used to reopen the issue at the execution/enforcement stage. Attempting to do so amounts to abuse of process. Madhya Pradesh Road Development Corporation Ltd. v. Jabalpur Corridor Pvt. Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 580 : 2026 INSC 590

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 - Judicial Interference in Arbitration - Arbitration as a dispute resolution mechanism has not failed in India; however, courts have sometimes failed arbitration by excessive and unwarranted interference. Judicial intervention has often proved to be “a cure without a disease”. Madhya Pradesh Road Development Corporation Ltd. v. Jabalpur Corridor Pvt. Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 580 : 2026 INSC 590

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 - Judicial Restraint - Judges handling arbitration matters must remain conscious of the foundational objectives of the Arbitration Act — speedy resolution, finality, and minimal judicial interference. Inconsistent judicial approaches cast a shadow on the viability of arbitration in India. Judicial restraint is the cornerstone of a successful arbitration ecosystem. Once an arbitral award attains finality on jurisdictional and other issues, repeated attempts to reopen it through successive proceedings must be firmly discouraged. Madhya Pradesh Road Development Corporation Ltd. v. Jabalpur Corridor Pvt. Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 580 : 2026 INSC 590

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 - Pre-Award Interest - A contractually agreed pre-award interest rate cannot be assailed as being contrary to public policy of India under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. Madhya Pradesh Road Development Corporation Ltd. v. Jabalpur Corridor Pvt. Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 580 : 2026 INSC 590

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; Section 33 & Section 34(3) – Limitation for filing Application to set aside Arbitral Award – Commencement of Limitation after disposal of Section 33 application - The Supreme Court held that once the jurisdiction of the Arbitral Tribunal under Section 33 of the Act is formally invoked, the limitation period of three months prescribed under Section 34(3) for challenging the arbitral award commences only from the date on which the Section 33 request is disposed of by the Tribunal - Supreme Court clarified that Section 34(3) does not distinguish between applications under Section 33 that are ultimately allowed or dismissed, nor does it restrict the benefit of deferred limitation only to applications that are found to be "maintainable" - Whether the application under Section 33 succeeds, fails, or is found to warrant no modification is not determinative; what matters is that the jurisdiction was formally invoked and the proceedings remained pending. [Paras 13-19] National Highway Authority of India v. T. Younis, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 589 : 2026 INSC 616

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; Section 33 & Section 34(3) – Prevention of Abuse of Process - Supreme Court cautioned that where applications under Section 33 are found to be sham, frivolous, or mala fide, or solely filed to defeat the limitation under Section 34(3) of the Act, courts are justified in imposing exemplary and punitive costs to maintain the balance between preserving legitimate remedies and preventing the abuse of the process of law. [Para 17, 18] National Highway Authority of India v. T. Younis, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 589 : 2026 INSC 616

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; Section 34(3) – Distinction from cases without formal invocation - The Supreme Court distinguished the present case from its earlier ruling in State of Arunachal Pradesh v. Damani Construction Co. (2007) 10 SCC 742 - held that the reliance on Damani Construction is misplaced where formal applications under Section 33 are admittedly filed within the statutory period and entertained by the Tribunal - In Damani Construction, the party had merely written a letter seeking a review/clarification outside the contours of Section 33 without formally invoking the Tribunal's jurisdiction. [Para 16] National Highway Authority of India v. T. Younis, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 589 : 2026 INSC 616

Arbitration (Proceedings Before the Courts) Rules, 2001 (Karnataka) – Rule 9(4) – Harmonious Construction with Section 9(2) – Held that while Rule 9(4) uses the term "initiated" and Section 9(2) uses "commenced," the terms must be read harmoniously - "Initiated" in Rule 9(4) must be understood as "commenced" within the meaning of Section 21 to prevent the strict timelines of the parent Act from being rendered otiose. [Relied on Sundaram Finance Ltd. v. NEPC India Ltd. (1999) 2 SCC 479; Milkfood Ltd. v. GMC Ice Cream (P) Ltd. (2004) 7 SCC 288; Geo Miller and Company Private Limited v. Chairman, Rajasthan Vidyut Utpadan Nigam Limited (2020) 14 SCC 643; Arif Azim Company Limited v. Aptech Limited (2024) 5 SCC 313; Para 29] Regenta Hotels v. Hotel Grand Centre Point, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 21 : 2026 INSC 32 : (2026) 4 SCC 142

Arbitration Act, 1940 – Section 2(a) and Section 39 – Absence of Arbitration Agreement – Jurisdiction of State Government – The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision setting aside an arbitral award, holding that there was neither a valid arbitration agreement nor informed consent by the Municipal Council to resolve disputes through arbitration - Noted that Clause 22 of the contract, which provided for dispute referral to the Collector with subsequent appeals to the Divisional Commissioner and the State Government, constituted a departmental dispute-resolution mechanism and not an "arbitration agreement". Bharat Udyog Ltd. v. Ambernath Municipal Council, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 291 : 2026 INSC 288 : AIR 2026 SC 1586

Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2015 — Section 11(6A) — Paradigm Shift — The 2015 Amendment introduced Section 11(6A), which limited the Court's inquiry solely to the "existence" of an arbitration agreement, effectively overruling the Patel Engineering dictum for post-amendment cases – Noted for proceedings commenced prior to 23.10.2015, the broader judicial scrutiny and finality of the Section 11 order under the old regime continue to apply – Appeal allowed. [Relied on SBP & Co. v. Patel Engineering Ltd. & Anr. (2005) 8 SCC 618; Paras 22-32] Eminent Colonizers v. Rajasthan Housing Board, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 109 : 2026 INSC 116

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; Part III — Sections 61, 73, and 74 — Challenge to Conciliation Award and Partition Deed — Order VII Rule 11 of CPC — Rejection of Plaint — The Supreme Court set aside the rejection of a suit challenging a partition deed (KBPP) and a subsequent Conciliation Award - held that the Jegatheesan group's challenge based on coercion, undue influence, and misrepresentation regarding the KBPP, and the allegation of fraud/fabrication regarding the Conciliation Award, disclosed a real cause of action that could not be summarily dismissed – Noted that while an execution proceeding under Section 36 is pending, an Execution Court cannot examine the validity of a partition deed or family arrangement; such challenges must be resolved through a properly instituted civil suit. J. Muthurajan & Anr. v. S. Vaikundarajan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 135 : 2026 INSC 139 : (2026) 5 SCC 71

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; Section 11(6-A) — Appointment of Arbitrators — Scope of Judicial Review — The Supreme Court or High Court, while considering a Section 11 application, must strictly confine its examination to the existence of an arbitration agreement - The use of the word "examination" indicates a limit to the court's jurisdiction, intended for a prima facie determination rather than a "laborious or contested inquiry" - Noted that Section 11(6-A) continues to remain in full force as its omission (by the 2019 Amendment) has not yet been notified. [Paras 14–17] Motilal Oswal Financial Services v. Santosh Cordeiro, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 32 : 2026 INSC 5 : (2026) 2 SCC 801

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; Section 12(5) and Seventh Schedule – Ineligibility of Arbitrator – Unilateral Appointment – The principle of equal treatment of parties under Section 18 applies not only to arbitral proceedings but also to the procedure for appointment of arbitrators - Equal treatment entails that parties must have an equal say in the constitution of the arbitral tribunal - Any person whose relationship with the parties, counsel, or the dispute falls within the Seventh Schedule is ineligible to be appointed as an arbitrator by operation of law – Held a person who is statutorily ineligible to act as an arbitrator cannot nominate or appoint another person as an arbitrator - A unilateral appointment by one party, where that party has exclusive power to appoint a sole arbitrator, violates the principle of impartiality and neutrality. Bhadra International (India) Pvt. Ltd. v. Airports Authority of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 4 : 2026 INSC 6

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; Section 12(5) Proviso – Waiver of Ineligibility – “Express Agreement in Writing” – Held that the ineligibility of an arbitrator under Section 12(5) can only be waived by an "express agreement in writing" entered into by the parties subsequent to the disputes having arisen – Supreme Court laid down Parameters of Waiver- i. Mere participation in proceedings, filing a Statement of Claim, requesting an extension of time under Section 29A, or failing to object in the first procedural order does not constitute an "express agreement in writing" ii. Recording "No Objection": A procedural order recording that parties have "no objection" to the appointment is insufficient to satisfy the requirement of a conscious, written waiver under the proviso to Section 12(5). Bhadra International (India) Pvt. Ltd. v. Airports Authority of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 4 : 2026 INSC 6

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; Section 15(2), 15(3), and 15(4) — Substitution of Arbitrator — Validity of prior proceedings — The Supreme Court held that while appointing a substitute arbitrator under Section 15(2), the High Court cannot declare proceedings undertaken by the previous tribunal as a "nullity" on the grounds of an IBC moratorium - Held that Section 15 is a mechanism to preserve continuity; prior proceedings remain valid unless the parties agree otherwise or the substitute tribunal, in its discretion, decides to repeat hearings. Ankhim Holdings Pvt. Ltd. v. Zaveri Construction Pvt. Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 133 : 2026 INSC 137 : AIR 2026 SC 1042

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; Section 16 & 23 - Jurisdiction to decide disputes not specifically mentioned in invocation notice - Unless the arbitration agreement specifically restricts the tribunal to only decided "specifically referred disputes," the claimant is entitled to add or amend claims in the statement of claim, and the respondent is entitled to file counter-claims, provided they are arbitrable and within limitation - Where an arbitration clause is widely worded to cover "any matter arising out of or connected with the agreement," the tribunal has jurisdiction to entertain all such disputes once constituted. Bhagheeratha Engineering Ltd. v. State of Kerala, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 31 : 2026 INSC 4

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; Section 16 — Doctrine of Competence-Competence — Arbitrability of Disputes — The determination of the substantive existence and validity of an arbitration agreement, as well as the arbitrability of the dispute, is the domain of the Arbitral Tribunal under Section 16 - The Referral Court is not the appropriate forum to conduct a "mini-trial" regarding the validity of the agreement. [Paras 15–16] Motilal Oswal Financial Services v. Santosh Cordeiro, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 32 : 2026 INSC 5 : (2026) 2 SCC 801

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; Section 2(1)(e), Section 11, and Section 29A — Jurisdiction to extend the mandate of an Arbitral Tribunal — Held that the expression "Court" used in Section 29A for the extension of time or substitution of arbitrators refers strictly to the Court as defined under Section 2(1)(e) of the Act - This definition encompasses the Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction in a district and includes a High Court only if it exercises ordinary original civil jurisdiction - The Supreme Court or High Courts exercising power under Section 11 to appoint an arbitrator do not retain supervisory control and become functus officio once the appointment is made. Jagdeep Chowgule v. Sheela Chowgule, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 89 : 2026 INSC 92 : AIR 2026 SC 666

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; Section 21 & 23 - Object of Section 21 Notice - The object of Section 21 is primarily to determine the commencement of arbitral proceedings for reckoning limitation - It is a procedural rather than a jurisdictional requirement. Failure to issue a Section 21 notice is not fatal to a party's claim if the dispute is otherwise arbitrable and covered by the arbitration agreement - The claims raised in a Section 21 notice do not restrict or limit the claims that can be subsequently raised before the Arbitral Tribunal in the statement of claim under Section 23 - held that an arbitral tribunal cannot decide disputes beyond a specific issue referred to it and that a party cannot raise additional disputes without issuing a separate notice under Section 21 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. Bhagheeratha Engineering Ltd. v. State of Kerala, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 31 : 2026 INSC 4

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; Section 29A(4) & 29A(5) - Power of Court to extend mandate after rendering of award – The Supreme Court held that an application for extension of the arbitrator's mandate under Section 29A(5) is maintainable even if it is filed after the expiry of the statutory period (12 months plus optional 6 months) and even after the award has been rendered in the interim - Noted that an award passed after the mandate has expired is unenforceable under Section 36 and "non est," but the arbitrator's indiscretion in passing such an award does not denude or impair the Court's jurisdiction to entertain an extension application. C. Velusamy v. K. Indhera, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 105 : 2026 INSC 112 : AIR 2026 SC 918

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; Section 29A(4) and Section 29A(6) — Extension of Mandate and Substitution of Arbitrator — The Supreme Court clarified that the expression "obligates" used in the Mohan Lal Fatehpuria case regarding the substitution of an arbitrator does not mean that substitution is an inevitable consequence when considering an extension of a mandate that has already expired - Substitution is only required "if the situation so warranted" and is not a mandatory inference following the termination of a mandate under Section 29A(4). Viva Highways Ltd. v. Madhya Pradesh Road Development Corporation Ltd; 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 145

Statutory Interpretation of Section 29A – The expression "if an award is not made" in Section 29A(4) does not create a threshold bar for cases where a late award has been delivered; rather, it empowers the Court to ensure proceedings reach their logical conclusion of a binding award - Termination of the mandate under Section 29A(4) is "conditional" and not "absolutistic," meaning it is subject to the Court's power to revive and extend the mandate retrospectively – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Rohan Builders (India) Pvt. Ltd. v. Berger Paints India Ltd., 2024 SCC Online SC 2494; Paras 13-23] C. Velusamy v. K. Indhera, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 105 : 2026 INSC 112 : AIR 2026 SC 918

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; Section 29A and Section 11 — Jurisdiction — held that Section 11 has no bearing on the provisions of Chapters 5 and 6 (where Section 29A is located) - Noted, an application for extension of time under Section 29A(4) does not lie before the High Court. Viva Highways Ltd. v. Madhya Pradesh Road Development Corporation Ltd; 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 145

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; Section 29A vs. Section 11 — Separation of Appointment and Supervision — Held that the power of appointment under Section 11 is a "special and limited" jurisdiction - It is a misconception to assume a hierarchy where only the appointing Court can extend the mandate - The extension of a mandate or substitution under Section 29A is a measure of curial supervision, not an "appointment" under Section 11 – Held that applications for extending an arbitral tribunal's mandate under Section 29A (4) of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 must be filed exclusively before the 'Court' as defined in Section 2(1)(e) i.e., the principal civil court of original jurisdiction, regardless of which authority appointed the arbitrators - Interpretations based on a perceived "conflict of power" or "hierarchical difficulties" between a Civil Court and a High Court are untenable and opposed to the rule of law. Jagdeep Chowgule v. Sheela Chowgule, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 89 : 2026 INSC 92 : AIR 2026 SC 666

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; Section 31(7)(a) and 31(7)(b) — General Conditions of Contract (GCC); Clause 16(3) and 64(5) — Pre-award/Pendente lite Interest — Post-award Interest — The Arbitral Tribunal cannot award pre-award or pendente lite interest, even in the form of "compensation," if the contract expressly prohibits interest on amounts payable to the contractor - a contractual bar on pre-award interest does not automatically extend to post-award interest - Post-award interest is a statutory mandate under Section 31(7)(b) and is not subject to "contracting out" by parties unless the exclusion is explicit and unambiguous - The Court retains the power to modify the rate of post-award interest if it is deemed excessive or lacks justification - Key Findings and Relied-on Decisions: i. Contractual Supremacy in Pre-award Interest: Under Section 31(7)(a), the arbitrator's power to award pre-award interest is subordinate to the terms of the agreement. If a contract (like Clause 16(3) of the GCC) bars interest on "amounts payable to the contractor," the arbitrator lacks jurisdiction to grant it. Ii. Rejection of Ejusdem Generis: The phrase "amounts payable to the contractor under the contract" in Clause 16(3) is independent and distinct from "earnest money" or "security deposits." It cannot be read down to only include deposits; iii. Statutory Mandate of Post-award Interest: Section 31(7)(b) is not subject to party autonomy. The expression "unless the award otherwise directs" refers to the rate of interest, not the entitlement to it; iv. Power to Modify Interest Rate: Courts can modify post-award interest rates to avoid excessive financial burdens and ensure "just compensation" based on contemporary economic scenarios – Appeal partly allowed. [Relied on Union of India v. Manraj Enterprises (2022) 2 SCC 331; RP Garg v. Chief General Manager, Telecom Department 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2928; Gayatri Balasamy v. M/s ISG Novasoft Technologies Limited (2025) 7 SCC 1; Union of India v. Bright Power Projects (India) (P) Limited (2015) 9 SCC 695; Union of India v. Manraj Enterprises (2022) 2 SCC 331; Paras 30-60] Union of India v. Larsen & Tubro, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 214 : 2026 INSC 203 : AIR 2026 SC 1284

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; Section 42 — Inapplicability to Section 11 — Section 42, which mandates that subsequent applications be filed in the same Court where the first application was made, does not apply to Section 11 applications - The Chief Justice or their delegate exercising power under Section 11 is not a "Court" as defined by Section 2(1)(e); therefore, a Section 11 application does not fix the jurisdiction for Section 29A applications – Appeals allowed. [Relied on SBP and Co. v. Patel Engineering Ltd. (2005) 8 SCC 618; State of West Bengal v. Associated Contractors (2015) 1 SCC 32; State of Jharkhand v. Hindustan Construction Co. Ltd. (2018) 2 SCC 602; Chief Engineer (NH) PWD (Roads) v. BSC&C and C JV 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1801; Paras 15-26] Jagdeep Chowgule v. Sheela Chowgule, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 89 : 2026 INSC 92 : AIR 2026 SC 666

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; Section 5 and Section 15 — Scope of Judicial Interference — Supreme Court clarified that the jurisdiction under Section 15(2) is limited and must be read with the principle of minimal judicial intervention - A court acting under Section 15(2) cannot exercise powers barred to it under other sections, such as setting aside a Section 16 rejection order (which is not appealable) or interfering with Section 17 orders outside of a Section 37 proceeding. Ankhim Holdings Pvt. Ltd. v. Zaveri Construction Pvt. Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 133 : 2026 INSC 137 : AIR 2026 SC 1042

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; Sections 14 and 34 – Challenge to Jurisdiction – Stage of Objection – Constitution of India; Article 14 – Public-Private Contracts - Held that an arbitrator falling under the Seventh Schedule becomes de jure unable to perform his functions, and his mandate terminates automatically - An objection to the inherent lack of jurisdiction due to such ineligibility can be raised at any stage, including for the first time in an application under Section 34 for setting aside the award – Held that unilateral appointment clauses in public-private contracts violate Article 14 for being arbitrary and failing to provide the minimum level of integrity required for quasi-judicial functions - Such clauses also violate the nemo judex rule, which constitutes a part of the fundamental policy of Indian law – Appeals allowed. [Relied on TRF Ltd. v. Energo Engineering Projects Ltd. (2017) 8 SCC 377; Perkins Eastman Architects DPC v. HSCC (India) Ltd. (2020) 20 SCC 760; Bharat Broadband Network Ltd. v. United Telecoms Ltd. (2019) 5 SCC 755; Dharma Prathishthanam v. Madhok Construction (P) Ltd. (2005) 9 SCC 686; Paras 55-107] Bhadra International (India) Pvt. Ltd. v. Airports Authority of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 4 : 2026 INSC 6

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; Sections 8 and 11 — Arbitrability and Allegations of Fraud — Whether disputes can be referred to arbitration when the very existence of the arbitration agreement is seriously disputed on allegations of forgery and fabrication — Held: When allegations of fraud are made regarding the arbitration agreement itself, the dispute is generally recognized as non-arbitrable - Arbitration is founded upon consent, and a party can only be bound if it is shown, at least prima facie, that they agreed to the process - Where an arbitration clause is embedded in a document (such as the "Admission Deed") whose existence is stoutly denied and alleged to be forged, the controversy strikes at the root of arbitral jurisdiction – Noted that in such cases, the court must examine the issue as a jurisdictional inquiry rather than referring the matter to an arbitrator - While findings in Section 9 proceedings are prima facie, once they attain finality (e.g., via dismissal of an SLP), they cannot be ignored in subsequent proceedings under Sections 8 and 11 involving the same issue. Rajia Begum v. Barnali Mukherjee, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 101 : 2026 INSC 106

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 — Interpretation of Contracts — Arbitral Autonomy — Patent Illegality — Section 34(2A) - held that the interpretation of the terms of a contract is primarily the domain of the Arbitral Tribunal - Even if a second view is possible, an award cannot be set aside merely because the appellate court prefers an alternative interpretation – Held that the Tribunal's decision to award idling charges for a Backhoe Dredger (BHD) under Clause 51.1 of the License Agreement despite the respondent's claim that Clause 38 only specified charges for "major dredgers" was found to be a logical and reasonable construction of the agreement - For an award to be set aside for patent illegality, the error must be apparent on the face of the award - A speaking award based on logical reasoning and proper interpretation of clauses does not suffer from patent illegality - a mere contravention of substantive Indian law is no longer a standalone ground for setting aside an award – Appeal allowed. [Relied on MMTC Limited vs. Vedanta Limited (2019) 4 SCC 163; UHL Power Company Limited vs. State of Himachal Pradesh (2022) 4 SCC 116; Bombay Slum Redevelopment Corporation Private Limited vs. Samir Narain Bhojwani (2024) 7 SCC 218; National Highways Authority of India v. M/s Hindustan Construction Company Ltd. 2024 INSC 388; Larsen Air Conditioning and Refrigeration Company vs. Union of India & Ors. (2023) 15 SCC 472; Paras 30-46] Jan De Nul Dredging India Pvt. Ltd. v. Tuticorin Port Trust, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 47 : 2026 INSC 34 : AIR 2026 SC 536 : (2026) 3 SCC 186

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 — Section 11, Section 16, and Section 34 — Pre-2015 Amendment Regime — Binding Nature of Section 11 Order — Res Judicata — Held that in cases governed by the SBP & Co. v. Patel Engineering Ltd. regime (prior to the 23.10.2015 amendments), the Section 11 Court exercised judicial power to determine the existence and validity of an arbitration agreement - Such a determination, even if implied, is binding on the parties at all subsequent stages, including before the Arbitral Tribunal and the Section 34 Court – Noted that the respondents, having failed to challenge the appointment order in the Supreme Court, cannot subsequently argue that the clause (Clause 23) was not an arbitration agreement. Eminent Colonizers v. Rajasthan Housing Board, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 109 : 2026 INSC 116

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – Section 16, Section 4, and Section 34 – Appointment of Presiding Arbitrator – Improper Constitution of Tribunal – Waiver and Conduct – The Appellant challenged the arbitral award on the ground that the Presiding Arbitrator was appointed by the two nominee arbitrators beyond the 30-day period prescribed in Clause 8.3(b) of the Agreement - The Appellant contended that after 30 days, the power of the nominee arbitrators was extinguished, and only the Secretary General of ICSID could make the appointment - Held: Clause 8.3(b) is an enabling provision, not a restrictive one - It provides a "fail-safe" by permitting parties to approach ICSID if the nominee arbitrators reach an impasse, but it does not denude the nominee arbitrators of their power to appoint after the 30-day period unless a request is actually made to ICSID - Since neither party approached ICSID, the appointment by the nominee arbitrators was valid. [Paras 30-34] Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai v. R.V. Anderson Associates, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 235 : 2026 INSC 228

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – Section 21 – Interpretation of "Commencement" – Supreme Court emphasized that the commencement of arbitral proceedings is a statutory event defined exclusively under Section 21 - This definition is not limited to calculating limitation under Section 43 but applies to all provisions of the Act unless specifically excluded - The legislature deliberately delinked commencement from judicial proceedings to ensure clarity and party autonomy. [Paras 24, 28, 29] Regenta Hotels v. Hotel Grand Centre Point, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 21 : 2026 INSC 32 : (2026) 4 SCC 142

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – Section 34 & Section 37 – Scope of Judicial Review – Modification of Arbitral Awards – Power to Modify – The Supreme Court upheld the power of a Court under Section 34 to modify an arbitral award to a limited extent, particularly when applying contractually agreed clauses to admitted facts – Noted that a Section 37 Court cannot substitute its own view for a plausible view taken by a Section 34 Court regarding the determination of "reasonable compensation" unless that determination is arbitrary or perverse. Saisudhir Energy Ltd. v. NTPC Vidyut Vyapar Nigam Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 112 : 2026 INSC 103 : AIR 2026 SC 850

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 — Section 34 and Section 37 — Scope of Appellate Interference — The Supreme Court reiterated that the jurisdiction of an appellate court under Section 37 is extremely circumscribed and akin to the limited jurisdiction under Section 34 - An appellate court cannot undertake an independent assessment of the merits of the award or reappraise evidence as if it were an ordinary court of appeal - Its primary role is to ascertain whether the court exercising power under Section 34 acted within its prescribed limits or exceeded them - If an Arbitral Tribunal's interpretation of a contract is a "plausible view" and is upheld under Section 34, the Section 37 court has no authority to substitute it with a different interpretation. Jan De Nul Dredging India Pvt. Ltd. v. Tuticorin Port Trust, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 47 : 2026 INSC 34 : AIR 2026 SC 536 : (2026) 3 SCC 186

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – Section 36 – Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Order XXI Rule 58 and Rule 102 – Execution of Arbitral Award – Transferee Pendente Lite – The Supreme Court upheld the dismissal of a claim petition filed by a third-party purchaser who acquired property after an arbitral award (money decree) was passed against the vendor – held that an arbitral award is a "deemed decree" enforceable under Section 36 of the 1996 Act - Under Order XXI Rule 102 CPC, the protections for bona fide claimants do not extend to a transferee pendente lite—defined as one to whom property is transferred after the institution of the suit/proceeding. R. Savithri Naidu v. Cotton Corporation of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 151 : 2026 INSC 150 : AIR 2026 SC 913

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – Section 4 and Section 16(2) – Timelines for Objection vs. Past Conduct – Held that while an objection under Section 16(2) raised before the statement of defence is technically "timely" to prevent statutory waiver under Section 4, the prior conduct and acquiescence of the party remain relevant in adjudicating the merits of the jurisdictional challenge - A party cannot participate in the process, allow multiple appointments of presiding arbitrators without protest, and then "keep a jurisdictional ace up their sleeve" to challenge the final constitution - Supreme Court must respect arbitral autonomy and ensure minimum judicial interference - If the arbitrator's interpretation of a contractual clause is a plausible view, the Court cannot substitute it with another view merely because it is possible – Appeal dismissed. [Relied on Hindustan Construction Co. Ltd. v. Bihar Rajya Pul Nirman Nigam Ltd. (2025 SCC OnLine SC 2578; Consolidated Construction Consortium Limited v. Software Technology Parks of India (2025 INSC 574); Paras 36, 40-45, 51-54, 61, 66, 67] Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai v. R.V. Anderson Associates, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 235 : 2026 INSC 228

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 — Section 73 — Authentication of Settlement — A settlement agreement (KBPP) not authenticated by the Conciliator as mandated under Section 73(4) and not signed by the parties at the time of the alleged award (Annexure P-2) raises serious questions regarding its status as an award under the Act – noted that coercion within a family context may not always involve physical threats or "life threats"- It can arise from a feeling of subservience or manifest obedience to an elder's opinion, which are matters of evidence and cannot be peremptorily rejected at the threshold of a suit - The plea of constructive res judicata is not applicable when earlier rounds of litigation specifically reserved liberty for the parties to work out their remedies in accordance with law and challenge the partition deed in a Civil Court. [Relied on Dahiben v. Arvindbhai Kalyanji Bhanusali (Gajra) D. Thr. LRs and Ors. (2020) 7 SCC 366; Paras 23-31] J. Muthurajan & Anr. v. S. Vaikundarajan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 135 : 2026 INSC 139 : (2026) 5 SCC 71

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – Section 9(2) and Section 21 – Commencement of Arbitral Proceedings – Automatic Vacation of Interim Relief – The Supreme Court held that for the purposes of Section 9(2), arbitral proceedings "commence" on the date the respondent receives a request for the dispute to be referred to arbitration, as defined under Section 21 - set aside the High Court's finding that proceedings only commence upon the filing of a Section 11 petition - If a notice invoking arbitration is received by the respondent within 90 days of an interim order, the mandate of Section 9(2) is satisfied, and the interim relief does not stand automatically vacated under Rule 9(4) of the Arbitration (Proceedings Before the Courts) Rules, 2001. [Paras 23, 24, 31] Regenta Hotels v. Hotel Grand Centre Point, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 21 : 2026 INSC 32 : (2026) 4 SCC 142

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 - Supreme Court drew the following conclusions: i. The principle of equal treatment of parties provided in Section 18 of the Act, 1996, applies not only to the arbitral proceedings but also to the procedure for appointment of arbitrators - Equal treatment of the parties entails that the parties must have an equal say in the constitution of the arbitral tribunal; ii. Sub-section (5) of Section 12 provides that any person whose relationship with the parties or counsel, or the dispute, whether direct or indirect, falls within any of the categories specified in the Seventh Schedule would be ineligible to be appointed as an arbitrator - Since, the ineligibility stems from the operation of law, not only is a person having an interest in the dispute or its outcome ineligible to act as an arbitrator, but appointment by such a person would be ex facie invalid; iii. The words “an express agreement in writing” in the proviso to Section 12(5) means that the right to object to the appointment of an ineligible arbitrator cannot be taken away by mere implication - The agreement referred to in the proviso must be a clear, unequivocal written agreement; iv. When an arbitrator is found to be ineligible by virtue of Section 12(5) read with the Seventh Schedule, his mandate is automatically terminated - In such circumstance, an aggrieved party may approach the court under Section 14 read with Section 15 for appointment of a substitute arbitrator - when an award has been passed by such an arbitrator, an aggrieved party may approach the court under Section 34 for setting aside the award; v. In arbitration, the parties vest jurisdiction in the tribunal by exercising their consent in furtherance of a valid arbitration agreement - An arbitrator who lacks jurisdiction cannot make an award on the merits - an objection to the inherent lack of jurisdiction can be taken at any stage of the proceedings. Bhadra International (India) Pvt. Ltd. v. Airports Authority of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 4 : 2026 INSC 6

Arbitration – Jurisdiction – Excepted Matters – Rule of Law – Section 28 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 – Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – The Supreme Court held that one party to a contract cannot be the sole arbiter to decide whether the other party committed a breach when liability is disputed. Such an interpretation violates the fundamental principle that no party shall be a judge in its own cause - Supreme Court clarified that while certain matters may be "excepted" from arbitration, they cannot be "excluded" from judicial remedy entirely, as a vacuum in legal remedies is opposed to the Rule of Law. ABS Marine Services v. Andaman and Nicobar Administration, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 287 : 2026 INSC 274 : AIR 2026 SC 1594

Arbitration — Setting aside of Award — Patent Illegality and Public Policy — Interpretation of Contract: The Supreme Court affirmed that the construction and interpretation of contractual terms are primarily within the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal - If an arbitrator adopts one of two plausible interpretations, the court cannot substitute its own view merely because an alternative view is possible - An award is not "patently illegal" or against "public policy" simply because of a mere contravention of law; it must violate fundamental principles of justice. [Paras 26, 29, 33, 59] National Highways Authority of India v. Gammon Atlanta (JV), 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 71 : 2026 INSC 76

Armed Forces Tribunal Act, 2007

Armed Forces Tribunal Act, 2007 – Section 14 – Judicial Review of Show Cause Notice – Where a Show Cause Notice for termination (under Regulation 216 of Navy Regulations) is directly premised on the findings and recommendations of an ICC report, the Tribunal cannot dismiss the challenge as "premature" or "merely at the preliminary stage" - The Tribunal is duty-bound to adjudicate upon the correctness of the ICC report and recommendations which form the foundational basis of the termination notice. 42605-B CDR Yogesh Mahla v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 103 : 2026 INSC 107

Armed Forces Tribunal Act, 2007 – Section 22 – Limitation Act, 1963 – Disability Pension – Broad Banding – Arrears – Delay and Laches – The Supreme Court held that the benefit of arrears of disability pension, including the benefit of "broad banding," cannot be restricted to three years prior to the filing of the application before the Armed Forces Tribunal. Union of India v. Sgt Girish Kumar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 148 : 2026 INSC 149

Arrests

Arrests from Court Premises - Guidelines - The Supreme Court partially modified the High Court's directions issued in a suo motu petition concerning police arrests and use of force within court premises. 1. Definition of Court Premises – The Supreme Court upheld the definition provided by the High Court in Para 8.1, which includes not only courtrooms but also all lands, buildings, and structures (except residential quarters) used in connection with court proceedings during notified working hours or till the court is in session, whichever is later. 2. Power of Police to Arrest – The Supreme Court held that the High Court's restrictions in Para 8.2(iii) were “too restrictive”. It modified the same to provide that police personnel shall be at liberty to arrest a person or use necessary force in court premises in the following situations: - (a) To prevent the occurrence of a cognizable offence in court premises; - (b) To arrest the accused/suspect where, immediately on committing an offence, such person can be apprehended at the spot; - (c) To prevent any suspect/accused from hiding himself in court premises. 3. District Level Committee – The Court directed the inclusion of one additional police officer (nominated by the jurisdictional Inspector General of Police or Commissioner of Police) as a member of the District Level Committee constituted to address conflicts between lawyers and police. However, it was clarified that neither the State nor the District Level Committees have any power to dilute or interfere with the statutory powers and duties of police officers in the maintenance of law and order. The appeal filed by the Kerala Police Officers Association was accordingly disposed of. Kerala Police Officers Association v. State of Kerala, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 311

Arrest - Supreme Court laid down following key points - i. Mandatory Written Communication: Supreme Court reiterated that the constitutional mandate of informing an arrestee of the grounds of arrest is mandatory for all offences under all statutes; ii. Procedural Non-Compliance: Even if grounds are explained orally at the time of arrest, they must be communicated in writing at least two hours prior to the production of the arrestee before the Magistrate; iii. Template Arrest Memos: A mere statement in a template arrest memo indicating that grounds were "explained" orally does not substitute for the requirement of furnishing written grounds; iv. Consequence of Violation: Any deviation from these principles renders the arrest and subsequent remand illegal, entitling the person to be set free. [Relied on Mihir Rajesh Shah v. State of Maharashtra & Another (2026) 1 SCC 500; Paras 20-23] Dr. Rajinder Rajan v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 327

Auction Law

Auction Law – Cancellation of Highest Bid – Arbitrariness – Whether a valid auction can be cancelled solely on the expectation of obtaining a higher price in a subsequent auction – Held, No – An auction process has a sanctity attached to it - The highest bid can only be discarded for valid reasons when the auction is otherwise held in accordance with law - Merely because an authority expects a higher bid than what was offered cannot be a reason to discard the highest bid, especially when it is above the reserve price - held that once a person is declared the highest bidder in an auction for a plot, it crystalises the future rights and obligations between the parties. Golden Food Products India v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 22 : 2026 INSC 22

Bail

Bail – Cancellation of Bail – Violation of Conditions – Siphoning of Funds – Fabrication of Documents – Failure to Settle Claims – The Supreme Court cancelled the bail granted to the petitioner (Director of Bhasin Infotech and Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd.) for blatant non-compliance with the primary condition of settling allottees' claims in the 'Grand Venice' project - that the petitioner was directed to deposit Rs. 50 Crores in his personal capacity as a pre-condition for bail - the petitioner sourced these funds from the Corporate Debtor (BIIPL) and related entities without any Board Resolution or compliance with Section 185 of the Companies Act, 2013 - Held, utilizing interest-free commercial benefits from the company to secure personal liberty lacks bona fides. Satinder Singh Bhasin v. Government of NCT of Delhi, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 316 : 2026 INSC 310

Bail Conditions vs. Final Civil Relief – A bail condition must be regulatory, not punitive or determinative. Ordering the sale of property as a condition for bail is in the nature of a final civil relief that affects property rights and cannot be sustained - Even if a counsel volunteers to sell property to secure bail, the Court should refrain from "tweaking" bail provisions to convert them into recovery proceedings. [Relied on Sumit Mehta Vs. State (NCT of Delhi) (2013) 15 SCC 570; Parvez Noordin Lokhandwalla Vs. State of Maharashtra (2020) 10 SCC 77; Mahesh Chandra Vs. State of U.P. (2006) 6 SCC 196; Paras 6 – 11] Feroze Basha v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 389

Bail - Right to Speedy Trial - The petitioner was arrested on 07.03.2017 in a murder case involving Sections 147, 148, 149, 120-B, and 302 IPC - Charge sheet was filed and the case was committed to Sessions Court - Trial remained pending even after almost nine years of custody. The High Court rejected the bail application, relying on X v. State of Rajasthan, 2024 INSC 909, observing that once trial commences, bail should not normally be granted. The Supreme Court described the High Court's order as “very shocking” and “very disappointing”. The High Court misconstrued the judgment in X v. State of Rajasthan. The said judgment does not lay down an absolute rule against grant of bail after trial begins. The length of custody and delay in trial remain paramount considerations. Gravity of the offence cannot justify indefinite detention of an undertrial when the delay in trial is not attributable to the accused. The Court granted bail without awaiting the State's response, holding that the infringement of Article 21 was apparent on the face of the record. The petitioner was directed to be released on bail forthwith, subject to terms and conditions to be imposed by the Trial Court if not required in any other case. Vaibhav Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 439

Anticipatory Bail - Routine filing and entertainment of anticipatory bail applications in private complaint cases is unnecessary, as mere issuance of summons/process does not entitle the police to arrest the accused. Sessions Courts and High Courts have no jurisdiction to direct an accused to surrender before the trial court while rejecting an anticipatory bail application in a complaint case. The Court may reject the application but cannot compel surrender. Om Prakash Chhawnika v. State of Jharkhand, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 419

Right to Speedy Trial – Bail – Seriousness of Offence - Where an undertrial accused is incarcerated for a prolonged period and there is no likelihood of the trial being concluded in the near future, the right to speedy trial under Article 21 of the Constitution is infringed. In such cases, bail must be considered and ordinarily granted, irrespective of the gravity of the offence. Sahil Manoj Machare v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 456

Anticipatory Bail - Successive Applications — Filing multiple anticipatory bail petitions in quick succession (e.g., three petitions within three months) after earlier dismissals, without any material change in circumstances, constitutes a clear abuse of process and reduces the extraordinary remedy of anticipatory bail to a mere gamble. Vasantha v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 520 : 2026 INSC 513

Bail - An undertrial prisoner who has remained in custody for 9 years is entitled to bail as continued detention amounts to a gross violation of his fundamental right to speedy trial under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. Vickki Yadav @ Vikas Yadav v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 545

Bail - Grant and Cancellation of – Successive Bail Application – Conduct of Accused and Parity - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Section 437/439 (corresponding to Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023) – Grant of bail by High Court in a successive application after cancellation by the Supreme Court – Sustainability - An order granting bail that fails to engage with the prior bail-cancellation order of the Supreme Court, overlooks the contumacious conduct of the accused in absconding post-cancellation, ignores prima facie incriminating material (such as CCTV footage and recovery of weapons), and blindly applies the principle of parity despite distinct criminal roles, suffers from manifest error of law and perversity. [Paras 22-34] Mohseen v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 536 : 2026 INSC 526

Bail – The Supreme Court, invoking its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution, directed the release of a murder convict on bail who had already undergone more than 22 years of actual imprisonment. The High Court's order dismissing a jail appeal filed by a life convict on the ground of delay of 3157 days, without considering the merits, was described by the Supreme Court as “very disturbing”. When an appeal is filed through jail by a convict serving life sentence, the High Court should adopt a practical and sympathetic approach and, at the very least, condone the delay to afford an opportunity of hearing on merits. The High Court failed to consider that the appellant had already undergone over 12 years of sentence at the time of filing the appeal and that it was a jail appeal. The Court took note of the convict's satisfactory jail conduct for 22 years and the fact that he was never released on parole or furlough even once. The District Legal Services Authority was directed to assist the petitioner in filing an appropriate representation for remission of sentence under the applicable remission policy. The Supreme Court held that remanding the matter to the High Court at this stage (after 22 years) would be a futile exercise. The petitioner was ordered to be released on bail upon furnishing a personal bond of ₹10,000/-. Arjun Jani @ Tuntun v. State of Orissa, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 473

Bail conditions - the Supreme Court strongly deprecated and set aside bail conditions requiring accused persons belonging to Dalit and Adivasi communities to clean police station premises for two months. In Re Condition Being Imposed While Granting Bail, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 472

Bail Jurisdiction - While exercising jurisdiction under Section 483 BNSS, a High Court cannot issue general directions to trial courts regarding service of summons and execution of coercive processes, as such directions fall outside the limited scope of bail proceedings. Rambalak v. State of U.P., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 527 : 2026 INSC 511

Bail - Cancellation of - A coordinate Bench of the High Court is not powerless to cancel bail granted by another coordinate Bench where the bail was secured by placing incorrect or wrong facts before the Court. If it comes to the notice of the Court that bail has been obtained by suppression or misrepresentation of material facts, it can always examine the matter and pass appropriate orders, including cancellation of bail. Suraj Mahananda v. State of West Bengal, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 586

Banking Law

Banking Law — Disclosure of Forensic Audit Reports - Whether banks are obligated to furnish the entire Forensic Audit Report (FAR) to the borrower before declaring an account as "fraud." - Held: Yes, Consistent with Rajesh Agarwal case and T. Takano v. SEBI (2022) 8 SCC 162, held that the disclosure of the FAR is the rule - Findings and conclusions alone are insufficient, as reasons for such findings are contained in the body of the report - Relevant material must be disclosed to allow the borrower to identify errors or omissions – Exception - Banks may redact or withhold portions of the report if they establish that disclosure would affect third-party privacy or rights, provided the reasons for such withholding are recorded. [Relied on State Bank of India v. Rajesh Agarwal (2023) 6 SCC 1; T. Takano v. Securities and Exchange Board of India (2022) 8 SCC 162; Paras 118 - 126] State Bank of India v. Amit Iron, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 337 : 2026 INSC 323

Banking Law — Reserve Bank of India (Fraud Risk Management in Commercial Banks) Directions, 2024 — Master Directions on Frauds, 2016 — Classification of Accounts as "Fraud" — Principles of Natural Justice — Right to Personal Hearing — Disclosure of Forensic Audit Reports - Right to Personal Hearing - Whether the principle of audi alteram partem mandates the grant of a personal/oral hearing to a borrower before their account is classified as a "fraud account" under the RBI Master Directions - Held: No, The Supreme Court clarified that the decision in State Bank of India v. Rajesh Agarwal (2023) 6 SCC 1 did not recognize an inherent right to a personal hearing - Natural justice is a flexible concept adapted to administrative realities - In the context of fraud classification an internal administrative process for risk mitigation the requirements of fairness are satisfied by the issuance of a detailed Show Cause Notice (SCN), providing the relied-upon evidentiary material, considering the borrower's written representation, and passing a reasoned order - Granting a mandatory oral hearing would defeat the objective of swift detection, encumber banking operations, and provide recalcitrant borrowers opportunities to dissipate assets or abscond. [Paras 74 - 93, 126] State Bank of India v. Amit Iron, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 337 : 2026 INSC 323

Sanctity of Settlements before Judicial/Quasi-Judicial Fora – Economic Implications - Allowing a bank to initiate criminal prosecution long after entering into a voluntary and approved compromise settlement before a judicial/quasi-judicial forum like the DRT severely undermines the sanctity of such settlements - Overlooking such conduct would make commercial entities hesitant to seek resolutions for banking disputes, causing a debilitating effect on the overall economy, especially when the institutional focus remains on the swift settlement of commercial disputes. [Relied on K. Bharthi Devi Vs. State of Telangana, (2024) 10 SCC 384; Paras 17-28] Vijay Kumar Kela v. Central Bureau of Investigation, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 565 : 2026 INSC 588

Canara Bank Officer Employees' (Discipline and Appeal) Regulations, 1976 – Regulation 10 – Common Proceedings – Interpretation of the word "May" – Held - The word "may" employed in Regulation 10 of the 1976 Regulations is directory and not mandatory - Construing "may" as mandatory would strip away the employer's necessary discretion in dynamic administrative situations - The roles of different charge-sheeted employees under a common category are often distinct, and their respective disciplinary authorities may vary depending on their cadres - Regulation 10 is a facilitative, enabling provision meant to empower the Bank to hold joint proceedings where necessary, but it does not vest a corresponding legal right in a delinquent employee to demand or insist upon a joint enquiry - the failure to conduct a joint enquiry does not vitiate independent disciplinary proceedings initiated against an individual officer. [Paras 15 – 17] Canara Bank v. Prem Latha Uppal, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 497 : 2026 INSC 478 : AIR 2026 SC 2420

Banking Law - The Supreme Court strongly deprecated the discriminatory and uneven approach adopted by banks in lending practices. The Court observed that banks are generally casual and negligent while granting huge loans to big companies/entities without proper due diligence of repayment capacity, but become excessively demanding, impose stringent conditions, and subject ordinary citizens seeking small personal loans to a tedious and harassing process. Bhaskar International v. State Bank of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 524

Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS)

Section 2(1)(k) - Inquiry

Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) — Section 2(1)(k) and Section 531(2)(a) — Definition of "Inquiry" — Saving of pending proceedings — Purely ministerial or administrative acts prior to taking cognizance – Held A mere ministerial act, such as a Special Court directing a prosecution complaint to be registered/numbered and fixing a future date for a hearing on cognizance, does not constitute an "inquiry" under Section 2(1)(k) of the BNSS - An inquiry is a judicial act requiring a positive, conscious application of the judicial mind, which commences only when the Court takes judicial notice of an offence - Where a PMLA complaint was filed prior to the commencement of the BNSS but the Special Court took cognizance after the said date without hearing the accused, the saving clause under Section 531(2)(a) of the BNSS cannot be invoked to apply the old CrPC - Because no "inquiry" or "trial" was pending immediately before the commencement of the BNSS, the substantive right of being heard under the first proviso to Section 223(1) of the BNSS must prospectively ensure to the benefit of the accused. [Relied on Kushal Kumar Agarwal v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1221; Yash Tuteja & Ors. v. Union of India, (2024) 8 SCC 46; Tarsem Lal v. Enforcement Directorate, (2024) 7 SCC 61; Hardeep Singh v. State of Punjab, (2014) 3 SCC 92; Paras 27-36] Parvinder Singh v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 522 : 2026 INSC 519

Section 2(1)(r) - "officer in charge of a police station".

Section 2(s) and 2(o) Cr.P.C. – Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 - The Supreme Court set aside a High Court of Andhra Pradesh judgment that had quashed several FIRs registered by the Anti-Corruption Bureau (ACB), Vijayawada – Held that the High Court had erroneously held that the ACB office in Vijayawada was not a notified "police station" under Section 2(s) of the CrPC following the state's bifurcation - The Supreme Court clarified that under the 2014 Reorganisation Act, existing laws and notifications (including G.O.Ms. No. 268 of 2003) continue to apply to successor states to prevent a legal vacuum - A "police station" under Section 2(s) includes a "post" held by a police officer and does not strictly require a specific physical building declaration in every instance - a subsequent 2022 clarificatory Government Order by the State of Andhra Pradesh did not have retrospective application but merely confirmed the existing legal position under the Reorganisation Act - Section 2(s) of the CrPC is exhaustive and inclusive, meaning any "post" or "place" declared by the State - A post held by a police officer can constitute a police station - Sections 100-102 of the 2014 Act ensure that laws (including notifications) in force before the appointed day continue to apply to the territories of the successor states until altered or repealed - A subsequent Government Order (G.O.Ms. No. 137 of 2022) issued as a clarification does not constitute retrospective application but merely reiterates the statutory position to avoid legal ambiguity. [Relied on Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, Ranchi and Another vs. Swarn Rekha Cokes and Coals (P) Ltd. and Others (2004) 6 SCC 689; State of Punjab and Others vs. Balbir Singh and Others (1976) 3 SCC 24; Paras 21-24, 26-29] Anti-Corruption Bureau v. Dayam Peda Ranga Rao, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 24 : 2026 INSC 37 : 2026 CriLJ 708

Section 4 - Trial of offences under Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita and other laws

Section 4 and 156 Cr.P.C. — Jurisdiction of State Anti-Corruption Bureau (ACB) over Central Government Employees — The Supreme Court upheld the Rajasthan High Court's finding that the State ACB has the jurisdiction to register criminal cases, investigate, and file charge-sheets against Central Government employees for offences committed within the State's territorial jurisdiction - Noted that the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act (DSPE Act), 1946, is permissive and does not expressly or impliedly divest regular State police authorities of their power to investigate offences under the PC Act - While an internal arrangement exists where the CBI typically handles Central Government employees and the ACB handles State employees to avoid duplication, this does not exclude the State's legal power to investigate - The only mandatory requirement is that the investigating officer must hold the rank specified under Section 17 of the PC Act – Key findings by Supreme Court – i. CrPC as Parent Statute: Unless a special law provides a separate, exclusive procedure for investigation, the general provisions of Section 156 CrPC (powers of police to investigate cognizable offences) prevail; ii. Non-Exclusivity of CBI: The DSPE Act (which governs the CBI) does not impair any other law empowering State police authorities to investigate offences - It is incorrect to claim that only the CBI has the authority to institute such prosecutions; iii. Validity of Charge-sheet: A charge-sheet filed by a State agency against a Central Government employee without the prior consent or approval of the CBI is valid in law – Appeal dismissed. [Relied on A.C. Sharma v. Delhi Administration (1973) 1 SCC 726; Paras 3-9] Nawal Kishore Meena @ N.K Meena v. State of Rajasthan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 68 : 2026 INSC 71 : 2026 (1) Crimes (SC) 172

Section 35 - When police may arrest without warrant

Quashing of FIR – Validity of interim directions to follow arrest procedures – The Supreme Court set aside an order of the High Court of Telangana which, while disposing of a petition to quash an FIR on the very first day, directed the Investigating Officer to follow the procedure under Section 35(3) of the BNSS (previously Section 41-A Cr.PC) and the Arnesh Kumar guidelines without hearing the defacto complainant. Practical Solutions Inc. v. State of Telangana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 74

Section 35 BNSS — Arrest — Mandatory issuance of notice for offences punishable with imprisonment up to 7 years — Interplay between Section 35(1)(b) and Section 35(3) to 35(6) — Discretionary nature of arrest - Core Principles and Rulings – i. Rule of Notice vs. Exception of Arrest - The Supreme Court held that for offences punishable with imprisonment up to 7 years, issuing a notice under Section 35(3) of the BNSS is the rule, whereas effecting an arrest under Section 35(6) read with Section 35(1)(b) is a clear exception; ii. Mandatory Checklist for Arrest - For an arrest to be legally justified in the specified category of offences, compliance with Section 35(1)(b)(i) (reason to believe) along with at least one condition mentioned in Section 35(1)(b)(ii) is a sine qua non; ii. No Automatic Arrest on Non-Compliance - Even if an individual fails to comply with the terms of a notice under Section 35(3) or is unwilling to identify themselves, arrest is not a matter of course - The Investigating Agency must still form an opinion that the arrest is an objective necessity for the investigation; iii. Fresh Materials Required for Subsequent Arrest - If a police officer decides to arrest an individual after having already issued a notice under Section 35(3), such an arrest must be based on materials and factors that were not available at the time the notice was issued; iv. Judicial Scrutiny - Magistrates must not authorize detention in a casual or mechanical manner - They are required to peruse the report and checklist furnished by the police officer to ensure the necessity of arrest is justified under the statutory parameters. [Relied on Arnesh Kumar v. State of Bihar & Anr, (2014) 8 SCC 273; Satender Kumar Antil v. Central Bureau of Investigation, (2022) 10 SCC 51; State of Uttar Pradesh v. Bhagwant Kishore Joshi, (1964) 3 SCR 71; Paras 20-33] Satender Kumar Antil v. Central Bureau of Investigation, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 114 : 2026 INSC 115

Section 84 - Proclamation for person absconding

Section 82 Cr.P.C. – Delay in Surrendering after Bail Cancellation – Effect of Pending Review Petition - The filing of a Review Petition before the Supreme Court does not operate as an automatic stay of a surrender direction - Evading arrest for 42 days, necessitating the issuance of a Non-Bailable Warrant (NBW) and initiation of proclamation proceedings under Section 82 CrPC, constitutes contumacious conduct that heavily weighs against the fresh grant of bail. [Para 26-27] Mohseen v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 536 : 2026 INSC 526

Section 168 - Police to prevent cognizable offences

Section 168 BNSS – Statutory Obligation of Police to Prevent Offences – Shifting of Burden via Bail Conditions – Section 168 of the BNSS casts a vital, primary statutory duty squarely upon the police and the State to prevent the commission of cognizable offences - Imposing a bail condition that ousts the accused from their residence to maintain peace effectively shifts this preventive burden from the law enforcement machinery onto the accused, thereby weakening the State's core obligation to prevent crime - Courts must remind the police of their statutory obligations to ensure no one breaches peace, rather than relying on disproportionately restrictive bail conditions to achieve situational harmony. [Relied on State of NCT of Delhi vs. Sanjay, (2014) 9 SCC 772; Paras 17-28] Sachin Yadav v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 451

Section 173 - Information in cognizable cases.

Section 173(1), Section 173(4), and Section 175(3) BNSS [erstwhile Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 — Section 154(1), Section 154(3), and Section 156(3)] — Sequential Mechanism for Criminal Prosecution — Held - The BNSS provides a structured, sequential mechanism for initiating criminal prosecution - If an officer-in-charge of a police station refuses to register an FIR under Section 173(1) BNSS, the informant's recourse lies first in approaching the jurisdictional Superintendent of Police under Section 173(4) BNSS, and subsequently, the competent Magistrate under Section 175(3) BNSS - Rushing directly to the High Court under Article 226 without exhausting these structured statutory steps renders the writ petition premature and unfit to be entertained. [Relied on Radha Krishan Industries v. State of H.P. (2021) 6 SCC 771; Thansingh Nathmal v. Superintendent of Taxes AIR 1964 SC 1419; Sakiri Vasu v. State of U.P. (2008) 2 SCC 409; Sudhir Bhaskarrao Tambe v. Hemant Yashwant Dhage (2016) 6 SCC 277; Paras 5-11] Sujal Vishwas Attavar v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 453 : 2026 INSC 442

Section 154 & Section 173 Cr.P.C. – Registration of Multiple FIRs for the Same Transaction / Occurrence – Permissibility of Parallel Investigations – Clubbing and Transfer of FIRs – The petitioners sought the clubbing and transfer of multiple FIRs registered against them across Delhi and Haryana, arising out of the same real estate project ("Brahma City/Krrish World") on identical allegations of cheating, non-delivery of plots/flats, and siphoning of homebuyer funds – Held - There cannot be multiple FIRs and parallel investigations in different jurisdictions concerning the same transaction or occurrence giving rise to cognizable offences - The scheme of the CrPC mandates a single, comprehensive investigation - Permitting parallel and overlapping investigations on identical facts leads to an avoidable multiplicity of proceedings, potential for conflicting findings, and manifest prejudice to the accused - the subsequent FIR registered in Gurugram, Haryana, was ordered to be clubbed and transferred to be investigated alongside the primary FIR in Delhi - A blanket protective order restraining coercive steps for potential future FIRs was declined. [Relied on T.T. Antony v. State of Kerala, (2001) 6 SCC 181; Paras 21 - 28] Amit Katyal v. State of Haryana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 516 : 2026 INSC 509

Section 173(3) BNSS – Registration of FIR – Preliminary Inquiry – Safeguard against mechanical registration – The Supreme Court quashed an FIR registered against a media executive, holding that the allegations were "absolutely vague," "speculative," and "inherently improbable" – Noted that Section 173(3) BNSS provides an additional safeguard for offences punishable between three and seven years - Unlike Section 154 CrPC, where a preliminary inquiry is limited to ascertaining if a cognizable offence is disclosed, Section 173(3) BNSS empowers police to conduct an inquiry to determine if a prima facie case exists even if the information ostensibly discloses a cognizable offence - The legislative intent is to prevent the registration of frivolous cases. In the instant case, the police acted with "unusual expediency" and registered the FIR in a mechanical manner without exercising the option of a preliminary inquiry despite the indeterminate nature of the allegations. [Paras 23-25] Ashish Dave v. State of Rajasthan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 258 : 2026 INSC 244

Section 154 & Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. - Mandatory Duty to Register FIR — Non-Registration Remedied by Efficacious Multi-Tiered Architecture - Where information discloses the commission of a cognizable offence, the registration of an FIR under Section 154 of the CrPC is mandatory, and the police hold no discretion to refuse it at the threshold - If the police fail or refuse to register an FIR, the CrPC provides a complete and comprehensive statutory architecture to address the grievance - The aggrieved person must first approach the Superintendent of Police under Section 154(3), and if the grievance persists, invoke the wide supervisory jurisdiction of the Magistrate under Section 156(3) to order registration and monitor the investigation. [Relied on Lalita Kumari v. Government of Uttar Pradesh (2014) 2 SCC 1 and Sakiri Vasu v. State of U.P. (2008) 2 SCC 409; Paras 47-56, 164] Ashwini Kumar Upadhyaya v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 437 : 2026 INSC 432

Section 154 Cr.P.C. — First Information Report — Delay in lodging FIR — Delay cannot be used as a ritualistic formula to discard the prosecution's case - It merely puts the court on its guard to search for a satisfactory explanation - If the delay is explained or understandable within the totality of the circumstances, it is not fatal - In cases where witnesses face fear, threats, or require time to regain tranquillity after a traumatic event, a mere delay of a few hours does not weaken the prosecution. [Paras 9, 10] Adalat Yadav v. State of Bihar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 415 : 2026 INSC 403

Section 154, 218, 219, 220, and 223 Cr.P.C. – Registration of FIR and Joinder of Charges– Whether multiple acts of cheating against numerous investors in a criminal conspiracy require separate FIRs or can be clubbed into a single FIR – Held: Where a criminal conspiracy is alleged leading to multiple acts of cheating against different individuals, registering one FIR and treating subsequent complaints as statements under Section 161 CrPC is a correct course of action - The "triple tests" to determine if acts form the 'same transaction' are: (1) unity of purpose and design; (2) proximity of time and place; and (3) continuity of action - If the Magistrate finds the acts constitute the 'same transaction', consolidated charges can be framed under Sections 220(1) and 223(a) & (d) CrPC. State (NCT of Delhi) v. Khimji Bhai Jadeja, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 11 : 2026 INSC 25 : 2026 CriLJ 625

Section 174 - Information as to noncognizable cases and investigation of such cases.

Social Media Posts & Political Speech – Guidelines for Registration of FIRs – Supreme Court refuses to interfere with the Telangana High Court's judgment quashing criminal proceedings and issuing mandatory operational guidelines for police and Magistrates when dealing with complaints based on social media posts – Noted that the High Court's guidelines (Para 29) aim to safeguard fundamental rights and prevent the mechanical or arbitrary invocation of the criminal process - Key Guidelines Upheld – i. Verification of Locus Standi - Police must verify if a complainant is a "person aggrieved" before registering FIRs for defamation or similar offences; ii. High Threshold for Media-Related Offences - Cases involving intentional insult, public mischief, or threat to public order shall not be registered unless there is prima facie material disclosing incitement to violence or hatred; iii. Protection of Political Speech: Constitutional protections under Article must be scrupulously enforced; mechanical registration of cases for harsh or critical political speech is prohibited; iv. Defamation Procedure - As a non-cognizable offence, police cannot directly register an FIR; complainants must be directed to a Magistrate, and action may only follow an order under Section 174(2) of the BNSS; v. Prior Legal Scrutiny: In sensitive cases involving expression, police must obtain a prior legal opinion from the Public Prosecutor before registration. [Relied on Kedar Nath Singh v. State of Bihar, 1962 Supp (2) SCR 769; Shreya Singhal v. Union of India, (2015) 5 SCC 1; Arnesh Kumar v. State of Bihar, (2014) 8 SCC 273; Paras 6,7] State of Telangana v. Nalla Balu @ Durgam Shashidhar Goud, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 113

Section 175 - Police officer's power to investigate cognizable case.

Section 175(3) and Section 175(4) BNSS – Interplay and Procedural Safeguards - The Supreme Court clarified that Section 175(4) is not an independent or standalone provision, nor is it a mere proviso to Section 175(3) - the two sub-sections must be read harmoniously. Section 175(4) acts as a procedural adjunct and an additional protective layer for public servants - Supreme Court held that although Section 175(4) uses the term "complaint" (which under Section 2(1)(h) can include oral allegations), in the context of proceedings against public servants, it must be interpreted as a written complaint supported by an affidavit - It is illogical to require an affidavit for allegations against private individuals under Section 175(3) but exempt it for public servants under Section 175(4). [Relied on Priyanka Srivastava v. State of U.P. 2015 6 SCC 287; Lalita Kumari v. Govt. of U.P 2014 2 SCC 1; Radhe Shyam v. Chhabi Nath 2015 5 SCC 423; Pradnya Pranjal Kulkarni v. State of Maharashtra 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1948; Paras 20-29, 37-39, 45-48] xxx v. State of Kerala, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 85 : 2026 INSC 88

Two-Tier Protection for Public Servants – Noted that BNSS provides a dual-protection mechanism for public officials: i. Threshold Stage: Under Section 175(4), a Magistrate must call for a report from the superior officer and consider the assertions of the accused public servant before ordering an investigation; ii. Cognizance Stage: Under Section 218(1), prior government sanction is required before the Court takes cognizance. xxx v. State of Kerala, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 85 : 2026 INSC 88

Section 156(3) and 200 Cr.P.C. - The parameters and fields of operation of Section 156(3) CrPC (direction for registration of FIR) and Section 200 CrPC (private complaint) are distinct and different. Once an application under Section 156(3) CrPC has been dismissed and the High Court, while dealing with a subsequent challenge, grants liberty to the complainant to file a private complaint under Section 200 CrPC, the complainant cannot file a second application under Section 156(3) CrPC by taking advantage of such liberty. Filing a second Section 156(3) application in such circumstances amounts to an impermissible attempt to review or override the earlier order of the High Court and is not maintainable in law. The Supreme Court set aside the orders of the High Court and the Magistrate directing registration of an FIR on a second application under Section 156(3) CrPC. The Court held that after the High Court had expressly granted liberty to file a private complaint under Section 200 CrPC against the police closure report, the Magistrate could not have entertained a fresh application under Section 156(3). The Court directed the Magistrate to treat the said second application filed under Section 156(3) CrPC as a private complaint under Section 200 CrPC and proceed in accordance with law. Mohan Karthik v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 458

Section 156(3) & Sections 196, 197 Cr.P.C. - Prior Sanction is NOT a precondition for directing registration of an FIR or conducting an investigation at the pre-cognizance stage - The Supreme Court set aside the Delhi High Court's view and ruled that the statutory requirement of obtaining prior sanction under Sections 196 and 197 of the CrPC operates strictly at the stage of "taking cognizance" by a Court - It does not extend to the anterior, pre-cognizance stage of registering an FIR or directing a police investigation under Section 156(3) - An order passed by a Magistrate directing an investigation under Section 156(3) does not amount to "taking cognizance" within the meaning of Section 190 of the CrPC - To condition the registration of an FIR upon prior sanction would invert the sequential statutory scheme and render investigative provisions unworkable. [Relied on State of Karnataka v. Pastor P. Raju (2006) 6 SCC 728; Sakiri Vasu v. State of U.P. (2008) 2 SCC 409; Paras 101-164] Ashwini Kumar Upadhyaya v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 437 : 2026 INSC 432

Section 176 - Procedure for investigation

Section 157 Cr.P.C. – Procedural Lapses – Alleged non-compliance with the requirement of sending the FIR to the Magistrate under Section 157 CrPC is not, by itself, fatal to the prosecution case - Such procedural lapses are insufficient to overturn a conviction when the overall evidence establishes the guilt of the accused - The movement of multiple accused persons, arriving together armed with firearms and chasing the deceased into a private residence to execute the killing, is sufficient to draw an inference of a common object - The recovery of 40 pellets from the body and multiple entry/exit wounds corroborated the involvement of multiple shooters. [Paras 13, 17 - 20] Dablu v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 238 : 2026 INSC 224 : AIR 2026 SC 1319

Section 180 - Examination of Witnesses by Police

Criminal Procedure – Grant of Bail – Judicial Discretion and Duty to Consider Material Evidence - The Supreme Court observed that while the judicial discretion to grant bail is wide, it must be exercised in a judicious, reasoned manner by adverting to the settled parameters, especially where accusations are grave - The High Court erred in isolating the omission in the inquest proceedings while completely ignoring vital material collected during the investigation - A specific overt act attributed to the accused in the FIR, the corroborative post-mortem report showing firearm injuries, the recovery of the weapon at the instance of the accused, and the statements of witnesses recorded under Section 180 of the BNSS, 2023 constitute material circumstances that cannot be brushed aside - Assigning reasons not in consonance with settled bail principles in serious offences renders the order unsustainable. [Paras 14-16] Bhagat Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 535 : 2026 INSC 527

Section 181 - Statements to police and use thereof

Section 162 Proviso CrPC r/w Section 145 of Evidence Act – Impeaching Credibility vs. Omissions in FIR – Defense merely cross-examined the prosecutrix by suggesting that the details of the videography threat were not mentioned in her initial complaint/FIR – Held: The FIR is primarily meant to set the criminal investigation into motion and is not an encyclopedia of all relevant facts - An omission in the FIR is not fatal unless it goes to the root of the case - To properly contradict and discredit a witness under the proviso to Section 162 CrPC, the defense must draw the witness's attention to significant omissions or contradictions in their previous statements recorded by the police under Section 161 CrPC during investigation - Suggestions of oral denial and reference only to the FIR do not invoke the statutory mechanism required to shake the veracity of the deposition. [Relied on Tahsildar Singh v. State of U.P., AIR 1959 SC 1012 and Balu Sudam Khalde v. State of Maharashtra, (2023) 13 SCC 365; Paras 74, 76, & 77, 90-100] Vijayakumar v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 531 : 2026 INSC 525

Section 183 - Recording of confessions and statements

Section 164 Cr.P.C. — Confessional Statements — Retracted and Exculpatory Confessions — Legal Aid — Held: A confession must be a direct acknowledgment of guilt to form the basis of a conviction – noted that in the present case, the confession of A1 was exculpatory (accusing the co-accused), and A2's statement did not admit to murder; thus, they could not be relied upon - the Magistrate failed to inform the accused of their right to legal aid before recording the statements, violating mandatory duties. [Paras 23-28] Bernard Lyngdoh Phawa v. State of Meghalaya, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 84 : 2026 INSC 85 : 2026 (1) Crimes (SC) 230

Section 187 - Procedure when investigation cannot be completed in 24 hours

Section 167(2) Cr.P.C. read with Section 43-D(2) of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 — Extension of time for investigation — Right to Default Bail — Mandatory requirement of production and notice to the accused - The Supreme Court set aside the orders extending the time for completing the investigation and granted default bail to the accused - held that the initial order extending the time to file the chargesheet was passed without procuring the presence of the accused (either physically or virtually) and without giving him an opportunity of being heard or raising objections - This constitutes a gross illegality that violates the fundamental rights of the accused under Article 21 of the Constitution of India – Supreme Court reiterated that the extension of time for completing an investigation is not an empty formality - Any direction to extend the period for filing a chargesheet encroaches upon personal liberty and must be preceded by due application of mind by recording justifiable, cogent, and valid reasons - Extension orders passed in an absolutely mechanical or perfunctory manner merely noting that "investigation is still pending" are legally unsustainable - Since the first extension order was declared illegal and arbitrary, the subsequent chargesheet filed after the expiry of the statutory period of 90 days could not defeat the right of the accused - The appellant's right to claim default bail stood crystallized upon the filing of his application under Section 167(2) CrPC before the chargesheet was submitted. [Relied on Jigar v. State of Gujarat, (2023) 6 SCC 484; Paras 24 - 36] Md. Ariz Hasnain @ Ariz Hasnain v. State of Jharkhand, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 475 : 2026 INSC 456

Section 193 - Report of police officer on completion of investigation

Section 193 BNSS – Stay of Investigation/Charge-sheet – Interim Orders in Writ Jurisdiction – The Supreme Court set aside a High Court's interim direction that restrained the police from filing a charge-sheet while allowing the investigation to continue - Supreme Court held that while a High Court can exercise discretion to grant protection from coercive steps during the pendency of a petition under Article 226, a blanket stay on filing the report under Section 193(3) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) is "wholly unjust" when the facts involve repeated fraudulent sale of society lands. Shrikant Ojha v State of U.P., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 493 : 2026 INSC 482

Section 173(8) Cr.P.C. - In the absence of express permission from the concerned Magistrate, the police cannot proceed with further investigation after filing a closure report/final report. The requirement of obtaining leave of the Court/Magistrate, though not expressly provided in the statute, has been read into Section 173(8) CrPC as a necessary safeguard through consistent judicial pronouncements. [Relied on: Rama Chaudhary v. State of Bihar, (2013) 5 SCC 762, Vinay Tyagi v. Irshad, (2013) 5 SCC 762, Peethambaran v. State of Kerala, 2023 LiveLaw (SC) 402, Robert Lalchungnunga Chongthu v. State of Bihar, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2511] Paliniswamy Veeraraja v. State of Karnataka, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 557 : 2026 INSC 561

Section 194 - Police to enquire and report on suicide, etc.

Section 194 BNSS – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Section 174 – Scope and Purpose of Inquest Proceedings – Bail Parameters - The Supreme Court held that the scope of an inquiry under Section 174 of the Cr.P.C. (now corresponding to Section 194 of the BNSS, 2023) is a preliminary enquiry of a limited and specific character, strictly confined to ascertaining the apparent cause of death - It is neither intended nor required to record a detailed account of the incident or register the names of the accused persons who might have caused the death - The High Court was not justified in drawing an adverse inference to grant bail to the accused merely because the informant and another panch witness had not made specific allegations against the accused during the inquest proceedings - Non-mention of the author of the crime in the inquest report cannot, by itself, be a valid reason to doubt the involvement of an accused who is subsequently named. [Relied on Pedda Narayana v. State of A.P., (1975) 4 SCC 153; Amar Singh v. Balwinder Singh, (2003) 2 SCC 518; Paras 12-14] Bhagat Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 535 : 2026 INSC 527

Section 215 - Prosecution for contempt of lawful authority of public servants

Section 195 read with Section 340 Cr.P.C. – Prosecution for Perjury in Matrimonial Disputes – Scope of – Application filed by husband seeking prosecution of wife for making allegedly false statements on oath during interim maintenance proceedings - Held: The allegations do not disclose the necessary ingredients of the offence of perjury - The husband's grievances stem from a hyper-technical dissection of the material on record and appear to be instigated by personal vendetta, anger, and pent-up frustration arising out of escalated matrimonial acrimony - Recourse to criminal prosecution under Section 340 CrPC cannot be permitted to satisfy a spiteful approach. Special Leave Petition filed by the husband dismissed. [Paras 36, 37] Ann Saurabh Dutt v. Lieutenant Colonel Saurabh Iqbal Bahadur Dutt, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 489 : 2026 INSC 475

Section 218 - Prosecution of Judges and public servants.

Section 197(1) Cr.P.C. – Protection of Public Servants – Protection under Section 197(1) is only available to public servants who are "not removable from his office save by or with the sanction of the Government." - Subordinate rank police officers who can be dismissed by an Inspector General of Police or other departmental heads without State Government sanction do not fall under this category. Samarendra Nath Kundu v. Sadhana Das, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 314 : 2026 INSC 304

Section 197(3) Cr.P.C. – State Government Notification – While the State Government has the power to extend Section 197(2) protection to members of forces charged with maintaining public order via notification, such protection only applies to the act of "taking cognizance." - If no bar existed on the date the court took cognizance, the trial can proceed despite a later notification. [Relied on Nagraj v. State of Mysore (AIR 1964 SC 269); Fakhruzamma v. State of Jharkhand (2013 15 SCC 552); Paras 10-15] Samarendra Nath Kundu v. Sadhana Das, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 314 : 2026 INSC 304

Section 197 Cr.P.C. – Sanction for Prosecution – Applicability of subsequent notification to prior cognizance – Held that the bar under Section 197 of Cr.P.C. applies at the stage of taking cognizance - A notification issued under Section 197(3) extending protection to subordinate police officers does not have a retrospective effect on proceedings where cognizance was already validly taken before the issuance of such notification - A post-cognizance sanction or a subsequent bar cannot nullify a validly passed cognizance order. Samarendra Nath Kundu v. Sadhana Das, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 314 : 2026 INSC 304

Section 197 Cr.P.C. – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023; Section 217 – Delay in Sanction – Reference to Larger Bench - While addressing the "lethargy and/or apathy" of competent authorities in granting sanction for prosecution, Supreme Court noted that the High Court of Madras had issued a direction stating that if no decision is taken on a sanction request within one month, "sanction will be deemed to have been granted." - Given the recurring nature of these grievances and existing proceedings before a Bench presided over by the Chief Justice of India, Supreme Court referred the matter for consideration by a Larger Bench – Held that the High Court's direction regarding "deemed sanction" remains stayed pending further orders. [Relied on Suneeti Toteja Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Anr. (2025) SCC OnLine SC 433; Paras 5-8 ] State v. M. Muneer Ahmed, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 167

Sanction for Prosecution – Concept of Deemed Sanction – Deemed Sanction not recognized in Subramanian Swamy vs. Manmohan Singh - The Supreme Court observed that the lead judgment in Dr. Subramanian Swamy vs. Manmohan Singh (2012) 3 SCC 64, does not refer to or discuss the concept of "deemed sanction" - While paragraph 81 of the said judgment part of the concurring opinion by Hon'ble A.K. Ganguly, is often cited, a Coordinate Bench in Suneeti Toteja Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh (2025) SCC OnLine SC 433 has already repelled arguments for deemed sanction, noting that even the Subramanian Swamy decision does not lend credence to such an argument. State v. M. Muneer Ahmed, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 167

Section 223 - Examination of complainant

Section 223(1) first proviso BNSS — Applicability to Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (PMLA) proceedings — Right of the accused to be heard prior to taking cognizance — Nature of provision – Held that the first proviso to Section 223(1) of the BNSS, which prohibits a Court from taking cognizance of an offence on a complaint without giving the accused an opportunity of being heard, is substantive and mandatory in nature - It confers a vital right upon the accused that forms an integral part of the right to a fair trial enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution of India - The procedural framework governing complaint cases under the erstwhile CrPC (Sections 200 to 205) and the corresponding provisions of the BNSS (Sections 223 to 228) apply to prosecution complaints filed under Section 44(1)(b) of the PMLA, as they are not inconsistent with the special statute - Non-compliance with the mandate of the first proviso to Section 223(1) of the BNSS is not a mere procedural irregularity but an illegality that renders the order taking cognizance void ab initio. Parvinder Singh v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 522 : 2026 INSC 519

Section 225 - Postponement of issue of process.

Section 225 BNSS - A Magistrate must conduct an inquiry himself or direct an investigation under Section 225 BNSS before issuing process against an accused who resides outside the territorial jurisdiction of the Court. Direct issuance of summons or process without complying with the mandatory procedure under Section 225 BNSS is impermissible. Rajeev Mehta @ Rajiv Kishor Kirtilal Mehta v. Param Bir Singh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 411

Section 202 Cr.P.C. - Once a Magistrate takes cognizance and issues process (summons), the accused is only required to appear before the Court and participate in the proceedings. Police have no authority to arrest the accused in a complaint case unless the Court issues a non-bailable warrant along with or in place of summons. Even when a Magistrate directs a police inquiry under Section 202 Cr.P.C. before issuing process, the police have no power to arrest the accused during the course of such inquiry. Om Prakash Chhawnika v. State of Jharkhand, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 419

Section 202(1) CrPC vs. Proviso to Section 200 CrPC – Postponement of issue of process – Accused residing beyond territorial jurisdiction – Mandatory inquiry under Section 202(1) CrPC vs. Proviso to Section 200 CrPC – Public Servant Exemption - The Supreme Court held: The mandatory requirement of conducting an inquiry or investigation under Section 202(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) in cases where the accused resides beyond the Magistrate's territorial jurisdiction must be construed harmoniously with the proviso to Section 200 CrPC - When a complaint is filed in writing by a public servant acting in the discharge of their official duties, the Magistrate is exempted from examining the complainant and witnesses on oath - the legislature has placed public servants on a "different pedestal," and the lack of a specific Section 202 inquiry does not vitiate the summoning order when the complaint is lodged by a competent official authority (such as a Drugs Inspector). State of Kerala v. Panacea Biotec Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 206 : 2026 INSC 200 : AIR 2026 SC 1270 ; 2026 (1) Crimes (SC) 285

Section 232 - Commitment of case to Court of Session when offence is triable exclusively by it.

Sections 209 and 323 of CrPC — Jurisdiction — Magistrate's Power to Commit — Noted that High Court's assumption that the case was triable by a Magistrate was premature. Even if a case is initially before a Magistrate, it can be committed to the Court of Sessions under Section 209 or Section 323 of the CrPC if the offences (such as Section 409 or 467 IPC, which carry sentences up to life imprisonment) warrant such a trial – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Dolat Ram and others vs. State of Haryana (1995) 1 SCC 349; Neeru Yadav vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and another (2014) 16 SCC 508; Sudha Singh vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and another (2021) 4 SCC 781; Paras 15-21] Rakesh Mittal v. Ajay Pal Gupta, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 170 : AIR 2026 SC 1117

Section 258 - Judgment of acquittal or conviction

Section 235(2) and Section 386(a) Cr.P.C. — Procedure on reversing an acquittal — Appellate Court's power and obligation to sentence — When an Appellate Court reverses a judgment of acquittal and convicts an accused for the first time, it has a bounden duty to hear the convict on the question of sentence and impose an appropriate sentence itself - The Appellate Court cannot abdicate its judicial function or relegate the matter to the Trial Court solely for the purpose of pronouncing and imposing a sentence - Such a course of remanding the matter for sentencing is alien to the scheme of Section 386(a) of the Cr.P.C - The Supreme Court partly allowed the appeals, setting aside the High Court's direction to the Trial Judge to impose the sentence - The matter was remitted back to the High Court with a direction to fix a date, hear the convict on the issue of sentence, and pass an appropriate sentence in accordance with law. [Relied on Kumar Exports v. Sharma Carpets, (2009) 2 SCC 513; Dagdu and Others v. State of Maharashtra, (1977) 3 SCC 68; Allauddin Mian and Others Sharif Mian and Another v. State of Bihar, (1989) 3 SCC 5; Kamalakar Nandram Bhavsar and Others v. State of Maharashtra, (2004) 10 SCC 192; Paras 14 - 20] Mukesh Kumar Yadav v. State, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 546 : 2026 INSC 559

Section 238 - Effect of errors.

Section 215, 228, 464, and 465 Cr.P.C. — Framing of Charge — Procedural Irregularity vs. Fundamental Illegality — De Novo Trial — The Supreme Court set aside a High Court order directing a fresh trial due to an unsigned formal charge-sheet - held that the purpose of framing a charge is to provide the accused with precise notice of accusations to enable an effective defense, rather than being a "mere ritualistic formality" - Where the record indicates that charges were read over and explained to the accused in the presence of counsel, and the accused subsequently participated in the trial for over fourteen years by extensively cross-examining witnesses, there is substantial compliance with Section 228 Cr.P.C. - A procedural lapse, such as the omission of a signature on a formal charge document, constitutes a curable irregularity under Sections 215 and 464 Cr.P.C. unless it is demonstrated that the accused was misled or that a "failure of justice" was occasioned. Sandeep Yadav v. Satish, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 296 : 2026 INSC 301

Exceptional Nature of De Novo Trials — A direction for a de novo trial is an exceptional measure and should not be resorted to for mere procedural lapses, especially when a trial has substantially progressed and key prosecution witnesses have since expired - Ordering a fresh trial in the absence of demonstrated prejudice irretrievably prejudices the prosecution and defeats the interests of timely justice. [Relied on Willie (William) Slaney v. State of Madhya Pradesh (AIR 1956 SC 116); Main Pal v. State of Haryana (2010) 10 SCC 130; Ajay Kumar Ghoshal v. State of Bihar (2017) 12 SCC 699; Paras 14-17] Sandeep Yadav v. Satish, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 296 : 2026 INSC 301

Section 241 - Separate charges for distinct offences

Rights of Complainants/Witnesses – Concern that treating complainants as witnesses in a single FIR deprives them of legal remedies – Held: Complainants treated as witnesses are entitled to file protest petitions if a closure report is filed or if the Magistrate intends to discharge the accused. The Magistrate is bound to consider such petitions on merits – Held: Requiring registration of individual FIRs for every victim in mass-cheating cases would lead to an unnecessary multiplicity of proceedings, which is not in the larger public interest or the interest of the State – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Mish Devgan vs. Union of India and others (2021) 1 SCC 1; Andhra Pradesh vs. Cheemalapati Ganeswara Rao (1964) 3 SCR 297; Paras 15-22] State (NCT of Delhi) v. Khimji Bhai Jadeja, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 11 : 2026 INSC 25 : 2026 CriLJ 625

Section 250 - Discharge

Sections 227 and 482 Cr.P.C. — Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 — Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) — Indian Penal Code, 1860 — Sections 471, 477-A, and 120-B — Orissa Forest Act, 1972 — Section 27 — Discharge — Vague and General Allegations — Principle of Parity - Held, that the presence of general allegations without any overt act or specific imputations against the accused is insufficient to proceed to trial - While a detailed appreciation of evidence is not warranted at the stage of framing charges, Supreme Court must be satisfied that there exists a sufficient ground or grave suspicion against the accused - Broad and joint accusations cast in a wide net, without defining individual roles or culpability, are impermissible under law - Held, that when similarly situated co-accused persons prominently placed in the administrative chain have already been discharged under similar allegations, the principle of parity requires that the Appellant be treated alike - Continuing proceedings against one accused while discharging others on indistinguishable facts would be arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India - Continuation of such vague criminal proceedings would amount to an abuse of the process of law - The High Court's order dismissing the application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is set aside, and the Appellant is discharged. [Relied on Neelu Chopra and another Vs. Bharti, (2009) 10 SCC 184 State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335; Yogesh v. State of Maharashtra, (2008) 10 SCC 394; Paras 15-24] Susanta Kumar Dalei v. State of Odisha, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 518 : 2026 INSC 510

Sections 227 and 228 – Discharge and Framing of Charge – Noted that a Judge has the power to sift and weigh evidence for the limited purpose of finding a prima facie case, they cannot conduct a "mini-trial" or a roving inquiry at the threshold stage - If two views are possible and one gives rise to only suspicion (as distinguished from "grave suspicion"), the Trial Judge is empowered to discharge the accused - Supreme Court noted that "the process itself can become the punishment" if responsibility at the framing stage is not exercised with care. [Paras 12 - 21] Dr. Anand Rai v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 136 : 2026 INSC 141 : AIR 2026 SC 1069

Section 330 - No formal proof of certain documents.

Section 294 CrPC — Scope and Distinction – Admissibility of documents without formal proof vs. Evidence of formal character on affidavit – The High Court dismissed the application under Section 294 Cr.P.C. by erroneously relying on a precedent concerning Section 296 Cr.P.C. – Held: Section 294 Cr.P.C. deals with documentary evidence where the court calls upon parties to admit or deny the genuineness of documents to dispense with formal proof - In contrast, Section 296 Cr.P.C. relates to evidence of a formal character given by affidavit - The ratio of a judgment concerning Section 296 cannot be applied to reject an application under Section 294 - It is the duty of the Court to uphold the spirit of Section 294 by ascertaining the genuineness of documents through admission or denial. [Relied on State of Punjab Vs. Naib Din (2001) 8 SCC 578; Para 6-9] R. Ganesh v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 471

Section 294 CrPC — Admissibility of Post-Mortem Report — The non-examination of the medical officer who conducted the post-mortem is not fatal to the prosecution if the defense admits the genuineness of the report under Section 294 CrPC - Once admitted, the report serves as substantive evidence of the correctness of its contents - Intention — Intention is a state of mind gathered from the cumulative effect of circumstances: nature of weapons, body parts targeted, force used, premeditation, and prior enmity - Even if weapons like lathis are used, their lethality is determined by the manner of use and the multiplicity of injuries on vital parts – Appeals allowed. [Relied on Daya Nand v. State of Haryana (2008) 15 SCC 717; Pulicherla Nagaraju v. State of A.P. (2006) 11 SCC 444; Akhtar v. State of Uttaranchal (2009) 13 SCC 722; Vinubhai Ranchhodbhai Patel v. Rajivbhai Dudabhai Patel (2018) 7 SCC 743; Paras 41-45, 61-67, 69, 70] Sitaram Kuchhbedia v. Vimal Rana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 189 : 2026 INSC 178

Section 337 - Person once convicted or acquitted not to be tried for same offence

Criminal Prosecution vs. Disciplinary Proceedings — Interplay and Effect of Exoneration - Whether exoneration in a departmental enquiry automatically results in the quashing of parallel criminal proceedings? –Supreme Court discussed following points and held that - i. Standard of Proof: reiterated that disciplinary proceedings and criminal prosecutions are independent, governed by different standards of proof: preponderance of probabilities for the former and proof beyond reasonable doubt for the latter; ii. Distinction between Fact-patterns: distinguished between cases where the very "substratum of the allegation" is found non-existent on merits (as in Radheshyam Kejriwal) and cases where exoneration is based on a lack of evidence or technical grounds; iii. Effect of Independent Entities: Where the prosecuting agency (e.g., Anti-Corruption Bureau/Lokayukta) and the disciplinary authority are different entities not in the same hierarchy, the findings of the departmental enquiry do not bind the criminal court; iv. Nature of Exoneration: Exoneration in a departmental proceeding ipso facto does not result in the quashing of criminal prosecution - Quashing is only permissible if the exoneration is on merits, where the allegation is found to be unsustainable and the person is held innocent; v. Specific Findings in This Case: In the present case, the "exoneration" was deemed a "discharge for lack of diligence" because the Inspector who conducted the trap was not examined, rather than a finding that the bribe was never demanded - Supreme Court found sufficient evidence (complainant testimony and independent witnesses) to justify the continuation of the criminal trial – Appeal allowed. [Relied on State (NCT of Delhi) v. Ajay Kumar Tyagi (2012) 9 SCC 685; Radheshyam Kejriwal v. State of W.B. (2011) 3 SCC 581; P.S. Rajya v. State of Bihar (1996) 9 SCC 1; Paras 12-17] Karnataka Lokayukta Bagalkote District v. Chandrashekar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 15 : 2026 INSC 31

Section 351 - Power to examine the accused.

Section 313 Cr.P.C. – Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 – Section 21 – Opportunity to Lead Defense Evidence – The appellant contended he was not afforded an opportunity to examine himself as a defense witness - Supreme Court rejected this, noting that the trial record showed the appellant's statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C. was recorded and he had the opportunity to avail himself of Section 21 of the P.C. Act but failed to do so during the trial. Raj Bahadur Singh v. State of Uttarakhand, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 242 : 2026 INSC 239 : AIR 2026 SC 1506

Section 313 Cr.P.C. – Examination of the Accused – Failure to put specific material circumstances – Prejudice to the Accused – The underlying object of Section 313 is based on the principle of audi alteram partem to enable the accused to explain incriminating circumstances - a generalized presumption of prejudice cannot be made merely because of inadequate or general questions - To vitiate a trial, the accused must demonstrate that the non-examination on a particular circumstance actually and materially prejudiced them, resulting in a failure of justice - In the present case, while questions were general, the incriminating circumstances were put to the appellants, and no specific prejudice was shown - Held, the testimony of eye-witnesses cannot be discarded merely because they are related to the deceased. If their presence at the site is natural and their testimony remains consistent under cross-examination, minor inconsistencies do not weaken the prosecution's. [Relied on Rakesh and Anr. Vs. State of U.P. and Anr. (2021 INSC 321; Suresh Chandra Bahri vs. State of Bihar (1995 Suppl (1) SCC 80); Om Pal and Ors. Vs. State of U.P. (now State of Uttarakhand) (2025 INSC 1262); Para 5-9] Ghanshyam Mandal v. State of Bihar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 201 : 2026 INSC 194 : AIR 2026 SC 1445

Section 313 Cr.P.C. - Examination of Accused – Duty of Court and Prosecutor – Impact of Inadequate Questioning - Held: It is the solemn duty of both the Trial Court and the Prosecutor to ensure all incriminating circumstances (motive, dying declarations, medical evidence) are put to the accused during their Section 313 examination - A casual or "scanty" examination that omits material circumstances falls short of the legal standard and can lead to the failure of the entire prosecution. Sanjay Kumar Sharma v. State of Bihar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 230 : 2026 INSC 223

Section 313 CrPC — Adverse Inference — Failure to Explain Incriminating Circumstances - Held: When an accused gives incorrect or false answers or maintains complete denial regarding facts within their exclusive knowledge during a Section 313 CrPC statement, the court is entitled to draw an adverse inference - In this case, the Appellant-Accused denied his relationship with the deceased and even his admission to the hospital despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary - Such conduct fails to meet the explanation expected of a person of normal prudence and tilts the case in favor of the prosecution. Gudipalli Siddhartha Reddy v. State C.B.I., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 166 : 2026 INSC 160 : AIR 2026 SC 950

Section 358 - Power to proceed against other persons appearing to be guilty of offence.

Section 319 CrPC – Subsequent Summoning of Quashed Accused – Doctrine of Double Jeopardy (Article 20(2) of the Constitution of India & Section 300 CrPC) – Held - Quashing of proceedings under Section 482 CrPC at the threshold does not amount to an acquittal on merits and does not trigger the bar of 'double jeopardy' - Supreme Court clarified that if strong and cogent evidence emerges during the trial of the husband implicating the present appellants, the trial court remains fully competent to exercise its powers under Section 319 CrPC to summon them to face trial. [Relied on State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335; Anand Kumar Mohatta v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2019) 11 SCC 706; Hardeep Singh v. State of Punjab, (2014) 3 SCC 92; MCD v. Ram Kishan Rohtagi, (1983) 1 SCC 1; Paras 22-57] Arti Mehta v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 539 : 2026 INSC 533

Section 319 Cr.P.C. – Principles for Granting Bail to Accused Added via Section 319 – High Standard of Evidence Required - The Supreme Court held that when a person is added as an accused under Section 319 Cr.P.C. and subsequently arrested, the court considering a bail plea must apply a test higher than a mere prima facie case - The relevant consideration is whether there is "strong and cogent evidence" of complicity, rather than a mere probability - While this standard is shorter than the satisfaction required for a conviction if the evidence goes unrebutted, it is significantly higher than the standard required for framing charges against original accused persons - In exercising discretion for bail for an accused summoned under Section 319, the Court must weigh the nature of the offence, the quality of evidence against the newly added accused, and the likelihood of the person absconding or tampering with evidence. [Para 13, 14] Md Imran @ D.C. Guddu v. State of Jharkhand, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 23 : 2026 INSC 36

Section 319 Cr.P.C. – Summoning of additional accused – Standards of Evidence – Three-Tier Threshold – Supreme Court noted three distinct levels of evidence assessment: (i) Prima facie standard(lowest) for framing formal charges; (ii) Strong and cogent evidence (middle) for summoning additional accused under Section 319 CrPC, where evidence must be reliable and reasonably persuasive but not beyond reasonable doubt; and (iii) Proof beyond reasonable doubt (highest) required for conviction. Mohammad Kaleem v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 251 : 2026 INSC 251 : AIR 2026 SC 1426

Section 319 Cr.P.C. – Scope of Judicial Scrutiny – Mini-Trial prohibited – The Supreme Court observed that while Section 319 is an extraordinary power to be exercised sparingly, the Trial Court must not conduct a "mini-trial" or a threadbare credibility assessment of minor contradictions at this stage - In the instant case, the Trial Court erred by overemphasizing minor inconsistencies in witness accounts, the absence of jail records, and the physical plausibility of the complainant escaping injury. Mohammad Kaleem v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 251 : 2026 INSC 251 : AIR 2026 SC 1426

Section 319 Cr.P.C. – Criminal Trial – Appreciation of Evidence – Fragmented vs. Cumulative Approach – Held, the Trial Court misdirected itself by treating inconsistencies in isolation rather than assessing the cumulative weight of testimonies and circumstances - Testimony on oath by three witnesses, including the complainant, is sufficient to meet the "strong and cogent" standard for summoning additional accused, even if minor inconsistencies exist which are matters for trial. [Relied on Hardeep Singh v. State of Punjab (2014) 3 SCC 92; Neeraj Kumar v. State of UP 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2639; Paras 7-12] Mohammad Kaleem v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 251 : 2026 INSC 251 : AIR 2026 SC 1426

Section 395 - Order to pay compensation

Sentencing Policy — Principle of Proportionality — Modification of Sentence to "Period Already Undergone" — Grounds of Lapse of Time and Victim Compensation — Held: The High Court erred in reducing the sentence of the Private Respondents from three years rigorous imprisonment to the period already undergone (two months) based on the lapse of time (10.5 years) and the willingness of the accused to pay compensation - Punishment must be commensurate with the gravity of the crime and the manner of its commission to maintain public confidence in the efficacy of law - Undue sympathy in awarding inadequate sentences undermines the justice system and fails to respond to society's cry for justice. Parameshwari v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 169 : 2026 INSC 164 : 2026 (1) Crimes (SC) 307

Section 403 - Court not to alter judgment

Section 362 Cr.P.C. - Bar on Alteration or Review of Signed Orders – The Supreme Court set aside an order of the Patna High Court which had recalled its earlier grant of bail to the appellant - The High Court had reversed the bail order on the grounds of a clerical error by the Court Master, who recorded the petition as "allowed" despite the operative portion allegedly being "rejected" - The Supreme Court held that under Section 362 CrPC, no alteration or review of a signed judgment or order is permissible except to correct clerical or arithmetical errors – Noted that no such error justified the recall, rendering the High Court's action unsustainable in law. Rambali Sahni v. State of Bihar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 61

Section 413 - No appeal to lie unless otherwise provided.

Sections 372 and 378 Cr.P.C. – Appeal against Acquittal – Right of Complainant as 'Victim' – Conflict of Judgments – Reference to Larger Bench – The Supreme Court observed a conflict between a recent co-ordinate Bench decision in Celestium Financial vs. A. Gnanasekaran (2025 INSC 804) and earlier decisions in Satya Pal Singh vs. State of M.P. and Subhash Chand vs. State (Delhi Administration) regarding whether a complainant in a Section 138 NI Act case must seek special leave to appeal under Section 378(4) CrPC or can appeal directly as a 'victim' under the proviso to Section 372 CrPC. Everest Automobiles v. Rajit Enterprises, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 155

Section 415 - Appeals from convictions

Convicts on Bail – Duty of Appellant – Supreme Court noted that convicts often neglect to cooperate with the court once their sentence is suspended - Appellants enlarged on bail have a responsibility to keep track of their appeals; they cannot blame the court or an Amicus Curiae for not raising specific grounds if they failed to engage with the proceedings for decades. [Relied on Anokhi Lal vs. State of Madhya Pradesh (2019) 20 SCC 196; Paras 17 - 23] Bhola Mahto v. State of Jharkhand, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 265 : 2026 INSC 257 : 2026 CriLJ 1869

Criminal Administration of Justice – Fair Trial vs. Expeditious Disposal – Appointment of Amicus Curiae – The Supreme Court emphasized that while fast-tracking criminal appeals is necessary, it must not occur at the expense of basic fairness - Noted that in cases where an appeal is listed after a significant delay (two decades in this instance) and the appellant's counsel is absent, it is a "desirable precaution" for the High Court to issue notice to the appellant regarding the appointment of an Amicus Curiae - While the High Court's intention to render legal assistance is genuine, justice is better served if the convict is informed so they may provide instructions for a "real and meaningful" defence rather than a "token gesture". Bhola Mahto v. State of Jharkhand, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 265 : 2026 INSC 257 : 2026 CriLJ 1869

Practice of the Court and Interests of Justice — Supreme Court observed that while the general practice is not to release a person sentenced to life imprisonment on bail, such practice cannot prevail if it operates to cause injustice - The underlying postulate of denying bail is that the appeal should be disposed of within a "measurable distance of time" - Keeping a person in jail for 5-6 years for an offence that may ultimately be found not to have been committed is a "travesty of justice" - Section 374(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 — Supreme Court noted that the right of appeal is a statutory right - Serious failure of justice ensues if an appellant remains incarcerated for over a decade only to have their appeal eventually succeed - Unless there are cogent grounds to the contrary, and where the delay is not attributable to the accused, the Court should ordinarily release the accused on bail if the appeal cannot be heard within a reasonable period. [Relied on Kashmira Singh vs. State of Punjab (1977) 4 SCC 291; Paras 5-13] Muna Bisoi v. State of Odisha, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 176

Section 419 - Appeal in case of acquittal

Appeal Against Acquittal — Circumstantial Evidence — Reversal of Acquittal by High Court — Held: The High Court erred in reversing the well-reasoned acquittal by the Trial Court without recording a clear finding that the Trial Court's view was not a possible view - An acquittal reinforces the presumption of innocence, which should not be displaced lightly by substituting inferences - The "golden principles" for circumstantial evidence were not satisfied as there was no complete chain of incriminating circumstances. Bernard Lyngdoh Phawa v. State of Meghalaya, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 84 : 2026 INSC 85 : 2026 (1) Crimes (SC) 230

Section 378 Cr.P.C. – Appeal against Acquittal – Grounds for Reversal – Noted that an order of acquittal may be reversed if the High Court rejects incontrovertible evidence based on unrealistic suspicion or surmises, or if it discounts the testimony of relatives solely on the ground of being 'interested' witnesses – Held that High Court wrongly placed undue reliance on the testimonies of hostile witnesses and contradictory defence evidence while ignoring the cogent testimonies of independent public servants – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar (2022) 3 SCC 471; Sadhu Saran Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2016) 4 SCC 35; State of Madhya Pradesh v. Phoolchand Rathore 2023 SCC OnLine SC 537; State of Uttar Pradesh v. Ajmal Beg 2025 SCC OnLine SC 280; Surajdeo Mahto v. State of Bihar (2022) 11 SCC 800; Paras 14-26] State of Himachal Pradesh v. Chaman Lal, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 48 : 2026 INSC 57 : 2026 1 Crimes (SC) 131 : 2026 CriLJ 823

Section 378 Cr.P.C. – Appeal against Acquittal – Scope of Interference by Appellate Court – The Supreme Court reiterated that an appellate court must exercise caution before reversing an order of acquittal - While the appellate court has full power to review and reappreciate evidence, it should not disturb the findings of the Trial Court if two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record - Interference is only justified if the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity, is based on a misreading or omission of material evidence, or if the Trial Court's view is "clearly unreasonable" - The acquittal further strengthens the double presumption of innocence in favor of the accused. [Paras 27 - 31] Tulasareddi @ Mudakappa v. State of Karnataka, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 59 : 2026 INSC 67 : 2026 (1) Crimes (SC) 121 ; 2026 CriLJ 534

Section 378(4) & (5) CrPC – Statutory Interpretation – Supreme Court noted that Section 378(4) and (5) were preserved in the Code, making it incumbent upon a complainant who initiated prosecution to obtain leave before filing an appeal against acquittal in the High Court - Supreme Court expressed disagreement with the interpretation that the proviso to Section 372 overrides the requirement of seeking leave under Section 378(4) - Noting the "far-reaching consequences" of the issue and the conflicting precedents, the Bench directed the matter to be placed before the Hon'ble Chief Justice of India for an authoritative pronouncement by a larger Bench. [Paras 2-4] Everest Automobiles v. Rajit Enterprises, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 155

Section 427 - Powers of the Appellate Court.

Appellate Jurisdiction – Interference with Order of Acquittal – Principles Reiterated – The Supreme Court observed that there is no absolute restriction in law on the appellate court to review and reappreciate the entire evidence upon which an order of acquittal is founded - While an appellate court is ordinarily slow to interfere with an acquittal, it must do so if the judgment is manifestly erroneous, perverse, or based on a misreading of evidence or incorrect application of law - Where the High Court adopts a wholly erroneous process of reasoning and ignores vital circumstances resulting in a grave miscarriage of justice, interference is imperative. State of Himachal Pradesh v. Chaman Lal, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 48 : 2026 INSC 57 : 2026 1 Crimes (SC) 131 : 2026 CriLJ 823

Section 430 - Suspension of sentence pending the appeal; release of appellant on bail

Attendance of Accused during Appeal/Revision – Suspension of Sentence – Validity of requiring physical presence on every hearing date – The Supreme Court held that once a sentence has been suspended and bail has been granted by an Appellate or Revisional Court, it is "unwarranted" and "burdensome" to require the accused to be present on every date of hearing - Such a practice serves no purpose, as the jurisdictional magistrate remains empowered to secure the accused's presence should the appeal or revision eventually be dismissed - noted that even if the prevalent practice is driven by the terms of Form No. 45 (Schedule II of the CrPC/BNSS) regarding bail bonds, it does not justify mandatory attendance for proceedings that may remain pending for years. [Paras 6 - 8] Meenakshi v. State of Haryana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 60

Suspension of Sentence — Grant of Bail pending Appeal — Long Incarceration — Life Imprisonment — The Supreme Court set aside an order of the High Court of Orissa which had declined the suspension of sentence for an appellant convicted under Sections 302/34 IPC and Section 27 of the Arms Act - The appellant had suffered incarceration for over 11 years while his appeal, filed in 2016, remained pending before the High Court. Muna Bisoi v. State of Odisha, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 176

Section 433 - Procedure where Judges of Court of appeal are equally divided

Section 392 Cr.P.C. – Anomalous and Irrational Consequences – The Supreme Court pointed out that a mechanical application of Sajjan Singh could lead to highly undesirable or discriminatory results under Article 14 - if a Division Bench unanimously decides to acquit two convicts but divides on the third, sending the entire composite appeal to a third Judge could put the unanimously acquitted persons at risk of conviction - in a State appeal against acquittal, it could risk the conviction of individuals whose acquittals were unanimously favoured by the Division Bench - Expressing its respectful disagreement with the coordinate bench ruling in Sajjan Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (1999) 1 SCC 315, the Bench referred the question of whether Sajjan Singh lays down the correct law to a larger Bench to be constituted by the Hon'ble Chief Justice of India. [Paras 35-41] Dr. Rakesh Kumar Gupta v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 615 : 2026 INSC 632

Section 392 Cr.P.C. – scope of referee judge's jurisdiction in composite appeals – difference of opinion – Whether a third Judge, upon a reference under Section 392 CrPC due to a division of opinion regarding one co-accused, can reopen and examine the case of other co-accused whose convictions were unanimously upheld by the Division Bench – Supreme Court doubted the correctness of its two-judge bench decision in Sajjan Singh v. State of M.P. (1999) – Matter referred to a larger Bench - Statutory Interpretation of Section 392 CrPC – "An Appeal" vs "The Appeal" – The Supreme Court highlighted the significant linguistic shift from Section 429 of the 1898 Code (which used "the case") to Section 392 of the 1973 Code (which uses "an appeal" and "the appeal") - Highlighting the anaphoric use of the definite article, the Supreme Court observed that while the indefinite article "an appeal" triggers the provision for any appeal resulting in a divided opinion, the definite article "the appeal" limits the referee Judge's jurisdiction strictly to the specific instance or individual appeal where the division occurred - Merely because multiple convicts file a composite joint appeal, it cannot mean that a unanimous decision dismissing the appeal against some convicts can be reopened by the third Judge if the division of opinion relates only to another co-accused. [Relied Bhagat Ram v. State of Rajasthan, (1972) 2 SCC 466; Paras 29 – 32] Dr. Rakesh Kumar Gupta v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 615 : 2026 INSC 632

Section 442 - High Court's powers of revision.

Section 442 BNSS (erstwhile Section 401 of CrPC) — Revisional Jurisdiction of the High Court — Judicial Restraint vs. Indulgence — High Court's order permitting the accused to travel to the USA for medical treatment, on the ground that he appeared before the Magistrate on 12 previous occasions and undertook to return within 6 months, held to be an unsustainable exercise of indulgence rather than judicial restraint - The Supreme Court observed that the trial had not commenced even after 10 years of filing the chargesheet due to the proactive role of the accused in initiating multifarious proceedings and securing interim protections, including the misuse of an order suspending a Look Out Circular (LoC) to leave the country without court permission - comparable medical facilities exist domestically in India. [Paras 8, 9] Seesa Santosh v. State of Telangana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 603 : 2026 INSC 628

Section 473 - Power to suspend or remit sentences

Section 432 Cr.P.C. (now Section 473 of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023) – Premature Release / Remission – Automation of Process – Automatic Triggering of Eligibility - It is the bounden obligation of the appropriate Government to consider the cases of all convicts for the grant of premature release as and when they become eligible for consideration in terms of the state policy - It is not necessary for the convict or their relatives to file a specific application for permanent remission; instead, the process must be automatically triggered and initiated a few months prior to their date of eligibility – Held that endorsing the implementation of the National Legal Services Authority's (NALSA) Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) of 2022, the Supreme Court directed the State of Uttar Pradesh to roll out the 'E-Prisons Early Release Processing Module' (developed by the NIC) as a pilot project in Central Jail, Agra, and District Jail, Lucknow to automate premature release processing, eradicate administrative delays, and eliminate the physical movement of files. [Relied on: In Re: Policy Strategy for Grant of Bail, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 349; Paras 14 - 22] Surendra @ Sunda v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 563 : 2026 INSC 414

Criminal Procedure – Remission / Premature Release – Rejection of Remission Proposal by Central Government – Investigation by CBI – Requirement of Concurrence – Speaking Order – Application of Mind – Parity – Reformative Theory of Punishment – Writ Petition challenging the letter dated 09.07.2025 issued by the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA), Union of India, which disallowed the recommendation of the State of Uttarakhand for the premature release of the petitioner who had been incarcerated for over 22 years in a murder case investigated by the CBI – Held that i. Cryptic and Non-Speaking Orders Invalidation: The impugned letter issued by the MHA rejecting the remission recommendation was ex-facie non-speaking, cryptic, and failed to disclose any reasons for its disagreement with the State Government's proposal - Recording of reasons is an essential safeguard against arbitrariness, ensures transparency, and reflects due application of mind - Absence of reasons violates the principles of natural justice and frustrates the convict's right to seek effective judicial review; ii. Heinousness of Offence Not the Sole Ground for Denial: Denial of remission cannot rest solely on the gravity or heinous nature of the original crime - The heinousness of the offence stands exhausted at the stage of sentencing and judicial determination of punishment - Remission is a distinct executive function concerned with the present and the future specifically the prisoner's conduct, evidence of reformation, and prospects of reintegration into society - Permanent incarceration under the shadow of a past worst act is impermissible in a liberal constitutional order; iii. Principle of Parity: Where a co-accused in the very same offence and incident has already been granted premature release after a lesser period of actual incarceration (17 years), denying similar consideration to the petitioner without any cogent, rational, and discernible distinguishing circumstances violates the constitutional requirements of fairness and non-arbitrariness under Article 14; iv. Futility of Remand: While a non-speaking order is ordinarily remanded for fresh consideration, a mechanical remand is unnecessary where the authority has already fully articulated its firm stand on merits before the Court - Relegating a convict who has served over 22 years to another round of administrative proceedings would prolong incarceration unnecessarily and fail the interests of justice - The impugned letter is quashed - The Writ Petition is allowed, and the petitioner (already on interim bail) is directed to be treated as prematurely released without requiring him to surrender. [Relied on Laxman Naskar v. State of W.B., (2000) 7 SCC 626; State (NCT of Delhi) v. Prem Raj, (2003) 7 SCC 121; Satish v. State of U.P., (2021) 14 SCC 580; Bilkis Yakub Rasool v. Union of India, (2024) 5 SCC 481; Sarat Chandra Rabha v. Khagendranath Nath, AIR 1961 SC 334; Paras 5 - 10] Rohit Chaturvedi v. State of Uttarakhand, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 501 : 2026 INSC 490 : AIR 2026 SC 2380 ; 2026 (2) Crimes SC 287

Section 480 - When bail may be taken in case of non-bailable offence

Section 480 (3) BNSS – the conditions stipulated under Section 480(3) BNSS are not applicable to non-bailable offences punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to seven years. Narayan v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 426

Section 482 - Direction for grant of bail to person apprehending arrest.

Section 482 BNSS (corresponding to Section 438 of CrPC) – Guidelines for Anticipatory Bail – Shifting of Burden – Scope of Judicial Discretion – The High Court erred in refusing anticipatory bail by shifting the burden of proof onto the accused to prove beyond doubt that the allegations made by him in a press conference were true - making observations regarding an offence under Section 339 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS), without it being alleged in the FIR and merely on the oral statement of the Advocate General, is incorrect - Anticipatory bail cannot be denied on a rigid or inexorable rule; instead, courts must weigh multiple considerations, including the nature and seriousness of the charges, the context of events, the flight risk, and the possibility of tampering with evidence. [Relied on Shri Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia and Others v. State of Punjab, (1980) 2 SCC 565; Pradip N. Sharma v. State of Gujarat and Another, 2025 SCC OnLine 457; Paras 15 – 27] Pawan Khera v. State of Assam, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 443 : 2026 INSC 437

Section 482 BNSS – Grant of Anticipatory Bail – The Supreme Court granted anticipatory bail to a businessman accused of sexual harassment and rape under Sections 351(2), 64, 74, 75, and 79 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS) and Section 67A of the IT Act - Noted that the FIR lodged by the complainant appeared to be a "counter-blast" to an earlier FIR filed by the appellant alleging extortion. Venu Gopalakrishnan v. State of Kerala, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 378 : 2026 INSC 373 : AIR 2026 SC 1995 : 2026 (2) Crimes SC 263

Section 482 BNSS – Grant of Anticipatory Bail – The Supreme Court granted anticipatory bail to a businessman accused of sexual harassment and rape under Sections 351(2), 64, 74, 75, and 79 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS) and Section 67A of the IT Act - Supreme Court observed that the FIR lodged by the complainant appeared to be a "counter-blast" to an earlier FIR filed by the appellant alleging extortion - noted that prior to the FIR, the parties had engaged in meetings where a financial settlement of ₹30 crores was discussed to bring a "quietus" to the allegations - The appellant had previously filed FIR against the complainant and her husband for extortion, leading to their arrest, prior to the filing of the rape allegations - Noted that had the financial settlement reached its logical conclusion, criminal proceedings likely would not have been initiated - The complainant's FIR was filed only after the appellant refused the settlement and initiated criminal action against the couple- The Supreme Court set aside the High Court of Kerala's order - The appellant is to be released on bail in the event of arrest, subject to – i. Furnishing a cash security of ₹1,00,000/- with two sureties; ii. Complete cooperation with the ongoing investigation; iii. Non-interference with witnesses or evidence. [Paras 10-16] Shankar Mahto v. State of Bihar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 379 : 2026 INSC 369

Addition of Graver Offences — Procedure for Arrest — Where an accused is already on bail and new, more serious, cognizable, and non-bailable offences are added, the accused does not automatically lose their liberty but the court must apply its mind afresh. In such cases – i. The accused may surrender and apply for bail for the newly added offences; ii. The investigating agency must obtain an order from the Court that granted bail to arrest the accused; a routine arrest without such an order is not permissible. [Relied on Sushila Aggarwal & Ors. vs. State (NCT of Delhi) & Anr. (2020) 5 SCC 1; Bharat Chaudhary and Anr. vs. State of Bihar and Anr. 2003) 8 SCC 77; Siddharth vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr. (2022) 1 SCC 676; Shri Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia vs. State of Punjab (1980) 2 SCC 565; Paras 12-25, 31-34] Sumit v. State of U.P., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 147 : 2026 INSC 145 : AIR 2026 SC 905

Section 438 Cr.P.C. - Anticipatory Bail - Cancellation of - Abuse of Authority by Law Enforcers - The Supreme Court set aside the order of the High Court granting anticipatory bail to three police officers accused of extorting cash from a citizen in exchange for a gold bar recovered during a search. The anticipatory bail granted by the High Court was cancelled. When police officers, who are duty-bound to protect citizens, themselves indulge in extortion, it creates a serious dilemma for citizens who have no option but to seek protection from the very authority that is abusing its power. The Court expressed strong disapproval of such uniformed excesses. State of Maharashtra v. Rahul Datta Bhosale, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 592 : 2026 INSC 596

Section 438 Cr.P.C. — Anticipatory Bail — Duration of Protection — The Supreme Court reiterated that once anticipatory bail is granted, it should not invariably be limited to a fixed period or restricted to the stage of filing a charge-sheet - The protection should ordinarily enure in favor of the accused without restriction on time and can continue until the end of the trial, unless specific facts or features necessitate a limited tenure. Sumit v. State of U.P., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 147 : 2026 INSC 145 : AIR 2026 SC 905

Section 438 Cr.P.C. — Anticipatory Bail – Non-Cooperation with Investigation – Scope of Section 438 CrPC / Section 482 BNSS – The Supreme Court held that the mere act of an accused not answering specific questions posed by the Investigating Officer (IO) does not automatically constitute "non-cooperation" with the investigation - Noted that if an accused has appeared before the IO pursuant to interim protection, the failure to provide specific answers is not a sufficient ground ipso facto to deny bail. Shally Mahant @ Sandeep v. State of Punjab, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 146

Section 438 Cr.P.C. — Anticipatory Bail — Absconding Accused — An absconder is not entitled to the relief of anticipatory bail as a general rule - The power to grant pre-arrest bail to an absconder may only be exercised in exceptional cases where, upon perusal of the FIR and case diary, the Court is prima facie satisfied that the accusation is false or over-exaggerated - In the present case, the Accused remained untraceable for over six years, a reward was announced for his arrest, and he allegedly threatened a key witness; such conduct makes it an unfit case for the exercise of judicial discretion under Section 438. Balmukund Singh Gautam v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 158 : 2026 INSC 157: 2026 (2) Crimes SC 112

Section 438 Cr.P.C. – Anticipatory Bail – Held that where co-accused summoned under Section 319 Cr.P.C. have already been granted anticipatory bail and have been appearing regularly before the trial court, no case for cancellation is made out unless specific grounds for such cancellation are established by the State. [Para 15, 18, 19] Md Imran @ D.C. Guddu v. State of Jharkhand, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 23 : 2026 INSC 36

Section 438 Cr.P.C. — Effect of Co-accused's Acquittal — The acquittal of co-accused persons during the period an accused was absconding does not automatically entitle the absconder to anticipatory bail on the ground of parity. In a trial against co-accused, the prosecution is not expected to adduce evidence against an absconding party; therefore, findings from that trial have no bearing on the absconder's independent trial - An accused cannot be permitted to "encash" on an acquittal achieved while they were making a mockery of the judicial process by fleeing. Balmukund Singh Gautam v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 158 : 2026 INSC 157: 2026 (2) Crimes SC 112

Sections 438 & 439 Cr.P.C. — Appeal Against Grant of Bail vs. Cancellation of Bail — The considerations for an appellate court assessing the correctness of a bail order are distinct from those governing an application for cancellation of bail - While cancellation is based on "supervening circumstances" (e.g., misuse of liberty), an appeal tests whether the original order was perverse, illegal, or unjustified at the time of its passing - the post-bail conduct of an accused is irrelevant when determining the legality of the initial grant of bail in an appeal – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Lavesh vs. State (NCT of Delhi), (2012) 8 SCC 730; Sushila Aggarwal vs. State (NCT of Delhi), (2020) 5 SCC 1; Vipan Kumar Dhir v. State of Punjab, (2021) 15 SCC 518; Ashok Dhankad v. State of NCT of Delhi, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1690; Paras 37-51] Balmukund Singh Gautam v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 158 : 2026 INSC 157: 2026 (2) Crimes SC 112

Section 438 Cr.P.C. (Section 482 BNSS, 2023) — Impact of Charge-sheet — The mere filing of a charge-sheet, taking of cognizance, or issuance of summons does not automatically terminate the protection granted under Section 438 Cr.P.C. - There is no restriction on granting or continuing anticipatory bail even after a charge-sheet is filed, as the primary objective is to prevent undue harassment through pre-trial arrest. Sumit v. State of U.P., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 147 : 2026 INSC 145 : AIR 2026 SC 905

Section 438 Cr.P.C. - Anticipatory Bail – Conditional Orders for Deposit: The Supreme Court criticized the Jharkhand High Court for making the grant of anticipatory bail contingent upon the deposit of a specific sum – Noted that High Court had directed the petitioners to file a supplementary affidavit showing payment of Rs. 9,12,926.84/- to the complainant, failing which the bail application would stand dismissed - Held, that the grant of regular or anticipatory bail should not be subject to the deposit of any amount - If a case for bail is made out, the court should pass an appropriate order; if not, it may decline - the court should not pass a conditional order for deposit and then exercise its discretion. [Relied on: Gajanan Dattatray Gore vs. State of Maharashtra & Another [(2025) SCC Online 1571; Paras 8 - 10] Prantik Kumar v. State of Jharkhand, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 131

Section 438 Cr.P.C. - Anticipatory Bail – Grounds for Grant – Civil Dispute and Parity – In a case involving alleged trespass and theft under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, Supreme Court found the appellant entitled to anticipatory bail based on three key factors- i. The appellant appeared before the IO as directed by the interim protection order; ii. The nature of the dispute appears to be a civil matter regarding immovable property (possession based on an agreement to sell); iii. Other co-accused in the same FIR had already been granted bail, establishing a ground for parity – Appeal allowed. [Paras 6, 7] Shally Mahant @ Sandeep v. State of Punjab, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 146

Section 438 Cr.P.C. - Anticipatory Bail — Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 — Section 18 — Cancellation of Anticipatory Bail - The Supreme Court allowed the appeals and cancelled the anticipatory bail granted to the respondents, observing that a prima facie case under the SC/ST Act was established - noted that while the High Court relied on the absence of casteist slurs in the initial FIR (lodged by a police official based on a social media video), it failed to exercise sufficient caution in examining other records - an affidavit filed by the Deputy Superintendent of Police and statements of various persons clearly alleged the use of casteist slurs and violence by the upper-caste respondents against marginalized community members over a drainage dispute – noted that the bar under Section 18 of the SC/ST Act, which precludes the grant of anticipatory bail, is applicable when the ingredients of the offence are prima facie disclosed - In this case, investigation reports indicated offences under the SC/ST Act, the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, and the Arms Act - noted that mere attempts at reconciliation by the police cannot prevent the taking of cognizance for criminal acts - Supreme Court found that the High Court erred in concluding there was no prima facie culpability, as subsequent investigation reports and affidavits by high-ranking police officials corroborated allegations of caste-based abuse and firearm discharge – Appeals allowed. [Relied on Shajan Skaria v. State of Kerala, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2249; Paras 8-15] Kuldeep Singh v. State of Punjab, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 239

Section 483 - Special powers of High Court or Court of Session regarding bail.

Section 483 BNSS (Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Section 437/439) – Bail Conditions – Recovery Proceedings – The Supreme Court reiterated that the jurisdiction of a Court while considering bail is limited to assessing whether an accused should be released pending trial and imposing conditions to ensure a fair trial - It does not extend to adjudicating civil rights or directing the recovery of alleged dues - held that neither the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 nor the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 enables a Court, at the stage of bail, to direct the sale of an accused's immovable property to settle alleged claims. Feroze Basha v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 389

Section 439 Cr.P.C. (also Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023; Section 483) — Successive Bail Petitions — Material Disclosures and Candour - A court entertaining a successive bail petition under a special statute is strictly bound to refer to the fate of the earlier petition and explicitly record what change in circumstances justifies a fresh consideration - A petitioner invoking the discretionary jurisdiction of the court must approach it with clean hands and full candour - Merely mentioning past case numbers without explicitly disclosing their nature or the factum of their dismissal falls well short of the expected candour and is calculated to obscure rather than illuminate. [Relied on Narcotics Control Bureau v. Kashif, (2024) 11 SCC 372; State of Meghalaya v. Lalrintluanga Sailo and Another, (2024) 15 SCC 36; Union of India v. Ajay Kumar Singh, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 346; Paras 11 – 14] State of Punjab v. Sukhwinder Singh @ Gora, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 421 : 2026 INSC 411 : AIR 2026 SC 2109 : 2026 (2) Crimes SC 130

Section 439 Cr.P.C. — Bail – Cancellation of Bail – Dowry Death – Sections 103(1) and 80 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS) – Appeal by the mother of the deceased challenging the High Court's order granting bail to the husband of the deceased – The deceased died within 1.5 years of marriage in suspicious circumstances with multiple external and internal injuries – Allegations of dowry harassment and threats by the accused prior to the death – High Court granted bail primarily noting the absence of criminal antecedents and the period of custody – Held: The High Court adopted a "mechanical approach" and failed to consider the gravity of the offence and the nature of the accusations – While criminal antecedents are a factor, they cannot outweigh the seriousness of a crime like dowry death where circumstantial evidence strongly points toward the accused – The Supreme Court emphasized that an appellate court can interfere with a bail order if relevant materials were ignored or the gravity of the offence was not considered. [Relied on P v. State of M.P., (2022) 15 SCC 211; Paras 14-27] Lal Muni Devi v. State of Bihar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 298

Section 439 Cr.P.C. — Bail Cancellation — POCSO Act — Heinous Offences — Allegations of Gang-rape of a Minor — Grant of bail by High Court without considering the nature and gravity of the offence, the statutory rigour under the POCSO Act, and the filing of the chargesheet — The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's order granting bail, observing that the exercise of discretion was "manifestly erroneous"- Noted that while the filing of a chargesheet does not preclude bail, the Court is duty-bound to consider the gravity of the offence and the material collected – Noted that the allegations involved repeated penetrative sexual assault under armed intimidation and blackmail via recorded acts, which have a "devastating impact on the life of the victim and shakes the collective conscience of society" - The High Court failed to apply settled parameters, including the vulnerability of the victim and the likelihood of witness intimidation – Held that the bail order was perverse, unreasonable, and ignored the relevant material – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Bhagwan Singh v. Dilip Kumar @ Deepu @ Depak and another (2023) 13 SCC 549; State of Bihar v. Rajballav Prasad @ Rajballav Pd. Yadav @ Rajballabh Yadav (2017) 2 SCC 178; Deepak Yadav v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2022) 8 SCC 559; Paras 12-18] X v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 36 : 2026 INSC 44

Section 439 Cr.P.C. — Bail - Condition of Upfront Deposit or Undertaking to Pay Arrears/Siphoned Amounts as a Pre-condition for Bail Deprecated - High Courts Must Decide Bail on Merits Rather Than Deferring Due to Non-Payment - The Supreme Court of India has reiterated that the practice of courts insisting on upfront deposits, or undertakings for such deposits, as a condition for considering a bail prayer on merits is improper - Such practices have the potential to derail the criminal justice delivery system by becoming a tool for complainants to extort settlements and forcing the accused to give up their right of defense - In the present case, the appellant was denied an extension of interim bail by the High Court solely because he failed to fulfill an undertaking to deposit the remaining balance of an alleged siphoned subsidy amount (approx. ₹4.10 crore), despite having already deposited over 50% of the amount - The Supreme Court held that – i. In offences under Section 409 IPC, there is no automatic presumption regarding the culpability of a Director; it must be established during the trial; ii. An inability to comply with a financial undertaking is not a valid ground to defer the consideration of a bail prayer on its merits, especially when the investigation is complete and the accused has already suffered significant incarceration; iii. The appropriate course for the High Court was to decide the regular bail application on its own merits rather than keeping the matter pending through repeated interim extensions tied to upfront deposits. [Relied on Gajanan Dattatray Gore vs. State of Maharashtra and Anr. 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1571; Paras 11-14] Rakesh Jain v. State, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 81

Section 439 Cr.P.C. — Bail - Disclosure of Material Facts — Duty of the Accused: The Court emphasized that an applicant seeking bail has a "solemn obligation" to make a full, fair, and candid disclosure of all material facts, specifically criminal antecedents. Suppression of such facts constitutes "fraud on the court," attracting the maxim suppressio veri, expressio falsi(suppression of truth is equivalent to expression of falsehood). [Relied On Kusha Duruka v. State of Odisha (2024) 4 SCC 432; Saumya Chaurasia v. Enforcement Directorate (2024) 6 SCC 401] Zeba Khan v. State of U.P., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 139 : 2026 INSC 144 : AIR 2026 SC 1006 : 2026 CriLJ 1113

Section 439 Cr.P.C. — Bail — Doctrine of Parity — Non-application to History-sheeters — Noted that the High Court erred in blindly extending the principle of parity to the respondent based on the bail granted to co-accused without considering his specific and distinctive features, including his use of 8 to 10 aliases, forged Aadhaar cards, and a history of absconding – Noted that when there is a likelihood of offences being repeated or justice being thwarted, discretion must be exercised cautiously. Rakesh Mittal v. Ajay Pal Gupta, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 170 : AIR 2026 SC 1117

Section 439 Cr.P.C. — Bail – Foreign Nationals – Article 21 of the Constitution of India – Financial Constraints in furnishing Surety –The Respondent, a 32-year-old Ugandan national, was granted bail by the High Court on 15.09.2025 in a case involving the NDPS Act - Despite the Trial Court reducing the surety amount progressively from ₹1,00,000 to ₹25,000, the accused remained in Tihar Jail for months due to her inability to furnish a solvent surety - Held: Article 21 of the Constitution, which protects the right to life and personal liberty, applies equally to foreign nationals prosecuted in India - Once an accused has established a case for bail, financial difficulties or the inability to provide a solvent surety should not act as a barrier to their release - In cases where a foreign national cannot meet surety requirements due to financial constraints, they may be released on a personal bond and subsequently housed in a detention center to ensure they do not leave the country - Supreme Court explicitly grounded its reasoning in the constitutional mandate of Article 21 of the Constitution of India, emphasizing its universal application to any person within the territory of India, regardless of nationality. [Paras 4-13] Customs v. Faridah Nakanwagi, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 278

Section 439 Cr.P.C. — Bail - Judicial Discretion — Impact of Criminal History: While a history-sheeter is not automatically disentitled to bail, criminal antecedents are a significant factor in judicial discretion, especially when the allegations involve systematic and organized crime (e.g., educational fraud rackets) - that once an investigation is complete and a chargesheet is filed, transfer to a special agency like the CBI should only be directed in exceptional circumstances showing bias, mala fides, or involvement of high-ranking officials – Appeal allowed. [Relied On Ash Mohammad v. Shiv Raj Singh @ Lalla Babu and another (2012) 9 SCC 446; Paras 28-33, 35- 41] Zeba Khan v. State of U.P., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 139 : 2026 INSC 144 : AIR 2026 SC 1006 : 2026 CriLJ 1113

Section 439 Cr.P.C. — Bail Jurisprudence — Distinction between Annulment and Cancellation of Bail - The Supreme Court clarified that an appeal against the grant of bail (annulment) stands on a different footing than an application for cancellation due to post-bail misconduct - While courts are generally slow to interfere with liberty, a bail order is liable to be set aside if it is perverse, illegal, or based on irrelevant material, such as documents whose genuineness is the subject of the trial. [Relied On State of Karnataka v. Sri Darshan Etc. (2025) SCC OnLine SC 1702; Yogendra Pal Singh v. Raghvendra Singh @ Prince and another (2025) scc OnLine SC 2580; Paras 13-14, 16-19] Zeba Khan v. State of U.P., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 139 : 2026 INSC 144 : AIR 2026 SC 1006 : 2026 CriLJ 1113

Section 439 Cr.P.C. — Bail - Mandatory Disclosure Framework - To streamline bail proceedings and prevent abuse, the Court provided an illustrative disclosure framework(recommendatory) for all bail applications, which includes – i. Case Details: FIR number, sections, and maximum punishment; ii. Custody Status: Date of arrest and total period of incarceration; iii. Status of Trial: Stage of proceedings and number of witnesses examined; iv. Criminal Antecedents: Detailed list of all FIRs (Pending/Acquitted/Convicted); v. Previous Bail Applications: Details of all prior applications and their outcomes; vi. Coercive Processes: Whether the applicant was ever declared a proclaimed offender or issued Non-Bailable Warrants. [Para 49] Zeba Khan v. State of U.P., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 139 : 2026 INSC 144 : AIR 2026 SC 1006 : 2026 CriLJ 1113

Section 439 Cr.P.C. — Bail — POCSO Act — Age Determination — Section 439 CrPC vs. Section 94 JJ Act — Mini-Trial at Bail Stage — The Supreme Court set aside the Allahabad High Court's directions mandating medical age determination tests in all POCSO cases at the commencement of investigation - held that while exercising bail jurisdiction under Section 439 CrPC, a High Court cannot conduct a "mini-trial" by entertaining challenges to the veracity of age-related documents or ordering roving inquiries. State of Uttar Pradesh v. Anurudh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 29 : 2026 INSC 47

Section 439 Cr.P.C. — Bail - The Supreme Court granted regular bail to an accused in the alleged multi-crore Andhra Pradesh liquor scam, invoking its plenary powers under Article 142 of the Constitution. Muppidi Avinash Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 274

Section 439 Cr.P.C. — Grant and Cancellation of Bail – Unlawful Assembly (Sections 143, 147, 148, 149 IPC) – SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 – Murder (Section 302 IPC) - Bail – Parameters for interference by Superior Court – Distinction between 'cancellation of bail' for misconduct and 'reversal' of an erroneous bail order – Supreme Court held that while cancellation under Section 439(2) CrPC (Section 483(3) BNSS) typically involves the accused misusing liberty, a superior court can reverse a bail order if it ignores relevant material, is based on extraneous considerations, or fails to consider the gravity of the offence. [Para 20] Shobha Namdev Sonavane v. Samadhan Bajirao Sonvane, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 188 : 2026 INSC 181 : 2026 (1) Crimes (SC) 278

Section 439 Cr.P.C. — Grant of Bail — Cancellation/Setting aside of bail order — Factors to be considered — Criminal Antecedents and Conduct — The Supreme Court set aside the Allahabad High Court's order granting bail to the first respondent, a "habitual offender" and "career criminal" involved in large-scale cheating and forgery - held that while liberty is a cardinal value, it is not absolute and must be balanced against the potential threat to society and the economic well-being of its members. Rakesh Mittal v. Ajay Pal Gupta, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 170 : AIR 2026 SC 1117

Section 439 Cr.P.C. — Grant of Bail – Delay in Trial – Incarceration without trial amounts to punishment – The Supreme Court granted bail to the appellant who had been in custody since April 13, 2024, for offenses under Sections 386, 307, 506, 120-B, 482, and 411 of the IPC, and Sections 25(6) and 27 of the Arms Act - Supreme Court observed that despite the prosecution proposing to examine 23 witnesses, none had been examined after almost two years of incarceration - Noted that when a trial is unlikely to conclude in the near future and the accused has undergone significant pre-trial detention, further detention is unnecessary as incarceration without trial amounts to punishment. [Paras 5-11] Pardeep Kumar @ Banu v. State of Punjab, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 302

Section 439 Cr.P.C. — Scope of Bail Jurisdiction — The jurisdiction of a Court under Section 439 is limited to granting or refusing bail based on prima facie evidence - It is coram non judice for a bail court to issue general mandatory directions to investigating authorities that contravene express legislative intent - Determination of age is a matter of trial and not a "matter of course" step during bail proceedings. [Relied on Chandrapal Singh v. State of U.P. (2022 SCC OnLine All 934); State v. M. Murugesan (2020) 15 SCC 251; Abuzar Hossain @ Gulam Hossain v. State of West Bengal (2012) 10 SCC 489; Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb (2021) 3 SCC 713; Paras 13-19] State of Uttar Pradesh v. Anurudh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 29 : 2026 INSC 47

Section 510 - Effect of omission to frame, or absence of, or error in, charge

Section 464 Cr.P.C. — Defect, Omission, or Irregularity in Charge — Absence of Prejudice - No finding or sentence is invalid due to an error, omission, or defect in the framing of charges unless a failure of justice has been occasioned - Where the accused's name was initially included in the charge framing order for offenses under Sections 302/120-B IPC, and the accused pleaded not guilty and claimed trial, they were fully cognizant of the case against them - If the witnesses were thoroughly cross-examined by the defense counsel regarding the murder charge, no prejudice is caused to the accused, and the trial is not vitiated. [Paras 41 - 43] Gopi Chand @ Pappu v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 609 : 2026 INSC 598

Section 528 - Saving of inherent powers of High Court.

Section 482 Cr.P.C. — Civil and Criminal Remedies – Parallel Proceedings – Inordinate Delay in Filing FIR - A long, unexplained delay in lodging an FIR in a case arising from a civil dispute raises strong suspicion of mala fide intent, vengeance, or an attempt to harass the other party after failing or anticipating failure in the civil proceedings. A frustrated litigant cannot be permitted to use criminal machinery as a weapon of harassment. The absence of a limitation period for criminal prosecution does not justify inordinate delay when the facts were known to the complainant for decades. Appeal allowed. Criminal proceedings quashed. [Relied on: Kishan Singh v. Gurpal Singh, (2010) 8 SCC 775] Nazibul Rahim Khan v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 608 : 2026 INSC 619

Section 482 Cr.P.C. — Civil and Criminal Remedies – Parallel Proceedings – Inordinate Delay in Filing FIR - Where civil and criminal remedies are available on the same cause of action and based on the same set of facts, both proceedings can be maintained. However, if an aggrieved person elects to invoke both remedies, there must not be an unreasonable or inordinate delay between the institution of the civil suit and the lodging of the FIR. An unexplained delay of 23 years in filing the FIR after instituting a civil suit on identical allegations is sufficient ground to quash the criminal proceedings. The Supreme Court quashed the FIR registered in 2024 against the appellants in respect of a property dispute involving an allegedly forged Power of Attorney and sale deed, when the respondent-complainant had already filed a civil suit in 2001 raising the very same allegations. Nazibul Rahim Khan v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 608 : 2026 INSC 619

Section 482 Cr.P.C. — Quashing of FIR — Civil Dispute Given a Criminal Colour — Extraordinary Delay — Improvement in Subsequent Complaint - Criminal proceedings cannot be permitted to become a weapon of harassment and coercion in disputes predominantly concerning title over immovable property - High Court erred in refusing to exercise its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the CrPC where a long-standing property dispute pending before civil courts since the year 2000 was converted into criminal proceedings - In frivolous or vexatious proceedings, the Supreme Court owes a duty to look into attending circumstances emerging from the record over and above the averments in the FIR - Where the initial complaint dated 21.05.2009 did not contain any allegation of extortion, demand of money, or criminal intimidation, but a subsequent FIR lodged after seven months introduced these grave allegations for the first time, such material improvements support the contention that the criminal proceedings are an afterthought to criminalize a civil dispute - An unexplained and extraordinary delay of nearly eight to nine years in registering the FIR (incidents pertaining to 2001, FIR registered in 2009), coupled with circumstances creating serious doubt about the genuineness of the prosecution, warrants quashing - A State Government Circular discouraging registration of FIRs in civil disputes cannot justify the complete inaction of the complainant who was actively litigating before civil courts and had alternative legal remedies available under Sections 154(3), 156(3), and 200 of the CrPC. [Relied on Mohd. Wajid v. State of U.P., (2023) 20 SCC 219; State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, AIR 1992 SC 604; Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 315; Paras 30-60] Bhikhubhai Govindbhai Patel v. State of Gujarat, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 593 : 2026 INSC 532

Section 528 BNSS [Inherent Powers / Quashing of Criminal Proceedings] – Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO Act) – Sections 3 & 4 – Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS) – Sections 65, 74, 115, 351, 352 – Vexatious and Frivolous Matrimonial Litigation - Appeal against the High Court's refusal to quash criminal proceedings involving grave allegations of rape and sexual assault under the POCSO Act and BNS filed by the wife/complainant against her estranged husband, brother-in-law, mother-in-law, and sister-in-law - The Supreme Court observed that the parties were heavily embroiled in multiple civil and criminal matrimonial disputes, with more than ten cases pending between them - Supreme Court noted that the allegations of rape against the father (appellant No. 1) and uncle (appellant No. 4) were completely generic, blanket statements lacking specific factual details or chronological backing - a close inspection of the statements of the complainant and the minor daughter revealed that they were virtually identical and reproduced verbatim, indicating a strong probability of tutoring and concoction due to pre-existing bad blood - highlighted the total absence of any medical examination or report, which was fatal to the prosecution's case given the gravity of the alleged physical injuries (such as the insertion of a hammer handle) - Held, allowing the continuation of such a trial on the basis of vague, omnibus, and improbable allegations would tantamount to an abuse of the process of law - The impugned order of the High Court was set aside, and the entire criminal proceedings arising out of the complaint case were quashed. [Paras 7 – 11] Ishwar Chand Sharma v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 566 : 2026 INSC 587

Section 482 Cr.P.C. – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) – Section 304-A – Medical Negligence – Quashing of Criminal Proceedings – Exoneration on Merits in Civil/Consumer Proceedings – Effect on Parallel Criminal Prosecution – The appellant, a senior anaesthetist, challenged the criminal prosecution initiated against her under Section 304-A read with Section 34 of the IPC for alleged gross negligence leading to the death of a patient post-surgery - The prosecution alleged that the appellant orally instructed an inexperienced staff nurse to administer a specialized analgesic injection ('sensorcaine') instead of doing it personally, which allegedly did not enter the epidural space, failing to alleviate pain and triggering a fatal cardiac event - Held, allowing the appeal and quashing the criminal proceedings, that for a criminal charge under Section 304-A of the IPC to survive, the negligence or recklessness must be of such a high degree as to be "gross" - An anaesthetist whose duty hours have concluded cannot be held criminally liable for a subsequent procedural error committed by a staff nurse in the mechanical execution of a standard post-operative pain management instruction - the family of the deceased pursued a parallel civil claim before the District Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum, which categorically exonerated the appellant on merits, finding that she had not given instructions to the nurse to administer the injection - This exoneration remained unchallenged and attained finality. Once an accused is exonerated on merits in civil proceedings, allowing a criminal prosecution to continue on identical allegations and facts constitutes a gross abuse of the process of law, as the standard of proof required in criminal cases is higher than that in civil cases. [Paras 18, 21-29] Supriya Kumari M.C. v. State of Kerala, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 540 : 2026 INSC 537

Section 482 Cr.P.C. – Inherent Powers of High Court – Quashing of Criminal Proceedings – Banking and Commercial Disputes – Approved Compromise Settlement – Impact on Prosecution - A criminal prosecution initiated under Sections 420 and 471 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) cannot be allowed to continue after a full and final settlement of the loan account by way of an approved compromise that has received the imprimatur of the Debts Recovery Tribunal (DRT) - Banking transactions arising out of loan facilities are commercial transactions having an overwhelmingly and predominantly civil flavour - Where the dispute has been amicably resolved, the settlement amount has been fully deposited, a "No Dues Certificate" has been issued, and recovery proceedings before the DRT have been consequently withdrawn, the possibility of a conviction becomes remote and bleak - In such circumstances, allowing the belated criminal prosecution to continue would cause grave prejudice, oppression, and injustice to the accused, and would amount to an abuse of the process of the court. Vijay Kumar Kela v. Central Bureau of Investigation, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 565 : 2026 INSC 588

Section 482 Cr.P.C. – Quashing of FIR and Criminal Proceedings – Matrimonial Disputes – Omnibus and Generalised Allegations against In-laws – Criminal proceedings under Section 498A/34 IPC, Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, and Section 12 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (DV Act) quashed against the sister-in-law, mother-in-law, and brother-in-law of the complainant – Held - While criminal law protects women from domestic abuse, it cannot be weaponised against every relative of the husband based on sweeping, vague, and omnibus allegations lacking specific factual foundation - A close reading of the FIR and the complainant's own divorce petition revealed that the core allegations of physical assault, verbal abuse, and surveillance were exclusively directed against the husband at his place of posting (Sheopur), while the appellants resided separately at Shivpuri - Mere familial association or failure to intervene in a marital discord does not automatically attract criminal culpability without active, specific involvement in the alleged offences. Arti Mehta v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 539 : 2026 INSC 533

Criminal Procedure – Inherent Powers – Quashing of Proceedings – Right to Speedy Trial as a Fundamental Right under Article 21 - The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and quashed the criminal proceedings pending against the appellant for 35 years arising out of a dispute over food in a police mess involving minor offences under Sections 147, 323, and 504 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and Section 120 of the Railways Act - Supreme Court emphasized that a quick trial is a sine qua non of Article 21 of the Constitution of India - Keeping a public servant in suspended animation for 35 years without any fault on his part runs completely contrary to the spirit of the "procedure established by law" - Right to speedy trial is not an abstract or illusory safeguard; it is a fundamental right and a human right that no civilized society can deny to an accused - If the continuation of proceedings amounts to a violation of Article 21, the High Court should not hesitate to exercise its inherent powers under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) or its writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. [Paras 30 - 42] Kailash Chandra Kapri v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 487 : 2026 INSC 473

Criminal Administration – Special Investigation Team (SIT) – Land Scams – In view of organized criminal activities involving the forgery of documents and unauthorized sale of a spiritual society's freehold lands across multiple states, Supreme Court directed the constitution of an SIT supervised by the Chief Secretary of Uttar Pradesh - The SIT, including the Registrar of Societies, is mandated to conduct a fact-finding inquiry into the alienation of society lands and submit a report to the police for further action. [Relied on Pradnya Pranjal Kulkarni v. State of Maharashtra (2025) SCC Online 1948; Neeharika Infrastructure (P) Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra (2021) 19 SCC 401; Pratibha Manchanda & Anr. Vs. State of Haryana & Anr. (2023) 8 SCC 181; Paras 14 -19] Shrikant Ojha v State of U.P., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 493 : 2026 INSC 482

Section 482 Cr.P.C. - Key Findings & Observations – i. Settlement Negotiations as Context - Supreme Court noted that prior to the FIR, the parties had engaged in meetings where a financial settlement of ₹30 crores was discussed to bring a "quietus" to the allegations; ii. Preceding Extortion Case - The appellant had previously filed FIR No. 1041/2025 against the complainant and her husband for extortion, leading to their arrest, prior to the filing of the rape allegations; iii. Sequence of Events - Supreme Court highlighted that had the financial settlement reached its logical conclusion, criminal proceedings likely would not have been initiated - The complainant's FIR was filed only after the appellant refused the settlement and initiated criminal action against the couple. [Paras 21-28] Venu Gopalakrishnan v. State of Kerala, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 378 : 2026 INSC 373 : AIR 2026 SC 1995 : 2026 (2) Crimes SC 263

Quashing of Proceedings – Matrimonial Dispute – Sections 498A, 323, 354 IPC and Sections 3 & 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act – Appeals filed by sister-in-law and parents-in-law assailing High Court order refusing to quash FIR and Chargesheet - Marriage solemnized in 2017; FIR lodged in 2023 – Held, law protects those who are vigilant about their rights (Vigilantibus non dormientibus jura subveniunt) – In matrimonial cases, a delay of nearly seven years can be fatal when not properly explained, as material evidence may disappear and it suggests an abuse of process. Charul Shukla v. State of U.P., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 307 : 2026 INSC 297

Section 482 Cr.P.C. - Maintainability of second quash petition – Dismissal of earlier petition as withdrawn without merits – Held - There is no inviolable rule that a second quash petition under Section 482 CrPC is not maintainable - Where the earlier petition was withdrawn without any discussion on the merits, the second petition cannot be thrown out purely on the ground of maintainability, especially when the facts reveal that the alleged offence is not made out. [Paras 15 - 22] Shaileshbhai Govindbhai Makwana v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 459

Section 482 Cr.P.C. — Quashing of FIR and Chargesheet — Absence of necessary ingredients - An FIR is liable to be quashed if its bare reading does not disclose the necessary ingredients to constitute the alleged offences - When the basic constituents of the offences under Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) of the SC/ST Act (i.e., occurrence in a place within public view) and Section 506 IPC (i.e., intent to cause alarm) are conspicuously missing from the contents of the FIR and the chargesheet, the framing of charges is unsustainable in the eyes of law. [Relied on Swaran Singh and Others vs. State through Standing Counsel and Another (2008) 8 SCC 435; Karuppudayar vs. State represented by the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Lalgudi Trichy and Others 2025 SCC OnLine SC 215; State of Haryana and Others vs. Bhajan Lal and Others 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335; Amar Nath Jha vs. Nand Kishore Singh and Others (2018) 9 SCC 137; Ramesh Chandra Vaishya vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Another (2023) 17 SCC 615; Paras 9 - 11] Gunjan @ Girija Kumari v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 484 : 2026 INSC 468

Section 482 Cr.P.C. (Section 528 of BNSS, 2023) - Quashing of Chargesheet - Scope of Inherent Powers - Reliance on CCTV Footage at the Quashing Stage – The Supreme Court quashed the criminal proceedings against the appellants facing charges under Sections 143, 341, 323, 324, 504, 506, 509, 427, and 354 IPC – Held: The CCTV footage, which formed part of the prosecution's own record (Chargesheet), clearly demonstrated that the appellants were not present during the actual assault and had only arrived later to pacify the situation – Where electronic evidence of "sterling and impeccable quality" completely belies the ocular version and indicates that the proceedings are maliciously instituted due to personal animosity, the High Court must exercise its inherent power to prevent abuse of the process of law. Sajal Bose v. State of West Bengal, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 335 : 2026 INSC 322

Section 482 Cr.P.C. – Inherent Powers vs. Revisional Jurisdiction – Noted that High Court's inherent power under Section 482 is not barred simply because a revision petition under Section 397 was maintainable or previously dismissed - Section 482 remains available to prevent the miscarriage of justice or abuse of the process of the court, even where a second revision is prohibited under Section 397(3). [Relied on S.M.S. Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. Neeta Bhalla (2005) 8 SCC 89; Krishnan & Anr. v. Krishnaveni & Anr (1997) 4 SCC 241; Paras 10, 11] Saroj Pandey v. Govt of NCT of Delhi, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 349 : 2026 INSC 324

Section 482 Cr.P.C. – Quashing of Proceedings – Scope of Interference – High Court quashed criminal proceedings involving allegations of fraud and forgery in the execution of a sale deed belonging to The Church of South India Trust Association (C.S.I.T.A.) - Supreme Court set aside the High Court order, holding that the High Court erred in conducting what amounted to a mini-trial and evaluating the sufficiency of evidence at the quashing stage - High Court held that a private complainant had no locus standi in the internal affairs of a registered body (C.S.I.T.A.) - Supreme Court reversed, reaffirming that criminal law can be set motion by any person having knowledge of an offence unless expressly barred by statute - Supreme Court emphasized that trust property held for the benefit of a community is a matter of legitimate public concern. State of Andhra Pradesh v. B. Reddeppa Reddy, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 308

Section 528 BNSS - Delineation of the "Four-Step Test" for Quashing – Supreme Court reiterated the structured test to determine the veracity of a prayer for quashing: i. Is the material relied upon by the accused of sterling and impeccable quality? ii. Does it rule out/overrule the factual assertions in the complaint? iii. Has the material remained unrefuted by the prosecution? iv. Would continuing the trial result in an abuse of process? iv. If all steps are answered in the affirmative, judicial conscience should persuade the Court to quash the proceedings. [Relied on Pradeep Kumar Kesarwani v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1947; State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335; Paras 22-29, 32-36] Sajal Bose v. State of West Bengal, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 335 : 2026 INSC 322

Section 528 BNSS - Differential Treatment of Co-accused - Lack of Reasoning – Noted that High Court had quashed proceedings against two co-accused but declined similar relief to the appellants based on the same set of allegations without assigning any cogent or discernible rationale – Held: In the absence of a clear rationale justifying differential treatment for similarly placed persons, the approach is legally and factually unsustainable. Sajal Bose v. State of West Bengal, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 335 : 2026 INSC 322

Section 482 Cr.P.C. - Quashing of Criminal Proceedings - Medical Negligence vs. Consent - Allegation of Forgery in Medical Consent Form – Supreme Court quashed proceedings against a pediatric surgeon accused of performing an Orchidectomy (removal of testicle) without specific consent instead of the agreed Orchidopexy(repositioning of testicle) – Supreme Court observed that while issues of tampering/interpolation are generally matters of trial, the High Court can exercise Section 482 powers to prevent abuse of process when the medical procedure itself is found to be appropriate by an expert board and there is no prima facie evidence of forgery – Held: Continuance of criminal proceedings would be an abuse of the process of the court where the Medical Board found the procedure to be an appropriate alternative to meet medical exigency. [Paras 18, 20] Dr. S. Balagopal v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 331 : 2026 INSC 319

Section 482 Cr.P.C. — Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) — Section 420 — Cheating — Criminal Conspiracy — Forgery of Will — Quashing of Criminal Proceedings against Bona Fide Purchaser — Criminal prosecution against a purchaser of property for valuable consideration cannot be sustained merely because the vendor allegedly used a forged Will to establish ownership and execute the registered sale deed - To attract the offence of cheating under Section 420 IPC, there must be a fraudulent inducement by the accused causing the complainant to deliver property or part with valuable security - Where there is no privity of contract or allegation that the purchaser deceived or fraudulently induced the third-party complainant, no offence of cheating is made out against the purchaser - If a vendor sells a property by creating a false document of ownership, the person defrauded/aggrieved is the purchaser whose title lands in dispute, not a third party who is not a party to the deed - In the absence of any tangible material showing the purchaser's involvement in the fabrication of the Will or knowledge of the forgery, allowing the prosecution to continue against him would amount to a gross abuse of the process of Court - Proceedings qua the appellant-purchaser quashed. [Relied on Mohammed Ibrahim and Others v. State of Bihar and Another, (2009) 8 SCC 751; Paras 20 - 25] S. Anand v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 429 : 2026 INSC 418

Section 528 BNSS (corresponding to Section 482 CrPC) – Quashing of FIR – Abuse of Process – Supreme Court observed that the FIR was a "glaring example" of an influential media house managing to register a case against its own executive following a fallout - The complaint lacked specific victim names, dates, or instances of the alleged extortion and cheating - If the allegations, even taken at face value, do not constitute an offence or are so absurd that no prudent person could reach a conclusion of sufficient grounds for proceeding, the FIR must be quashed to prevent the abuse of the process of law – Appeal allowed. [Relied on State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335; Lalita Kumari v. Govt. of U.P., (2014) 2 SCC 1; Imran Pratapgadhi v. State of Gujarat, (2026) 1 SCC 721; Paras 19-28] Ashish Dave v. State of Rajasthan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 258 : 2026 INSC 244

Section 528 BNSS — Quashing of Proceedings — Informant's Right to Hearing — The Supreme Court set aside a High Court order that quashed an FIR and consequential criminal proceedings without issuing notice to the informant - The High Court had quashed the case based on a general observation in a previous election-related writ petition suggesting parties withdraw all proceedings - The Supreme Court held that since the FIR disclosed a cognizable offence and a charge-sheet had already been submitted following investigation, the proceedings could not be quashed "straight-away" without giving the informant an opportunity to be heard - Matter restored for fresh consideration. [Relied on District Bar Association and Another vs. Bar Council of India Writ (C) No. 5973 of 2025; Paras 11-13] Suman Kumar Raghav v. Ravindra Kumar Sharma, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 279

Section 482 Cr.P.C. - Quashing of Proceedings - Suicide Note – Held that criminal proceedings quashed where the suicide note lacked material particulars regarding the nature, time, and place of alleged threats – Noted that where a suicide note indicts multiple creditors (nine in this case) without specifying individual roles or showing they acted as a group, a trial based on such a note would be a "futile exercise" and an "abuse of the process of the Court" – Held that Mere evidence of frequency of calls (40 calls in six months) without audio recordings or records of the content of those calls to indicate threats is insufficient to sustain a prosecution under Section 306 IPC – Appeal allowed. [Paras 10-15] Dhirubhai Nanjibhai Patel Lotwala v. State of Gujarat, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 270

Section 482 of CrPC / Section 528 of BNSS – Quashing of Proceedings – Offences under Sections 341, 323, 498A, and 34 of the IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act – General and Omnibus Allegations – Parity in Relief – The High Court quashed proceedings against the sister-in-law but refused to extend the same relief to the father-in-law and mother-in-law (appellants) despite identical allegations. Held: The Supreme Court found that the allegations against the appellants were general and omnibus, lacking specific dates, places, or overt acts – Held that Relatives of the husband cannot be prosecuted based on vague and general allegations without any specific overt act attributed to them - Supreme Court observed that since the allegations against the appellants and the sister-in-law were identical in substance, the High Court erred in applying different standards. Quashing the proceedings against the appellants - noted that criminal proceedings should not be used as a tool for harassment through improved and supplemental versions of events – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Preeti Gupta & Anr. v. State of Jharkhand & Anr., (2010) 7 SCC 667; Geeta Mehrotra & Anr. v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr., (2012) 10 SCC 741; Kahkashan Kausar @ Sonam & Ors. v. State of Bihar & Ors., (2022) 6 SCC 599; Paras 7 - 11] Dr. Sushil Kumar Purbey v. State of Bihar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 220 : 2026 INSC 212 : AIR 2026 SC 1299

Section 482 Cr.P.C. - Quashing of Proceedings – Summoning of Accused – Copyright Infringement – Appeal against High Court order refusing to quash criminal proceedings for alleged copyright infringement of a film script - The Supreme Court observed that summoning an accused is a serious matter and should not be done as a matter of course - The Magistrate's order must reflect an application of mind to the facts and law, involving a careful scrutiny of the evidence to determine if an offence is prima facie made out - In the present case, the Chief Judicial Magistrate (CJM) failed to record satisfaction regarding any specific similarities between the appellant's film 'Kahaani-2' and the complainant's script 'Sabak' - The summoning order was passed in a mechanical manner. Sujoy Ghosh v. State of Jharkhand, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 271 : 2026 INSC 267 : AIR 2026 SC 1552

Section 482 Cr.P.C. – Quashing of FIR – Forgery and Fraud – High Court quashed FIR at the threshold while investigation was ongoing and vital forensic evidence was awaited - Supreme Court held that when allegations of forgery are made and documents have been sent to a handwriting expert, quashing the FIR without awaiting the report is unjustified - Once the Court is apprised that the genuineness of signatures is under SFSL analysis, there is no reason to exercise jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC to stifle the probe - Supreme Court's Observations – i. The High Court prematurely terminated the proceedings despite clear allegations establishing fraud, falsification of documents, and criminal breach of trust; ii. Subsequent SFSL reports confirmed that the signatures on bank nomination documents and sale deeds were forged/facsimile stamps and did not match the admitted signatures of the deceased; iii. The High Court's reliance on Mir Nagvi Askari v. CBI (2009) 15 SCC 643 was misplaced and irrelevant to the facts of the present case, as the proof of forgery was dependent on the then-pending handwriting expert's report - Held: The impugned judgment of the High Court was set aside - The Investigating Officer was directed to conclude the investigation and file the result before the concerned Court – Appeals allowed. [Relied on Mir Nagvi Askari v. CBI, (2009) 15 SCC 643; Paras 16-23] Sharla Bazliel v. Baldev Thakur, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 256 : 2026 INSC 252

Section 482 Cr.P.C. – Quashing of Criminal Proceedings – Civil Dispute vs. Criminal Offence – Commercial Risk in Movie Production – Supreme Court observed that movie making is a high-risk business where fulfilment of a promise (sharing profits) is not entirely in the control of the promisor - If a transaction involves inherent risk and the conduct of the parties does not reflect dishonest intention from the beginning, the High Court should exercise its inherent powers to quash criminal proceedings and relegate the parties to civil remedies - In the present case, since the movie was actually completed and released, the promise to make the movie was not false, and the dispute regarding profit-sharing remains a civil cause of action. V. Ganesan v. State, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 269 : 2026 INSC 265 : AIR 2026 SC 1547

Quashing of FIR – Penal Code, 1860 – Sections 406, 420, 467, 468, and 471 – Civil Dispute given a criminal cloak – Abuse of process of law – The Supreme Court quashed an FIR lodged 11 years after the execution of a Joint Venture Agreement (JVA), holding that the dispute was essentially of a civil nature - While considering a prayer to quash an FIR, allegations are ordinarily taken at face value to assess if a prima facie cognizable offence is made out - where the cause is essentially civil, the Court must assess whether it has been given a "cloak of criminal offence." - In such cases, the Court is not restricted to the FIR's contents but may consider admitted facts and documents recited therein, such as the JVA - A delay of 11 years in lodging the FIR (JVA dated 2010; FIR lodged 2021) indicates the absence of dishonest intention from the inception. If a stark dishonest intention existed, it would have been reported promptly. [Relied on: Paramjeet Batra v. State of Uttarakhand and others, (2013) 11 SCC 673; Para 15, 25-27] Vandana Jain v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 200 : 2026 INSC 192

Transfer of Cases – Allegation of Bias – Matrimonial Disputes – Conduct of Parties – Deceitful Litigation – Held that the High Court's order of transfer, based on allegations that the wife's relatives (a Head Constable and a District Court staff member) could exert influence, cannot be sustained - Bias on the part of a Judge cannot be lightly inferred merely because a party's relative is a police officer within the jurisdiction or a staff member in the same District Court - Litigation – Noted that the husband surreptitiously obtained a divorce decree while a compromise was being reached in criminal proceedings, without informing the wife - Such reprehensible conduct by the husband should have restrained the High Court from granting a transfer that increased the travails of a woman with two children – Held that to address the husband's alleged threat to life, he is permitted to seek appearance through counsel or video conferencing - If physical presence is required, the Magistrate may provide necessary protection – Appeal allowed. [Para 5 - 12] Prasanna Kasini v. State of Telangana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 16 : 2026 INSC 30

Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023

Section 4 - Punishments

Section 53 & Section 302 IPC — Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 — Section 433-A — Modification of Life Sentence to Fixed Term — Constitutional courts (the High Courts and the Supreme Court) possess the power to modify a sentence of life imprisonment to a fixed-term sentence or to the period already undergone, provided that the period imposed is not less than 14 years of imprisonment - Such modification of a life sentence to a specific term of incarceration does not amount to an enhancement of the sentence - Held: When a sentence of life imprisonment is imposed, Section 53 read with Section 45 of the IPC conveys the meaning that it is for the rest of the natural life of the prisoner, subject to the right of claiming remission - Modifying a sentence of life imprisonment and imposing a fixed sentence is fully permissible as long as the period imposed exceeds fourteen years of imprisonment - Considering that the appellant was 21 years old at the time of the incident in 1998 and has already undergone 23 years, 6 months, and 3 days of imprisonment without remission, the Supreme Court modified the life sentence to the period already undergone and directed his immediate release. [Relied on Union of India v. V. Sriharan, (2016) 7 SCC 1; Shiva Kumar alias Shiva alias Shivamurthy v. State of Karnataka, (2023) 9 SCC 817; Paras 10-18] Munna Moyuddin Shaikh v. State of Gujarat, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 548 : 2026 INSC 558

Section 61 - Criminal conspiracy

Section 120B IPC — Criminal Conspiracy to Commit Murder — Liability for Foreseeable Crimes - To establish criminal conspiracy under Section 120-A, a meeting of minds to execute an illegal act or a legal act by illegal means is vital - Direct evidence is rarely available, and conspiracy can be inferred from surrounding circumstances and conduct - One who enters into a conspiratorial relationship is jointly liable for every reasonably foreseeable crime committed by other members in furtherance of the common design, irrespective of whether they directly participated in or had specific knowledge of the collateral act - Where a group forcefully separates victims to steal a vehicle using deadly weapons (Gandasa), causing grievous hurt or murder is a foregone, foreseeable conclusion - The conspirator maintaining a vigil while co-participants execute the killings is justifiably liable under Section 302 read with Section 120-B IPC. [Paras 50 – 55] Gopi Chand @ Pappu v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 609 : 2026 INSC 598

Section 120B IPC – Criminal Conspiracy – Demand and Acceptance of Bribe – Individual Liability vs. Collective Culpability – The Supreme Court held that even if a charge of criminal conspiracy (Section 120B IPC) fails due to lack of evidence regarding a prior meeting of minds or demand by one of the accused, the other accused can still be independently convicted for demand and acceptance under Section 7 of the PC Act if the evidence specifically establishes their individual role - The conduct of an accused person—such as turning pale, remaining "mum," or attempting to escape/dispose of the bribe money when challenged by the Trap Laying Officer—is admissible as relevant conduct under Section 8 of the Evidence Act. Central Bureau of Investigation v. Baljeet Singh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 228 : 2026 INSC 221

Section 63 - Rape definition

Distinction between False Promise and Breach of Promise — held that a breach of promise (where an initially serious intention is later hindered by unforeseen circumstances) is not a "false promise" (where there is no intention to marry from the beginning) - Supreme Court expressed concern over the "disquieting tendency" of giving broken relationships the color of criminality, noting that such misuse of the justice machinery trivializes the offense of rape and burdens the judiciary – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Naim Ahamed vs. State (NCT of Delhi), (2023) 15 SCC 38; Mahesh Damu Khare vs. State of Maharashtra, (2024) 11 SCC 39; Prashant vs. State of NCT of Delhi, (2025) 5 SCC 764; Samadhan vs. State of Maharashtra, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2528; Paras 19-27] Pramod Kumar Navratna v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 118 : 2026 INSC 124 : 2026 CriLJ 1016

Section 64 - Punishment for rape

Section 376(2)(n), 377, and 506 IPC – Rape on false promise of marriage – Consent given under misconception of fact versus breach of promise – Prolonged physical relationship with full knowledge of marital status – Held: If a physical relationship is maintained for a prolonged period knowingly by the woman, it cannot be said with certainty that the relationship was purely because of the alleged promise of marriage - Unless it is shown that the physical relationship had a direct nexus with the promise of marriage, without being influenced by any other consideration, there can be no vitiation of consent under a misconception of fact - In the present case, both parties were fully aware that they were married to different spouses - The complainant uploaded her profile on a matrimonial site and established a physical relationship even before her divorce was finalized - The parties happily cohabited and travelled together for over 4 years without any complaint of force - This is a case of a relationship turning sour, rather than a promise of marriage resulting in deception - Criminal proceedings quashed. [Relied on Mahesh Damu Khare v. State of Maharashtra and Anr., (2024) 11 SCC 398; Naim Ahamed v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2023) 15 SCC 385; M.C. Ravi Kumar v. D.S. Velmurugan & Ors., [2025] SCC Online SC 1498; Superintendent & Remembrancer of Legal Affairs West Bengal v. Mohan Singh and Others, (1975) 3 SCC 706; Paras 18 - 21] Shaileshbhai Govindbhai Makwana v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 459

Section 376(2)(n) IPC — Rape on false pretext of marriage — Consensual relationship vs. Misconception of fact — Quashing of FIR — The Supreme Court quashed the criminal proceedings against an advocate-accused where the complainant, also an advocate, was a married woman with a child and had pending divorce proceedings - held that since the complainant was already married and legally ineligible to enter into a second marriage under Section 5(i) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, any alleged promise of marriage by the accused was legally unenforceable and could not be termed a "misconception of fact" to vitiate consent. Pramod Kumar Navratna v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 118 : 2026 INSC 124 : 2026 CriLJ 1016

Scope of Section 376(2)(n) IPC — "Repeatedly" — The provision contemplates a series of separate acts of sexual assault committed at different points in time, often under fear, pressure, or continued deceit - Held that a consensual relationship turning acrimonious does not satisfy the ingredients of this section. Pramod Kumar Navratna v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 118 : 2026 INSC 124 : 2026 CriLJ 1016

Section 376(2)(g) IPC - Solitary Testimony of Prosecutrix — Reliability — While conviction can rest on the solitary version of a prosecutrix, it must inspire the confidence of the Court - Supreme Court found material inconsistencies in the statements of the prosecutrix regarding the location of the incident (room vs. plot) and the distance from her house, which weakened the prosecution's case - held that the defense of prior enmity (water dispute) between the parties was not properly considered by the lower courts, which had given undue weightage to the prosecutrix's emotional outbursts - In the absence of immediate reporting, supporting evidence such as a medical report becomes crucial - there was a total lack of medical or corroborative evidence to prove the act – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Vijayan vs. State of Kerala (2008) 14 SCC 763; Paras 13-18] Rajendra v. State of Uttarakhand, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 243 : 2026 INSC 238 : AIR 2026 SC 1490

Section 376(2)(g) and Section 506 IPC — Rape — Conviction Set Aside — Appreciation of Evidence — Delayed FIR and Solitary Testimony of Prosecutrix — The Supreme Court set aside the conviction of the appellants, holding that the prosecution failed to establish the case beyond reasonable doubt - Supreme Court observed that the FIR was lodged after a significant delay of over three months without a cogent explanation - noted that the prosecutrix's version failing to disclose the incident even to her husband but allegedly disclosing it later to a stranger who was never produced as a witness was contrary to natural human conduct. Rajendra v. State of Uttarakhand, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 243 : 2026 INSC 238 : AIR 2026 SC 1490

Section 376 IPC - SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 — Sexual Offences — Appreciation of Child Witness Testimony — Appeal against acquittal — The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgment of acquittal, restoring the conviction of the respondent - held that the High Court erred by prioritizing minor inconsistencies and "mathematical precision" regarding travel time over the credible, unshakeable testimony of the nine-year-old victim - Reiterated that there is no hard and fast rule for testing the competency of a child witness; it depends on the trial judge's satisfaction regarding the child's capacity to distinguish truth from falsehood - Corroboration is a rule of practical wisdom, not a legal necessity, and conviction can be based solely on a child's testimony if it inspires confidence and withstands cross-examination. [Para 7, 8, 10] State of Himachal Pradesh v. Hukum Chand @ Monu, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 294 : 2026 INSC 290

Section 74 - Assault or use of criminal force to woman with intent to outrage her modesty

Penal Code, 1860 - Section 354 and 313 – Lack of Evidentiary Support – Senior Citizens and Separate Residence - Allegations of forced miscarriage (Section 313) were dropped by the Investigating Officer due to lack of medical evidence – Allegations against the father-in-law under Section 354 (Outraging modesty) lacked substantive material and specific instances – Bald allegations not supported by material facts are fatal to the prosecution's case - Father-in-law (73) and Mother-in-law (71) are senior citizens – Sister-in-law is a professor living separately from the complainant – Held, it is neither expedient nor in the interest of justice to permit prosecution where allegations are highly improbable and implausible – Appeals allowed. [Relied on Dara Lakshmi Narayana vs. State of Telangana, (2025) 3 SCC 735; State of Punjab vs. Sarwan Singh, (1981) 3 SCC 34; State of Haryana vs. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Suppl (1) SCC 335; Paras 22- 27] Charul Shukla v. State of U.P., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 307 : 2026 INSC 297

Section 80 - Dowry death

Section 80(2) and 85 BNS — Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023; Section 118 — Dowry Death — Grant of Bail — Sustainability of High Court Order — Supreme Court set aside the Allahabad High Court's order granting bail to the husband in a dowry death case where the marriage lasted only three months and the cause of death was asphyxia due to strangulation – Noted that the High Court failed to consider the gravity of the offense and the statutory presumption under Section 118 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (erstwhile Section 113-B of the Evidence Act). Chetram Verma v. State of U.P., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 141

Section 82. Marrying again during lifetime of husband or wife

Sections 494 & 34 IPC – Bigamy & Common Intention – Liability of In-laws – To sustain a charge under Section 494 against relatives of the husband, the prosecution must prima facie establish an overt act, omission, or active facilitation in the performance of the second marriage ceremony - Mere inferential knowledge, passive awareness, or familial relationship with the husband does not automatically translate into a shared common intention or criminal liability under Section 494 read with Section 34 - Inherent powers exercised to quash the criminal proceedings against the father-in-law, mother-in-law, and sister-in-law as the uncontroverted allegations in the FIR and charge sheet failed to prima facie disclose specific offenses against them. [Relied on State of Haryana and Others v. Bhajan Lal and Others, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335; S. Nitheen and Others v. State of Kerala and Another, (2024) 8 SCC 706; Paras 21 - 28] Sivaraman Nair v. State of Kerala, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 422 : 2026 INSC 412

Section 85 - Husband or relative of husband of a woman subjecting her to cruelty

Section 498A IPC - Mere refusal by a husband to talk to his wife for 13 days does not, by itself, constitute “cruelty” within the meaning of Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code. Differences and occasional non-communication are natural parts of marital life and cannot be treated as wilful conduct driving the wife to suicide unless supported by cogent evidence of persistent harassment or cruelty. The Supreme Court set aside the conviction and sentence of the husband under Section 498A IPC, holding that the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the alleged non-communication caused the wife's suicide. Jayesh Kanna v. Assistant Commissioner Law and Order (West), 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 620 : 2026 INSC 615

Sections 498A & 34 IPC – Cruelty – Generalised and Vague Accusations Against Relatives – The tendency to implicate all family members of the husband in matrimonial disputes without specific allegations of active involvement must be restricted - General statements of presence and encouragement, unsupported by concrete evidence or specific acts of demand, threat, or physical assault on any identifiable occasion, do not satisfy the legal threshold to sustain a criminal prosecution under Section 498A against the in-laws – Noted that allowing such proceedings to continue constitutes an abuse of the judicial process. [Paras 23 - 25] Sivaraman Nair v. State of Kerala, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 422 : 2026 INSC 412

Section 498A IPC - Vague and Omnibus Allegations – Misuse of Section 498A IPC – Complainant made generalized accusations of dowry demands and harassment without material evidence or specific details of active involvement by the appellants – Held, there is a growing tendency to misuse Section 498A as a tool for personal vendetta against the husband's family – Such generalized and sweeping accusations unsupported by concrete evidence cannot form the basis for criminal prosecution and must be "nipped in the bud". Charul Shukla v. State of U.P., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 307 : 2026 INSC 297

Sections 498A and 304B IPC - Delay in Trial – Pendency of Revision Petitions – Judicial Discipline – Rights of Victims - The Supreme Court expressed deep concern over a 23-year delay in the High Court of Rajasthan deciding a Criminal Revision Petition challenging an order of framing charges – Noted that the Revision Petition, filed in 2003 against charges under Sections 498A and 304B IPC, remained pending with an interim stay on trial proceedings until it was finally dismissed by the High Court in 2025 - that if trials for serious offences like murder, dowry death, and rape remain stayed for decades, it results in a "mockery of justice" - Justice must be balanced between the accused and the victim/family members - Noted that "Injustice anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere" - The Supreme Court requested the Chief Justices of all High Courts to ensure that petitions involving interim stays on trials, particularly in sensitive and serious matters, are prioritized and heard immediately - The Registrar General of the Rajasthan High Court was directed to provide a detailed breakup of Criminal Revision Petitions filed and disposed of between 2001 and 2026, and the State was questioned on its failure to expedite the hearing during the 23-year interregnum. [Paras 21-23, 26-30] Vijay Kumar v. State of Rajasthan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 25

Section 100 - Culpable homicide

Section 299, 300 Clause (3), and 304 Part II IPC — Culpable Homicide vs. Murder — Vicarious Liability under Section 149 IPC — The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgment which had toned down the conviction of 19 accused persons from Section 302/149 IPC to Section 304 Part II/149 IPC - held that when an unlawful assembly waylays a victim with premeditation, uses lathis to inflict 29 injuries (including four bone-deep head fractures), and acts out of caste-based retaliation, the intention to cause such bodily injury as is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death is clearly established. Sitaram Kuchhbedia v. Vimal Rana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 189 : 2026 INSC 178

Section 101 - Murder

Section 300 Exception 4, Section 302 and Section 304 Part II IPC — Culpable Homicide Not Amounting to Murder — Free Fight and Private Defence — The appellant was initially convicted under Section 302/149 for the death of the deceased during a group clash - The High Court altered the conviction to Section 304 Part II, holding that in a "free fight" involving two rival groups where both sides sustained injuries, a common object for an unlawful assembly cannot be easily inferred - The Supreme Court upheld this alteration, noting that the appellant acted without premeditation in the midst of a sudden commotion - While the appellant's use of a lathi on the deceased's head established "knowledge" that the injury was likely to cause death, the lack of specific intent to cause death in the context of a group fight justifies the invocation of Section 304 Part II. Shrikrishna v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 35 : 2026 INSC 45 : 2026 (1) Crimes (SC) 242

Section 103 - Punishment for murder

Sections 302, 364, 396, 201 r/w. 120B IPC — Evidence Act, 1872; Sections 9, 27, 106, 114 — Criminal Procedure Code, 1973; Section 100(4) — Circumstantial Evidence — Last seen together theory — Recovery of dead body and articles — Reversal of conviction by High Court upheld - The case of the prosecution entirely rested on circumstantial evidence - The High Court reversed the Trial Court's conviction and acquitted the accused persons on finding the chain of circumstances incomplete – Noted the following key points - i. Recovery of Dead Body - The alleged recovery of the dead body at the instance of the accused was rightly doubted. At the time of arrest, the police had only received a missing report, yet the arrest memo pre-recorded offences under Sections 302, 394, and 201 IPC - independent witnesses were withheld, creating a serious dent in the prosecution's story - Suspicion, however strong, cannot take the place of legal evidence. ii. Recovery from Accessible Places - The discovery of the vehicle (Bolero Jeep) allegedly at the instance of the accused was from an open road accessible to all and not from the exclusive possession of the accused, making it unreliable; iii. Last Seen Together - Evidence of 'last seen together' is a weak type of evidence. Conviction solely based on 'last seen' without other corroborative evidence is unsustainable - Section 106 of the Evidence Act does not shift the primary burden of proof, which always remains on the prosecution; iv. Test Identification Parade (TIP) of Articles: Recovered articles like a tape recorder and wrist watch were never subjected to a TIP under the applicable police rules. Identification of recovered articles directly in Court without a prior TIP is meaningless in the eyes of law and makes the recovery insignificant; v. Common Household Objects - Recovery of a towel without any connecting material (such as bloodstains) is wholly immaterial as it is a common household object – Held that to convict an accused on circumstantial evidence, the prosecution must prove each incriminating circumstance beyond reasonable doubt, forming an unbroken chain that excludes every hypothesis consistent with the innocence of the accused. [Relied on Jaikam Khan v. State of U.P. (2021) 13 SCC 716; Manoj @ Munna v. State of Chhattisgarh (2025 INSC 1466) and Kanhaiya Lal vs. State of Rajasthan (2014) 4 SCC 715; Thammaraya & Anr. v. The State Of Karnataka (2025) 3 SCC 590; Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra (1984) 4 SCC 116; Hanumant v. State of Madhya Pradesh (1952) 2 SCC 71; Paras 29 – 32, 33-43] Pawan Kumar Sharma v. Manoj Kumar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 543 : 2026 INSC 539

Penal Code, 1872; Section 302 - Evidence Act, 1872; Section 134 - Quality vs Quantity of Evidence - Conviction on Solitary Witness – Held - It is a settled principle of criminal jurisprudence that it is the quality and not the quantity of evidence which is determinative - The Indian legal system does not insist on a plurality of witnesses. Neither the Legislature under Section 134 of the Evidence Act, 1872, nor the judiciary mandates that there must be a particular number of witnesses to record an order of conviction against an accused - The emphasis of Courts is always on the value, weight, and quality of evidence rather than on quantity, multiplicity, or plurality of witnesses. Even the testimony of a solitary witness, if found to be wholly reliable, free from blemish or suspicion, and of a sterling quality, is sufficient to form the sole basis of a conviction without the necessity of corroboration - a court may acquit the accused in spite of the testimony of several witnesses if it is not satisfied with the quality of evidence - the mere fact that a large number of witnesses, including panch witnesses and some of the alleged eyewitnesses, have turned hostile will not entitle the accused to the benefit of doubt if the remaining material witnesses completely establish the case of the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt. [Relied on Namdeo v. State of Maharashtra, (2007) 14 SCC 150; Bhimappa Chandappa v. State of Karnataka, (2006) 11 SCC 32; Paras 8-16] Mitesh @ T.V. Vaghela v. State of Gujarat, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 486 : 2026 INSC 469

Section 302 and Section 498A IPC — Evidence Act, 1872 — Section 106 — Murder in the privacy of a house — Custodial death of wife — Burden of proof on inmates — Homicidal vs. Suicidal Hanging — Medical Evidence — Sustained dowry harassment and torture established against the husband – Held - Where an offence takes place inside the privacy of a house, though the initial burden to establish the case rests on the prosecution, Section 106 of the Evidence Act casts a corresponding burden on the inmates to give a cogent explanation as to how the victim succumbed. If the husband does not offer any explanation regarding how his wife received fatal injuries in their shared dwelling home, or offers an explanation found to be false, it serves as a strong circumstance indicating his responsibility for the crime. Inmates cannot escape liability by simply keeping quiet on the premise that the burden lies entirely on the prosecution. [Relied on Trimukh Maroti Kirkan v. State of Maharashtra, (2006) 10 SCC 681; Paras 20 - 31] Gour Acharjee v. State of Tripura, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 538 : 2026 INSC 535

Sections 302 and 376A IPC - Appellate Jurisdiction to Correct Conviction - The case involved the gruesome rape and murder of a school headmistress whose body was found concealed in a bag. The prosecution's case against the respondent rested primarily on the alleged recovery of a black umbrella belonging to the deceased. The Trial Court had convicted the accused under Sections 302 and 376A IPC and awarded the death sentence. The High Court acquitted him of the major offences but convicted him under Section 201 IPC. The Supreme Court found serious lapses in the investigation regarding recovery and identification of evidence and held that the prosecution failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal filed by the State and upheld the acquittal of the accused. The Court also set aside the conviction under Section 201 IPC (causing disappearance of evidence) recorded by the High Court, even though the accused had not challenged the same. An appellate court is empowered to set aside an erroneous conviction in the interest of justice even in the absence of an appeal by the accused. State of Assam v. Moinul Haque @ Monu, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 410 : 2026 INSC 386

Section 302, Section 307, and Section 149 read with Section 120B IPC — Evidence Act, 1872 — Section 134 — Testimony of a Single Witness / Injured Witness — Conviction based on a solitary eye-witness is entirely permissible if the evidence is of 'sterling quality' - The law of evidence measures testimony by its quality, not quantity - The testimony of an injured witness rests on a higher pedestal because their presence at the scene is indisputable and they have withstood cross-examination - Minor differences between ocular evidence (eyewitness stating the victim was shot in the head) and medical evidence (postmortem showing entry at the back of the skull and exit at the nose) are immaterial as both consistently confirm the fatal injury to the head. [Paras 6 - 11] Adalat Yadav v. State of Bihar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 415 : 2026 INSC 403

Section 302 and Section 342 IPC — Conviction for Murder and Dying Declaration - Conviction Upheld — The Appellant was accused of beating his wife, pouring kerosene, and setting her on fire following a dispute over preparing food - The Supreme Court refused to interfere with the concurrent findings of the Trial Court and High Court - Held that interference in concurrent findings is restricted unless there are manifest errors in law or misappreciation of crucial evidence. Shankar v. State of Rajasthan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 324 : 2026 INSC 315

Section 302 IPC – Circumstantial Evidence – Witness Testimony – Related vs. Interested Witnesses - The Supreme Court set aside the conviction of the appellant, holding that the prosecution failed to establish a complete and unbroken chain of evidence pointing solely to the guilt of the accused - noted that suspicion, however strong, cannot take the place of proof - Supreme Court emphasized the distinction between a "related" witness and an "interested" witness - A witness is "interested" only when they derive some benefit from the result of the litigation, such as having a motive to falsely implicate the accused due to prior enmity - The testimony of an interested witness, without independent corroboration, cannot sustain a conviction. [Paras 18, 19] Gautam Satnami v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 345 : 2026 INSC 325

Sections 302, 120-B, 201, 506 r/w 34 IPC – Circumstantial Evidence – Reliability of Sole Eye-Witness – In a case primarily resting on circumstantial evidence and the testimony of a purported eye-witness, Supreme Court found the evidence insufficient to sustain conviction - Noted significant discrepancies: the eye-witness failed to report the incident for 21 days, alleged threats were not substantiated, and the witness was treated as partially hostile - medical evidence regarding the time of death (10 days prior to post-mortem) conflicted with the prosecution's timeline (21 days prior) - held that the prosecution failed to establish a complete and unbroken chain of circumstances - Required – Conspiracy cannot be presumed and requires proof of a meeting of minds, prior agreement, and concerted action - Mere suspicion, association, or the existence of civil disputes cannot substitute for proof of a criminal conspiracy – Appeals allowed. [Relied on Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar v. State of Karnataka, 2024 (8) SCC 149; Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar, (2022) 3 SCC 471; Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415; Ramesh v. State of Uttarakhand, 2020 (20) SCC 522; Paras 7, 24, 25] Tulasareddi @ Mudakappa v. State of Karnataka, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 59 : 2026 INSC 67 : 2026 (1) Crimes (SC) 121 ; 2026 CriLJ 534

Section 302 r/w Section 34 IPC – Conviction for Murder – Non-recovery of weapons of assault – Effect of – Held, recovery of the weapons of assault is not a sine qua non for convicting an accused if the evidence on record, particularly reliable ocular testimony, establishes the guilt beyond reasonable doubt - Even if the Investigating Officer fails to bring on record the weapons described by eye-witnesses, this omission cannot benefit the accused when the version of eye-witnesses is found to be consistent, reliable, and corroborated by medical evidence. [Para 7, 8] Ghanshyam Mandal v. State of Bihar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 201 : 2026 INSC 194 : AIR 2026 SC 1445

Sections 302 and 201 IPC — Evidence Act, 1872; Section 27 — Circumstantial Evidence — Conviction Upheld — The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal against concurrent findings of conviction in a case of abduction, ransom, and murder - held that the prosecution successfully established an unbroken chain of circumstances, including the recovery of the deceased's body and her vehicle at the specific disclosure of the appellant. Neelu @ Nilesh Koshti v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 179 : 2026 INSC 173 : AIR 2026 SC 1085

Section 302 and Section 498A IPC - Evidence Act, 1872; Section 32 - Dying Declaration - Reliability of Dying Declaration in cases of high percentage of burns - Conviction Upheld – The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's reversal of an acquittal, affirming the conviction of the appellant for murdering his wife by pouring kerosene and setting her on fire - held that even with 80-90% burn injuries, a dying declaration is reliable if the attending doctors certify the patient was in a fit and conscious state to make a statement - The evidence of the victim's daughter (PW-3), who was an eyewitness to the appellant fetching kerosene and setting the deceased on fire, was found to be "clinchingly" credible - Supreme Court dismissed the defense's argument regarding inconsistencies in witness testimonies (PW-7 and PW-16), noting that the professional medical opinion of the treating doctors (PW-10 and PW-11) carries more weight regarding the deceased's mental capacity than the contradictory statements of other witnesses - noted that a mere discrepancy in the investigation officer's statements would not discredit the dying declaration when the doctor has approved the deceased's fit state of mind to give statements. [Paras 11-23] Subramani v. State of Karnataka, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 255 : 2026 INSC 249

Sections 302/34 and 201 IPC [Sections 103(1)/3(5) and 238 of BNS, 2023] – Conviction based on circumstantial evidence – Requirements for conviction – Held that the "Panchsheel" principles governing circumstantial evidence - To sustain a conviction, the circumstances must be fully established and form a complete chain that excludes every possible hypothesis except the guilt of the accused - The mental distance between "may be guilty" and "must be guilty" is long and divides vague conjectures from sure conclusions. [Relied on Harad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra (1984) 4 SCC 116; Paras 27-28] Pooranmal v. State of Rajasthan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 227 : 2026 INSC 217

Section 105 - Punishment for culpable homicide not amounting to murder

Section 304 Part II IPC — Culpable Homicide Not Amounting to Murder — Sentence Reduction — Where an incident arose from a boundary dispute between close relatives, was preceded by an altercation, and the fatal injury was caused by a solitary blow using a log picked up from the spot (not a dangerous weapon) in the heat of the moment, Supreme Court reduced the sentence from five years to three years rigorous imprisonment - Appellant cannot be held liable for culpable homicide with the aid of Section 34 when there is no evidence of exhortation or shared intention to cause death - The mere fact that A-1 initiated an attack (which resulted in non-grievous injuries to a third party) does not establish common intention for the fatal blow delivered independently by another accused (A-2). [Relied on Apoorva Arora & Anr. v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) & Anr., (2024) 6 SCC 181; Para 21-27] Sivakumar v. State rep. by the Inspector of Police, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 329 : 2026 INSC 318

Sentencing Policy — Advanced Age of Appellant — While upholding the conviction under Section 304 Part II, the Supreme Court reduced the sentence to the period already undergone (approximately six years and three months) – Held that since the appellant is now over 80 years old, sending him back to prison would be "harsh and inadvisable," emphasizing that courts should not be insensitive to the advanced age of convicts – Appeal dismissed. [Relied on Kesar Singh and Another vs. State of Haryana, (2008) 15 SCC 753; Paras 5, 6] Shrikrishna v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 35 : 2026 INSC 45 : 2026 (1) Crimes (SC) 242

Section 106 - Causing death by negligence

Section 304A IPC — Culpable Rashness and Negligence — To attract punishment under Section 304A, the rashness or negligence must be attributable to a state of mind involving a "deliberation in mind" risking the crime and the life of a person, rather than a mere error of judgment or acting bona fide under regulatory operational instructions - Highlighting the concept of "culpable rashness", negligence cannot be presumed merely from an accident but must be inferred from the distinct attendant circumstances. [Relied On Ravi Kapur v. State of Rajasthan, (2012) 9 SCC 284; State of Karnataka v. Satish, (1998) 8 SCC 493; Para 7-10] Mohammad Hanif Jainum Khalifa v. State of Karnataka, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 552 : 2026 INSC 565

Section 304A IPC - Criminal Law – Proximate Cause (Causa Causans) – To fasten criminal liability under Section 304-A IPC, there must be a direct and proximate nexus between the alleged negligent act and the death - Where the post-mortem report conclusively establishes that the immediate cause of death was acute coronary insufficiency resulting from an underlying, undisclosed 80% blockage in the coronary artery, the actions of an off-duty anaesthetist are far too remote to attract criminal culpability. [Relied on Jacob Mathew v. State of Punjab, (2005) 6 SCC 1; Radheyshyam Kejriwal v. State of West Bengal, (2011) 3 SCC 581; Videocon Industries Ltd. and Anr. v. State of Maharashtra and Ors., (2016) 12 SCC 315; Prem Raj v. Poonamma Menon, (2024) 6 SCC 143; Para 20-28] Supriya Kumari M.C. v. State of Kerala, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 540 : 2026 INSC 537

Section 108 - Abetment of suicide

Section 306 IPC - Abetment of Suicide - Debt Recovery – Held a creditor making repeated phone calls or persistent demands for the return of money lent does not, by itself, constitute the offence of abetment of suicide - Such a demand is a lawful act - Supreme Court observed that in the absence of evidence showing the deceased was beaten or physically assaulted, mere demands for dues cannot be inferred as abetment - noted that the deceased might have committed suicide due to depression from being unable to clear the debt rather than due to the actions of the creditors. Dhirubhai Nanjibhai Patel Lotwala v. State of Gujarat, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 270

Sections 306, 307, and 109 IPC — Abetment of Suicide — Suicide Pacts — Culpability of the Surviving Partner - Held: The survivor of a mutual suicide pact is legally culpable for the abetment of the other's suicide under Section 307 of the IPC - A suicide pact involves mutual encouragement and a reciprocal commitment to die together, where the survivor's presence and participation act as a direct catalyst for the deceased's actions - The resolve of each party is reinforced and strengthened by the participation of the other; if not for the active participation of both parties, the act would not occur - The law treats such conduct as abetment because the State has a fundamental interest in preserving life, and any assistance in ending it is a crime against the State. Gudipalli Siddhartha Reddy v. State C.B.I., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 166 : 2026 INSC 160 : AIR 2026 SC 950

Section 109. Attempt to murder

Section 307 IPC – Attempt to Murder – Absence of Firearm Injury - The mere absence of firearm injuries does not negate a charge under Section 307 IPC - The essential ingredient is the act being done with the requisite intent or knowledge that it could cause death; if the victims escape by chance, the offence is complete - The principle of parity is not an inflexible rule and cannot be mechanically applied by courts when the roles attributed to the accused persons are materially different and distinct. [Relied on Ajwar v. Waseem & Anr., (2024) 10 SCC 768; Neeru Yadav v. State of U.P., (2014) 16 SCC 508; Sudha Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr., (2021) 4 SCC 781; Para 29-32] Mohseen v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 536 : 2026 INSC 526

Section 307 vs Section 325 IPC - Attempt to Murder vs Voluntarily Causing Grievous Hurt - Essential Ingredients - Intention or Knowledge - The essential ingredient of the offence of attempt to murder is the intention or knowledge to cause death, which must be established independently of the act itself - The gravity of the injury by itself cannot be determinative of an offence under Section 307 IPC unless the prosecution establishes the requisite mens rea - The intention to commit murder cannot be presumed merely because the injuries were ultimately opined to be dangerous to life - In the absence of evidence showing prior motive, premeditation, repeated deliberate blows with deadly weapons, or any conduct indicative of a determined effort to cause death, a conviction under Section 307 IPC cannot be sustained - Since the incident occurred suddenly when the injured intervened in an altercation, and the weapons used were ordinary lathis without showing brutal persistence, the conviction was altered from Section 307 read with Section 34 IPC to Section 325 read with Section 34 IPC. [Paras 26, 31-38] Roshan Lal v. State of Haryana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 537 : 2026 INSC 524

Section 115 (2) - Punishment for voluntarily causing hurt

Sections 323, 341, 506, and 34 IPC — Quashing of Proceedings — Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 — Section 482 — Where allegations of assault and criminal intimidation rest solely on the statement of the complainant without independent corroboration and are contradicted by other witness statements, the basic foundation for the offences is missing - Held, that continuing such proceedings would amount to an abuse of the process of law. [Relied on Punjabrao vs. D.P. Meshram 1964 SCC OnLine 76; State of Haryana vs. Bhajan Lal 1992 Supp 1 SCC 335; K.P. Manu vs. Scrutiny Committee forVerification of Community Certificate 2015 4 SCC 1; Paras 40-60] Chinthada Anand v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 288 : 2026 INSC 283

Section 116 - Grievous hurt

Section 320 (Seventhly & Eighthly), 325 IPC - Grievous Hurt - Fracture or dislocation of a bone constitutes grievous hurt within the meaning of Clause Seventhly of Section 320 IPC - Any hurt which endangers life or causes the sufferer to be in severe bodily pain or undergo prolonged treatment attracts Clause Eighthly of Section 320 IPC - Where the medical evidence unequivocally establishes that the victim suffered fractures in both parietal bones near the midline accompanied by neurological complications and prolonged hospitalization, the ingredients necessary to attract Section 325 IPC stand fully satisfied. [Paras 36-38] Roshan Lal v. State of Haryana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 537 : 2026 INSC 524

Section 140 - Kidnapping or abducting in order to murder or for ransom, etc.

Section 364A IPC – Demand for Ransom – Proof through Oral Testimony - The defence argued that the absence of Call Detail Records (CDRs) and a Section 65-B certificate under the Evidence Act was fatal to establishing a ransom demand – Held that Unlike cases purely dependent on electronic evidence, the present case features consistent, unshaken, and corroborative oral testimonies from multiple witnesses (PW-1, PW-2, and PW-3) coupled with the Investigating Officer's testimony (PW-7) proving a ransom demand of Rs. 5 Lakhs - The lack of a CDR from a rural telephone exchange in 2003 cannot paralyze the criminal justice system when substantive oral evidence remains cogent and unimpeached. [Paras 23-30] Harjindra Singh v. State of U.P., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 598 : 2026 INSC 569

Section 364A & Section 368 IPC – Kidnapping for Ransom – Ingredients and Proof – Arms Act, 1959 – Section 25 – Conviction Upheld -– Threat to Life or Hurt – Firearm Usage - The appellants challenged their conviction under Section 364A IPC contending that no explicit threat to cause death or hurt was administered to the 8-year-old victim - Held that stopping young, defenceless children on their way to school by brandishing a .315 bore country-made pistol inherently constitutes a severe threat to cause death or hurt - The active use of a lethal weapon satisfies the statutory requirement of a threat under Section 364A IPC. [Paras 21-30] Harjindra Singh v. State of U.P., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 598 : 2026 INSC 569

Section 190 - Every member of unlawful assembly guilty of offence committed in prosecution of common object

Unlawful Assembly – Individual Role Attribution – Noted that the High Court erred in granting bail on the ground that the individual role or specific injury caused by each accused could not be ascertained - The Supreme Court clarified that where an offence is committed by an unlawful assembly, every member is equally responsible for acts done in furtherance of the common object - Under Section 149 IPC, the prosecution is not obligated to identify the specific weapon or injury attributable to a particular member at the bail stage. [Paras 27 - 30] Shobha Namdev Sonavane v. Samadhan Bajirao Sonvane, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 188 : 2026 INSC 181 : 2026 (1) Crimes (SC) 278

Section 149 IPC – Unlawful Assembly and Vicarious Liability – Murder – The Supreme Court upheld the conviction of four appellants sentenced to life imprisonment for the murder of a Watershed Committee Chairman - Noted that to attract Section 149 IPC, two essential elements must be established: an "unlawful assembly" and a "common object" - Even in the absence of a specific overt act attributed to each member, the mere presence of the accused as part of an armed unlawful assembly is sufficient for conviction - noted that all accused alighting together from a bus while armed with firearms clearly established their common motive and participation in the unlawful assembly. [Paras 12, 13] Dablu v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 238 : 2026 INSC 224 : AIR 2026 SC 1319

Section 149 IPC — Vicarious Liability - Individual Attribution — Once the existence of an unlawful assembly and a common object to commit murder is established, the individual attribution of the fatal blow becomes inconsequential - Section 149 IPC fastens constructive liability on every member of the assembly, regardless of who delivered the "crucial act" or fatal injury - The High Court's reasoning that all accused could not be convicted under Section 302 because the specific assailant who caused the fatal head injury was unidentified was held to be "perverse" and "self-contradictory" as it ignored the fundamental principle of vicarious liability. Sitaram Kuchhbedia v. Vimal Rana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 189 : 2026 INSC 178

Section 196 - Promoting enmity between different groups on grounds of religion, race, place of birth, residence, language, etc., and doing acts prejudicial to maintenance of harmony.

Sections 153A, 153B, 295A, 298, and 505 IPC - Hate Speech & Preamble – Fundamental Values - Substantive meaning of 'Fraternity' and civilisational ethos of 'Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam' run fundamentally counter to Hate Speech - Supreme Court observed that the field of substantive criminal law addressing hate speech is fully occupied by existing statutory provisions (such as Sections 153A, 153B, 295A, 298, and 505 of the IPC/BNS), which penalise speech threatening communal harmony and public order - Hate speech is fundamentally antithetical to the core constitutional value of "Fraternity" enshrined in the Preamble and the Fundamental Duty cast under Article 51A(e) to promote harmony and the spirit of common brotherhood - Fraternity mandates a reciprocal obligation among citizens to respect the equal dignity of others - True citizenship cannot be reduced to a tool of exclusion or division based on an "us versus them" binary, which directly corrodes both the secular fabric of the Republic and India's civilisational maxim of vasudhaiva kutumbakam (the world is one family). [Relied on K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India (2017) 10 SCC 1 and Section 6-A of the Citizenship Act, 1955, In Re (2024) 16 SCC 105. (Paragraphs 78, 80, 81, 86, 88, 95] Ashwini Kumar Upadhyaya v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 437 : 2026 INSC 432

Section 281 - Rash driving or riding on a public way

Section 279 & Section 304A IPC — Rash and Negligent Driving — Liability of a Bus Driver — A passenger bus driver cannot be attributed with culpable negligence or rashness if he moves or restarts the vehicle strictly in accordance with the indicative instructions or whistling signals of the bus conductor - The driver is duty-bound to concentrate on driving for safety stakes and naturally relies on the conductor who is the person in charge of regulating passenger movement to monitor when to stop or move the bus - The driver is not expected to turn his head back to personally verify if the passengers have safely alighted - Acting bona fide on the conductor's signals negates the element of criminal negligence or recklessness. [Paras 5, 6] Mohammad Hanif Jainum Khalifa v. State of Karnataka, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 552 : 2026 INSC 565

Section 296 - Obscene acts and songs

Section 294(b) IPC — Obscenity — Use of abusive language — Mere use of the word "bastard" during a heated conversation does not per se amount to obscenity — Supreme Court held that "obscenity" relates to material that has the potential to appeal to the prurient interest or arouse sexual/lustful thoughts - While vulgarity or profanities may be distasteful, unpalatable, or evoke disgust, they do not automatically satisfy the legal threshold of being "obscene" under Section 294 - Given modern contemporary mores, the use of such words in the heat of a moment does not sustain a conviction for obscenity. [Paras 19, 20] Sivakumar v. State rep. by the Inspector of Police, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 329 : 2026 INSC 318

Section 308 - Extortion

Sections 384, 504, 506, and 511 IPC — Extortion & Criminal Intimidation — Vague Allegations - Where the FIR fails to specify the date, place, or exact circumstances of the alleged demand of money, and no property or money was actually delivered pursuant to such a threat, the ingredients of extortion under Section 384 are absent - General observations that the accused "tried" to extort money cannot automatically attract Section 511 of the IPC when the substantive allegations are completely vague - allegations under Sections 504 and 506 fail when the FIR does not disclose the exact words uttered or the surrounding circumstances of intimidation - when substantive offences are not made out, the charge of conspiracy under Section 120-B necessarily fails - Criminal antecedents cannot constitute the sole or even the primary basis to decline the quashing of criminal proceedings under Section 482 of the CrPC - It is the duty of the Court to see whether the essential ingredients of the alleged offences in the impugned FIR are prima facie made out - General observations regarding the "modus operandi" or "proclivity" of the accused cannot replace the requirement of fulfilling the basic ingredients of the offences. Bhikhubhai Govindbhai Patel v. State of Gujarat, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 593 : 2026 INSC 532

Section 316 - Criminal Breach of Trust

Sections 406, 420, 467, 468, and 471 IPC – Civil Dispute given a criminal cloak – Abuse of process of law – The Supreme Court quashed an FIR lodged 11 years after the execution of a Joint Venture Agreement (JVA), holding that the dispute was essentially of a civil nature - While considering a prayer to quash an FIR, allegations are ordinarily taken at face value to assess if a prima facie cognizable offence is made out - where the cause is essentially civil, the Court must assess whether it has been given a "cloak of criminal offence." - In such cases, the Court is not restricted to the FIR's contents but may consider admitted facts and documents recited therein, such as the JVA - A delay of 11 years in lodging the FIR (JVA dated 2010; FIR lodged 2021) indicates the absence of dishonest intention from the inception. If a stark dishonest intention existed, it would have been reported promptly. [Relied on: Paramjeet Batra v. State of Uttarakhand and others, (2013) 11 SCC 673; Para 15, 25-27] Vandana Jain v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 200 : 2026 INSC 192

Section 406 IPC – Criminal Breach of Trust – Non-refundable Security Deposit – The allegation regarding non-refund of security money does not constitute a criminal offence when the JVA stipulates that the deposit is non-refundable and only adjustable against future sale proceeds - Non-fulfillment of such contractual obligations gives rise to a civil cause of action, not a criminal one. [Para 22 - 28] Vandana Jain v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 200 : 2026 INSC 192

Section 318 - Cheating

Section 420 IPC — Cheating — Essential Ingredients - To constitute the offence of cheating, there must exist deception, fraudulent inducement, and consequential delivery of property coupled with dishonest intention at the inception of the transaction - A disputed civil claim pending before a competent civil court cannot automatically be treated as a fraudulent misrepresentation so as to attract Section 420 of the IPC, especially in the absence of any allegation that the complainant delivered any property, money, or valuable security to the accused. Bhikhubhai Govindbhai Patel v. State of Gujarat, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 593 : 2026 INSC 532

Section 420 IPC – Cheating – Ingredients – Essential requirement of dishonest intention from the inception – The Supreme Court held that to constitute an offence of cheating, the intention to deceive must exist at the time the inducement was made - Mere failure to keep a promise subsequently cannot be the sole basis to presume dishonest intention existed from the beginning - Every breach of contract does not give rise to an offence of cheating unless deception was played at the very inception. V. Ganesan v. State, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 269 : 2026 INSC 265 : AIR 2026 SC 1547

Section 420 IPC – Cheating – Absence of False Representation – No offence of cheating was made out as there was no false representation in the JVA - The agreement did not contain a specific statement that "no litigation was pending"; rather, it provided an indemnity to the second party for any loss due to disputes - The representation that no "restraint order" existed was not shown to be false. [Paras 20-26] Vandana Jain v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 200 : 2026 INSC 192

Section 336 - Forgery

Sections 463, 464, 465, 467, 468, and 471 IPC — Forgery — Making of a "False Document" — Disputed Claim of Title - The essential ingredient of forgery is the making of a "false document" as defined under Section 464 of the IPC - When a person executes a document (such as a Power of Attorney) claiming a property as their own or asserting a share pursuant to revenue entries, they are not pretending to be someone else, nor is it a case of impersonation or forged signatures - A disputed claim of title, whether ultimately sustainable in law or not, cannot be equated with the making of a false document - If the document is not a false document, there is no forgery, and Sections 467 and 471 of the IPC are not attracted. [Relied on Mohd. Ibrahim v. State of Bihar, (2009) 8 SCC 751] Bhikhubhai Govindbhai Patel v. State of Gujarat, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 593 : 2026 INSC 532

Section 338 - Forgery of valuable security, will, etc.

Sections 467, 468, 471 IPC – Forgery – Document not traceable in records – Merely because a document (such as a Tehsildar's letter) is not traceable in official records 11 years after its purported issuance, it cannot be deemed "forged" or "false" under Section 464 IPC. Official records are not always maintained in perpetuity. [Para 24] Vandana Jain v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 200 : 2026 INSC 192

Section 351 - Criminal intimidation punishment

Section 506 r/w. 34 — Criminal Intimidation — Sine qua non of "intent to cause alarm" — Absence of common intention - The pivotal aspect to establish an offence of criminal intimidation under Section 506 IPC is the "intent to cause alarm" to the complainant. Where allegations do not demonstrate that the threats exerted by the accused were intended to cause such alarm, and there is no evidence of a common intention to commit a criminal act under Section 34 IPC, prosecuting the accused would amount to an abuse of the process of law. [Para 10] Gunjan @ Girija Kumari v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 484 : 2026 INSC 468

Section 506 Part II IPC – Evolving Understanding of "Chastity" and "Unchastity" – Meaning of threatening to "impute unchastity to a woman" in the digital age – Held: Chastity is not to be considered purely from a traditional moral perspective focused on virtue alone; it must be viewed through the prism of an individual woman's dignity, privacy, and sexual autonomy under Article 21 of the Constitution - "Unchastity" encompasses any action or unwarranted interference that disrupts a woman's control over her own sexual choices and dissemination of personal information - The act of secretly video-recording a victim in a naked state in a bathroom, and threatening to publish it online, directly assaults her sexual autonomy, undermines her dignity, and violates her privacy - Such a threat squarely constitutes an act to "impute unchastity" within the meaning of Part II of Section 506 IPC, irrespective of whether the parties were in a long-term consensual physical relationship. [Relied on Joseph Shine v. Union of India, (2019) 3 SCC 39; Pawan Kumar v. State of H.P., (2017) 7 SCC 780; K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India, (2017) 10 SCC 1 Paras 31 - 41] Vijayakumar v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 531 : 2026 INSC 525

Section 503 & Section 506 Part II IPC – Criminal Intimidation to Impute Unchastity – Appeal against conviction for threatening to upload a video of the prosecutrix bathing on Facebook if she insisted on continuing their relationship – Non-recovery of mobile phone/videography – Held: Law does not mandate that the recovery of an article of crime is sine qua non for conviction if there is other credible evidence to prove its existence - What is relevant is that the threat was issued, and the victim truly believed and felt threatened that such a threat could be carried out - The genuine perception of the prosecutrix that such a video exists and that the appellant threatened to upload it on social media constitutes key ingredients to invoke Section 503 IPC - Non-recovery of the device is not fatal to the prosecution's case. [Relied on Goverdhan v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2025) 3 SCC 378; Paras 46, 53, 54 - 87] Vijayakumar v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 531 : 2026 INSC 525

Section 506 IPC – Criminal Intimidation – Mere threats without intention to cause alarm do not constitute an offence – Vague allegations and delayed improvements in statements weaken the prosecution's case - The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and quashed proceedings against the appellant (Accused No. 5), a lawyer, who was primarily charged under Section 506 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) - Noted that the prosecutrix's initial statement under Section 161 of the CrPC did not mention any threats from the appellant - after a delay of seven to eight days, she improved her version in a statement recorded under Section 164 of the CrPC, making a vague reference to "an uncle" (the appellant) threatening her - held that for a charge of criminal intimidation to stand, there must be a clear intention to cause alarm, irrespective of whether the victim was actually alarmed - Vague allegations unsupported by prima facie cogent evidence do not satisfy the requirements of Section 506 IPC - noted that a lawyer discharging professional duties, such as giving advice or suggestions, cannot be deemed to be engaging in intimidation – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Naresh Aneja Vs. State of U.P., (2025) 2 SCC 604; Sharif Ahmad Vs. State of U.P., (2024) 14 SCC 122; Paras 6-8] Beri Manoj v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 92

Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023

Evidence Act, 1872 — Appreciation of Evidence — Canon of Common Sense — The dictum of common sense and common wisdom serves as a vital canon for evaluating evidence and judging human conduct in criminal trials - Applying the yardstick of common sense to day-to-day affairs and natural human activities helps the court look past technical assumptions and arrive closer to the truth. [Para 7-9] Mohammad Hanif Jainum Khalifa v. State of Karnataka, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 552 : 2026 INSC 565

Section 2(1)(e) - “evidence”

Evidentiary Value of Affidavits – Indian Evidence Act, 1872; Section 3 – Civil Procedure Code, 1908; Order XIX– Whether an affidavit constitutes 'evidence' – An affidavit does not fall within the definition of "evidence" under Section 3 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 - It can only be treated as evidence if the Court passes a specific order for sufficient reasons under Order XIX of the CPC - In the absence of an opportunity for cross-examination, or where the circumstances surrounding the filing of such affidavits appear suspicious or self-created prior to the submission of pleadings, they cannot be relied upon to determine factual situations or invalidate a proved document - It is a settled proposition of law that mutation entries in revenue records do not confer, create, or extinguish title over immovable property. Such entries are effected purely for fiscal purposes to enable the State to realize land revenue from the person recorded therein. [Relied on Meena Pradhan and Others v. Kamla Pradhan and Another, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1198; H. Venkatachala Iyengar v. B.N. Thimmajamma and Others, 1958 SCC OnLine SC 31; Balwant Singh and Another v. Daulat Singh (Dead) By LRs. and Others, (1997) 7 SCC 137; Rabindra Nath Mukherjee and Another v. Panchanan Banerjee (Dead) by LRs and Others, (1995) 4 SCC 459; Ram Piari v. Bhagwant and Ors., (1990) 3 SCC 364; Para 31-38] Parvathi Nairthi v. Laxmi Nairthy, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 528 : 2026 INSC 521

Section 5. Facts which are occasion, cause or effect of facts in issue or relevant facts.

Circumstantial Evidence — Five Golden Principles — For a conviction based solely on circumstantial evidence, the conditions outlined in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda vs. State of Maharashtra (1984) 4 SCC 116 must be fulfilled - These include: (1) circumstances from which guilt is drawn must be fully established; (2) facts must be consistent only with the hypothesis of guilt; (3) circumstances must be of a conclusive nature; (4) they must exclude every possible hypothesis except guilt; and (5) the chain of evidence must be so complete as to leave no reasonable ground for the conclusion of innocence. Neelu @ Nilesh Koshti v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 179 : 2026 INSC 173 : AIR 2026 SC 1085

Circumstantial Evidence – Last Seen Together Theory – Noted that prosecution's "last seen" theory failed due to significant inconsistencies and interpolations in police records regarding the date and time of the accused's prior arrest for a different matter - noted that the child allegedly went missing while the accused may have already been in police custody - Where the investigation is "botched" and "inept," leaving the chain of circumstances incomplete and failing to eliminate other hypotheses, the accused is entitled to the benefit of doubt - Conviction set aside. [Relied on Dharam Deo Yadav v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2014) 5 SCC 509; Jaffar Hussain Dastagir v. State of Maharashtra (1969) 2 SCC 872; Ramkishan Mithanlal Sharma v. State of Bombay (1954) 2 SCC 516; Paras 10-20] Rohit Jangde v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 164 : 2026 INSC 162 : AIR 2026 SC 1095

Section 6 - Motive, preparation and previous or subsequent conduct

Distinction between "Preparation" and "Attempt" – Section 376 r/w Section 511 of the IPC and Section 18 of the POCSO Act – The Supreme Court set aside an Allahabad High Court order that had downgraded a summons from "attempt to commit rape" to a lesser charge of Section 354B IPC - held that when accused persons act with pre-determined intent, execute mens rea through overt acts (such as dragging a victim toward a culvert), and are only stopped by the intervention of third parties, the stage of "preparation" has concluded and an "attempt" has commenced. In Re: Order Dated 17.03.2025 Passed by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 168 : 2026 INSC 165

Motive in Circumstantial Evidence — While motive is significant in cases of circumstantial evidence, it is not an absolute necessity when the chain of circumstances is otherwise complete - Failure to prove motive is not fatal to the prosecution's case if the facts clearly point to the accused's guilt - A delay of three days in lodging a missing person report is neither excessive nor unusual, as family members often conduct their own search before approaching the police; such delay does not, by itself, vitiate the prosecution's case – Appeal dismissed. [Relied on: Mulakh Raj and Others vs. Satish Kumar and Others (1992) 3 SCC 43; Paras 13-17, 20-29] Neelu @ Nilesh Koshti v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 179 : 2026 INSC 173 : AIR 2026 SC 1085

Section 8 IEA – Admissibility as Conduct – Even if a recovery is not admissible under Section 27 due to a lack of formal custody, the fact that the accused led the police to a location where incriminating items were found can be admitted as "conduct" under Section 8 - such evidence is considered "weak" and can only offer corroboration; it cannot, by itself, result in a conviction without other proven links in the chain of circumstances. Rohit Jangde v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 164 : 2026 INSC 162 : AIR 2026 SC 1095

Section 7 - Facts necessary to explain or introduce fact in issue or relevant facts

Section 9 IEA – Test Identification Parade (TIP) vs. Dock Identification & Section 27 Recoveries - The appellants contended that the absence of a formal TIP vitiated their identification – Held that A TIP is corroborative and not a substantive piece of evidence - The eyewitnesses (PW-2 and PW-3) had a clear daylight opportunity to observe the kidnappers - More crucially, the identity is decisively cemented by infallible recoveries made pursuant to disclosures under Section 27 of the Evidence Act specifically, the recovery of the living child at the behest of one appellant and the recovery of the crime weapon (.315 bore pistol) at the behest of the other. These direct recoveries negate the necessity of a formal TIP. [Paras 26 - 28] Harjindra Singh v. State of U.P., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 598 : 2026 INSC 569

Section 16 - Admission by party to proceeding or his agent

Evidence Act, 1872 — Admission by Parties — Substantive Evidence Substantive admissions made by a party or their witnesses substitute the root-matter of the case. When consistent and unambiguous recitals are present in a primary document text (such as a foundation deed), they cannot be lightly brushed aside or disregarded on the mere ground that the contemporaneous person lacked personal knowledge. [Paras 26, 27] A.P. State Wakf Board v. Janaki Busappa, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 423 : 2026 INSC 413

Section 23 - Confession to police officer

Section 27 IEA – Recovery of Incriminating Articles – Hostile Panch/Seizure Witnesses – Value of Investigating Officer's Testimony - Appeal against the dismissal of a criminal appeal by the Madhya Pradesh High Court, which upheld the Trial Court's order convicting the appellant under Section 302 read with Section 149 of the IPC for the murder of four family members - The appellant challenged the conviction, arguing inter alia that the recovery of the incriminating articles (empty phials of Calmpose injection, clothes, and rope) under Section 27 of the Evidence Act was unreliable because the independent panch/seizure witnesses turned hostile – Held that dismissing the appeal, the Supreme Court ruled that it is a well-settled principle of law that a recovery under Section 27 of the Evidence Act cannot be discarded or vitiated merely because the panch witnesses turned hostile, provided that the recovery is otherwise convincingly proved through the testimony of the Investigating Officer - The prosecution successfully proved the recovery at the instance of the appellant through the credible testimony of the Investigating Officer (PW-24), which was further corroborated by the postmortem and viscera reports showing traces of "Diazepham" (Calmpose). Uperndra Khare v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 607 : 2026 INSC 538

Elastic Time of Death - Extra-Judicial Confession - Exculpatory Statements - Where the postmortem report indicates an elastic timeframe for the time of death (e.g., '24 hours not passed during examination') and the time gap between when the deceased was last seen with the accused and the recovery of the body is large, death cannot be termed as proximate. Consequently, no conviction can be sustained solely based on the last seen together theory - An exculpatory statement made by an accused absolving himself and accusing the co-accused is, by its very nature, unreliable. It cannot be used against co-accused persons as they have no opportunity to cross-examine the maker, nor does it incriminate the maker since it lacks an element of confession. Furthermore, a statement made while being detained by a mob under pressure, undue duress, or threat of violence lacks credibility and is a weak piece of evidence. [Paras 9-11] Papan Sarkar @ Pranab v. State of West Bengal, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 532 : 2026 INSC 528

Evidentiary Value of Confessional Statements – noted that the conviction was not based solely on confessions, but was supported by the discovery of incriminating material (contraband and money) documented via panchnamas - Such discoveries constitute independent and relevant evidence under Sections 6, 10, and 11 of the Evidence Act. Amad Noormamad Bakali v. State of Gujarat, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 190 : 2026 INSC 180

Evidence Act, 1872 – Section 25, 26, 27 & 161 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Section 161 & 162 – Approver/Accomplice Evidence – Use of Previous Statement for Contradiction - The Supreme Court held that a non-confessional statement of an accused recorded by an Investigating Officer during investigation qualifies as a statement under Section 161 Cr.P.C - If the accused subsequently turns into an approver and steps into the witness box as a prosecution witness, such a statement can be put to him for the purpose of contradiction under Section 162 Cr.P.C - A confessional statement made while in police custody remains strictly barred by Section 25 of the Evidence Act and cannot be used for any purpose other than what is permissible under Section 27. State of Tamil Nadu v. Ponnusamy, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 519 : 2026 INSC 507

Circumstantial Evidence - Evidentiary value of co-accused confession - In cases based solely on circumstantial evidence, the prosecution must establish an unbroken chain of circumstances that unerringly points to the guilt of the accused and excludes every possible hypothesis consistent with innocence. The confession of a co-accused is of weak evidentiary value and cannot form the sole basis of conviction in the absence of strong and independent corroboration. State of Assam v. Moinul Haque @ Monu, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 410 : 2026 INSC 386

Evidence Act - Section 27 - Recovery and Identification of Articles - Delayed Recovery - The recovery of an incriminating article pursuant to a disclosure statement cannot be relied upon unless it is properly sealed and its identity is established through a reliable procedure. Mere calling of family members of the deceased to the police station for identification does not constitute a valid test identification parade. Such proceedings should ordinarily be conducted before a Magistrate after sealing the article to ensure credibility. A significant delay in recovery of the alleged incriminating article (in this case, 14 days) weakens the prosecution's case, particularly when the entire case rests on circumstantial evidence. State of Assam v. Moinul Haque @ Monu, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 410 : 2026 INSC 386

Evidence Act, 1872 — Section 27 — Joint / Simultaneous Disclosures — Evaluation of Admissibility and Credibility — Joint or simultaneous disclosure statements taken from multiple persons in police custody are not per se inadmissible under Section 27, but they pose inherent practical difficulties regarding credibility and their distinct nexus with the discovery - The contents of a panchanama do not constitute substantive evidence; rather, what is stated by the panch witnesses in the witness box is substantive - Where the independent panch witness fails to depose a single word regarding the exact words or statements made by the specific appellants in his presence, and where the primary discoveries (weapon, vehicle, and ornaments) were exclusively at the instance of the principal accused, the safeguards of Section 27 are completely absent - In a case entirely based on circumstantial evidence, a joint discovery of the same spot/mental fact cannot be utilized against the co-accused appellants when it is impossible to determine which statement of a particular accused relates distinctly to the fact discovered. [Paras 49 - 68] Anand Jakkappa Pujari @ Gaddadar v. State of Karnataka, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 427 : 2026 INSC 417

Evidence Act, 1872 – Section 27 – Recovery of Weapons – Supre,e Court observed that the mere presence of human blood on a seized weapon is insufficient for conviction if the blood group is not determined and no definitive link is made between the weapon and the injuries sustained by the deceased - The recovery was further weakened by the fact that seizure witnesses turned hostile or admitted they did not sign the memos at the time of recovery. [Relied on Sharad Birdhi Chand Sarda vs. State of Maharashtra (1984 INSC 121; Agniraj & Ors. vs. State through Deputy Superintendent of Police, CB-CID (2025 INSC 774); Javed Shaukat Ali Qureshi vs. State of Gujarat (2023 INSC 829); State of Rajasthan vs. Smt. Kalki & Anr. (1981 INSC 94); Paras 15-30] Gautam Satnami v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 345 : 2026 INSC 325

Recoveries under Section 27, Evidence Act — Essential Ingredients - Concealment and its knowledge, revealed from the statement of the accused, are the crucial ingredients of Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act - In the absence of a recorded statement showing that the concealment was effected by the accused, a mere recital in the seizure list that objects were recovered "on being shown and certified" by the accused does not qualify as a valid recovery under Section 27 - Assault: Where weapon recoveries lack clarity, are made from open spaces with free access, are not produced or confronted before the witnesses in Court, and are not shown to the medical officer to elicit an opinion on whether they could cause the injuries found on the deceased, such recoveries do not form a clinching incriminating circumstance – Motive - While the absence of motive is not imperative when the chain of circumstances is so complete as to establish only a hypothesis of guilt, its absence raises a reasonable doubt when the individual links in the chain of circumstances are weak, unproven, or not incriminating. [Paras 12 - 19] Papan Sarkar @ Pranab v. State of West Bengal, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 532 : 2026 INSC 528

Section 27 IEA — Criminal Evidence — Circumstantial Evidence — Last Seen Together Theory — Extra-judicial Confession — Recovery under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act — Absence of Motive — Conviction set aside - Last Seen Together Theory — Time Gap & Proximity - What assumes significance in placing reliance on the 'last seen together' theory is the gap between the time the accused and the deceased were seen together and the occurrence of death - The proximity of the death having occurred within a short time after they were last seen together is most relevant for that fact to be taken as an incriminating circumstance - When the time gap is large, intervening circumstances can snap the link and prevent an adverse inference against the accused, even if the accused fails to explain when they parted company. [Relied on State of Goa v. Sanjay Thakran and Another, (2007) 3 SCC 755; Para 7-10] Papan Sarkar @ Pranab v. State of West Bengal, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 532 : 2026 INSC 528

Section 27 IEA — Discovery of Fact — Doctrine of Confirmation by Subsequent Events — Section 27 is a proviso to Sections 25 and 26 - The "fact discovered" embraces not merely the object recovered, but the place from which it is produced and the knowledge of the accused as to its existence - The actual discovery of the body from the exact location disclosed by the appellant (a well) serves as a guarantee of the truthfulness of the information supplied. Neelu @ Nilesh Koshti v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 179 : 2026 INSC 173 : AIR 2026 SC 1085

Section 27 IEA – Recovery of remnants of deceased – Requirement of "Custody" – Information leading to a discovery is admissible under Section 27 only if it comes from a person who is in the custody of the police at the time the statement is made - In the present case, the Section 27 memorandum was drawn at 10:30 AM on 13.10.2018, whereas the formal arrest of the accused occurred later that night at 22:00 hrs - As the accused was not in police custody when the statement was made, the recovery cannot be brought under the ambit of Section 27. Rohit Jangde v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 164 : 2026 INSC 162 : AIR 2026 SC 1095

Section 27 IEA [Proviso to Section 23 of BSA, 2023] – Recovery of currency notes and blood-stained shirt – Reliability - Currency Notes: A discrepancy in the amount recovered (Rs. 46,000/- vs Rs. 46,145/- counted in Court) casts a "grave cloud of doubt" on the factum of recovery - Mere recovery of money, without a clear nexus to the crime, is not an incriminating circumstance – Noted that it "highly improbable and unnatural" that an accused, who was at liberty for days, would meticulously conceal a blood-stained shirt in an iron box rather than destroying it or washing it. Pooranmal v. State of Rajasthan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 227 : 2026 INSC 217

Section 27 IEA — Recovery of Weapon and Discovery of Body — Held: Recoveries made from open spaces or crime scenes already searched (like a graveyard) without a recorded disclosure statement are suspect - Since the rope was not linked to the crime through forensic evidence (no blood, skin, or hair detected), it failed as an incriminating circumstance. [Paras 17-19] Bernard Lyngdoh Phawa v. State of Meghalaya, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 84 : 2026 INSC 85 : 2026 (1) Crimes (SC) 230

Last Seen Together Theory — Proximity to Death — Held: For the "last seen together" theory to hold weight, it must be proximate to the time of death – Noted that in this case, there was no proof the deceased was with the accused immediately before death, and the identification of the accused by an auto-driver in a police station (without a Test Identification Parade) was unreliable. [Paras 13-15] Bernard Lyngdoh Phawa v. State of Meghalaya, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 84 : 2026 INSC 85 : 2026 (1) Crimes (SC) 230

Section 26 - Cases in which statement of relevant fact by person who is dead or cannot be found, etc., is relevant

Evidence Act, 1872; Section 32(1) - Oral Dying Declaration - Reliability and Evidentiary Value – Held - The legal position with regard to dying declarations is well settled by a catena of decisions - A truthful and voluntary dying declaration, if found to be reliable, can by itself form the sole basis of conviction without the necessity of corroboration - Simply because the deceased subsequently became unconscious by the time he reached the hospital or the doctor, it cannot be presumed that he was unconscious even when the witness initially reached the spot and asked him about the incident immediately after the occurrence - the non-mentioning of the name of the assailant in the medical history papers pales into insignificance, as medical history is recorded by doctors primarily to understand how the incident occurred and what type of weapon was involved, rather than investigating who caused the injury. [Relied on P.V. Radhakrishna v. State of Karnataka, (2003) 6 SCC 44; State of Uttar Pradesh v. Ram Sagar Yadav and Others, (1985) 1 SCC 552; Paras 13-15] Mitesh @ T.V. Vaghela v. State of Gujarat, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 486 : 2026 INSC 469

Evidence Law - Dying Declaration — Mental Condition and Procedure — The Appellant's contention that the Magistrate reported the victim was not in a fit mental condition was rejected - A perusal of the Magistrate's testimony and the medical certificate confirmed the deceased was conscious and in a position to give a statement - The lack of a specific note by the Magistrate regarding "sound mind" on the document itself was immaterial since a duty doctor had separately certified her condition. [Relied on Manjunath v. State of Karnataka, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1421; Paras 9-17] Shankar v. State of Rajasthan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 324 : 2026 INSC 315

Evidence Act, 1872 — Section 32 (Bhartiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 — Section 26) — Dying Declaration — Admissibility and Sanctity — The conviction was primarily based on the dying declaration recorded by a Magistrate in a question-and-answer format - reiterated that a dying declaration rests on the philosophical premise that a person facing imminent death will speak only the truth - If found consistent, believable, and free from tutoring, it can form the sole basis for conviction - In this case, the medical evidence from duty doctors and the certificate of mental fitness provided by the duty doctor on the flip side of the declaration paper affirmed its sanctity. Shankar v. State of Rajasthan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 324 : 2026 INSC 315

Section 32 IEA – Dying Declaration – Credibility and Corroboration – held that a dying declaration, if found to be true and voluntary, can form the sole basis for conviction without any further corroboration – Held that High Court erred in discarding a dying declaration recorded by a Tehsildar (PW-1) after obtaining a medical certificate of fitness - Discrepancies regarding the exact time of the Tehsildar's arrival at the hospital were minor and did not justify discarding a clear and consistent statement by the deceased identifying her husband as the perpetrator. State of Himachal Pradesh v. Chaman Lal, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 48 : 2026 INSC 57 : 2026 1 Crimes (SC) 131 : 2026 CriLJ 823

Section 32 IEA - Dying Declaration – Conviction on the sole basis of dying declaration – Requirements and Caution - Held: While a dying declaration is a crucial piece of evidence that can form the sole basis for conviction without corroboration, it must inspire full confidence in the Court – Supreme Court must be satisfied that the deceased was in a fit state of mind, and the statement was not the result of tutoring, prompting, or imagination - If the declaration is suspicious or the deceased's physical/mental capacity is in doubt, it should not be acted upon without corroborative evidence - In the present case, multiple inconsistencies, the presence of interested relatives during recording, and the lack of medical certification regarding the victim's fit state of mind rendered the declarations unreliable. Sanjay Kumar Sharma v. State of Bihar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 230 : 2026 INSC 223

Section 39 - Opinions of experts

Identification of Decomposed Body — Medical Jurisprudence — Absence of DNA testing does not vitiate identification when credible and consistent testimonies of witnesses who knew the deceased personally are available - Relying on Modi's Textbook of Medical Jurisprudence and Toxicology, Supreme Court noted that putrefaction in water is slower than in air, especially when the body is protected by clothing - Identification based on clothing and recognizable facial features by familial and close witnesses is legally sustainable. Neelu @ Nilesh Koshti v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 179 : 2026 INSC 173 : AIR 2026 SC 1085

Forensic Science Laboratory (FSL) Report – Chain of Custody – Sanctity of Samples. For an FSL report to be reliable, the prosecution must prove an unbroken chain of custody from seizure to laboratory - In this case, contradictions between the Malkhana In-charge and Carrier Constable regarding the dates the samples were sent and returned from the FSL (due to unspecified "defects") breached the chain of custody – Noted that even if blood groups match, this circumstance in isolation cannot link the accused to the crime without other cogent evidence. [Relied on Karandeep Sharma alias Razia alias Raju v. State of Uttarakhand 2025 SCC OnLine SC 773; Paras 41-44] Pooranmal v. State of Rajasthan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 227 : 2026 INSC 217

Expert Evidence – Forensic Science – Gait Analysis – Admissibility and Reliability Standards - The Supreme Court noted that while gait analysis is an evolving scientific technique useful for corroborating a suspect's identity and physical attributes, its validity relies entirely on a comparison between two independently admissible and reliable pieces of visual evidence - Where the original hard disk and DVR of a CCTV system were mishandled, delayed in extraction, and ultimately corrupted or destroyed by the investigating agency, a gait analysis report prepared by a private laboratory using an unverified backup copy cannot be safely relied upon. [Paras 91-93, 95-102] State of Tamil Nadu v. Ponnusamy, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 519 : 2026 INSC 507

Section 54 - Proof of facts by oral evidence

Evidence and Pleadings – Oral Evidence vs. Pleadings – Supreme Court noted that a party asserting a competing claim to hereditary rights must specifically plead material particulars, such as when they entered possession and when obstruction began - The Appellants' written statement was silent on these aspects – Noted that the settled legal principle that oral evidence cannot serve as a substitute for pleadings, and a case not made out in the pleadings cannot be established through evidence alone. [Para 23] Ogeppa v. Sahebgouda, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 198 : 2026 INSC 191

Section 58 - Secondary evidence

Sections 63, 64, and 65 IEA – Admissibility of Secondary Evidence – Photocopy of Power of Attorney – Primary evidence is the "best evidence" rule, and secondary evidence is an exception admissible only upon laying a factual foundation. A photocopy is a mechanical copy and constitutes secondary evidence - It cannot be admitted as evidence unless the party establishes the legal right to lead secondary evidence by proving the original's existence and providing valid reasons for its non-production under the specific exceptions of Section 65 - A photocopy is no evidence unless proved by following the prescribed procedure. [Paras 20 - 23] Tharammel Peethambaran v. T. Ushakrishnan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 128 : 2026 INSC 134 : AIR 2026 SC 938

Section 63 - Admissibility of electronic records

Section 63(4) BSA - Supreme Court upholds constitutional validity of Section 63(4) BSA mandating certificate with hash value and expert certification for admissibility of secondary electronic evidence. Pune Bar Association v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 551

Evidence Act, 1872 – Section 65-B – Call Detail Records (CDRs) – Mode of Proof and Chain of Custody - The Supreme Court upheld the rejection of Call Detail Records (CDRs) filed by a Cyber Unit Police Officer who took printouts of data sent via email by telecom service providers and certified them under Section 65-B - Because the officer was merely a recipient and not the person having lawful control over the computer systems that generated the original records, he was incompetent to prove their contents - The prosecution's failure to examine the concerned Nodal Officers of the telecom companies or to produce the routing emails created a fatal gap in the chain of custody of the electronic data. [Paras 80, 81] State of Tamil Nadu v. Ponnusamy, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 519 : 2026 INSC 507

Section 65-B IEA [Section 63 of BSA, 2023] – Admissibility of Electronic Evidence (Call Detail Records) – Held that the certificate required under Section 65-B(4) is a condition precedent to the admissibility of electronic records. Oral evidence cannot substitute this mandatory requirement - Since the prosecution failed to prove the Section 65-B certificate, the CDRs indicating frequent contact between the accused were rendered inadmissible. [Relied on Anvar P.V. v. P.K. Basheer (2014) 10 SCC 473; Arjun Panditrao Khotkar v. Kailash Kushanrao Gorantyal (2020) 7 SCC 1; Paras 49-52] Pooranmal v. State of Rajasthan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 227 : 2026 INSC 217

Section 65-B IEA – Penal Code, 1860 – Sections 302/34 and 201 [Sections 103(1)/3(5) and 238 of BNS, 2023] – Circumstantial Evidence – Recovery of Articles – Call Detail Records (CDR) – Conviction based on circumstantial evidence – Requirements for conviction – Held that the "Panchsheel" principles governing circumstantial evidence - To sustain a conviction, the circumstances must be fully established and form a complete chain that excludes every possible hypothesis except the guilt of the accused - The mental distance between "may be guilty" and "must be guilty" is long and divides vague conjectures from sure conclusions. [Relied on harad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra (1984) 4 SCC 116; Paras 27-28] Pooranmal v. State of Rajasthan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 227 : 2026 INSC 217

Section 84 - Presumption as to powers-of-attorney

Section 85 IEA – Registration Act, 1908 – Section 33 – Presumption as to Power of Attorney – The presumption of valid execution and authentication under Section 85 of the Evidence Act or Section 33 of the Registration Act applies only when the original document or legally admitted secondary evidence is produced - In the absence of an original or properly adduced secondary evidence, it is impermissible to apply these sections to conclude the extent of authority granted to an agent. [Para 23] Tharammel Peethambaran v. T. Ushakrishnan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 128 : 2026 INSC 134 : AIR 2026 SC 938

Section 94 - Evidence of terms of contracts, grants and other dispositions of property reduced to form of document

Sections 91 and 92 IEA – Admissibility of Oral Evidence – Where the terms of a written registered document are clear and unambiguous, extrinsic evidence to ascertain the true intention of the parties is inadmissible - While oral evidence may be admissible to show a document is a "sham," the threshold for such a claim is extremely high and must be supported by strong evidence of surrounding circumstances, not subsequent conduct - Supreme Court suggested an urgent need for the Union and State Governments to digitize land records and registered documents using secure, tamper-proof technologies like Blockchain to minimize forgery and "clever drafting" that clogs the judicial system – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Prem Singh and Ors. vs. Birbal and Ors., (2006) 5 SCC 353; Rattan Singh and Ors. v. Nirmal Gill & Ors., (2021) 15 SCC 300; Gangabai w/o Rambilas Gilda (Smt.) vs. Chhabubai w/o Pukharajji Gandhi (Smt.), (1982) 1 SCC 4; Paras 35, 41-47, 76, 77] Hemalatha v. Tukaram, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 79 : 2026 INSC 82

Section 104 - Burden of proof

Evidence Act, 1872 – Section 101 & 102 – Burden of Proof – Allegation of fraud and misuse of fiduciary position – Power of Attorney – Held, the burden of establishing that transactions executed under registered General Powers of Attorney (GPAs) were not genuine sale transactions, but merely security arrangements for loans, rests upon the plaintiff/appellant - Mere allegations of fraud or misuse of fiduciary position are not sufficient unless supported by reliable and cogent evidence - Before the burden can shift onto the beneficiaries/respondents to establish their bona fides, the plaintiff is required to first establish foundational facts constituting fraud or fiduciary misuse - In the absence of documentary material substantiating the alleged loan transactions or repayment/discharge, the initial burden continues to remain upon the plaintiff. [Paras 45, 46] Mallika v. R. Nallathambi, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 534 : 2026 INSC 529

Evidence Act, 1872 — Sections 101, 102 — Burden of Proof — Declaratory Relief and Permanent Injunction In a suit seeking a permanent injunction, the burden of proof lies solely upon the plaintiff who asserts the facts. The plaintiff must succeed entirely on the strength of their own case and cannot receive any strength from the weakness or deficiency of the defendant's case. A court cannot shift the onus of proof until the plaintiff has first discharged their legal obligation to establish a clear and sustainable claim. [Paras 32, 33, 34] A.P. State Wakf Board v. Janaki Busappa, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 423 : 2026 INSC 413

Section 106. Burden of proof as to particular fact

Evidence Act, 1872 – Sections 103 and 114(g) – Adverse Inference – Non-production of Best Evidence – Where a party in possession of the "best evidence" (in this case, an unregistered sale deed) withholds it from the Court, an adverse inference must be drawn against them - Supreme Court has no responsibility to compel the party to produce such documents. [Relied on Union of India v. Jahangir Byramji Jeejeebhoy, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 489; Gurnam Singh v. Surjit Singh, (1975) 4 SCC 404; Ajay Kumar D. Amin v. Air France, (2016) 12 SCC 566; Paras 13-19] Hari Ram v. State of Rajasthan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 372 : 2026 INSC 350

Section 109. Burden of proving fact especially within knowledge.

Evidence Act, 1872 — Section 106 — Burden of proving fact especially within knowledge — Matrimonial Home Death — Circumstantial Evidence — Appeal against the concurrent findings of the Trial Court and High Court convicting the appellant-husband under Sections 302 and 201 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, for the murder of his wife - The deceased died an unnatural death inside her matrimonial home - The prosecution's case rested entirely on circumstantial evidence - The medical reports and autopsy indicated the cause of death as "asphyxia due to strangulation" based on a fractured hyoid bone and trachea, a fresh bruise mark on the cheek, and multiple ligature marks - A critical circumstance relied upon was that the deceased's left earring, right leg anklet, and toe rings were missing—articles unlikely to be displaced in a case of suicide by hanging - The appellant set up a defense of suicide based on a recovered chit (suicide note) - handwriting experts and evidence established that the chit was forcibly written by the accused prior to the strangulation - The appellant also failed to explain why, after being told by the first doctor that the victim was dead, he rushed her to another private clinic instead of a civil hospital – Held that the death occurred under suspicious circumstances inside the matrimonial home where the appellant-husband resided with the deceased - This fact was within the special knowledge of the appellant under Section 106 of the Evidence Act - The appellant utterly failed to provide any justifiable or plausible explanation to discharge this statutory burden - When a case rests on circumstantial evidence, the failure of the accused to offer a reasonable explanation under Section 106 provides an additional link to the chain of circumstances established by the prosecution - The prosecution successfully established a complete, unbroken chain of circumstances pointing unerringly to the guilt of the appellant - No interference is warranted under Article 136 of the Constitution of India against concurrent findings of fact. Appeal dismissed. [Relied on Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra, (1984) 4 SCC 116; Nagendra Sah v. State of Bihar, (2021) 10 SCC 725; Mulakh Raj and Others v. Satish Kumar and Others, (1992) 3 SCC 43; Paras 16, 19 - 26] Chetan Dashrath Gade v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 526 : 2026 INSC 522

Evidence Act, 1872 – Section 106 & Section 114 – Burden of Proof & Special Knowledge in Interpersonal Relationships – Applicability of Section 106 to private moments within a romantic relationship – Held: The "especial knowledge" contemplated under Section 106 is not confined strictly to physical spaces (like a domestic house) - It extends to intimate interpersonal relationships where only the accused and the victim are privy to conversations and transactions - Once the foundational fact of a long-term physical relationship is established by the prosecution, the court can draw reasonable inferences under Section 114 regarding human conduct - The burden then shifts to the accused to provide an explanation or an alternate version of facts within his special knowledge - A generalized, studied silence or a stock reply of "false evidence" during Section 313 CrPC examination fails to discharge this burden or create reasonable doubt against an otherwise unimpeached, credible testimony of the prosecutrix. [Relied on Anees v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2024) 15 SCC 48 and Shivaji Chintappa Patil v. State of Maharashtra, (2021) 5 SCC 626; Paras 62, 63, 66, 68, & 81] Vijayakumar v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 531 : 2026 INSC 525

Section 116 - Birth during marriage, conclusive proof of legitimacy.

Section 116 BSA / Evidence Act, 1872 – Section 112 – Paternity – Presumption of Legitimacy vs. Scientific Proof – DNA Test Report Already on Record and Finalized – Effect of – Held - The statutory presumption of conclusive proof of legitimacy under Section 112 of the Evidence Act must yield to scientific proof where an accurate DNA test report is already available on record and has attained finality - While courts must generally exercise extreme caution and hesitation before ordering DNA tests to protect a child from the stigma of illegitimacy, the position changes when the test has already been conducted with the consent of the mother and remains undisputed - In such cases, the scientific fact overrides the legal presumption, and the alleged father cannot be held liable to pay maintenance to a child proven not to be his biological offspring - Held that when a conflict arises between a conclusive proof envisaged under law and a proof based on scientific advancement accepted by the world community to be correct, the latter must prevail over the former - This squarely covers cases where the DNA test report is already on record and contradicts the statutory presumption - Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, clarifying that since the DNA test had already been completed with the mother's consent and its findings were never disputed, the scientific truth must override the legal presumption under Section 112 of the Evidence Act - Expressing concern for the minor child's future, the Court additionally directed the Secretary of Women and Child Development, GNCTD, to monitor and ensure the child's well-being regarding education, healthcare, and nutrition - appeal dismissed. [Relied On: Nandlal Wasudeo Badwaik v. Lata Nandlal Badwaik, (2014) 2 SCC 576; Paras 7-10] Nikhat Parveen @ Khusboo Khatoon v. Rafique @ Shillu, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 406 : 2026 INSC 399

Section 118 - Presumption as to dowry death

Section 118 BSA — Parameters for Granting Bail in Serious Offenses — The Supreme Court emphasized that while considering a bail application in cases of dowry death, the High Court must consider: (i) the nature of the crime; (ii) the prescribed punishment; (iii) the relationship between the parties; (iv) the place of incident; (v) the postmortem report; and (vi) the statutory presumption of commission of offense – Held that under Section 118 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023, if a woman is subjected to cruelty or harassment for dowry soon before her death, the Court shall presume the person caused the dowry death. [Paras 15-20] Chetram Verma v. State of U.P., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 141

Section 119 - Court may presume existence of certain facts.

Evidence Act, 1872 – Section 114(g) – Adverse Inference – Non-examination of a party – Held, where serious allegations of fraud, forgery of receipts, misuse of signed blank papers, and collusive transfers are levelled, and the party possessing special knowledge of facts fails to enter the witness box, an adverse inference may legitimately be drawn against such party. [Paras 48, 49] Mallika v. R. Nallathambi, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 534 : 2026 INSC 529

Section 138 - Accomplice evidence

Evidence Act, 1872 — Section 133 r/w. 114, Illustration (b) — Accomplice/Approver Testimony — Worthiness of Credit and Prudence of Corroboration - The combined result of Section 133 and Illustration (b) to Section 114 is that an accomplice is a competent witness, and a conviction based on uncorroborated testimony is not illegal per se - as a rule of prudence, courts require corroboration in material particulars to safely connect the accused with the crime - The corroboration need not be direct and can be circumstantial, nor must it confirm every single material fact independently Creditworthiness is evaluated cumulatively, the approver must not be a planted witness, their testimony must be intrinsically natural, and it must be inculpatory rather than exculpatory - If the disclosure is complete and inspires confidence, it cannot be discarded merely because the approver did not inflict the fatal blow or implicate himself to the exact same extent as the other co-accused. [Paras 24 - 36] Gopi Chand @ Pappu v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 609 : 2026 INSC 598

Section 142 - Examination of witnesses

Ocular Evidence vs. Unnatural Conduct – held that the testimony of related witnesses (brother, son, and nephews of the deceased) could not be discarded merely because they failed to intervene or take the victim to the hospital after the shooting - Such "unnatural behavior" does not invalidate their evidence when consistent with other facts, such as the established political rivalry and the forensic evidence of multiple gunshot wounds. [Paras 11 - 15] Dablu v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 238 : 2026 INSC 224 : AIR 2026 SC 1319

Evidence Act, 1872 — Witness Testimony — Credibility of Injured Eyewitness vs. Related/Chance Witness - Appreciation of Evidence — Injured Witness Credibility - The credibility of an injured eyewitness is a tad higher than an ordinary eyewitness who has merely seen the incident, as the very fact that the witness suffered an injury in the same transaction adds to its trustworthiness - when the prosecution projects certain individuals as 'injured eyewitnesses' but fails to produce any medical corroboration (such as a wound certificate or hospital intimation) to prove the injuries allegedly sustained during the transaction, their greater credibility is completely lost - Such an unproved assertion reduces them below the status of a chance witness and casts serious doubt on their very presence at the place of occurrence - while related witnesses cannot always be labeled as interested witnesses, their natural presence together on a public road cannot be presumed without explicit, credible evidence. [Paras 13 - 17] Sadek Ali @ Md. Sadek Ali v. State of Assam, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 435 : 2026 INSC 421

Section 157 - Question by party to his own witness.

Witness Testimony – Hostile Witnesses – The testimony of "hostile" independent witnesses cannot be discarded in toto - Supreme Court must consider parts of the testimony that are creditworthy and corroborated by other evidence, such as the Trap Laying Officer's account and the recovery of marked currency. [Relied on Neeraj Dutta v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi), (2023) 4 SCC 731; Prakash Chand v. State (Delhi Administration), (1979) 3 SCC 90; State of Bihar v. Basawan Singh, AIR 1958 SC 500; Himachal Pradesh Administration v. Shri Om Prakash, (1972) 1 SCC 249; Paras 15-30] Central Bureau of Investigation v. Baljeet Singh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 228 : 2026 INSC 221

Criminal Evidence – Testimony of Hostile Witness – Evidentiary Value for Acquittal – The Supreme Court ruled that just as the dependable part of a hostile witness's testimony can be used to convict an accused if corroborated by reliable evidence, the reverse is also true - The testimony or statement in the deposition of a hostile witness can be properly employed to discredit the prosecution's case and support a conclusion of acquittal, especially when it inspires credibility and aligns with other evidence on record to cast serious doubt on the occurrence of the incident - Held: The evidence of a hostile witness does not get completely washed off the record - If such evidence discredits the very fulcrum and genesis of the prosecution's story (such as the holding of a village panchayat or the presence of eyewitnesses), and is supported by unexplained medical discrepancies and a failure to examine independent public witnesses at a busy crime scene, the benefit of the doubt must go to the accused - The concurrent convictions by the Trial Court and High Court were set aside, and the appellant was acquitted. [Relied on Ghulam Hassan Beigh vs. Mohammad Maqbool Magrey and Others, (2022) 12 SCC 657; Bhaskarrao and Others vs. State of Maharashtra, (2018) 6 SCC 591; Koli Lakhmanbhai Chanabhai vs. State of Gujarat, (1999) 8 SCC 624; Himanshu alias Chintu vs. State (NCT of Delhi), (2011) 2 SCC 36; Paras 6-10] Talari Naresh v. State of Telangana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 496 : 2026 INSC 486

Border Security Force Act, 1968

Border Security Force Act, 1968; Section 40, 48(1)(c) and 50 — Dismissal from Service — National Security — Proportionality of Punishment — The Supreme Court upheld the dismissal of a BSF Sub-Inspector with 36 years of service who was convicted of facilitating illegal cattle smuggling at the Indo-Bangladesh border - Noted that when national security is paramount, infractions by officers manning the borders cannot be viewed lightly - held that under Section 50 of the BSF Act, 1968, a Security Force Court is permitted to impose a composite sentence, including both imprisonment and dismissal, as contemplated under Section 48(1)(c). Bhagirath Choudhary v. Border Security Force, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 165

Building

Building Bye-Laws and Land-Use Regulations — Unauthorized Construction and Commercial Misuse of Residential Areas — Pan-India Inquiry — The Supreme Court expressed grave concern over the "alarming state of affairs" where a G+1 floor building was constructed without any approved sanction plan, suggesting collusion and connivance of Municipal Authorities - Supreme Court noted widespread and blatant violations of building bye-laws and land-use regulations, specifically the conversion of residential colonies into commercial areas, which causes significant prejudice to bona fide residents and serious environmental consequences. Loganathan v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 325

Campus Suicide

Campus Suicide – Mandatory registration of FIR – Higher Educational Institutions (HEIs) - Institutional Responsibility vs. Student Autonomy - Mandatory Directions under Article 142 - The Supreme Court addressed the alarming rise in student suicides across Higher Educational Institutions (HEIs) in India - Recognized student suicide as the "visible tip of a much larger iceberg of student distress," Supreme Court noted that the legal and moral obligation of educational authorities to create safe, inclusive, and nurturing environments - Supreme Court reviewed an interim report by a National Task Force (NTF) and issued several mandatory directions under Article 142 of the Constitution to address structural, social, and academic stressors - Key Legal Issues & Rulings held – i. Mandatory Registration of F.I.R. for Campus Suicides – Noted that educational institutions have an unequivocal legal obligation to promptly lodge an F.I.R. with appropriate authorities if an incident of suicide occurs on campus - This follows the clarification of law regarding mandatory registration of F.I.R.s in the event of disclosure of a cognizable offence; ii. Institutional Responsibility vs. Student Autonomy - Supreme Court criticized the tendency of HEIs to "shift the blame" onto the individual autonomy of the deceased student to avoid institutional responsibility - held that HEIs cannot shirk their fundamental duty to ensure institutions are safe and conducive spaces for learning; iii. Mandatory Directions under Article 142 - Data Maintenance: SRS data on suicides for the 15-29 age group must be centrally maintained - The NCRB must distinguish between school-going and higher education students in its reports; iv. Reporting Protocol - HEIs must report all student suicides or unnatural deaths (on or off-campus) to police immediately - Annual reports of such incidents must be submitted to regulatory bodies like UGC, NMC, BCI, etc; v. Faculty Vacancies - All vacant faculty positions, with priority to reserved categories (SC/ST/OBC/PwD), must be filled within four months; vi. Scholarship Disbursements: Pending scholarship backlogs must be cleared within four months - HEIs are strictly prohibited from barring students from exams or hostels due to administrative delays in scholarship disbursals; vii. Regulatory Compliance - HEIs must strictly adhere to UGC regulations concerning Ragging (2009), Equity (2012), Sexual Harassment (2016), and Grievance Redressal (2023); viii. Accessibility and Mental Health - Supreme Court mandated accessibility audits for marginalized groups (PwDs and Transgender students) and emphasized the need for student-friendly mental health services provided by qualified professionals rather than untrained faculty members. [Relied on Sukdeb Saha v. The State of Andhra Pradesh, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1515; Paras 19-39; 44, 45] Amit Kumar v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 56 : 2026 INSC 62

Census

Census - Supreme Court declines to direct separate enumeration of Denotified, Nomadic and Semi-Nomadic Tribes (DNT) in Census – Matter held to be in policy domain, not justiciable - The classification/sub-classification sought in the census enumeration process is a policy decision falling exclusively within the domain of the competent executive authorities of the Union of India and is not a justiciable issue before the Court. - The Court granted liberty to the petitioners to make appropriate representations before the concerned executive authorities. The Bench observed that India should strive towards a casteless society rather than creating more and more classifications and divisions in society. The Court noted that such demands involve “very calculated moves” and expressed caution regarding deep-rooted attempts to further divide society. Dakxinkumar Bajrange v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 312

Central Civil Services (Pension) Rules, 1972

Central Civil Services (Pension) Rules, 1972 – Rule 69(1)(c) – Withholding of Gratuity during pendency of proceedings – Interpretation of "Departmental or Judicial proceedings" – Held: Rule 69(1)(c) operates as a statutory bar or "embargo" on the payment of gratuity - The use of the disjunctive "or" in the provision indicates that gratuity shall not be paid so long as either departmental or judicial proceedings are pending against the government servant - The appellant's contention that gratuity becomes payable upon the conclusion of any one set of proceedings (e.g., exoneration in departmental inquiry while criminal trial is pending) is rejected as it would defeat the purpose of safeguarding the financial interests of the State. Bikram Chand Rana v. Himachal Pradesh Road Transport Corporation, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 344 : 2026 INSC 326

Central Civil Services (Pension) Rules, 1972 – Rule 9(1) – Right to withhold or withdraw pension – Interplay with Rule 69 – Held: Rule 9 is "downstream" in its operation - It applies at the stage where an employee has been found guilty of grave misconduct - It cannot be invoked to justify the release of gratuity during the interregnum of pending proceedings on the premise that recovery could be effected later if a conviction occurs. Bikram Chand Rana v. Himachal Pradesh Road Transport Corporation, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 344 : 2026 INSC 326

Central Excise Act, 1944

Central Excise Act, 1944 – Section 2(f) – Burden of Proof and Standard of Proof for Marketability – The burden of establishing that a transformed product is "marketable" or "capable of being marketed" lies entirely on the Revenue - Marketability is a question of fact that must be proved through objective evidence of trade parlance and commercial understanding, showing that the product can stand independently in the market as a distinct article - A mere assertion, a hypothetical possibility of sale, or the mistaken past conduct of an assessee paying duty under a bona fide error cannot discharge this burden - The standard of proof to be met by the Revenue is that of preponderance of probabilities, calibrated proportionately to the nature, rarity, or character of the specific goods in question. [Relied on Navin Chemicals Manufacturing & Trading Co. Ltd. v. Collector of Customs, (1993) 4 SCC 320; Servo-Med Industries (P) Ltd. v. CCE, (2015) 14 SCC 47; Union of India v. Delhi Cloth & General Mills Co. Ltd., 1962 SCC OnLine SC 148; Moti Laminates (P) Ltd. v. CCE, (1995) 3 SCC 23 ; Paras 84-95] Alupro Building Systems Pvt. Ltd v. Commissioner of Central Excise Bangalore-II, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 599 : 2026 INSC 582

Central Excise Act, 1944 – Section 2(f) – Definition of "Manufacture" – Two-fold Test – Transformation and Marketability – Process of cutting, grooving (routing), and bending Aluminum Composite Panels (ACPs) to specific sizes for installation on building facades does not amount to "manufacture" – What enters the process is an ACP consisting of two aluminum sheets bonded to a polyethylene core, and what emerges is still an ACP cut to a particular size – The essential character, material properties, and commercial identity of the goods remain entirely unchanged – The process merely adapts the dimensions and shape of the panels to facilitate their specific use or installation as cladding, which amounts to superficial changes rather than a transformation into a distinct commercial product. [Paras 65 - 76] Alupro Building Systems Pvt. Ltd v. Commissioner of Central Excise Bangalore-II, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 599 : 2026 INSC 582

Central Excise Act, 1944 – Section 35G(1) and Section 35L(1)(b) – Appellate Jurisdiction of High Court vs. Supreme Court – Dispute on Excisability of Goods – An appeal involving the determination of the taxability or excisability of goods goes to the root of assessment and is intrinsically connected with the "rate of duty" - Under Section 35G(1), the High Court's appellate jurisdiction explicitly excludes orders relating to the determination of any question having a relation to the rate of duty of excise or the value of goods for the purpose of assessment - the appropriate remedy against an order of the Appellate Tribunal determining the excisability of a product lies exclusively before the Supreme Court under Section 35L, and not the High Court. [Paras 19-38] Alupro Building Systems Pvt. Ltd v. Commissioner of Central Excise Bangalore-II, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 599 : 2026 INSC 582

Central Excise Act, 1944 – Section 35L(2) [as inserted by the Finance (No. 2) Act, 2014] – Nature of Amendment – Clarificatory and Retrospective Application – Sub-section (2) of Section 35L, which explicitly states that the determination of any question having relation to the rate of duty shall include the determination of taxability or excisability of goods, is clarificatory and declaratory in nature - It does not create new liabilities or a new right of appeal, but merely makes explicit what was already implicit in the structural scheme of Sections 35G and 35L - the presumption against retrospectivity does not apply, and the amendment operates retrospectively. [Paras 43-53] Alupro Building Systems Pvt. Ltd v. Commissioner of Central Excise Bangalore-II, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 599 : 2026 INSC 582

Central Excise Act, 1944 – Section 11A(1) Proviso – Extended Period of Limitation – Suppression of Facts – Revenue Neutrality – The Revenue invoked the extended period of five years alleging suppression of actual use of Naphtha - held that "suppression" requires a deliberate act to escape payment of duty - Where the assessee is a Public Sector Undertaking receiving subsidies from the Central Government, any excise duty paid would be reimbursed as a subsidy, making the entire exercise "revenue neutral" - In cases of revenue neutrality where no benefit is derived by the assessee from evading duty, the extended period of limitation cannot be invoked. [Relied on Steel Authority of India v. Collector of Central Excise (1996) 5 SCC 484; State of Haryana v. Dalmia Dadri Cement Limited 1987 Supp SCC 679; Pushpam Pharmaceuticals Company v. Collector of Central Excise (1995) Supp 3 SCC 462; Nirlon Limited v. Chief Commissioner of Excise (2015) 14 SCC 798; Paras 38-45, 52-54, 56-58] Rashtriya Chemicals and Fertilizers Ltd. v. Commissioner of Central Excise and Service Tax, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 295 : 2026 INSC 285

Central Excise Act, 1944 – Section 5A – Exemption Notifications (No. 75/84-CE and No. 4/97-CE) – Naphtha used in the manufacture of Fertilizer – Interpretation of "Intended Use" – The Supreme Court held that when an exemption notification is conditioned on the "intended use" of a product, the benefit is attracted if the goods are used for the purpose and with the intention of manufacturing the specified product (fertilizer/ammonia) – Noted that the mere fact that a fraction of the procured Naphtha was used for generating electricity (steam), a portion of which was used in a chemical plant or supplied to the electricity board, does not disentitle the assessee from the exemption - Once eligibility for exemption is established, the notification must be construed liberally. Rashtriya Chemicals and Fertilizers Ltd. v. Commissioner of Central Excise and Service Tax, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 295 : 2026 INSC 285

Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017

Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 — Sections 2(31), 2(52), 7, 9, And 15 — Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017 — Rule 31a, Rule 31b, And Rule 31c — Constitution of India — Article 246a Read With Entry 34 of List II — Online Gaming, Fantasy Sports, And Casinos — Taxability Of Stakes As Betting And Gambling - Key Issues Decided – i. Characterization of Games of Skill played with Stakes - Whether placing monetary stakes on games predominantly involving skill (such as Rummy or Fantasy Sports) alters the nature of the transaction to fall within the ambit of "Betting and Gambling" under the GST/Constitutional framework; ii. Relevance of Skill vs. Chance in Taxing Framework - Whether the distinction between games of skill and games of chance pales into insignificance once the element of betting or staking money on an uncertain outcome enters the activity - Held by the Supreme Court – a. Staking Transforms Activity into Betting and Gambling - Once money or money's worth is risked or staked upon an uncertain outcome, the activity inherently acquires the character of betting and gambling - This holds true irrespective of whether the underlying game is categorized as a game of skill, a game of chance, or a combination of both, as the intrinsic nature of the underlying game loses significance for regulatory and fiscal purposes once a staking arrangement is introduced; b. Betting and Gambling as Interchangeable Cognate Expressions - The expressions "betting" and "gambling" are interchangeable and cognate terms that cannot be artificially split or rewritten as "betting on gambling" - Both terms fundamentally encompass the act of staking money on an unknown and uncertain future victory or outcome; c. Online Rummy and Fantasy Sports with Stakes constitute Betting - While the underlying formats of games like online Rummy or Fantasy Sports may involve elements of expertise or skill, playing or organizing them with real money stakes open to the general public constitutes a betting enterprise - The participants are effectively forecasting an unknown future event (victory) to win a pool directly linked to the staked amounts; d. Definition of Gaming Includes Skill and Chance for Money - Relying on established jurisprudence, "gaming" is judicially defined as playing any game, whether of skill or chance, for money or money's worth - The act does not cease to be gaming merely because the underlying game requires a substantial degree of skill. [Relied on M.J. Sivani and Others v. State of Karnataka and Others (1995) 6 SCC 289; Clarified State of Bombay v. R.M.D. Chamarbaugwala (RMDC-I) 1957 SCR 870; R.M.D. Chamarbaugwala v. Union of India (RMDC-II) 1957 SCR 930; Distinguished from K.R. Lakshmanan v. State of Tamil Nadu (1996) 2 SCC 226; Paras 66-86] Directorate General of Goods and Services Tax Intelligence Hqs v. Gameskraft Technologies, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 572 : 2026 INSC 595

Central Sales Tax Act, 1956

Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 – Inapplicability of the Public Trust Doctrine to Fiscal Claims and Tax Situs - The Public Trust Doctrine is rooted in environmental jurisprudence (Articles 21, 48A, and 51A(g)) to ensure normative standards of resource management by the State as a trustee - It cannot be extended beyond its avowed purpose to serve as an instrument to override the constitutional scheme of legislative competence or to artificially create a local taxing jurisdiction for a State in clear breach of constitutional limitations under Articles 269 and 286. [Relied on Tata Iron and Steel Co. Limited v. S.R. Sarkar & Ors., 1960 SCC OnLine SC 106; State of Andhra Pradesh v. National Thermal Power Corporation, (2002) 5 SCC 203; Manganese Ore (India) Ltd. v. The Regional Assistant Commissioner of Sales Tax, Jabalpur, (1976) 4 SCC 124; Sedco Forex International Drill. Inc. and Ors. v. CIT, Dehradun & Anr., (2005) 12 SCC 717; Sree Sankaracharya University of Sanskrit & Ors. v. Dr. Manu & Anr., (2023) 19 SCC 30; Para 88] State of Uttar Pradesh v. Reliance Industries, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 502 : 2026 INSC 491

Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 – Nature and Scope of Explanation 3 to Section 3 of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 - Explanation 3 to Section 3 of the CST Act (introduced vide Act 28 of 2016) is purely clarificatory and curative in nature, inserted ex abundanti cautela to formalize the pre-existing situation - It did not alter the existing understanding or create a new regime but explicitly codified the pre-existing legal position that the movement of gas through a common carrier pipeline from one State to another, despite co-mingling, is deemed an inter-State movement - Being clarificatory, the argument that it applies only prospectively is misplaced and rejected. [Paras 61 - 66] State of Uttar Pradesh v. Reliance Industries, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 502 : 2026 INSC 491

Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 – Priority of Section 3 over Section 4 of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 - Section 4 of the CST Act is expressly made subject to Section 3 of the Act. Even if a sale is fictionally deemed to have taken place "inside" a particular State under the situs tests of Section 4(2) (based on the place of appropriation of unascertained or future goods), if that sale simultaneously occasions the movement of goods across State borders, Section 3 takes precedence and overrides Section 4 - The State cannot tax it as a purely local (intra-State) sale under its general sales tax laws once the transaction fulfills the conditions of an inter-State trade under Section 3. [Para 71-83] State of Uttar Pradesh v. Reliance Industries, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 502 : 2026 INSC 491

Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 – Relevance of Co-mingling and Fungibility in Common Carrier Transportation - The physical co-mingling of natural gas with the gas of other parties in a common transport or distribution pipeline does not affect or alter the inter-State character of the transaction - The subsequent physical blending and re-metering at the destination are mere incidents of transportation attendant upon a sale already fully concluded at the delivery point in the originating State where the title and risk had passed. [Paras 81, 85] State of Uttar Pradesh v. Reliance Industries, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 502 : 2026 INSC 491

Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 – Sections 3 & 4 – Uttar Pradesh Value Added Tax Act, 2008 – Section 7 – Inter-State Sale vs. Intra-State Sale – Common Carrier Pipeline – Co-mingling of Gas – Natural gas was extracted off-shore in Andhra Pradesh, metered and delivered to buyers' designated transporters at Gadimoga (A.P.) under Gas Sales and Purchase Agreements (GSPA) – Title and risk passed to buyers at the delivery point in Andhra Pradesh – The gas was thereafter transported through common carrier pipelines across States to buyers' factories in Uttar Pradesh – The State of Uttar Pradesh levied local VAT treating the transaction as an intra-State sale, on the grounds that the gas moved in a co-mingled, fungible form through a common carrier pipeline and was ascertained only upon re-metering at the consumers' premises in U.P. – Dismissing the State's appeals, the Supreme Court held that once a sale occasions the movement of goods from one State to another pursuant to a pre-existing contract of sale, it constitutes an inter-State sale under Section 3(a) of the CST Act. [Paras 81-83] State of Uttar Pradesh v. Reliance Industries, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 502 : 2026 INSC 491

Certified Copy

Certified Copy - The Supreme Court has reiterated that a statutory appeal cannot be entertained without a certified copy of the impugned judgment. Central Bank of India v. Bijendra Kumar Jha, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 273

Cinema Law

Cinema Law - The Supreme Court dismissed a writ petition seeking a stay on release of the film “Yadav Ji ki Love Story”, holding that the title of the movie does not portray the Yadav community in a negative manner. A bench of Justice BV Nagarathna and Justice Ujjal Bhuyan noted that the title did not contain any adjective or word that attached any negative meaning to the community. Awdesh Kumar Yadav v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 215

Civil Law

Civil Law – Hereditary Pujari Rights – Suit for Possession – Effect of Withdrawing Previous Suit – The Appellants claimed hereditary pujariki (priest) rights based on a 1901 decree - noted that the Appellants' predecessor had filed a subsequent suit specifically seeking possession of the temple and an injunction - This subsequent filing constituted a categorical admission that the Appellants were not in possession at that time - held that a party in settled possession does not sue for possession - the Appellants withdrew the 1944 suit with liberty to file a fresh one but failed to do so for 36 years, leading to an "inevitable inference" that they had reconciled with the factual reality of not having possession. [Paras 18–20] Ogeppa v. Sahebgouda, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 198 : 2026 INSC 191

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908

Civil Procedure & Precedents – Finality of Civil Court Decrees – Scope of Appellate Review - The Division Bench of the High Court was not justified in rendering observations to virtually unsettle a permanent injunction decree passed by a Civil Court way back in 1988, which had already attained finality after the Municipal Corporation's subsequent appeals were dismissed - The scope of adjudication before the Division Bench should have been strictly confined to the direction given by the learned Single Judge namely, to consider the prayer for incorporation of the plot in the layout plan and nothing beyond that. [Paras 24-34] Pawan Garg v. South Delhi Municipal Corporation, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 397 : 2026 INSC 389

Civil Suit - A plaintiff seeking declaration of title and injunction must succeed on the strength of their own case and cannot derive any benefit from the alleged weakness of the defendant's title. Hari Shankar Jain v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 313

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Interconnected Proceedings – Independent Remedies – Multiple proceedings pending including a parent writ petition, an intra-court appeal (LPA), and a civil revision (CR) – Held: Overlap between proceedings is not the same as identity - Unless there is a statutory interdict, maintainable remedies should not be rendered dormant for an indefinite period awaiting the outcome of a broader challenge - Directed the High Court to decide the LPA and CR together on their own merits, independently of the parent writ petition. [Relied on Mumbai International Airport Private Limited v. Regency Convention Centre and Hotels Private Limited (2010) 7 SCC 417; Paras 7-15] Chopra Hotels v. Harbinder Singh Sekhon, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 352 : 2026 INSC 335

Civil Procedure – Practice and Procedure – Deficiency in Pleadings raised in Appeal - Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Pleadings – Deficiency raised for the first time in appeal – Where the pleadings in substance contain the necessary averments, and the parties went to trial fully conscious of the case and the issues, leading evidence thereon, it is not open to a party to raise the question of deficiency or absence of specific pleadings in appeal. [Para 41] Marietta D' Silva v. Rudolf Clothan Lacerda, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 503 : 2026 INSC 496

Civil Procedure – Practice and Procedure – Taking Cognizance of Subsequent Events - Subsequent developments – Power of the Court to take note of subsequent events – While relief is ordinarily judged based on the date of institution of the suit, the Court can, and in many cases must, take cautious cognizance of subsequent events and developments to ensure the remedy matches current realities, provided rules of fairness are scrupulously observed. [Para 47] Marietta D' Silva v. Rudolf Clothan Lacerda, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 503 : 2026 INSC 496

Civil Suit for Declaration of Title and Possession — Burden of Proof — Management vs. Ownership — Shifts of Burden — In a suit for declaration of title and restoration of possession, the burden of proof lies squarely upon the plaintiff to establish a clear and cogent title to the suit property on the strength of their own case, and not on the weakness of the defense - The mere fact that a society exercises certain supervisory or managerial functions over a temple, participates in the appointment of pujaris (priests/caretakers), or maintains periodic control over temple articles does not ipso facto confer proprietary title or ownership of immovable property upon it - The distinction between the management of a religious institution and the ownership of its properties is well-recognized in law, and the two cannot be conflated - Even if the defendant fails to conclusively establish their claim of independent title or hereditary succession, such an infirmity does not enure to the benefit of the plaintiff - The plaintiff must independently discharge the burden under Sections 101, 102, and 110 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 by producing legally admissible documents of title, deeds of dedication, or endowments evidencing ownership - Courts below cannot misdirect themselves in law by shifting the focus from the requirement of proof of title onto the weaknesses of the defense. [Relied on Union of India v. Vasavi Co-op. Housing Society Ltd., (2014) 2 SCC 269; Paras 12 - 19] Kishan Chand v. Gautam Gaur Hitkarak Sabha, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 463 : 2026 INSC 448

Section 2 - Definitions.

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) – Section 2(2), Order XX Rule 18 – Partition Suit – Executability of Decree – Execution of Preliminary Decree without drawing a formal Final Decree – Distinction between Preliminary and Final Decree - The Supreme Court observed that the fundamental error in the High Court's appreciation was that it proceeded solely on the nomenclature assigned to the Decree - A decree can be both preliminary and final, or partly preliminary and partly final - Where a decree determines the entitlement or right to possession, fixes mesne profits, and provides a specific alternate mechanism (such as sale/auction) if physical division by metes and bounds is reported to be impossible, the direction to file a fresh application for a separate final decree is completely unwarranted - Supreme Court emphasized that once a preliminary decree is passed, the trial court should proceed for drawing up the final decree suo motu and there is no need to file a separate final decree proceeding - where the Advocate Commissioner reported that the small flat was unavailable for division by metes and bounds, the executing court was well within its jurisdiction to proceed with the bidding process and auction of the subject matter - High Court's order setting aside the execution proceedings on the rigid technicality that a final decree was a sine qua non for execution was set aside. [Relied on Shankar Balwant Lokhande v. Chandrakant Shankar Lokhande, (1995) 3 SCC 413; Bimal Kumar v. Shakuntala Debi, (2012) 3 SCC 548 (Paragraph 13); Kattukandi Edathil Krishnan v. Kattukandi Edathil Valsan, (2022) 16 SCC 7; Paras 14 - 17] Jennifer Messias v. Leonard G Lobo, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 513 : 2026 INSC 502

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Section 2(9), Order XIV Rule 1, Order XX Rule 4(2) – Requirements of a valid judgment in ex parte proceedings – Framing of Issues vs. Points for Determination – Held: Although framing of formal issues is not mandatory under Order XIV Rule 1(6) where the defendant makes no defense, the court is still obligated to deliver a "judgment" as defined under Section 2(9) - A valid judgment must contain a concise statement of the case, the points for determination, the decision thereon, and the reasons for such decision as per Order XX Rule 4(2) - Simply granting a decree on default without resolving the controversy through reasoned findings constitutes a "material irregularity". Pramod Shroff v. Mohan Singh Chopra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 384 : 2026 INSC 378

Section 11 - Res judicata

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 — Section 11, Explanation VI — Joint Defense — Same Title — Where multiple defendants collectively resist a partition suit, share a common interest, defend the same partition deed, and assert an identical plea against the plaintiffs, they litigate under the same title - An earlier final order passed against some of the defendants binds the remaining co-defendants or their legal representatives - They cannot escape the bar of res judicata merely because their specific predecessor was not the applicant in the first round. [Paras 37-70] B.S. Lalitha v. Bhuvanesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 506 : 2026 INSC 499

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Section 11, Explanation IV — Constructive Res Judicata — The principle of constructive res judicata applies to matters which "might and ought" to have been made a ground of attack in former proceedings - An adjudication is conclusive not only as to actual matters determined but also as to every matter essentially connected with the subject matter of the litigation that the parties ought to have litigated – Held that High Court exceeded its jurisdiction by reassessing the entire factual matrix and interfering with concurrent findings of fact without demonstrating perversity.. Interference in a second appeal is limited to cases involving a "substantial question of law" and should not result in a "third trial on facts." [Relied on Gurbux Singh v. Bhooralal, AIR 1964 SC 1810; Paras 12-38] Channappa v. Parvatewwa, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 354 : 2026 INSC 343

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 — Section 11, Section 105(1), and Order II Rule 2 — Maintainability of Subsequent Suit — Res Judicata and Constructive Res Judicata — The Supreme Court set aside a High Court judgment that had decreed a second suit (Suit-II) for declaration of title and possession, which was filed while an appeal for a previous suit (Suit-I) for injunction and cancellation of an adoption deed was pending – Noted that that the failure to challenge an interlocutory order (specifically the rejection of an application under Order II Rule 2 CPC) at the time it is made does not preclude the party from questioning its correctness while appealing the final decree - The legislative scheme of Section 105(1) ensures that non-appealable interlocutory orders can be assailed in an appeal against the final decree unless a statute expressly mandates otherwise. Channappa v. Parvatewwa, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 354 : 2026 INSC 343

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Section 11 – Res Judicata – Dismissal at Threshold without Adjudication on Merits - Where an earlier application for cancellation of leases/pattas under Section 198(4) of the Abolition Act was dismissed at the threshold by the revenue authority on the sole ground that the execution of the leases had not been established/proved, without entering into the validity or legality of the pattas on merits, the principle of res judicata has no application to subsequent proceedings - For res judicata to apply, the issue must have been directly and substantially in issue and finally decided on merits in the previous proceeding. [Relied on Hinch Lal Tiwari vs. Kamala Devi and others (2001) 6 SCC 496; Jagpal Singh and others vs. State of Punjab and others (2011) 11 SCC 396; Paras 34, 35, 36] Babu Singh v. Consolidation Officer, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 405 : 2026 INSC 395

Sections 11, 151, and 152 CPC – Res Judicata between stages of the same proceeding – Clerical Errors – Once a High Court holds at an intermediate stage that an appeal has not abated because the deceased's interest is sufficiently represented, it cannot revisit and reverse this finding at a later stage of the same proceeding - Such a reversal is barred by the principle of res judicata - a typographical error in a court order directing the deletion of the original party instead of a deceased legal representative is a clerical mistake that can be corrected under Sections 151 and 152 of the CPC and should not be used to the disadvantage of a party. [Paras 41-44] Kishorilal v. Gopal, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 39 : 2026 INSC 48

Section 13 - When foreign judgment not conclusive.

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Section 13(b), (c), (d), and (f) – Refusal to Enforce Summary Foreign Judgment: Even if a foreign court (English Court) is a court of competent jurisdiction by contractual agreement, its summary judgment is unenforceable in India under Section 44A if it fails the substantive tests of Section 13 - Denying leave to defend where triable issues exist violates procedural fairness [Section 13(d)]; failing to consider binding statutory conditions imposed by Indian regulatory authorities attracts Section 13(c); and enforcing a liability in direct breach of those statutory conditions brings the decree within the prohibition of Section 13(f). [Paras 85, 86, 87] Messer Griesheim GMBH v. Goyal Gases Private Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 403 : 2026 INSC 401

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Section 13(b) – Foreign Judgment 'On Merits' vs. Summary Judgment - A foreign decree cannot be regarded as having been rendered "on the merits" within the meaning of Section 13(b) of the CPC if it is passed without any investigation into the substantive issues or where a party is foreclosed from a full opportunity to defend despite disclosing bona fide triable issues - Adjudication by way of a summary procedure, which refuses leave to defend in the face of highly contested facts and statutory contemporaneous documents (such as audited Balance Sheets under the Companies Act), amounts to a premature adjudication that denies a fair trial. [Paras 41, 46, 52-86] Messer Griesheim GMBH v. Goyal Gases Private Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 403 : 2026 INSC 401

Section 47 – Questions to be determined by the Court executing decree.

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Section 47 – Jurisdiction of Executing Court – Power to modify decree – Held: The Executing Court has no jurisdiction to go beyond the decree sought to be executed - It must execute the decree as it stands, without changing its terms or assuming the role of a trial court to substitute its own view - Even if the execution of certain portions of the land as per the decree is deemed "impracticable" due to unauthorized construction or third-party sales, these reasons are immaterial and do not authorize the Executing Court to alter the terms of a compromise decree. [Paras 24 - 30] Maurice W. Innis v. Lily Kazrooni @ Lily Arif Shaikh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 395 : 2026 INSC 340

Execution of Compromise Decree – Identity of Property – Held: Where a compromise decree clearly describes the portions of land falling into the shares of the parties, there is no dispute regarding identity - The Executing Court must strictly conform to the decree and ensure both parties fulfill their reciprocal obligations in pith and substance. [Relied on Vasudev Dhanjibhai Modi v. Rajabhai Abdul Rehman and Ors. (1970) 1 SCC 670; Sunder Dass v. Ram Prakash (1977) 2 SCC 662; Jai Narain Ram Lundia v. Kedar Nath Khetan and Ors. (1956) 1 SCC 75; Paras 27 – 30] Maurice W. Innis v. Lily Kazrooni @ Lily Arif Shaikh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 395 : 2026 INSC 340

Section 96 - Appeal from original decree

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Section 96 vs. Order IX Rule XIII – Distinct Jurisdictions – The scope of proceedings under Section 96 and Order IX Rule XIII CPC are distinct - Order IX Rule XIII confers a wider jurisdiction, allowing an applicant to demonstrate "sufficient cause" for non-appearance and seek the setting aside of an ex parte decree, even after the dismissal of an appeal – Appeal allowed. Deepesh Maheswari v. Renu Maheswari, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 317 : 2026 INSC 306

Section 100 - Second Appeal

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Second Appeal under Section 100 CPC – Reversal of Concurrent Decrees on Irrelevant Considerations – Substitution of Relief Without Prayer or Consent – Permissibility – Held that the High Court cannot set aside a concurrent decree for mandatory injunction and compel the plaintiffs to accept monetary compensation in the absence of any prayer for damages/compensation made by the plaintiff or consent given by their legal heirs - The High Court committed a grave error by reversing the well-reasoned decrees of the Trial Court and first Appellate Court to direct the Executing Court to assess the value of an illegal construction for monetary compensation - Such a course is entirely unsupported by Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, because once a decree is set aside, no executable decree remains in the field for the Executing Court to act upon - a Second Appeal cannot be disposed of by answering hypothetical questions in favor of the defendants without properly formulating and adjudicating actual substantial questions of law under Section 100 CPC - Impugned judgments set aside, and matters remanded to the High Court for fresh, expeditious disposal on merits - the Supreme Court explicitly held that modifying decrees and awarding monetary compensation without entering into the merits of the controversy or framing substantial questions of law is legally impermissible - The High Court's failure to adhere to this binding historical remand order in the same case structure forms the primary basis of the current reversal. [Relied on Rajat Kumar & Ors. v. S D Adarsh Jain Kanya Maha Vidyalaya Sadhaura & Ors. (Civil Appeal Nos. 8203 of 2013 and 8281 of 2013; Paras 5, 6] Rajat Kumar v. S.D. Adarsh Jain Kanya Maha Vidyalaya Sadhaura, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 637 : 2026 INSC 648

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Section 100 – Second Appeal – Scope of interference with concurrent findings –High Court is not justified in interfering with concurrent findings of fact unless such findings are shown to be perverse, based on no evidence, or suffering from material illegality or misreading of evidence - Merely because another possible view may arise from the same material on record does not justify interference under Section 100 CPC – noted that to emphasize that where two inferences are possible from a set of circumstances, the one drawn by the lower appellate court is binding on the High Court in second appeal. [Relied on Kondiba Dagadu Kadam v. Savitribai Sopan Gujar (1999) 3 SCC 722] A. Shahul Hameed v. N. Malligarjuna, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 604 : 2026 INSC 573

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 — Section 100 — Scope of Second Appeal — Interference with Findings of Fact - Findings of fact, howsoever erroneous or wrong, cannot be reopened, disturbed, or interfered with by the High Court in a second appeal under Section 100 CPC in the absence of a substantial question of law or a clear error of law, unless the findings stand completely vitiated for want of perversity. [Paras 30, 31-35] Russi Fisheries v. Bhavna Seth, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 402 : 2026 INSC 339

Section 100 CPC — Second Appeal — Interference with concurrent findings — Held that the High Court is justified in interfering with concurrent findings of fact in a second appeal if such findings are found to be perverse, contrary to the statutory framework, or based on a misapplication of settled legal principles - The absence of cogent evidence regarding the exact location and measurements of the disputed property renders a decree for mandatory injunction legally unsustainable - A suit filed by partners of an unregistered firm for the protection of property rights (common law action) rather than the enforcement of a contractual right is maintainable and not barred by Section 69. [Relied on Anathula Sudhakar v. P. Buchi Reddy (Dead) by LRs and Others, (2008) 4 SCC 594; Para 13, 24 - 27] Sanjay Paliwal v. Bharat Heavy Electricals Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 54 : 2026 INSC 61

Section 100 CPC – Second Appeal – Scope of Interference with Concurrent Findings of Fact – Possession and Injunction – The Supreme Court set aside a High Court judgment that had dismissed a suit for permanent prohibitory injunction despite concurrent findings of possession in favor of the appellant by the Trial Court and First Appellate Court – Noted that the High Court failed to frame a specific substantial question of law regarding the correctness or validity of the findings on possession returned by the lower courts - The Supreme Court held that interference with concurrent findings of fact under Section 100 CPC is permissible only on limited grounds, such as perversity, misreading of evidence, or consideration of inadmissible evidence. P. Elaiyappan v. Natarajan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 219

Sections 100 and 103 CPC – Jurisdiction of High Court in Second Appeal – Interference with Findings of Fact – Held that the High Court generally does not disturb findings of fact, it is well within its jurisdiction to interfere if such findings are perverse, based on no evidence, founded on conjectures, or result from a misconstruction of documents/inadmissible evidence - Relying on a photocopy (no evidence) to accept the existence of a power to alienate is an error of law that the High Court may rightly correct - Courts should not, by themselves, compare disputed signatures without the assistance of an expert, especially when the signatures used for comparison are not admitted signatures – Appeal dismissed. [Relied on Smt. J. Yashoda v. K. Shobha Rani (2007) 5 SCC 730; Jagmail Singh v. Karamjit Singh (2020) 5 SCC 178; O. Bharathan v. K. Sudhakaran (1996) 2 SCC 70; Para 23] Tharammel Peethambaran v. T. Ushakrishnan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 128 : 2026 INSC 134 : AIR 2026 SC 938

Section 114 - Review

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Section 114 & Order XLVII Rule 1 — Scope of Review — A review petition has a limited purpose and cannot be allowed to be an "appeal in disguise" - An error on the face of the record must be self-evident and strike the court immediately, without requiring a long-drawn process of reasoning where two opinions are conceivable - Perceived career insecurity or difficulties faced by teachers do not constitute a palpable error on the face of the record warranting a review of the final judgment. [Relied on Northern India Caterers (India) Ltd. v. State (UT of Delhi), (1980) 2 SCC 167; Bharti Airtel Ltd. v. A.S. Raghavendra, (2024) 6 SCC 418; Anjuman Ishaat-e-Taleem Trust v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1912; State of Nagaland v. Lipok AO, (2005) 3 SCC 752; Paras 15-34] State of UP v. Anjuman Ishaat-E-Taleem Trust, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 568 : 2026 INSC 597

Section 151 - Saving of inherent powers of Court

Sections 151 and 152 CPC – Scope of "Clarification" vs. Substantive Modification – High Courts cannot make substantive changes to the quantum of compensation or redistribute liability under the guise of a "clarification" application - Section 152 CPC is strictly confined to correcting clerical or arithmetical mistakes arising from accidental slips - Any modification affecting substantive rights amounts to a review in substance and must meet the requirements of Order XLVII CPC. Reliance General Insurance v. Kanika, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 196 : 2026 INSC 188 : AIR 2026 SC 1188

Order I - Parties to Suits

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Impleadment of Parties – Necessary and Proper Party – Article 226 of the Constitution of India – Order I Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Appeal against High Court order dismissing impleadment application in a writ petition challenging the Punjab Unified Building Rules, 2025 – Appellant sought impleadment as municipal authorities relied on an interim stay in said writ petition to reject Appellant's building plans and initiate demolition – Held: A person directly and demonstrably affected by an interim order cannot be shut out of proceedings merely because they were not an original party to the principal challenge - The Appellant is at least a "proper party" whose presence enables the Court to effectively adjudicate the consequences of its own interim order. Procedural exclusion of a party facing immediate civil consequences (demolition and refusal of statutory benefits) is unsustainable - High Court's order set aside; Appellant impleaded as a party respondent. Chopra Hotels v. Harbinder Singh Sekhon, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 352 : 2026 INSC 335

Order I Rule 10 - Suit in name of wrong plaintiff.

Order I Rule 10 CPC – Dominus Litis – Joinder of Parties – Noted that the petitioner is dominus litis and has the right to decide who to join as a party - The Registry cannot make inroads into judicial domains by questioning why a particular party was arrayed as a respondent - If unnecessary parties are joined, Supreme Court can delete them under Order I Rule 10 CPC or deal with it judicially if done with ill-motive - Supreme Court observed with "pain" that there was an "abandonment of its judicial role by the High Court" in rejecting the petition in such an unjust manner – Appeal allowed. [Paras 7-13] Sri Mukund Maheswar v. Axis Bank Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 82 : 2026 INSC 84

Order I Rule 10 CPC – Impleadment of Parties – Necessary vs. Proper Party – Dominus Litis – Suit for recovery of service charges – Twin Tests for Necessary Party – Held: A plaintiff is the dominus litis and cannot be compelled to add a third person as a defendant against their wishes unless that person is a necessary party without whom no effective decree can be passed - In a suit for recovery of service charges against a partnership firm, a third-party company claiming to be a "successor" is not a necessary party if the plaintiff seeks no relief against them and the original firm continues to exist- Held: To be a "necessary party," two tests must be satisfied: (1) there must be a right to some relief against such party in respect of the controversies involved; and (2) no effective decree can be passed in their absence - A "proper party" is one whose presence enables the court to adjudicate completely, even if no decree is made against them. Nak Engineering Company Pvt. Ltd. v. Tarun Keshrichand Shah, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 5 : 2026 INSC 8

Order II Rule 2 - Suit to include the whole claim

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Order II Rule 2 — Identity of Cause of Action — Supreme Court held that Suit-II was barred because the foundational facts regarding the property dispute were identical to Suit-I - Since the plaintiff was aware of the defendant's adverse claim of ownership during Suit-I but omitted to seek a declaration of title without obtaining the court's leave, she was precluded from seeking that omitted relief in a subsequent suit. Channappa v. Parvatewwa, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 354 : 2026 INSC 343

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Order II Rule 2 – Tests for Applicability – To invoke the bar under Order II Rule 2, the defendant must satisfactorily establish that: (i) the subsequent suit is in respect of the same cause of action as the previous suit; (ii) the plaintiff was entitled to more than one relief for that cause of action; and (iii) the plaintiff omitted to sue for such relief in the earlier suit without the leave of the Court - The technical bar cannot be presumed based on inferential reasoning. [Relied on Mohammad Khalil Khan vs. Mahbub Ali Mian, 1948 SCC OnLine PC 44; Cuddalore Powergen Corporation Ltd. vs. Chemplast Cuddalore Vinyls Limited, 2025 SCC OnLine 82; T. Arivandandam vs. T.V. Satyapal, (1977) 4 SCC 467; Paras 6-8] S. Valliammai v. S. Ramanathan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 383 : 2026 INSC 372

Order VI Rule 1 - Pleading.

Civil Procedure – Pleadings vs. Proof – Scope of Summary Facts - Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Order VI Rules 1 & 2 – Distinction between facta probanda (material facts to be proved) and facta probantia (facts/evidence by which they are proved) – Pleadings must contain only facta probandaand not facta probantia – In an eviction suit, the plaintiff is required to plead and prove the existence of a landlord-tenant relationship and the statutory grounds for eviction – Specific documents like share certificates, internal family understandings, or detailed requirements of the family constitute evidence (facta probantia) to establish the material facts and are not required to be set out verbatim in the plaint itself – Both tests of pleading and proof stand satisfied if the essential elements of the cause of action are present in the plaint and substantiated through evidence. [Paras 28, 31-34, 36, 40] Marietta D' Silva v. Rudolf Clothan Lacerda, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 503 : 2026 INSC 496

Order VI Rule 4 - Particulars to be given where necessary.

Order VI Rule 4 CPC – Pleading Standards – Rule Against "Clever Drafting" – A party alleging that a registered Deed is a sham must satisfy a rigorous standard of pleading by providing clear, cogent, and convincing averments with material particulars - Adopting a test akin to Order VI Rule 4 of the CPC, Supreme Court held that "clever drafting" creating an illusion of a cause of action is impermissible - Mere suspicion or nebulous averments without material particulars are insufficient to dislodge the presumption under Sections 91 and 92 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. [Paras 34, 35] Hemalatha v. Tukaram, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 79 : 2026 INSC 82

Order VI Rule 17 - Amendment of pleadings.

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 — Order VI Rule 17 — Amendment of Plaint — Bonafide Need of Landlord — Death of Landlord during Appeal — Power of Court to examine merits at the stage of amendment — Held: Whether an amendment should be allowed is not dependent on whether the case proposed to be set up will eventually succeed at the trial - While determining the permissibility of an amendment, the Court cannot go into the merits/demerits of the case - The factual truth of the subsequent pleadings is a matter to be considered on the merits of the claim and not at the stage of amendment. [Paras 15-18] Vinay Raghunath Deshmukh v. Natwarlal Shamji Gada, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 424 : 2026 INSC 416

Order VII Rule 7 - Relief to be specifically stated

Order VII Rule 7 and Order VI Rule 17 CPC – Pleadings and Reliefs – Multiple reliefs and defective prayers –Rejection of a writ petition because multiple reliefs were claimed in a single prayer is "perhaps, unprecedented" - If a prayer is defective or does not conform to Writ Rules, the High Court should permit amendments under principles of Order VI Rule 17 CPC or mould the relief - A claim cannot be dismissed simply because a suitor claims a wider relief than they are entitled to; the court remains free to grant a lesser relief. Sri Mukund Maheswar v. Axis Bank Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 82 : 2026 INSC 84

Order VII Rule 11 - Rejection of plaint

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Order VII Rule 11 – Rejection of Plaint – Duty of Court at the threshold – Clever Drafting and Fictional Cause of Action – Admission of a plaint is not an automatic or mechanical process - The trial Court has a bounden duty to scrutinize the averments of the plaint in conjunction with the relied-upon documents to determine whether it discloses a real cause of action or if it is barred by law - Litigants cannot circumvent statutory prohibitions by clever drafting or artful pleadings that create a surreal or illusory cause of action - When clever drafting veils an implied bar under law, the Court must lift the veil, expose the bar, and nip the sham litigation in the bud at the earliest stage, without necessarily waiting for the defendant to enter appearance or seek rejection. [Paras 8, 9, 26 - 29] Manjula v. D.A. Srinivas, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 478 : 2026 INSC 465

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 — Order VII Rule 11 — Scope of Inquiry — Excessive Relief — Plaint Averments — For the purpose of deciding an application under Order VII Rule 11, only the averments in the plaint are to be taken as correct, and external defense materials or written statements cannot be considered - A plaint cannot be rejected at the threshold merely because the plaintiffs have claimed a larger or excessive relief (such as partitioning the entire estate rather than just the father's share) than what they may ultimately be entitled to after a trial. [Relied on Satyadhyan Ghosal v. Deorajin Debi, AIR 1960 SC 941; Mayar (H.K.) Ltd. v. Owners & Parties, Vessel M.V. Fortune Express, (2006) 3 SCC 100; Vineeta Sharma v. Rakesh Sharma, (2020) 9 SCC 1; Paras 31-58] B.S. Lalitha v. Bhuvanesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 506 : 2026 INSC 499

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 — Order VII Rule 11(d) read with Section 11 — Rejection of Plaint — Interlocutory Res Judicata — Multiple Applications under Order VII Rule 11 — The legal representatives of a defendant filed a second application seeking rejection of the plaint, asserting a 'change in law' - The Supreme Court held that the second application was barred by the principle of res judicata since the identical issue had been directly and substantially raised, heard, and decided on merits against the defendants by the High Court in an earlier round of proceedings, which had attained finality - A party cannot circumvent the finality of an adverse order by re-framing the same challenge under a different sub-clause or procedural provision. [Paras 35-70] B.S. Lalitha v. Bhuvanesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 506 : 2026 INSC 499

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Order VII Rule 11(a) – Order VII Rule 11(a), (b), and (c) — Rejection of Plaint — Cause of Action — Mini-trial — Undervaluation — Deficit Court Fees — Mandatory Opportunity to Cure Defect - Plaint disclosing a live and subsisting commercial dispute cannot be rejected at the threshold – Court cannot conduct a mini-trial to assess the enforceability of an unsigned document at this stage - The High Court erred in rejecting the plaint by undertaking a detailed examination of the enforceability of an unsigned Memorandum of Agreement (MoA) - At the stage of Order VII Rule 11, the Court must take the averments in the plaint in their entirety, along with the documents relied upon, to be true - It cannot test their correctness, weigh them against the defense, or assess the probability of success - Whether an unsigned MoA constitutes a concluded contract or is unenforceable for want of signatures is a matter falling squarely within the domain of trial. [Paras 18, 22 - 27 Marg Ltd. v. Sushil Lalwani, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 409 : 2026 INSC 402

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Order VII Rule 11(b) & (c) – Rejection of a plaint for undervaluation or deficit court fee is not automatic – Statutory obligation on Courts to first afford an opportunity to the plaintiff to rectify the defect - The procedural mandate under clauses (b) and (c) of Order VII Rule 11 introduces a conditional, two-step process - The Court must first form an opinion regarding the insufficiency of the valuation or court fee, determine the correct valuation, and specify a timeframe for the plaintiff to correct it - Outright rejection of a plaint without providing a substantive opportunity to cure the defect is a manifest error of law - Deficiency in court fees does not render the suit non-maintainable at the threshold; it is a curable defect. [Relied on Dahiben v. Arvindbhai Kalyanji Bhanusali (Gajra) & Ors. (2020) 7 SCC 366; Azhar Hussain v. Rajiv Gandhi 1986 Supp SCC 315; Paras 30-35] Marg Ltd. v. Sushil Lalwani, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 409 : 2026 INSC 402

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Order VII Rule 11(d) – Statement in the Plaint – For the purpose of deciding an application under Order VII Rule 11(d), the Court must only look at the "statement in the plaint," which includes a meaningful reading of the averments and the documents appended thereto - The written statement or any other materials produced by the defendant are wholly irrelevant at this stage. Valliammai v. S. Ramanathan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 383 : 2026 INSC 372

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Order VII Rule 11(d) vs. Order II Rule 2 – Rejection of Plaint – Distinction between "Bar to Sue" and "Suit Barred by Law" – The Supreme Court held that the application of Order II Rule 2 (relinquishment of part of claim or omission to sue for one of several reliefs) cannot be a ground for rejection of a plaint under Order VII Rule 11(d) - While Order VII Rule 11(d) applies when a suit is barred by an express or implied law (e.g., Section 34 of the SARFAESI Act), Order II Rule 2 pertains to the "right to sue" for specific claims or reliefs - A plea under Order II Rule 2 must be established by the defendant through evidence, requiring a comparative analysis of the plaints in the former and subsequent suits to determine identity of the cause of action. Valliammai v. S. Ramanathan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 383 : 2026 INSC 372

Order VII Rule 11 – Rejection of Plaint – Where a property is neither notified in the official list of auqaf nor registered with the Waqf Board, a suit for injunction simpliciter regarding such property cannot be entertained by the Waqf Tribunal – noted that the plaint is liable to be rejected as the Tribunal lacks the mandatory statutory requirement to adjudicate the property's status – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Ramesh Gobindram v. Sugra Humayun Mirza Wakf (2010) 8 SCC 726; Paras 20-50] Habib Alladin v. Mohammed Ahmed, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 88 : 2026 INSC 90

Order VIII Rule 9 - Subsequent pleadings

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Order VIII Rule 9 - A defendant cannot be permitted to radically alter or retract her stand in a civil suit by filing an additional written statement under Order VIII Rule 9 CPC after the commencement of trial, particularly when the new plea is wholly inconsistent with the original defence. A party cannot, under the garb of an additional written statement, introduce a completely contradictory case to achieve what is otherwise barred by the proviso to Order VI Rule 17 CPC (amendment of pleadings after trial has begun). Such an attempt amounts to an abuse of process of court and is impermissible under Order VI Rule 7 CPC, which prohibits a party from raising allegations inconsistent with its previous pleadings except by way of amendment. Mondira Ghosh v. Chaitali Ghosh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 579 : 2026 INSC 545

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Order VIII Rule 9 - The plaintiff filed a suit for declaration of unlawful possession and eviction. In her original written statement, the defendant claimed to be a bona fide co-sharer. After framing of issues and extensive cross-examination of the plaintiff's witness, the defendant sought to file an additional written statement along with a counterclaim, claiming instead that she was a tenant under the plaintiff. The Trial Court rejected the application. The High Court, however, permitted filing of the additional written statement (subject to costs) while rejecting the counterclaim. Allowing the plaintiff's appeal, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court's order and restored the Trial Court's rejection. The Court held that the defendant's attempt was a clear volte-face and a belated attempt to overcome the statutory embargo on amendments after trial had commenced. The filing of such an application at an advanced stage of the trial was held to be a clear abuse of process. Mondira Ghosh v. Chaitali Ghosh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 579 : 2026 INSC 545

Order IX Rule 13 - Setting aside decree ex parte against defendant

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Order IX Rule XIII – Application to set aside ex parte decree – Minority of Appellant – Sufficient Cause – The Supreme Court set aside the concurrent rejection of an application under Order IX Rule XIII CPC filed by a minor (Appellant No. 1) - held that a minor, being legally incapacitated, cannot be expected to respond to a public notice or initiate legal proceedings independently - The failure of the respondents to ensure the appointment of a lawful guardian for a known minor legal heir, coupled with material misstatements regarding the widow's identity, vitiated the original proceedings for a succession certificate. [Paras 7, 8, 9] Deepesh Maheswari v. Renu Maheswari, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 317 : 2026 INSC 306

Order XII Rule 6 - Judgment on admissions.

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Order XII Rule 6 – Judgment on Admission – Admissions made outside pleadings, including in criminal proceedings, can form basis for decree - Held, a judgment under Order XII Rule 6 CPC can be passed on the basis of an admission made by a party even outside the pleadings, provided the admission is clear, unequivocal and in writing or oral. There is no bar under the Code restricting such admissions to only those made in the pleadings. Sheikh Abedin v. Iqbal Ahmed, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 483

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Order XII Rule 6 – Judgment on Admission – The appellant-defendant had admitted in a complaint leading to registration of an FIR that he was merely a caretaker of the suit property owned by the respondent-plaintiff. Relying upon this admission, the Trial Court decreed the suit for mandatory injunction directing the defendant to vacate the premises. The First Appellate Court and the High Court upheld the decree. The defendant contended before the Supreme Court that an admission made in criminal proceedings could not be relied upon for passing judgment under Order XII Rule 6 CPC. Held: Dismissing the appeal, the Supreme Court clarified that admissions, wherever made, if clear and unequivocal, can be the foundation for a decree under Order XII Rule 6 CPC. The Court reiterated that the object of the provision is to enable a party to obtain speedy justice on the basis of admissions made by the opposite party. [Relied on : Uttam Singh Duggal & Co. Ltd. vs. United Bank of India, (2000) 7 SCC 120] Sheikh Abedin v. Iqbal Ahmed, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 483

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Order XII Rule 6 – Judgment on Admission – Requirements of clear, unequivocal and unconditional Admission - Held, a decree under Order XII Rule 6 CPC can be passed only where the admission by the defendant is clear, categorical, unconditional and unequivocal. A mere reference to statements or inconsistencies does not amount to an admission sufficient for granting judgment on admission when disputed questions of fact exist which require adjudication in a full-fledged trial. Pushpa v. Dayawati, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 610 : 2026 INSC 603

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Order XII Rule 6 – Judgment on Admission – Key principles laid down: 1. Every statement made by a party in the pleadings does not automatically entitle the plaintiff to a decree under Order XII Rule 6 CPC. The admission must be unambiguous and must clearly establish the liability of the defendant towards the plaintiff. 2. Pleadings cannot be read in a piecemeal manner; they must be construed holistically. 3. Disputed questions of fact cannot be resolved by way of judgment on admission. 4. Revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 CPC is limited and cannot be exercised by the High Court to substitute its own interpretation of the written statement merely because another view is possible, in the absence of jurisdictional error or material irregularity. Pushpa v. Dayawati, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 610 : 2026 INSC 603

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Order XII Rule 6 – Judgment on Admission – In a dispute relating to distribution of sale proceeds of a jointly owned agricultural property sold for ₹15.31 crore, the plaintiff sought a decree under Order XII Rule 6 CPC against defendant No.3 for recovery of ₹44,79,167/- on the basis of an alleged admission in the written statement that each co-owner had received ₹3 crore under a family settlement. The District Court rejected the application, holding that the matter required trial. The High Court allowed the revision and decreed the suit. The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's order and restored the District Court's order, holding that there was no clear, unconditional admission of liability by defendant No.3, and the issues involved disputed questions of fact which could only be decided after full trial. Pushpa v. Dayawati, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 610 : 2026 INSC 603

Order XIII-A Rule 3 — Grounds for Summary Judgment

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 — Order XIII-A Rule 3 — Limitation — Adjudication of Mixed Questions of Law and Fact via Summary Judgment — Held - Although limitation is ordinarily a mixed question of law and fact when foundational facts are contested, the Court can decisively address and determine the issue of limitation at the summary judgment stage if it rests on admitted and undisputed material on record - Forcing a matter to proceed to a full-fledged trial despite absolute clarity of the material on record contradicts the principle of proportionality and needlessly prolongs ripe litigation. [Relied on Ambalal Sarabhai Enterprises Ltd. v. K. S. Infraspace LLP and Another, (2020) 15 SCC 585; Swain v. Hillman, [2001] 1 All ER 91 (England and Wales Court of Appeal); Paras 60-65, 75, 76] Reliance Eminent Trading v. Delhi Development Authority, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 442 : 2026 INSC 436

Order XIV - Settlement of Issues

Code Civil Procedure, 1908 – Prejudice caused by non-framing of issues – Specific Performance – Lack of Title – Held: The omission to frame issues can vitiate a trial if it causes prejudice to the parties - The test for prejudice is whether the parties had knowledge that a particular question was in issue and had the opportunity to lead evidence on it - In the present case, the trial court dismissed a suit for specific performance on the ground that the plaintiff failed to prove the defendant's title, despite no such issue being framed or pleaded - Since the appellant was never put to notice or given an opportunity to lead evidence on the question of title, the non-framing of issues caused significant prejudice - Held: To succeed in a suit for specific performance, the plaintiff must prove: (i) the existence of a valid contract; (ii) a breach of contract by the defendant; and (iii) the readiness and willingness of the plaintiff to perform their part of the contract. [Relied on Balraj Taneja and Another v. Sunil Madan and Another (1999) 8 SCC 396; Paras 21-33] Pramod Shroff v. Mohan Singh Chopra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 384 : 2026 INSC 378

Order XV Rule 5 - Case Management hearings during trial

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 — Order XV Rule 5 — First Date of Hearing — Determination of — Held, the expression 'first date of hearing' is not a mere formal date or any earlier date fixed for procedural purposes - It has to be understood as the date when the Court proposes to apply its mind to determine the points in controversy between the parties and to frame issues, if necessary - In the absence of a clear determination of such a date, the very foundation for invoking Order XV Rule 5 CPC becomes uncertain - Held, rules of procedure are made to advance the cause of justice and not to defeat it - Construction of a rule of procedure which promotes justice and prevents miscarriage has to be preferred - Procedural law is the handmaid of justice and not its mistress. [Relied on Bimal Chand Jain v. Sri Gopal Agarwal, (1981) 3 SCC 486; Santosh Mehta v. Om Prakash, (1980) 3 SCC 610; Siraj Ahmad Siddiqui v. Prem Nath Kapoor, (1993) 4 SCC 406; Salem Advocate Bar Association v. Union of India, (2005) 6 SCC 344; Paras 16-28] Dharmendra Kalra v. Kulvinder Singh Bhatia, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 509 : 2026 INSC 492

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 — Order XV Rule 5 — Striking off defence for non-deposit of rent — Discretionary vs. Mandatory nature — Held, the power to strike off the defence under Order XV Rule 5 CPC, though couched in mandatory terms, is not to be exercised mechanically - It is in the nature of a penalty and carries a serious responsibility - Supreme Court must consider whether there has been substantial compliance and whether the default is wilful, deliberate, or contumacious, rather than resorting to it as a routine visitation of a punitive extreme. [Paras 16, 17] Dharmendra Kalra v. Kulvinder Singh Bhatia, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 509 : 2026 INSC 492

Order XXII Rule 4 - Procedure in case of death of one of several defendants or of sole defendant

Order XXII Rule 4 – Abatement of Appeal – Substantial Representation of Estate – Suit for Specific Performance – Appeal does not abate if the estate of the deceased party is sufficiently represented by other legal heirs already on record - In the present case, while the vendor (Kishorilal) died during the appeal, all his four legal heirs were initially substituted - Upon the death of one of those heirs (Murarilal), the appeal could not be declared to have abated because the remaining three heirs and the lis pendens transferees (who held the title) remained on record, ensuring the estate was sufficiently represented. [Paras 30 - 40] Kishorilal v. Gopal, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 39 : 2026 INSC 48

Order XXIII Rule 3 - Compromise of suit

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 — Execution of Compromise Decree — Power of Executing Court — Statutory vs. Equitable Valuation - An Executing Court cannot travel beyond the decree or substitute strict statutory valuation rules with general notions of fairness or sympathy - where parties have consensually agreed to a statutory benchmark (Guideline Value) via a compromise decree, the Judgment Debtor cannot later contest the calculation by attempting to re-classify the nature of the land to minimize compensation. [Paras 21 - 39] Nandi Infrastructure Corridor Enterprises Ltd. v. B. Gurappa Naidu, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 445 : 2026 INSC 434

Order XXI Rule 95 - Delivery of property in occupancy of judgment-debtor

Order 21 Rule 95 CPC - Possession of Auction Purchaser – Supreme Court observed that while Order 21 Rule 95 CPC provides a procedure for an auction purchaser to take possession, if the purchaser actually gains possession and maintains it on the date of the suit's institution, they cannot be denied an injunction against a party with no title who seeks to interfere - Even if a specific issue on possession was not formally framed by the Trial Court, since the parties went to trial fully aware that the issue was central and led evidence accordingly, they cannot later claim prejudice - Held – The High Court erred by not considering the extensive documentary evidence (e.g., revenue records, factory registrations, tax payments) relied upon by the First Appellate Court to establish the appellant's possession - The matter was remanded to the High Court for fresh consideration within the scope of Section 100 CPC. [Relied on Nagubai Ammal and Others v. B. Shama Rao & Ors., (1956) 1 SCC 698; B. Arvind Kumar v. Govt. of India & Ors., (2007) 5 SCC 745; Paras 19-25] P. Elaiyappan v. Natarajan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 219

Order XXI Rule 97 - Resistance or obstruction to possession of immovable property

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Order XXI, Rules 97, 98, 99, and 101 – Execution Proceedings – Objection by Third Party / Family Member – Deliberate attempt to stall recovery – Supreme Court set aside a High Court order that had permitted the mother of a Judgment Debtor (JD) to lead evidence to prove her claim of a share in a joint family property - Key Findings – i. Complete Code for Disputes - Order XXI, Rules 97, 98, 99, and 101 of the CPC constitute a complete code for resolving all execution-related disputes raised by a third party interested in the suit property without requiring a separate suit; ii. Feigned Ignorance and Delay - The objector (the mother) was a Director in the co-defendant Private Limited Company along with her son (the JD) - Supreme Court observed that she could not feign ignorance of the suit or the execution proceedings, especially when an attachment notice was conspicuously affixed to the property in 2017 where she claimed to reside - Filing an objection nine years into execution proceedings only when dispossession is threatened constitutes a deliberate attempt to stall recovery; iii. Lack of Prima Facie Basis - Speculative claims of co-ownership or purchases made from a "joint family business nucleus" cannot be entertained to lead evidence when structural facts and prior individual property transactions by the family members clearly contradict the claim. [Paras 5-8] Challani Ginning and Pressing Factory v. Kamal, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 444 : 2026 INSC 426

Order XXI Rules 97-101 – Execution of Decree – Obstruction by Third Party – Abuse of Process – Re-litigation – Res Judicata – Appellants obtained a decree for specific performance and initiated execution - Respondents 1-3 (third parties) filed objections under Order XXI Rules 99-101 claiming independent title - During the pendency of the specific performance suit, the appellants had also filed separate suits against the same respondents for injunction/possession but allowed those suits to be dismissed for default and failed to restore them - Held: The appellants, having abandoned their earlier independent suits against the respondents for the same subject matter without seeking liberty to file afresh, are precluded from contesting the respondents' rights in execution proceedings - To permit the appellants to reap the benefits of the decree against these respondents through execution, after having failed to pursue direct legal remedies against them, would amount to an abuse of the process of the court and "re-litigation" - The principle of nemo debet bis vexari (no one should be twice troubled for the same cause) applies. [Paras 32-54] Sharada Sanghi v. Asha Agarwal, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 299 : 2026 INSC 292

Order XLI Rule 25 - Where Appellate Court may frame issues and refer them for trial to Court whose decree appealed from.

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 — Order XLI Rule 25 — Power of Appellate Court to frame issues and refer them for trial — Held: Even if the Trial Court did not omit to frame or try the issue originally, the Appellate Court can always exercise power under Order XLI Rule 25 to frame an issue to determine any question of fact which appears essential to the right decision of the suit upon the merits based on subsequent events (such as the amendment of the plaint). [Relied on Raj Kumar Bhatia Vs. Subhash Chander Bhatia, 2017 INSC 1240; Sadhna Lodh v. National Insurance Company, (2003) 3 SCC 524; Pasupuleti Venkateswarlu Vs. The Motor & General Traders, 1975 INSC 75; Para 18] Vinay Raghunath Deshmukh v. Natwarlal Shamji Gada, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 424 : 2026 INSC 416

Order XLI Rule 27 - Production of additional evidence in Appellate Court

Order XLI Rule 27 CPC — Exercise of Judicial Discretion — Noted that power to allow additional evidence is discretionary and must be used sparingly to remove a lacuna in the evidence, not to allow a party to fill gaps in their case at their "leisure or sweet will." - If the Appellate Court can pronounce a satisfactory and reasoned judgment based on the existing record, the provision has no application. [Para 11] Gobind Singh v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 221 : 2026 INSC 211 : AIR 2026 SC 1303

Order XLI Rule 27 CPC — Production of Additional Evidence in Appellate Court — Scope and Conditions Precedent — The Supreme Court reaffirmed that parties to an appeal are not entitled to produce additional evidence as a matter of right - The provision is couched in negative terms and applies only in three specific contingencies: (a) refusal by the trial court to admit evidence that ought to have been admitted; (aa) the party establishing that despite due diligence, such evidence was not within their knowledge or could not be produced at the trial stage; or (b) the Appellate Court itself requiring the evidence to enable it to pronounce judgment or for any other substantial cause. Gobind Singh v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 221 : 2026 INSC 211 : AIR 2026 SC 1303

Order XLI Rule 31 - Contents, date and signature of judgment.

Civil Procedure Code, 1908 - Compliance with Appellate Judgment Requisites – Order XLI Rule 31 – Effect of framing general points for determination – Strict technical interpretation of Order XLI Rule 31 of CPC should not compromise substantial justice - Total or partial non-compliance with the requirement to frame specific points for determination does not automatically vitiate an appellate judgment or render it void - If a perusal of the judgment demonstrates that the First Appellate Court made an honest endeavor to appraise the rival contentions, thoroughly scrutinized the entire evidence on record, and provided well-supported reasons for its conclusions, there is substantial compliance with the law. [Paras 36, 37] Parvathi Nairthi v. Laxmi Nairthy, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 528 : 2026 INSC 521

Civil Procedure Code, 1908 – Order XLI Rule 31 – Requirement of framing points for determination by the First Appellate Court – Nature of compliance – Held, compliance with Order XLI Rule 31 is mandatory, and the appellate court must formulate points for determination and record findings thereon supported by reasons - the requirement is one of substantial compliance and not one of mere technical formality - The substance of the judgment and the manner in which the appellate court has dealt with the controversy are of greater significance than the form in which points are framed - Where the First Appellate Court has undertaken a detailed reappreciation of oral and documentary evidence and recorded independent findings while reversing the trial court decree, the judgment is not liable to be set aside solely on the ground of non-compliance with the form of Order XLI Rule 31. [Paras 40, 41, 42] Mallika v. R. Nallathambi, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 534 : 2026 INSC 529

Commercial Courts Act, 2015

Commercial Courts Act, 2015 — Schedule — Insertion of Order XIII-A to the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 — Summary Judgment — Scope, Principles, and Guidelines — Held - The emergence of summary judgment under Indian procedural law represents a significant shift steering litigation toward factual certainty and judicial efficiency - Rule 3 of Order XIII-A empowers the Court to grant a summary judgment against a party if they have no "real prospect" of successfully succeeding on or defending the claim, and there is no other compelling reason why the matter should go to trial - A "real prospect of success" postulates a likelihood that is real and substantial, as opposed to being merely fanciful or speculative - While the Court should not conduct a "mini-trial" at this threshold stage, it is not required to take everything at face value and must assess the evidence actually available alongside the evidence that can reasonably be expected to be led at trial - Summary judgment is an exceptional power that cuts short the trial process and ought to be exercised when oral evidence and a full trial would serve no real purpose. [Paras 36, 43, 51 – 59] Reliance Eminent Trading v. Delhi Development Authority, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 442 : 2026 INSC 436

Company Law

Settlement of Claims – Meaning of "Attempt to Settle" – Supreme Court clarified that Condition (viii) of the bail order required a real and effective resolution of claims, either through valid possession or refund - Mere execution of mediation agreements without implementation does not constitute compliance - The project remains incomplete, lacking essential services (lifts, water, fire safety NOCs), rendering any "notional possession" delivered to allottees legally invalid. Satinder Singh Bhasin v. Government of NCT of Delhi, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 316 : 2026 INSC 310

Fabrication and Fraud – Conduct of Petitioner – Supreme Court noted the inclusion of "GST" in an allotment agreement purportedly dated 15.04.2015, whereas GST was only introduced in 2017 - Held, such an inclusion is not a clerical error but points directly at the fabrication of documents to derive commercial benefits - Further, the petitioner engaged in "double allotment" and created third-party rights using fabricated stamp papers – Following the initiation of the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP), the petitioner siphoned off approximately Rs. 74 Crores to entities controlled by his immediate family members (wife, daughter, and sons) - Held, such conduct during a moratorium is ex-facie impermissible and lends credence to allegations of committing similar offences while on bail - Due to intentional and established violations of bail conditions, the Court ordered the forfeiture of the entire Rs. 50 Crore deposit along with accrued interest - Rs. 5 Crores was directed to be transmitted to NALSA, and the remainder to the Interim Resolution Professional (IRP) for IBC proceedings. [Relied on Ashok Dhankad v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1690; Satinder Singh Bhasin v. Col. Gautam Mullick and Ors, Civil Appeal Nos. 13779 and 13812 of 2025; P. v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2022) 15 SCC 211; Daulat Ram v. State of Haryana, (1995) 1 SCC 349; Paras 65-80, 122-128] Satinder Singh Bhasin v. Government of NCT of Delhi, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 316 : 2026 INSC 310

Companies Act, 1956 – Section 394-A – Amalgamation Scheme – Binding nature on State Authorities – Supreme Court rejected the appellant's reliance on a clause in the amalgamation scheme allowing the transfer of losses - It was observed that while the Income Tax Department is statutorily required to be notified of amalgamation proceedings under the Companies Act, there is no such requirement to notify the State Government regarding Agricultural Income Tax - the State of Kerala, not being a party to the proceedings or issued notice, is not bound by the terms of the scheme that affect its tax revenue - Supreme Court upheld the High Court's finding that even if a set-off were permissible, the losses in question pertained to a period beyond the eight-year limit prescribed under Section 12 of the Kerala Act. [Relied on Dalmia Power Ltd. and Another v. Assistant Commissioner of Income-Tax (2019 INSC 1410); Paras 11 - 15] Aspinwall and Co. Ltd. v. Inspecting Assistant Commissioner, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 371 : 2026 INSC 359

Company Law – Subsidiary Companies – Distinct Legal Entity – Rights of Shareholders – While a subsidiary is a separate legal entity, when a holding company is being wound up due to financial distress, the valuation and shareholding of its 100% owned subsidiary (JAIL) must be factored into the rehabilitation or winding-up process - Clandestine changes to the shareholding pattern of a subsidiary by the management company without legal sanction are illegal - Physical revival of a unit closed for nearly four decades is impossible as employees have reached the age of superannuation. Heirs of deceased or superannuated employees do not have a vested right to employment in a defunct unit but maintain a right to receive unpaid wages and statutory dues. [Relied on Sivanandan C.T. and Others vs. High Court of Kerala and Others (2024) 3 SCC 799; Vodafone International Holdings BV v. Union of India (2012) 6 SCC 613; Cement Workers Karamchari Sangh V. Jaipur Udyog Ltd. (2008) 4 SCC 701; BRS Ventures Investments Ltd. v. SREI Infrastructure Finance Ltd. (2025) 1 SCC 456; Paras 112, 136, 155- 177] Bhartiya Mazdoor Sangh, v. State of U.P., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 373 : 2026 INSC 364

National Company Law Appellate Tribunal Rules, 2016 – Rule 22(2) – Mandate of Certified Copy – Compliance with Rule 22(2) cannot be rendered nugatory - While NCLAT has the power to exempt compliance under Rules 14 and 15, it does not confer an automatic right on the applicant to dispense with the certified copy - If an appeal is instituted without applying for a certified copy within the limitation period, it practically means there is no filing of an appeal in the eyes of law. [Relied on V. Nagarajan vs. SKS Ispat and Power Limited and others, (2022) 2 SCC 244; Ebix Singapore Private Limited vs. Committee of Creditors of Educomp Solutions Limited and another, (2022) 2 SCC 401; Paras 7 - 10] Angelwoods Apartment Allottees Association v. M. Lalitha, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 491 : 2026 INSC 479

Companies Act, 1956 — Sections 2(27), 41(2), 397, 398 and 399 — Maintainability of Oppression and Mismanagement Petition — Absence of Formal Entry in Register of Members — Deemed Membership by Conduct — Jurisdictional Fact — The Supreme Court held that the absence of a formal entry of a person's name in the register of members does not automatically debar them from maintaining a petition under Sections 397 and 398 of the Companies Act, 1956 - The expression "member" for the purpose of invoking remedies against oppression and mismanagement must be construed in light of the wider definitional framework of Section 2(27) rather than being rigidly controlled by the procedural requirements of Section 41(2) - Where a person's substantial investment is accepted and utilized by the company, and cumulative factual circumstances (such as being inducted as Managing Director, rebranding the business, and being recognized as a "co-owner" in communications) demonstrate long-standing recognition of their proprietary stake, considerations of equity and justice must prevail to treat them as a member for the purpose of maintaining the petition. [Relied on M/s World Wide Agencies Pvt. Ltd. and Anr. v. Margarat T. Desor and Ors. (1990) 1 SCC 536; Paragraphs 17 - 29] Dr. Bais Surgical and Medical Institute Pvt. Ltd. v. Dhananjay Pande, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 461 : 2026 INSC 447

Companies Act, 2013 – Voting Rights at AGM by Juristic Members (Societies/Trusts) – “Vote-Cast-First” Rule Rejected - Where rival groups within a society/trust claim authority to exercise voting rights attached to shares held by such juristic member in a company's Annual General Meeting, the validity of the vote is not determined by priority in point of time. The vote must be cast only by the person(s) lawfully authorised under the society's governing documents (such as its constitution, rules, or trust deed) and in accordance with the statutory framework under the Companies Act, 2013 and the Companies (Management and Administration) Rules, 2014. The Supreme Court held that the statutory scheme relating to remote e-voting does not recognise chronology as the basis for determining the validity of a vote. Once a valid vote is cast on behalf of a member, the member cannot vote again. Courts cannot substitute the principle of “first in time” for the requirement of lawful authority. The High Court's direction that the first vote cast on behalf of a society would prevail, irrespective of the source of authority (Board of Trustees or Managing Committee), was set aside as being contrary to law. The validity of a vote cast on behalf of a society cannot be determined merely by priority in point of time and must rest upon lawful authority traceable to the governing documents of the society and the statutory framework governing voting. Hindustan Medical Institution v. Birla Corporation, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 583 : 2026 INSC 554

Companies (Transfer of Pending Proceedings) Rules, 2016 – Rule 3 – Transfer of proceedings to NCLT – Where a "second motion" for a Scheme of Arrangement was pending and not "reserved for orders" at the time the 2016 Rules came into effect (December 15, 2016), the High Court was mandated to transfer the proceedings to the Tribunal - In this case, a second motion filed belatedly in 2009 and left pending for years should have been transferred to the NCLT. Omkara Assets Reconstruction v. Amit Chaturvedi, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 191 : 2026 INSC 189 : AIR 2026 SC 1205

Companies Act, 2013; Section 58(3) and Section 433 — Limitation Act, 1963; Section 5 — Condonation of Delay by Company Law Board (CLB) — Applicability of Limitation Act to Quasi-Judicial Bodies - The Supreme Court examined whether the CLB, as a quasi-judicial body, possessed the inherent or statutory power to condone delay in filing an appeal under Section 58(3) of the Act, 2013, particularly for appeals filed between 12.09.2013 and 01.06.2016 (before the constitution of NCLT/NCLAT) – Held that the settled principle that the Limitation Act, 1963, applies only to "courts" in the traditional sense and not to quasi-judicial bodies or tribunals unless expressly extended by statute - While Section 433 of the Act, 2013 now expressly applies the Limitation Act to proceedings before the NCLT and NCLAT, this power cannot be retroactively borrowed to signify a similar power for the erstwhile CLB - held that Section 58(3) is a simpliciter provision prescribing a mandatory limitation period - The absence of peremptory language such as "but not thereafter" does not render the prescribed period merely directory – Held that Regulation 44 of the CLB Regulations which saves the inherent power of the CLB would not enable the CLB to extend time for the filing of the appeal or the application itself, as the case may be. [Relied on Town Municipal Council, Athani v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Hubli (1969) 1 SCC 873, Paras 42-44, 69, 70, 90-93, 108, 161] Property Company (P) Ltd. v. Rohinten Daddy Mazda, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 19 : 2026 INSC 33

Companies Act, 2013 – Section 418A & 419 – Composition of NCLAT Benches – Validity of Technical Member Majority - Supreme Court rejected the challenge to a three-member NCLAT Bench comprising two Technical Members and one Judicial Member - held that while a Bench must have at least one Judicial Member, the current law does not mandate a majority of Judicial Members in larger Benches - Technical and administrative members are not to be treated with "disdain" or labeled lower in status, as their expertise aids in holistic adjudication - A notice is "tricky" if it is artfully framed to mislead or conceal material facts from shareholders - the disclosure of the exit price and the availability of valuation reports at the registered office satisfied the requirements of Section 102. [Relied on: Kaye v. Croydon Tramways & Co. Ltd.; Baillie v. Oriental Telephone and Electric Co. Ltd.; In Re: Cadbury India Limited; Mihir H. Mafatlal v. Mafatlal Industries Ltd. 2014 SCC Online Bom 4934; Paras 18-22, 23-37, 48, 50] Pannalal Bhansali v. Bharti Telecom, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 222 : 2026 INSC 213

Companies Act, 2013 – Section 66 – Reduction of Share Capital – Validity of Selective Reduction and Forced Exit of Minority Shareholders - The Supreme Court upheld the reduction of share capital under Section 66, even if selective and resulting in an involuntary exit of minority shareholders – Held that reduction of share capital is a domestic concern of the company decided by the majority - As long as the procedure is followed and the transaction is not unfair, inequitable, or against public interest, the majority has the right to decide how to carry out the reduction, including extinguishing certain shares while retaining others. [Relied on: Re: Reckitt Benckiser (India) Ltd.; British and American Trustee and Finance Corporation v. Couper 2005 SCC Online Del 674; Paras 42-47] Pannalal Bhansali v. Bharti Telecom, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 222 : 2026 INSC 213

Companies Act, 2013 – Section 66 – Requirement of Valuation Report – Statutory Interpretation – Held that unlike Sections 62, 230, and 232, Section 66 does not statutorily mandate a valuation report from a registered valuer for the reduction of share capital - The primary safeguards are a special resolution and confirmation by the Tribunal - The absence of a valuation report being sent with the notice does not constitute a "tricky notice" if the fair value and methodology are disclosed or made available for inspection. [Paras 24-37] Pannalal Bhansali v. Bharti Telecom, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 222 : 2026 INSC 213

Companies Act, 2013 — Sections 212(6), 447, 448, 451 — Cognizance of offences involving fraud — Bar on private complaints — Whether a Special Court can take cognizance of offences under Sections 448 (false statement liable to punishment for fraud) and 451 (repeated default) of the Companies Act, 2013 on the basis of a private criminal complaint. Held, an offence under Section 448 is an "offence covered under Section 447" within the meaning of Section 212(6), as it prescribes punishment in terms of fraud as defined and punishable under Section 447. Consequently, the second proviso to Section 212(6) bars the Special Court from taking cognizance of such offences except upon a written complaint by the Director of the Serious Fraud Investigation Office (SFIO) or an officer authorised in writing by the Central Government. This statutory bar serves as a safeguard against frivolous or motivated complaints by disgruntled shareholders, members, or competitors in corporate disputes. It rejected the contention that the 2015 amendment to Section 212(6) limited the bar solely to the offence under Section 447 itself, holding that offences inextricably linked to fraud (such as under Section 448) attract the same restriction. The ancillary offence under Section 451 was also held to be covered by the bar. However, aggrieved persons are not remediless: they may approach the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) under Section 213 for an order directing investigation into the affairs of the company by SFIO, upon satisfying the eligibility criteria under clauses (a) or (b) thereof. (Para 26, 35) Yerram Vijay Kumar v. State of Telangana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 28 : 2026 INSC 42

Companies Act, 2013 — Sections 212(6), 447, 448, 451 — The case arose from a management dispute in a Hyderabad-based real estate company, where the original promoter (complainant) filed a private complaint alleging that former directors (appellants), after removal, fraudulently convened an EGM, passed forged resolutions, appointed new directors, and filed false Form DIR-12 with the Ministry of Corporate Affairs. The Special Court took cognizance of offences under Sections 448 and 451 of the Companies Act and various IPC sections (including 420, 468, etc.). The High Court declined to quash the proceedings, leading to the appeal. Allowing the appeals in part, the Supreme Court quashed the proceedings and cognizance to the extent of offences under Sections 448 and 451 of the Companies Act. The Court directed transfer of the remaining complaint (IPC offences) to the appropriate court having territorial jurisdiction for trial on merits. It set aside the High Court's order. (Para 26, 35) Yerram Vijay Kumar v. State of Telangana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 28 : 2026 INSC 42

Companies Act, 2013 – Valuation – Discount for Lack of Marketability (DLOM) – Applicability in Unlisted Companies - held that the application of a Discount for Lack of Marketability (DLOM) is a valid accounting principle for valuing shares of unlisted or delisted companies - While DLOM may be declined in court-ordered buyouts involving "oppression," it is applicable in a standard Section 66 reduction where no oppression is proved and the shares lack liquidity - noted that "Fair Value" under Indian Accounting Standards (Ind AS 113) is a market-based measurement that accounts for restrictions on sale. [Relied on: Liew Kit Fah v. Koh Keng Chew [2020] 1 SLR 275; Paras 39-45] Pannalal Bhansali v. Bharti Telecom, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 222 : 2026 INSC 213

Company Law – Control and Management – "Head and Brain" Test – In determining the residence and commercial substance of the respondents, the AAR applied the "head and brain" test - It was found that though the companies were incorporated in Mauritius, the real control over transactions exceeding USD 250,000 rested with a non-resident individual in the USA – Held that if the board of directors of a subsidiary is reduced to "puppets" and the steering interference of the parent/owner is such that the subsidiary does not perform activities on its own authority, the corporate veil can be pierced - It held that the AAR's findings on the lack of commercial substance and the centralized control in the USA were sufficient to establish a prima facie case of tax avoidance - the applications for advance rulings were not maintainable. Authority For Advance Rulings v. Tiger Global International II Holdings, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 50 : 2026 INSC 60

Competition Act, 2002

Competition Act, 2002; Sections 5, 6(2), 20(1), 31(1), 43A, 44, 45 — Competition Commission of India (Procedure in regard to the transaction of business relating to combinations) Regulations, 2011; Regulations 9(4), 9(5) — Merger Control Regime — Power to keep Approval Order in Abeyance or Compel Fresh Form II Filing Post-Approval – Supreme Court held that – i. No Power to Keep Approval in Abeyance - The Competition Commission of India (CCI) does not possess any inherent or statutory power to place a concluded approval order under Section 31(1) in abeyance, suspend it, or compel a fresh Form II notice for an already approved and consummated transaction - A statutory authority cannot expand its jurisdiction or create post-approval suspension powers via descriptive recitals within an approval order; ii. Distinction Between Non-Notification and Defective Disclosure - Section 43A is a strict penal provision confined only to the transactional gateway default of a complete "failure to give notice" under Section 6(2) - A processed notification cannot be converted into a case of non-notification merely because the regulator subsequently disagrees with the descriptive characterization or nomenclature used by the notifying party for disclosed agreements - Misdescriptions or material omissions fall strictly within the domain of Sections 44 and 45, not Section 43A; iii. Evidentiary Value of Internal Pre-Execution Communications - Pre-execution internal communications and exploratory strategies cannot substitute the statutory inquiry into the executed transaction agreements, the formal notice, and responses filed during the review - Penal consequences under Sections 44 and 45 cannot rest on broad inferences of "lack of candour" without distinct, reasoned findings meeting the strict ingredients of material falsity, requirement of disclosure, and the relevant mental element; iv. Limitation Bar on Reopening Merger Scrutiny - The proviso to Section 20(1) imposes a rigid jurisdictional limitation of one year from the date a combination takes effect to initiate a competition merits inquiry - The CCI cannot indirectly circumvent this limitation bar after the expiry of one year under the guise of an information-gathering procedure or penalty proceeding by keeping a valid approval in abeyance and ordering a fresh merits review; v. Principles of Natural Justice in Punitive Proceedings - Show cause notices are the foundation of adjudicatory authority - Shifting the final reasoning to a materially sharpened case based on internal documents or introducing severe civil consequences like keeping a prior clearance order in abeyance without specific supplemental notice and a focused opportunity to be heard, fundamentally violates the principles of natural justice. [Relied on State of Punjab v. Shamlal Murari, (1976) 1 SCC 719; Mangalore Chemicals and Fertilisers Ltd. v. CCT, (1992) Supp (1) SCC 21; Competition Commission of India v. Thomas Cook (India) Limited & Anr., (2018) 6 SCC 549; SCM Solifert Limited & Anr. v. Competition Commission of India, (2018) 6 SCC 631; Kranti Associates (P) Ltd. v. Masood Ahmed Khan, (2010) 9 SCC 496.; Gorkha Security Services v. Govt. (NCT of Delhi), (2014) 9 SCC 105; Siemens Engineering & Mfg. Co. of India Ltd. v. Union of India, (1976) 2 SCC 981; Excel Crop Care Ltd. v. Competition Commission of India, (2017) 8 SCC 47; Vodafone International Holdings B.V. v. Union of India, (2012) 6 SCC 613; Paras 146- 301] Amazon v. Competition Commission of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 553 : 2026 INSC 576

Condonation of Delay

Condonation of Delay – Special Leave Petition – Consistent Negligence by Statutory Body – The Supreme Court dismissed a Special Leave Petition filed by the Delhi Development Authority (DDA) due to an unexplained and "fatal" delay of 235 days - noted a pattern of consistent delay by the DDA, highlighting prior delays of 685 days in filing a Letters Patent Appeal (LPA) and 577 days in filing a review petition before the High Court - clarified that a development authority cannot be granted special indulgence or immunity from limitation periods simply by virtue of its status - The explanation provided for the delay was deemed neither satisfactory nor sufficient in law – Noted that that the DDA should implement a robust litigation policy and screening process for cases before filing them belatedly, noting that such actions contribute to "docket explosion" and the unnecessary consumption of judicial time - The petition was dismissed on the grounds of delay with a cost of Rs. 10,000/- to be paid to the Supreme Court Legal Services Committee within six weeks. Delhi Development Authority v. Shilya, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 75

Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974

Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 (COFEPOSA) – Preventive Detention in Gold Smuggling – Upholdment of Detention Orders - Procedural Compliance - No right of legal representation before advisory board as of right - The Supreme Court upheld the preventive detention orders issued under Section 3(1) of the COFEPOSA against an actress and her aide for their alleged involvement in organised gold smuggling activities. There was substantial compliance with procedural safeguards under Article 22 of the Constitution. The detenus were supplied with relied-upon documents within the prescribed time. Contents of electronic evidence, including CCTV footage, were duly displayed to them in prison. A detenu has no automatic right to be represented by a legal practitioner before the Advisory Board. Such a right arises only if the detaining authority is represented by a lawyer, which was not the case in the present matter. The detention orders contained adequate reasons demonstrating the detaining authority's subjective satisfaction. A live and proximate link existed between the past smuggling activities (including multiple prior disposals of smuggled foreign-marked gold bars) and the necessity for preventive detention to prevent future prejudicial activities. Contentions regarding non-supply of documents, absence of imminent possibility of future smuggling, lack of subjective satisfaction, and violation of natural justice were held to be without merit. Priyanka Sarkariya v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 380 : 2026 INSC 371

Consolidation of Holdings

Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953 (U.P.) - Jurisdiction of Consolidation Authorities vis-à-vis Registered Instruments – Void vs. Voidable Documents – While Consolidation Authorities are exclusively invested with powers to adjudicate claims and can choose to disregard a document that is void ab initio, they possess no jurisdiction or power to cancel or ignore a "voidable" document - A voidable document continues to remain valid and binding upon the Consolidation Authorities until and unless it is explicitly set aside or cancelled by a competent Civil Court. [Relied on Khursheed and Another vs. Shaqoor, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2929; Ram Sakal Singh vs. Mosamat Monako Devi, (1997) 5 SCC 192; Paras 46 – 49] Sarafat Ali v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 642 : 2026 INSC 652

Constitution of India

Constitutional & Administrative Law — Correlative Public Duties of Local Authorities — Maintenance of Pedestrian Infrastructure – The Supreme Court ruled that the fundamental right to walk on demarcated footpaths carries a corresponding, enforceable legal duty upon public authorities - Wherever a road exists, there is a strict public duty to ensure a footpath is demarcated, constructed, and safely maintained - The primary duty-bearers responsible for provisioning and safeguarding this pedestrian infrastructure are Urban Development Authorities, Municipal Corporations, Municipalities, and Panchayats. [Paras 7 - 10] Maniyar Iliyaz Shaik Riyaz v. P. Ayyappan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 632 : 2026 INSC 647

Constitution of India – Judicial Review of Employer's Decision on Suitability – Appointment to Disciplined Force – Criminal Antecedents and Acquittal via Compounding - Even after a truthful disclosure of past criminal cases ending in acquittal, an employer retains the discretion to assess a candidate's suitability for appointment - such a decision cannot be arbitrary - To survive judicial review, it must be supported by material on record demonstrating that an offence involving moral turpitude was indeed committed and that the candidate was linked to it, despite earning an acquittal on technical grounds, benefit of doubt, or due to witnesses turning hostile or being won over. [Para 14] Gajula Thirupathi v. Telangana State Level Police Recruitment Board, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 606 : 2026 INSC 493

Constitutional Law – Separation of Powers & Judicial Review - Judiciary cannot create or expand criminal offences or prescribe punishments in the absence of legislative action - The Supreme Court held that the authority to enact binding general norms of conduct, formulate policy, and choose legislative responses falls squarely within the exclusive province of the Legislature - Under the Doctrine of Separation of Powers embedded in the Indian Constitution, the functional demarcation between the organs is fundamental; one organ cannot usurp the essential functions of another - While Courts can fill interstitial gaps to protect fundamental rights when a absolute legislative vacuum or constitutional silence exists, they cannot supplant the legislative scheme or construct parallel regulatory regimes where the field is already fully occupied by substantive law. [Relied on SCWLA v. Union of India (2016) 3 SCC 680; Dr. Ashwini Kumar v. Union of India (2020) 13 SCC 585; Paras 25-98, 164] Ashwini Kumar Upadhyaya v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 437 : 2026 INSC 432

Constitutional Law – Writ of Continuing Mandamus - Continuing Mandamus cannot be issued in anticipation of future contingencies or to micro-manage executive functions - The device of "continuing mandamus" is a judicial innovation designed to secure compliance with a declared right against institutional inertia, rather than a substantive standalone writ remedy - It cannot be deployed to keep matters pending in anticipation of future contingencies or possible defaults that have not yet arisen - To assume executive failure in advance and maintain continuous judicial oversight would violate the principle of institutional comity, transgress the doctrine of separation of powers, and unconstitutionally reduce the Court's role to the "micro-management" of matters falling strictly within the executive domain. [Relied on Lok Prahari v. Union of India (2021) 15 SCC 80 and National Federation of Indian Women v. Union of India (W.P. (C) No. 719 of 2023; Paras 65, 67, 69, 73, 75] Ashwini Kumar Upadhyaya v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 437 : 2026 INSC 432

Article 12 - Definition of State

Article 12 – Definition of 'State' – Maintainability of Writ Petition – Air Force Group Insurance Society (AFGIS) - The Supreme Court held that the Air Force Group Insurance Society (AFGIS) constitutes 'State' within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India. Consequently, writ petitions filed by its employees under Article 226 of the Constitution are maintainable - Key Determinants for Article 12 Status – Supreme Court observed that while no single test is exhaustive, the cumulative effect of the following factors established AFGIS as an instrumentality of the State - i. Deep and Pervasive Control - The Society was established with the sanction of the President of India, who also approved its deputation rules; ii. Administrative Dominance - The Board of Trustees and Managing Committee consist entirely of serving senior officers of the Indian Air Force (IAF); iii. Compulsory Nature - Membership and premium deductions are mandatory for all IAF personnel as an integral part of their service conditions, leaving no choice to the individual; iv. Public Function - The Society performs a public duty by providing insurance and welfare to armed forces personnel, which is a core government function linked to national sovereignty and security; v. Self-Representation - The Society had previously represented itself as 'Government' to seek exemptions from service tax under the Finance Act, 1994 – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Pradeep Kumar Biswas v. Indian Institute of Chemical Biology (2002) 5 SCC 111; Paras 15-19] Ravi Khokhar v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 244 : 2026 INSC 233

Article 12 and Article 226 – Maintainability of Writ Petition against a Society – Fiduciary Duty of Government Officers in Governing Bodies – The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's finding that a writ petition under Article 226 is maintainable against a Society (HEWO) comprising government employees, especially when issues of lack of transparency, unfairness, and unreasonableness in the allotment of housing facilities are raised - Noted that ex-officio members of a Governing Body, who are responsible government officers, must act in a fiduciary capacity for the common good, ensuring fairness, transparency, and accountability while eschewing favoritism, bias, and arbitrariness. [Para 5]. Dinesh Kumar v. State of Haryana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 171 : 2026 INSC 163 : AIR 2026 SC 1495

Article 14 – Equality before law

Constitution of India, 1950 — Article 14 — Public Interest Litigation — Regularisation vs. Demolition — Doctrine of Proportionality and Irreversibility — Irregular allotment of land by City and Industrial Development Corporation Limited (CIDCO) to a private developer without a competitive tender process - The High Court declared the allotment illegal and ordered restoration/demolition but granted liberty to apply for regularisation – Held that demolition of a fully operational commercial complex (shopping mall and hotel) after 17 years, an investment of ₹450 crores, 8,000 livelihoods, and ₹100 crores of annual tax revenue would not vindicate public interest - The severity of a remedial measure must bear a rational and proportionate relationship to the nature and magnitude of the wrong - Financial prejudice to the public authority can be remedied through a rigorous financial recovery mechanism, whereas demolition causes catastrophic and irreparable socio-economic harm - Public law must distinguish between remedies that restore public welfare and those that merely punish at the cost of the public - Demolition order set aside. [Paras 22, 23, 24, 26] K. Raheja Corp. v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 575 : 2026 INSC 551

Constitution of India, 1950 — Article 14 — Equal Pay for Equal Work / Regularization — Parity in Service benefits - The State Government framed a policy in 2005 to regularize Work Charged and Muster Roll workers engaged prior to 01.04.1993, under which approximately 30,000 workers were regularized - The appellants, who were similarly situated, engaged prior to the cut-off date, and had rendered continuous service for decades, were excluded due to clerical errors and administrative lapses on the part of the State - Held, the State cannot extend a benefit to one large group and deny it to a smaller group within the same identifiable class without demonstrating a valid distinction - Equality does not allow selective or partial implementation of a policy - Exclusion of the appellants is manifestly arbitrary, discriminatory, and violative of Article 14. [Relied on Secretary, State of Karnataka v. Umadevi, (2006) 4 SCC 1; State of Karnataka & Others v. M.L. Kesari & Others, (2010) 9 SCC 247; Jaggo v. Union of India, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3826; National Buildings Construction Corporation v. S. Raghunathan, (1998) 7 SCC 66; Bhola Nath v. State of Jharkhand and Others, 2026 INSC 99; Paras 60 - 78] Sukhendu Bhattacharjee v. State of Assam, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 529 : 2026 INSC 523

Constitution of India, 1950 — Articles 14 and 16 — Public Employment — Arbitrary Contractual Appointment against Regular Vacancy — Validity of Selection Process — Even by the most liberal approach to the primacy of selection committees in educational institutions, denying a regular appointment to a fully qualified candidate while appointing others on a regular basis through the same selection process is patently illegal and unconstitutional, especially when the selection record discloses no reasons for such differential treatment - If a candidate is deemed unsuitable for a regular appointment, they cannot be recommended even on a contractual basis. (Paras 12 - 14) Lokendra Kumar Tiwari v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 495 : 2026 INSC 487

Constitution of India — Articles 14, 16, 226, 142 and 309 — Mandamus for Regularisation contrary to Statutory Rules — High Court dismissed writ petitions filed by contractual para-teachers seeking regularisation — Held that Courts exercising powers under Articles 226 or 142 cannot issue a mandamus to regularise services contrary to the statutory scheme or rules made under Article 309 - Adherence to statutory rules must be insisted upon to protect the rights of open-market candidates and preserve the constitutional guarantees of equal opportunity in public employment. [Paras 11 - 21] Sunil Kumar Yadav v. State of Jharkhand, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 470 : 2026 INSC 462

Constitution of India, 1950 - Article 14 – Equal Treatment and Arbitrary Classification – Pendency of litigation cannot be a valid basis for classification - Denying engagement orders to candidates simply because litigation was pending against them as on the date of the closure of a government scheme, while issuing engagement orders to similarly situated candidates with no pending litigation, fails the twin-test of reasonable classification - Mere pendency of litigation is an extraneous circumstance and bears no rational nexus with the objective of maintaining educational standards. Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir v. Saba Wani, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 450 : 2026 INSC 439

Constitution of India – Articles 14 and 16 – Service Law – Promotion – Educational Qualification – Relaxation – Arbitrariness and Discrimination – The Supreme Court set aside the High Court Division Bench order that had upheld the Registrar's rejection of a promotion recommendation - held that when the Board of Directors—the competent authority validly exercises its discretion to grant relaxation in educational qualifications based on an employee's long service and competence, the Registrar cannot arbitrarily reject such a proposal - Denial of promotion to the appellant while granting it to similarly situated employees (Sushil Kumar Tripathi and Ram Swaroop Pandey) possessing the same qualifications constitutes a violation of the fundamental concept of equality. [Paras 6 - 9] Kamal Prasad Dubey v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 365 : 2026 INSC 353

Constitution of India – Key Principles and Reliance – i. Twin Tests of Article 14: For a classification to be valid, it must satisfy two conditions: (1) it must be founded on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes those grouped together from others; and (2) that differentia must have a rational nexus to the object sought to be achieved; ii. Arbitrariness as the Enemy of Equality: Equality and arbitrariness are sworn enemies. Where an act is arbitrary, it is implicitly unequal and violative of Article 14; iii. Financial Crunch vs. Discrimination: While a financial crunch may justify deferring benefits or setting implementation dates, it cannot justify providing discriminatory rates of enhancement for the same inflationary pressure once the decision to grant the benefit has been made. [Relied on D.S. Nakara & Others v. Union of India (1983) 1 SCC 305; State of Punjab & Ors. v. Davinder Singh & Ors (2025) 1 SCC 1; Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi (1981) 1 SCC 72; Paras 20-28] State of Kerala v. M. Vijayakumar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 360 : 2026 INSC 352

Constitution of India – Article 14 and Article 32 – Public Procurement – Transparency and Accountability – Facts – Petitioners alleged systemic nepotism and corruption in Arunachal Pradesh, asserting that public works were awarded to firms related to the Chief Minister and other high officials without open tenders - CAG report identified missing vouchers worth crores and repeated execution of works without tenders - The State holds public resources as a trustee on behalf of the people - Award of public contracts and execution of works must be transparent, fair, and free from arbitrariness or undisclosed conflicts of interest – Extraordinary power under Article 32 to transfer investigation to the CBI must be exercised sparingly and in exceptional situations - Such transfer is justified where high officials are involved, where the investigation by State machinery lacks credibility, or to instil public confidence in the rule of law. Save Mon Region Federation v. State of Arunachal Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 333 : 2026 INSC 320

Constitution of India – Article 14 – Equality before Law – Reasonable Classification – Dearness Allowance (DA) vs. Dearness Relief (DR) – Whether the State/KSRTC can effect a classification between serving employees and pensioners by granting enhancement of DA/DR at differential rates – HELD: No, The object of both DA and DR is common: to mitigate the hardship of inflation - Inflation hits both serving and retired employees with equal force - Once a decision is taken to provide and increase these allowances based on inflation, fixing a higher rate for serving employees (14%) than for pensioners (11%) has no rational nexus to the object sought to be achieved and is discriminatory and arbitrary. State of Kerala v. M. Vijayakumar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 360 : 2026 INSC 352

Article 14 – Manifest Arbitrariness – Srimati Radhika Sinha Institute and Sachchidanand Sinha Library (Requisition & Management) Act, 2015 – Unconstitutionality – Held: The impugned Act, which provides for the complete takeover of the management and assets of a private trust-run institution (Sinha Library) without a principled framework for compensation or a demonstration of mismanagement, is "manifestly arbitrary" - The State cannot use its legislative power to single out a specific institution for takeover without an intelligible basis or fair process - The Act fails the test of reasonableness and non-confiscatory nature required under Article 300A. Anurag Krishna Sinha v. State of Bihar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 226 : 2026 INSC 219

Articles 14 and 21 – Judicial Review of Executive Policy – Separation of Powers – While acknowledging the executive's competence in drafting health policies, Supreme Court maintained that the separation of powers cannot prevent judicial intervention when fundamental rights are violated due to the absence of a structured relief framework in exceptional circumstances. Rachana Gangu v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 225 : 2026 INSC 218

Articles 14 and 21 – Environmental Law – Precautionary Principle – Sustainable Development – Validity of Industrial Reclassification – The Supreme Court quashed the Central Pollution Control Board's (CPCB) January 2025 revised industrial categorization which downgraded "stand-alone cement grinding units without Captive Power Plants (CPP)" from 'Red' to 'Orange' category - Held: A regulatory downgrade that weakens environmental protection must bear a rational nexus to the object of safeguarding life and health - In the absence of proportionate and scientifically substantiated justification, such dilution is arbitrary and infringes the right to a clean and healthy environment under Article 21. [Paras 58, 65, 66] Harbinder Singh Sekhon v. State of Punjab, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 162 : 2026 INSC 159

Article 14 — Manifest Arbitrariness — Executive memoranda issued by the State that departed from the AICPI-linked formula stipulated in the ROPA Rules without an independent study or rational basis were held to be "manifestly arbitrary" - Noted that State action must be governed by reason and the "lacking in reasoned principle" prong of manifest arbitrariness applies when a State ignores its own statutory stipulations. State of West Bengal v. Confederation of State Government Employees, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 120 : 2026 INSC 123 : AIR 2026 SC 1213

Article 14 and 16 — Regularization of Service — Model Employer — The Supreme Court set aside the Jharkhand High Court's refusal to regularize contractual employees who had served for over a decade in sanctioned posts - held that the State, as a "model employer," cannot exploit the unequal bargaining power of employees by keeping them in perpetual contractual roles to evade regular employment obligations - Abruptly discontinuing long-serving employees solely based on "contractual nomenclature" without a speaking order is manifestly arbitrary and violative of Article 14. Bhola Nath v. State of Jharkhand, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 95 : 2026 INSC 99

Article 14 — Substantive Equality — The principle of substantive equality requires the State to remedy structural, institutional, and systemic disadvantages - Mere equal treatment is insufficient when individuals are placed in unequal positions due to biological, social, or economic factors. Inaccessibility of MHM measures converts a biological reality into a structural exclusion, violating the right to participate in education on equal terms. [Paras 41- 65] Dr. Jaya Thakur v Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 94 : 2026 INSC 97

Articles 14, 15(3), 21, and 21A — Right to Education and Menstrual Health — The Supreme Court held that the right to education is a "multiplier right" that enables the exercise of other human rights and forms an integral part of the right to life and human dignity - Noted that inaccessibility to Menstrual Hygiene Management (MHM) measures including clean gender-segregated toilets, sanitary napkins, and safe disposal mechanisms constitutes a violation of the fundamental rights of adolescent girl students. [Paras 20-40] Dr. Jaya Thakur v Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 94 : 2026 INSC 97

Articles 14, 21, and 41 – Directive Principles of State Policy – Article 142 of the Constitution – Supreme Court noted that Fundamental Rights (Part III) and Directive Principles (Part IV) are "two wheels of a chariot," where the principles of Article 39(a) (right to livelihood) and Article 41 (right to work in cases of disablement) must guide the interpretation of fundamental rights - The right to work is recognized as a precious liberty that enables a person to live with dignity beyond "mere animal existence." – Exercising its power to do complete justice, directed the creation of a supernumerary post for the appellant at North Eastern Coalfields CIL - The employer was directed to provide "reasonable accommodation" in the form of a suitable desk job with a computer and keyboard designed as per "universal design" under Section 2(ze) of the RPwD Act. [Relied on Omkar Ramchandra Gond v. Union of India; 2024 INSC 775; Anmol v. Union of India 2025 SCC OnLine SC 387; Om Rathod v. Director General of Health Services 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3130; Rajive Raturi v. Union of India 2024 16 SCC 654; Paras 13- 24] Sujata Bora v. Coal India Ltd; 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 46 : 2026 INSC 53 : AIR 2026 SC 454

Articles 14 and 21 - Classifying widowed daughters-in-law based solely on the timing of their husband's death (before or after the father-in-law) is arbitrary and lacks a rational nexus with the Act's object of securing maintenance for vulnerable dependants - Denying maintenance on such technical grounds would expose them to destitution, violating the right to life with dignity under Article 21 - Section 19 casts a personal obligation on the father-in-law to maintain his daughter-in-law during his lifetime - Section 22 creates an obligation on the heirs of the deceased to maintain dependants out of the estate - A claim under Section 22 arises only after the death of the father-in-law – Appeals dismissed. [Relied on B. Premanand v. Mohan Koikal (2011) 4 SCC 266; Vinod Kumar v. DM, Mau (2023) 19 SCC 126; Paras 16-28] Kanchana Rai v. Geeta Sharma, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 41 : 2026 INSC 54

Article 14 – Discrimination – noted that the respondents failed to show that any similarly situated candidates (those admitted after the 2010-11 session) were given direct appointments - noted that the last direct appointments (made in 2015) were pursuant to Court orders and limited to batches admitted prior to the 2011 policy change - Noted that the Uttar Pradesh Ayush Department (Ayurved) Nursing Service Rules, 2021 now govern the post, and recruitment must be conducted through the UPSSSC to select the most meritorious candidates. [Relied on Sivanandan C T and Others vs. High Court of Kerala and Others (2023 INSC 709; Paras 19-27] State of Uttar Pradesh v. Bhawana Mishra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 26 : 2026 INSC 38

Articles 14 and 16 - Retrospective Application of Recruitment Rules — Change in the "Rules of the Game" — The Supreme Court set aside the retrospective application of the Bihar Engineering Service Class-II Recruitment (Amendment) Rules, 2022, which introduced a 25% weightage for contractual work experience after the selection process (written examination and provisional merit list) had already commenced under the 2019 Rules – Supreme Court laid down key legal principles – i. Recruitment Process Sanctity: Eligibility criteria notified at the start of a recruitment process cannot be changed midway unless the extant rules or the advertisement explicitly permit such changes; ii. Vested Rights vs. Selection Criteria: While the State has the power to legislate retrospectively under Article 309, this power cannot be used to arbitrarily disrupt a selection process or alter the "eligibility criteria for being placed in the merit list" once the "game" has already been played; iii. Executive Instructions vs. Statutory Rules: The State cannot rely on executive memos (2018 and 2021) to override statutory recruitment rules that were in force at the time of the advertisement, particularly to the detriment of candidates who had no prior notice of such weightage - Supreme Court directed the State to finalize appointments based on the original merit lists from June/July 2022, strictly following the unamended 2019 Rules, within two months. [Relied on Tej Prakash Pathak and Others v. Rajasthan High Court and Others, (2025) 2 SCC 1; K. Manjusree v. State of Andhra Pradesh & Anr., (2008) 3 SCC 512; Paras 25-45] Abhay Kumar Patel v. State of Bihar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 14 : 2026 INSC 24

Article 14 — Admission to Medical Courses — Sports Quota — Change in Rules after commencement of process — Transparency and Fair Play — The Supreme Court quashed the Punjab Government's decision to expand the "zone of consideration" for sports achievements from Classes XI & XII to include Classes IX & X for MBBS/BDS admissions - Granted — To avoid unsettling admissions of third parties not before the Court, the relief was restricted to the appellants – directed that the appellants are to be accommodated in government medical college seats previously allotted to Respondents 4 and 5, while the respondents are to be moved to the seats vacated by the appellants in a private medical college. Divjot Sekhon v. State of Punjab, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 12 : 2026 INSC 26

Article 16 – Equality of opportunity in matters of public employment.

Constitution of India, Article 16 – Reservation for Economically Weaker Sections (EWS) – Validity of Income and Asset Certificates – Requirement of Specified Financial Year – Held: For claiming the benefit of EWS reservation, the Income and Asset Certificate must relate to the financial year prior to the year of application as prescribed in the advertisement and relevant Government Orders - A certificate pertaining to a different financial year, or one issued prior to the closure of the relevant financial year, is invalid and goes to the root of a candidate's eligibility - Candidates must be in possession of the necessary certificate in the prescribed form on or before the cut-off date - Rejection of candidature due to non-conformity with these requirements is justified to ensure the expeditious completion of public recruitment processes. Poonam Dwivedi v State of U.P., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 359 : 2026 INSC 351 : AIR 2026 SC 1860

Article 16 – Recruitment Process – Challenge by Unsuccessful Candidate – Estoppel – All India Council for Technical Education (Career Advancement Scheme for the Teachers and Other Academic Staff in Technical Institutions) (Degree) Regulations, 2012 – Scope and Applicability – Direct Recruitment vs. Career Progression - Held that it is a settled principle that a candidate who participated in the selection process without protest cannot challenge the "rules of the game" after being declared unsuccessful – Noted that the respondent participated in the interview held on 17.12.2015, secured 28 marks against the qualifying 45, and only challenged the process after failing to secure a recommendation – Held that to apply AICTE Regulations to a candidate participating in recruitment for the post of Professors in the Engineering Colleges in the State conducted by the Commission under State Rules framed by the State, would be to stretch the AICTE Regulations beyond its text, context, and purpose - The law does not permit a regulation crafted as a ladder to be used as a gate – Held that the AICTE Regulations do not apply to the process of direct recruitment under the State Rules - The AICTE Regulations of 2012 are not "Recruitment Rules" but are "Promotion and Progression Rules" - They apply to individuals already within the institutional framework (incumbents or newly appointed staff) for the purpose of career advancement - Suitability for a post determined by a committee of experts does not warrant interference in the exercise of powers of judicial review – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Anupal Singh & Others v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2020) 2 SCC 173; Paras 13 – 18] Gujarat Public Service Commission v. Gnaneshwary Dushyantkumar Shah, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 64 : 2026 INSC 70

Article 19 - Protection of certain rights regarding freedom of speech, etc.

Constitution of India, 1950 — Article 19(1)(d), Article 19(1)(a), Article 19(1)(b), Article 19(1)(c), and Article 21 — Fundamental Right to Walk and Access Demarcated Footpaths — Priority over Motorised Vehicles - The Supreme Court declared that the "Right to Walk" is a fundamental right guaranteed under Part III of the Constitution of India - It is inextricably connected to life and is integral to the right to move freely throughout the territory of India - This right takes within its sweep the right to safe, comfortable, and well-demarcated footpaths alongside motorised roads, which must be treated as primary and take priority over the movement of motorized vehicles - Walking also embodies expressional, congregational, and associational rights. [Paras 20] Maniyar Iliyaz Shaik Riyaz v. P. Ayyappan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 632 : 2026 INSC 647

Constitution of India, 1950 - Article 19(1)(a) – Freedom of Speech and Expression – Right to Education in Mother Tongue/Language of Choice - The guarantee of freedom of speech and expression necessarily encompasses the right to receive information in a form that is both meaningful and comprehensible - The true value of this freedom lies in the ability to understand, internalize, and process information - Education, as a primary vehicle for transmitting knowledge, must be imparted in a language that the child understands best - A child, or a parent/guardian on their behalf, has a fundamental right to freedom of choice regarding the medium of instruction at the primary school stage, and the State cannot artificially restrict this choice. [Paras 42, 43] Padam Mehta v. State of Rajasthan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 492 : 2026 INSC 476

Constitution of India, 1950 – Articles 19 and 21 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Cr.P.C.) / Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) – Section 168 (erstwhile Section 149 CrPC) – Bail Conditions – Validity of bail condition directing the accused to not reside in the same building as the complainant – Restraint on Residence – Proportionality and Reasonableness – Grant of bail with conditions is a discretionary relief, and courts may impose conditions that impinge on fundamental rights in exceptional cases - a bail condition that effectively ousts an accused from their own residence causes serious curtailment of rights guaranteed under Article 21 and must strictly satisfy the tests of reasonableness, proportionality, and necessity - In the absence of clear and cogent material showing that a less restrictive measure would not suffice, such an severe restriction becomes punitive rather than preventive - Where the conclusion of the trial is nowhere in sight and a speedy trial appears to be a mirage, a continuous restraint on the accused's right of residence is disproportionately harsh, unreasonable, and uncalled for. [Paras 15, 16, 23 & 24] Sachin Yadav v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 451

Articles 19(1)(f) and 31 - Right to Property and Burden of Proof – i. Burden of Proof - In cases alleging fundamental rights violations, the initial burden lies on the petitioner to establish the existence and invasion of such rights; ii. Title over Land - held that the petitioner failed to prove that Mizo Chiefs were absolute owners of the land under the British regime - Documents (boundary papers) suggested they functioned as administrative heads rather than proprietary owners; iii. Privy Purses - rejected the plea of discrimination comparing Mizo Chiefs to rulers of Princely States, noting that privy purses were outcomes of specific pre-constitutional contractual arrangements and not a legally enforceable fundamental right - the petitioner failed to establish a clear title to the lands or a specific breach of fundamental rights under the erstwhile Articles 19(1)(f) and 31, the petition was dismissed. [Relied on Tilokchand and Motichand & Ors v. H.B. Munshi & Anr (1969) 1 SCC 110; Rabindranath Bose & Ors v. Union of India & Ors (1970) 1 SCC 84; Assam Sanmilita Mahasangha & Ors vs Union of India & Ors (2015) 3 SCC 1; G.P. Doval & Ors v. Chief Secretary, Government of U.P. (1984) 4 SCC 329; Paras 27-64] Mizo Chief Council Mizoram v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 241 : 2026 INSC 236

Article 19(1)(a) – Freedom of Speech and Expression – Article 19(2) – Reasonable Restrictions – Cinematograph Act, 1952 – Film Certification – Judicial Interference – Petition filed seeking to restrain the release of the film "Ghooskhor Pandat," alleging offensive stereotyping against the Brahmin community - The Respondent/Producer filed an affidavit unequivocally withdrawing the title and undertaking that any new title would not be evocative of the earlier one - Supreme Court disposed of the petition, noting that the grievances were suitably addressed by this undertaking. Atul Mishra v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 193

Standards for Judging Film Content – "The Ordinary Reasonable Man" – The effect of words or expressions in a movie must be judged by the standards of "reasonable, strong-minded, firm and courageous men," and not by those of weak or hypersensitive minds – Noted that the "man on the top of a Clapham omnibus" standard - Freedom of expression cannot be held to ransom by an intolerant group of people – Noted that if the rights of artists were subjected to popular notions of what is acceptable, the constitutional guarantee would be rendered illusory - Once a competent statutory Board grants a certificate, no individual or group can create disturbances in the exhibition of the film - Courts must be at the forefront to zealously protect the freedom of speech and expression, even if Judges personally dislike the spoken or written words. [Para 19, 22-24, 32-34] Atul Mishra v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 193

Article 19(1)(c) – Right to Form Associations – Regulatory Control over Sports Bodies –The Supreme Court reaffirmed that while the right to form an association includes its continued existence with its original voluntary composition, it does not extend to an uninhibited right to pursue goals free from regulatory control - So long as the initial voluntary composition remains unaffected, regulatory measures do not violate Article 19(1)(c). Tiruchirappalli District Cricket Association v. Anna Nagar Cricket Club, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 154 : 2026 INSC 154 : AIR 2026 SC 1051

Article 20 - Protection in respect of conviction for offences

Constitution of India – Article 20(3) – Evidence Act, 1872 – Sections 25 & 26 – Crime Scene Re-enactment – Right Against Self-Incrimination - The Supreme Court corrected the High Court's finding that compelling an accused to re-enact a crime scene per se violates the right against self-incrimination under Article 20(3) of the Constitution or constitutes an inadmissible confession under Sections 25 and 26 of the Evidence Act - The core test is whether the exercise compels the disclosure of incriminating information from the personal knowledge of the accused, or merely requires him to mimic a visual sequence or perform physical movements - A directed re-enactment staged by the Investigating Officer to analyze physical attributes does not amount to a personal testimony - While a re-enactment is merely "created evidence" and not substantive proof of the actual crime, expert assessments derived from it—such as gait analysis—are admissible as corroborative evidence of identity. [Paras 86-90] State of Tamil Nadu v. Ponnusamy, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 519 : 2026 INSC 507

Article 20(3) – Right Against Self-Incrimination – Anticipatory Bail – NDPS Act – Held that State cannot insist that an accused hand over his mobile phone as a condition for "cooperating with the investigation" if doing so forces the accused to incriminate himself - The Supreme Court held that while an appellant must join the investigation, the obligation to cooperate does not extend to a violation of the constitutional right against self-incrimination. Vinay Kumar Gupta v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 180

Article 21 - Protection of life and personal liberty

Constitution of India, 1950 — Article 21 — Fundamental Right to Travel Abroad vs. Right to Speedy Trial and Societal Interest — Interplay and Balancing of Rights — While Article 21 guarantees the fundamental right to personal liberty, including the right to travel abroad, such a right is not absolute and cannot be viewed in isolation - A balance must be struck between the individual liberty of the accused on one hand, and the victim's right to a speedy trial along with the larger societal interest in ensuring the effective administration of criminal justice on the other. [Para 10] Seesa Santosh v. State of Telangana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 603 : 2026 INSC 628

Constitution of India – Article 21 – Criminal Procedure – Right to Speedy Trial and Timely Investigation – Duty of Constitutional Courts - Inordinate Delay in Investigation – Appeal against High Court order dismissing a writ petition seeking directions to file a charge-sheet in a criminal complaint pending for nearly two decades – Constitutional courts cannot remain mute spectators to prolonged and endless investigations – Right to speedy trial is an intrinsic facet of Article 21 of the Constitution, which inherently includes the timely completion of investigations – If an investigation continues for an unduly long period without adequate justification, the High Court ought to exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction to intervene instead of dismissing the plea on technical or alternative-remedy grounds. [Paras 10 - 13] Sahil Abdulsattar Mansuri v. Safimahamad Fafirbhai Mansuri, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 601 : 2026 INSC 626

Constitution of India, 1950 — Articles 21 & 23 — Human Trafficking for Commercial Sexual Exploitation (CSE)— Right to Rehabilitation — Held, a combined reading of Articles 21 and 23 establishes that victims of trafficking for CSE possess a fundamental right to rehabilitation - The constitutional obligations owed to victims of exploitative structures extend beyond a prevention, rescue, and punishment paradigm to comprehensive rehabilitation - State's failure to provide a robust "Victim Protection Plan" and adequate rehabilitation infrastructures violates Articles 21 and 23 - Detailed guidelines issued under Articles 32 and 142 to govern pre-rescue, rescue, post-rescue, rehabilitation, and repatriation of victims until the enactment of comprehensive central legislation. [Paras 56, 277-281, 290 - 303] Prajwala v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 574 : 2026 INSC 609

Constitution of India – Article 21 [Right to Life and Personal Liberty] – Administrative Delay in Releasing Prisoner on Parole Post-Judicial Order – Inherent Power / Public Law Remedy – Grant of Monetary Compensation for Illegal Detention - Appeal seeking monetary compensation for 24 days of illegal detention resulting from administrative delay by State authorities in executing a judicial release order on permanent parole - The High Court had directed the release of the appellant-convict on parole, and despite compliance with the conditions and verification of sureties, the State delayed his actual release on the ground that it was considering filing an appeal against the parole order - The Supreme Court observed that the deprivation of liberty by the State without lawful authority or in violation of constitutional provisions constitutes illegal detention - Supreme Court forcefully negated the State's justification, holding that a judicial order remains in operation unless stayed, modified, or set aside by a superior forum - The principle of "obey first, appeal later" must guide executive actions, and the State cannot subordinate an individual's fundamental right to personal liberty to its slow bureaucratic processes or administrative decisions regarding whether to prefer an appeal - Just because a person is a convict does not mean their constitutional rights weigh any less on the scales of justice - Held, the non-release of the prisoner after the satisfaction of judicial conditions amounts to illegal detention, for which monetary compensation is an established public law remedy to penalize the public wrong and make amends - The State was directed to pay a compensation of Rs. 11,00,000/- directly to the appellant. [Paras 9 - 12] Daudayal v. State of Rajasthan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 567 : 2026 INSC 599

Constitution of India, 1950 — Article 21 — Right to Life — Right to Trauma Care and Road Safety — The right to trauma care of citizens is an integral part of the right to life enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution of India - A robust, uniform, and swift mechanism for emergency trauma care is critical to recognizing and responding to road accident situations to save human lives - Bystanders often hesitate to act due to fear of legal proceedings or police harassment - Systemic interventions, uniform frameworks, and proper Good Samaritan laws are required to eliminate these barriers. Savelife Foundation v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 556

Constitution of India, 1950 — Article 21 — Right to Life — Right to Trauma Care and Road Safety — Interim Directions for Uniform Trauma Care System — The Supreme Court issued comprehensive time-bound interim directions to the Union and all States/UTs i. Full technical and operational integration of all emergency helplines (100, 101, 108, etc.) into the universal helpline 112 within three months; ii. Establishment of functional physical and digital Good Samaritan Grievance Redressal Systems within three months; iii. Notification of a medical rescue protocol by the Union within three months, to be operationalized by States/UTs within three months thereafter; iv. Mandatory Automotive Industry Standard 125 (AIS-125) compliance and GPS/Vehicle Location Tracking Device (VLTD) fitment in all public and private ambulances, integrated with helpline 112 within three months; v. Adoption of the National Commission for Allied and Healthcare Professionals (NCAHP) notified Emergency Medical Technician (EMT) curriculum within three months; vi. Establishment of State Trauma Registries within four months; vii. Grading and designation of all medical facilities across National/State Highways and urban areas within three months; viii. Full operationalization of the PM RAHAT cashless treatment scheme for road accident victims within three months, failing which it would amount to a violation of the Motor Vehicles Act; ix. Execution of multi-lingual mass-media campaigns within one month. [Relied on Savelife Foundation v. Union of India, (2016) 7 SCC 194; Paras 5-12] Savelife Foundation v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 556

Constitution of India, 1950 - Article 21 — Right to Life and Personal Safety — Stray Dog Menace vs. Animal Welfare - Held, the fundamental right to live with dignity under Article 21 encompasses the right of every citizen to move freely and access public spaces without living under constant apprehension of physical harm, attack, or exposure to life-threatening events like dog bites - While animal welfare and protection of sentient beings are of high constitutional and moral significance, they cannot eclipse or subordinate the paramount obligation of the State to safeguard human life, bodily integrity, and public safety - When human lives are weighed against the interests of sentient beings, the constitutional balance must unequivocally tilt in favor of the preservation and protection of human life. (Paras 31, 99, 101) In Re : City Hounded by Strays, Kids Pay Price v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 515 : 2026 INSC 506

Constitution of India, 1950 - Article 21 — Right to Life and Personal Safety — Stray Dog Menace vs. Animal Welfare - Protection of Officials Acting in Good Faith - Held, all officers and officials of municipal authorities, local bodies, Panchayati Raj institutions, and autonomous bodies/schools/hospitals tasked with executing the Court's directions shall be entitled to due protection for acts performed in good faith - No FIR, criminal complaint, or coercive proceeding shall ordinarily be initiated against them unless a prima facie case of mala fides or gross abuse of authority is established. [Para 108] In Re : City Hounded by Strays, Kids Pay Price v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 515 : 2026 INSC 506

Tortious Liability & Administrative Accountability - Stray Dog Management — Assumption of Responsibility by Animal Welfare Groups and Institutional Heads - Held, the assertion of rights or interests in favor of protecting and feeding stray dogs cannot operate in isolation from the corresponding responsibility to safeguard human safety - It is mandatory for animal welfare groups, associations, or student-led bodies operating within educational or institutional campuses to file an affidavit undertaking express tortious liability for any incident of dog bites or attacks occurring within the premises - If no such undertaking is filed, no activity of maintaining or feeding stray dogs shall be permitted within the campus - Failure to enforce this will entail suitable action against the Head of the Institution concerned. [Paras 71–74] In Re : City Hounded by Strays, Kids Pay Price v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 515 : 2026 INSC 506

Engagement of NGOs — Due Diligence and Financial Accountability - While observing that Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) can play a constructive role in executing the Capture-Sterilize-Vaccinate-Release (CSVR) model to ease the burden on local bodies, judicial notice was taken of instances where fraudulent or repetitive bills were submitted for monetary gain - Held, municipal authorities must undertake rigorous background checks, verify credentials, and evaluate technical capability and financial integrity before awarding contracts to NGOs - Public funds must be protected through continuous supervision, periodic field inspections, and independent financial/performance audits. [Paras 65–67] In Re : City Hounded by Strays, Kids Pay Price v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 515 : 2026 INSC 506

Constitution of India, 1950 – Article 21 – Criminal Procedure – Anticipatory Bail – Political Rivalry – A careful balance must be struck between the State's interest in ensuring a fair investigation and the individual's fundamental right to personal liberty under Article 21 - The criminal process must be applied with objectivity and circumspection to ensure that individual liberty is not imperiled by proceedings coloured by political rivalry - Where allegations and counter-allegations prima facie appear to be politically motivated, and the surrounding circumstances indicate the presence of political overtones, a higher threshold is required to justify the deprivation of personal liberty - If the tests enumerated for the grant of anticipatory bail are met, and the veracity of the allegations can be tested at trial, custodial interrogation is not warranted. [Paras 25, 26] Pawan Khera v. State of Assam, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 443 : 2026 INSC 437

Constitution of India - Article 21 - Right to Speedy Trial - Prolonged incarceration of an undertrial prisoner for nearly 9 years without conclusion of trial constitutes a gross violation of the fundamental right to speedy trial. Bail must be granted in such cases, irrespective of the gravity of the offence. Vaibhav Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 439

Road Safety Directions – Parking and Encroachment – i. Prohibition on Unauthorized Parking: Heavy/commercial vehicles prohibited from parking on any National Highway carriageway or paved shoulder except at designated bays - Enforcement mandated via Advanced Traffic Management System (ATMS), GPS-timestamped evidence, and eChallans; ii. Encroachment Removal: Construction of new commercial structures within the Right of Way (ROW) prohibited with immediate effect - District Magistrates directed to remove existing unauthorized structures within 60 days; iii. Land Use Restrictions: State Governments to notify prohibition of land use change within 40 metres (residential) and 75 metres (commercial) from the highway mid-point; iv. Emergency Services: Deployment of BLS ambulances and recovery cranes at intervals not exceeding 75 km within 60 days; v. Wayside Amenities: Construction of truck lay-byes every 75 km, prioritized on the Amritsar-Jamnagar Highway - Amenities must include rest areas, food services, and first-aid; vi. Blackspots: Identification and publication of accident blackspots within 45 days, followed by installation of high-intensity LED lighting and speed cameras; vii. District Highway Safety Task Force: Constitution of task forces in every district within 15 days to conduct fortnightly reviews; viii. Monitoring: NHAI to conduct drone-based aerial surveys at least twice annually - MoRTH to report on the constitution of an Inter-State Highway Safety Coordination Committee within 60 days. [Relied on Gyan Prakash vs. Union of India and others, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1189; Paras 4-8] In Re: Phalodi Accident, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 391 : 2026 INSC 388

Constitution of India – Article 21 and Article 142 – Right to Life and Safe Passage – Road Safety and Infrastructure Failures – Supreme Court took suo-motu cognizance of systemic negligence following fatal accidents in Phalodi (Rajasthan) and Rangareddy (Telangana) - Held: The 'Right to Life' under Article 21 is a positive mandate for the State to ensure a safe environment - Safety of commuters is an integral facet of the right to live with dignity - Recognizing that National Highways account for nearly 30% of road fatalities despite being only 2% of total road length, the Court issued comprehensive interim directions under Article 142 to address administrative lethargy and infrastructural gaps. In Re: Phalodi Accident, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 391 : 2026 INSC 388

Constitution of India, 1950; Article 21 and Article 142 — Environmental Law — Illegal Sand Mining — National Chambal Gharial Sanctuary — The Supreme Court took proactive measures against rampant illegal sand mining in the National Chambal Gharial Sanctuary, spanning the states of Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, and Uttar Pradesh - Supreme Court emphasized that the protection of fragile ecosystems is a constitutional imperative and an integral facet of the Right to Life under Article 21 - Exercising powers under Article 142, the Court issued mandatory interim directions to curb environmental degradation and protect enforcement personnel from organized "sand mafias". In Re: Illegal Sand Mining in the National Chambal Sanctuary, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 386 : 2026 INSC 380

Article 21 of the Constitution of India – Criminal Jurisprudence – Bail – Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (UAPA) – Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (PMLA) – Prolonged incarceration of an undertrial accused – Appeal against Delhi High Court order denying bail – Appellant in custody since June 4, 2019, with a combined incarceration of 8 ½ years in NIA and ED cases – Trial proceeding at a "snail's pace" with only 34 out of 248 witnesses examined so far – Held, prolonged detention where a trial is unlikely to conclude within a reasonable time results in undue curtailment of personal liberty under Article 21 – Stringent bail provisions in special statutes (UAPA/PMLA) cannot be used to incarcerate an accused indefinitely without trial – The rigours of such statutory provisions melt down when there is no likelihood of the trial completing in a reasonable time and the accused has undergone a substantial part of the sentence – Considering the appellant's advanced age (74 years), medical ailments, and bleak chances of early trial disposal, Supreme Court enlarged the appellant on bail subject to stringent conditions – Appeal allowed. [Relied on V. Senthil Balaji v. Deputy Director, Enforcement Directorate, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2626; Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb, (2021) 3 SCC 713; Paras 18-20] Shabir Ahmed Shah v. National Investigation Agency, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 305

Article 21 – Right to Die with Dignity – Passive Euthanasia – Withdrawal of Life-Sustaining Treatment – Clinically Assisted Nutrition and Hydration (CANH) – Supreme Court allowed the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment, specifically CANH administered through a PEG tube, for a patient in an irreversible Permanent Vegetative State (PVS) for over 12 years - Held: The right to live with dignity under Article 21 includes the right to die with dignity - In cases where medical treatment is futile and serves no therapeutic purpose other than artificially prolonging a mindless biological existence, its withdrawal is constitutionally permissible. [Paras 29, 52, 72, 91] Harish Rana v Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 229 : 2026 INSC 222

Article 21 – Right to Life and Health – COVID-19 Vaccination – Adverse Events Following Immunization (AEFI) – Compensation Policy – The Supreme Court directed the Union of India to formulate a "no-fault" compensation framework for serious adverse events or deaths resulting from COVID-19 vaccinations - held that while the state-led vaccination program was a vital public health intervention, the State bears a positive obligation under Article 21 to ensure that families suffering grave harm are not left without an accessible mechanism for redress. Rachana Gangu v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 225 : 2026 INSC 218

Article 21 – Right to Life and Dignity – The guarantee of life and personal dignity extends beyond prison gates; incarceration must not degenerate into inhumanity - Convicts are not denuded of all fundamental rights by mere reason of conviction. OCIs, based on trust and self-discipline, align with the constitutional vision of viewing prisons as institutions of correction and social reintegration - Exclusion of women prisoners from OCIs in several states (e.g., Assam, Gujarat, UP, West Bengal) or failing to transfer eligible women constitutes blatant gender discrimination - States directed to develop gender-sensitive protocols to ensure women have equal access to reformative facilities. Suhas Chakma v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 205 : 2026 INSC 198

Article 21 – Right to a Clean and Healthy Environment – The Supreme Court reaffirmed that the right to a clean and healthy environment is an inseparable part of the Right to Life guaranteed under Article 21 – Held that the State has an affirmative duty to protect the environment to ensure the well-being of all citizens, noting that the time is ripe for the rigorous implementation of this constitutional guarantee. Bhopal Municipal Corporation v. Dr. Subhash C. Pandey, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 182

Article 21 — Right to Dignity, Privacy, and Health — The right to life includes the right to a dignified existence and the right to menstrual health - Dignity is undermined when girl children are subjected to stigma or compelled to adopt unsafe practices due to a lack of facilities - Privacy is a concomitant of dignity, imposing a positive obligation on the State to facilitate a private space for menstrual management. [Paras 70 -80, 85 – 96] Dr. Jaya Thakur v Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 94 : 2026 INSC 97

Article 21A - Right to Education

Constitution of India - Article 21-A & Article 142 – Right to Education vs. Complete Justice – The constitutional guarantee to provide education includes within its ambit the right to quality education - While invoking plenary powers under Article 142 to balance equities and accommodate merit-holders , the mandate of Article 21-A cannot be compromised - the state is at liberty to dispense with the services of teachers who fail to acquire mandatory minimum statutory qualifications within the prescribed grace period. Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir v. Saba Wani, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 450 : 2026 INSC 439

Article 21A and Article 23 – Right to Education and Prohibition of Forced Labour – Contractual Teachers – Honorarium Revision – The Supreme Court held that part-time contractual instructors appointed under the Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan (now Samagra Shiksha Scheme) in Upper Primary Schools are entitled to periodic revision of their honorarium – Noted that keeping such teachers on a stagnant, meager honorarium (initially ₹7,000/-) for over a decade, while prohibiting them from taking other employment, amounts to "economic coercion" and "forced labour" (Begar) prohibited under Article 23. U.P. Junior High School Council Instructor Welfare Association v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 110

Article 32 – Remedies for enforcement of rights conferred by this Part

Constitution of India – Article 32 vs. Statutory Remedies - Extraordinary Jurisdiction under Article 32 cannot be routinely invoked to bypass efficacious statutory mechanisms - The Supreme Court clarified that while constitutional remedies under Articles 32 and 226 remain available as vital safeguards against the failure of statutory authorities, this jurisdiction is extraordinary in nature - It ought not to be invoked in a routine manner to bypass the comprehensive, multi-tiered remedies provided under the statutory framework of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (now Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023). [Sakiri Vasu v. State of U.P. (2008) 2 SCC 409; Paras 56, 61, 98] Ashwini Kumar Upadhyaya v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 437 : 2026 INSC 432

Constitution of India – Article 32 – Public Interest Litigation (PIL) – Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006 – Maintainability of PIL based on media reports – Judicial Restraint – Separation of Powers - Public Interest Litigation – Requirements of Credible Material – Petitioner sought a writ of mandamus for the constitution of a National Task Force and a nationwide food safety audit based on various instances of food contamination and regulatory failure - Held: PILs must be founded on credible, cogent, and research-based material - Newspaper reports and media publications highlighting sporadic incidents do not constitute reliable or legally admissible evidence to establish a systemic failure of fundamental rights under Article 32. [Paras 5, 6] Dr. K.A. Paul @ Kilari Anand Paul v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 355

Article 32 and Article 14 – Declaration of Public Holidays – Judicial Review of Policy Decisions – Writ petition seeking directions to the Union and State governments to frame uniform guidelines for declaring public/gazetted holidays and to declare Guru Gobind Singh's 'Prakash Parv' as a nationwide gazetted holiday - Held: Dismissing the petition, the Court observed that the declaration of public holidays is a policy decision involving administrative efficiency, economic implications, and the balancing of diverse socio-cultural practices – Noted that i. Executive Domain: Matters of policy determination regarding governance and administrative exigencies lie within the exclusive domain of the executive. Any judicial mandate to increase non-working days involves a line-drawing exercise that is inherently policy-driven and not amenable to judicial determination; ii. Article 14 (Equality): The absence of a uniform policy does not amount to discrimination under Article 14. Absolute uniformity is not mandated where differentiation is founded on rational considerations, such as regional socio-cultural needs in a federal structure; iii. Article 25 (Religious Freedom): Freedom of religion does not extend to a right to seek State recognition of a religious occasion in the form of a compulsory nationwide public holiday; iv. Administrative Impact: Expanding the list of gazetted holidays would adversely impact governance and public productivity - In a developing nation, the focus must remain on the dignity of labor and continuity of work; v. Floodgates Argument: Granting such relief would open the floodgates to similar claims from diverse sections of society, leading to an impractical expansion of holidays; vi. Legacy of Guru Gobind Singh Ji: Supreme Court recorded deep reverence for the Tenth Guru, noting that his teachings of 'Kirat Karo' (honest living) and 'Vand Chakko' (sharing) emphasize active engagement with responsibilities - His legacy is best honored through the dedicated performance of duties rather than a symbolic show of respect by demanding a holiday. [Paras 11-18] All India Shiromani Singh Sabha v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 290 : 2026 INSC 289

Article 32 – Writ Petition seeking directions regarding alleged violations of the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) – Import of animals by private facilities – Legality of CITES permits – Held: The subject matter was previously examined by a Special Investigation Team (SIT) in W.P. (C) No. 783 of 2025, which found no violation of domestic or international law - The CITES Secretarial Document relied upon by the petitioner explicitly records that no evidence was found regarding imports without requisite documentation or for commercial purposes - Once an import is effected under valid permission, it cannot be subsequently treated as prohibited merely because objections are raised later - Disturbing the settled environment, custody, and care of living animals (including rescued animals) after lawful import may itself result in cruelty. [Relied on East India Commercial Co. Ltd. Vs. The Collector of Customs, 1962 AIR 1893; Paras 2-5] Karanartham Viramah Foundation v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 266

Article 32 and Article 21 – Right to Legal Representation and Personal Liberty – Transfer of Criminal Case – The Supreme Court deprecated the acts of hooliganism and violence by the District Bar Association, Barabanki, where members passed a resolution to not represent the accused and physically assaulted the office of an advocate who filed a bail application - held that the denial of bail for over two months in a case arising from a trivial scuffle at a toll plaza was unjustified and violative of Article 21 – Noted that denial of bail to the petitioners and the curtailment of their liberty for a period exceeding two months is absolutely unjustified and violative of the Fundamental Right of Liberty guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India warranting exercise of the extraordinary writ jurisdiction conferred upon this Court by Article 32 of the Constitution of India - To ensure a fair trial and proper legal representation - the Supreme Court directed the immediate release of the petitioners on bail and transferred the proceedings from Barabanki, Uttar Pradesh, to Tis Hazari Courts, New Delhi. Vishvjeet v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 257 : 2026 INSC 254

Article 32 – Writ Petition – Delay and Laches – Right to Property – Writ petition filed by Mizo Chief Council seeking compensation for lands allegedly acquired without due process in 1954-55 - Respondents raised preliminary objection regarding inordinate delay of nearly six decades - The Supreme Court reiterated that while Article 32 is a fundamental right, it is not immune from general principles of law and reasonable procedure - Petitions agitating stale claims ought not to be entertained to prevent disturbing settled positions and causing prejudice to third parties - Supreme Court clarified that the operative test is not "unreasonable delay" but "unexplained delay. Mizo Chief Council Mizoram v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 241 : 2026 INSC 236

Article 32 – Writ Jurisdiction vs. High Court Administration – While the Supreme Court does not ordinarily function as a supervisory forum over the day-to-day administration or rosters of High Courts, it may intervene in "rare and exceptional situations" where continuing inaction results in a demonstrable infringement of fundamental rights under Articles 14 and 21 – Supreme Court noted that pending revisions must be decided by giving full effect to the legal and constitutional observations of the Supreme Court - The failure to implement specific directions regarding the re-evaluation of withdrawal of prosecution (Section 321 CrPC) implicated the credibility of the criminal process. [Paras 3-9] Jaideep Kumar Srivastava v. State of U.P., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 211

Article 32 – Enforcement of Fundamental Rights – Abuse of Criminal Process – Successive FIRs – The Supreme Court allowed a Writ Petition where the State registered multiple FIRs in quick succession to ensure the petitioner remained in custody despite being granted bail in earlier matters – Noted that such conduct by the prosecution established a conscious effort to keep the petitioner incarcerated, amounting to a violation of personal liberty. Binay Kumar Singh v. State of Jharkhand, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 153

Article 32 – Powers of the Supreme Court – Article 32 is the "heart and soul" of the Constitution as it empowers citizens to directly approach the Supreme Court for the enforcement of fundamental rights – Noted that it will not readily refuse to hear a petition under Article 32 if a violation of a fundamental right is prima facie established. Binay Kumar Singh v. State of Jharkhand, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 153

Article 32 – Writ Petition – Domestic Workers' Rights – Minimum Wages – Separation of Powers – Petitioners sought a writ of mandamus declaring that domestic workers have a fundamental right to minimum wages under Articles 21 and 23 and challenging their exclusion from the Minimum Wages Act and Code of Wages, 2019 - Held: Supreme Court declined to issue a positive mandamus for the enactment of law, emphasizing the doctrine of separation of powers - While acknowledging the vulnerable status of domestic workers and the lack of legislative protection, noted that an enforceable decree cannot be passed if it requires the legislature to enact a specific law - Supreme Court impressed upon State Governments to consider the grievances highlighted by the petitioners and urged the development of suitable mechanisms to prevent exploitation and ensure minimum wages. [Relied on Ajay Malik vs. State of Uttarakhand and another [(2025) INSC 118]; Paras 2-8] Penn Thozhilalargal Sangam v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 124

Article 32 – Writ Jurisdiction – Principles of Natural Justice – Doctrine of Bias – Selection Process – Search-cum-Selection Committee (SCSC) – Bias and Malafides in Service Matters - The Supreme Court allowed the writ petition, setting aside the SCSC's decision to reject the petitioner's candidature - held that the inclusion of an officer as a member of the selection committee who had been personally arraigned as a contemnor by the candidate in the same dispute violates the principles of natural justice - Such participation creates a "reasonable apprehension of bias" in the mind of the candidate, rendering the decision-making process vulnerable and a nullity, regardless of whether actual bias is proven – Noted that justice must not only be done but must manifestly be seen to be done, and authorities must appear to act fairly to preserve public confidence in the impartiality of the selection process – Supreme Court directed the DoPT to convene a fresh SCSC meeting within four weeks, excluding "the Officer" in question, and imposed costs of Rs. 5 lakhs on the respondents for "rank procrastination" and "deliberate obstacles" bordering on vendetta. [Relied on State of Gujarat v. R.A. Mehta, (2013) 3 SCC 1; A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India, (1969) 2 SCC 262; S. Parthasarathi v. State of A.P., (1974) 3 SCC 459; Paras 41-46] Captain Pramod Kumar Bajaj v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 97 : 2026 INSC 101

Article 32, 19(1)(d), 19(1)(e), and 19(1)(g) – Judicial Service – Migration to another State Service – Right to Profession – Petitioners, serving as Civil Judges in Uttarakhand, sought permission to join the Delhi Judicial Service after being declared successful in the recruitment examination - The High Court of Uttarakhand rejected their request, citing concerns over judicial vacancies and the impact on the litigant public - Held: The interest of the individual officers to advance their careers has an overriding effect over the administrative concerns of the parent High Court regarding vacancies - Denial of such permission results in "negativity, frustration," and a violation of fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution - The Supreme Court directed the High Court of Uttarakhand to pass orders for the cessation of their services to enable them to join the Delhi Judicial Service by the stipulated deadline - Supreme Court clarified that while the petitioners' joining was delayed due to the pending legal challenge, their seniority in the Delhi Judicial Service must be maintained as per their original position in the Select List - held that permission cannot be denied to a judicial officer to join the service of another State merely on the ground that migration will give rise to vacancies in the first State - The delay caused by the litigation shall not adversely affect their merit-based seniority – Petition allowed. [Paras 13-18] Anubhuti Goel v. High Court of Uttarakhand, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 67

Article 39 - Certain principles of policy to be followed by the State.

Article 39(b) – Public Trust Doctrine – Spectrum as a Natural Resource – Spectrum is a finite, scarce, and renewable natural resource - The State holds spectrum in trust for the people and is constitutionally obligated to ensure its distribution subserves the common good and generates adequate compensation for the public - The grant of a license is a "State largesse" and does not result in the transfer of proprietary interest or ownership to private entities. [Paras 15, 16, 33] State Bank of India v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 152 : 2026 INSC 153

Articles 48A - Protection and improvement of environment and safeguarding of forests and wild life

Articles 48A, 51A(g), 226, and 32 – Environmental Law – Protection of Reserved Forests – Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants – Due Process – Rule of Law – The Supreme Court addressed the State's obligation to protect reserved forests while balancing the rights of long-standing human habitations - Noted that while forests are vital ecological systems and carbon sinks, and the State has a constitutional mandate to safeguard them, such protection must be pursued through lawful, non-arbitrary means. Abdul Khalek v. State of Assam, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 134 : 2026 INSC 140 : AIR 2026 SC 933

Article 51A - Fundamental duties of every citizen of India

Articles 51A and 51A(e) – Fraternity and Constitutional Duty – Supreme Court noted that fraternity is a guiding philosophy of the Constitution - It is the fundamental duty of every citizen to promote harmony and the spirit of common brotherhood - Vilifying or denigrating any community based on religion, language, caste, or region is constitutionally impermissible. [Para 11-14] Atul Mishra v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 193

Article 91 - Power of the Deputy Chairman or other person to perform the duties of the office of, or to act as, Chairman.

Article 91 – Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968 – Section 3(1) – Competence of Deputy Chairman – Held that the office of the Chairman of the Rajya Sabha is vacant, the Deputy Chairman is constitutionally mandated under Article 91(1) to perform all duties of the office - The statutory powers vested in the "Chairman" under Section 3 of the Inquiry Act are inseparable from the office of the Presiding Officer and must be read in harmony with the Constitutional scheme - the Deputy Chairman is competent to consider a notice of motion and exercise discretion to admit or refuse it under Section 3(1) of the Act. [Paras 17 - 22] X v. Speaker of the House of the People, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 53 : 2026 INSC 65

Article 136 – Special leave to appeal by the Supreme Court

Constitution of India, 1950 – Article 136 – Scope of Writ Jurisdiction – Layout Sanction and Plot Incorporation – Title Disputes - The High Court in its writ jurisdiction cannot unnecessarily delve into or adjudicate upon the issue of title when it was never under dispute and the writ petition was filed for the limited purpose of seeking a direction to incorporate a plot into a colony's layout plan - A mere entry in the list of properties maintained by a Municipal Corporation cannot, by itself, constitute a valid proof of title over the subject land. Pawan Garg v. South Delhi Municipal Corporation, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 397 : 2026 INSC 389

Constitution of India - Article 136 – Equitable Relief – Supreme Court declined to exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution, observing that the appellant's conduct was "callous, laconic, and in clear violation of applicable rules -" Supreme Court emphasized that it would be loath to substitute its own discretion for that of the State Government regarding commercial decisions like the allotment of industrial plots at concessional rates. [Para 73, 77, 78] Piaggio Vehicles Pvt. Ltd. v. State of U.P., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 332 : 2026 INSC 321

Article 136 – Concurrent Findings of Fact – The Supreme Court reiterated that its jurisdiction under Article 136 should be exercised sparingly, particularly when dealing with concurrent findings of fact from the courts below - Interference is only warranted if such findings are "manifestly perverse" - In this case, the findings of the First Appellate Court and the High Court in favor of the Respondents were found to be legally sound and based on a careful appreciation of the factual matrix – Appeal dismissed. [Paras 16 - 24] Ogeppa v. Sahebgouda, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 198 : 2026 INSC 191

Article 136 — Scope of Interference — Contract Law — Unconscionable Agreements — "Lion and Lamb" Analogy - While the Court is cautious with concurrent findings, it can interfere under Article 136 if findings are perverse, disregard statutory provisions, or result in substantial and grave injustice – Noted that an appellant must demonstrate exceptional circumstances for such review - Where a "mighty" State (the lion) contracts with an individual job seeker (the lamb), the inequality is structural - Clauses barring claims for regularization in such standard-form contracts are unconscionable if the employee had no meaningful choice but to "sign on the dotted line." - Acceptance of such terms does not amount to a waiver of fundamental rights - Continuous service for over a decade, supported by repeated extensions and satisfactory performance, nurtures a legitimate expectation of recognition - The bar against this doctrine for contractual workers only applies if the initial appointment lacked a proper selection process - directed the respondent-State to forthwith regularize the services of all the appellants against the sanctioned posts to which they were initially appointed - The appellants shall be entitled to all consequential service benefits accruing from the date of this judgment. [Relied on State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (2006) 4 SCC 1; Central Inland Water Transport Corpn. v. Brojo Nath Ganguly (1986) 3 SCC 156; Chandra Singh v. State of Rajasthan (2003) 6 SCC 545; Army Welfare Education Society v. Sunil Kumar Sharma (2024) 16 SCC 598; Jaggo v. Union of India, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3826; State of Karnataka v. Uma Devi, (2006) 4 SCC 1; Paras 11-14] Bhola Nath v. State of Jharkhand, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 95 : 2026 INSC 99

Article 139A - Transfer of certain cases.

Article 139A(1) – Withdrawal of cases from High Court – Substantial questions of general importance – Stagnation of Trial – Failure to pronounce judgment after reserving it – The Supreme Court exercised its extraordinary power under Article 139A(1) to withdraw three criminal revision petitions pending before the Allahabad High Court to itself – Noted that the revisions had been heard and judgment reserved on 05.02.2020, but no judgment had been pronounced for several years - The continuing stay on trial proceedings arising from a 1994 incident resulted in a "standstill" of the criminal process for decades, infringing upon the right to speedy justice. Jaideep Kumar Srivastava v. State of U.P., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 211

Article 141 – Law declared by Supreme Court to be binding on all courts.

Precedent – Nature of Orders – Article 141 – that the High Court relied on Ram Naresh Singh v. Bokaro Steel Limited (Civil Appeal No. 4740 of 2017) as a binding precedent to direct the release of gratuity with only nominal rent deductions - Held: The order in Ram Naresh Singh was passed on grounds of equity in specific facts and did not purport to lay down a binding precedent - An order passed on facts cannot be elevated to the status of a precedent by operation of Article 141 of the Constitution of India. [Para 17] Management of Steel Authority of India v. Shambhu Prasad Singh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 262 : 2026 INSC 263

Article 142 – Enforcement of decrees and orders of the Supreme Court and orders as to discovery, etc

Constitution of India – Article 142 – Complete Justice – Enhancement of Compensation – Permanent Disability – Paraplegia - Even though the claim under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 was not strictly appropriate as the vehicle was not the proximate cause of the accident, the Supreme Court invoked its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 142 to prevent a person with life-altering, grievous injuries (total paraplegia with bladder and bowel incontinence) from being left in the lurch by another round of litigation - Finding the High Court's assessment technically restrictive and insufficient, the Supreme Court enhanced the total compensation to ₹25,00,000/- with interest from the date of the claim petition, keeping the original apportionment of liability undisturbed to serve the ends of justice. [Paras 12-15] Commissioner, Bruhat Bangalore Mahanagara Palike v. K.K. Umesh Kumar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 621 : 2026 INSC 637

Constitution of India – Article 142(1) – Dissolution of Marriage on Irretrievable Breakdown - The Supreme Court possesses the inherent, discretionary jurisdiction under Article 142(1) to dissolve a marriage on the ground of its irretrievable breakdown to do "complete justice," even if the facts do not strictly satisfy a statutory ground under the prevailing personal law - This power is exercised with great care and caution when the Court is fully convinced that the marriage is totally unworkable, emotionally dead, beyond salvation, and that the continuation of a formal legal tie on paper is unjustified and merely perpetuates frustration - Given that the parties were living separately for over 15 years, mediation had failed, and both were financially independent doctors with no children from the wedlock, it was deemed a fit case to sever the ties and put an end to a stale, frozen relationship. [Relied on Samar Ghosh v. Jaya Ghosh, (2007) 4 SCC 511; Nayan Bhowmick v. Aparna Chakraborty, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2798; Vikas Kanaujia v. Sarita, (2025) 3 SCC 748; Shilpa Sailesh v. Varun Sreenivasan, (2023) 14 SCC 231; R. Srinivas Kumar v. R. Shametha, (2019) 9 SCC 409; Paras 29-37] Sonal Talpada v. Veerbhan Singh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 594 : 2026 INSC 620

Constitution of India – Article 142 – Administration of Justice – Undue delay in pronouncing reserved judgements by High Courts – Frame of Uniform Guidelines – The Supreme Court observed that the right to life and personal liberty guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution extends to every stage of a proceeding and is violated by delayed delivery of reserved judgements, particularly impacting those in custody - Exercising powers under Article 142, the Supreme Court issued comprehensive and binding guidelines for all High Courts to ensure timely pronouncement and uploading of judgements. Pila Pahan @ Peela Pahan v. State of Jharkhand, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 571 : 2026 INSC 604

Constitution of India, 1950 - Article 142 — Power to do complete justice — Taking a pragmatic approach to avoid the sudden displacement of a substantial number of in-service teachers and consequent disruption to school-going children, the timeline to qualify the TET is modified - The timeline originally granted in Anjuman Ishaat-e-Taleem Trust v. State of Maharashtra is extended from 2 (two) years to 3 (three) years - In-service teachers must acquire the TET qualification by August 31, 2028, instead of August 31, 2027 - States are directed to conduct the TET periodically, preferably twice a year. State of UP v. Anjuman Ishaat-E-Taleem Trust, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 568 : 2026 INSC 597

Constitution of India - Article 142 — Plenary Power to Do Complete Justice — Scope and Limits: Reaffirmed, the jurisdiction under Article 142 is expansive but tempered by self-imposed restraints founded on fundamental public policy - It cannot be invoked to "supplant" substantive law or disregard express statutory provisions rooted in fundamental public policy considerations - it retains wide discretion to mould relief, bridge gaps, and address situations in nebulous areas where the law is silent or inadequate, provided it does not contravene a core, non-derogable principle of a statute - issuing directions to protect sensitive institutional areas from stray dogs does not override or contravene the statutory scheme, but supplements, clarifies, and operationalizes it. [Relied on: Union Carbide Corporation v. Union of India, (1991) 4 SCC 584; Supreme Court Bar Association v. Union of India, (1998) 4 SCC 409; and Shilpa Sailesh v. Varun Sreenivasan, (2023) 14 SCC 231; Paras 50–54, 62 - 75] In Re : City Hounded by Strays, Kids Pay Price v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 515 : 2026 INSC 506

Constitution of India, 1950 – Article 142 – Modification of Penalty – Although the appellant committed a lapse through a brazen mis-declaration regarding his faculty appearances in the same academic year, the incident dated back to 2016 - Considering that a decade had passed, the appellant was now 76 years old, and the operation of the penalty had remained stayed throughout the litigation, the Supreme Court exercised its extraordinary powers under Article 142 to do complete justice - Supreme Court directed the National Medical Commission (NMC) to reduce the punishment from a three-month removal of the appellant's name from the Indian Medical Register to the issuance of a censure/warning. [Paras 13-16] Dr. Nigam Prakash Narain v. National Medical Commission, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 467 : 2026 INSC 453

Constitutional Law – Article 142 – Scope of Extraordinary Powers – Condonation of Illegalities – Extraordinary powers under Article 142 cannot be invoked to condone significant illegalities committed by a party, such as the unauthorized sale of assets of a sick company and its subsidiary during the pendency of litigation - held it was not a case for "ironing of creases" but one involving multiple illegalities that could not be regularized. [Paras 166–176] Bhartiya Mazdoor Sangh, v. State of U.P., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 373 : 2026 INSC 364

Constitution of India – Article 142 – Dissolution of Marriage – Irretrievable Breakdown of Marriage – Mediated Settlement – Appellant-Husband and Respondent-Wife entered into a mediated Settlement Agreement to dissolve marriage by mutual consent - Appellant-Husband performed substantial obligations, including payment of ₹89,00,000 and return of jewellery - Respondent-Wife resiled from the settlement before the Second Motion, alleging oral promises of additional jewellery worth ₹120 crores and gold biscuits worth ₹50 crore - Held: Withdrawal of consent without proving fraud, force, or undue influence, specifically based on terms not included in a signed mediated settlement, indicates an irretrievable breakdown of marriage - Supreme Court exercised powers under Article 142 to grant a decree of divorce to do complete justice. [Paras 36 - 55] Dhananjay Rathi v. Ruchika Rathi, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 366 : 2026 INSC 360

Constitution of India – Article 142 – Matrimonial Dispute – Irretrievable Breakdown of Marriage – Dissolution of Marriage and Quashing of Multiplicity of Proceedings – The parties were embroiled in a decade-long "vicious spate of litigation" including over 80 legal proceedings initiated by the respondent-husband against the appellant-wife, her family, and her legal counsels – Held that the marriage "dead for all practical purposes" and a fit case to exercise extraordinary jurisdiction to do complete justice. XXX v. YYY, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 347 : 2026 INSC 334

Constitution of India - Exercise of Powers under Article 142 – Termination of Vexatious Litigation – Supreme Court observed the respondent-husband, a practicing advocate, had misused his legal knowledge to file vindictive and oppressive complaints before various forums, including the State Bar Council and criminal courts - To provide a "quietus" to the dispute, the Supreme Court quashed all pending civil, criminal, and miscellaneous proceedings inter se, including FIRs and disciplinary complaints against advocates. XXX v. YYY, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 347 : 2026 INSC 334

Constitution of India – Article 142 – Modification of Relief – Finding the High Court's direction to grant admission justified, the Supreme Court invoked its jurisdiction under Article 142 to modify the timing of the relief - Due to the pendency of litigation for over three years, the Court directed the respondent to be admitted for the academic year 2026-2027 instead of 2023-2024. [Relied on S. Krishna Sradha v. State of Andhra Pradesh & Others (2020) 17 SCC 465; Paras 15-19] Secretary National Medical Commission v. Sanjana Thakur, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 330

Article 142 – Gender Equality in Armed Forces – Grant of Permanent Commission (PC) to Short Service Commission Women Officers (SSCWOs) – Assessment of Merit – Casual Grading of ACRs – The Supreme Court held that the Annual Confidential Reports (ACRs) of women officers commissioned between 2010 and 2012 were authored under the systemic assumption that they were ineligible for career progression beyond 14 years - This institutional mindset resulted in "middling" or "average" grades being assigned to women while "outstanding" grades were reserved for male counterparts whose future depended on them - Supreme Court observed that such a structural disadvantage, embedded in years of service assessments, cannot be neutralized by mere procedural safeguards like anonymization of data at the final evaluation stage. Lt Col Pooja Pal v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 283 : 2026 INSC 281

Article 142 — Irretrievable Breakdown of Marriage — Recognition of Foreign Divorce Decrees — Section 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - The Supreme Court set aside a High Court order that had dismissed a divorce petition in India on the grounds of a pre-existing US divorce decree - held that the foreign decree was not binding as it was granted on a ground (irretrievable breakdown) not recognized under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, and the husband had not effectively submitted to the foreign jurisdiction - Exercising its powers under Article 142, the Supreme Court granted a decree of divorce to bring a quietus to the 18-year-long separation - Key Legal Points – i. Non-Binding Nature of Foreign Decrees: A foreign decree of divorce is not conclusive or binding if it is granted on grounds not available under the matrimonial law governing the parties (in this case, the Hindu Marriage Act) and where the opposite party did not voluntarily or effectively submit to the foreign court's jurisdiction; ii. Effective Participation: Mere service of summons or filing a jurisdictional objection by post does not constitute "effective participation" or "voluntary submission" to a foreign forum - Principles of natural justice require a meaningful opportunity to contest the proceedings; iii. Article 142 Power: Where a marriage has irretrievably broken down and parties have been separated for a prolonged period (nearly 18 years), the Supreme Court can exercise its plenary power under Article 142 to dissolve the marriage directly to ensure justice. [Relied on Y. Narasimha Rao v. Y. Venkata Lakshmi (1991) 3 SCC 451; Paras 8-11] Kishorekumar Mohan Kale v. Kashmira Kale, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 259

Article 142 – Dissolution of Marriage – Irretrievable Breakdown – Exercise of Extraordinary Jurisdiction despite opposition by one spouse - The Supreme Court dissolved a marriage that had lasted only 65 days of cohabitation followed by over a decade of separation and excessive litigation - held that where a marriage is wrecked beyond salvage, maintaining a formal legal relationship is unjustified and the Court can exercise its power under Article 142 to do "complete justice," even if one spouse opposes the divorce. Neha Lal v. Abhishek Kumar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 73 : 2026 INSC 73

Article 142 – Restoration of Withdrawn Petitions – National Highways Act, 1956 – Sections 3G and 3J – Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – Section 34 – The Supreme Court invoked its extraordinary powers under Article 142 to set aside an order of the Trial Court, which had allowed land owners to withdraw their Section 34 petitions following a High Court judgment declaring Sections 3G and 3J of the National Highways Act unconstitutional - noted that since the High Court's judgment was subsequently stayed, the land owners were left "remediless" as fresh petitions would be barred by limitation under Section 34(3) of the 1996 Act - Supreme Court has raised concerns over the deep structural flaws in determining the land acquisition compensation acquired under the National Highways Act, 1956. The Court said that land owners whose lands were acquired under the 1956 Act faces significant disadvantage when compared to land owners whose lands were acquired under different laws. [Para 1-3] Riar Builders Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 65

Article 145 - Rules of Court, etc.

Constitution of India, 1950 – Article 145(4) – Supreme Court Rules, 2013 – Order XII Rules 1 and 3 – Practice and Procedure – Status of Order Dictated in Open Court vs. Signed Order – Variance – Modification before Signing – Miscellaneous application filed seeking a clarification that a draft order dictated in open court is final and binding, and that the subsequent signed order uploaded later lacks the force of law due to the omission of an ancillary direction for status quo and the modification of a direction disposing of a Writ Petition – Held - Displaced the applicants' contention. A distinction must be drawn between the dictation of a draft order to a Court-master and the formal pronouncement of a judgment - The dictation of an order in open court serves as a skeletal framework to put facts on record, which remains subject to correction, refinement, and enhancement in chambers prior to signing - The digitally signed and uploaded order is the sole final expository of the Court's unalterable opinion - Judges retain a locus poenitentiae to change their mind or correct an error in law (such as the erroneous grant of an ancillary status quo order) before the judgment crystallizes through signing - Unless a material change is made to the core outcome behind the back of the parties without a re-hearing, refinements made in chambers do not invalidate the signed order. [Paras 15, 19 - 23, 25 - 28] Fakir Mamad Suleman Sameja v. Adani Ports and Special Economic Zones, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 490 : 2026 INSC 483

Article 226 - Power of High Courts to issue certain writs

Constitution of India, 1950 — Article 226(1) and Article 226(2) — Territorial Jurisdiction of High Court — Central Armed Police Forces (CAPF) / Border Security Force (BSF) — Dismissal from Service — Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens - Key Legal Principles Summarized by Supreme Court – i. Territorial Jurisdiction based on Situs of Office: Even if the entire cause of action arises outside the territorial limits of the Delhi High Court (e.g., the misconduct occurred and the dismissal order was issued elsewhere), a member of the Central Armed Police Forces (CAPF), including the BSF, can maintain a writ petition before the Delhi High Court under Article 226(1) of the Constitution - This is because the overall command, administration, and superintendence vest in authorities whose offices are situated in New Delhi (the Union of India and the Director General, BSF); ii. Inapplicability of Forum Non Conveniens to Article 226(1) Writs - The doctrine of forum non conveniens is misapplied when used by a High Court to refuse to exercise discretionary writ jurisdiction invoked under Article 226(1) based on the situs of the respondent's office - When a suitor chooses a forum that is highly convenient to the respondents themselves, and where the official records are readily available or can be summoned, applying the doctrine of forum non conveniens becomes self-defeating and denies access to justice. [Relied on Shri Ranjeet Mal v. General Manager, Northern Railway (1977) 1 SCC 484; Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd. v. Union of India (2004) 6 SCC 254; Dinesh Chandra Gahtori v. Chief of Army Staff (2001) 9 SCC 525; Eastern Coalfields Ltd. v. Kalyan Banerjee (2008) 3 SCC 456; Paragraph 21-40] Baksish Ahmad v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 616 : 2026 INSC 630

Constitution of India, 1950 — Article 226 — Suppression of Facts — Relief Moulding vs. State Inaction — Suppression of a fact by a litigant must be of a material fact that has the potential to significantly influence the decision-making process or alter its trajectory on merits to disentitle them from relief - Even in cases of non-disclosure of connected litigation, the Court cannot permit the State to deny the appellants the benefit of a judicial order passed in their favour which has attained finality and was never challenged - Allowing the State to escape its obligation on the ground of delay in seeking implementation would tantamount to permitting it to take advantage of its own wrong (Ex injuria sua nemo habere debet) - The State, being a model employer under Article 12, is estopped from espousing such a contention, especially when the failure to make monthly payments gives rise to a fresh cause of action every month - The Supreme Court emphasized that it is the duty of the litigants and their counsel to place all connected facts on record, and it is for the Court to decide what constitutes a "material fact." - Pick-and-choose disclosures are impermissible - reiterated that the principle of suppression is a safeguard against the abuse of judicial process and not a weapon of technicality, noting that the withheld fact must be of such critical import that its absence renders a decision unjust. [Relied on SJS Enterprises (P) Ltd. v. State of Bihar, (2004) 7 SCC 166; Government of NCT of Delhi v. BSK Realtors LLP, (2024) 7 SCC 370; Kusheshwar Prasad Singh v. State of Bihar, (2007) 11 SCC 447; Machhindranath v. Ramchandra Gangadhar Dhamne, (2025) 7 SCC 450; Union Territory of Ladakh v. Jammu and Kashmir National Conference, (2024) 18 SCC 643; Paras 6 – 8] B. Yerraji v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 505 : 2026 INSC 495

Constitutional Law – Article 226 vs Section 528 BNSS (Section 482 CrPC) – Quashing of FIR – Distinguishing the scope of jurisdiction, the Court observed that so long as cognizance of an offence is not taken, a writ to quash an FIR/charge-sheet can be issued under Article 226 - once a judicial order of taking cognizance intervenes, the power under Article 226 is not available, though the inherent power under Section 528 BNSS (erstwhile Section 482 CrPC) can be invoked to quash the proceedings. Shrikant Ojha v State of U.P., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 493 : 2026 INSC 482

Constitution of India, 1950 — Article 226 — Writ Jurisdiction — Exhaustion of Alternative Statutory Remedies — Registration of FIR — Held - The extraordinary writ jurisdiction under Article 226 is discretionary and subject to self-imposed restrictions - It ought not to be invoked for the registration of a First Information Report (FIR) or proper investigation when alternative, equally efficacious sequential statutory remedies are available under the criminal procedure framework, unless justified by exceptional urgency or imminent danger to life or liberty - Entertaining such a writ petition in the first instance effectively results in the High Court acting as a forum of first instance, thereby completely bypassing the structured statutory scheme, which is impermissible. Sujal Vishwas Attavar v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 453 : 2026 INSC 442

Constitution of India, 1950 — Article 226 — Maintainability of Writ Petition against Co-operative Societies — The Supreme Court held that disputes pertaining purely to the internal management, governance, or electoral processes of co-operative societies do not ordinarily attract writ jurisdiction – Noted that District Milk Unions are autonomous, member-driven bodies and not "State" or "instrumentalities of the State" under Article 12, even if they are subject to statutory regulation or oversight by the Registrar - A writ lies against a non-State entity only when it performs public duties or acts in breach of statutory obligations of a public character, which was not the case here. [Relied on Federal Bank Ltd. v. Sagar Thomas (2003) 10 SCC 733; Thalappalam Service Co-operative Bank Ltd. v. State of Kerala, (2013) 16 SCC 8] Ram Chandra Choudhary v. Roop Nagar Dugdh Utpadak Sahakari Samiti Ltd; 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 361 : 2026 INSC 347

Constitution of India – Article 226 – Writ Jurisdiction against Show Cause Notice – Reiterated that while courts ordinarily do not interfere at the SCN stage, it is not an "inviolable rule" - Interference is permissible in exceptional circumstances, including patent lack of jurisdiction, abuse of process of law, or where the notice reflects a pre-determined approach. [Relied on Union of India v. VICCO Laboratories (2007) 13 SCC 270; Paras 30-40] J. Sri Nisha v. Special Director, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 320 : 2026 INSC 309

Article 226 — Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Section 482 — Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023; Section 528 — Quashing of FIR — Duty of High Court to Decide on Merits - The Supreme Court held that when a petitioner seeks the quashing of an FIR, the High Court must consider the merits of the challenge based on available material and applicable law, rather than disposing of the petition with general directions to follow arrest guidelines or concluding it without addressing the underlying grievance - Once jurisdiction for quashing is invoked, the High Court should decide the matter "one way or the other" on its merits. [Relied on Pradeep Kumar Kesarwani vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr. (2025 SCC OnLine SC 1947; Pradnya Pranjal Kulkarni vs. State of Maharashtra & Anr. (2025 SCC OnLine SC 1948; Paras 5-8] Md. Mashood v. State of U.P., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 264 : 2026 INSC 259

Article 226 – Writ Jurisdiction – Interim Relief – Alternative Remedy – The Supreme Court reiterated that once a High Court declines to entertain a writ petition on the ground of an available efficacious alternative remedy, it cannot pass interim orders (such as a stay or status quo) to operate until the petitioner approaches the alternative forum - Order – Interim relief can only be granted in aid of, and as ancillary to, the main relief available upon the final determination of rights - It is impermissible for a High Court to grant interim relief as the "only and final relief" while simultaneously declining to decide on the merits of the case or the rights of the parties. Mangal Rajendra Kamthe v. Tahsildar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 194 : 2026 INSC 185

Article 226 – Writ Jurisdiction – Rejection of Writ Petition at the threshold on technical office objections – Sustainability of – High Court rejected a writ petition arising under the SARFAESI Act based on Registry objections regarding prayer revision, multiple reliefs in a single prayer, and joinder of parties – Held that the High Court erred in sustaining these technical objections to "nip a proceeding in the bud" - When fraud and collusion are alleged specifically regarding the conduct of a Commissioner appointed under Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act; the court must remember the maxim "fraus omnia corrumpit" (fraud unravels everything) - Allegations of fraud should not be buried without an examination of merits due to mere technicalities. Sri Mukund Maheswar v. Axis Bank Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 82 : 2026 INSC 84

Article 226 – Writ Jurisdiction – Disputed Questions of Fact and Delay – Held that High Court erred in entertaining a writ petition filed in 2015 challenging construction activities that commenced in 2002 and were completed by 2007-2008 - Held: Gross delay in approaching the Court disentitles a petitioner to discretionary relief under Article 226 – Noted that in writ proceedings decided on affidavits, the burden of proof lies on the petitioner to specifically plead and substantiate facts with cogent material; mere abstract points of law without evidence are insufficient. [Paras 66 - 70] Raj Singh Gehlot v. Amitabha Sen, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 72 : 2026 INSC 77

Article 226(3) – Vacation of Interim Orders – Mandatory Timeline for Disposal – Special Leave Petition filed against an interim order of status quo – Petitioner submitted that an application for vacating the interim order had been pending since January 2025 – Held, Article 226(3) of the Constitution of India mandates that upon an application for vacating an interim order being filed, the High Court is required to dispose of the same within a period of two weeks – In light of this provision, the Supreme Court requested the High Court to take up and dispose of the pending application on its own merits. [Paras 3, 4] Giriraj v. Mohd. Amir, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 66

Article 227 - Power of superintendence over all courts by the High Court

Constitution of India, 1950 — Article 227 — Scope of Supervisory Jurisdiction — Capacity as an Appellate Court Impermissible - The High Court cannot act as a court of first appeal to reappreciate or reweigh evidence/facts under Article 227 - Supervisory jurisdiction is a correctional jurisdiction meant to be exercised sparingly to set right grave dereliction of duty, flagrant abuse, or patent errors of law - It cannot be used to substitute a plausible and reasonable view taken by a subordinate court with an alternative interpretation merely because another view is possible. [Paras 31 - 36] Nandi Infrastructure Corridor Enterprises Ltd. v. B. Gurappa Naidu, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 445 : 2026 INSC 434

Constitution of India — Article 227 — Supervisory Jurisdiction of High Court — Interference with discretionary order of amendment — Held: In the exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 227, the High Court does not act as an appellate court or tribunal - It is not open to the High Court to review or reassess the evidence or material upon which the inferior court or tribunal passed the order - The supervisory jurisdiction is strictly confined to seeing whether an inferior court or tribunal has proceeded within the parameters of its jurisdiction - The High Court transgresses its limitations if it enters upon the merits of the case set up in the amendment. [Paras 15, 16] Vinay Raghunath Deshmukh v. Natwarlal Shamji Gada, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 424 : 2026 INSC 416

Article 227 — Code of Civil Procedure, 1908; Order VII Rule 11 and Order VI Rule 16 — Supervisory Jurisdiction vs. Statutory Remedy — The Supreme Court held that the High Court cannot invoke its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 to strike off a plaint when a specific statutory remedy for rejection of the plaint exists under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC - The existence of an alternative remedy under the CPC acts as a "near total bar" against the exercise of powers under Article 227 - Noted that Order VI Rule 16, which pertains to striking out specific "pleadings" (parts or sections), cannot be utilized as a tool to strike down an entire plaint - Supervisory power is intended to keep subordinate courts within their bounds, not to serve as an "appeal in disguise" or to circumvent statutory law - Key Principles held – i. Alternative Remedy as a Bar - Where a specific remedy is provided under the CPC, the High Court should, as a matter of discipline and prudence, desist from exercising its power of superintendence; ii. Factual Inquiry - Rejection of a plaint under Order VII Rule 11 often requires factual inquiries (e.g., disclosure of cause of action, valuation disputes) which are inappropriate for summary determination under Article 227; iii. Scope of Order VI Rule 16 - This provision is for removing unnecessary, scandalous, or vexatious matters within a pleading, not for the wholesale dismissal of a suit – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Shalini Shyam Shetty vs. Rajendra Shankar Patil (2010) 8 SCC 32; Virudhunagar Hindu Nadargal Dharma Paribalana Sabai vs. Tuticorin Educational Society (2019) 9 SCC 538; Radhey Shyam vs. Chhabi Nath (2015) 5 SCC 423; State vs. Navjot Sandhu (2003) 6 SCC 641; Paras 6-11] P. Suresh v. D. Kalaivani, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 116 : 2026 INSC 121

Article 227 — Supervisory Jurisdiction — The jurisdiction under Article 227 is not an appellate jurisdiction in disguise and does not permit the reappreciation of evidence – Held that the High Court was not justified in dislodging concurrent findings of the Trial Court and First Appellate Court to refer a dispute to arbitration when the existence of the agreement was under serious doubt. [Relied on: Managing Director Bihar State Food and Civil Supply Corporation Limited v. Sanjay Kumar, (2025) SCC OnLine SC 1604; Avitel Post Studioz Ltd. & Ors. v. HSBC PI Holdings (Mauritius) Ltd., (2021) 4 SCC 713; Rashid Raza v. Sadaf Akhtar, (2019) 8 SCC 710; A. Ayyasamy v. A. Paramasivam & Others, (2016) 10 SCC 386; Paras 16- 23] Rajia Begum v. Barnali Mukherjee, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 101 : 2026 INSC 106

Article 227 – Supervisory Jurisdiction – Interference with Interlocutory Orders – Held: While the High Court's jurisdiction under Article 227 is supervisory and it should generally not intervene in interlocutory orders like impleadment, the Supreme Court will not restore an incorrect Trial Court order if the High Court has rightly interfered to prevent an illegality – Held that an impleadment application filed nearly nine years after acquiring knowledge of the suit (as evidenced by the applicant's seal on the original summons) is liable to be rejected on the ground of silence and delay. [Relied on Ramesh Hirachand Kundanmal v. Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay, (1992) 2 SCC 524; Kasturi v. Iyyamperumal, (2005) 6 SCC 733; Mumbai International Airport (P) Ltd. v. Regency Convention Centre & Hotels (P) Ltd., (2010) 7 SCC 417; Vidur Impex & Traders (P) Ltd. v. Tosh Apartments (P) Ltd., (2012) 8 SCC 384; Paras 33-44] Nak Engineering Company Pvt. Ltd. v. Tarun Keshrichand Shah, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 5 : 2026 INSC 8

Article 233 - Appointment of district judges

Article 233(2) – Eligibility of Judicial Officers for District Judge Recruitment – Direct Recruitment vs. Promotion – Practice Requirement - Held: In-service judicial officers are eligible for appointment as District Judges through direct recruitment - Their past service as a judicial officer must be counted toward the minimum practice requirement of seven years as stipulated under Article 233(2) - Categories of Relief held – i. Category A (Appointed but Reverted): Officers whose appointments were reversed due to an erroneous interpretation of law are deemed to have continued in service without a break - They are entitled to seniority and notional pay fixation but no arrears of pay; ii. Category B (Selected but not Formally Appointed): Selected candidates whose appointments were stalled by judicial intervention must be immediately offered appointments, subject to vacancy availability. Seniority will be determined by a committee of three senior High Court judges; iii. Category C & D (Ongoing or Future Selection): Officers currently in the selection process or seeking to participate must be treated as eligible; iv. Age Relaxation: Candidates who crossed the age limit while erroneously considered ineligible are granted a one-time relaxation to participate in the next selection process; v. Cadre Management: All officers benefiting from these directions shall be treated as District Judges appointed through direct recruitment. [Overruled Dheeraj Mor v. High Court of Delhi, (2020) 7 SCC 401; Paras 5-22] Rejanish K.V. v. K. Deepa, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 306

Article 235 - Control over subordinate courts.

Constitution of India - Article 235 - The Registrar General of a High Court has no independent or suo motu authority to initiate disciplinary proceedings against a judicial officer. The power of disciplinary control over judicial officers under Article 235 of the Constitution is vested collectively in the High Court, comprising the Chief Justice and the companion Judges. The Registrar General can act only as a delegate on behalf of the Chief Justice or a committee of Judges duly constituted by the Chief Justice. Any disciplinary action initiated without the approval or authorisation of the Chief Justice or such a committee suffers from a jurisdictional infirmity and is void ab initio. High Court of Uttarakhand v. Deepali Sharma, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 623

Article 300A – Persons not to be deprived of property save by authority of law.

Constitutional Law – Right to Pension – Nature of Pension – Plea of Financial Burden – Constitution of India, 1950 – Article 300A – Held that Pension is not a bounty, grace, or a matter of financial convenience dependent on the employer - It is a deferred wage and a hard-earned benefit amassed by virtue of long and continuous service, constituting "property" within the meaning of Article 300A of the Constitution - A constitutional right cannot be rendered illusory or defeated on account of administrative inaction or the plea of financial burden. [Paras 41-74] Bhikhani Devi v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 582 : 2026 INSC 612

Constitution of India – Article 300A – Right to Property – Fair Compensation - The right to receive fair statutory compensation upon the compulsory deprivation of property is an intrinsic sub-right encapsulated within the sacrosanct constitutional and human right under Article 300A - Statutes that are expropriatory must be strictly construed, and the State cannot abdicate its responsibility or deprive a person of property without strict compliance with the prescribed statutory compensation mechanism. [Paras 41 - 62] Brihanmumbai Municipal Corporation v. Vijay Nagar Apartments, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 523 : 2026 INSC 517

Constitution of India – Article 300A – Constitutional Right to Property – The right of redemption is a valuable right embedded in the SARFAESI Act to protect the borrower's ownership, which is a constitutional right - This right survives until the completion of the sale by a registered deed following a legally valid process - Since the borrowers discharged the entire outstanding liability during the pendency of the proceedings and the sale process was legally infirm due to timeline violations, the borrowers are entitled to redeem the property. [Relied on Mathew Varghese v. M. Amritha Kumar (2014) 5 SCC 610; Paras 18-30] E. Muthurathinasabathy v. Sri International, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 319 : 2026 INSC 303

Article 309 – Recruitment and conditions of service of persons serving the Union or a State.

Article 309 – Bihar Pharmacists Cadre Rules, 2014 (as amended in 2024) – Rule 6(1) – Validity of Minimum Qualification – The Supreme Court upheld the constitutional validity of Rule 6(1) and the "Note" in Appendix-I of the Cadre Rules, which prescribes Diploma in Pharmacy as the essential qualification for the post of Pharmacist (basic category) - Noted that candidates possessing higher qualifications (B. Pharma/M. Pharma) are eligible only if they also possess a Diploma in Pharmacy as the essential qualification for the post of Pharmacist (basic category) - Noted that candidates possessing higher qualifications (B. Pharma/M. Pharma) are eligible only if they also possess a Diploma in Pharmacy - It is the exclusive prerogative of the State, as an employer, to determine the most suitable qualifications for public posts based on its independent assessment - The power of judicial review is limited and cannot be used to rewrite service rules, determine equivalence of qualifications, or substitute the Court's assessment for that of the employer – Appeal dismissed. MD. Firoz Mansuri v. State of Bihar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 57 : 2026 INSC 68

Article 311 - Dismissal, removal or reduction in rank of civil servants.

Constitution of India — Article 311(1) — Scope of Protection — Employees of Statutory Corporations/Public Sector Undertakings - The protection of Article 311(1) of the Constitution of India providing that a member of a civil service or a holder of a civil post shall not be dismissed by an authority subordinate to the appointing authority applies strictly to persons holding civil posts under the Union or a State - Employees of a public sector company or corporation (such as MSEDCL) having a distinct legal personality independent of the Government do not hold a civil post merely because of government ownership or control - Their disciplinary competence is governed entirely by the internal Service Regulations of the Corporation and not by Article 311. [Relied on S.L. Agarwal v. General Manager, Hindustan Steel Ltd., (1970) 1 SCC 177; Paras 80-110] Surekha Domaji Bele v. Executive Engineer, Testing Division, MSEDCL, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 624 : 2026 INSC 639

Article 311(2)(b) – Dismissal from service without departmental inquiry – Scope of "Reasonably Practicable" – Requirement of Objective Satisfaction – The Supreme Court set aside the dismissal of a Delhi Police Constable, holding that the power to dispense with a regular departmental inquiry under Article 311(2)(b) cannot be exercised based on mere "assumptions and conjectures" - Supreme Court noted that the disciplinary authority must record satisfaction based on independent material showing that holding an inquiry is not "reasonably practicable" - Key Observations held – i. Judicial Review and Satisfaction - The finality given to the disciplinary authority's decision under Article 311(3) is not binding on the Courts - The scope of judicial review is open to strike down orders dispensing with an inquiry if the reasons are irrelevant, arbitrary, or lack a factual basis – Held that court must consider whether a "reasonable man acting in a reasonable way" would have reached the same conclusion in the prevailing situation; ii. Absence of Material Evidence: In the present case, the Preliminary Inquiry (PE) report failed to record any specific instances of the appellant who was in custody at the time—threatening or intimidating witnesses - The Deputy Commissioner of Police (DCP) relied on the ACP's "presumption" of potential witness tampering without any supporting material, which the Court deemed a failure of application of mind; iii. Custody as a Factor: It was incumbent upon the authority to demonstrate how the appellant, while in jail, posed a threat that made an inquiry "not reasonably practicable"; iv. Adherence to Circulars: noted that the Delhi Police's own circulars (dated 31.12.1998 and 11.09.2007) mandate that Article 311(2)(b) should not be used as a "short cut" and requires "cogent and legally tenable reasons". [Relied on Union of India v. Tulsiram Patel (1985) 3 SCC 398; Jaswant Singh v. State of Punjab (1991) 1 SCC 36; Paras 23-40] Manohar Lal v. Commissioner of Police, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 236 : 2026 INSC 234

Article 324 - Superintendence, direction and control of elections to be vested in an Election Commission.

Constitution of India – Article 324 & Article 327 – Interplay between Constitutional Powers and Parliamentary Legislation – The legislative competence of Parliament under Article 327 and the ECI's mandate under Article 324 are complementary, not competing - Parliamentary legislation cannot extinguish or paralyse the core constitutional functions of the Commission - The Commission retains plenary authority to issue regulatory directions and fill vacuums where the law is silent, though it must act consistently with express statutory prohibitions. [Relied on: Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commissioner, (1978) 1 SCC 405; Sadiq Ali v. Election Commission of India, (1972) 4 SCC 664; All Party Hill Leaders' Conference v. Captain W.A. Sangma, (1977) 4 SCC 161; Kanhiya Lal Omar v. R.K. Trivedi, (1985) 4 SCC 628; In Re: Special Reference No. 1 of 2002, (2002) 8 SCC 237; Para 175-186] Association For Democratic Reforms v. Election Commission of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 549 : 2026 INSC 564

Article 329 - Bar to interference by courts in electoral matters

Constitution of India - Article 329 - Representation of the People Act, 1951 - A writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution challenging the rejection of a nomination paper by the Returning Officer during an election process is not maintainable in view of the constitutional bar contained in Article 329(b). The proper and exclusive remedy for challenging the improper rejection of a nomination lies in an election petition under the Representation of the People Act, 1951, after the declaration of results. The Supreme Court cannot carve out exceptions based on the alleged “glaring”, “manifest”, or “arbitrary” nature of the rejection of nomination, as doing so would amount to rewriting Article 329 and creating an impermissible parallel jurisdiction between writ courts and election tribunals. The Court refrained from expressing any opinion on the merits of the challenge regarding the non-disclosure of a private criminal complaint in Form 26 affidavit. Meenakshi Natarajan v. Election Commission of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 627 : 2026 INSC 643

Constitution of India - Article 329 - Representation of the People Act, 1951 - The petitioner's nomination for Rajya Sabha from Madhya Pradesh was rejected by the Returning Officer on the ground that she failed to disclose a pending private complaint filed against her in a Court, despite receiving summons. The petitioner contended that disclosure was not required under Section 33A of the RP Act as no cognizance had been taken and no charge had been framed. She argued that the rejection was arbitrary and prevented a contested election. Article 329 imposes a clear constitutional embargo on judicial interference in electoral matters except through the mechanism provided by law (election petition). The Court rejected the petitioner's reliance on Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commissioner to justify pre-result interference, holding that the cited observations do not dilute the bar under Article 329. Allowing writ jurisdiction in “glaring” cases while relegating others to election petitions would lead to splitting of jurisdiction and judicial overreach. The right to contest an election is a statutory right, not a fundamental right, reinforcing the inapplicability of Article 32. Writ petition dismissed as non-maintainable with liberty to the petitioner to file an election petition. No order as to costs. The Court clarified that it has not made any observation on the merits of the case. Meenakshi Natarajan v. Election Commission of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 627 : 2026 INSC 643

Seventh Schedule

Constitution of India – Seventh Schedule, List II, Entry 34 – Betting and Gambling – Online Gaming – Games of Skill vs. Games of Chance – Scope of legislative competence of States – Interpretation of the conjunction "and" – Article 14 – Manifest Arbitrariness – Article 19(1)(g) – Res Extra Commercium – List II, Entry 1 – Public Order - The Supreme Court set aside the findings of the Madras High Court and Karnataka High Court which held that Entry 34 of List II is restricted to games of chance - The expression "betting and gambling" cannot be split disjunctively or interpreted narrowly as "betting on gambling" to provide immunity to games of skill played for stakes - Entry 34 of List II empowers the State Legislatures to regulate or prohibit betting activities on both games of chance and games of skill when played for stakes. [Relied on: State of U.P. v. Lalta Prasad Vaish, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3029; Welfare Association v. Ranjit P. Gohil, (2003) 9 SCC 358; Paras 217-228, 267 – 273] State of Tamil Nadu v. Junglee Games India Pvt. Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 591 : 2026 INSC 594

Eighth Schedule

Eighth Schedule Technicality vs. Constitutional Imperative - The State cannot justify its continued inaction or lackadaisical approach on the technical premise that a regional language (such as Rajasthani) is not formally recognized in the Eighth Schedule to the Constitution - The absence of an administrative policy is an executive shortcoming warranting prompt rectification, not a valid ground to defend institutional inertia. [Para 46] Padam Mehta v. State of Rajasthan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 492 : 2026 INSC 476