Administrative Law – Interest Liability – Delay by Government Authority: The Supreme Court upheld the TDSAT's finding that the Department of Telecommunications (DoT) could not levy interest for the period during which it "slept over the matter." - Interest is only payable from the expiry of the notice period stipulated in the show-cause notice (December 8, 2014), rather than the date of...
Administrative Law – Interest Liability – Delay by Government Authority: The Supreme Court upheld the TDSAT's finding that the Department of Telecommunications (DoT) could not levy interest for the period during which it "slept over the matter." - Interest is only payable from the expiry of the notice period stipulated in the show-cause notice (December 8, 2014), rather than the date of the Court's order in 2013, as the delay in issuing the demand was attributable solely to the DoT - For successful bidders in the fresh auction, the liability to pay the interim reserve price ceases on the date the Letter of Intent (LoI) is issued, as the LoI stipulates the commencement of the new 20-year term – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Centre for Public Interest Litigation and others vs. Union of India and others (2012) 3 SCC 1; Paras 14-17] Union of India v. Sistema Shyam Teleservices, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 184 : 2026 INSC 174
Administrative Law – Retrospective Validation – Ex Post Facto Approval – Whether subsequent Board approval can cure a jurisdictional defect in a CLU issued without statutory backing. Held: When a statute prescribes a particular manner for doing an act, it must be done in that manner and no other - A CLU that is unlawful on the date of its grant for want of statutory authority does not become lawful merely because of a later administrative decision, unless the statute expressly confers power for retrospective validation. [Paras 41-48, 53-59] Harbinder Singh Sekhon v. State of Punjab, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 162 : 2026 INSC 159
Administrative Remedy – Representation to Chief Justice – Re-employment – Supreme Court granted liberty to the petitioner to make a representation before the Chief Justice of the High Court - The Chief Justice is requested to gather information regarding disparities in superannuation ages across States and engage with the State Government on the administrative side - Decisions regarding re-employment and continuation in service must be taken by the Chief Justice in consultation with puisne Judges. [Paras 3-5] Ranjeet Kumar v. State of Jharkhand, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 123
Anticipatory Bail – Conditional Orders for Deposit: The Supreme Court criticized the Jharkhand High Court for making the grant of anticipatory bail contingent upon the deposit of a specific sum – Noted that High Court had directed the petitioners to file a supplementary affidavit showing payment of Rs. 9,12,926.84/- to the complainant, failing which the bail application would stand dismissed - Held, that the grant of regular or anticipatory bail should not be subject to the deposit of any amount - If a case for bail is made out, the court should pass an appropriate order; if not, it may decline - the court should not pass a conditional order for deposit and then exercise its discretion. [Relied on: Gajanan Dattatray Gore vs. State of Maharashtra & Another [(2025) SCC Online 1571; Paras 8 - 10] Prantik Kumar v. State of Jharkhand, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 131
Anticipatory Bail – Grounds for Grant – Civil Dispute and Parity – In a case involving alleged trespass and theft under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, Supreme Court found the appellant entitled to anticipatory bail based on three key factors- i. The appellant appeared before the IO as directed by the interim protection order; ii. The nature of the dispute appears to be a civil matter regarding immovable property (possession based on an agreement to sell); iii. Other co-accused in the same FIR had already been granted bail, establishing a ground for parity – Appeal allowed. [Paras 6, 7] Shally Mahant @ Sandeep v. State of Punjab, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 146
Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2015 — Section 11(6A) — Paradigm Shift — The 2015 Amendment introduced Section 11(6A), which limited the Court's inquiry solely to the "existence" of an arbitration agreement, effectively overruling the Patel Engineering dictum for post-amendment cases – Noted for proceedings commenced prior to 23.10.2015, the broader judicial scrutiny and finality of the Section 11 order under the old regime continue to apply – Appeal allowed. [Relied on SBP & Co. v. Patel Engineering Ltd. & Anr. (2005) 8 SCC 618; Paras 22-32] Eminent Colonizers v. Rajasthan Housing Board, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 109 : 2026 INSC 116
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; Part III — Sections 61, 73, and 74 — Challenge to Conciliation Award and Partition Deed — Order VII Rule 11 of CPC — Rejection of Plaint — The Supreme Court set aside the rejection of a suit challenging a partition deed (KBPP) and a subsequent Conciliation Award - held that the Jegatheesan group's challenge based on coercion, undue influence, and misrepresentation regarding the KBPP, and the allegation of fraud/fabrication regarding the Conciliation Award, disclosed a real cause of action that could not be summarily dismissed – Noted that while an execution proceeding under Section 36 is pending, an Execution Court cannot examine the validity of a partition deed or family arrangement; such challenges must be resolved through a properly instituted civil suit. J. Muthurajan & Anr. v. S. Vaikundarajan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 135 : 2026 INSC 139
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; Section 15(2), 15(3), and 15(4) — Substitution of Arbitrator — Validity of prior proceedings — The Supreme Court held that while appointing a substitute arbitrator under Section 15(2), the High Court cannot declare proceedings undertaken by the previous tribunal as a "nullity" on the grounds of an IBC moratorium - Held that Section 15 is a mechanism to preserve continuity; prior proceedings remain valid unless the parties agree otherwise or the substitute tribunal, in its discretion, decides to repeat hearings. Ankhim Holdings Pvt. Ltd. v. Zaveri Construction Pvt. Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 133 : 2026 INSC 137
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; Section 29A(4) & 29A(5) - Power of Court to extend mandate after rendering of award – The Supreme Court held that an application for extension of the arbitrator's mandate under Section 29A(5) is maintainable even if it is filed after the expiry of the statutory period (12 months plus optional 6 months) and even after the award has been rendered in the interim - Noted that an award passed after the mandate has expired is unenforceable under Section 36 and "non est," but the arbitrator's indiscretion in passing such an award does not denude or impair the Court's jurisdiction to entertain an extension application. C. Velusamy v. K. Indhera, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 105 : 2026 INSC 112
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; Section 29A(4) and Section 29A(6) — Extension of Mandate and Substitution of Arbitrator — The Supreme Court clarified that the expression "obligates" used in the Mohan Lal Fatehpuria case regarding the substitution of an arbitrator does not mean that substitution is an inevitable consequence when considering an extension of a mandate that has already expired - Substitution is only required "if the situation so warranted" and is not a mandatory inference following the termination of a mandate under Section 29A(4). Viva Highways Ltd. v. Madhya Pradesh Road Development Corporation Ltd; 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 145
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; Section 29A and Section 11 — Jurisdiction — held that Section 11 has no bearing on the provisions of Chapters 5 and 6 (where Section 29A is located) - Noted, an application for extension of time under Section 29A(4) does not lie before the High Court. Viva Highways Ltd. v. Madhya Pradesh Road Development Corporation Ltd; 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 145
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; Section 5 and Section 15 — Scope of Judicial Interference — Supreme Court clarified that the jurisdiction under Section 15(2) is limited and must be read with the principle of minimal judicial intervention - A court acting under Section 15(2) cannot exercise powers barred to it under other sections, such as setting aside a Section 16 rejection order (which is not appealable) or interfering with Section 17 orders outside of a Section 37 proceeding. Ankhim Holdings Pvt. Ltd. v. Zaveri Construction Pvt. Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 133 : 2026 INSC 137
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; Sections 8 and 11 — Arbitrability and Allegations of Fraud — Whether disputes can be referred to arbitration when the very existence of the arbitration agreement is seriously disputed on allegations of forgery and fabrication — Held: When allegations of fraud are made regarding the arbitration agreement itself, the dispute is generally recognized as non-arbitrable - Arbitration is founded upon consent, and a party can only be bound if it is shown, at least prima facie, that they agreed to the process - Where an arbitration clause is embedded in a document (such as the "Admission Deed") whose existence is stoutly denied and alleged to be forged, the controversy strikes at the root of arbitral jurisdiction – Noted that in such cases, the court must examine the issue as a jurisdictional inquiry rather than referring the matter to an arbitrator - While findings in Section 9 proceedings are prima facie, once they attain finality (e.g., via dismissal of an SLP), they cannot be ignored in subsequent proceedings under Sections 8 and 11 involving the same issue. Rajia Begum v. Barnali Mukherjee, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 101 : 2026 INSC 106
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 — Section 11, Section 16, and Section 34 — Pre-2015 Amendment Regime — Binding Nature of Section 11 Order — Res Judicata — Held that in cases governed by the SBP & Co. v. Patel Engineering Ltd. regime (prior to the 23.10.2015 amendments), the Section 11 Court exercised judicial power to determine the existence and validity of an arbitration agreement - Such a determination, even if implied, is binding on the parties at all subsequent stages, including before the Arbitral Tribunal and the Section 34 Court – Noted that the respondents, having failed to challenge the appointment order in the Supreme Court, cannot subsequently argue that the clause (Clause 23) was not an arbitration agreement. Eminent Colonizers v. Rajasthan Housing Board, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 109 : 2026 INSC 116
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – Section 34 & Section 37 – Scope of Judicial Review – Modification of Arbitral Awards – Power to Modify – The Supreme Court upheld the power of a Court under Section 34 to modify an arbitral award to a limited extent, particularly when applying contractually agreed clauses to admitted facts – Noted that a Section 37 Court cannot substitute its own view for a plausible view taken by a Section 34 Court regarding the determination of "reasonable compensation" unless that determination is arbitrary or perverse. Saisudhir Energy Ltd. v. NTPC Vidyut Vyapar Nigam Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 112 : 2026 INSC 103
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – Section 36 – Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Order XXI Rule 58 and Rule 102 – Execution of Arbitral Award – Transferee Pendente Lite – The Supreme Court upheld the dismissal of a claim petition filed by a third-party purchaser who acquired property after an arbitral award (money decree) was passed against the vendor – held that an arbitral award is a "deemed decree" enforceable under Section 36 of the 1996 Act - Under Order XXI Rule 102 CPC, the protections for bona fide claimants do not extend to a transferee pendente lite—defined as one to whom property is transferred after the institution of the suit/proceeding. R. Savithri Naidu v. Cotton Corporation of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 151 : 2026 INSC 150
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 — Section 73 — Authentication of Settlement — A settlement agreement (KBPP) not authenticated by the Conciliator as mandated under Section 73(4) and not signed by the parties at the time of the alleged award (Annexure P-2) raises serious questions regarding its status as an award under the Act – noted that coercion within a family context may not always involve physical threats or "life threats"- It can arise from a feeling of subservience or manifest obedience to an elder's opinion, which are matters of evidence and cannot be peremptorily rejected at the threshold of a suit - The plea of constructive res judicata is not applicable when earlier rounds of litigation specifically reserved liberty for the parties to work out their remedies in accordance with law and challenge the partition deed in a Civil Court. [Relied on Dahiben v. Arvindbhai Kalyanji Bhanusali (Gajra) D. Thr. LRs and Ors. (2020) 7 SCC 366; Paras 23-31] J. Muthurajan & Anr. v. S. Vaikundarajan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 135 : 2026 INSC 139
Armed Forces Tribunal Act, 2007 – Section 14 – Judicial Review of Show Cause Notice – Where a Show Cause Notice for termination (under Regulation 216 of Navy Regulations) is directly premised on the findings and recommendations of an ICC report, the Tribunal cannot dismiss the challenge as "premature" or "merely at the preliminary stage" - The Tribunal is duty-bound to adjudicate upon the correctness of the ICC report and recommendations which form the foundational basis of the termination notice. 42605-B CDR Yogesh Mahla v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 103 : 2026 INSC 107
Armed Forces Tribunal Act, 2007 – Section 22 – Limitation Act, 1963 – Disability Pension – Broad Banding – Arrears – Delay and Laches – The Supreme Court held that the benefit of arrears of disability pension, including the benefit of "broad banding," cannot be restricted to three years prior to the filing of the application before the Armed Forces Tribunal. Union of India v. Sgt Girish Kumar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 148 : 2026 INSC 149
Bail - Disclosure of Material Facts — Duty of the Accused: The Court emphasized that an applicant seeking bail has a "solemn obligation" to make a full, fair, and candid disclosure of all material facts, specifically criminal antecedents. Suppression of such facts constitutes "fraud on the court," attracting the maxim suppressio veri, expressio falsi(suppression of truth is equivalent to expression of falsehood). [Relied On Kusha Duruka v. State of Odisha (2024) 4 SCC 432; Saumya Chaurasia v. Enforcement Directorate (2024) 6 SCC 401] Zeba Khan v. State of U.P., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 139 : 2026 INSC 144
Bail — Doctrine of Parity — Non-application to History-sheeters — Noted that the High Court erred in blindly extending the principle of parity to the respondent based on the bail granted to co-accused without considering his specific and distinctive features, including his use of 8 to 10 aliases, forged Aadhaar cards, and a history of absconding – Noted that when there is a likelihood of offences being repeated or justice being thwarted, discretion must be exercised cautiously. Rakesh Mittal v. Ajay Pal Gupta, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 170
Bail - Judicial Discretion — Impact of Criminal History: While a history-sheeter is not automatically disentitled to bail, criminal antecedents are a significant factor in judicial discretion, especially when the allegations involve systematic and organized crime (e.g., educational fraud rackets) - that once an investigation is complete and a chargesheet is filed, transfer to a special agency like the CBI should only be directed in exceptional circumstances showing bias, mala fides, or involvement of high-ranking officials – Appeal allowed. [Relied On Ash Mohammad v. Shiv Raj Singh @ Lalla Babu and another (2012) 9 SCC 446; Paras 28-33, 35- 41] Zeba Khan v. State of U.P., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 139 : 2026 INSC 144
Bail Jurisprudence — Distinction between Annulment and Cancellation of Bail - The Supreme Court clarified that an appeal against the grant of bail (annulment) stands on a different footing than an application for cancellation due to post-bail misconduct - While courts are generally slow to interfere with liberty, a bail order is liable to be set aside if it is perverse, illegal, or based on irrelevant material, such as documents whose genuineness is the subject of the trial. [Relied On State of Karnataka v. Sri Darshan Etc. (2025) SCC OnLine SC 1702; Yogendra Pal Singh v. Raghvendra Singh @ Prince and another (2025) scc OnLine SC 2580; Paras 13-14, 16-19] Zeba Khan v. State of U.P., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 139 : 2026 INSC 144
Bail - Mandatory Disclosure Framework - To streamline bail proceedings and prevent abuse, the Court provided an illustrative disclosure framework(recommendatory) for all bail applications, which includes – i. Case Details: FIR number, sections, and maximum punishment; ii. Custody Status: Date of arrest and total period of incarceration; iii. Status of Trial: Stage of proceedings and number of witnesses examined; iv. Criminal Antecedents: Detailed list of all FIRs (Pending/Acquitted/Convicted); v. Previous Bail Applications: Details of all prior applications and their outcomes; vi. Coercive Processes: Whether the applicant was ever declared a proclaimed offender or issued Non-Bailable Warrants. [Para 49] Zeba Khan v. State of U.P., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 139 : 2026 INSC 144
Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023; Section 80(2) and 85 — Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023; Section 118 — Dowry Death — Grant of Bail — Sustainability of High Court Order — Supreme Court set aside the Allahabad High Court's order granting bail to the husband in a dowry death case where the marriage lasted only three months and the cause of death was asphyxia due to strangulation – Noted that the High Court failed to consider the gravity of the offense and the statutory presumption under Section 118 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (erstwhile Section 113-B of the Evidence Act). Chetram Verma v. State of U.P., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 141
Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023; Section 118 — Parameters for Granting Bail in Serious Offenses — The Supreme Court emphasized that while considering a bail application in cases of dowry death, the High Court must consider: (i) the nature of the crime; (ii) the prescribed punishment; (iii) the relationship between the parties; (iv) the place of incident; (v) the postmortem report; and (vi) the statutory presumption of commission of offense – Held that under Section 118 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023, if a woman is subjected to cruelty or harassment for dowry soon before her death, the Court shall presume the person caused the dowry death. [Paras 15-20] Chetram Verma v. State of U.P., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 141
Border Security Force Act, 1968; Section 40, 48(1)(c) and 50 — Dismissal from Service — National Security — Proportionality of Punishment — The Supreme Court upheld the dismissal of a BSF Sub-Inspector with 36 years of service who was convicted of facilitating illegal cattle smuggling at the Indo-Bangladesh border - Noted that when national security is paramount, infractions by officers manning the borders cannot be viewed lightly - held that under Section 50 of the BSF Act, 1968, a Security Force Court is permitted to impose a composite sentence, including both imprisonment and dismissal, as contemplated under Section 48(1)(c). Bhagirath Choudhary v. Border Security Force, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 165
Civil Law – Hereditary Pujari Rights – Suit for Possession – Effect of Withdrawing Previous Suit – The Appellants claimed hereditary pujariki (priest) rights based on a 1901 decree - noted that the Appellants' predecessor had filed a subsequent suit specifically seeking possession of the temple and an injunction - This subsequent filing constituted a categorical admission that the Appellants were not in possession at that time - held that a party in settled possession does not sue for possession - the Appellants withdrew the 1944 suit with liberty to file a fresh one but failed to do so for 36 years, leading to an "inevitable inference" that they had reconciled with the factual reality of not having possession. [Paras 18–20] Ogeppa v. Sahebgouda, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 198 : 2026 INSC 191
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Sections 100 and 103 – Jurisdiction of High Court in Second Appeal – Interference with Findings of Fact – Held that the High Court generally does not disturb findings of fact, it is well within its jurisdiction to interfere if such findings are perverse, based on no evidence, founded on conjectures, or result from a misconstruction of documents/inadmissible evidence - Relying on a photocopy (no evidence) to accept the existence of a power to alienate is an error of law that the High Court may rightly correct - Courts should not, by themselves, compare disputed signatures without the assistance of an expert, especially when the signatures used for comparison are not admitted signatures – Appeal dismissed. [Relied on Smt. J. Yashoda v. K. Shobha Rani (2007) 5 SCC 730; Jagmail Singh v. Karamjit Singh (2020) 5 SCC 178; O. Bharathan v. K. Sudhakaran (1996) 2 SCC 70; Para 23] Tharammel Peethambaran v. T. Ushakrishnan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 128 : 2026 INSC 134
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Sections 151 and 152 – Scope of "Clarification" vs. Substantive Modification – High Courts cannot make substantive changes to the quantum of compensation or redistribute liability under the guise of a "clarification" application - Section 152 CPC is strictly confined to correcting clerical or arithmetical mistakes arising from accidental slips - Any modification affecting substantive rights amounts to a review in substance and must meet the requirements of Order XLVII CPC. Reliance General Insurance v. Kanika, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 196 : 2026 INSC 188
Code of Civil Procedure — Concurrent Findings — Scope of Interference by Supreme Court — While the Supreme Court ordinarily does not reappreciate facts where the NCLT and NCLAT have recorded concurrent findings, an exception exists when the perversity of such findings is clearly established – Noted that the NCLT and NCLAT erred by ignoring binding contractual terms of the DTD based on "surmises, conjectures and assumptions"- Appeal allowed. [Relied on Innoventive Industries Limited vs. ICICI Bank and another (2018) 1 SCC 407; Indus Biotech Private Limited vs. Kotak India Venture (Offshore) Fund and others (2021) 6 SCC 436; Para 18-22] Catalyst Trusteeship Ltd. v. Ecstasy Realty Pvt. Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 192 : 2026 INSC 186
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Section 197 – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023; Section 217 – Delay in Sanction – Reference to Larger Bench - While addressing the "lethargy and/or apathy" of competent authorities in granting sanction for prosecution, Supreme Court noted that the High Court of Madras had issued a direction stating that if no decision is taken on a sanction request within one month, "sanction will be deemed to have been granted." - Given the recurring nature of these grievances and existing proceedings before a Bench presided over by the Chief Justice of India, Supreme Court referred the matter for consideration by a Larger Bench – Held that the High Court's direction regarding "deemed sanction" remains stayed pending further orders. [Relied on Suneeti Toteja Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Anr. (2025) SCC OnLine SC 433; Paras 5-8 ] State v. M. Muneer Ahmed, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 167
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Section 438 — Anticipatory Bail — Absconding Accused — An absconder is not entitled to the relief of anticipatory bail as a general rule - The power to grant pre-arrest bail to an absconder may only be exercised in exceptional cases where, upon perusal of the FIR and case diary, the Court is prima facie satisfied that the accusation is false or over-exaggerated - In the present case, the Accused remained untraceable for over six years, a reward was announced for his arrest, and he allegedly threatened a key witness; such conduct makes it an unfit case for the exercise of judicial discretion under Section 438. Balmukund Singh Gautam v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 158 : 2026 INSC 157
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Section 438 — Effect of Co-accused's Acquittal — The acquittal of co-accused persons during the period an accused was absconding does not automatically entitle the absconder to anticipatory bail on the ground of parity. In a trial against co-accused, the prosecution is not expected to adduce evidence against an absconding party; therefore, findings from that trial have no bearing on the absconder's independent trial - An accused cannot be permitted to "encash" on an acquittal achieved while they were making a mockery of the judicial process by fleeing. Balmukund Singh Gautam v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 158 : 2026 INSC 157
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Sections 438 & 439 — Appeal Against Grant of Bail vs. Cancellation of Bail — The considerations for an appellate court assessing the correctness of a bail order are distinct from those governing an application for cancellation of bail - While cancellation is based on "supervening circumstances" (e.g., misuse of liberty), an appeal tests whether the original order was perverse, illegal, or unjustified at the time of its passing - the post-bail conduct of an accused is irrelevant when determining the legality of the initial grant of bail in an appeal – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Lavesh vs. State (NCT of Delhi), (2012) 8 SCC 730; Sushila Aggarwal vs. State (NCT of Delhi), (2020) 5 SCC 1; Vipan Kumar Dhir v. State of Punjab, (2021) 15 SCC 518; Ashok Dhankad v. State of NCT of Delhi, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1690; Paras 37-51] Balmukund Singh Gautam v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 158 : 2026 INSC 157
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Admissibility of Post-Mortem Report — Section 294 CrPC — The non-examination of the medical officer who conducted the post-mortem is not fatal to the prosecution if the defense admits the genuineness of the report under Section 294 CrPC - Once admitted, the report serves as substantive evidence of the correctness of its contents - Intention — Intention is a state of mind gathered from the cumulative effect of circumstances: nature of weapons, body parts targeted, force used, premeditation, and prior enmity - Even if weapons like lathis are used, their lethality is determined by the manner of use and the multiplicity of injuries on vital parts – Appeals allowed. [Relied on Daya Nand v. State of Haryana (2008) 15 SCC 717; Pulicherla Nagaraju v. State of A.P. (2006) 11 SCC 444; Akhtar v. State of Uttaranchal (2009) 13 SCC 722; Vinubhai Ranchhodbhai Patel v. Rajivbhai Dudabhai Patel (2018) 7 SCC 743; Paras 41-45, 61-67, 69, 70] Sitaram Kuchhbedia v. Vimal Rana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 189 : 2026 INSC 178
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 — Bail — Narcotics Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 — Sections 8(c), 20(b)(ii)(C), 22(c), 23, 28, and 29 — Commercial Quantity — Prolonged Incarceration — Parity — The Supreme Court granted regular bail to the appellant despite the seizure of a commercial quantity of contraband - noted that the appellant had been in custody for 4 years, 1 month, and 28 days - Relief was further justified on the grounds of parity, as an identically situated accused person traveling on the same flight had already been granted bail by the Court – Supreme Court set aside the High Court's order denying bail and directed release on stringent terms, including the surrender of her passport. Reginamary Chellamani v. State Rep By Superintendent of Customs, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 121 : 2026 INSC 127
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 — Legal Aid — Rights of the Accused — Fair Trial — Mandatory Procedure for Trial Courts — The Supreme Court observed that the appellant initially failed to cross-examine witnesses until she engaged her own counsel – Noted that Trial Courts are duty-bound to inform accused persons of their right to legal representation and their entitlement to legal aid counsel if they cannot afford one - Mandatory Directions - Trial Courts must scrupulously adopt a procedure to record in their orders: (i) the offer of legal aid made to the accused, (ii) the response of the accused, and (iii) the action taken thereon, all before commencing the examination of witnesses - This order is to be communicated to the Chief Justices of all High Courts for issuance of suitable instructions to all concerned Trial Courts. Reginamary Chellamani v. State Rep By Superintendent of Customs, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 121 : 2026 INSC 127
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Section 313 – Examination of the Accused – Failure to put specific material circumstances – Prejudice to the Accused – The underlying object of Section 313 is based on the principle of audi alteram partem to enable the accused to explain incriminating circumstances - a generalized presumption of prejudice cannot be made merely because of inadequate or general questions - To vitiate a trial, the accused must demonstrate that the non-examination on a particular circumstance actually and materially prejudiced them, resulting in a failure of justice - In the present case, while questions were general, the incriminating circumstances were put to the appellants, and no specific prejudice was shown - Held, the testimony of eye-witnesses cannot be discarded merely because they are related to the deceased. If their presence at the site is natural and their testimony remains consistent under cross-examination, minor inconsistencies do not weaken the prosecution's. [Relied on Rakesh and Anr. Vs. State of U.P. and Anr. (2021 INSC 321; Suresh Chandra Bahri vs. State of Bihar (1995 Suppl (1) SCC 80); Om Pal and Ors. Vs. State of U.P. (now State of Uttarakhand) (2025 INSC 1262); Para 5-9] Ghanshyam Mandal v. State of Bihar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 201 : 2026 INSC 194
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Sections 227 and 228 (and Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023) – Discharge and Framing of Charge – Noted that a Judge has the power to sift and weigh evidence for the limited purpose of finding a prima facie case, they cannot conduct a "mini-trial" or a roving inquiry at the threshold stage - If two views are possible and one gives rise to only suspicion (as distinguished from "grave suspicion"), the Trial Judge is empowered to discharge the accused - Supreme Court noted that "the process itself can become the punishment" if responsibility at the framing stage is not exercised with care. [Paras 12 - 21] Dr. Anand Rai v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 136 : 2026 INSC 141
Code of Criminal Procedure – Discharge in Police Case vs. Statutory Complaint – A discharge order passed by a Magistrate in a criminal case arising from an FIR (Police Investigation) has no bearing on a separate complaint filed by the Appropriate Authority under Section 28 of the PCPNDT Act - The Act mandates cognizance only upon a complaint by the authorized authority, and police investigation is generally discouraged for these specialized offences – appeal dismissed. [Relied on Ravinder Kumar v. State of Haryana, 2024 SCC Online SC 2495; Federation of Obstetrics and Gynaecological Societies of India (FOGSI) v. Union of India, (2019) 6 SCC 283; Pooran Mal v. Director of Inspector (Investigation), New Delhi, (1974) 1 SCC 345; Radha Kishan v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1963 SC 822; Paras 28, 37, 54] Dr. Naresh Kumar Garg v. State of Haryana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 186 : 2026 INSC 176
Code of Criminal Procedure – Postponement of issue of process – Accused residing beyond territorial jurisdiction – Mandatory inquiry under Section 202(1) CrPC vs. Proviso to Section 200 CrPC – Public Servant Exemption - The Supreme Court held: The mandatory requirement of conducting an inquiry or investigation under Section 202(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) in cases where the accused resides beyond the Magistrate's territorial jurisdiction must be construed harmoniously with the proviso to Section 200 CrPC - When a complaint is filed in writing by a public servant acting in the discharge of their official duties, the Magistrate is exempted from examining the complainant and witnesses on oath - the legislature has placed public servants on a "different pedestal," and the lack of a specific Section 202 inquiry does not vitiate the summoning order when the complaint is lodged by a competent official authority (such as a Drugs Inspector). State of Kerala v. Panacea Biotec Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 206 : 2026 INSC 200
Code of Criminal Procedure – Quashing of FIR – Indian Penal Code, 1860 – Sections 406, 420, 467, 468, and 471 – Civil Dispute given a criminal cloak – Abuse of process of law – The Supreme Court quashed an FIR lodged 11 years after the execution of a Joint Venture Agreement (JVA), holding that the dispute was essentially of a civil nature - While considering a prayer to quash an FIR, allegations are ordinarily taken at face value to assess if a prima facie cognizable offence is made out - where the cause is essentially civil, the Court must assess whether it has been given a "cloak of criminal offence." - In such cases, the Court is not restricted to the FIR's contents but may consider admitted facts and documents recited therein, such as the JVA - A delay of 11 years in lodging the FIR (JVA dated 2010; FIR lodged 2021) indicates the absence of dishonest intention from the inception. If a stark dishonest intention existed, it would have been reported promptly. [Relied on: Paramjeet Batra v. State of Uttarakhand and others, (2013) 11 SCC 673; Para 15, 25-27] Vandana Jain v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 200 : 2026 INSC 192
Companies (Transfer of Pending Proceedings) Rules, 2016 – Rule 3 – Transfer of proceedings to NCLT – Where a "second motion" for a Scheme of Arrangement was pending and not "reserved for orders" at the time the 2016 Rules came into effect (December 15, 2016), the High Court was mandated to transfer the proceedings to the Tribunal - In this case, a second motion filed belatedly in 2009 and left pending for years should have been transferred to the NCLT. Omkara Assets Reconstruction v. Amit Chaturvedi, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 191 : 2026 INSC 189
Constitutional Law — Article 14 — Manifest Arbitrariness — Executive memoranda issued by the State that departed from the AICPI-linked formula stipulated in the ROPA Rules without an independent study or rational basis were held to be "manifestly arbitrary" - Noted that State action must be governed by reason and the "lacking in reasoned principle" prong of manifest arbitrariness applies when a State ignores its own statutory stipulations. State of West Bengal v. Confederation of State Government Employees, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 120 : 2026 INSC 123
Constitutional Law – Public Trust Doctrine – Spectrum as a Natural Resource – Article 39(b) – Spectrum is a finite, scarce, and renewable natural resource - The State holds spectrum in trust for the people and is constitutionally obligated to ensure its distribution subserves the common good and generates adequate compensation for the public - The grant of a license is a "State largesse" and does not result in the transfer of proprietary interest or ownership to private entities. [Paras 15, 16, 33] State Bank of India v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 152 : 2026 INSC 153
Constitution of India, 1950; Article 227 — Code of Civil Procedure, 1908; Order VII Rule 11 and Order VI Rule 16 — Supervisory Jurisdiction vs. Statutory Remedy — The Supreme Court held that the High Court cannot invoke its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 to strike off a plaint when a specific statutory remedy for rejection of the plaint exists under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC - The existence of an alternative remedy under the CPC acts as a "near total bar" against the exercise of powers under Article 227 - Noted that Order VI Rule 16, which pertains to striking out specific "pleadings" (parts or sections), cannot be utilized as a tool to strike down an entire plaint - Supervisory power is intended to keep subordinate courts within their bounds, not to serve as an "appeal in disguise" or to circumvent statutory law - Key Principles held – i. Alternative Remedy as a Bar - Where a specific remedy is provided under the CPC, the High Court should, as a matter of discipline and prudence, desist from exercising its power of superintendence; ii. Factual Inquiry - Rejection of a plaint under Order VII Rule 11 often requires factual inquiries (e.g., disclosure of cause of action, valuation disputes) which are inappropriate for summary determination under Article 227; iii. Scope of Order VI Rule 16 - This provision is for removing unnecessary, scandalous, or vexatious matters within a pleading, not for the wholesale dismissal of a suit – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Shalini Shyam Shetty vs. Rajendra Shankar Patil (2010) 8 SCC 32; Virudhunagar Hindu Nadargal Dharma Paribalana Sabai vs. Tuticorin Educational Society (2019) 9 SCC 538; Radhey Shyam vs. Chhabi Nath (2015) 5 SCC 423; State vs. Navjot Sandhu (2003) 6 SCC 641; Paras 6-11] P. Suresh v. D. Kalaivani, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 116 : 2026 INSC 121
Constitution of India, 1950 – Article 32 – Enforcement of Fundamental Rights – Abuse of Criminal Process – Successive FIRs – The Supreme Court allowed a Writ Petition where the State registered multiple FIRs in quick succession to ensure the petitioner remained in custody despite being granted bail in earlier matters – Noted that such conduct by the prosecution established a conscious effort to keep the petitioner incarcerated, amounting to a violation of personal liberty. Binay Kumar Singh v. State of Jharkhand, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 153
Constitution of India, 1950 – Article 32 – Powers of the Supreme Court – Article 32 is the "heart and soul" of the Constitution as it empowers citizens to directly approach the Supreme Court for the enforcement of fundamental rights – Noted that it will not readily refuse to hear a petition under Article 32 if a violation of a fundamental right is prima facie established. Binay Kumar Singh v. State of Jharkhand, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 153
Constitution of India; Article 227 — Supervisory Jurisdiction — The jurisdiction under Article 227 is not an appellate jurisdiction in disguise and does not permit the reappreciation of evidence – Held that the High Court was not justified in dislodging concurrent findings of the Trial Court and First Appellate Court to refer a dispute to arbitration when the existence of the agreement was under serious doubt. [Relied on: Managing Director Bihar State Food and Civil Supply Corporation Limited v. Sanjay Kumar, (2025) SCC OnLine SC 1604; Avitel Post Studioz Ltd. & Ors. v. HSBC PI Holdings (Mauritius) Ltd., (2021) 4 SCC 713; Rashid Raza v. Sadaf Akhtar, (2019) 8 SCC 710; A. Ayyasamy v. A. Paramasivam & Others, (2016) 10 SCC 386; Paras 16- 23] Rajia Begum v. Barnali Mukherjee, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 101 : 2026 INSC 106
Constitution of India – Article 12 and Article 226 – Maintainability of Writ Petition against a Society – Fiduciary Duty of Government Officers in Governing Bodies – The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's finding that a writ petition under Article 226 is maintainable against a Society (HEWO) comprising government employees, especially when issues of lack of transparency, unfairness, and unreasonableness in the allotment of housing facilities are raised - Noted that ex-officio members of a Governing Body, who are responsible government officers, must act in a fiduciary capacity for the common good, ensuring fairness, transparency, and accountability while eschewing favoritism, bias, and arbitrariness [Para 5]. Dinesh Kumar v. State of Haryana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 171 : 2026 INSC 163
Constitution of India – Article 136 – Concurrent Findings of Fact – The Supreme Court reiterated that its jurisdiction under Article 136 should be exercised sparingly, particularly when dealing with concurrent findings of fact from the courts below - Interference is only warranted if such findings are "manifestly perverse" - In this case, the findings of the First Appellate Court and the High Court in favor of the Respondents were found to be legally sound and based on a careful appreciation of the factual matrix – Appeal dismissed. [Paras 16 - 24] Ogeppa v. Sahebgouda, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 198 : 2026 INSC 191
Constitution of India – Article 19(1)(a) – Freedom of Speech and Expression – Article 19(2) – Reasonable Restrictions – Cinematograph Act, 1952 – Film Certification – Judicial Interference – Petition filed seeking to restrain the release of the film "Ghooskhor Pandat," alleging offensive stereotyping against the Brahmin community - The Respondent/Producer filed an affidavit unequivocally withdrawing the title and undertaking that any new title would not be evocative of the earlier one - Supreme Court disposed of the petition, noting that the grievances were suitably addressed by this undertaking. Atul Mishra v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 193
Constitution of India – Article 19(1)(c) – Right to Form Associations – Regulatory Control over Sports Bodies –The Supreme Court reaffirmed that while the right to form an association includes its continued existence with its original voluntary composition, it does not extend to an uninhibited right to pursue goals free from regulatory control - So long as the initial voluntary composition remains unaffected, regulatory measures do not violate Article 19(1)(c). Tiruchirappalli District Cricket Association v. Anna Nagar Cricket Club, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 154 : 2026 INSC 154
Constitution of India – Article 20(3) – Right Against Self-Incrimination – Anticipatory Bail – NDPS Act – Held that State cannot insist that an accused hand over his mobile phone as a condition for "cooperating with the investigation" if doing so forces the accused to incriminate himself - The Supreme Court held that while an appellant must join the investigation, the obligation to cooperate does not extend to a violation of the constitutional right against self-incrimination. Vinay Kumar Gupta v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 180
Constitution of India – Article 21A and Article 23 – Right to Education and Prohibition of Forced Labour – Contractual Teachers – Honorarium Revision – The Supreme Court held that part-time contractual instructors appointed under the Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan (now Samagra Shiksha Scheme) in Upper Primary Schools are entitled to periodic revision of their honorarium – Noted that keeping such teachers on a stagnant, meager honorarium (initially ₹7,000/-) for over a decade, while prohibiting them from taking other employment, amounts to "economic coercion" and "forced labour" (Begar) prohibited under Article 23. U.P. Junior High School Council Instructor Welfare Association v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 110
Constitution of India – Article 21 – Right to a Clean and Healthy Environment – The Supreme Court reaffirmed that the right to a clean and healthy environment is an inseparable part of the Right to Life guaranteed under Article 21 – Held that the State has an affirmative duty to protect the environment to ensure the well-being of all citizens, noting that the time is ripe for the rigorous implementation of this constitutional guarantee. Bhopal Municipal Corporation v. Dr. Subhash C. Pandey, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 182
Constitution of India – Article 226 – Writ Jurisdiction – Interim Relief – Alternative Remedy – The Supreme Court reiterated that once a High Court declines to entertain a writ petition on the ground of an available efficacious alternative remedy, it cannot pass interim orders (such as a stay or status quo) to operate until the petitioner approaches the alternative forum - Order – Interim relief can only be granted in aid of, and as ancillary to, the main relief available upon the final determination of rights - It is impermissible for a High Court to grant interim relief as the "only and final relief" while simultaneously declining to decide on the merits of the case or the rights of the parties. Mangal Rajendra Kamthe v. Tahsildar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 194 : 2026 INSC 185
Constitution of India – Article 32 – Writ Petition – Domestic Workers' Rights – Minimum Wages – Separation of Powers – Petitioners sought a writ of mandamus declaring that domestic workers have a fundamental right to minimum wages under Articles 21 and 23 and challenging their exclusion from the Minimum Wages Act and Code of Wages, 2019 - Held: Supreme Court declined to issue a positive mandamus for the enactment of law, emphasizing the doctrine of separation of powers - While acknowledging the vulnerable status of domestic workers and the lack of legislative protection, noted that an enforceable decree cannot be passed if it requires the legislature to enact a specific law - Supreme Court impressed upon State Governments to consider the grievances highlighted by the petitioners and urged the development of suitable mechanisms to prevent exploitation and ensure minimum wages. [Relied on Ajay Malik vs. State of Uttarakhand and another [(2025) INSC 118]; Paras 2-8] Penn Thozhilalargal Sangam v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 124
Constitution of India – Articles 14 and 21 – Environmental Law – Precautionary Principle – Sustainable Development – Validity of Industrial Reclassification – The Supreme Court quashed the Central Pollution Control Board's (CPCB) January 2025 revised industrial categorization which downgraded "stand-alone cement grinding units without Captive Power Plants (CPP)" from 'Red' to 'Orange' category - Held: A regulatory downgrade that weakens environmental protection must bear a rational nexus to the object of safeguarding life and health - In the absence of proportionate and scientifically substantiated justification, such dilution is arbitrary and infringes the right to a clean and healthy environment under Article 21. [Paras 58, 65, 66] Harbinder Singh Sekhon v. State of Punjab, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 162 : 2026 INSC 159
Constitution of India – Articles 48A, 51A(g), 226, and 32 – Environmental Law – Protection of Reserved Forests – Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants – Due Process – Rule of Law – The Supreme Court addressed the State's obligation to protect reserved forests while balancing the rights of long-standing human habitations - Noted that while forests are vital ecological systems and carbon sinks, and the State has a constitutional mandate to safeguard them, such protection must be pursued through lawful, non-arbitrary means. Abdul Khalek v. State of Assam, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 134 : 2026 INSC 140
Constitution of India – Fraternity and Constitutional Duty – Articles 51A and 51A(e) – Supreme Court noted that fraternity is a guiding philosophy of the Constitution - It is the fundamental duty of every citizen to promote harmony and the spirit of common brotherhood - Vilifying or denigrating any community based on religion, language, caste, or region is constitutionally impermissible. [Para 11-14] Atul Mishra v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 193
Constitution of India – Standards for Judging Film Content – "The Ordinary Reasonable Man" – The effect of words or expressions in a movie must be judged by the standards of "reasonable, strong-minded, firm and courageous men," and not by those of weak or hypersensitive minds – Noted that the "man on the top of a Clapham omnibus" standard - Freedom of expression cannot be held to ransom by an intolerant group of people – Noted that if the rights of artists were subjected to popular notions of what is acceptable, the constitutional guarantee would be rendered illusory - Once a competent statutory Board grants a certificate, no individual or group can create disturbances in the exhibition of the film - Courts must be at the forefront to zealously protect the freedom of speech and expression, even if Judges personally dislike the spoken or written words. [Para 19, 22-24, 32-34] Atul Mishra v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 193
Construction of Documents — Literal Rule vs. Purposive Construction — Supreme Court emphasized that a contract must first be constructed in its plain, ordinary, and literal meaning - If the words are clear, the intention of the parties must be derived directly from the text. Reliance on the ex-post facto conduct of parties (such as the lessor continuing to occupy a portion not demised) is unnecessary and improper when the literal expression is unambiguous – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Associated Hotels of India Ltd. v. R.N. Kapoor, AIR 1959 SC 1262; Paras 15-21] General Secretary, Vivekananda Kendra v. Pradeep Kumar Agarwalla, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 204 : 2026 INSC 199
Consumer Protection Act, 1986; Section 2(1)(d) - Statutory Interpretation - Definition of "Consumer" - Commercial Purpose - Onus of Proof - The Supreme Court set aside the NCDRC's dismissal of a consumer complaint, holding that the mere act of leasing out a residential flat does not, by itself, classify the purchase as being for a "commercial purpose" – Noted that the onus of proving that a complainant falls within the exclusion clause of Section 2(1)(d) (i.e., that the goods or services were obtained for a commercial purpose) rests squarely upon the service provider and not the complainant - This burden must be discharged based on a "preponderance of probabilities". Vinit Bahri v. Mgf Developers Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 117 : 2026 INSC 114
Consumer Protection Act, 1986 - Dominant Purpose Test - To exclude a person from the definition of a 'consumer', it must be proved that the dominant intention or purpose behind the purchase was to facilitate profit generation through commercial activity, showing a close and direct nexus between the transaction and such profit-generating activity - The mere purchase of immovable property, or even multiple units, does not ipso facto attract the exclusion clause unless a commercial dominant purpose is established – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Lilavati Kirtilal Mehta Medical Trust vs. Unique Shanti Developers and Others (2020) 2 SCC 265; Shriram Chits (India) Private Limited vs. Raghachand Associates (2024) 9 SCC 509; Laxmi Engineering Works vs. P.S.G. Industrial Institute (1995) 3 SCC 583; Paras 11-17] Vinit Bahri v. Mgf Developers Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 117 : 2026 INSC 114
Consumer Protection Act, 1986 – Section 14 – Award of Interest beyond Contractual Terms – Supreme Court rejected the appellant's contention that compensation should be restricted to the nominal rate (Rs. 10/- per sq. ft.) specified in Clause 10(c) of the Flat Buyer Agreement - It held that where a clause is found to be unfair, one-sided, or oppressive especially when compared to the high interest (24% p.a.) charged to consumers for defaults—consumer fora are not bound to mechanically enforce it and may award higher interest to prevent manifest injustice. [Paras 15 - 18] Parsvnath Developers Ltd. v. Mohit Khirbat, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 178 : 2026 INSC 170
Consumer Protection Act, 1986 – Sections 13 and 22 – Procedure and Evidence – Applicability of Indian Evidence Act – Held that the Indian Evidence Act (now Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam) is not strictly applicable to Consumer Forums, the Principles of Natural Justice must be followed - If a party seeks to cross-examine a witness or expert whose affidavit is on record, the Commission should evolve a procedure to permit such cross-examination—via written questions, video conferencing, or a court-appointed Commission to ensure fair play. ITC Limited v. Aashna Roy, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 129 : 2026 INSC 135
Consumer Protection Act, 1986 – Sections 2(1)(g), 2(1)(o), 2(1)(r), and 14 – Housing Construction and Delay in Possession – Held that housing construction falls within the ambit of "service" under Section 2(1)(o), and failure to deliver possession within the stipulated period constitutes "deficiency" under Section 2(1)(g) - held that the jurisdiction of consumer fora is statutory and not merely contractual; therefore, one-sided or oppressive contractual terms cannot curtail the power of the NCDRC to award just and reasonable compensation. [Paras 10 - 18] Parsvnath Developers Ltd. v. Mohit Khirbat, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 178 : 2026 INSC 170
Consumer Protection – Deficiency in Service – Quantum of Compensation – Evidence and Proof – Challenge to the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (NCDRC) order awarding ₹2,00,00,000/- compensation for a faulty haircut – Held that while the finding of deficiency in service was upheld in the first round of litigation, the quantum of compensation must be based on "material evidence and not on the mere asking" - Compensation to the tune of crores cannot be awarded based on unauthenticated photocopies of documents, especially when their authenticity is denied by the opposite party. ITC Limited v. Aashna Roy, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 129 : 2026 INSC 135
Consumer Protection – Joint Development Agreement (JDA) – Liability of Landowners for Delay in Construction – Held: Landowners cannot be held jointly and severally liable with the developer for deficiency in service arising from construction delays if the obligation to construct rests solely with the developer under the JDA and the General Power of Attorney (GPA) - The developer's right to enter into sale agreements and undertake construction for their share of the property, coupled with indemnity clauses protecting landowners from the developer's breaches, shifts the liability for delay compensation exclusively to the developer. Sriganesh Chandrasekaran v. Unishire Homes Llp, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 185 : 2026 INSC 172
Consumer Protection – Principal and Agent Relationship – General Power of Attorney – Held: The execution of a GPA by landowners in favor of a developer to facilitate sale agreements and title transfers does not automatically make the landowners liable for the developer's specific failures in construction, especially when no acts or omissions are attributed to the landowners regarding the delay - Held: While landowners are not liable for construction delay compensation, they remain jointly responsible with the developer to ensure the transfer of title and execution of sale deeds in favor of the flat buyers – Appeals dismissed. [Paras 12-16] Sriganesh Chandrasekaran v. Unishire Homes Llp, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 185 : 2026 INSC 172
Contempt Jurisdiction – Interim Orders – Noted that the High Court's order directing the framing of charges in a contempt petition while a fresh, detailed government rejection order remained unchallenged was found improper - Contempt should not be a shortcut for relief when appealable orders exist - The Supreme Court permitted the respondents to challenge the latest government order via a fresh writ petition to be heard alongside the contempt proceedings - The High Court is directed to pass a final order on merits and strictly prohibited from remanding the matter back to the authorities for further reconsideration, given the government's clear stance. [Paras 14-18] Mahendra Prasad Agarwal v. Arvind Kumar Singh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 195 : 2026 INSC 175
Contempt of Courts Act, 1971; Section 12 & 15 - Article 215 of the Constitution of India - Doctrine of Merger - Maintainability of Contempt Petition in High Court after Supreme Court affirmation - High Court's jurisdiction to punish for contempt of its own order does not cease to operate merely because said order has been affirmed by the Supreme Court in appeal - Even if the doctrine of merger applies, the order to be executed remains the directions issued by the High Court - Held: If contempt petitions were driven to the Supreme Court in every case of affirmation by a non-speaking order, the Apex Court would be flooded with such petitions - The legal provisions cannot be used to coerce a litigant to approach the Supreme Court without resorting to filing a Contempt Petition in the High Court. [Paras 13-14] United Labour Federation v. Gagandeep Singh Bedi, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 208 : 2026 INSC 204
Contract Act, 1872 – Section 74 – Liquidated Damages – Public Utility Projects – Proof of Actual Loss –In projects involving public utility or public interest (such as solar power projects under the National Solar Mission), it is not mandatory to prove actual loss for the award of liquidated damages - The delay in commissioning such a utility itself constitutes a loss to the public. The burden shifts to the party in breach to prove that no loss was caused - Key Findings held – i. Admitted Breach - The Solar Power Developer (SEL) admitted to delays in commissioning the 20 MW project (two months for the first 10 MW and five months for the balance); ii. Public Interest - The project, executed under the Jawaharlal Nehru National Solar Mission (JNNSM), was a public utility activity aimed at promoting green energy; thus, the strict proof of financial loss by the nodal agency (NVVNL) was unnecessary; iii. Jurisdictional Error by Division Bench - The Division Bench, acting under Section 37, erred by recalculating and reducing the compensation from 50% of the contractual claim (as awarded by the Single Judge) to a lower amount, as this amounted to a merits-based substitution of a plausible view. [Relied on Gayatri Balasamy vs. ISG Novasoft Technologies Limited (2025 INSC 605); AC Chokshi Share Broker Private Limited vs. Jatin Pratap Desai and another (2025 INSC 174); Paras 12-18] Saisudhir Energy Ltd. v. NTPC Vidyut Vyapar Nigam Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 112 : 2026 INSC 103
Co-operative Societies Act, 1960 (Maharashtra) — Section 154 — Revisional Powers — Maintainability — Supreme Court ruled that the revisional power under Section 154 is "extremely wide" and is not denuded by the availability of alternative remedies under Rule 107(13) or (14) - A revision to annul a sale confirmation that is void ab initio (due to violation of mandatory rules) does not require a pre-deposit of the decretal amount under Section 154(2A)- that Rule 107(11)(h) serves a larger public purpose beyond the interest of the creditor, ensuring the sanctity of public auctions and preventing price manipulation by non-serious bidders - Supreme Court set aside the auction sale dated 29.01.2005 and the confirmation order dated 18.03.2005, declaring them null and void - directed a fresh auction for the property and ordered the Bank to refund the auction purchaser's deposit with 6% interest per annum. [Relied on Shilpa Shares & Securities and others vs. National Co-operative Bank Ltd. and others (2007) 12 SCC 165; Paras 39-42, 55-58] Adishakti Developers v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 202 : 2026 INSC 197
Co-operative Societies Act, 1960 (Maharashtra) — Section 23(2) and Section 154 — Membership of Housing Society — Delay in Payment of Contribution — The Supreme Court set aside a High Court order that had quashed the grant of membership to the legal heirs of a long-term tenant - held that since the Society had passed a resolution in 2005 to admit the predecessor-in-interest as a member upon payment, and that resolution was never revoked, the heirs were entitled to membership upon depositing the amount with interest - Supreme Court noted that denying membership while the parties remained in peaceful, undisputed possession of the flat would create a "serious anomaly" and "subsisting tussle". [Paras 41-45] Shashin Patel v. Uday Dalal, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 125 : 2026 INSC 125
Co-operative Societies — Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Rules, 1961 — Rule 107(11)(g) and (h) — Mandatory Nature of Deposit Timelines — The Supreme Court held that the requirement to deposit the remainder of the purchase money within fifteen days (as per the Rule at the relevant time) from the date of auction sale is mandatory - Failure to deposit the full purchase money within this prescribed period renders the auction sale a nullity and not a mere irregularity. Supreme Court clarified that the Recovery Officer has no discretion to extend the time for making payment of the remainder of the purchase money, unlike the extension permitted for the cost of stamp duty. [Paras 47-55] Adishakti Developers v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 202 : 2026 INSC 197
Criminal Jurisprudence – Distinction between "Preparation" and "Attempt" – Section 376 r/w Section 511 of the IPC and Section 18 of the POCSO Act – The Supreme Court set aside an Allahabad High Court order that had downgraded a summons from "attempt to commit rape" to a lesser charge of Section 354B IPC - held that when accused persons act with pre-determined intent, execute mens rea through overt acts (such as dragging a victim toward a culvert), and are only stopped by the intervention of third parties, the stage of "preparation" has concluded and an "attempt" has commenced. In Re: Order Dated 17.03.2025 Passed by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 168 : 2026 INSC 165
Criminal Law – Anticipatory Bail – Non-Cooperation with Investigation – Scope of Section 438 CrPC / Section 482 BNSS – The Supreme Court held that the mere act of an accused not answering specific questions posed by the Investigating Officer (IO) does not automatically constitute "non-cooperation" with the investigation - Noted that if an accused has appeared before the IO pursuant to interim protection, the failure to provide specific answers is not a sufficient ground ipso facto to deny bail. Shally Mahant @ Sandeep v. State of Punjab, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 146
Criminal Law — Arrest — Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) — Section 35 — Mandatory issuance of notice for offences punishable with imprisonment up to 7 years — Interplay between Section 35(1)(b) and Section 35(3) to 35(6) — Discretionary nature of arrest - Core Principles and Rulings – i. Rule of Notice vs. Exception of Arrest - The Supreme Court held that for offences punishable with imprisonment up to 7 years, issuing a notice under Section 35(3) of the BNSS is the rule, whereas effecting an arrest under Section 35(6) read with Section 35(1)(b) is a clear exception; ii. Mandatory Checklist for Arrest - For an arrest to be legally justified in the specified category of offences, compliance with Section 35(1)(b)(i) (reason to believe) along with at least one condition mentioned in Section 35(1)(b)(ii) is a sine qua non; ii. No Automatic Arrest on Non-Compliance - Even if an individual fails to comply with the terms of a notice under Section 35(3) or is unwilling to identify themselves, arrest is not a matter of course - The Investigating Agency must still form an opinion that the arrest is an objective necessity for the investigation; iii. Fresh Materials Required for Subsequent Arrest - If a police officer decides to arrest an individual after having already issued a notice under Section 35(3), such an arrest must be based on materials and factors that were not available at the time the notice was issued; iv. Judicial Scrutiny - Magistrates must not authorize detention in a casual or mechanical manner - They are required to peruse the report and checklist furnished by the police officer to ensure the necessity of arrest is justified under the statutory parameters. [Relied on Arnesh Kumar v. State of Bihar & Anr, (2014) 8 SCC 273; Satender Kumar Antil v. Central Bureau of Investigation, (2022) 10 SCC 51; State of Uttar Pradesh v. Bhagwant Kishore Joshi, (1964) 3 SCR 71; Paras 20-33] Satender Kumar Antil v. Central Bureau of Investigation, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 114 : 2026 INSC 115
Criminal Law – Grant and Cancellation of Bail – Unlawful Assembly (Sections 143, 147, 148, 149 IPC) – SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 – Murder (Section 302 IPC) - Bail – Parameters for interference by Superior Court – Distinction between 'cancellation of bail' for misconduct and 'reversal' of an erroneous bail order – Supreme Court held that while cancellation under Section 439(2) CrPC (Section 483(3) BNSS) typically involves the accused misusing liberty, a superior court can reverse a bail order if it ignores relevant material, is based on extraneous considerations, or fails to consider the gravity of the offence. [Para 20] Shobha Namdev Sonavane v. Samadhan Bajirao Sonvane, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 188 : 2026 INSC 181
Criminal Law — Grant of Bail — Cancellation/Setting aside of bail order — Factors to be considered — Criminal Antecedents and Conduct — The Supreme Court set aside the Allahabad High Court's order granting bail to the first respondent, a "habitual offender" and "career criminal" involved in large-scale cheating and forgery - held that while liberty is a cardinal value, it is not absolute and must be balanced against the potential threat to society and the economic well-being of its members. Rakesh Mittal v. Ajay Pal Gupta, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 170
Criminal Law — Indian Penal Code, 1860 — Sections 306, 307, and 109 — Abetment of Suicide — Suicide Pacts — Culpability of the Surviving Partner - Held: The survivor of a mutual suicide pact is legally culpable for the abetment of the other's suicide under Section 307 of the IPC - A suicide pact involves mutual encouragement and a reciprocal commitment to die together, where the survivor's presence and participation act as a direct catalyst for the deceased's actions - The resolve of each party is reinforced and strengthened by the participation of the other; if not for the active participation of both parties, the act would not occur - The law treats such conduct as abetment because the State has a fundamental interest in preserving life, and any assistance in ending it is a crime against the State. Gudipalli Siddhartha Reddy v. State C.B.I., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 166 : 2026 INSC 160
Criminal Law - Jurisdiction — Magistrate's Power to Commit — Sections 209 and 323 of CrPC — Noted that High Court's assumption that the case was triable by a Magistrate was premature. Even if a case is initially before a Magistrate, it can be committed to the Court of Sessions under Section 209 or Section 323 of the CrPC if the offences (such as Section 409 or 467 IPC, which carry sentences up to life imprisonment) warrant such a trial – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Dolat Ram and others vs. State of Haryana (1995) 1 SCC 349; Neeru Yadav vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and another (2014) 16 SCC 508; Sudha Singh vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and another (2021) 4 SCC 781; Paras 15-21] Rakesh Mittal v. Ajay Pal Gupta, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 170
Criminal Law — Practice of the Court and Interests of Justice — Supreme Court observed that while the general practice is not to release a person sentenced to life imprisonment on bail, such practice cannot prevail if it operates to cause injustice - The underlying postulate of denying bail is that the appeal should be disposed of within a "measurable distance of time" - Keeping a person in jail for 5-6 years for an offence that may ultimately be found not to have been committed is a "travesty of justice" - Section 374(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 — Supreme Court noted that the right of appeal is a statutory right - Serious failure of justice ensues if an appellant remains incarcerated for over a decade only to have their appeal eventually succeed - Unless there are cogent grounds to the contrary, and where the delay is not attributable to the accused, the Court should ordinarily release the accused on bail if the appeal cannot be heard within a reasonable period. [Relied on Kashmira Singh vs. State of Punjab (1977) 4 SCC 291; Paras 5-13] Muna Bisoi v. State of Odisha, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 176
Criminal Law – Sanction for Prosecution – Concept of Deemed Sanction – Deemed Sanction not recognized in Subramanian Swamy vs. Manmohan Singh - The Supreme Court observed that the lead judgment in Dr. Subramanian Swamy vs. Manmohan Singh (2012) 3 SCC 64, does not refer to or discuss the concept of "deemed sanction" - While paragraph 81 of the said judgment part of the concurring opinion by Hon'ble A.K. Ganguly, is often cited, a Coordinate Bench in Suneeti Toteja Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh (2025) SCC OnLine SC 433 has already repelled arguments for deemed sanction, noting that even the Subramanian Swamy decision does not lend credence to such an argument. State v. M. Muneer Ahmed, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 167
Criminal Law — Sentencing Policy — Principle of Proportionality — Modification of Sentence to "Period Already Undergone" — Grounds of Lapse of Time and Victim Compensation — Held: The High Court erred in reducing the sentence of the Private Respondents from three years rigorous imprisonment to the period already undergone (two months) based on the lapse of time (10.5 years) and the willingness of the accused to pay compensation - Punishment must be commensurate with the gravity of the crime and the manner of its commission to maintain public confidence in the efficacy of law - Undue sympathy in awarding inadequate sentences undermines the justice system and fails to respond to society's cry for justice. Parameshwari v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 169 : 2026 INSC 164
Criminal Law - Statutory Interpretation – Section 378(4) & (5) CrPC – Supreme Court noted that Section 378(4) and (5) were preserved in the Code, making it incumbent upon a complainant who initiated prosecution to obtain leave before filing an appeal against acquittal in the High Court - Supreme Court expressed disagreement with the interpretation that the proviso to Section 372 overrides the requirement of seeking leave under Section 378(4) - Noting the "far-reaching consequences" of the issue and the conflicting precedents, the Bench directed the matter to be placed before the Hon'ble Chief Justice of India for an authoritative pronouncement by a larger Bench. [Paras 2-4] Everest Automobiles v. Rajit Enterprises, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 155
Criminal Law — Suspension of Sentence — Grant of Bail pending Appeal — Long Incarceration — Life Imprisonment — The Supreme Court set aside an order of the High Court of Orissa which had declined the suspension of sentence for an appellant convicted under Sections 302/34 IPC and Section 27 of the Arms Act - The appellant had suffered incarceration for over 11 years while his appeal, filed in 2016, remained pending before the High Court. Muna Bisoi v. State of Odisha, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 176
Criminal Procedure — Addition of Graver Offences — Procedure for Arrest — Where an accused is already on bail and new, more serious, cognizable, and non-bailable offences are added, the accused does not automatically lose their liberty but the court must apply its mind afresh. In such cases – i. The accused may surrender and apply for bail for the newly added offences; ii. The investigating agency must obtain an order from the Court that granted bail to arrest the accused; a routine arrest without such an order is not permissible. [Relied on Sushila Aggarwal & Ors. vs. State (NCT of Delhi) & Anr. (2020) 5 SCC 1; Bharat Chaudhary and Anr. vs. State of Bihar and Anr. 2003) 8 SCC 77; Siddharth vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr. (2022) 1 SCC 676; Shri Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia vs. State of Punjab (1980) 2 SCC 565; Paras 12-25, 31-34] Sumit v. State of U.P., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 147 : 2026 INSC 145
Criminal Procedure — Anticipatory Bail — Duration of Protection — The Supreme Court reiterated that once anticipatory bail is granted, it should not invariably be limited to a fixed period or restricted to the stage of filing a charge-sheet - The protection should ordinarily enure in favor of the accused without restriction on time and can continue until the end of the trial, unless specific facts or features necessitate a limited tenure. Sumit v. State of U.P., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 147 : 2026 INSC 145
Criminal Procedure — Evidence — Section 313 CrPC — Adverse Inference — Failure to Explain Incriminating Circumstances - Held: When an accused gives incorrect or false answers or maintains complete denial regarding facts within their exclusive knowledge during a Section 313 CrPC statement, the court is entitled to draw an adverse inference - In this case, the Appellant-Accused denied his relationship with the deceased and even his admission to the hospital despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary - Such conduct fails to meet the explanation expected of a person of normal prudence and tilts the case in favor of the prosecution. Gudipalli Siddhartha Reddy v. State C.B.I., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 166 : 2026 INSC 160
Criminal Procedure – Investigation – Cooperation of Accused – Cooperation with an investigation does not mean the accused must render a confession to suit the convenience of the prosecution – Noted that the State's claim of "non-cooperation" with "a pinch of salt" when used as a justification for continued custody in the face of successive FIR registrations. [Paras 7-13] Binay Kumar Singh v. State of Jharkhand, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 153
Criminal Procedure — Section 438 Cr.P.C. (Section 482 BNSS, 2023) — Impact of Charge-sheet — The mere filing of a charge-sheet, taking of cognizance, or issuance of summons does not automatically terminate the protection granted under Section 438 Cr.P.C. - There is no restriction on granting or continuing anticipatory bail even after a charge-sheet is filed, as the primary objective is to prevent undue harassment through pre-trial arrest. Sumit v. State of U.P., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 147 : 2026 INSC 145
Criminal Procedure – Social Media Posts & Political Speech – Guidelines for Registration of FIRs – Supreme Court refuses to interfere with the Telangana High Court's judgment quashing criminal proceedings and issuing mandatory operational guidelines for police and Magistrates when dealing with complaints based on social media posts – Noted that the High Court's guidelines (Para 29) aim to safeguard fundamental rights and prevent the mechanical or arbitrary invocation of the criminal process - Key Guidelines Upheld – i. Verification of Locus Standi - Police must verify if a complainant is a "person aggrieved" before registering FIRs for defamation or similar offences; ii. High Threshold for Media-Related Offences - Cases involving intentional insult, public mischief, or threat to public order shall not be registered unless there is prima facie material disclosing incitement to violence or hatred; iii. Protection of Political Speech: Constitutional protections under Article must be scrupulously enforced; mechanical registration of cases for harsh or critical political speech is prohibited; iv. Defamation Procedure - As a non-cognizable offence, police cannot directly register an FIR; complainants must be directed to a Magistrate, and action may only follow an order under Section 174(2) of the BNSS; v. Prior Legal Scrutiny: In sensitive cases involving expression, police must obtain a prior legal opinion from the Public Prosecutor before registration. [Relied on Kedar Nath Singh v. State of Bihar, 1962 Supp (2) SCR 769; Shreya Singhal v. Union of India, (2015) 5 SCC 1; Arnesh Kumar v. State of Bihar, (2014) 8 SCC 273; Paras 6,7] State of Telangana v. Nalla Balu @ Durgam Shashidhar Goud, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 113
Custody of Minors – Paramount Consideration vs. Holistic Factors - The Supreme Court held that while the welfare of the child is the "paramount consideration" in custody disputes, the High Court erred in holding that other factors—such as the conduct of the parents, financial capacity, standard of living, and the child's education are not relevant – Noted that these factors have a cumulative effect and are necessary for determining a custody arrangement - noted that the respondent-wife had removed the children from Qatar to India mid-academic session without the father's consent or original passports, using "fake or duplicate" documents - This conduct, coupled with her violation of a court undertaking to return the children to Qatar for which she was found guilty of contempt constituted material aspects that the High Court failed to consider - Supreme Court highlighted that the High Court ignored the impact of the Qatar Court's order (dated 31.10.2023), which had revoked the wife's custody due to her misconduct in removing the children from its jurisdiction - The Supreme Court observed that, at the time of the High Court's judgment, there was no subsisting order of custody in favor of the mother; rather, an order existed in favor of the father as the guardian - Relying on mediation reports and interviews, noted that both minor children expressed an inclination to join their father in Qatar, despite limited memory of life there - The elder child felt his father's presence was sufficient for his care, and both appeared comfortable being without their mother - The High Court judgment was set aside for ignoring "material and crucial aspects." The matter was remanded for reconsideration on merits within four months – Appeal allowed. [Paras 22-33] Mohtashem Billah Malik v. Sana Aftab, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 115
Customs Act, 1962 – Section 135(1)(b)(i) – Smuggling of foreign wrist watches – Admissibility of Section 108 statements – Sentencing – Reduction of sentence to period already undergone – The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of the appellants for the illegal import and handling of 777 foreign-made wrist watches and 879 straps - upheld the High Court's finding that statements recorded by Customs Officers under Section 108 are substantive pieces of evidence and are not barred by Sections 24, 30, or 34 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, provided they are voluntary. Amad Noormamad Bakali v. State of Gujarat, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 190 : 2026 INSC 180
Digitalization of Judiciary — e-Courts Project — Handwritten Orders — Supreme Court expressed concern over Tribunals continuing to use handwritten, illegible order sheets despite the national e-Courts project started in 2007 - High Courts directed to ensure computers provided are utilized and that officers' names and UID numbers are clearly mentioned on orders. [Relied on Parminder Singh v. Honey Goyal and Others, 2025 INSC 361: (2025) 9 SCC 539; Paras 10-18] National Insurance Company Ltd v. Rathlavath Chandulal, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 149 : 2026 INSC 146
Discretionary Toolkit of the Court – Held that while exercising power under Section 29A, the Court must examine "sufficient cause" and may deploy several measures to ensure integrity and efficiency – i. Reduction of arbitrator fees (up to 5% per month of delay); ii. Substitution of one or all arbitrators; iii. Imposition of actual or exemplary costs on parties; iv. Imposition of specific terms and conditions for the conduct of proceedings. C. Velusamy v. K. Indhera, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 105 : 2026 INSC 112
Distinction Between Precedent and Res Judicata — Section 11(7) — Held that while a "precedent" operates in rem and serves as a source of law for other parties, "res judicata" operates in personam between the same parties to ensure finality in litigation - Even if other benches of a High Court interpreted an identical clause differently in separate litigations (precedent), the specific order appointing the arbitrator between the current parties constitutes res judicata regarding the existence of the arbitration agreement - The correctness of the initial decision is immaterial unless it relates to a lack of inherent jurisdiction. Eminent Colonizers v. Rajasthan Housing Board, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 109 : 2026 INSC 116
Doctrine of Estoppel – Participation in Selection Process – The Supreme Court rejected the High Court's view that the appellant was estopped from challenging the allotment simply because he participated in the draw of lots. The Court held that participation does not bar a challenge when the process is marred by bias and arbitrary exercise of power - Supreme Court imposed costs of ₹1 lakh on the Society (HEWO), ₹50,000 on Respondent No. 3, and ₹25,000 on Respondent No. 4. It directed a fresh draw of lots among the four eligible applicants who were available at the earlier point of time – Appeal allowed. [Paras 15 - 18] Dinesh Kumar v. State of Haryana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 171 : 2026 INSC 163
Doctrine of Lis Pendens in Money Decrees – Supreme Court rejected the argument that lis pendens does not apply to simple money suits - If Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act were excluded from money suits, a judgment-debtor could easily defeat the decree by alienating property before execution, rendering the judicial process meaningless - Noted that "the true difficulties of a litigant begin only after they have obtained a decree". R. Savithri Naidu v. Cotton Corporation of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 151 : 2026 INSC 150
Doctrine of Merger - Effect of Granting Leave - Once the Supreme Court grants leave in a Special Leave Petition and the appeal is thereafter decided, the doctrine of merger applies, whether the Supreme Court's order is one of reversal, modification, or mere affirmation - Distinguished cases where SLP is dismissed without granting leave, where no merger occurs – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Kunhayammed & Ors. v. State of Kerala & Anr., (2000) 6 SCC 359; Khoday Distilleries Limited & Ors. v. Sri Mahadeshwara Sahakara Sakkare Karkhane Limited, Kollegal, (2019) 4 SCC 376; Paras 11-12] United Labour Federation v. Gagandeep Singh Bedi, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 208 : 2026 INSC 204
Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 – Section 18(a)(vi) read with Rule 74, 18-B, 22(1)(cca), 27(d), and 28-A – Record Maintenance – Limitation for Filing Complaint – Jurisdiction of Courts – Held that i. Non-Maintenance of Records as a Substantive Offence: The Appellants were prosecuted for failing to maintain records as stipulated under Schedule M and Schedule U of the Drugs and Cosmetics Rules, 1945, specifically regarding the drug Pseudoephedrine - held that allegations regarding the contravention of Section 18(a)(vi) of the Act (manufacturing/stocking in contravention of rules) are punishable under Section 27(d); ii. Limitation Period for Prosecution: The Appellants argued that the offence fell under Section 18-B (punishable under Section 28-A), which carries a maximum punishment of one year, thus attracting a one-year limitation period under Section 468 of the Cr.P.C. - The Supreme Court rejected this, clarifying that since the allegations included violations of Section 18(a)(vi) punishable under Section 27(d) (imprisonment up to two years), the limitation period is three years as per Section 468 Cr.P.C; iii. Jurisdiction and Committal to Special Court/Sessions: Under Section 32(2), no court inferior to a Court of Session shall try an offence punishable under Chapter IV of the Act - While Section 36-A allows for summary trials by a Magistrate for certain offences, it explicitly excludes those triable by the Special Court or Court of Session - the committal of the case to the Special Judge-I (a Court of Session) was legally sound – Appeal dismissed. [Relied on Miteshbhai J. Patel Vs. Drug Inspector, 2025 SCC online SC 2203; Paras 27-32] SBS Biotech v. State of Himachal Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 181 : 2026 INSC 171
Economic Policy and Legislative Intent — Excessive Judicial Review — Supreme Court cautioned against the strategic use of litigation by unsuccessful resolution applicants to delay the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP). Excessive judicial scrutiny beyond narrow statutory boundaries leads to value destruction, erodes the going-concern status of the Corporate Debtor, and discourages future bidders by introducing legal uncertainty - The IBC prioritizes speed, finality, and predictability to ensure efficient resource allocation in the economy. [Relied on Committee of Creditors of Essar Steel India Limited vs. Satish Kumar Gupta, (2020) 8 SCC 531; Kalyani Transco vs. Bhushan Power & Steel Ltd., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2093; Swiss Ribbons Private Ltd. vs. Union of India, (2019) 4 SCC 17; Pratap Technocrats Private Ltd. vs. Monitoring Committee of Reliance Infratel Limited, (2021) 10 SCC 623; Paras 7-14] Torrent Power v. Ashish Arjunkumar Rathi, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 207 : 2026 INSC 206
Economic Viability and Fiscal Prudence – Comparative data from Rajasthan reveals OCIs are significantly more cost-effective than closed prisons - Per-prisoner per-day expenditure in closed prisons is approximately Rs. 333.12, whereas in open prisons, it is only Rs. 49.60 - Staffing ratios also show marked efficiency: 6:1 in closed prisons versus 80:1 in open camps - While "Prisons" is a State subject (Schedule VII, List II), States are urged to implement the Model Prison Manual, 2016 and the Model Prisons and Correctional Services Act, 2023 to ensure uniformity and modernization - Specific Directions – i. Establishment of High-Powered Committee (HPC): Constituted under the Executive Chairmanship of Hon'ble Mr. Justice S. Ravindra Bhat (Retd.) to formulate Common Minimum Standards for OCI governance, eligibility, and management; ii. Expansion of Infrastructure: States lacking OCIs (e.g., Arunachal Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Telangana) must assess feasibility and develop protocols for establishment within three months; iii. Mandatory Monitoring: All High Courts directed to register a suo motu writ petition as a continuing mandamus to oversee compliance; iv. State Monitoring Committees: Every State/UT to constitute a committee headed by the Executive Chairman of the State Legal Services Authority within four weeks. [Relied on D. Bhuvan Mohan Patnaik v. State of Andhra Pradesh (1975) 3 SCC 185; Mohammed Giasuddin v. State of Andhra Pradesh (1977) 3 SCC 287; Dharambir v. State of Uttar Pradesh (1979) 3 SCC 645; Vikram Deo Singh Tomar v. State of Bihar (1988) SCC OnLine SC 450; Paras 33-36, 47-51, 67-71, 73] Suhas Chakma v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 205 : 2026 INSC 198
Employees' Compensation Act, 1923; Section 4A(3)(b) — Liability to pay Penalty — The Supreme Court reiterated that while an Insurance Company is liable to indemnify the employer for the principal compensation amount and interest, it cannot be fastened with the liability to pay the penalty component - Noted that the penalty under Section 4A(3)(b) is imposed due to the "personal fault and negligence" of the employer for failing to deposit compensation within the stipulated one month. New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Rekha Chaudhary, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 187 : 2026 INSC 177
Employees' Compensation Act, 1923 - Statutory Interpretation — Section 4A — Following the 1995 Amendment, the components of compensation/interest (Clause 'a') and penalty (Clause 'b') have been severed - The legislative intent behind this severance was to ensure that the burden of penalty which is not a natural corollary of the indemnity contract remains a deterrence for the employer rather than being passed onto the insurer - The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's order regarding the penalty. It held that the employer (Respondent No. 4) is solely liable to pay the penalty amount of Rs. 2,57,838/- within eight weeks. [Relied on Ved Prakash Garg v. Premi Devi (1997) 8 SCC 1; Paras 10-22] New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Rekha Chaudhary, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 187 : 2026 INSC 177
Environment (Protection) Act, 1986 – Section 5 – Directions for Implementation – To bridge significant implementation gaps and ensure readiness for the 2026 Rules, Supreme Court issued nationwide directions: i. Three-Tier Enforcement: Failure to comply shall be treated as more than an administrative lapse, involving: Tier 1 (immediate fines), Tier 2 (criminal prosecution), and Tier 3 (prosecution of responsible officials for neglect of oversight duties); ii. Role of Elected Representatives: Mayors, Councillors, and Ward Members are designated as lead facilitators for source-segregation education; iii. Infrastructure and Monitoring: Mandated infrastructure audits by District Collectors and the establishment of multi-tier monitoring task forces by 15.03.2026; iv. Bulk Waste Generators (BWGs): Must register on a centralized portal and operate on-site wet waste processing facilities or procure EBWGR certificates by 31.03.2026. [Paras 12-19] Bhopal Municipal Corporation v. Dr. Subhash C. Pandey, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 182
Environmental Law – Siting Norms – Proximity to Schools and Habitations – Mandatory nature of buffer zones and siting distances. Held: Preventive safeguards and siting norms (e.g., PPCB notification dated 02.09.1998) are designed to operate in advance to prevent avoidable risk to sensitive receptors - Demonstrable compliance based on objective, verified measurements of emission sources is required at the threshold; assumptions of compliance to be tested at a later stage (Consent to Operate) are legally insufficient. [Relied on Vellore Citizens' Welfare Forum v. Union of India (1996) 5 SCC 647; K. Ramadas Shenoy v. Town Municipal Council, Udipi (1974) 2 SCC 506; A.P. Pollution Control Board v. Prof. M.V. Nayudu (1999) 2 SCC 718; Paras 26-33] Harbinder Singh Sekhon v. State of Punjab, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 162 : 2026 INSC 159
Equitable Relief — Enhanced Interest for Delay — While recognizing the membership, Supreme Court provided liberty to aggrieved members to seek "enhanced interest" or "additional amounts" due to the significant delay (from 1995/2005 to 2025) in making the contribution – Appeals allowed. [Para 47] Shashin Patel v. Uday Dalal, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 125 : 2026 INSC 125
Essential Commodities Act, 1955 – Sections 3 and 7 – Prosecution for cement black-marketing – Effect of decontrol – The appellants were convicted for the unauthorized possession and intended sale of government-quota cement in 1994, allegedly violating the Maharashtra Cement (Licensing and Control) Order, 1973 - The Supreme Court held that since the Central Government had substantially withdrew price and distribution control over cement via S.O. 168(E) dated 01.03.1989 and rescinded state licensing powers via S.O. 624(E) dated 07.08.1990, no valid control order under Section 3 was in force on the date of the alleged offense (24.03.1994) - In the absence of a subsisting statutory order, a conviction under Section 7 is legally impermissible. Manoj v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 157 : 2026 INSC 152
Estates Acquisition Act, 1953 (West Bengal) – Sections 6(1)(j), 53, 57A, and 57B – Power of Review – Jurisdiction of Revenue Officer – Quasi-Judicial Authorities – Separation of Powers - Whether a Revenue Officer, as a quasi-judicial authority under the West Bengal Estates Acquisition (WBEA) Act, 1953, possesses the inherent or statutory power to review a vesting order that has attained finality, especially in the absence of an express legislative mandate - Key Findings of the Court – i. No Inherent Power of Review - Supreme Court reiterated that the power of review is not an inherent power; it must be expressly conferred by statute or by necessary implication - Quasi-judicial authorities can only exercise those powers specifically bestowed upon them by law; ii. Interpretation of Section 57A - held that Section 57A, which allows the State to invest authorities with the "powers of a Civil Court," does not amount to a blanket conferment of the power of substantive review - Such an interpretation would conflict with Section 57B(3), which expressly prohibits Revenue Officers from reopening matters already decided or determined; iii. Separation of Powers & Basic Structure - Conferring judicial functions like the power of review upon executive functionaries (like Revenue Officers), who lack judicial training or independence from executive control, blurs the demarcation between the executive and judiciary - This encroaches upon the Separation of Powers, which is part of the Basic Structure of the Constitution; iv. Failure on Merits of Review – Held that even if jurisdiction existed, the 2008 review failed the criteria under Order XLVII Rule 1 of the CPC - The respondent-company failed to prove it was "exclusively engaged in farming" as of January 1, 1952, despite ample opportunities in 1971 - Subsequent economic considerations or "amicable settlements" are not legally sustainable grounds for review – v. Nullity of Orders without Jurisdiction - An order passed by an authority lacking inherent jurisdiction is void ab initio and a nullity. Its invalidity can be challenged at any stage, including collateral proceedings. [Relied on: Patel Narshi Thakershi v. Pradyuman Singhji, (1971) 3 SCC 844; Kalabharati Advertising v. Hemant Vimalnath Narichania, (2010) 9 SCC 437; Union of India v. Madras Bar Assn., (2010) 11 SCC 1; Balvant N. Viswamitra v. Yadav Sadashiv Mule, (2004) 8 SCC 706; Paras 31-89] State of West Bengal v. Jai Hind Pvt. Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 126 : 2026 INSC 132
Eviction Procedure – Procedural Safeguards – Supreme Court recorded and approved a policy mechanism evolved by the State of Assam to ensure fairness in removing encroachments: i. Committee Constitution: A committee comprising forest and revenue officials will be formed to oversee the process; ii. Notice and Hearing: Alleged unauthorized occupants must be served a notice and granted an opportunity to produce evidence of their right to occupy the land; iii. Revenue vs. Forest Land: If land is found within revenue limits and outside notified forest areas, the matter must be referred to the Revenue Department; iv. Speaking Order: If an occupation is found to be unauthorized after scrutiny, a speaking order must be passed and served; v. Grace Period: A 15-day notice period must be granted to vacate the premises after the speaking order is served. Abdul Khalek v. State of Assam, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 134 : 2026 INSC 140
Evidence Act, 1872; Section 27 — Discovery of Fact — Doctrine of Confirmation by Subsequent Events — Section 27 is a proviso to Sections 25 and 26 - The "fact discovered" embraces not merely the object recovered, but the place from which it is produced and the knowledge of the accused as to its existence - The actual discovery of the body from the exact location disclosed by the appellant (a well) serves as a guarantee of the truthfulness of the information supplied. Neelu @ Nilesh Koshti v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 179 : 2026 INSC 173
Evidence Act, 1872; Section 27 – Recovery of remnants of deceased – Requirement of "Custody" – Information leading to a discovery is admissible under Section 27 only if it comes from a person who is in the custody of the police at the time the statement is made - In the present case, the Section 27 memorandum was drawn at 10:30 AM on 13.10.2018, whereas the formal arrest of the accused occurred later that night at 22:00 hrs - As the accused was not in police custody when the statement was made, the recovery cannot be brought under the ambit of Section 27. Rohit Jangde v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 164 : 2026 INSC 162
Evidence Act, 1872; Section 8 – Admissibility as Conduct – Even if a recovery is not admissible under Section 27 due to a lack of formal custody, the fact that the accused led the police to a location where incriminating items were found can be admitted as "conduct" under Section 8 - such evidence is considered "weak" and can only offer corroboration; it cannot, by itself, result in a conviction without other proven links in the chain of circumstances. Rohit Jangde v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 164 : 2026 INSC 162
Evidence Act, 1872 – Section 85 – Registration Act, 1908 – Section 33 – Presumption as to Power of Attorney – The presumption of valid execution and authentication under Section 85 of the Evidence Act or Section 33 of the Registration Act applies only when the original document or legally admitted secondary evidence is produced - In the absence of an original or properly adduced secondary evidence, it is impermissible to apply these sections to conclude the extent of authority granted to an agent. [Para 23] Tharammel Peethambaran v. T. Ushakrishnan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 128 : 2026 INSC 134
Evidence Act, 1872 – Sections 63, 64, and 65 – Admissibility of Secondary Evidence – Photocopy of Power of Attorney – Primary evidence is the "best evidence" rule, and secondary evidence is an exception admissible only upon laying a factual foundation. A photocopy is a mechanical copy and constitutes secondary evidence - It cannot be admitted as evidence unless the party establishes the legal right to lead secondary evidence by proving the original's existence and providing valid reasons for its non-production under the specific exceptions of Section 65 - A photocopy is no evidence unless proved by following the prescribed procedure. [Paras 20 - 23] Tharammel Peethambaran v. T. Ushakrishnan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 128 : 2026 INSC 134
Evidence – Admissibility of Evidence Collected in Illegal Search – Rule of Relevancy – Even if a search is conducted in infraction of statutory procedures (such as Section 30 of the PCPNDT Act), the materials or records seized during such search are not automatically discarded. Materials gathered in an illegal search remain admissible in evidence subject to the test of relevancy and genuineness – Noted that Court must, however, examine such evidence with greater care. [Paras 50 - 52] Dr. Naresh Kumar Garg v. State of Haryana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 186 : 2026 INSC 176
Evidence and Pleadings – Oral Evidence vs. Pleadings – Supreme Court noted that a party asserting a competing claim to hereditary rights must specifically plead material particulars, such as when they entered possession and when obstruction began - The Appellants' written statement was silent on these aspects – Noted that the settled legal principle that oral evidence cannot serve as a substitute for pleadings, and a case not made out in the pleadings cannot be established through evidence alone. [Para 23] Ogeppa v. Sahebgouda, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 198 : 2026 INSC 191
Evidence Law - Admissibility of Documents – Mode of Proof – Distinction between an objection to the "admissibility" of a document and its "mode of proof" - A prompt objection to the mode of proof (e.g., producing photocopies instead of originals) is necessary to allow the party tendering the evidence an opportunity to cure the defect – Noted that in this case, the appellant categorically denied the photocopies and filed applications for the production of originals and cross-examination, which the Commission failed to address - The Supreme Court found the award of ₹2,00,00,000/- unjustified as the respondent failed to establish actual financial loss or a causal link between the haircut and lost career opportunities - The appeal was partially allowed, restricting the compensation to the ₹25,00,000/- already released to the respondent. [Relied on Malay Kumar Ganguly v. Dr. Sukumar Mukherjee and others (2009) 9 SCC 221; Venkatachala Gounder v. Arulmigu Viswesaraswami & V.P. Temple and another (2003) 8 SCC 75; Dr. J.J. Merchant and others v. Shrinath Chaturvedi (2002) 6 SCC 635; Paras 17-22] ITC Limited v. Aashna Roy, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 129 : 2026 INSC 135
Evidence Law - Circumstantial Evidence — Five Golden Principles — For a conviction based solely on circumstantial evidence, the conditions outlined in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda vs. State of Maharashtra (1984) 4 SCC 116 must be fulfilled - These include: (1) circumstances from which guilt is drawn must be fully established; (2) facts must be consistent only with the hypothesis of guilt; (3) circumstances must be of a conclusive nature; (4) they must exclude every possible hypothesis except guilt; and (5) the chain of evidence must be so complete as to leave no reasonable ground for the conclusion of innocence. Neelu @ Nilesh Koshti v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 179 : 2026 INSC 173
Evidence Law - Circumstantial Evidence – Last Seen Together Theory – Noted that prosecution's "last seen" theory failed due to significant inconsistencies and interpolations in police records regarding the date and time of the accused's prior arrest for a different matter - noted that the child allegedly went missing while the accused may have already been in police custody - Where the investigation is "botched" and "inept," leaving the chain of circumstances incomplete and failing to eliminate other hypotheses, the accused is entitled to the benefit of doubt - Conviction set aside. [Relied on Dharam Deo Yadav v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2014) 5 SCC 509; Jaffar Hussain Dastagir v. State of Maharashtra (1969) 2 SCC 872; Ramkishan Mithanlal Sharma v. State of Bombay (1954) 2 SCC 516; Paras 10-20] Rohit Jangde v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 164 : 2026 INSC 162
Evidence Law - Identification of Decomposed Body — Medical Jurisprudence — Absence of DNA testing does not vitiate identification when credible and consistent testimonies of witnesses who knew the deceased personally are available - Relying on Modi's Textbook of Medical Jurisprudence and Toxicology, Supreme Court noted that putrefaction in water is slower than in air, especially when the body is protected by clothing - Identification based on clothing and recognizable facial features by familial and close witnesses is legally sustainable. Neelu @ Nilesh Koshti v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 179 : 2026 INSC 173
Evidence Law - Motive in Circumstantial Evidence — While motive is significant in cases of circumstantial evidence, it is not an absolute necessity when the chain of circumstances is otherwise complete - Failure to prove motive is not fatal to the prosecution's case if the facts clearly point to the accused's guilt - A delay of three days in lodging a missing person report is neither excessive nor unusual, as family members often conduct their own search before approaching the police; such delay does not, by itself, vitiate the prosecution's case – Appeal dismissed. [Relied on: Mulakh Raj and Others vs. Satish Kumar and Others (1992) 3 SCC 43; Paras 13-17, 20-29] Neelu @ Nilesh Koshti v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 179 : 2026 INSC 173
Evidentiary Value of Confessional Statements – noted that the conviction was not based solely on confessions, but was supported by the discovery of incriminating material (contraband and money) documented via panchnamas - Such discoveries constitute independent and relevant evidence under Sections 6, 10, and 11 of the Evidence Act. Amad Noormamad Bakali v. State of Gujarat, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 190 : 2026 INSC 180
Execution of Award — Procedure of Attachment — Fairness — The Tribunal issued warrants for the attachment of office furniture, fixtures, and computers of a Public Sector Undertaking (PSU) shortly after the execution petition was filed - Held: Such a process paralyzes the working of the company – Noted that while awards must be satisfied, the Executing Court should adopt fair procedures, such as the attachment of bank accounts, rather than coercive attachment of essential office equipment without judicial mind. National Insurance Company Ltd v. Rathlavath Chandulal, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 149 : 2026 INSC 146
Forest Rights – Recognition of Legal Occupation – Supreme Court noted that certain residents, such as those in "Forest Villages" listed in the 'Jamabandi Register' or title holders under the Scheduled Tribes and Other Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights) Act, 2006, are legally authorized and not liable for eviction - directed the parties to maintain status quo regarding the land in occupation until a speaking order is passed and the subsequent 15-day notice period expires. [Paras 9-13] Abdul Khalek v. State of Assam, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 134 : 2026 INSC 140
Hindu Law – Alienation – Legal Necessity – Karta's Power - held that alienations by a Karta in favor of a single coparcener must be strictly proved to be for legal necessity - Vague or general recitals in sale deeds regarding "family needs" or "debts" are insufficient to bind the interests of other coparceners - upheld the item-wise scrutiny performed by the lower courts to distinguish between proved legal necessity and impermissible alienations. [Para 33] Dorairaj v. Doraisamy, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 119 : 2026 INSC 126
Hindu Law – Joint Family Property – Burden of Proof - Supreme Court affirmed that while the mere existence of a joint family does not render all properties joint, once it is established that ancestral properties yielding income existed and acquisitions were made during the subsistence of the joint family, the burden shifts to the person asserting self-acquisition to prove the same - noted that Hindu law does not require coparceners to establish the exact source of funds for every acquisition made by the Karta if a sufficient nucleus is shown. [Relied On Shrinivas Krishnarao Kango v. Narayan Devji Kango and Ors. (1954) 1 SCC 544; Pattusami Padayachi v. Mullaiammal and others MLJ (II) 1976 225; Paras 29, 30] Dorairaj v. Doraisamy, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 119 : 2026 INSC 126
Hindu Law – Wills – Suspicious Circumstances - upheld the rejection of an unregistered Will executed 72 hours prior to the testator's death - Key suspicious circumstances included the use of a thumb impression by a testator who was literate and habitually signed documents, the involvement of a close relative as a scribe instead of a professional, and the exclusion of natural heirs - since the Appellant did not challenge the Trial Court's rejection of the Will at the First Appeal stage, the finding attained finality - The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals, finding no ground to interfere with the High Court's judgment, which had correctly applied principles of Hindu Law regarding coparcenary property and legal necessity – Appeals dismissed. Dorairaj v. Doraisamy, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 119 : 2026 INSC 126
Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 – Section 25 – Permanent Alimony – Enhancement Of Maintenance – The Supreme Court Enhanced The Permanent alimony awarded to the appellant-wife from ₹15,000/- to ₹30,000/- per month - Noted that the initial amount was inadequate considering the respondent-husband's profession as a doctor with an approximate monthly income of ₹1,60,000/-, the current cost of living, and the impact of inflation – Held that a woman Is Entitled To Live A life consistent with the standard of living she was accustomed to during the subsistence of the marriage - The obligation of the husband to ensure the wife lives with dignity does not end merely because she is educated or has parental support - Sustenance does not mean mere survival; it means leading a life in a similar manner as she would have lived in the house of her husband. Anamika Jain v. Dr. Atul Jain, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 111
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947; Section 2(j) – Definition of "Industry" – Temple/Charitable Trust – The Supreme Court declined to interfere with the findings of the Labour Court and High Court which held that the respondent-Trust, being a temple and a charity-based institution with no object of earning profit or manufacturing activity, does not fall within the definition of "industry". Indravadan N. Adhvaryu Pipala Fali Modhvada v. Laxminarayan Dev Trust, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 102
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 – Termination – Grant of Monetary Compensation – Where a permanent employee (Accountant) was orally terminated after twelve years of unblemished service without an inquiry, the Court directed the payment of a lump-sum compensation of ₹12,00,000/- in full and final settlement, even without deciding on the merits of the "industry" status, to lay the entire issue to rest. [Relied on Bangalore Water Supply & Sewerage Board vs. A. Rajappa and Others (1978) 2 SCC 213; Paras 2-5] Indravadan N. Adhvaryu Pipala Fali Modhvada v. Laxminarayan Dev Trust, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 102
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016; Section 14 — Moratorium vs. Arbitral Continuity — Noted that the High Court erred in nullifying arbitral orders passed during a moratorium period while exercising jurisdiction under the Arbitration Act - The Supreme Court used its powers under Article 142 to declare transactions (sale of flats) made pursuant to such arbitral orders as lawfully valid to protect third-party homebuyer rights. [Relied on Yashwith Constructions Pvt. Ltd. v. Simplex Concrete Piles India Ltd. & Anr. (2006) 6 SCC 204; Interplay Between Arbitration Agreements under Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 & Stamp Act, 1899, In re, (2024) 6 SCC 1; Hindustan Construction Co. Ltd. v. Bihar Rajya Pul Nirman Nigam Ltd., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2578; Official Trustee v. Sachindra Nath Chatterjee, 1968 SCC Online SC 103; Paras 28-47] Ankhim Holdings Pvt. Ltd. v. Zaveri Construction Pvt. Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 133 : 2026 INSC 137
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016; Section 61(3)(ii) — Material Irregularity — Seeking clarifications from resolution applicants by the Resolution Professional (RP) under the specific instructions of the CoC does not constitute "material irregularity." - The RP acts as a communicator for the CoC's queries to ensure a comprehensive evaluation of the feasibility and viability of resolution plans - Such conduct does not amount to an independent or unilateral modification of the process by the RP. Torrent Power v. Ashish Arjunkumar Rathi, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 207 : 2026 INSC 206
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016; Section 7(2) and 7(5)(b) — Adherence to Form — An application under Section 7 is not liable to be rejected for insignificant omissions or technical errors if it is substantially in conformity with Form 1and discloses the essential ingredients: (a) applicant is a financial creditor, (b) existence of a financial debt, (c) occurrence of default, and (d) default meets the threshold under Section 4 - The Adjudicating Authority may allow the rectification of applications and the filing of additional documents at any time before the final order. B. Prashanth Hegde v. State Bank of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 156 : 2026 INSC 155
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016; Section 7 — Effect of Counterclaims and Criminal Proceedings — Mere pendency of a counterclaim for damages or the institution of criminal proceedings against the officials of a Financial Creditor does not bar the initiation of CIRP - Such proceedings have no bearing on the existence of the financial debt or the right of the creditor to invoke IBC – Appeal dismissed. [Relied on Asset Reconstruction Company (India) Ltd. v. Bishal Jaiswal & Anr. (2021) 6 SCC 366; Dena Bank v. C. Shivakumar Reddy (2021) 10 SCC 330; M. Suresh Kumar Reddy v. Canara Bank (2023) 8 SCC 387; Paras 31, 37-40, 45-51, 54, 55] B. Prashanth Hegde v. State Bank of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 156 : 2026 INSC 155
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016; Section 7 — Limitation Act, 1963; Section 18 and Article 137 — Acknowledgement of Debt — The Supreme Court upheld the NCLAT's finding that a Section 7 application was within limitation despite the initial default occurring years prior - held that entry of debt in the Corporate Debtor's (CD) balance sheets serves as a valid acknowledgement under Section 18 of the Limitation Act, 1963, provided it is signed by a director (who acts as an agent of the company) – Noted that how a bank classifies its debt for asset classification (NPA) under RBI norms is not a determining factor for the starting point of limitation if the debt is subsequently restructured and acknowledged in fresh agreements. B. Prashanth Hegde v. State Bank of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 156 : 2026 INSC 155
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016; Sections 30(2), 31, 61(3), and 62 — Doctrine of Commercial Wisdom — Scope of Judicial Review — The Supreme Court reaffirmed that the commercial wisdom of the Committee of Creditors (CoC) is paramount and non-justiciable - The Adjudicating Authority (NCLT) and Appellate Authority (NCLAT) have limited jurisdiction to interfere with the CoC's decision, restricted strictly to ensuring compliance with statutory requirements under Section 30(2) and identifying material irregularities under Section 61(3) – Held that courts cannot act as courts of equity or substitute their commercial assessment for that of the CoC, which comprises financial creditors who bear the economic consequences of the corporate debtor's failure. Torrent Power v. Ashish Arjunkumar Rathi, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 207 : 2026 INSC 206
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 — Debenture Trust Deed (DTD) — Modification of Terms — Procedure for Restructuring — Supreme Court observed that the Corporate Debtor's claim of an existing moratorium was based on unilateral e-mail exchanges with only one debenture holder (ECLF) – Held that such negotiations could not bind other debenture holders or the Debenture Trustee in the absence of express authorization - Any modification, amendment, or waiver of the DTD terms must strictly adhere to the procedure prescribed within the deed itself—specifically requiring a "Special Resolution" passed by a three-fourths majority of debenture holders and a written document signed by all parties. [Paras 13-15, 18] Catalyst Trusteeship Ltd. v. Ecstasy Realty Pvt. Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 192 : 2026 INSC 186
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Discretion of Adjudicating Authority (NCLT) – Section 7 vs. Section 9 – Held: The use of the word "may" in Section 7(5)(a) confers a degree of discretion upon the NCLT to admit a financial creditor's application, whereas "shall" in Section 9(5)(a) for operational creditors is mandatory - this discretion must be exercised reasonably and not arbitrarily – Noted that the NCLT should admit a Section 7 application upon satisfaction of financial debt and default, unless there are "good reasons" to the contrary. [Relied on BRS Ventures Investments Ltd. v. SREI Infrastructure Finance Ltd. & Anr. (2025) 1 SCC 456; Maitreya Doshi v. Anand Rathi Global Finance Ltd. (2023) 17 SCC 606; Axis Bank Ltd. v. Vidarbha Industries Power Ltd. (2022) 8 SCC 352; Paras 77-104] ICICI Bank v, Era Infrastructure, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 203 : 2026 INSC 201
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Doctrine of Election – Applicability to IBC Claims – Held: The doctrine of election is not attracted in the context of filing claims against both the debtor and the guarantor - Restricting a creditor to elect between the two would defeat the purpose of a guarantee and potentially lead to the loss of rights under the "clean slate" principle if the full debt is not claimed in a concluding CIRP - There is no statutory proscription in the IBC against filing such simultaneous claims. ICICI Bank v, Era Infrastructure, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 203 : 2026 INSC 201
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Double Enrichment – Safeguards under 2016 Regulations – Held: While concerns regarding double enrichment (recovering more than the total debt) are well-founded, they do not justify a bar on simultaneous proceedings - Sufficient safeguards exist in Regulation 12A (obligation of the creditor to update claims upon partial satisfaction from any source) and Regulation 14 (duty of the Resolution Professional to revise admitted claim amounts based on new information) of the IBBI (Insolvency Resolution Process for Corporate Persons) Regulations, 2016. ICICI Bank v, Era Infrastructure, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 203 : 2026 INSC 201
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Interaction between IBC and Benami Act – Overriding Effect – Held: While the IBC is a later and special enactment, it does not displace the statutory mechanism of the Benami Act regarding the determination of "tainted" assets - The "residuary jurisdiction" of the NCLT under Section 60(5) cannot be used to "short-circuit" the specialized adjudicatory hierarchy (Adjudicating Authority, Appellate Tribunal, and High Court) established under the Benami Act. S. Rajendran v. Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 199 : 2026 INSC 187
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Key Directions issued by the Supreme Court – i. Engagement of NBCC: NBCC is directed to complete the pending projects within stipulated timelines using its own resources and 70% of project receivables; ii. Protection for Home Buyers: Existing allottees shall not be subjected to any cost escalation beyond the original Builder Buyer Agreements; iii. Administrative Oversight: Constitution of an Apex Court Committee and Project-wise Court Committees to monitor progress and approve fund transfers between projects; iv. No Judicial Interference: No Court or Tribunal shall pass interim orders stopping projects commenced by NBCC; any grievances must be brought directly to the Supreme Court; v. Appointment of Amicus Curiae: Mr. Rajiv Jain, Senior Counsel, and Mr. Amarendra Kumar are appointed as Amicus Curiae to assist the Tribunal and monitor ongoing projects. [Paras 15-22] Apex Heights Pvt. Ltd. v. Ram Kishor Arora, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 142
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Liquidation Estate and Beneficial Ownership – Section 36 IBC – Held: Only assets beneficially owned by the corporate debtor form part of the liquidation estate - Since a benamidar (the corporate debtor in this case) possesses no beneficial interest and holds property in a fiduciary capacity, such property is expressly excluded from the liquidation estate under Section 36(4)(a)(i) and cannot be distributed to creditors. S. Rajendran v. Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 199 : 2026 INSC 187
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Moratorium – Section 14 IBC – Scope – Held: The moratorium under Section 14 is intended to protect the corporate debtor from "creditor actions" for debt recovery -It does not act as an automated stay against sovereign in rem proceedings initiated for the attachment or confiscation of property under penal statutes like the Benami Act - The protection under Section 32A is "event-based" and only triggered upon the approval of a resolution plan or a liquidation sale to an unconnected third party -It does not validate a defective title or retrospectively convert benami property into assets of the corporate debtor during the pendency of proceedings. [Relied on Embassy Property Developments (P) Ltd. v. State of Karnataka (2020) 13 SCC 308; State Bank of India v. Union of India (2026 INSC 153); Gujarat Urja Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Amit Gupta (2021) 7 SCC 209; Controller of Estate Duty, Lucknow v. Aloke Mitra (1981) 2 SCC 121; Paras 13-24] S. Rajendran v. Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 199 : 2026 INSC 187
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Real Estate Project – Default in Possession – Completion Certificate – Where a developer fails to obtain a final completion certificate and fails to execute tripartite sublease deeds as required by the lessor (UPSIDA), physical delivery of possession without such legal formalities has no legal import - The existence of a financial debt and default is established when units are not made ready or delivered in a fit state for occupation despite payment of consideration. [Relied on Manish Kumar vs. Union of India (2021) 5 SCC 1; Surendra Trading Company vs. Juggilal Kamlapat Jute Mills Company Limited (2017) 16 SCC 143; Edelweiss Asset Reconstruction Company Limited vs. Sachet Infrastructure Private Limited (2019) SCC OnLine NCLAT 592; Paras 31 - 37] Satinder Singh Bhasin v. Col. Gautam Mullick, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 100 : 2026 INSC 104
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 — Resolution Plan — Modification vs. Clarification — Clarifications that reaffirm existing terms of a Resolution Plan—such as confirming the treatment of Bank Guarantees or the Net Present Value (NPV) of deferred payments—do not amount to an unauthorized enhancement or modification of a commercial offer after the conclusion of negotiations. Torrent Power v. Ashish Arjunkumar Rathi, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 207 : 2026 INSC 206
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Section 7(1) Second Proviso – Threshold of 100 Allottees – Relevant Date for Calculation – The Supreme Court reaffirmed that the crucial date for ascertaining whether the minimum threshold of 100 allottees (or 10% of total allottees) is met is the date of filing of the petition, and not the date of its admission or hearing - Any subsequent settlements or withdrawals during the pendency of the proceedings do not render the petition non-maintainable if the threshold was met at the time of presentation. [Para 9, 21] Satinder Singh Bhasin v. Col. Gautam Mullick, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 100 : 2026 INSC 104
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Section 7 – Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) – Real Estate Projects – Role of Third-Party Entities – National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT) Jurisdiction – Article 142 of the Constitution of India – The Supreme Court upheld the NCLAT's direction to engage NBCC India Ltd., a Government of India entity, to complete 16 stalled residential projects of M/s. Supertech Limited - held that the primary consideration in insolvency proceedings involving real estate companies is to protect the interests of home buyers who have waited decades for shelter - Claims of secured creditors, operational creditors, and land authorities (Noida, Greater Noida, and Yamuna Expressway) are, for the time being, considered secondary to the delivery of units with basic amenities – Held that such an equitable mechanism, aimed at completing construction on a "war footing," does not violate the IBC and warrants protection under the umbrella of Article 142 of the Constitution. Apex Heights Pvt. Ltd. v. Ram Kishor Arora, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 142
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 — Section 7 — Initiation of Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) — Admissibility of Application — Existence of Debt and Default — The Supreme Court set aside the concurrent findings of the NCLT and NCLAT which had refused to initiate CIRP against the Corporate Debtor - held that for admission of an application under Section 7, the adjudicating authority is only required to examine and satisfy itself that a financial debt exists and there is a default in relation thereto - The concept of a "pre-existing dispute," relevant for operational creditors under Section 9, has no bearing on applications filed by financial creditors under Section 7. [Para 12] Catalyst Trusteeship Ltd. v. Ecstasy Realty Pvt. Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 192 : 2026 INSC 186
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Section 7 – Maintainability of Joint Petition – Multi-Corporate Entities – Threshold Requirement – Supreme Court upheld the maintainability of a single Section 7 application against two separate corporate entities (Grand Venezia Ltd. and Bhasin Ltd.) where they were found to be "intrinsically linked" in the construction and implementation of a real estate project -Noted that interlinkage of related corporate debtors is beneficial for value maximization and for continuing companies as going concerns. [Para 11 - 16, 20 - 26] Satinder Singh Bhasin v. Col. Gautam Mullick, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 100 : 2026 INSC 104
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Section 7 vs. Companies Act, 1956 – Sections 391-394 – Overriding effect of IBC – Redundancy of Scheme of Arrangement (SOA) due to gross delay – The Supreme Court held that proceedings under Section 7 of the IBC cannot be stalled on the grounds of "judicial discipline" due to a pending Scheme of Arrangement under the Companies Act, especially when such a scheme has become defunct and inoperative due to a decade-long delay and non-compliance with statutory timelines - Noted that the IBC is a special statute aimed at the revival of companies, and its provisions prevail over inconsistent provisions in other laws by virtue of Section 238. Omkara Assets Reconstruction v. Amit Chaturvedi, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 191 : 2026 INSC 189
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Sections 14, 36, 60(5), and 238 – Prohibition of Benami Property Transactions Act, 1988 – Sections 24 and 27 – Jurisdiction of NCLT/NCLAT over Benami Proceedings – Held: The National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) and the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT) do not have the jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the legality or validity of provisional attachment orders or confiscation proceedings initiated under the Benami Act - Such proceedings fall within the realm of public law and sovereign functions of the State, which are distinct from private proprietary disputes or debt recovery actions. S. Rajendran v. Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 199 : 2026 INSC 187
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Sections 18(f) and 36(4) – Applicability to Spectrum – Ownership vs. Right to Use – Held, Spectrum allocated to Telecom Service Providers (TSPs) cannot be subjected to proceedings under the IBC - While spectrum may be recorded as an "intangible asset" in the TSPs' books of account for accounting purposes in compliance with AS 26 and Ind AS 38, such recognition is not determinative of ownership - The IBC explicitly excludes assets owned by a third party but held by the corporate debtor under contractual arrangements from the insolvency/liquidation estate - Since the Union of India retains exclusive privilege and ownership over spectrum as a trustee for the public, the TSPs hold only a limited, conditional, and revocable "right to use". [Paras 60, 61, 63, 69] State Bank of India v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 152 : 2026 INSC 153
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Sections 7, 60(2), and 60(3) – Simultaneous Proceedings – Maintainability of Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) against Principal Debtor and Corporate Guarantor – Held: Simultaneous proceedings for CIRP under the IBC against both the principal debtor and its corporate guarantor (or vice-versa) are maintainable - The liability of a surety is co-extensive with that of the principal debtor under Section 128 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 - The IBC permits separate or simultaneous proceedings to be initiated by a financial creditor against both entities. ICICI Bank v, Era Infrastructure, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 203 : 2026 INSC 201
Interest Act, 1978; Section 3(3) - Code of Civil Procedure, 1908; Section 34 - Contractual Bar on Interest - Sustainability of interest on delayed payments when specifically excluded by contract – The Supreme Court set aside a High Court order that had granted interest for delayed payments to a government contractor - held that when parties explicitly agree via a contract clause (such as Clause 5 of the preliminary agreement) that no interest or damages shall be claimed for belated settlement of bills, such terms are binding - The Interest Act, 1978, mandates interest only in the absence of an agreement or where terms are contrary to law - Section 3(3) of the Interest Act, 1978, ensures that contractual prohibitions on interest are respected, and Section 34 of the CPC does not have an overriding effect on this provision. [Paras 6 - 10] Kerala Water Authority v. T.I. Raju, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 172
Interpretation of Statutes – Omission of Provisions – Where a statutory provision is unconditionally omitted without a saving clause, all proceedings founded upon such provision must lapse - noted that while the diversion of government property might attract the Indian Penal Code, the investigating agency failed to invoke those provisions, and the High Court cannot substitute a conviction under a distinct statutory offense for the first time in appeal – Appeals allowed. [Relied on Kolhapur Canesugar Works Ltd. v. Union of India (2000) 2 SCC 536; Paras 16-25] Manoj v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 157 : 2026 INSC 152
Interpretation of Statutes - Statutory Interpretation – Harmonious Construction – Conflict between IBC and Telecommunication Laws – Where two special statutes contain non-obstante clauses, the court must analyze the dominant purpose of each - The IBC focuses on the reorganization of the corporate debtor, whereas the Telegraph Act, Wireless Telegraphy Act, and TRAI Act form an exhaustive code for the telecom sector - The IBC cannot be permitted to make inroads into the telecom sector to restructure rights and liabilities arising from the administration of spectrum, which falls under the exclusive legal province of the Union and the Regulator. [Relied on Centre for Public Interest Litigation v. Union of India, (2012) 3 SCC 1; Natural Resources Allocation, In Re, Special Reference No. 1 of 2012, (2012) 10 SCC 1; Embassy Property Developments (P) Ltd. v. State of Karnataka, (2020) 13 SCC 308; Union of India v. Association of Unified Telecom Service Providers of India, (2011) 10 SCC 543; Swiss Ribbons (P) Ltd. v. Union of India, (2019) 4 SCC 17; Paras 64, 66, 67] State Bank of India v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 152 : 2026 INSC 153
Judicial Discipline – Supreme Court observed that when proceedings are terminated due to the existence of an alternative remedy, the proceedings do not survive and must end immediately - Passing interim orders in such circumstances "circumvents" statutory provisions and exceeds the scope of Article 226. [Relied on State of Orissa v. Madan Gopal Rungta (1952) AIR 1952 SC 12; Paras 6, 7, 8] Mangal Rajendra Kamthe v. Tahsildar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 194 : 2026 INSC 185
Judicial Discipline vs. Economic Implications – While judicial discipline is a cornerstone of justice, it cannot be used by "tardy litigators" to jeopardize public funds or put the economy in a "hostage situation." - In cases with significant economic implications, the larger national interest of rehabilitating an industry and ensuring financial probity takes pre-eminence – Appeals allowed. [Relied on A. Navinchandra Steels (P) Ltd. v. Srei Equipment Finance Ltd. (2021) 4 SCC 435; Paras 13-20] Omkara Assets Reconstruction v. Amit Chaturvedi, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 191 : 2026 INSC 189
Judicial Review – Recruitment Process – Interference with Answer Key – Power of High Court to act as Subject Expert – Held: The High Court, while exercising its power of judicial review, cannot assume the role of a "super-examiner" or subject expert - Even in examinations for judicial services where Judges may have vast legal experience, the exercise of re-evaluating or re-considering an answer key should ordinarily be left to domain experts. Jharkhand Public Service Commission v. State of Jharkhand, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 138
Judicial Scrutiny of Bail Orders – Held that the High Court's decision to grant bail by dissecting medical evidence and questioning the "intent to kill" due to a gap between the assault and death (septicaemia) was found to be premature - Such detailed analysis is reserved for the trial - The presence of multiple injuries, including cerebral damage from blunt trauma, outweighed the "extraneous considerations" of pending civil litigation and lack of specific role attribution – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Ajwar v. Waseem (2024) 10 SCC 768: (2025) 1 SCC (Cri) 320; Shabeen Ahmad v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr. (2025) 4 SCC 172; Victim 'XX' v. State of Bihar & Anr. (2025) INSC 877; Paras 21, 22, 29 - 31] Shobha Namdev Sonavane v. Samadhan Bajirao Sonvane, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 188 : 2026 INSC 181
Judicial Sensitivity – Protection of Vulnerable Victims – Guidelines – Taking note of the "insensitivity" and "impassive judicial decisions" in cases involving sexual offences, the Supreme Court directed the National Judicial Academy to constitute a Committee of Experts to draft comprehensive guidelines - These guidelines aim to inculcate compassion and empathy into the judicial process, specifically for cases involving children and women. [Relied on State of Madhya Pradesh v. Mahendra alias Golu, (2022) 12 SCC 442; Paras 11-24] In Re: Order Dated 17.03.2025 Passed by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 168 : 2026 INSC 165
Limitation Act, 1963; Section 5 — Condonation of Delay — State/Government Litigants — The Supreme Court dismissed a Special Leave Petition filed by the State of Odisha, refusing to condone a delay of 123 days in filing and 96 days in re-filing – Held that while a liberal approach and certain latitude ("play at the joints") are traditionally extended to the State due to procedural red tape, there is a limit to such indulgence – Noted that the State's explanation—citing "procedural delay in obtaining approval from the higher authority"—as a "lame excuse" rather than a "sufficient cause." – Noted that condonation of delay is not a matter of right but a discretionary power, and the State had shown "utter lethargy" throughout the proceedings in both the High Court and the Supreme Court. State of Odisha v. Managing Committee of Namatara Girls High School, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 161 : 2026 INSC 148
Limitation Act, 1963; Section 5 — Sufficient Cause vs. Bureaucratic Indifference — Relying on its previous observations in Amateur Riders Club, reiterated that "there is a point beyond which even the courts cannot help a litigant even if the litigant is Government which is itself under the shackles of bureaucratic indifference." - noted that despite decades of judicial optimism that governmental promptitude would improve, there has been no conspicuous change, leading to the exhaustion of judicial patience regarding stereotyped explanations for delay. [Relied on Commissioner of Wealth Tax, Bombay v. Amateur Riders Club, Bombay, 1994 Supp (2) SCC 603; Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Mst Katiji, (1987) 2 SCC 107; G. Ramegowda v. Land Acquisition Officer, (1988) 2 SCC 142; Postmaster General v. Living Media India Limited, (2012) 3 SCC 563; Paras 12-20] State of Odisha v. Managing Committee of Namatara Girls High School, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 161 : 2026 INSC 148
Limitation Act, 1963 – Article 135 of the Schedule – Execution of Decree for Mandatory Injunction – Period of Limitation – The Supreme Court upheld the dismissal of an execution application filed beyond the prescribed three-year period - Under Article 135, the limitation for enforcing a decree granting a mandatory injunction is three years, commencing from the date of the decree or the date fixed for performance - Where the decree does not specify a particular date for performance, the limitation period begins from the date of the decree itself - The petitioners sought to execute a mandatory injunction part of a decree dated 06.01.2005 - The execution application was filed on 12.08.2010 - As the decree did not specify a performance date, held that the application was barred by limitation under Article 135, as it was filed more than three years after the decree was passed. [Paras 4, 5] Babu Singh v. Jalandhar Improvement Trust, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 175
Limitation and Accrual of Right – The right to approach the Tribunal for broad banding of disability pension effectively accrued on 10.12.2014 (the date of the Ram Avtar judgment), which removed previous legal impediments – noted that claims filed thereafter are not barred by the Limitation Act or Section 22 of the Armed Forces Tribunal Act - Supreme Court maintained its consistent stance that the right to receive disability pension is a valuable right, and once found due, the benefit must be granted from the date it became due without being curtailed by a three-year limitation period. [Relied on Union of India & Others v. Ram Avtar, 2014 SCC Online SC 1761; Paras 15-22]. Union of India v. Sgt Girish Kumar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 148 : 2026 INSC 149
Limitation – Commencement of Period – Identity of Offender – Section 468 & 469(1)(c) CrPC - The Supreme Court held: In cases involving misbranded or substandard drugs where an investigation is necessary to establish the exact chain of supply and the identity of the manufacturers/distributors, the limitation period for taking cognizance commences from the date the identity of the offender is known to the aggrieved person or the investigating officer, as per Section 469(1)(c) of the CrPC - The three-year limitation period under Section 468(2)(c) is computed from the date the identity of all accused persons is clearly established by the competent authority, not necessarily from the date of the initial tip-off or the date of the offense. State of Kerala v. Panacea Biotec Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 206 : 2026 INSC 200
Medical Jurisprudence — Postmortem Examination — Professional Misconduct — Premature Disclosure to Media - Held: The conduct of an autopsy surgeon in furnishing an erroneous report based on "naked eye" observations—without waiting for forensic (FSL) results and publicizing sensational claims to the media constitutes professional misconduct and contempt of court - Such actions spread misinformation, erode trust in investigative agencies, and violate the sub judice rule - Justice is served by truth established through impartial investigation, not by following majority sentiment or public pressure amplified by premature media reports. [Relied on Munna Kumar Upadhyay Alias Munna Upadhyaya vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, (2012) 6 SCC 174; State of W.B. vs. Mir Mohammad Omar & Ors., (2000) 8 SCC 382; Raj Kumar vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2014) 5 SCC 353; Abhinav Mohan Delkar vs. State of Maharashtra, 2025 SCC Online SC 1725; Patel Babubhai Manohardas vs. State of Gujarat, 2025 SCC Online SC 503; Paras 102-106, 110, 117-119] Gudipalli Siddhartha Reddy v. State C.B.I., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 166 : 2026 INSC 160
Medical Termination of Pregnancy – Reproductive Autonomy and Bodily Integrity – Right to Life and Liberty under Article 21 – Supreme Court allowed the medical termination of a 30-week pregnancy of a girl who conceived as a minor – Supreme Court set aside the Bombay High Court's order which had declined termination on the grounds of foetal viability and the possibility of adoption - Key Principles Established – i. Priority of Maternal Rights: held that the reproductive autonomy and bodily integrity of the pregnant woman must be given sufficient emphasis over the rights of an unborn foetus; ii. Decisional Autonomy: A woman's right to choose whether to carry a pregnancy to term is firmly rooted in her right to bodily autonomy – Noted that forcing a woman to continue an unwanted pregnancy causes "visceral" trauma and ignores the physical and mental transformations a woman's body undergoes; iii. Irrelevance of Foetal Viability: When a pregnant woman is determined to terminate and has detached herself from the pregnancy, considerations such as whether the child would be born healthy or is viable are not relevant; iv. Status of the Mother: The fact that the daughter had crossed 18 years of age by the time of the High Court order was deemed "irrelevant," as she was a minor at the time of conception and the pregnancy resulted from a relationship outside of wedlock. [Relied on X vs. Health & Family Welfare Department, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1321; Paras 15-17] A (Mother of X) v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 160
Military Pension – Disability Pension – Attributes of Service – Impact of Lifestyle Habits – The Supreme Court upheld the denial of disability pension to an army personnel suffering from "Stroke Ischemic RT MCA TERRITORY" - Noted that the disease was neither attributable to nor aggravated by military service, as the Medical Board clearly opined that the condition could have been occasioned by the appellant's habit of smoking ten bidis per day. Sarevesh Kumar v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 163
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 – Conventional Heads – Loss of Consortium vs. Loss of Love and Affection – Subsumption of Heads – Held: Compensation in death cases is restricted to three conventional heads: loss of estate, loss of consortium, and funeral expenses. "Loss of love and affection" is not a distinct head of compensation and is comprehended within the broader head of "consortium," which encompasses spousal, parental, and filial consortium. [Paras 22 - 29] V. Pathmavathi v. Bharthi Axa General Insurance Co. Ltd, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 132 : 2026 INSC 131
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 – Procedural Safeguards for Deductions – Proof of Receipt – Deductions from MVA compensation cannot be made based on mere assumptions of eligibility - The Tribunal must first determine the full compensation; claimants must then file an affidavit/declaration regarding the receipt of benefits under the 2006 Rules before the executing court - Adjustments to prevent double recovery are to be made only after receipt is established – Appeals allowed. [Relied on Reliance General Insurance v. Shashi Sharma (2016) 9 SCC 627; Jayalakshmi Coelho v. Oswald Joseph Coelho (2001) 4 SCC 181; State of Punjab v. Darshan Singh (2004) 1 SCC 328; Paras on 6, 7, 8] Reliance General Insurance v. Kanika, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 196 : 2026 INSC 188
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 – Quantum of Compensation – Evidence of Income – Salary Certificate – Held: Determination of income must be founded on proof placed on record and cannot rest on conjecture. Where a salary certificate (Exhibit P-14) and corroborating employer affidavit (PW-3) establish a fixed monthly salary, it is impermissible for courts to assess income at a lower figure without evidence impeaching such documents - Held: Considering the dependents had been pursuing legal proceedings for 15 years since the death of the victim in 2011, the Court enhanced the interest rate to 9% p.a. from the date of filing the claim petition till realization. [Para 32] V. Pathmavathi v. Bharthi Axa General Insurance Co. Ltd, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 132 : 2026 INSC 131
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — Section 147 — Liability of Insurer — Gratuitous Passenger in Goods Vehicle — "Pay and Recover" Principle — The Supreme Court restored the Tribunal's order directing the Insurance Company to first pay the compensation to the claimants and subsequently recover the same from the vehicle owner – Noted that the deceased had hired a tempo primarily to transport a Ganesh idol for immersion, making the act of travelling incidental to the transport of goods - In such circumstances, the deceased is treated as a gratuitous passenger travelling with his goods - Supreme Court distinguished this from cases where a vehicle is hired solely for passenger travel, reaffirming that the benevolent object of the Act justifies the "pay and recover" direction even when the insurer is not otherwise liable under the policy – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Manuara Khatun & Ors. v. Rajesh Kumar Singh & Ors. (2017) 4 SCC 796; National Insurance Company Limited v. Saju P. Paul & Anr. (2013) 2 SCC 41; Paras 10-13] Kaminiben v. Oriental Insurance, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 174
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 – Section 166 and 168 – Just Compensation – Future Prospects – Held: The addition of future prospects to the established income of the deceased is not a matter of judicial discretion but a mandatory legal requirement. For a deceased who was self-employed or on a fixed salary and below the age of 40 years, an addition of 40% towards future prospects is compulsory. The High Court erred in failing to apply this binding precedent. [Relied on National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Pranay Sethi (2017) 16 SCC 680; Sarla Verma v. DTC (2009) 6 SCC 121; Magma General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Nanu Ram (2018) 18 SCC 130; Paras 17, 18, 19] V. Pathmavathi v. Bharthi Axa General Insurance Co. Ltd, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 132 : 2026 INSC 131
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — Section 173 — Appeal against Award — Dismissal on ground of Undertaking — Legality of — High Court dismissed the Insurance Company's appeal merely because a local manager had given an undertaking to the Executing Court to satisfy the award - Held: An undertaking to comply with an award, often given under pressure of execution proceedings (such as attachment of office furniture), does not deprive the insurer of its statutory right to challenge the award on merits - The High Court, as the First Appellate Court, is duty-bound to consider the appeal on both law and facts, especially when patent errors in compensation calculation are alleged - Dismissed an appeal without touching the merits caused grave injustice. National Insurance Company Ltd v. Rathlavath Chandulal, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 149 : 2026 INSC 146
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 – Section 173 – Compensation – Deduction of Compassionate Financial Assistance – Haryana Compassionate Assistance to Dependents of Deceased Government Employees Rules, 2006 – Rule 5 – The Supreme Court reiterated that financial assistance received under the 2006 Rules which directly replaces "pay and allowances" (loss of income) must be deducted from the compensation awarded under the Motor Vehicles Act to prevent double recovery - components such as family pension, life insurance, and provident fund are not deductible as they do not correspond to the specific head of loss of income. Reliance General Insurance v. Kanika, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 196 : 2026 INSC 188
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 – Sections 8, 21, and 22 – Drugs (Control) Act, 1950 – Sections 5 and 13 – Grant of Anticipatory Bail – Appellant sought anticipatory bail in a case involving the seizure of 710 bottles of cough syrup from a car registered in his name, though he was not named in the FIR - Noted that since the appellant had already joined the investigation and was cooperating within the limitations prescribed by law, custodial interrogation was not warranted at this stage - allowing the appeal and setting aside the High Court's denial of bail, the Supreme Court directed that in the event of arrest, the appellant be released on terms fixed by the trial court, subject to compliance with conditions stipulated under Section 482(2) of the BNSS. Vinay Kumar Gupta v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 180
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 — Sections 8(b), 22(c), 25, 27-A, and 29 — Grant of Bail — Prolonged Incarceration vs. Seriousness of Offence — Prosecution's Intention to Examine 159 Witnesses — The petitioner was arrested on March 29, 2022, in connection with the recovery of approximately 2428 Kilograms of Mephedrone - Despite the seriousness of the crime, Supreme Court noted that the petitioner remained in judicial custody as an undertrial prisoner for over 3 years and 6 months - the charge was only framed on January 16, 2026, after the Court's previous intervention. Chintan Rajubhai Panseriya v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 99
National Company Law Tribunal Rules, 2016 – Rule 28 – Amendment of Petition before Registration – Abuse of Process – held that alterations or substitutions in the memorandum of parties (names of allottees) made after the initial filing but before formal "registration" by the Registrar do not constitute an abuse of process - Under Rule 28(3), a party is allowed to rectify and amend a returned petition - An application is only treated as "validly filed" once it is complete in every respect and registered under Rule 28(4). [Paras 23, 24] Satinder Singh Bhasin v. Col. Gautam Mullick, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 100 : 2026 INSC 104
Navy Act, 1957 – Section 15(2) read with Regulation 216 of Navy (Discipline and Miscellaneous Provisions) Regulations, 1967 – Termination of Service – While the Government/Chief of Naval Staff has the power to terminate services for misconduct, such power must be exercised based on specific foundational facts: (i) meaningful consideration of misconduct reports, (ii) satisfaction that a court-martial is inexpedient, and (iii) an opinion that further retention of the officer is undesirable – Appeal allowed. [Paras 20 - 27] 42605-B CDR Yogesh Mahla v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 103 : 2026 INSC 107
Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 – Section 138 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Sections 372 and 378 – Appeal against Acquittal – Right of Complainant as 'Victim' – Conflict of Judgments – Reference to Larger Bench – The Supreme Court observed a conflict between a recent co-ordinate Bench decision in Celestium Financial vs. A. Gnanasekaran (2025 INSC 804) and earlier decisions in Satya Pal Singh vs. State of M.P. and Subhash Chand vs. State (Delhi Administration) regarding whether a complainant in a Section 138 NI Act case must seek special leave to appeal under Section 378(4) CrPC or can appeal directly as a 'victim' under the proviso to Section 372 CrPC. Everest Automobiles v. Rajit Enterprises, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 155
Onus of Proof and Collusion – Noted that appellant, being the mother of the Managing Director of the judgment-debtor company, failed to produce the tripartite agreement that allegedly facilitated the sale - Held that the sale cannot be deemed to be "without notice" of the existing liability, especially given the relationship between the parties and the long-standing nature of the dispute – Appeal dismissed. [Relied on Danesh Singh and others v. Har Pyari (Dead) Thr. LRs. (2025 INSC 1434); Usha Sinha v. Dina Ram (2008) 7 SCC 144; Jini Dhanrajgir v. Shibu Mathew (2023) 20 SCC 76; Paras 10-13] R. Savithri Naidu v. Cotton Corporation of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 151 : 2026 INSC 150
Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 – Jurisdictional Fact – Applicability of Statutes – The applicability of the PG Act depends on "jurisdictional facts" - facts that must exist before an authority can assume jurisdiction - If an employee falls under the exclusionary clause of Section 2(e), the Controlling Authority lacks jurisdiction to award benefits under the PG Act - – Section 14, which provides an overriding effect to the PG Act over other enactments, can only be invoked by those who first qualify as "employees" under Section 2(e) – Noted that since the appellants were excluded by the definition itself, the overriding clause cannot be applied to defeat the specific exclusion. N. Manoharan v. Administrative Officer, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 137 : 2026 INSC 143
Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 – Section 2(e) – Definition of "Employee" – Exclusionary Clause – Employees of Heavy Water Plant (HWP), Tuticorin – The Supreme Court held that retired employees of the Heavy Water Plant (HWP), which functions under the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE), are not covered under the Payment of Gratuity Act (PG Act) - Noted that HWP is an adjunct or ancillary of the DAE and is not a separate corporate entity or PSU - Since the appellants held civil posts under the Central Government and were governed by the Central Civil Services (Pension) Rules, 1972, they fall squarely within the exclusionary limb of Section 2(e) of the PG Act – Appeals dismissed. [Relied on Arun Kumar v. Union of India, (2007) 1 SCC 732; Mahalakshmi Oil Mills v. State of A.P., (1989) 1 SCC 164; Paras 12, 13] N. Manoharan v. Administrative Officer, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 137 : 2026 INSC 143
Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 – Statutory Interpretation – Section 2(e) of PG Act – Use of "Means" and "Does Not Include" – The use of "means" coupled with "does not include" signifies exclusionary language that strictly removes certain classes from the scope of the provision – Noted that a person holding a post under the Central or State Government who is governed by any other Act or Rules providing for gratuity is excluded at the threshold from the definition of "employee". N. Manoharan v. Administrative Officer, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 137 : 2026 INSC 143
Penal Code, 1860; Sections 302 and 201 — Indian Evidence Act, 1872; Section 27 — Circumstantial Evidence — Conviction Upheld — The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal against concurrent findings of conviction in a case of abduction, ransom, and murder - held that the prosecution successfully established an unbroken chain of circumstances, including the recovery of the deceased's body and her vehicle at the specific disclosure of the appellant. Neelu @ Nilesh Koshti v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 179 : 2026 INSC 173
Penal Code, 1860 - Cheating – Section 420 IPC – Absence of False Representation – No offence of cheating was made out as there was no false representation in the JVA - The agreement did not contain a specific statement that "no litigation was pending"; rather, it provided an indemnity to the second party for any loss due to disputes - The representation that no "restraint order" existed was not shown to be false. [Paras 20-26] Vandana Jain v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 200 : 2026 INSC 192
Penal Code, 1860 - Criminal Breach of Trust – Section 406 IPC – Non-refundable Security Deposit – The allegation regarding non-refund of security money does not constitute a criminal offence when the JVA stipulates that the deposit is non-refundable and only adjustable against future sale proceeds - Non-fulfillment of such contractual obligations gives rise to a civil cause of action, not a criminal one. [Para 22 - 28] Vandana Jain v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 200 : 2026 INSC 192
Penal Code, 1860 Culpable Homicide vs. Murder — Section 299, 300 Clause (3), and 304 Part II IPC — Vicarious Liability under Section 149 IPC — The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgment which had toned down the conviction of 19 accused persons from Section 302/149 IPC to Section 304 Part II/149 IPC - held that when an unlawful assembly waylays a victim with premeditation, uses lathis to inflict 29 injuries (including four bone-deep head fractures), and acts out of caste-based retaliation, the intention to cause such bodily injury as is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death is clearly established. Sitaram Kuchhbedia v. Vimal Rana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 189 : 2026 INSC 178
Penal Code, 1860 — Distinction between False Promise and Breach of Promise — held that a breach of promise (where an initially serious intention is later hindered by unforeseen circumstances) is not a "false promise" (where there is no intention to marry from the beginning) - Supreme Court expressed concern over the "disquieting tendency" of giving broken relationships the color of criminality, noting that such misuse of the justice machinery trivializes the offense of rape and burdens the judiciary – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Naim Ahamed vs. State (NCT of Delhi), (2023) 15 SCC 38; Mahesh Damu Khare vs. State of Maharashtra, (2024) 11 SCC 39; Prashant vs. State of NCT of Delhi, (2025) 5 SCC 764; Samadhan vs. State of Maharashtra, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2528; Paras 19-27] Pramod Kumar Navratna v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 118 : 2026 INSC 124
Penal Code, 1860 - Forgery – Sections 467, 468, 471 IPC – Document not traceable in records – Merely because a document (such as a Tehsildar's letter) is not traceable in official records 11 years after its purported issuance, it cannot be deemed "forged" or "false" under Section 464 IPC. Official records are not always maintained in perpetuity. [Para 24] Vandana Jain v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 200 : 2026 INSC 192
Penal Code, 1860 — Scope of Section 376(2)(n) IPC — "Repeatedly" — The provision contemplates a series of separate acts of sexual assault committed at different points in time, often under fear, pressure, or continued deceit - Held that a consensual relationship turning acrimonious does not satisfy the ingredients of this section. Pramod Kumar Navratna v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 118 : 2026 INSC 124
Penal Code, 1860 – Section 302 r/w Section 34 – Conviction for Murder – Non-recovery of weapons of assault – Effect of – Held, recovery of the weapons of assault is not a sine qua non for convicting an accused if the evidence on record, particularly reliable ocular testimony, establishes the guilt beyond reasonable doubt - Even if the Investigating Officer fails to bring on record the weapons described by eye-witnesses, this omission cannot benefit the accused when the version of eye-witnesses is found to be consistent, reliable, and corroborated by medical evidence. [Para 7, 8] Ghanshyam Mandal v. State of Bihar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 201 : 2026 INSC 194
Penal Code, 1860 — Section 376(2)(n) — Rape on false pretext of marriage — Consensual relationship vs. Misconception of fact — Quashing of FIR — The Supreme Court quashed the criminal proceedings against an advocate-accused where the complainant, also an advocate, was a married woman with a child and had pending divorce proceedings - held that since the complainant was already married and legally ineligible to enter into a second marriage under Section 5(i) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, any alleged promise of marriage by the accused was legally unenforceable and could not be termed a "misconception of fact" to vitiate consent. Pramod Kumar Navratna v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 118 : 2026 INSC 124
Penal Code, 1860 - Unlawful Assembly – Individual Role Attribution – Noted that the High Court erred in granting bail on the ground that the individual role or specific injury caused by each accused could not be ascertained - The Supreme Court clarified that where an offence is committed by an unlawful assembly, every member is equally responsible for acts done in furtherance of the common object - Under Section 149 IPC, the prosecution is not obligated to identify the specific weapon or injury attributable to a particular member at the bail stage. [Paras 27 - 30] Shobha Namdev Sonavane v. Samadhan Bajirao Sonvane, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 188 : 2026 INSC 181
Penal Code, 1860 - Vicarious Liability (Section 149 IPC) — Individual Attribution — Once the existence of an unlawful assembly and a common object to commit murder is established, the individual attribution of the fatal blow becomes inconsequential - Section 149 IPC fastens constructive liability on every member of the assembly, regardless of who delivered the "crucial act" or fatal injury - The High Court's reasoning that all accused could not be convicted under Section 302 because the specific assailant who caused the fatal head injury was unidentified was held to be "perverse" and "self-contradictory" as it ignored the fundamental principle of vicarious liability. Sitaram Kuchhbedia v. Vimal Rana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 189 : 2026 INSC 178
Pension as Property – Article 300A of the Constitution of India – Pension is not a bounty or a matter of largesse; it is a deferred portion of compensation for past service that matures into a vested and enforceable right - Withholding accrued arrears of disability pension, which became due following judicial determination and government policy, constitutes a deprivation of property under Article 300A – Noted that the decision in Union of India v. Ram Avtar (2014) is a judgment in rem - Therefore, the Union of India should have extended the benefit of broad banding to all eligible ex-servicemen automatically rather than requiring them to file individual applications. Union of India v. Sgt Girish Kumar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 148 : 2026 INSC 149
Pension Regulations for the Army, 1961 – Regulation 173 – Guide to Medical Officers, 2002 – Paragraph 6 – Supreme Court noted that compensation cannot be awarded for any disablement or death arising from intemperance in the use of alcohol, tobacco, or drugs, as these are matters within the member's own control – Appeal dismissed. Sarevesh Kumar v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 163
Practice and Procedure – Misconceived SLPs – Article 136 – The Supreme Court observed that the petitions were "misconceived at the threshold" as they combined a challenge to a High Court order with a prayer to secure the benefits of that very same order - Discretionary jurisdiction under Article 136 cannot be invoked to grant relief that does not arise from an adjudication of the petitioners' rights on merits. Damor Nanabhai Manabhai v. State of Gujarat, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 104
Practice and Procedure – Remand by High Court – Requirement of Deciding All Issues – The Supreme Court set aside a High Court order that had remanded a service matter to the School Tribunal based on a single technical point regarding the Secretary's authorization to initiate proceedings - Held: When several issues arise for determination, a Court should ideally record findings and reasons for each issue rather than focusing on just one "decisive" point - This approach ensures clarity, provides finality for litigants, and assists the appellate court with a reasoned decision. Hemlata Eknath Pise v. Shubham Bahu Uddeshiya Sanstha Waddhamna, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 177 : 2026 INSC 147
Practice and Procedure – The "Consider Jurisprudence" – The Supreme Court criticized the routine practice of courts issuing directions to "consider" or "reconsider" claims as a means to "throw the ball out of the Court" - Such practice is counterproductive, harms the legal system, and delays justice - Courts must articulate directions in clear terms, specifying the method and manner of compliance to leave the government with no choice but to comply, appeal, or face contempt. Mahendra Prasad Agarwal v. Arvind Kumar Singh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 195 : 2026 INSC 175
Pre-Conception and Pre-Natal Diagnostic Techniques (Prohibition of Sex Selection) Act, 1994 – Section 30(1) – Search and Seizure – Collective Decision Required – The power to authorize a search under Section 30(1) must be exercised by the "Appropriate Authority" collectively as defined under Section 17 - An individual member, including the Chairperson/Civil Surgeon acting alone, cannot legally authorize a search – Noted that in this case, the search was directed solely by the Civil Surgeon without the association of the other two members (District Programme Officer and District Attorney), rendering the search technically illegal. [Paras 41 - 50] Dr. Naresh Kumar Garg v. State of Haryana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 186 : 2026 INSC 176
Pre-Conception and Pre-Natal Diagnostic Techniques (Prohibition of Sex Selection) Rules, 1996 – Rule 9 and Rule 10 – Maintenance of Form F – Maintenance of records in "Form F" is mandatory and not a mere procedural formality - Non-maintenance or inaccurate maintenance of records constitutes a "springboard" for the offence of female foeticide and amounts to a contravention of Sections 5 and 6 of the Act - Even if sex determination is not proven, the failure to maintain statutory records is a punishable offence under Section 23. [Paras 33 - 54] Dr. Naresh Kumar Garg v. State of Haryana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 186 : 2026 INSC 176
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988; Section 17A – Jurisdiction of State Anti-Corruption Bureau (ACB) over Central Government Employees – The Supreme Court upheld the Rajasthan High Court's finding that the State ACB has the jurisdiction to register criminal cases, investigate, and file charge-sheets against Central Government employees for offences committed within the State's territorial jurisdiction - It is incorrect to contend that the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) holds exclusive jurisdiction or that its prior consent is mandatory for the ACB to proceed. [Para 3] Anil Daima v. State of Rajasthan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 108 : 2026 INSC 72
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988; Section 17A – Scope of Previous Approval – Demand of Illegal Gratification –The protection under Section 17A, which requires previous approval for enquiries or investigations into decisions taken or recommendations made by a public servant in the discharge of official duties, does not apply to cases involving the demand of illegal gratification - Noted that Section 17A was enacted with a specific object and cannot, by any stretch of imagination, be applied to bribery/extortion cases as these do not constitute "official functions or duties." [Paras 6-7] Anil Daima v. State of Rajasthan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 108 : 2026 INSC 72
Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002 – Section 2(1)(u) – "Proceeds of Crime" – The definition is wide enough to include property equivalent in value to the property obtained from criminal activity - This allows for the attachment of alternate property if the direct proceeds of crime are unavailable – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Vijay Madanlal Choudhary v. Union of India (2023) 12 SCC 1; Paras 37-52] Nav Nirman Builders & Developers Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 127 : 2026 INSC 130
Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002 – Section 8(3), 8(7), and 8(8) – Interplay between Adjudication, Confiscation, and Restoration – Finality of Confirmation Order – Held: Section 8(7) and Section 8(8) are stand-alone provisions - An application for confiscation under Section 8(7) can only be decided by the Special Court once the confirmation order passed under Section 8(3) attains finality - If a confirmation order is challenged before a higher forum (Appellate Tribunal or High Court), a "deemed embargo" operates on the conclusion of proceedings under Section 8(7) until that challenge is resolved - The Special Court must refrain from deciding Section 8(7) applications while an appeal under Section 26 is pending, as the doctrine of merger applies. Nav Nirman Builders & Developers Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 127 : 2026 INSC 130
Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002 – Section 8(7) – "Material before it" – The expression "material before it" in Section 8(7) has a limited import, primarily to demonstrate the contingency (death of accused, proclaimed offender, etc.) and entitlement to possession - A party who suffered an adverse order under Section 8(3) can only seek relief under Section 8(7) if there is "new material" not previously considered by the Adjudicating Authority or higher forums. Nav Nirman Builders & Developers Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 127 : 2026 INSC 130
Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002 – Section 8(8) and 2016 Rules – Claim for Restoration – An application under the second proviso to Section 8(8) for restoration of property during trial is maintainable only if the claimant satisfies the essential conditions under Rule 2(b) and Rule 3A of the Prevention of Money-laundering (Restoration of Confiscated Property) Rules, 2016 - This includes acting in good faith, not being involved in money laundering, and suffering a quantifiable loss. Nav Nirman Builders & Developers Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 127 : 2026 INSC 130
Prison Reforms – Open Correctional Institutions (OCIs) – Overcrowding – Constitutional Rights of Prisoners – Gender Discrimination – Cost-Effectiveness – Supreme Court issues comprehensive directions for the assessment, establishment, and expansion of Open Correctional Institutions (OCIs) and open/semi-open barracks across all States and Union Territories to address chronic prison overcrowding (occupancy rate of 120.8% nationally) and facilitate the reformative objective of punishment. Suhas Chakma v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 205 : 2026 INSC 198
Quantum Of Maintenance – Factors To Be Considered – While Fixing the quantum, courts must consider the status of the parties, reasonable needs of the wife and dependent children, the husband's actual income, and his liabilities - The financial position of the wife's parents is immaterial - The fact that a wife is educated or capable of earning is not a sufficient ground to deny or reduce maintenance if her independent income is insufficient to maintain the lifestyle of the matrimonial home – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Bhuwan Mohan Singh v. Meena and others (2015) 6 SCC 353; Rajnesh v. Neha and another (2021) 2 SCC 324; Manish Jain v. Akanksha Jain (2017) 15 SCC 801; Shailji v. Khobbanna (2018) 2 SCC (Civ) 712; Paras 10-15] Anamika Jain v. Dr. Atul Jain, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 111
Real Estate and Statutory Compliances – Occupancy Certificate (OC) – A developer cannot compel a purchaser to accept possession without a valid Occupancy Certificate - Obtaining an OC is a statutory pre-condition integral to the lawful delivery of possession - Failure to obtain the same constitutes a deficiency in service. [Paras 25 - 29] Parsvnath Developers Ltd. v. Mohit Khirbat, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 178 : 2026 INSC 170
Real Estate - Subsequent Purchasers – Right to Compensation – A subsequent purchaser is entitled to seek the same relief as the original allottee - The right to claim compensation for deficiency in service travels with the allotment and cannot be denied merely because the party stepped into the shoes of the original allottee at a later stage – Appeals dismissed. [Relied on Pioneer Urban Land & Infrastructure Ltd. v. Govindan Raghavan (2019) 5 SCC 725; IREO Grace Realtech Private Limited v. Abhishek Khanna (2021) 3 SCC 241; Bangalore Development Authority v. Syndicate Bank (2007) 6 SCC 71; Samruddhi Cooperative Housing Society Ltd. v. Mumbai Mahalaxmi Construction (P) Ltd. (2022) 4 SCC 103; Dharmendra Sharma v. Agra Development Authority 2024 INSC 667; Para 18-22] Parsvnath Developers Ltd. v. Mohit Khirbat, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 178 : 2026 INSC 170
Re-evaluation of Answer Sheets – Absence of Statutory Provision – Held: The High Court rightly restated the settled legal position that re-evaluation of an answer sheet is impermissible unless the governing rules, regulations, or policy expressly provide for it – Held that if an answer key has been vetted by the High Court on the administrative side, any judicial challenge to its correctness should ideally be referred back to an administrative committee or a committee of subject experts (including eminent law professors and language experts) for reassessment – Supreme Court should not take the responsibility of determining the correctness of specific answers itself - The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's directions to award marks for specific questions and delete others - The matters were referred to an administrative committee of the High Court to re-examine the disputed questions (Nos. 8, 74, and 96) and provide an opinion to the Public Service Commission. [Paras 7-9] Jharkhand Public Service Commission v. State of Jharkhand, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 138
Regional and Town Planning and Development Act, 1995 (Punjab) – Sections 70, 75, 76, 79, 80 and 81 – Master Plan – Change of Land Use (CLU) – Legality of granting CLU for a 'Red' category industry in a 'Rural Agricultural Zone' contrary to the notified Master Plan. Held: A Master Plan is a statutory instrument, not a mere policy document. Once published in the Official Gazette, it binds both authorities and the public - Land use permissibility must be determined with reference to operative zoning; it cannot be displaced by ad hoc permissions or internal administrative file notings. Harbinder Singh Sekhon v. State of Punjab, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 162 : 2026 INSC 159
Representation of the People Act, 1951 – Section 8A, Section 99, and Section 123 – Corrupt Practices – Power of Disqualification – Issue- Whether the High Court, while setting aside an election on the grounds of corrupt practices, has the jurisdiction to directly disqualify a candidate for a specific period? - Held: No, The power to pass an order of disqualification under the Representation of the People Act, 1951, rests solely with the President of India and not with the High Court – Held that - i. Statutory Procedure for Disqualification - Under Section 8A of the RP Act, 1951, once a person is found guilty of a corrupt practice by an order under Section 99, the case must be submitted to the President of India for determination of whether the person shall be disqualified and for what period; ii. Role of the President and Election Commission - The President must obtain the opinion of the Election Commission before making a decision and is bound to act according to such opinion; iii. Excess of Jurisdiction - In the instant case, the High Court erred by directly disqualifying the appellant for six years in its operative order - By doing so, the High Court exercised powers and jurisdiction that are statutorily reserved for the President of India; iv. Operative Portion Set Aside - The Supreme Court set aside Clause 2 of the High Court's order which had disqualified the appellant for six years - noted that since the 2016-2021 term had already lapsed, the challenge to the setting aside of the election was no longer a "live issue". [Paras 7-12] K.M. Shaji v. M.V. Nikesh Kumar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 107 : 2026 INSC 111
Revisional Jurisdiction of High Court — Failure to Apply Judicial Mind — Held: The High Court "ignominiously" reduced the sentence without stating cogent reasons or considering that the Trial Court had already shown leniency by awarding only three years against a maximum of ten years under Section 307 IPC - The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgment and restored the Trial Court's sentence, directing the respondents to surrender within four weeks. [Relied on State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Saleem Alias Chamaru and Another (2005) 5 SCC 554; State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Suresh (2019) 14 SCC 151; Shivani Tyagi vs. State of U.P. & Another 2024 SCC OnLine SC 842; Hazara Singh vs. Raj Kumar and others (2013) 9 SCC 516; Paras 22-34] Parameshwari v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 169 : 2026 INSC 164
Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 – Section 7(5) and Rule 20(3) – The State Government has an "onerous duty" to provide funds for the Act's implementation - Under Rule 20(3), instructors must be paid at par with regular teachers having similar qualifications and experience - The State cannot deny payment citing the Central Government's failure to release its 60% share; the State must "pay and recover" the balance from the Union - Reaffirmed that the existence of an alternative remedy (under Section 24(3) of the Act) is a rule of "prudence and self-restraint," not an absolute bar - Since the matter was already adjudicated on merits by the High Court, relegating parties to an alternative forum would defeat the ends of justice - directed the State of Uttar Pradesh to pay an honorarium of ₹17,000/- per month to all instructors with effect from 2017-18. [Relied on Rajasthan State Electricity Board v. Union of India (2008) 5 SCC 632; Harbanslal Sahnia v. Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. (2003) 2 SCC 107; Jaggo v. Union of India and Ors. 2024 SCC Online SC 3826; People's Union For Democratic Rights v. Union of India (1982) 3 SCC 235; Paras 41-69] U.P. Junior High School Council Instructor Welfare Association v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 110
Rights of Persons with Disabilities – All India Bar Examination (AIBE) and Common Law Admission Test (CLAT) – Provision of Scribes – Eligibility Criteria for Scribes - The Supreme Court directed the Bar Council of India and the Consortium of NLUs to revisit and modify existing policies regarding the provision of scribes for specially-abled candidates - Supreme Court accepted the petitioners' suggestion that specially-abled candidates (specifically those with visual impairment) are entitled to scribe assistance, provided the scribe is an undergraduate not pursuing law or humanities – Noted that there is no bar on using a scribe who possesses qualifications higher than 10+2 schooling - Key Directives: i. Implementation: The Bar Council of India and the Consortium of NLUs must implement and formally notify these modifications well before the next examination cycle; ii. Compliance: A compliance affidavit is required to be filed within two weeks. [Paras 2-4] Yash Dodani v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 150
Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (2013 Act) – Statutory Interpretation - Interplay with Limitation Act, 1963 - Applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act to Section 74 of the 2013 Act – i. The Supreme Court held that Section 74 of the 2013 Act, which provides for appeals to the High Court, does not "expressly exclude" the application of Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act, 1963 - Section 5 of the Limitation Act (Condonation of Delay) is applicable to appeals filed under Section 74 of the 2013 Act; ii. Mandatory nature of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act – Supreme Court emphasized that for a special law to oust the Limitation Act, the exclusion must be "clear, apparent and manifest." Mere prescription of a specific period of limitation in a special statute does not amount to an express exclusion of the 1963 Act; iii. Interpretation of Section 103 of the 2013 Act - Section 103, which states the Act is "in addition to and not in derogation of any other law," facilitates borrowing from the Limitation Act to ensure the 2013 Act functions as a complete code - Barring the application of the 1963 Act would render Section 103 redundant and otiose; iv. Nature of the Authority under the 2013 Act - The Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Authority is treated as a "Civil Court" and its proceedings are "judicial proceedings" - An award passed by the Authority under Section 69 partakes the character of a "decree" and a "judgment" under the CPC - This reinforces the judicial nature of the appellate remedy under Section 74; iv. Land Acquisition Initiated under 1894 Act (Section 24(1)(a)) - In cases where proceedings began under the 1894 Act but no award was passed before January 1, 2014, all provisions of the 2013 Act relating to the determination of compensation apply - This includes the appellate mechanism under Section 74 of the 2013 Act - The Supreme Court allowed the appeals, condoned the delays, and directed the High Courts to adjudicate the first appeals on their merits. [Relied on Mangu Ram v. Municipal Corporation Delhi (1976) 1 SCC 392; Indore Development Authority v. Manoharlal (2020) 8 SCC 129; H.S.I.I.D.C. Ltd. v. Deepak Agarwal (2023) 6 SCC 51; Paras 59-85] Deputy Commissioner and Special Land Acquisition Officer v. S.V. Global Mill Ltd, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 130 : 2026 INSC 138
Right to Life and Dignity – Article 21 – The guarantee of life and personal dignity extends beyond prison gates; incarceration must not degenerate into inhumanity - Convicts are not denuded of all fundamental rights by mere reason of conviction. OCIs, based on trust and self-discipline, align with the constitutional vision of viewing prisons as institutions of correction and social reintegration - Exclusion of women prisoners from OCIs in several states (e.g., Assam, Gujarat, UP, West Bengal) or failing to transfer eligible women constitutes blatant gender discrimination - States directed to develop gender-sensitive protocols to ensure women have equal access to reformative facilities. Suhas Chakma v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 205 : 2026 INSC 198
Role of the Bar – Professional Ethics – Supreme Court emphasized that the Bar has an important role in ensuring litigation does not become endless - Counsel are expected to place the full procedural history with clarity and advise litigants against pursuing repetitive proceedings that seek to reopen concluded issues. [Relied on Union of India v. M.K. Sarkar, (2010) 2 SCC 59; State of Uttar Pradesh v. Arvind Kumar Srivastava, (2015) 1 SCC 347; Paras 7-9] Damor Nanabhai Manabhai v. State of Gujarat, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 104
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 – Section 14-A – Nature of Appellate Jurisdiction – Held that an appeal under Section 14-A is a statutory first appeal on both facts and law – Noted that High Court does not function merely as a revisional or supervisory court but as a first appellate court obliged to independently evaluate the material on record - A mechanical affirmation of a Trial Court's order without independent scrutiny is inconsistent with settled appellate jurisprudence. [Paras 17, 18] Dr. Anand Rai v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 136 : 2026 INSC 141
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 – Sections 3(2)(v) and 3(2)(va) – Quashing of Charges – Requirement of Knowledge – The Supreme Court quashed charges under the SC/ST Act against the appellant, observing that "knowledge" of the victim's caste is an essential ingredient for attracting liability under Sections 3(2)(v) and 3(2)(va) – Held that where the FIR and Section 161 CrPC statements are silent on the use of casteist slurs or the specific identity of the victims as SC/ST members, the charge cannot stand - Allowing proceedings to continue without a prima facie disclosure of statutory ingredients amounts to an abuse of the process of law. [Relied on Sajjan Kumar v. CBI (2010) 9 SCC 36; Bani Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh (1996) 4 SCC 720; State of Bihar v. Ramesh Singh (1977) 4 SCC 39; Paras 14, 15, and 19] Dr. Anand Rai v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 136 : 2026 INSC 141
Sentencing Discretion – While the statutory minimum was six months, Supreme Court exercised its discretion to reduce the three-year rigorous imprisonment sentence to the period already undergone (approximately one year) - This decision was based on the advanced age of the surviving appellants, the fact that the incident occurred nearly four decades ago (1985), and the prolonged pendency of the proceedings – Appeals partly allowed. [Relied on K.I. Pavunny v. Assistant Collector (HQ), Central Excise Collectorate, Cochin (1997) 3 SCC 721; Paras 20-22, 27-28] Amad Noormamad Bakali v. State of Gujarat, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 190 : 2026 INSC 180
Service Jurisprudence – Deemed Permanency and Substantive Appointment – Supreme Court ruled that instructors continuing for over ten years in a row against mandatory student-teacher ratio requirements acquire a degree of permanency - Even if originally contractual, these appointments are treated as "substantive in character" because they were made through a public selection process and the nature of work is permanent and integral to the institution - The PAB is the sole central authority with financial powers to approve budgets and fix honoraria under the scheme - Once the PAB approved a proposal to pay ₹17,000/- per month, the State Executive Committee had no authority to unilaterally reduce or ignore this determination. U.P. Junior High School Council Instructor Welfare Association v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 110
Service Law – Allocation of Cadre – Indian Police Service (IPS) – Request for re-allocation to 'insider' vacancy – Finality of Selection – The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals of an IPS officer seeking re-allocation from the Tamil Nadu cadre to an 'insider' vacancy in the Rajasthan cadre from the 2004 examination batch - held that cadre allocation cannot remain fluid indefinitely, as it would lead to a "chain reaction" of reshuffling among selected candidates from the same batch – Noted that the appellant, who was third in the merit list for the 'insider' vacancy, raised his grievance in 2010, six years after the selection process - noted that the appellant had already served in the Tamil Nadu cadre for over two decades by the time of the final hearing. Rupesh Kumar Meena v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 122 : 2026 INSC 119
Service Law – Allotment of Housing – Eligibility Criteria – Nepotism and Self-Aggrandizement – Supreme Court set aside the allotment of super deluxe flats to a Governing Body member (Respondent No. 3) and his subordinate (Respondent No. 4) – i. Ineligibility of Respondent No. 3: The allotment was deemed a "blatant display of self-aggrandizement" as the respondent did not satisfy the mandatory six-month deputation period at the time of application and had not submitted a timely application or earnest money deposit (Para 13, 14); ii. Ineligibility of Respondent No. 4: The Court found that Respondent No. 4 did not fall within the stipulated pay-band level (Level 10 to 20) and that the Governing Body's decision to "regularize" the allotment by carving out an exception was an arbitrary exercise of power. [Paras 15, 16] Dinesh Kumar v. State of Haryana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 171 : 2026 INSC 163
Service Law – Appointment of Director General of Police (DGP) – Role of UPSC and State Government – Delay in submitting proposals – Selection Guidelines – i. Mandate for Regular Appointment: The Supreme Court reiterated the necessity of appointing a regular Director General of Police (Head of Police Force) in accordance with the time-frame and scheme established in Prakash Singh vs. Union of India, (2006) 8 SCC 1; ii. Obligation of UPSC: Despite inordinate delays by State Governments in submitting proposals, the UPSC is obligated to convene the Empanelment Committee Meeting (ECM) to prevent further aggravation of the situation and to ensure meritorious senior officers are not overlooked; iii. Ad hoc Arrangements Criticized: The Supreme Court expressed concern over States preferring ad hoc arrangements (appointing acting DGPs) instead of regular appointments, which led to the UPSC inserting paragraph 4(xii) into its guidelines requiring States to seek leave from the Supreme Court for delayed submissions; iv. Enforcement Mechanism: To ensure compliance with the Prakash Singh mandate, the UPSC is authorized to: a. Write to State Governments for timely proposals whenever a vacancy arises; b. Move an application before the Supreme Court for enforcement if a State fails to submit a timely proposal; v. Accountability: held that those responsible for the delay in submitting proposals shall be held accountable. [Paras 7-11] Union Public Service Commission v. T. Dhangopal Rao, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 144
Service Law – Consumption of Vacancy – Supreme Court observed that even if a senior candidate (Rishikesh Meena or Rajesh Kumar) does not join or accept an 'insider' vacancy, the next candidate in the merit list does not gain an automatic right to claim allocation to that specific post - Finality must be attached to the selection and allocation process to prevent administrative instability – Appeals dismissed. [Paras 9-12] Rupesh Kumar Meena v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 122 : 2026 INSC 119
Service Law — Dearness Allowance (DA) — Legally Enforceable Right — Financial Inability of State — The Supreme Court held that the right to receive Dearness Allowance is a legally enforceable right that accrued in favor of the employees of the State of West Bengal – Held that while the State has the discretion to formulate its pay structure, once it incorporates a specific standard (like the All-India Consumer Price Index - AICPI) into its statutory rules (ROPA Rules, 2009), it cannot deviate from that mechanism through executive memoranda. State of West Bengal v. Confederation of State Government Employees, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 120 : 2026 INSC 123
Service Law - Departmental Inquiry — Proof of Misconduct — Fabrication of Medical Certificate — Graver the charge, greater the need for caution and circumspection — Findings of Inquiry Officer based on "word against word" without expert verification held perverse — Where a charge of forgery entails mandatory dismissal, fair play requires a thorough investigation consistent with principles of natural justice – Facts - The appellant, a Court Attender, was dismissed from service on charges of unauthorized absence and submitting a fabricated medical certificate. The Inquiry Officer relied on the statement of a Medical Practitioner (PW-2) who denied issuing the certificate, despite admitting the appellant consulted him and that the letterhead belonged to him - The High Court upheld the dismissal - Supreme Court Findings – i. Perversity in Findings: The Supreme Court held that the Inquiry Officer's conclusion was perverse as it was based on no credible evidence - noted that the rubber stamp on the disputed certificate was identical to the one used by the doctor on official notices; ii. Need for Handwriting Expert: Since the certificate was fully handwritten and the doctor's undisputed signatures varied, the Inquiry Officer should have referred the matter to a handwriting expert before recording a finding of forgery; iii. Standard of Proof for Grave Charges: When charges involve consequences like loss of livelihood, investigations must be consistent with the requirement of the situation and fair play. [Relied on Sawai Singh vs. State of Rajasthan (1986) 3 SCC 454; Paras 31-45] K. Rajaiah v. High Court for the State of Telangana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 140 : 2026 INSC 142
Service Law – Disciplinary Inquiry – Principles of Natural Justice – The appellant alleged a gross breach of natural justice, claiming the inquiry officer abruptly closed proceedings on August 1, 2017, preventing the completion of cross-examination of management witnesses - The High Court erred by not considering these allegations of procedural lapses and the merits of the Tribunal's original findings while ordering a remand. Hemlata Eknath Pise v. Shubham Bahu Uddeshiya Sanstha Waddhamna, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 177 : 2026 INSC 147
Service Law — Paucity of Funds as a Defense — Supreme Court categorically rejected the State's plea of financial inability or paucity of funds as a ground to deny the payment of statutory dues like DA - Once a legal right is established, the State, as a "model employer," must honor its obligations regardless of the financial burden - Findings returned in the first round of litigation, which declared DA a legally enforceable right and were reaffirmed by the dismissal of a review petition, attain conclusive finality and bind the parties. [Relied on Francis Coralie Mullin v. Administrator, Union Territory of Delhi (1981) 1 SCC 608; Sivanandan CT v. High Court of Kerala (2024) 3 SCC 799; Jitendra Kumar v. State of Haryana (2008) 2 SCC 161; hayara Bano v. Union of India (2017) 9 SCC 1; Assn. for Democratic Reforms v. Union of India (2024) 5 SCC 1; Lily Thomas v. Union of India (2000) 6 SCC 224; Paras 39-59] State of West Bengal v. Confederation of State Government Employees, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 120 : 2026 INSC 123
Service Law — Pensionary Benefits — Representation for Compassionate Consideration — While refusing to interfere with the dismissal order due to the appellant's history of multiple offenses (imprisonment in 1980 and severe reprimands in 1989 and 1994), Supreme Court permitted the appellant to submit a representation to the authorities for the grant of pension - The authorities are at liberty to consider this on its own merits, taking into account the appellant's 36 years of service, though this is not a mandatory direction to grant such pension. [Relied on Yasodhar Kamat Vs. Director General, Border Security Force and Ors., (2021) 13 SCC 333; Para 7]. Bhagirath Choudhary v. Border Security Force, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 165
Service Law - Regularization of Casual Workers - Parity in Treatment - Irregular vs. Illegal Appointment - The Appellants, engaged as daily-wage workers (Sweepers and Cook) with the Income Tax Department since the 1990s, sought regularization of their services - The Tribunal and High Court denied relief, citing non-fulfillment of the 10-year continuous service criteria as of 10.04.2006 per the Umadevi (3) judgment - Held: The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgment, noting that the Appellants were similarly situated to other daily-wage workers whose services were already regularized under Court orders – Noted that "irregular" appointments (where procedures like interviews were followed) should be distinguished from "illegal" backdoor entries - It observed that the perennial nature of the work, evidenced by subsequent outsourcing, necessitated regular posts - Denying regularization by misapplying Umadevi (3) to long-serving employees performing indispensable duties is contrary to equity - Services ordered to be regularized from 01.07.2006 with consequential benefits – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Ravi Verma and Ors. Vs. Union of India and Ors. (Civil Appeal Nos. 2795-2796 of 2018); Raman Kumar and Ors. Vs. Union of India and Ors. (Civil Appeal No. 4146 of 2023); Jaggo Vs. Union of India and Ors. (2024 INSC 1034); Paras 7-10] Pawan Kumar v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 159 : 2026 INSC 156
Service Law – Relief – Superannuation during Pendency – Held that since the appellant has reached the age of superannuation, reinstatement is no longer possible - The High Court, on fresh consideration, must determine: (i) whether the Tribunal's interference with the disciplinary action was justified, and (ii) the appellant's entitlement to back wages and retiral benefits – Appeal allowed. [Paras 9-11] Hemlata Eknath Pise v. Shubham Bahu Uddeshiya Sanstha Waddhamna, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 177 : 2026 INSC 147
Service Law – Reopening of Concluded Litigation – Delay and Laches – "Fence-sitters" – The Supreme Court dismissed Special Leave Petitions filed by primary school teachers seeking to revive a service dispute that had attained finality over a decade ago - The petitioners sought directions similar to a 2021 High Court order which directed the consideration of a representation for higher grade pay scales - held that the petitioners, whose services were terminated in 1994 and whose prior challenges were dismissed in 2009 and 2011, were not "identically situated" to the 2021 petitioner who was still in service. Damor Nanabhai Manabhai v. State of Gujarat, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 104
Service Law – Salary Payment and Creation of Posts – Private Aided vs. Self-Financed Schemes – Respondents (lecturers) sought government salary payments and post sanctions for subjects run under a self-financed scheme - The High Court had repeatedly issued "reconsideration" directions without deciding the existence of a legal right, leading to a "Second Season" of episodic litigation spanning 16 years - Held: Constitutional and statutory remedies are not for academic discourse; if a case deserves relief, it must be granted "then and there, unflinchingly". Mahendra Prasad Agarwal v. Arvind Kumar Singh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 195 : 2026 INSC 175
Service Law – Superannuation Age of Judicial Officers – Jharkhand Superior Judicial Service (Recruitment, Appointment and Conditions of Service) Rules, 2001 – Article 233 and 309 of the Constitution of India – Petitioner, a Principal District and Sessions Judge, sought enhancement of retirement age to 61 or 62 years - Held, enhancement of retirement age requires a policy decision and consequential amendment in Service Rules - While some States have enhanced the age to 61/62 years to match government departments, such issues should not be resolved through judicial orders for individual benefit - A holistic view is required by stakeholders to ensure parity across States - Writ Petition under Article 32 not entertained. Ranjeet Kumar v. State of Jharkhand, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 123
Service Law – Termination of Service – Validity of Degrees – Prospective Application of Judicial Declaration – Protection of Students' Careers - The appellants were appointed as librarians by the State of Bihar in 2010 based on Bachelor of Library Science (B.Lib) degrees obtained in 2004 from the University of Technology and Science, Raipur - This university was established under the Chhattisgarh Niji Kshetra Vishwavidyalaya Act, 2002 - in Professor Yash Pal v. State of Chhattisgarh (2005) 5 SCC 420, the Supreme Court had declared the 2002 Act ultra vires, resulting in the cessation of all universities established under it - Relying on this, the State of Bihar terminated the appellants' services in 2015, contending their degrees were unrecognized - The Patna High Court upheld the termination - Held: The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgment and the termination orders – i. Protection of Students' Interests: In Professor Yash Pal, Supreme Court specifically directed the State to protect students currently studying by affiliating their institutions with existing State universities - held that this logic extends to students who had already passed out before the Act was struck down, provided the university was not bogus and actual study was imparted; ii. No Fault of Appellants: The appellants could not be held at fault for studying in a university established under a then-valid State law - the State of Bihar appointed them in 2010—years after the Yash Pal judgment—meaning the State was or should have been aware of the legal status but allowed them to work for over five years; iii. Relief: directed the reinstatement of the appellants with continuity of service - back wages were denied as the appellants had not performed duties during the intervening period and the State was not solely at fault – Appeals allowed. [Relied on Prof. Yashpal and Anr. v. State of Chhattisgarh and Ors. (2005) 5 SCC 420; Paras 12-18] Priyanka Kumari v. State of Bihar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 173 : 2026 INSC 167
Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013 – Section 18 – Appeal against ICC Recommendations – Jurisdiction of Armed Forces Tribunal (AFT) – The Supreme Court held that an appeal under Section 18 of the POSH Act is maintainable before the Armed Forces Tribunal when read in juxtaposition with Section 14 of the Armed Forces Tribunal Act, 2007 – Held that the High Court erred in holding that the appellant had no right of appeal under Section 18 of the POSH Act against the recommendations of the Internal Complaints Committee (ICC). 42605-B CDR Yogesh Mahla v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 103 : 2026 INSC 107
Society - Autonomy of Society — General Body Resolutions — Supreme Court emphasized that the Society's General Body, in an AGM held on September 30, 2025, had ratified the membership of the appellants and the subsequent purchaser – Noted that the High Court's conclusion that the Revisional Authority acted in excess of jurisdiction was unsustainable, especially since the appellants had initially approached the Society's Authorised Officer and only then availed statutory remedies under the MCS Act. [Paras 43-44] Shashin Patel v. Uday Dalal, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 125 : 2026 INSC 125
Solid Waste Management Rules, 2026 – Statutory Nature and Enforcement – Supreme Court observed that the SWM Rules, 2026 (effective from 01.04.2026), framed under Sections 3, 6, and 25 of the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986, and placed before Parliament as per Section 26, are not mere delegated legislation but represent the "will expressed by the parliament" - The transition to a "digital-first circular economy framework" introduces Extended Bulk Waste Generator Responsibility (EBWGR) and mandates a four-stream waste segregation (Wet, Dry, Sanitary, and Special Care). Bhopal Municipal Corporation v. Dr. Subhash C. Pandey, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 182
Sports Administration – Applicability of S. Nithya Directions to Cricket Associations – Mandatory Inclusion of Sports Persons – The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's directions which had applied the mandate from S. Nithya v. Union of India (requiring 75% of members and key office bearers to be eminent sports persons) to a District Cricket Association - Held, the directions in S. Nithya arose from the specific context of athletics governance and are inapplicable to Cricket associations, which are governed by the specialized regulatory framework established in the BCCI case. Tiruchirappalli District Cricket Association v. Anna Nagar Cricket Club, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 154 : 2026 INSC 154
Sports - Cricket Administration – District Cricket Associations – Conformity with BCCI Constitution – Held, the judgment in BCCI v. Cricket Assn. of Bihar does not mandate that District Associations must model their regulations and bye-laws on the exact lines of the BCCI Constitution - While State Associations are required to bring their constitutions in conformity with the BCCI, this requirement does not automatically extend to the internal composition and business of District-level bodies through judicial review. Tiruchirappalli District Cricket Association v. Anna Nagar Cricket Club, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 154 : 2026 INSC 154
Sports - Public Character of Sports – Material Resources of the Community – The Court emphasized that sporting facilities and opportunities are "material resources of the community" under Article 39(b) and organizers are "institutions of the national life" under Article 38 - District Associations should volunteer to adopt "Sadhana" (endeavor) toward good governance, transparency, and the exclusion of conflicts of interest to ensure sports do not remain a privilege of the urban economic elite – Appeal allowed. [Relied on BCCI v. Cricket Assn. of Bihar (2016) 8 SCC 535; Paras 13-23] Tiruchirappalli District Cricket Association v. Anna Nagar Cricket Club, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 154 : 2026 INSC 154
Sports - The Supreme Court lifted the ban imposed on BJP Leader Anurag Thakur from holding office in the Board of Control for Cricket in India (BCCI). Board of Control for Cricket in India v. Cricket Association of Bihar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 143
Stale Claims and Representations – The Supreme Court reiterated that the practice of reviving stale or dead claims by making repeated representations followed by a prayer to "consider" them is disapproved - Rejection of a belated representation does not furnish a fresh cause of action - Courts must satisfy themselves that a claim relates to a "live issue" before issuing directions for consideration. Damor Nanabhai Manabhai v. State of Gujarat, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 104
Statutory Interpretation of Section 29A – The expression "if an award is not made" in Section 29A(4) does not create a threshold bar for cases where a late award has been delivered; rather, it empowers the Court to ensure proceedings reach their logical conclusion of a binding award - Termination of the mandate under Section 29A(4) is "conditional" and not "absolutistic," meaning it is subject to the Court's power to revive and extend the mandate retrospectively – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Rohan Builders (India) Pvt. Ltd. v. Berger Paints India Ltd., 2024 SCC Online SC 2494; Paras 13-23] C. Velusamy v. K. Indhera, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 105 : 2026 INSC 112
Telecom Law – Spectrum Allocation – Liability for Reserve Price – Effective Date for Commencement of Liability - The Supreme Court held that telecom licensees whose Unified Access Service (UAS) licences were quashed by the Court on February 2, 2012, but who continued operations to ensure non-disruption of services to the general public, are liable to pay the reserve price fixed for the November 2012 auction starting from February 2, 2012 – Held that the liability commences from the date the original licences were declared illegal and quashed, not from the date of subsequent orders or the date of fresh auctions. Union of India v. Sistema Shyam Teleservices, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 184 : 2026 INSC 174
Telegraph Act, 1885 – Section 4 – Nature of Telecom License – The Central Government possesses the exclusive privilege of establishing and operating telecommunications - A license granted under the proviso to Section 4 is a contract between the licensor and licensee but is not an ordinary commercial agreement; it is a statutory grant shaped by public law obligations. [Paras 18, 32] State Bank of India v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 152 : 2026 INSC 153
Transfer of Property Act, 1882; Section 105 and Section 108 — Indian Easements Act, 1882; Section 52 — Lease vs. Licence — Interpretation of Deeds — The Supreme Court set aside a High Court judgment that had re-characterized a registered 99-year lease deed as a licence - held that when the nomenclature, text, and context of a document clearly indicate a "lease simpliciter," courts should not resort to purposive construction or ex-post facto circumstances to infer a different intention - A unilateral cancellation of such a registered lease deed, without bilateral agreement or meeting conditions under Section 111 of the Transfer of Property Act, is illegal and non-est. General Secretary, Vivekananda Kendra v. Pradeep Kumar Agarwalla, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 204 : 2026 INSC 199
Trial Delay and Witness Management — Noted that the prosecution expressed intent to examine 159 witnesses - noted that even examining 50% of these witnesses would take a "pretty long time" and questioned the necessity of multiplying witnesses on the same issues – noted that the prosecution should focus on important witnesses to establish its case rather than prolonging the trial - While acknowledging the gravity of the NDPS charges, exercised its discretion in favor of the petitioner due to the overall delay and the age of pending cases in the Trial Court - Bail granted subject to terms imposed by the Trial Court and specific conditions including a travel restriction to Ankleshwar, Gujarat, and surrender of passport. [Paras 5-11] Chintan Rajubhai Panseriya v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 99
University Grants Commission (UGC) Act, 1956 — Direction to Universities — Respondent – Supreme Court directed the Universities to furnish information to the UGC regarding students who obtained questionable degrees in technical branches - The UGC shall then take decisions based on the principles laid down in Orissa Lift Irrigation Corporation Ltd. v. Rabi Sankar Patro - Order passed in the exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction to do complete justice in the specific facts and circumstances of the case. [Relied on Orissa Lift Irrigation Corporation Ltd. VS. Rabi Sankar Patro & Ors., (2018) 1 SCC 468; Paras 6-8] University Grants Commission v. Annamalai University, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 183
University Grants Commission (UGC) Act, 1956 — Distance Education — Technical Degrees — Validity of Degrees — Primacy of Statutory Bodies — The Supreme Court upheld the primacy of the UGC in making regulations for distance education - it modified a High Court order that had validated technical degrees obtained via distance learning through interim orders – Held that technical education (Engineering) requires practical, hands-on training and cannot be conducted via distance mode without express AICTE approval - Following the precedent in CMJ Foundation & Ors. vs. State of Meghalaya & Ors., Supreme Court held that the UGC is the appropriate statutory authority to consider the consequences of its orders and take necessary actions regarding the annulment of illegal degrees. University Grants Commission v. Annamalai University, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 183
Value Added Tax Act, 2008 (UP) – Schedule II, Part A, Entry 103 vs. Schedule V, Entry 1 (Residuary Entry) – Classification of "Sharbat Rooh Afza" - The Supreme Court held that "Sharbat Rooh Afza" is classifiable as a "fruit drink" under Entry 103 of Schedule II, Part A of the UPVAT Act, taxable at the concessional rate of 4%, rather than as an unclassified item under the residuary entry taxable at 12.5%; held that - 1. Inclusive Nature of Entry 103 - Supreme Court observed that Entry 103 is an inclusive and umbrella entry covering "processed or preserved vegetables and fruits, fruit drink and fruit juice."- Since the entry does not prescribe a minimum quantitative threshold for fruit content, it is improper to read a rigid percentage requirement into it that the Legislature did not provide; 2. Essential Character Test - Supreme Court applied the "Essential Character Test" as embodied in Rule 3(b) of the HSN Explanatory Notes - It held that while invert sugar syrup constitutes 80% of the volume, it merely acts as a carrier and preservative - The flavor, aroma, and beverage identity are derived from the 10% fruit juice and herbal distillates, which impart the product's distinctive character as a refreshing drink; 3. Common Parlance vs. Regulatory Classification - Supreme Court clarified that regulatory classifications under food safety laws (like the Fruit Products Order, 1955) are intended for quality control and safety, not fiscal classification - A fiscal statute must be interpreted based on how the product is understood in common or commercial parlance; 4. Burden of Proof on Revenue for Reclassification - Supreme Court reiterated that the burden of proof lies squarely on the Revenue to establish that a product falls within a residuary entry or an entry different from that claimed by the assessee - In this case, the Revenue failed to produce trade inquiries or market evidence to displace the appellant's classification; 5. Avoidance of Residuary Clause - Recourse to a residuary entry is impermissible when a commodity can reasonably be brought within the ambit of a specific entry. Denying a product "parentage" in a specific entry and consigning it to the "orphanage of the residuary clause" is against the principles of classification – Appeals allowed. [Relied on Dunlop India Ltd v. Union of India (1976) 2 SCC 241; Reserve Bank of India v. Peerless General Finance & Investment Co. Ltd. (1987) 1 SCC 424; Hindustan Ferodo Ltd v. Collector of Central Excise (1997) 2 SCC 677; CCE v. Connaught Plaza Restaurant (P) Ltd (2012) 13 SCC 639; Paras 16, 19-22, 24-27, 30] Hamdard (Wakf) Laboratories v. Commissioner of Commercial Tax, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 197 : 2026 INSC 195
Vicarious Liability – Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 – Section 34 – Directors' Responsibility - The Supreme Court held: Whether Directors of a company were "in charge of" and "responsible to" the company for the conduct of its business at the time of the offense is a question of fact - Quashing a complaint at the threshold on the ground of insufficient compliance with Section 34 of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act is premature; such determinations are best left to the Trial Court to be decided at the appropriate stage based on evidence – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Cheminova India Limited v. State of Punjab, (2021) 8 SCC 818; Paras 32-59] State of Kerala v. Panacea Biotec Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 206 : 2026 INSC 200
Victimology vs. Penology — Compensation as a Substitute for Punishment — Held: Victim compensation under Section 395 of the Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (or Section 357 CrPC) is an addition to, and not an alternative for, the sentence imposed - Compensation is restitutory, whereas punishment is punitive and intended to create deterrence - Reducing a sentence for a grave offence (Section 307 IPC) in exchange for monetary payment is a "dangerous" practice akin to "Blood Money" and is not acceptable in the Indian criminal justice system. Parameshwari v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 169 : 2026 INSC 164
Water Disputes - The Supreme Court directed constitution of a Tribunal for resolving disputes pending between the States of Tamil Nadu and Karnataka over sharing of Pennaiyar river water resources. The Court ordered the constitution of a Water Disputes Tribunal by the Central Government within 1 month. State of Tamil Nadu v. State of Karnataka, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 106