Administrative Law — Doctrine of Legitimate Expectation — Policy Change — Lack of Probity and Transparency - Service/Education Law — Alteration of the "Rules of the Game" - Supreme Court found that the policy modification was prompted by an undisclosed representation from the father of a high-ranking candidate who failed to disclose his private interest - Such a change, introduced...
Administrative Law — Doctrine of Legitimate Expectation — Policy Change — Lack of Probity and Transparency - Service/Education Law — Alteration of the "Rules of the Game" - Supreme Court found that the policy modification was prompted by an undisclosed representation from the father of a high-ranking candidate who failed to disclose his private interest - Such a change, introduced after the issuance of the prospectus and the submission of applications, violates the principle of fairness and predictability - Reiterated the well-settled principle that the criteria for selection/admission cannot be altered by the authorities once the process has commenced - Noted that the State adopted "double standards" as the expanded criteria were not applied to other allied medical courses during the same session – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation vs. Rajendra Bhimrao Mandve (2001) 10 SCC 51; K. Manjusree vs. State of Andhra Pradesh (2008) 3 SCC 512; Tej Prakash Pathak vs. Rajasthan High Court (2025) 2 SCC 1; Mandeep Singh vs. State of Punjab (2025) INSC 834; Paras 20-40] Divjot Sekhon v. State of Punjab, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 12 : 2026 INSC 26
Administrative Law – Publication and Promulgation – Noted that Law, to bind, must first exist and be made known in the manner ordained by the legislature - The requirement of publication in the Official Gazette for delegated legislation is not an "empty formality" but a dual-purpose constitutional requirement to ensure accessibility to the governed and accountability in the exercise of executive power - Until publication, a Notification is merely an "intention" and has not crossed the threshold to become a legal "obligation." Viraj Impex Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 76 : 2026 INSC 80
Advocates Act, 1961 – Section 35 and Section 38 – Professional Misconduct – Withdrawal of Complaint – Sustainability of Disciplinary Action – The Supreme Court set aside the order of the Disciplinary Committee of the Bar Council of India (BCI) which had held an advocate guilty of professional misconduct and imposed a penalty of Rs. 1 Lakh – Noted that the BCI failed to consider that the complainant had filed a sworn affidavit seeking to withdraw the complaint, stating the initial grievance arose from a "misunderstanding" regarding the deposit of costs and expressing full satisfaction with the advocate's services. Monty Goyal v. Navrang Singh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 91 : 2026 INSC 94
Arbitration (Proceedings Before the Courts) Rules, 2001 (Karnataka) – Rule 9(4) – Harmonious Construction with Section 9(2) – Held that while Rule 9(4) uses the term "initiated" and Section 9(2) uses "commenced," the terms must be read harmoniously - "Initiated" in Rule 9(4) must be understood as "commenced" within the meaning of Section 21 to prevent the strict timelines of the parent Act from being rendered otiose. [Relied on Sundaram Finance Ltd. v. NEPC India Ltd. (1999) 2 SCC 479; Milkfood Ltd. v. GMC Ice Cream (P) Ltd. (2004) 7 SCC 288; Geo Miller and Company Private Limited v. Chairman, Rajasthan Vidyut Utpadan Nigam Limited (2020) 14 SCC 643; Arif Azim Company Limited v. Aptech Limited (2024) 5 SCC 313; Para 29] Regenta Hotels v. Hotel Grand Centre Point, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 21 : 2026 INSC 32
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; Section 11(6-A) — Appointment of Arbitrators — Scope of Judicial Review — The Supreme Court or High Court, while considering a Section 11 application, must strictly confine its examination to the existence of an arbitration agreement - The use of the word "examination" indicates a limit to the court's jurisdiction, intended for a prima facie determination rather than a "laborious or contested inquiry" - Noted that Section 11(6-A) continues to remain in full force as its omission (by the 2019 Amendment) has not yet been notified. [Paras 14–17] Motilal Oswal Financial Services v. Santosh Cordeiro, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 32 : 2026 INSC 5
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; Section 12(5) and Seventh Schedule – Ineligibility of Arbitrator – Unilateral Appointment – The principle of equal treatment of parties under Section 18 applies not only to arbitral proceedings but also to the procedure for appointment of arbitrators - Equal treatment entails that parties must have an equal say in the constitution of the arbitral tribunal - Any person whose relationship with the parties, counsel, or the dispute falls within the Seventh Schedule is ineligible to be appointed as an arbitrator by operation of law – Held a person who is statutorily ineligible to act as an arbitrator cannot nominate or appoint another person as an arbitrator - A unilateral appointment by one party, where that party has exclusive power to appoint a sole arbitrator, violates the principle of impartiality and neutrality. Bhadra International (India) Pvt. Ltd. v. Airports Authority of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 4 : 2026 INSC 6
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; Section 12(5) Proviso – Waiver of Ineligibility – “Express Agreement in Writing” – Held that the ineligibility of an arbitrator under Section 12(5) can only be waived by an "express agreement in writing" entered into by the parties subsequent to the disputes having arisen – Supreme Court laid down Parameters of Waiver- i. Mere participation in proceedings, filing a Statement of Claim, requesting an extension of time under Section 29A, or failing to object in the first procedural order does not constitute an "express agreement in writing" ii. Recording "No Objection": A procedural order recording that parties have "no objection" to the appointment is insufficient to satisfy the requirement of a conscious, written waiver under the proviso to Section 12(5). Bhadra International (India) Pvt. Ltd. v. Airports Authority of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 4 : 2026 INSC 6
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; Section 16 & 23 - Jurisdiction to decide disputes not specifically mentioned in invocation notice - Unless the arbitration agreement specifically restricts the tribunal to only decided "specifically referred disputes," the claimant is entitled to add or amend claims in the statement of claim, and the respondent is entitled to file counter-claims, provided they are arbitrable and within limitation - Where an arbitration clause is widely worded to cover "any matter arising out of or connected with the agreement," the tribunal has jurisdiction to entertain all such disputes once constituted. Bhagheeratha Engineering Ltd. v. State of Kerala, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 31 : 2026 INSC 4
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; Section 16 — Doctrine of Competence-Competence — Arbitrability of Disputes — The determination of the substantive existence and validity of an arbitration agreement, as well as the arbitrability of the dispute, is the domain of the Arbitral Tribunal under Section 16 - The Referral Court is not the appropriate forum to conduct a "mini-trial" regarding the validity of the agreement. [Paras 15–16] Motilal Oswal Financial Services v. Santosh Cordeiro, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 32 : 2026 INSC 5
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; Section 2(1)(e), Section 11, and Section 29A — Jurisdiction to extend the mandate of an Arbitral Tribunal — Held that the expression "Court" used in Section 29A for the extension of time or substitution of arbitrators refers strictly to the Court as defined under Section 2(1)(e) of the Act - This definition encompasses the Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction in a district and includes a High Court only if it exercises ordinary original civil jurisdiction - The Supreme Court or High Courts exercising power under Section 11 to appoint an arbitrator do not retain supervisory control and become functus officio once the appointment is made. Jagdeep Chowgule v. Sheela Chowgule, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 89 : 2026 INSC 92
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; Section 21 & 23 - Object of Section 21 Notice - The object of Section 21 is primarily to determine the commencement of arbitral proceedings for reckoning limitation - It is a procedural rather than a jurisdictional requirement. Failure to issue a Section 21 notice is not fatal to a party's claim if the dispute is otherwise arbitrable and covered by the arbitration agreement - The claims raised in a Section 21 notice do not restrict or limit the claims that can be subsequently raised before the Arbitral Tribunal in the statement of claim under Section 23 - held that an arbitral tribunal cannot decide disputes beyond a specific issue referred to it and that a party cannot raise additional disputes without issuing a separate notice under Section 21 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. Bhagheeratha Engineering Ltd. v. State of Kerala, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 31 : 2026 INSC 4
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; Section 29A vs. Section 11 — Separation of Appointment and Supervision — Held that the power of appointment under Section 11 is a "special and limited" jurisdiction - It is a misconception to assume a hierarchy where only the appointing Court can extend the mandate - The extension of a mandate or substitution under Section 29A is a measure of curial supervision, not an "appointment" under Section 11 – Held that applications for extending an arbitral tribunal's mandate under Section 29A (4) of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 must be filed exclusively before the 'Court' as defined in Section 2(1)(e) i.e., the principal civil court of original jurisdiction, regardless of which authority appointed the arbitrators - Interpretations based on a perceived "conflict of power" or "hierarchical difficulties" between a Civil Court and a High Court are untenable and opposed to the rule of law. Jagdeep Chowgule v. Sheela Chowgule, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 89 : 2026 INSC 92
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; Section 42 — Inapplicability to Section 11 — Section 42, which mandates that subsequent applications be filed in the same Court where the first application was made, does not apply to Section 11 applications - The Chief Justice or their delegate exercising power under Section 11 is not a "Court" as defined by Section 2(1)(e); therefore, a Section 11 application does not fix the jurisdiction for Section 29A applications – Appeals allowed. [Relied on SBP and Co. v. Patel Engineering Ltd. (2005) 8 SCC 618; State of West Bengal v. Associated Contractors (2015) 1 SCC 32; State of Jharkhand v. Hindustan Construction Co. Ltd. (2018) 2 SCC 602; Chief Engineer (NH) PWD (Roads) v. BSC&C and C JV 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1801; Paras 15-26] Jagdeep Chowgule v. Sheela Chowgule, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 89 : 2026 INSC 92
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; Sections 14 and 34 – Challenge to Jurisdiction – Stage of Objection – Constitution of India; Article 14 – Public-Private Contracts - Held that an arbitrator falling under the Seventh Schedule becomes de jure unable to perform his functions, and his mandate terminates automatically - An objection to the inherent lack of jurisdiction due to such ineligibility can be raised at any stage, including for the first time in an application under Section 34 for setting aside the award – Held that unilateral appointment clauses in public-private contracts violate Article 14 for being arbitrary and failing to provide the minimum level of integrity required for quasi-judicial functions - Such clauses also violate the nemo judex rule, which constitutes a part of the fundamental policy of Indian law – Appeals allowed. [Relied on TRF Ltd. v. Energo Engineering Projects Ltd. (2017) 8 SCC 377; Perkins Eastman Architects DPC v. HSCC (India) Ltd. (2020) 20 SCC 760; Bharat Broadband Network Ltd. v. United Telecoms Ltd. (2019) 5 SCC 755; Dharma Prathishthanam v. Madhok Construction (P) Ltd. (2005) 9 SCC 686; Paras 55-107] Bhadra International (India) Pvt. Ltd. v. Airports Authority of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 4 : 2026 INSC 6
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 — Interpretation of Contracts — Arbitral Autonomy — Patent Illegality — Section 34(2A) - held that the interpretation of the terms of a contract is primarily the domain of the Arbitral Tribunal - Even if a second view is possible, an award cannot be set aside merely because the appellate court prefers an alternative interpretation – Held that the Tribunal's decision to award idling charges for a Backhoe Dredger (BHD) under Clause 51.1 of the License Agreement despite the respondent's claim that Clause 38 only specified charges for "major dredgers" was found to be a logical and reasonable construction of the agreement - For an award to be set aside for patent illegality, the error must be apparent on the face of the award - A speaking award based on logical reasoning and proper interpretation of clauses does not suffer from patent illegality - a mere contravention of substantive Indian law is no longer a standalone ground for setting aside an award – Appeal allowed. [Relied on MMTC Limited vs. Vedanta Limited (2019) 4 SCC 163; UHL Power Company Limited vs. State of Himachal Pradesh (2022) 4 SCC 116; Bombay Slum Redevelopment Corporation Private Limited vs. Samir Narain Bhojwani (2024) 7 SCC 218; National Highways Authority of India v. M/s Hindustan Construction Company Ltd. 2024 INSC 388; Larsen Air Conditioning and Refrigeration Company vs. Union of India & Ors. (2023) 15 SCC 472; Paras 30-46] Jan De Nul Dredging India Pvt. Ltd. v. Tuticorin Port Trust, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 47 : 2026 INSC 34
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – Section 21 – Interpretation of "Commencement" – Supreme Court emphasized that the commencement of arbitral proceedings is a statutory event defined exclusively under Section 21 - This definition is not limited to calculating limitation under Section 43 but applies to all provisions of the Act unless specifically excluded - The legislature deliberately delinked commencement from judicial proceedings to ensure clarity and party autonomy. [Paras 24, 28, 29] Regenta Hotels v. Hotel Grand Centre Point, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 21 : 2026 INSC 32
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 — Section 34 and Section 37 — Scope of Appellate Interference — The Supreme Court reiterated that the jurisdiction of an appellate court under Section 37 is extremely circumscribed and akin to the limited jurisdiction under Section 34 - An appellate court cannot undertake an independent assessment of the merits of the award or reappraise evidence as if it were an ordinary court of appeal - Its primary role is to ascertain whether the court exercising power under Section 34 acted within its prescribed limits or exceeded them - If an Arbitral Tribunal's interpretation of a contract is a "plausible view" and is upheld under Section 34, the Section 37 court has no authority to substitute it with a different interpretation. Jan De Nul Dredging India Pvt. Ltd. v. Tuticorin Port Trust, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 47 : 2026 INSC 34
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – Section 9(2) and Section 21 – Commencement of Arbitral Proceedings – Automatic Vacation of Interim Relief – The Supreme Court held that for the purposes of Section 9(2), arbitral proceedings "commence" on the date the respondent receives a request for the dispute to be referred to arbitration, as defined under Section 21 - set aside the High Court's finding that proceedings only commence upon the filing of a Section 11 petition - If a notice invoking arbitration is received by the respondent within 90 days of an interim order, the mandate of Section 9(2) is satisfied, and the interim relief does not stand automatically vacated under Rule 9(4) of the Arbitration (Proceedings Before the Courts) Rules, 2001. [Paras 23, 24, 31] Regenta Hotels v. Hotel Grand Centre Point, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 21 : 2026 INSC 32
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 - Supreme Court drew the following conclusions: i. The principle of equal treatment of parties provided in Section 18 of the Act, 1996, applies not only to the arbitral proceedings but also to the procedure for appointment of arbitrators - Equal treatment of the parties entails that the parties must have an equal say in the constitution of the arbitral tribunal; ii. Sub-section (5) of Section 12 provides that any person whose relationship with the parties or counsel, or the dispute, whether direct or indirect, falls within any of the categories specified in the Seventh Schedule would be ineligible to be appointed as an arbitrator - Since, the ineligibility stems from the operation of law, not only is a person having an interest in the dispute or its outcome ineligible to act as an arbitrator, but appointment by such a person would be ex facie invalid; iii. The words “an express agreement in writing” in the proviso to Section 12(5) means that the right to object to the appointment of an ineligible arbitrator cannot be taken away by mere implication - The agreement referred to in the proviso must be a clear, unequivocal written agreement; iv. When an arbitrator is found to be ineligible by virtue of Section 12(5) read with the Seventh Schedule, his mandate is automatically terminated - In such circumstance, an aggrieved party may approach the court under Section 14 read with Section 15 for appointment of a substitute arbitrator - when an award has been passed by such an arbitrator, an aggrieved party may approach the court under Section 34 for setting aside the award; v. In arbitration, the parties vest jurisdiction in the tribunal by exercising their consent in furtherance of a valid arbitration agreement - An arbitrator who lacks jurisdiction cannot make an award on the merits - an objection to the inherent lack of jurisdiction can be taken at any stage of the proceedings. Bhadra International (India) Pvt. Ltd. v. Airports Authority of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 4 : 2026 INSC 6
Arbitration — Setting aside of Award — Patent Illegality and Public Policy — Interpretation of Contract: The Supreme Court affirmed that the construction and interpretation of contractual terms are primarily within the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal - If an arbitrator adopts one of two plausible interpretations, the court cannot substitute its own view merely because an alternative view is possible - An award is not "patently illegal" or against "public policy" simply because of a mere contravention of law; it must violate fundamental principles of justice. [Paras 26, 29, 33, 59] National Highways Authority of India v. Gammon Atlanta (JV), 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 71 : 2026 INSC 76
Auction Law – Cancellation of Highest Bid – Arbitrariness – Whether a valid auction can be cancelled solely on the expectation of obtaining a higher price in a subsequent auction – Held, No – An auction process has a sanctity attached to it - The highest bid can only be discarded for valid reasons when the auction is otherwise held in accordance with law - Merely because an authority expects a higher bid than what was offered cannot be a reason to discard the highest bid, especially when it is above the reserve price - held that once a person is declared the highest bidder in an auction for a plot, it crystalises the future rights and obligations between the parties. Golden Food Products India v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 22 : 2026 INSC 22
Bail - Condition of Upfront Deposit or Undertaking to Pay Arrears/Siphoned Amounts as a Pre-condition for Bail Deprecated - High Courts Must Decide Bail on Merits Rather Than Deferring Due to Non-Payment - The Supreme Court of India has reiterated that the practice of courts insisting on upfront deposits, or undertakings for such deposits, as a condition for considering a bail prayer on merits is improper - Such practices have the potential to derail the criminal justice delivery system by becoming a tool for complainants to extort settlements and forcing the accused to give up their right of defense - In the present case, the appellant was denied an extension of interim bail by the High Court solely because he failed to fulfill an undertaking to deposit the remaining balance of an alleged siphoned subsidy amount (approx. ₹4.10 crore), despite having already deposited over 50% of the amount - The Supreme Court held that – i. In offences under Section 409 IPC, there is no automatic presumption regarding the culpability of a Director; it must be established during the trial; ii. An inability to comply with a financial undertaking is not a valid ground to defer the consideration of a bail prayer on its merits, especially when the investigation is complete and the accused has already suffered significant incarceration; iii. The appropriate course for the High Court was to decide the regular bail application on its own merits rather than keeping the matter pending through repeated interim extensions tied to upfront deposits. [Relied on Gajanan Dattatray Gore vs. State of Maharashtra and Anr. 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1571; Paras 11-14] Rakesh Jain v. State, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 81
Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) – Section 175(3) and Section 175(4) – Interplay and Procedural Safeguards - The Supreme Court clarified that Section 175(4) is not an independent or standalone provision, nor is it a mere proviso to Section 175(3) - the two sub-sections must be read harmoniously. Section 175(4) acts as a procedural adjunct and an additional protective layer for public servants - Supreme Court held that although Section 175(4) uses the term "complaint" (which under Section 2(1)(h) can include oral allegations), in the context of proceedings against public servants, it must be interpreted as a written complaint supported by an affidavit - It is illogical to require an affidavit for allegations against private individuals under Section 175(3) but exempt it for public servants under Section 175(4). [Relied on Priyanka Srivastava v. State of U.P. 2015 6 SCC 287; Lalita Kumari v. Govt. of U.P 2014 2 SCC 1; Radhe Shyam v. Chhabi Nath 2015 5 SCC 423; Pradnya Pranjal Kulkarni v. State of Maharashtra 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1948; Paras 20-29, 37-39, 45-48] xxx v. State of Kerala, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 85 : 2026 INSC 88
Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) – Two-Tier Protection for Public Servants – Noted that BNSS provides a dual-protection mechanism for public officials: i. Threshold Stage: Under Section 175(4), a Magistrate must call for a report from the superior officer and consider the assertions of the accused public servant before ordering an investigation; ii. Cognizance Stage: Under Section 218(1), prior government sanction is required before the Court takes cognizance. xxx v. State of Kerala, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 85 : 2026 INSC 88
Campus Suicide – Mandatory registration of FIR – Higher Educational Institutions (HEIs) - Institutional Responsibility vs. Student Autonomy - Mandatory Directions under Article 142 - The Supreme Court addressed the alarming rise in student suicides across Higher Educational Institutions (HEIs) in India - Recognized student suicide as the "visible tip of a much larger iceberg of student distress," Supreme Court noted that the legal and moral obligation of educational authorities to create safe, inclusive, and nurturing environments - Supreme Court reviewed an interim report by a National Task Force (NTF) and issued several mandatory directions under Article 142 of the Constitution to address structural, social, and academic stressors - Key Legal Issues & Rulings held – i. Mandatory Registration of F.I.R. for Campus Suicides – Noted that educational institutions have an unequivocal legal obligation to promptly lodge an F.I.R. with appropriate authorities if an incident of suicide occurs on campus - This follows the clarification of law regarding mandatory registration of F.I.R.s in the event of disclosure of a cognizable offence; ii. Institutional Responsibility vs. Student Autonomy - Supreme Court criticized the tendency of HEIs to "shift the blame" onto the individual autonomy of the deceased student to avoid institutional responsibility - held that HEIs cannot shirk their fundamental duty to ensure institutions are safe and conducive spaces for learning; iii. Mandatory Directions under Article 142 - Data Maintenance: SRS data on suicides for the 15-29 age group must be centrally maintained - The NCRB must distinguish between school-going and higher education students in its reports; iv. Reporting Protocol - HEIs must report all student suicides or unnatural deaths (on or off-campus) to police immediately - Annual reports of such incidents must be submitted to regulatory bodies like UGC, NMC, BCI, etc; v. Faculty Vacancies - All vacant faculty positions, with priority to reserved categories (SC/ST/OBC/PwD), must be filled within four months; vi. Scholarship Disbursements: Pending scholarship backlogs must be cleared within four months - HEIs are strictly prohibited from barring students from exams or hostels due to administrative delays in scholarship disbursals; vii. Regulatory Compliance - HEIs must strictly adhere to UGC regulations concerning Ragging (2009), Equity (2012), Sexual Harassment (2016), and Grievance Redressal (2023); viii. Accessibility and Mental Health - Supreme Court mandated accessibility audits for marginalized groups (PwDs and Transgender students) and emphasized the need for student-friendly mental health services provided by qualified professionals rather than untrained faculty members. [Relied on Sukdeb Saha v. The State of Andhra Pradesh, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1515; Paras 19-39; 44, 45] Amit Kumar v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 56 : 2026 INSC 62
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908; Section 100 — Second Appeal — Interference with concurrent findings — Held that the High Court is justified in interfering with concurrent findings of fact in a second appeal if such findings are found to be perverse, contrary to the statutory framework, or based on a misapplication of settled legal principles - The absence of cogent evidence regarding the exact location and measurements of the disputed property renders a decree for mandatory injunction legally unsustainable - A suit filed by partners of an unregistered firm for the protection of property rights (common law action) rather than the enforcement of a contractual right is maintainable and not barred by Section 69. [Relied on Anathula Sudhakar v. P. Buchi Reddy (Dead) by LRs and Others, (2008) 4 SCC 594; Para 13, 24 - 27] Sanjay Paliwal v. Bharat Heavy Electricals Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 54 : 2026 INSC 61
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Order I Rule 10 – Dominus Litis – Joinder of Parties – Noted that the petitioner is dominus litis and has the right to decide who to join as a party - The Registry cannot make inroads into judicial domains by questioning why a particular party was arrayed as a respondent - If unnecessary parties are joined, Supreme Court can delete them under Order I Rule 10 CPC or deal with it judicially if done with ill-motive - Supreme Court observed with "pain" that there was an "abandonment of its judicial role by the High Court" in rejecting the petition in such an unjust manner – Appeal allowed. [Paras 7-13] Sri Mukund Maheswar v. Axis Bank Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 82 : 2026 INSC 84
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Order I Rule 10 – Impleadment of Parties – Necessary vs. Proper Party – Dominus Litis – Suit for recovery of service charges – Twin Tests for Necessary Party – Held: A plaintiff is the dominus litis and cannot be compelled to add a third person as a defendant against their wishes unless that person is a necessary party without whom no effective decree can be passed - In a suit for recovery of service charges against a partnership firm, a third-party company claiming to be a "successor" is not a necessary party if the plaintiff seeks no relief against them and the original firm continues to exist- Held: To be a "necessary party," two tests must be satisfied: (1) there must be a right to some relief against such party in respect of the controversies involved; and (2) no effective decree can be passed in their absence - A "proper party" is one whose presence enables the court to adjudicate completely, even if no decree is made against them. Nak Engineering Company Pvt. Ltd. v. Tarun Keshrichand Shah, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 5 : 2026 INSC 8
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Order VII Rule 11 – Rejection of Plaint – Where a property is neither notified in the official list of auqaf nor registered with the Waqf Board, a suit for injunction simpliciter regarding such property cannot be entertained by the Waqf Tribunal – noted that the plaint is liable to be rejected as the Tribunal lacks the mandatory statutory requirement to adjudicate the property's status – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Ramesh Gobindram v. Sugra Humayun Mirza Wakf (2010) 8 SCC 726; Paras 20-50] Habib Alladin v. Mohammed Ahmed, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 88 : 2026 INSC 90
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Order VII Rule 7 and Order VI Rule 17 CPC – Pleadings and Reliefs – Multiple reliefs and defective prayers –Rejection of a writ petition because multiple reliefs were claimed in a single prayer is "perhaps, unprecedented" - If a prayer is defective or does not conform to Writ Rules, the High Court should permit amendments under principles of Order VI Rule 17 CPC or mould the relief - A claim cannot be dismissed simply because a suitor claims a wider relief than they are entitled to; the court remains free to grant a lesser relief. Sri Mukund Maheswar v. Axis Bank Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 82 : 2026 INSC 84
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Order VI Rule 4 CPC – Pleading Standards – Rule Against "Clever Drafting" – A party alleging that a registered Deed is a sham must satisfy a rigorous standard of pleading by providing clear, cogent, and convincing averments with material particulars - Adopting a test akin to Order VI Rule 4 of the CPC, Supreme Court held that "clever drafting" creating an illusion of a cause of action is impermissible - Mere suspicion or nebulous averments without material particulars are insufficient to dislodge the presumption under Sections 91 and 92 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. [Paras 34, 35] Hemalatha v. Tukaram, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 79 : 2026 INSC 82
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Order XXII Rule 4 – Abatement of Appeal – Substantial Representation of Estate – Suit for Specific Performance – Appeal does not abate if the estate of the deceased party is sufficiently represented by other legal heirs already on record - In the present case, while the vendor (Kishorilal) died during the appeal, all his four legal heirs were initially substituted - Upon the death of one of those heirs (Murarilal), the appeal could not be declared to have abated because the remaining three heirs and the lis pendens transferees (who held the title) remained on record, ensuring the estate was sufficiently represented. [Paras 30 - 40] Kishorilal v. Gopal, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 39 : 2026 INSC 48
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Sections 11, 151, and 152 – Res Judicata between stages of the same proceeding – Clerical Errors – Once a High Court holds at an intermediate stage that an appeal has not abated because the deceased's interest is sufficiently represented, it cannot revisit and reverse this finding at a later stage of the same proceeding - Such a reversal is barred by the principle of res judicata - a typographical error in a court order directing the deletion of the original party instead of a deceased legal representative is a clerical mistake that can be corrected under Sections 151 and 152 of the CPC and should not be used to the disadvantage of a party. [Paras 41-44] Kishorilal v. Gopal, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 39 : 2026 INSC 48
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Section 319 – Principles for Granting Bail to Accused Added via Section 319 – High Standard of Evidence Required - The Supreme Court held that when a person is added as an accused under Section 319 Cr.P.C. and subsequently arrested, the court considering a bail plea must apply a test higher than a mere prima facie case - The relevant consideration is whether there is "strong and cogent evidence" of complicity, rather than a mere probability - While this standard is shorter than the satisfaction required for a conviction if the evidence goes unrebutted, it is significantly higher than the standard required for framing charges against original accused persons - In exercising discretion for bail for an accused summoned under Section 319, the Court must weigh the nature of the offence, the quality of evidence against the newly added accused, and the likelihood of the person absconding or tampering with evidence. [Para 13, 14] Md Imran @ D.C. Guddu v. State of Jharkhand, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 23 : 2026 INSC 36
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Section 378 – Appeal against Acquittal – Grounds for Reversal – Noted that an order of acquittal may be reversed if the High Court rejects incontrovertible evidence based on unrealistic suspicion or surmises, or if it discounts the testimony of relatives solely on the ground of being 'interested' witnesses – Held that High Court wrongly placed undue reliance on the testimonies of hostile witnesses and contradictory defence evidence while ignoring the cogent testimonies of independent public servants – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar (2022) 3 SCC 471; Sadhu Saran Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2016) 4 SCC 35; State of Madhya Pradesh v. Phoolchand Rathore 2023 SCC OnLine SC 537; State of Uttar Pradesh v. Ajmal Beg 2025 SCC OnLine SC 280; Surajdeo Mahto v. State of Bihar (2022) 11 SCC 800; Paras 14-26] State of Himachal Pradesh v. Chaman Lal, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 48 : 2026 INSC 57
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Section 438 – Anticipatory Bail – Held that where co-accused summoned under Section 319 Cr.P.C. have already been granted anticipatory bail and have been appearing regularly before the trial court, no case for cancellation is made out unless specific grounds for such cancellation are established by the State. [Para 15, 18, 19] Md Imran @ D.C. Guddu v. State of Jharkhand, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 23 : 2026 INSC 36
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Appellate Jurisdiction – Interference with Order of Acquittal – Principles Reiterated – The Supreme Court observed that there is no absolute restriction in law on the appellate court to review and reappreciate the entire evidence upon which an order of acquittal is founded - While an appellate court is ordinarily slow to interfere with an acquittal, it must do so if the judgment is manifestly erroneous, perverse, or based on a misreading of evidence or incorrect application of law - Where the High Court adopts a wholly erroneous process of reasoning and ignores vital circumstances resulting in a grave miscarriage of justice, interference is imperative. State of Himachal Pradesh v. Chaman Lal, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 48 : 2026 INSC 57
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Attendance of Accused during Appeal/Revision – Suspension of Sentence – Validity of requiring physical presence on every hearing date – The Supreme Court held that once a sentence has been suspended and bail has been granted by an Appellate or Revisional Court, it is "unwarranted" and "burdensome" to require the accused to be present on every date of hearing - Such a practice serves no purpose, as the jurisdictional magistrate remains empowered to secure the accused's presence should the appeal or revision eventually be dismissed - noted that even if the prevalent practice is driven by the terms of Form No. 45 (Schedule II of the CrPC/BNSS) regarding bail bonds, it does not justify mandatory attendance for proceedings that may remain pending for years. [Paras 6 - 8] Meenakshi v. State of Haryana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 60
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Quashing of FIR – Validity of interim directions to follow arrest procedures – The Supreme Court set aside an order of the High Court of Telangana which, while disposing of a petition to quash an FIR on the very first day, directed the Investigating Officer to follow the procedure under Section 35(3) of the BNSS (previously Section 41-A Cr.PC) and the Arnesh Kumar guidelines without hearing the defacto complainant. Practical Solutions Inc. v. State of Telangana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 74
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Rights of Complainants/Witnesses – Concern that treating complainants as witnesses in a single FIR deprives them of legal remedies – Held: Complainants treated as witnesses are entitled to file protest petitions if a closure report is filed or if the Magistrate intends to discharge the accused. The Magistrate is bound to consider such petitions on merits – Held: Requiring registration of individual FIRs for every victim in mass-cheating cases would lead to an unnecessary multiplicity of proceedings, which is not in the larger public interest or the interest of the State – Appeal allowed. [Relied on mish Devgan vs. Union of India and others (2021) 1 SCC 1; Andhra Pradesh vs. Cheemalapati Ganeswara Rao (1964) 3 SCR 297; Paras 15-22] State (NCT of Delhi) v. Khimji Bhai Jadeja, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 11 : 2026 INSC 25
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Section 154, 218, 219, 220, and 223 – Registration of FIR and Joinder of Charges– Whether multiple acts of cheating against numerous investors in a criminal conspiracy require separate FIRs or can be clubbed into a single FIR – Held: Where a criminal conspiracy is alleged leading to multiple acts of cheating against different individuals, registering one FIR and treating subsequent complaints as statements under Section 161 CrPC is a correct course of action - The "triple tests" to determine if acts form the 'same transaction' are: (1) unity of purpose and design; (2) proximity of time and place; and (3) continuity of action - If the Magistrate finds the acts constitute the 'same transaction', consolidated charges can be framed under Sections 220(1) and 223(a) & (d) CrPC. State (NCT of Delhi) v. Khimji Bhai Jadeja, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 11 : 2026 INSC 25
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 — Section 164 — Confessional Statements — Retracted and Exculpatory Confessions — Legal Aid — Held: A confession must be a direct acknowledgment of guilt to form the basis of a conviction – noted that in the present case, the confession of A1 was exculpatory (accusing the co-accused), and A2's statement did not admit to murder; thus, they could not be relied upon - the Magistrate failed to inform the accused of their right to legal aid before recording the statements, violating mandatory duties. [Paras 23-28] Bernard Lyngdoh Phawa v. State of Meghalaya, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 84 : 2026 INSC 85
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Section 362 - Bar on Alteration or Review of Signed Orders – The Supreme Court set aside an order of the Patna High Court which had recalled its earlier grant of bail to the appellant - The High Court had reversed the bail order on the grounds of a clerical error by the Court Master, who recorded the petition as "allowed" despite the operative portion allegedly being "rejected" - The Supreme Court held that under Section 362 CrPC, no alteration or review of a signed judgment or order is permissible except to correct clerical or arithmetical errors – Noted that no such error justified the recall, rendering the High Court's action unsustainable in law. Rambali Sahni v. State of Bihar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 61
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Section 378 – Appeal against Acquittal – Scope of Interference by Appellate Court – The Supreme Court reiterated that an appellate court must exercise caution before reversing an order of acquittal - While the appellate court has full power to review and reappreciate evidence, it should not disturb the findings of the Trial Court if two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record - Interference is only justified if the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity, is based on a misreading or omission of material evidence, or if the Trial Court's view is "clearly unreasonable" - The acquittal further strengthens the double presumption of innocence in favor of the accused. [Paras 27 - 31] Tulasareddi @ Mudakappa v. State of Karnataka, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 59 : 2026 INSC 67
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 — Section 439 — Scope of Bail Jurisdiction — The jurisdiction of a Court under Section 439 is limited to granting or refusing bail based on prima facie evidence - It is coram non judice for a bail court to issue general mandatory directions to investigating authorities that contravene express legislative intent - Determination of age is a matter of trial and not a "matter of course" step during bail proceedings. [Relied on Chandrapal Singh v. State of U.P. (2022 SCC OnLine All 934); State v. M. Murugesan (2020) 15 SCC 251; Abuzar Hossain @ Gulam Hossain v. State of West Bengal (2012) 10 SCC 489; Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb (2021) 3 SCC 713; Paras 13-19] State of Uttar Pradesh v. Anurudh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 29 : 2026 INSC 47
Companies Act, 2013; Section 58(3) and Section 433 — Limitation Act, 1963; Section 5 — Condonation of Delay by Company Law Board (CLB) — Applicability of Limitation Act to Quasi-Judicial Bodies - The Supreme Court examined whether the CLB, as a quasi-judicial body, possessed the inherent or statutory power to condone delay in filing an appeal under Section 58(3) of the Act, 2013, particularly for appeals filed between 12.09.2013 and 01.06.2016 (before the constitution of NCLT/NCLAT) – Held that the settled principle that the Limitation Act, 1963, applies only to "courts" in the traditional sense and not to quasi-judicial bodies or tribunals unless expressly extended by statute - While Section 433 of the Act, 2013 now expressly applies the Limitation Act to proceedings before the NCLT and NCLAT, this power cannot be retroactively borrowed to signify a similar power for the erstwhile CLB - held that Section 58(3) is a simpliciter provision prescribing a mandatory limitation period - The absence of peremptory language such as "but not thereafter" does not render the prescribed period merely directory – Held that Regulation 44 of the CLB Regulations which saves the inherent power of the CLB would not enable the CLB to extend time for the filing of the appeal or the application itself, as the case may be. [Relied on Town Municipal Council, Athani v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Hubli (1969) 1 SCC 873, Paras 42-44, 69, 70, 90-93, 108, 161] Property Company (P) Ltd. v. Rohinten Daddy Mazda, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 19 : 2026 INSC 33
Companies Act, 2013 — Sections 212(6), 447, 448, 451 — Cognizance of offences involving fraud — Bar on private complaints — Whether a Special Court can take cognizance of offences under Sections 448 (false statement liable to punishment for fraud) and 451 (repeated default) of the Companies Act, 2013 on the basis of a private criminal complaint. Held, an offence under Section 448 is an "offence covered under Section 447" within the meaning of Section 212(6), as it prescribes punishment in terms of fraud as defined and punishable under Section 447. Consequently, the second proviso to Section 212(6) bars the Special Court from taking cognizance of such offences except upon a written complaint by the Director of the Serious Fraud Investigation Office (SFIO) or an officer authorised in writing by the Central Government. This statutory bar serves as a safeguard against frivolous or motivated complaints by disgruntled shareholders, members, or competitors in corporate disputes. It rejected the contention that the 2015 amendment to Section 212(6) limited the bar solely to the offence under Section 447 itself, holding that offences inextricably linked to fraud (such as under Section 448) attract the same restriction. The ancillary offence under Section 451 was also held to be covered by the bar. However, aggrieved persons are not remediless: they may approach the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) under Section 213 for an order directing investigation into the affairs of the company by SFIO, upon satisfying the eligibility criteria under clauses (a) or (b) thereof. (Para 26, 35) Yerram Vijay Kumar v. State of Telangana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 28 : 2026 INSC 42
Companies Act, 2013 — Sections 212(6), 447, 448, 451 — The case arose from a management dispute in a Hyderabad-based real estate company, where the original promoter (complainant) filed a private complaint alleging that former directors (appellants), after removal, fraudulently convened an EGM, passed forged resolutions, appointed new directors, and filed false Form DIR-12 with the Ministry of Corporate Affairs. The Special Court took cognizance of offences under Sections 448 and 451 of the Companies Act and various IPC sections (including 420, 468, etc.). The High Court declined to quash the proceedings, leading to the appeal. Allowing the appeals in part, the Supreme Court quashed the proceedings and cognizance to the extent of offences under Sections 448 and 451 of the Companies Act. The Court directed transfer of the remaining complaint (IPC offences) to the appropriate court having territorial jurisdiction for trial on merits. It set aside the High Court's order. (Para 26, 35) Yerram Vijay Kumar v. State of Telangana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 28 : 2026 INSC 42
Company Law – Control and Management – "Head and Brain" Test – In determining the residence and commercial substance of the respondents, the AAR applied the "head and brain" test - It was found that though the companies were incorporated in Mauritius, the real control over transactions exceeding USD 250,000 rested with a non-resident individual in the USA – Held that if the board of directors of a subsidiary is reduced to "puppets" and the steering interference of the parent/owner is such that the subsidiary does not perform activities on its own authority, the corporate veil can be pierced - It held that the AAR's findings on the lack of commercial substance and the centralized control in the USA were sufficient to establish a prima facie case of tax avoidance - the applications for advance rulings were not maintainable. Authority For Advance Rulings v. Tiger Global International II Holdings, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 50 : 2026 INSC 60
Condonation of Delay – Special Leave Petition – Consistent Negligence by Statutory Body – The Supreme Court dismissed a Special Leave Petition filed by the Delhi Development Authority (DDA) due to an unexplained and "fatal" delay of 235 days - noted a pattern of consistent delay by the DDA, highlighting prior delays of 685 days in filing a Letters Patent Appeal (LPA) and 577 days in filing a review petition before the High Court - clarified that a development authority cannot be granted special indulgence or immunity from limitation periods simply by virtue of its status - The explanation provided for the delay was deemed neither satisfactory nor sufficient in law – Noted that that the DDA should implement a robust litigation policy and screening process for cases before filing them belatedly, noting that such actions contribute to "docket explosion" and the unnecessary consumption of judicial time - The petition was dismissed on the grounds of delay with a cost of Rs. 10,000/- to be paid to the Supreme Court Legal Services Committee within six weeks. Delhi Development Authority v. Shilya, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 75
Constitutional Law – Articles 14, 21, and 41 – Directive Principles of State Policy – Article 142 of the Constitution – Supreme Court noted that Fundamental Rights (Part III) and Directive Principles (Part IV) are "two wheels of a chariot," where the principles of Article 39(a) (right to livelihood) and Article 41 (right to work in cases of disablement) must guide the interpretation of fundamental rights - The right to work is recognized as a precious liberty that enables a person to live with dignity beyond "mere animal existence." – Exercising its power to do complete justice, directed the creation of a supernumerary post for the appellant at North Eastern Coalfields CIL - The employer was directed to provide "reasonable accommodation" in the form of a suitable desk job with a computer and keyboard designed as per "universal design" under Section 2(ze) of the RPwD Act. [Relied on Omkar Ramchandra Gond v. Union of India; 2024 INSC 775; Anmol v. Union of India 2025 SCC OnLine SC 387; Om Rathod v. Director General of Health Services 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3130; Rajive Raturi v. Union of India 2024 16 SCC 654; Paras 13- 24] Sujata Bora v. Coal India Ltd; 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 46 : 2026 INSC 53
Constitutional Validity — Articles 14 and 21 - Classifying widowed daughters-in-law based solely on the timing of their husband's death (before or after the father-in-law) is arbitrary and lacks a rational nexus with the Act's object of securing maintenance for vulnerable dependants - Denying maintenance on such technical grounds would expose them to destitution, violating the right to life with dignity under Article 21 - Section 19 casts a personal obligation on the father-in-law to maintain his daughter-in-law during his lifetime - Section 22 creates an obligation on the heirs of the deceased to maintain dependants out of the estate - A claim under Section 22 arises only after the death of the father-in-law – Appeals dismissed. [Relied on B. Premanand v. Mohan Koikal (2011) 4 SCC 266; Vinod Kumar v. DM, Mau (2023) 19 SCC 126; Paras 16-28] Kanchana Rai v. Geeta Sharma, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 41 : 2026 INSC 54
Constitution of India, 1950; Article 136 — Scope of Interference — Contract Law — Unconscionable Agreements — "Lion and Lamb" Analogy - While the Court is cautious with concurrent findings, it can interfere under Article 136 if findings are perverse, disregard statutory provisions, or result in substantial and grave injustice – Noted that an appellant must demonstrate exceptional circumstances for such review - Where a "mighty" State (the lion) contracts with an individual job seeker (the lamb), the inequality is structural - Clauses barring claims for regularization in such standard-form contracts are unconscionable if the employee had no meaningful choice but to "sign on the dotted line." - Acceptance of such terms does not amount to a waiver of fundamental rights - Continuous service for over a decade, supported by repeated extensions and satisfactory performance, nurtures a legitimate expectation of recognition - The bar against this doctrine for contractual workers only applies if the initial appointment lacked a proper selection process - directed the respondent-State to forthwith regularize the services of all the appellants against the sanctioned posts to which they were initially appointed - The appellants shall be entitled to all consequential service benefits accruing from the date of this judgment. [Relied on State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (2006) 4 SCC 1; Central Inland Water Transport Corpn. v. Brojo Nath Ganguly (1986) 3 SCC 156; Chandra Singh v. State of Rajasthan (2003) 6 SCC 545; Army Welfare Education Society v. Sunil Kumar Sharma (2024) 16 SCC 598; Jaggo v. Union of India, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3826; State of Karnataka v. Uma Devi, (2006) 4 SCC 1; Paras 11-14] Bhola Nath v. State of Jharkhand, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 95 : 2026 INSC 99
Constitution of India, 1950; Article 14 and 16 — Regularization of Service — Model Employer — The Supreme Court set aside the Jharkhand High Court's refusal to regularize contractual employees who had served for over a decade in sanctioned posts - held that the State, as a "model employer," cannot exploit the unequal bargaining power of employees by keeping them in perpetual contractual roles to evade regular employment obligations - Abruptly discontinuing long-serving employees solely based on "contractual nomenclature" without a speaking order is manifestly arbitrary and violative of Article 14. Bhola Nath v. State of Jharkhand, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 95 : 2026 INSC 99
Constitution of India, 1950 – Andhra Pradesh Reorganisation Act, 2014 – Section 2(f), 100, 101, and 102 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Section 2(s) and 2(o) – Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 - The Supreme Court set aside a High Court of Andhra Pradesh judgment that had quashed several FIRs registered by the Anti-Corruption Bureau (ACB), Vijayawada – Held that the High Court had erroneously held that the ACB office in Vijayawada was not a notified "police station" under Section 2(s) of the CrPC following the state's bifurcation - The Supreme Court clarified that under the 2014 Reorganisation Act, existing laws and notifications (including G.O.Ms. No. 268 of 2003) continue to apply to successor states to prevent a legal vacuum - A "police station" under Section 2(s) includes a "post" held by a police officer and does not strictly require a specific physical building declaration in every instance - a subsequent 2022 clarificatory Government Order by the State of Andhra Pradesh did not have retrospective application but merely confirmed the existing legal position under the Reorganisation Act - Section 2(s) of the CrPC is exhaustive and inclusive, meaning any "post" or "place" declared by the State - A post held by a police officer can constitute a police station - Sections 100-102 of the 2014 Act ensure that laws (including notifications) in force before the appointed day continue to apply to the territories of the successor states until altered or repealed - A subsequent Government Order (G.O.Ms. No. 137 of 2022) issued as a clarification does not constitute retrospective application but merely reiterates the statutory position to avoid legal ambiguity. [Relied on Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, Ranchi and Another vs. Swarn Rekha Cokes and Coals (P) Ltd. and Others (2004) 6 SCC 689; State of Punjab and Others vs. Balbir Singh and Others (1976) 3 SCC 24; Paras 21-24, 26-29] Anti-Corruption Bureau v. Dayam Peda Ranga Rao, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 24 : 2026 INSC 37
Constitution of India, 1950 — Article 14 — Admission to Medical Courses — Sports Quota — Change in Rules after commencement of process — Transparency and Fair Play — The Supreme Court quashed the Punjab Government's decision to expand the "zone of consideration" for sports achievements from Classes XI & XII to include Classes IX & X for MBBS/BDS admissions - Granted — To avoid unsettling admissions of third parties not before the Court, the relief was restricted to the appellants – directed that the appellants are to be accommodated in government medical college seats previously allotted to Respondents 4 and 5, while the respondents are to be moved to the seats vacated by the appellants in a private medical college. Divjot Sekhon v. State of Punjab, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 12 : 2026 INSC 26
Constitution of India, 1950 — Article 14 — Substantive Equality — The principle of substantive equality requires the State to remedy structural, institutional, and systemic disadvantages - Mere equal treatment is insufficient when individuals are placed in unequal positions due to biological, social, or economic factors. Inaccessibility of MHM measures converts a biological reality into a structural exclusion, violating the right to participate in education on equal terms. [Paras 41- 65] Dr. Jaya Thakur v Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 94 : 2026 INSC 97
Constitution of India, 1950 — Article 21 — Right to Dignity, Privacy, and Health — The right to life includes the right to a dignified existence and the right to menstrual health - Dignity is undermined when girl children are subjected to stigma or compelled to adopt unsafe practices due to a lack of facilities - Privacy is a concomitant of dignity, imposing a positive obligation on the State to facilitate a private space for menstrual management. [Paras 70 -80, 85 – 96] Dr. Jaya Thakur v Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 94 : 2026 INSC 97
Constitution of India, 1950 – Article 226 – Writ Jurisdiction – Disputed Questions of Fact and Delay – Held that High Court erred in entertaining a writ petition filed in 2015 challenging construction activities that commenced in 2002 and were completed by 2007-2008 - Held: Gross delay in approaching the Court disentitles a petitioner to discretionary relief under Article 226 – Noted that in writ proceedings decided on affidavits, the burden of proof lies on the petitioner to specifically plead and substantiate facts with cogent material; mere abstract points of law without evidence are insufficient. [Paras 66 - 70] Raj Singh Gehlot v. Amitabha Sen, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 72 : 2026 INSC 77
Constitution of India, 1950 – Article 226 – Writ Jurisdiction – Rejection of Writ Petition at the threshold on technical office objections – Sustainability of – High Court rejected a writ petition arising under the SARFAESI Act based on Registry objections regarding prayer revision, multiple reliefs in a single prayer, and joinder of parties – Held that the High Court erred in sustaining these technical objections to "nip a proceeding in the bud" - When fraud and collusion are alleged specifically regarding the conduct of a Commissioner appointed under Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act; the court must remember the maxim "fraus omnia corrumpit" (fraud unravels everything) - Allegations of fraud should not be buried without an examination of merits due to mere technicalities. Sri Mukund Maheswar v. Axis Bank Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 82 : 2026 INSC 84
Constitution of India, 1950 — Articles 14, 15(3), 21, and 21A — Right to Education and Menstrual Health — The Supreme Court held that the right to education is a "multiplier right" that enables the exercise of other human rights and forms an integral part of the right to life and human dignity - Noted that inaccessibility to Menstrual Hygiene Management (MHM) measures including clean gender-segregated toilets, sanitary napkins, and safe disposal mechanisms constitutes a violation of the fundamental rights of adolescent girl students. [Paras 20-40] Dr. Jaya Thakur v Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 94 : 2026 INSC 97
Constitution of India; Article 14 – Discrimination – noted that the respondents failed to show that any similarly situated candidates (those admitted after the 2010-11 session) were given direct appointments - noted that the last direct appointments (made in 2015) were pursuant to Court orders and limited to batches admitted prior to the 2011 policy change - Noted that the Uttar Pradesh Ayush Department (Ayurved) Nursing Service Rules, 2021 now govern the post, and recruitment must be conducted through the UPSSSC to select the most meritorious candidates. [Relied on Sivanandan C T and Others vs. High Court of Kerala and Others (2023 INSC 709; Paras 19-27] State of Uttar Pradesh v. Bhawana Mishra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 26 : 2026 INSC 38
Constitution of India – Article 142 – Dissolution of Marriage – Irretrievable Breakdown – Exercise of Extraordinary Jurisdiction despite opposition by one spouse - The Supreme Court dissolved a marriage that had lasted only 65 days of cohabitation followed by over a decade of separation and excessive litigation - held that where a marriage is wrecked beyond salvage, maintaining a formal legal relationship is unjustified and the Court can exercise its power under Article 142 to do "complete justice," even if one spouse opposes the divorce. Neha Lal v. Abhishek Kumar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 73 : 2026 INSC 73
Constitution of India – Article 142 – Restoration of Withdrawn Petitions – National Highways Act, 1956 – Sections 3G and 3J – Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – Section 34 – The Supreme Court invoked its extraordinary powers under Article 142 to set aside an order of the Trial Court, which had allowed land owners to withdraw their Section 34 petitions following a High Court judgment declaring Sections 3G and 3J of the National Highways Act unconstitutional - noted that since the High Court's judgment was subsequently stayed, the land owners were left "remediless" as fresh petitions would be barred by limitation under Section 34(3) of the 1996 Act - Supreme Court has raised concerns over the deep structural flaws in determining the land acquisition compensation acquired under the National Highways Act, 1956. The Court said that land owners whose lands were acquired under the 1956 Act faces significant disadvantage when compared to land owners whose lands were acquired under different laws. [Para 1-3] Riar Builders Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 65
Constitution of India - Article 14 - Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 - Section 17A - Vires of Section 17A - Whether the requirement of prior approval for conducting an enquiry, inquiry, or investigation into offences relatable to recommendations made or decisions taken by a public servant is unconstitutional? - Held (per Nagarathna, J.) - Section 17A of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 is unconstitutional and is liable to be struck down - The provision is a resurrection of the Single Directive 4.7(3) and Section 6A of the Delhi Special Police Establishment (DSPE) Act, 1946, both of which were previously struck down by the Supreme Court - Resurrection of Struck-down Provisions: Section 17A is an attempt to reintroduce a prior approval regime that was already declared unconstitutional in larger bench decisions. It is "old wine in a new bottle" and does not remove the basis on which Section 6A of the DSPE Act was invalidated - The primary object of the Act is to effectively curb the "cancerous growth of corruption" - Section 17A forestalls even a bare preliminary enquiry, thereby protecting corrupt officials rather than merely honest ones - The provision is arbitrary because it requires approval from the very government department to which the public servant belongs - This creates a "policy bias" and a "conflict of interest," as the authority granting approval may have been involved in the same decision-making process, leading to a lack of objectivity and neutrality - The classification based on the nature of duties (recommendations or decisions) to protect a certain class of public servants is illegal and violates the mandate of equality before the law - The expression "Government" or "competent authority" in Section 17A cannot be substituted with "Lokpal" or "Lokayukta" through interpretation, as such substitution would amount to impermissible judicial legislation. [Relied on Vineet Narain vs. Union of India, (1998) 1 SCC 226; Subramanian Swamy vs. Director, CBI, (2014) 8 SCC 68; Lalita Kumari vs. Government of Uttar Pradesh, (2014) 2 SCC 1; Manohar Lal Sharma vs. Principal Secretary, (2014) 2 SCC 532; Paras 19-22] Centre for Public Interest Litigation v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 43 : 2026 INSC 55
Constitution of India – Article 16 – Recruitment Process – Challenge by Unsuccessful Candidate – Estoppel – All India Council for Technical Education (Career Advancement Scheme for the Teachers and Other Academic Staff in Technical Institutions) (Degree) Regulations, 2012 – Scope and Applicability – Direct Recruitment vs. Career Progression - Held that it is a settled principle that a candidate who participated in the selection process without protest cannot challenge the "rules of the game" after being declared unsuccessful – Noted that the respondent participated in the interview held on 17.12.2015, secured 28 marks against the qualifying 45, and only challenged the process after failing to secure a recommendation – Held that to apply AICTE Regulations to a candidate participating in recruitment for the post of Professors in the Engineering Colleges in the State conducted by the Commission under State Rules framed by the State, would be to stretch the AICTE Regulations beyond its text, context, and purpose - The law does not permit a regulation crafted as a ladder to be used as a gate – Held that the AICTE Regulations do not apply to the process of direct recruitment under the State Rules - The AICTE Regulations of 2012 are not "Recruitment Rules" but are "Promotion and Progression Rules" - They apply to individuals already within the institutional framework (incumbents or newly appointed staff) for the purpose of career advancement - Suitability for a post determined by a committee of experts does not warrant interference in the exercise of powers of judicial review – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Anupal Singh & Others v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2020) 2 SCC 173; Paras 13 – 18] Gujarat Public Service Commission v. Gnaneshwary Dushyantkumar Shah, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 64 : 2026 INSC 70
Constitution of India – Article 226(3) – Vacation of Interim Orders – Mandatory Timeline for Disposal – Special Leave Petition filed against an interim order of status quo – Petitioner submitted that an application for vacating the interim order had been pending since January 2025 – Held, Article 226(3) of the Constitution of India mandates that upon an application for vacating an interim order being filed, the High Court is required to dispose of the same within a period of two weeks – In light of this provision, the Supreme Court requested the High Court to take up and dispose of the pending application on its own merits. [Paras 3, 4] Giriraj v. Mohd. Amir, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 66
Constitution of India – Article 227 – Supervisory Jurisdiction – Interference with Interlocutory Orders – Held: While the High Court's jurisdiction under Article 227 is supervisory and it should generally not intervene in interlocutory orders like impleadment, the Supreme Court will not restore an incorrect Trial Court order if the High Court has rightly interfered to prevent an illegality – Held that an impleadment application filed nearly nine years after acquiring knowledge of the suit (as evidenced by the applicant's seal on the original summons) is liable to be rejected on the ground of silence and delay. [Relied on Ramesh Hirachand Kundanmal v. Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay, (1992) 2 SCC 524; Kasturi v. Iyyamperumal, (2005) 6 SCC 733; Mumbai International Airport (P) Ltd. v. Regency Convention Centre & Hotels (P) Ltd., (2010) 7 SCC 417; Vidur Impex & Traders (P) Ltd. v. Tosh Apartments (P) Ltd., (2012) 8 SCC 384; Paras 33-44] Nak Engineering Company Pvt. Ltd. v. Tarun Keshrichand Shah, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 5 : 2026 INSC 8
Constitution of India – Article 309 – Bihar Pharmacists Cadre Rules, 2014 (as amended in 2024) – Rule 6(1) – Validity of Minimum Qualification – The Supreme Court upheld the constitutional validity of Rule 6(1) and the "Note" in Appendix-I of the Cadre Rules, which prescribes Diploma in Pharmacy as the essential qualification for the post of Pharmacist (basic category) - Noted that candidates possessing higher qualifications (B. Pharma/M. Pharma) are eligible only if they also possess a Diploma in Pharmacy as the essential qualification for the post of Pharmacist (basic category) - Noted that candidates possessing higher qualifications (B. Pharma/M. Pharma) are eligible only if they also possess a Diploma in Pharmacy - It is the exclusive prerogative of the State, as an employer, to determine the most suitable qualifications for public posts based on its independent assessment - The power of judicial review is limited and cannot be used to rewrite service rules, determine equivalence of qualifications, or substitute the Court's assessment for that of the employer – Appeal dismissed. MD. Firoz Mansuri v. State of Bihar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 57 : 2026 INSC 68
Constitution of India – Article 32, 19(1)(d), 19(1)(e), and 19(1)(g) – Judicial Service – Migration to another State Service – Right to Profession – Petitioners, serving as Civil Judges in Uttarakhand, sought permission to join the Delhi Judicial Service after being declared successful in the recruitment examination - The High Court of Uttarakhand rejected their request, citing concerns over judicial vacancies and the impact on the litigant public - Held: The interest of the individual officers to advance their careers has an overriding effect over the administrative concerns of the parent High Court regarding vacancies - Denial of such permission results in "negativity, frustration," and a violation of fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution - The Supreme Court directed the High Court of Uttarakhand to pass orders for the cessation of their services to enable them to join the Delhi Judicial Service by the stipulated deadline - Supreme Court clarified that while the petitioners' joining was delayed due to the pending legal challenge, their seniority in the Delhi Judicial Service must be maintained as per their original position in the Select List - held that permission cannot be denied to a judicial officer to join the service of another State merely on the ground that migration will give rise to vacancies in the first State - The delay caused by the litigation shall not adversely affect their merit-based seniority – Petition allowed. [Paras 13-18] Anubhuti Goel v. High Court of Uttarakhand, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 67
Constitution of India – Article 32 – Writ Jurisdiction – Principles of Natural Justice – Doctrine of Bias – Selection Process – Search-cum-Selection Committee (SCSC) – Bias and Malafides in Service Matters - The Supreme Court allowed the writ petition, setting aside the SCSC's decision to reject the petitioner's candidature - held that the inclusion of an officer as a member of the selection committee who had been personally arraigned as a contemnor by the candidate in the same dispute violates the principles of natural justice - Such participation creates a "reasonable apprehension of bias" in the mind of the candidate, rendering the decision-making process vulnerable and a nullity, regardless of whether actual bias is proven – Noted that justice must not only be done but must manifestly be seen to be done, and authorities must appear to act fairly to preserve public confidence in the impartiality of the selection process – Supreme Court directed the DoPT to convene a fresh SCSC meeting within four weeks, excluding "the Officer" in question, and imposed costs of Rs. 5 lakhs on the respondents for "rank procrastination" and "deliberate obstacles" bordering on vendetta. [Relied on State of Gujarat v. R.A. Mehta, (2013) 3 SCC 1; A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India, (1969) 2 SCC 262; S. Parthasarathi v. State of A.P., (1974) 3 SCC 459; Paras 41-46] Captain Pramod Kumar Bajaj v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 97 : 2026 INSC 101
Constitution of India – Article 91 – Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968 – Section 3(1) – Competence of Deputy Chairman – Held that the office of the Chairman of the Rajya Sabha is vacant, the Deputy Chairman is constitutionally mandated under Article 91(1) to perform all duties of the office - The statutory powers vested in the "Chairman" under Section 3 of the Inquiry Act are inseparable from the office of the Presiding Officer and must be read in harmony with the Constitutional scheme - the Deputy Chairman is competent to consider a notice of motion and exercise discretion to admit or refuse it under Section 3(1) of the Act. [Paras 17 - 22] X v. Speaker of the House of the People, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 53 : 2026 INSC 65
Constitution of India - Retrospective Application of Recruitment Rules — Change in the "Rules of the Game" — Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India — The Supreme Court set aside the retrospective application of the Bihar Engineering Service Class-II Recruitment (Amendment) Rules, 2022, which introduced a 25% weightage for contractual work experience after the selection process (written examination and provisional merit list) had already commenced under the 2019 Rules – Supreme Court laid down key legal principles – i. Recruitment Process Sanctity: Eligibility criteria notified at the start of a recruitment process cannot be changed midway unless the extant rules or the advertisement explicitly permit such changes; ii. Vested Rights vs. Selection Criteria: While the State has the power to legislate retrospectively under Article 309, this power cannot be used to arbitrarily disrupt a selection process or alter the "eligibility criteria for being placed in the merit list" once the "game" has already been played; iii. Executive Instructions vs. Statutory Rules: The State cannot rely on executive memos (2018 and 2021) to override statutory recruitment rules that were in force at the time of the advertisement, particularly to the detriment of candidates who had no prior notice of such weightage - Supreme Court directed the State to finalize appointments based on the original merit lists from June/July 2022, strictly following the unamended 2019 Rules, within two months. [Relied on Tej Prakash Pathak and Others v. Rajasthan High Court and Others, (2025) 2 SCC 1; K. Manjusree v. State of Andhra Pradesh & Anr., (2008) 3 SCC 512; Paras 25-45] Abhay Kumar Patel v. State of Bihar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 14 : 2026 INSC 24
Consumer Protection Act, 2019 – Section 71 – Execution of Orders – Liability of Directors/Promoters – The Supreme Court held that an order passed by a Consumer Forum against a company (Corporate Debtor) cannot be executed against its Directors or Promoters if they were not parties to the original complaint and no specific findings of liability were recorded against them - Noted that execution must strictly conform to the decree and cannot be used to enlarge liability to bind persons who were not parties to the adjudication. Ansal Crown Heights Flat Buyers Association v. Ansal Crown Infrabuild Pvt. Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 40 : 2026 INSC 51
Contempt Jurisdiction – Non-compliance with directions for payment of salary to part-time teachers – Opportunity of hearing - the Supreme Court allowed certain part-time teachers in the State of West Bengal to make a fresh representation before the School Education Department Secretary for pay parity with full-time teachers teaching in non-government aided higher secondary schools - ordered that the competent authority shall pass a reasoned order on the representations within 4 months - Failure of Due Process – Held that while deciding representations, the authorities failed to afford the petitioners an opportunity of hearing or summon relevant school records as directed by the High Court - Directions – The Supreme Court granted liberty to the petitioners to file fresh representations within six weeks and directed the Secretary, School Education Department, is directed to: i. Afford an opportunity of hearing to the petitioners (in person or through an advocate); ii. Summon and allow inspection of engagement records from respective schools; iii. Pass a detailed reasoned order within four months. [Paras 12-15] Gurupada Bera v. Binod Kumar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 9 : 2026 INSC 20
Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 – Section 10 – Sham vs. Genuine Contracts – Following the Constitution Bench in SAIL, Supreme Court reiterated that the prohibition of contract labour does not lead to automatic absorption - if a contract is found to be a "sham" or "camouflage" intended to bypass labour laws, the workers are treated as de facto employees of the principal employer - Such a determination involves disputed questions of fact that must be adjudicated by the Industrial Tribunal/Court, not a Writ Court – Appeal dismissed. [Relied on Steel Authority of India Limited (SAIL) v. National Union Waterfront Workers (2001) 7 SCC 1; Shambu Nath Goyal v. Bank of Baroda (1978) 2 SCC 353; Paras 24-40] Premium Transmission v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 86 : 2026 INSC 87
Contract Labour – Sham Contracts and Regularization – If a contract is proved to be a "camouflage" or "sham" to hide a real employer-employee relationship where the principal employer retains full control, the workers must be treated as direct employees and regularized - determining whether a contract is "sham" or "genuine" involves disputed questions of fact that must be adjudicated by the Industrial Tribunal/Court, not by Writ Courts under Article 226 – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Steel Authority of India Ltd. and others v. National Union Waterfront Workers and others (2001) 7 SCC 1; Paras 8-11] Premium Transmission v. Kishan Subhash Rathod, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 87
Contract Law; Procedural Prerequisites and Waiver - A party at fault cannot be permitted to set up a bar of non-performance of prerequisite obligations to exclude the operation of an arbitration clause - If a party's conduct such as failing to adhere to strict timelines for Engineer decisions or Adjudicator recommendations disables preceding steps, those procedural prerequisites are deemed waived. [Relied on M.K. Shah Engineers & Contractors vs. State of M.P. (1999) 2 SCC 59; ASF Buildtech Private Limited vs. Shapoorji Pallonji & Company Private Limited (2025) 9 SCC 76; State of Goa v. Praveen Enterprises (2012) 12 SCC 581; Paras 16-20] Bhagheeratha Engineering Ltd. v. State of Kerala, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 31 : 2026 INSC 4
Contract Law – Apartment Buyers' Agreement – Dominant Position and Fraud – The High Court's finding that flat owners were made to "sign on the dotted line" due to the developer's dominant position was held to be conjectural – Held - In the absence of foundational pleadings alleging fraud, misrepresentation, or coercion at the time of execution, a decade-old registered agreement cannot be disregarded or held to be executed under misrepresentation. [Paras 61, 62] Raj Singh Gehlot v. Amitabha Sen, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 72 : 2026 INSC 77
Contractual Interpretation — Subsequent Legislation Clause: In contracts where the bid was submitted before the actual implementation of the BOCW machinery in a specific State, the introduction of cess collection via subsequent State Notifications/Rules qualifies as "subsequent legislation." - Contractors could not have factored in the 1% cess component in their bids when no mechanism for collection existed at the time of submission (28 days prior to the bid deadline). [Relied on A. Prabhakara Reddy and Company vs. State of Madhya Pradesh and others (2016) 1 SCC 600; Paras 38, 51, 52] National Highways Authority of India v. Gammon Atlanta (JV), 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 71 : 2026 INSC 76
Criminal Intimidation – Section 506 IPC – Mere threats without intention to cause alarm do not constitute an offence – Vague allegations and delayed improvements in statements weaken the prosecution's case - The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and quashed proceedings against the appellant (Accused No. 5), a lawyer, who was primarily charged under Section 506 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) - Noted that the prosecutrix's initial statement under Section 161 of the CrPC did not mention any threats from the appellant - after a delay of seven to eight days, she improved her version in a statement recorded under Section 164 of the CrPC, making a vague reference to "an uncle" (the appellant) threatening her - held that for a charge of criminal intimidation to stand, there must be a clear intention to cause alarm, irrespective of whether the victim was actually alarmed - Vague allegations unsupported by prima facie cogent evidence do not satisfy the requirements of Section 506 IPC - noted that a lawyer discharging professional duties, such as giving advice or suggestions, cannot be deemed to be engaging in intimidation – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Naresh Aneja Vs. State of U.P., (2025) 2 SCC 604; Sharif Ahmad Vs. State of U.P., (2024) 14 SCC 122; Paras 6-8] Beri Manoj v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 92
Criminal Jurisprudence — Last Seen Together Theory — Proximity to Death — Held: For the "last seen together" theory to hold weight, it must be proximate to the time of death – Noted that in this case, there was no proof the deceased was with the accused immediately before death, and the identification of the accused by an auto-driver in a police station (without a Test Identification Parade) was unreliable. [Paras 13-15] Bernard Lyngdoh Phawa v. State of Meghalaya, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 84 : 2026 INSC 85
Criminal Law — Bail Cancellation — POCSO Act — Heinous Offences — Allegations of Gang-rape of a Minor — Grant of bail by High Court without considering the nature and gravity of the offence, the statutory rigour under the POCSO Act, and the filing of the chargesheet — The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's order granting bail, observing that the exercise of discretion was "manifestly erroneous"- Noted that while the filing of a chargesheet does not preclude bail, the Court is duty-bound to consider the gravity of the offence and the material collected – Noted that the allegations involved repeated penetrative sexual assault under armed intimidation and blackmail via recorded acts, which have a "devastating impact on the life of the victim and shakes the collective conscience of society" - The High Court failed to apply settled parameters, including the vulnerability of the victim and the likelihood of witness intimidation – Held that the bail order was perverse, unreasonable, and ignored the relevant material – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Bhagwan Singh v. Dilip Kumar @ Deepu @ Depak and another (2023) 13 SCC 549; State of Bihar v. Rajballav Prasad @ Rajballav Pd. Yadav @ Rajballabh Yadav (2017) 2 SCC 178; Deepak Yadav v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2022) 8 SCC 559; Paras 12-18] X v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 36 : 2026 INSC 44
Criminal Law — Bail — POCSO Act — Age Determination — Section 439 CrPC vs. Section 94 JJ Act — Mini-Trial at Bail Stage — The Supreme Court set aside the Allahabad High Court's directions mandating medical age determination tests in all POCSO cases at the commencement of investigation - held that while exercising bail jurisdiction under Section 439 CrPC, a High Court cannot conduct a "mini-trial" by entertaining challenges to the veracity of age-related documents or ordering roving inquiries. State of Uttar Pradesh v. Anurudh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 29 : 2026 INSC 47
Criminal Law — Circumstantial Evidence — Appeal Against Acquittal — Reversal of Acquittal by High Court — Held: The High Court erred in reversing the well-reasoned acquittal by the Trial Court without recording a clear finding that the Trial Court's view was not a possible view - An acquittal reinforces the presumption of innocence, which should not be displaced lightly by substituting inferences - The "golden principles" for circumstantial evidence were not satisfied as there was no complete chain of incriminating circumstances. Bernard Lyngdoh Phawa v. State of Meghalaya, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 84 : 2026 INSC 85
Criminal Law – Delay in Trial – Pendency of Revision Petitions – Judicial Discipline – Rights of Victims - The Supreme Court expressed deep concern over a 23-year delay in the High Court of Rajasthan deciding a Criminal Revision Petition challenging an order of framing charges – Noted that the Revision Petition, filed in 2003 against charges under Sections 498A and 304B IPC, remained pending with an interim stay on trial proceedings until it was finally dismissed by the High Court in 2025 - that if trials for serious offences like murder, dowry death, and rape remain stayed for decades, it results in a "mockery of justice" - Justice must be balanced between the accused and the victim/family members - Noted that "Injustice anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere" - The Supreme Court requested the Chief Justices of all High Courts to ensure that petitions involving interim stays on trials, particularly in sensitive and serious matters, are prioritized and heard immediately - The Registrar General of the Rajasthan High Court was directed to provide a detailed breakup of Criminal Revision Petitions filed and disposed of between 2001 and 2026, and the State was questioned on its failure to expedite the hearing during the 23-year interregnum. [Paras 21-23, 26-30] Vijay Kumar v. State of Rajasthan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 25
Criminal Law - Quashing of Prosecution – Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 – Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) – Essential Ingredients - The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and quashed the criminal prosecution against the appellant, holding that the mere presence of an accused at the scene of an incident, without a specific overt act or intentional insult directed at the complainant's caste, does not satisfy the statutory requirements for an offense under the SC/ST Act – Noted following points – i. Ingredients of Section 3(1)(r) - To constitute an offense under this section, there must be an intentional insult or intimidation with the specific intent to humiliate a member of a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe in a place within public view Noted that mere fact that a complainant belongs to a protected community is insufficient; the insult must be because of their caste identity - Even knowledge of the complainant's caste is not enough to attract this section without the intent to humiliate; ii. Ingredients of Section 3(1)(s) - This section requires the accused to abuse a member of a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe "by the caste name" in public view - noted that the intent behind the abuse must be found to be denigrating toward the caste, resulting in a feeling of caste-based humiliation - Merely saying a caste name or simple abuse does not automatically constitute an offense; iii. Application to Facts - Held that neither the FIR nor the chargesheet contained allegations of the appellant uttering any specific words or performing overt acts - The allegations were deemed general in nature and failed to prima facie constitute an offense – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Shajan Skaria v. The State of Kerala & Anr., 2024 SCC OnLine SC 224; Paras 11-20] Keshaw Mahto @ Keshaw Kumar Mahto v. State of Bihar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 62
Criminal Procedure – Transfer of Cases – Allegation of Bias – Matrimonial Disputes – Conduct of Parties – Deceitful Litigation – Held that the High Court's order of transfer, based on allegations that the wife's relatives (a Head Constable and a District Court staff member) could exert influence, cannot be sustained - Bias on the part of a Judge cannot be lightly inferred merely because a party's relative is a police officer within the jurisdiction or a staff member in the same District Court - Litigation – Noted that the husband surreptitiously obtained a divorce decree while a compromise was being reached in criminal proceedings, without informing the wife - Such reprehensible conduct by the husband should have restrained the High Court from granting a transfer that increased the travails of a woman with two children – Held that to address the husband's alleged threat to life, he is permitted to seek appearance through counsel or video conferencing - If physical presence is required, the Magistrate may provide necessary protection – Appeal allowed. [Para 5 - 12] Prasanna Kasini v. State of Telangana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 16 : 2026 INSC 30
Criminal Prosecution vs. Disciplinary Proceedings — Interplay and Effect of Exoneration - Whether exoneration in a departmental enquiry automatically results in the quashing of parallel criminal proceedings? –Supreme Court discussed following points and held that - i. Standard of Proof: reiterated that disciplinary proceedings and criminal prosecutions are independent, governed by different standards of proof: preponderance of probabilities for the former and proof beyond reasonable doubt for the latter; ii. Distinction between Fact-patterns: distinguished between cases where the very "substratum of the allegation" is found non-existent on merits (as in Radheshyam Kejriwal) and cases where exoneration is based on a lack of evidence or technical grounds; iii. Effect of Independent Entities: Where the prosecuting agency (e.g., Anti-Corruption Bureau/Lokayukta) and the disciplinary authority are different entities not in the same hierarchy, the findings of the departmental enquiry do not bind the criminal court; iv. Nature of Exoneration: Exoneration in a departmental proceeding ipso facto does not result in the quashing of criminal prosecution - Quashing is only permissible if the exoneration is on merits, where the allegation is found to be unsustainable and the person is held innocent; v. Specific Findings in This Case: In the present case, the "exoneration" was deemed a "discharge for lack of diligence" because the Inspector who conducted the trap was not examined, rather than a finding that the bribe was never demanded - Supreme Court found sufficient evidence (complainant testimony and independent witnesses) to justify the continuation of the criminal trial – Appeal allowed. [Relied on State (NCT of Delhi) v. Ajay Kumar Tyagi (2012) 9 SCC 685; Radheshyam Kejriwal v. State of W.B. (2011) 3 SCC 581; P.S. Rajya v. State of Bihar (1996) 9 SCC 1; Paras 12-17] Karnataka Lokayukta Bagalkote District v. Chandrashekar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 15 : 2026 INSC 31
Customs Act, 1962; Section 28, 46 — Customs Tariff Act, 1975; General Rules of Interpretation (GRI) — Classification of "Aluminium Shelving for Mushroom Growing" - The Supreme Court set aside the CESTAT order that had classified aluminium shelves as "parts of agricultural machinery" under CTI 84369900 - held that the subject goods are "Aluminium Structures" classifiable under CTI 76109010 - 1. Analysis of General Rules of Interpretation (GRI) – i. Sequential Application: The Court reiterated that GRIs 1 to 4 must be applied sequentially; ii. Primacy of GRI 1: Classification begins and often ends at GRI 1, which prioritizes the terms of headings and relevant Section or Chapter Notes; iii. GRI 3 (Specific vs. General): GRI 3 is a "tie-breaker" invoked only if GRI 1 and GRI 2 result in a tie between two or more headings - The CESTAT erred by jumping to GRI 3 to prefer a "specific" heading without first exhausting the mandatory sequential inquiry of GRI 1; iv. Reliance on HSN Explanatory Notes - These notes are the foundation for interpreting the HSN-based tariff - affirmed that HSN notes have binding force when the domestic tariff is aligned with HSN – Held that the 'Aluminum Shelves' imported for mushroom cultivation cannot be classified as 'parts of agricultural machinery' but are liable to be classified as 'aluminium structures', attracting a customs duty. [Relied on Commissioner of Central Excise, Salem v. Madhan Agro Industries (India) Private Ltd. (2024); Paras 117- 142] Commissioner of Customs (Import) v. Welkin Foods, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 17 : 2026 INSC 19
Customs Act, 1962 - Analysis of "End Use" and "Intended Use" – Held that the taxable event is the time of import - The condition of the article at import not its eventual use is the crucial factor – Held that holding that "use" is relevant only if the tariff entry itself explicitly refers to use or adaptation; iii. Objective Characteristics: Classification must be based on objective characteristics and properties to ensure legal certainty and prevent subjectivity. [Relied on Dunlop India Ltd v. Union of India (1976); Indian Aluminium Cables Ltd v. Union of India (1985), Paras 69-83, 87-93] Commissioner of Customs (Import) v. Welkin Foods, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 17 : 2026 INSC 19
Customs Act, 1962 - Analysis of the Common Parlance Test – i. Restrictive Application: The "common parlance" or "trade parlance" test is not a measure of first resort in the HSN era; ii. Conditions for Invocation - It can only be invoked if: (i) the statute/notes provide no explicit definition; (ii) the heading lacks scientific/technical terms; and (iii) it does not contradict the statutory framework; iii. Exceptions - Where a term is used in a scientific or technical sense, common parlance is irrelevant - held that technical meanings must prevail over commercial nomenclature if the statute implies a technical sense. [Relied on Akbar Badrudin Giwani v. Collector of Customs, Bombay (1990); Paras 63-68] Commissioner of Customs (Import) v. Welkin Foods, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 17 : 2026 INSC 19
Customs Act, 1962 - Definition and Characteristics of "Machine" – i. Essential Features: A machine must consist of moving parts and utilize power (mechanical or electrical) to perform a specific task; ii. Support Structures vs. Parts: Static structures that merely support a plant are not "parts" of the machine itself – Held that All of the individual machines are already complete and fully operational on their own; their mechanical and electrical functions do not rely on aluminium shelves - These shelves do not contribute to their operation; they merely serve as a surface for the devices to perform their functions. [Relied On Saraswati Sugar Mills v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Delhi-III (2014); Paras 124-140] Commissioner of Customs (Import) v. Welkin Foods, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 17 : 2026 INSC 19
Customs Act, 1962 - Specific Application to Aluminium Shelves – Held that i. Heading 7610: The HSN Explanatory Notes characterize "structures" as items that generally remain in position once installed and are made of bars, rods, plates, etc., joined by riveting or bolting - The subject goods fulfilled all these criteria; ii. Heading 8436: The shelves lacked moving parts and independent mechanical functions - Integrating them post-import with watering systems did not change their character at the time of import into "agricultural machinery" – Held that the subject goods are correctly classifiable under CTI 7610 90 10 - The CESTAT judgment was set aside for misapplying the General Rules of Interpretation and over-relying on the end-use/common parlance tests in the face of clear statutory guidance – Appeal allowed. [Paras 96, 100, 117-130, 142] Commissioner of Customs (Import) v. Welkin Foods, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 17 : 2026 INSC 19
Customs Duty – Special Economic Zone (SEZ) – Electrical Energy – Supply to Domestic Tariff Area (DTA) – Levy of Customs Duty – The appellant challenged the levy of customs duty on electrical energy generated in its SEZ unit and supplied to the DTA for the period between 16 September 2010 and 15 February 2016 - The High Court of Gujarat had previously in 2015 struck down a similar levy for an earlier period (June 2009 to September 2010), holding that such a supply does not constitute an "import into India" under Section 12 of the Customs Act, 1962 - in the impugned 2019 judgment, the High Court declined to extend this relief to the subsequent period, reasoning that the later notifications (Notification Nos. 91/2010-Cus. and 26/2012-Cus.) were not specifically challenged - The Supreme Court held that the 2015 judgment had correctly identified that there was no identifiable charging event to attract customs duty under Section 12 for electricity generated within India in an SEZ and wheeled to the DTA - An SEZ is not a foreign territory, and the legal fiction in Section 30 of the SEZ Act ("as if imported") is for the purpose of determining the rate of duty and does not convert an intra-national supply into an act of import - Observed that Section 25 of the Customs Act is a power to relax or exempt duty, not a power to create or invent a new tax - The use of an "exemption" notification to introduce a fresh liability is a colourable exercise of delegated authority and is ultra vires – Appeal allowed. [Paras 45-85] Adani Power Ltd. v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 3 : 2026 INSC 1
Delay - Important Observations on Incarceration & Procedural Delay - i. Attribution of Delay - noted that procedural history did not support the claim that delay was solely due to prosecutorial or judicial inaction. It observed that at various stages, the prosecution was ready to proceed, while the defense raised objections, requested deferments, or filed successive applications; ii. Complexity of the Case - noting the volume of documentary and electronic evidence and the nature of the "structured and continuing conspiracy," noted that the proceedings are inherently time-consuming; iii. Threshold for Constitutional Intervention- held that for constitutional intervention to override a statutory embargo, there must be a finding that continued detention has become "punitive or unconscionable". [Relied on Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb (2021) 3 SCC 713; National Investigation Agency v. Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali (2019) 5 SCC 1; Union of India v. Saleem Khan (2025) SCC OnLine SC 1754; Paras 104-106, 387-390, 430, 431] Gulfisha Fatima v. State (Govt of NCT of Delhi), 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 1 : 2026 INSC 2
Development and Regulation of Urban Areas Act, 1975 (Haryana) – Section 3(3A) – De-licensing and Validation – Power to grant a license includes the implied power to withdraw, modify, or de-license, as supported by Section 21 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 – Held - The 2020 Amendment to the 1975 Act retrospectively validated de-licensing actions taken by the authorities. [Para 71, 72] Raj Singh Gehlot v. Amitabha Sen, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 72 : 2026 INSC 77
Disciplinary Inquiry – Standard of Proof and Perversity – Administrative Law – Maxim “Nemo Firut Repente Turpissimus” - While a Court does not typically act as an appellate authority over an inquiry report, it can interfere if the findings are "perverse," meaning no reasonable person would have reached such a conclusion on the available material – Held in this case, neither the complainant nor the stenographer (alleged to be the conduit for bribes) was examined, and the Public Prosecutor testified that the bail orders were proper- Held that Authorities should not ignore the long-standing reputation of an officer when evaluating a sudden allegation of "doubtful integrity" based on a mere hunch or hypothesis. [Relied on Sadhna Chaudhary v. State of U.P. (2020) 11 SCC 760; R.R. Parekh v. High Court of Gujarat (2016) 14 SCC 1; Union of India v. K.K. Dhawan (1993) 2 SCC 56; Ishwar Chand Jain v. High Court of Punjab and Haryana (1988) 3 SCC 370; Krishna Prasad Verma v. State of Bihar (2019) 10 SCC 640; Paras 29-40] Nirbhay Singh Suliya v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 2 : 2026 INSC 7
Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940; Drugs and Cosmetics Rules, 1945 – Rule 49 – Power of the State Government to prescribe essential qualifications for the post of Drug Inspector (DI) or Drug Control Officer (DCO) - Key Issues – i. Whether the State Government, under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution of India (or State Acts), can prescribe "experience" as an essential qualification for appointment to the post of Drug Inspector when such qualification is absent in the Central Rules; ii. Applicability of the Doctrine of Occupied Field where the Central Government has already exercised its rule-making power under Section 33 of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act (D&C Act) – Held that when a field prescribing a qualification for a public post is occupied by the Union, then it is impermissible for the States to impose additional qualifications, observed the Supreme Court - Main Findings & Ratio – i. Doctrine of Occupied Field - The D&C Act is a "central law" that occupies the field regarding the prescription of qualifications for Inspectors under Section 33(2)(b) and Section 33(2)(n) - The State Government's power to appoint persons "as it thinks fit" under Section 21 does not extend to altering the "prescribed qualifications" set by the Central Government; ii. Interpretation of Rule 49 - The substantive part of Rule 49 of the Drug Rules, 1945, mandates specific educational degrees as the only essential qualifications for appointment - The 18-month experience mentioned in the proviso to Rule 49 is not a condition for eligibility for appointment; rather, it is a condition precedent for authorizing an already appointed Inspector to inspect the manufacture of substances listed in Schedule C; iii. Constitutional Supremacy - Rules framed by the State under the proviso to Article 309 or State enactments (like the Karnataka State Civil Services Act) cannot override or be inconsistent with the Central Drug Rules in an occupied field. [Relied on A.B. Krishna v. State of Karnataka (1998) 3 SCC 495; Paras 38 – 63] State of Haryana v. Krishan Kumar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 58 : 2026 INSC 63
Drugs and Cosmetics Rules, 1945 – Directions issued by the Court – i. Selection Criteria - Public Service Commissions (HPSC and KPSC) must complete selections based strictly on educational qualifications in Rule 49, ignoring the "experience" requirement added by State Rules; ii. Redrawing Merit List - Lists must be redrawn within eight weeks; iii. Protection of Existing Appointees (Haryana) - Selected candidates who remain in the new merit list shall continue in service - Those who fall out of the merit list may be continued only at the State's discretion via supernumerary posts, placed at the bottom of the seniority list. State of Haryana v. Krishan Kumar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 58 : 2026 INSC 63
Drugs - Legal Definition of "Drugs" vs. "New Drugs" regarding Stem Cells - While autologous stem cells used in ASD treatments (not undergoing substantial manipulation) may not qualify as "new drugs" under the New Drugs and Clinical Trial Rules, 2019 (NDCT Rules), they fall under the broader definition of "drug" as "substances" under Section 3(b)(i) of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 - stem-cell derived products involving "substantial manipulation" are perpetually categorized as "new drugs" under Rule of the NDCT Rules. [Relied on Chimanlal Jagjivan Das Sheth v. State of Maharashtra 1962 SCC OnLine SC 16; Ishwar Singh Bindra and Others v. State of U.P. 1968 SCC OnLine SC 98; Paras 101 – 109] Yash Charitable Trust v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 93 : 2026 INSC 96
Employer-Employee Relationship – Sham or Camouflage – Held that mere fact that the same individuals continued to work for the principal employer despite periodic changes in contractors does not, by itself, establish a direct relationship or prove a "sham" arrangement - Contractors may retain existing personnel to ensure continuity and prevent complaints from the principal employer - Regularization – Despite allowing the appeals, the Supreme Court exercised its discretion to direct the appellant to consider the respondents' cases for regularization on a sympathetic basis, given their decades of uninterrupted service in jobs that appear perpetual in nature - This direction was issued under the "special facts and circumstances" of the case and is not to be treated as a precedent. Municipal Council v. K. Jayaram, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 38
Environmental Law – CPCB Methodology for Environmental Compensation – Scope and Applicability – The Central Pollution Control Board (CPCB) is a facilitative and indicative tool, not a rigid or exhaustive code - While primarily designed for industrial sectors, its adoption by the NGT for residential projects is not legally impermissible, especially when the resulting quantification is not arbitrary or disproportionate. Rhythm County v. Satish Sanjay Hegde, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 98 : 2026 INSC 102
Environmental Law – Principle of Correlation – Actual Damage vs. Statutory Violation – While mere violation of law without demonstrable harm may not automatically warrant compensation in all cases, activities with the potential to degrade the environment or those involving "flagrant violations" (such as continuing construction despite stop-work orders) justify the imposition of deterrent and restorative damages – Appeal dismissed. [Relied on M/s. Goel Ganga Developers India Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India (2018) 18 SCC 257; Deepak Nitrite Ltd. v. State of Gujarat (2004) 6 SCC 402; Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai v. Ankita Sinha (2022) 13 SCC 401; Research Foundation for Science (18) v. Union of India (2005) 13 SCC 186; Paras 21-46] Rhythm County v. Satish Sanjay Hegde, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 98 : 2026 INSC 102
Evidence Act, 1872; Section 32 – Dying Declaration – Credibility and Corroboration – held that a dying declaration, if found to be true and voluntary, can form the sole basis for conviction without any further corroboration – Held that High Court erred in discarding a dying declaration recorded by a Tehsildar (PW-1) after obtaining a medical certificate of fitness - Discrepancies regarding the exact time of the Tehsildar's arrival at the hospital were minor and did not justify discarding a clear and consistent statement by the deceased identifying her husband as the perpetrator. State of Himachal Pradesh v. Chaman Lal, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 48 : 2026 INSC 57
Evidence Act, 1872 — Section 27 — Recovery of Weapon and Discovery of Body — Held: Recoveries made from open spaces or crime scenes already searched (like a graveyard) without a recorded disclosure statement are suspect - Since the rope was not linked to the crime through forensic evidence (no blood, skin, or hair detected), it failed as an incriminating circumstance. [Paras 17-19] Bernard Lyngdoh Phawa v. State of Meghalaya, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 84 : 2026 INSC 85
Evidence Act, 1872 – Sections 91 and 92 – Admissibility of Oral Evidence – Where the terms of a written registered document are clear and unambiguous, extrinsic evidence to ascertain the true intention of the parties is inadmissible - While oral evidence may be admissible to show a document is a "sham," the threshold for such a claim is extremely high and must be supported by strong evidence of surrounding circumstances, not subsequent conduct - Supreme Court suggested an urgent need for the Union and State Governments to digitize land records and registered documents using secure, tamper-proof technologies like Blockchain to minimize forgery and "clever drafting" that clogs the judicial system – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Prem Singh and Ors. vs. Birbal and Ors., (2006) 5 SCC 353; Rattan Singh and Ors. v. Nirmal Gill & Ors., (2021) 15 SCC 300; Gangabai w/o Rambilas Gilda (Smt.) vs. Chhabubai w/o Pukharajji Gandhi (Smt.), (1982) 1 SCC 4; Paras 35, 41-47, 76, 77] Hemalatha v. Tukaram, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 79 : 2026 INSC 82
Exam Rules, 2013 & Cadre Allocation Policy – Rule 1, 13, 14, and 17 of Exam Rules read with Paragraph 9 of the Policy – Interpretation of "General Standards - Emphasized that the IFS examination is a "two-tier" process where the Preliminary Examination is an integral stage - Under the proviso to Rule 14(ii), a reserved category candidate can only be adjusted against unreserved vacancies if they have been recommended without resorting to any relaxation/concession in eligibility or selection criteria at "any stage of the examination" – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Deepa E.V. v. Union of India and Ors. (2017) 12 SCC 680; Gaurav Pradhan v. State of Rajasthan (2018) 11 SCC 352; Niravkumar Dilipbhai Makwana v. Gujarat Public Service Commission (2019) 7 SCC 383; Union of India v. Sajib Roy (2025) SCC OnLine SC 1943; Paras 25-36] Union of India v. G. Kiran, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 8
Factories Act, 1948; Section 59(2) — Overtime Wages — Definition of "Ordinary Rate of Wages" — Inclusion of Compensatory Allowances — The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision that compensatory allowances such as House Rent Allowance (HRA), Transport Allowance (TA), Small Family Allowance (SFA), and Clothing and Washing Allowance (CWA) must be included in the "ordinary rate of wages" for the purpose of calculating overtime wages - noted that Section 59(2) provides for only two specific exclusions: bonus and wages for overtime work - In the absence of statutory rules, the Executive cannot use Office Memorandums to read additional exclusions into the Act that the Legislature did not contemplate - Noted that different Ministries cannot assign different meanings to the same statutory provision, noting that the Ministry of Railways was already including such allowances in its calculations. [Paras 14, 15] Union of India v. Heavy Vehicles Factory Employees Union, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 70
Factories Act, 1948; Sections 64, 65, 112, & 113 — Rule-making Power — Jurisdiction of Central Government — Under Chapter VI and Chapter XI of the 1948 Act, the power to frame exempting rules or general rules is vested primarily with the State Governments - The Central Government's role is limited to issuing directions to State Governments for the execution of the Act's provisions - various Ministries (Defence, Labour, and Finance) lack the legal authority to issue clarifications or Office Memorandums that modify the definition of "ordinary rate of wages" under Section 59(2) – Held that The Factories Act, 1948, is a beneficial legislation intended to protect workers from exploitation and ensure their health and safety - Any interpretation that restricts or curtails benefits admissible to workers under the Act must be avoided - Executive instructions that lack statutory force cannot override the law or run contrary to literal statutory mandates – Appeals dismissed. [Relied on Gujarat Mazdoor Sabha & Anr. v. State of Gujarat (2020) 10 SCC 459; Paras 9 - 13] Union of India v. Heavy Vehicles Factory Employees Union, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 70
Foreign Trade (Development and Regulation) Act, 1992 – Section 3 – Minimum Import Price (MIP) – Commencement of Delegated Legislation – The Supreme Court held that a Notification issued under Section 3 of the Act acquires the force of law only upon its publication in the Official Gazette - The expression "date of this Notification" used in such instruments must necessarily be construed as the date of its publication in the Gazette (in this case, 11.02.2016), rather than the date it was signed or uploaded on a website (05.02.2016). Viraj Impex Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 76 : 2026 INSC 80
Foreign Trade Policy (2015-2020) – Paragraph 1.05(b) – Transitional Protection – Importers who opened irrevocable Letters of Credit prior to the actual date of Gazette publication (11.02.2016) are entitled to the transitional protection under Para 1.05(b) of the FTP - Supreme court rejected the argument that "uploading" a notification on a website constitutes sufficient notice to curtail rights before formal Gazette publication – Appeal allowed. [Relied on B.K. Srinivasan & Ors. v. State of Karnataka & Ors. (1987) 1 SCC 658; Paras 16-23] Viraj Impex Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 76 : 2026 INSC 80
Forest Service (IFS) – Cadre Allocation – Migration of Reserved Category Candidate to Unreserved Vacancy – Effect of relaxation at Preliminary Examination stage – The Supreme Court held that a reserved category candidate who avails "relaxed standards" (concessions) at the Preliminary Examination stage cannot be treated as a candidate selected on "General Standards" for the purpose of cadre allocation against an unreserved vacancy, even if they secure higher marks than a general category candidate in the final merit list - rejected the High Court's view that "General Standards" only refers to the qualifying marks in the Main Examination - If a candidate's entry into the Main Examination was made possible only through a relaxed cut-off in the Preliminary Examination, they are ineligible to claim an unreserved/General Insider vacancy. Union of India v. G. Kiran, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 8
Guide for Judicial Magistrates – Discretionary Power - The use of the word "may" in Section 175(4) signifies discretionary power- i. If the Magistrate is prima facie satisfied the act was in the discharge of official duty, they must follow the Section 175(4) procedure; ii. If they are satisfied the act had no reasonable nexus to official duty, they may proceed under the general procedure of Section 175(3); iii. Magistrates are not required to wait indefinitely for a report from superior officers; if a report is not submitted within a reasonable time, the Magistrate may proceed based on the public servant's version if available - Supreme Court reiterated that a judicial order passed by a Magistrate in criminal matters (such as calling for a report under Section 175(4)) cannot be challenged through a writ petition under Article 226 - The appropriate remedy is a petition under Section 528 of the BNSS or Article 227 of the Constitution. [Paras 46-55] xxx v. State of Kerala, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 85 : 2026 INSC 88
Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956; Sections 21(vii) and 22 — Maintenance of Dependants — Whether a daughter-in-law who becomes a widow after the death of her father-in-law is a 'dependant' entitled to claim maintenance from his estate? - Held that a plain and literal reading of Section 21(vii) makes it crystal clear that "any widow of his son" is a dependant - The legislature deliberately avoided using the word "predeceased" before "son" in this section, unlike other statutes – At the time of the son's death, whether before or after the father-in-law's demise is immaterial for determining the status of the widow as a dependant - When the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, it must be given its natural meaning – Held that Courts cannot "add, and mend" or supply assumed omissions to the text of the law - Departure from the literal rule is only permissible in rare cases, as the exclusive domain to legislate lies with the legislature. Kanchana Rai v. Geeta Sharma, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 41 : 2026 INSC 54
Income Tax Act, 1961 – Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement (DTAA) – India-Mauritius Treaty – Tax Residency Certificate (TRC) – Held that the limited evidentiary role of a TRC in proceedings under Section 245R(2) - While a TRC establishes residency, it does not prevent the Revenue from examining whether an entity is a mere "conduit" or a "see-through entity" used as a device for tax avoidance – Held that the applications were rightly rejected by the AAR as being hit by the threshold jurisdictional bar under proviso (iii) to Section 245R(2) – Supreme Court concluded that capital gains arising from transfers effected after the cut-off date of 01.04.2017 are taxable in India under the Income Tax Act read with the DTAA – Appeals allowed. [Relied on Vodafone International Holdings BV v. Union of India (2012) 6 SCC 613; Balvir Singh v. State of Uttarakhand (2023) SC 5551; Union of India v. Azadi Bachao Andolan (2004) 10 SCC 1; LIC v. Escorts Ltd. (1986) 1 SCC 264; McDowell & Company Ltd v. Commercial Tax Officer (1985) 3 SCC 230; Paras 12-25; 40-50] Authority For Advance Rulings v. Tiger Global International II Holdings, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 50 : 2026 INSC 60
Income Tax Act, 1961 – Section 245R(2) Proviso (iii) – Advance Rulings – Chapter X-A (GAAR) – General Anti-Avoidance Rules - Rejection of application on the ground of being prima facie designed for the avoidance of tax – held that the use of the term "prima facie" in Section 245R(2) implies that the Authority for Advance Rulings (AAR) needs only an initial examination of documents to be satisfied that a transaction is for tax avoidance - The level of satisfaction for a prima facie conclusion is much lower than what is required for final proof – Held that that where evidence prima facie establishes that transactions do not qualify as lawful and are impermissible tax-avoidance arrangements, Chapter X-A becomes applicable. Authority For Advance Rulings v. Tiger Global International II Holdings, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 50 : 2026 INSC 60
Income Tax Act, 1961 – Section 260A – Jurisdiction of High Court – Substantial Question of Law – Whether the High Court can decide an issue (taxability under Section 28) not specifically framed as a substantial question of law – Held: Issues incidental or collateral to the main formulated question, on which parties have been heard and which go to the root of the matter, can be considered by the High Court - The absence of a formal formulation does not vitiate the judgment if no prejudice is caused and parties had the opportunity to address the dispute – Appeal dismissed. [Para 9] Jindal Equipment Leasing Consultancy Services Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax Delhi – II, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 37 : 2026 INSC 46
Income Tax Act, 1961 – Section 28 and Section 47(vii) – Amalgamation – Substitution of Shares held as Stock-in-Trade – Whether the receipt of shares of an amalgamated company in lieu of shares of an amalgamating company held as stock-in-trade gives rise to taxable business income – Held: Amalgamation is a statutory process of substitution - While Section 47(vii) exempts capital gains arising from such substitution if the shares are "capital assets," it does not apply if they are held as "stock-in-trade" - Taxable business income under Section 28 arises when an assessee receives a real and presently realisable commercial benefit - In the context of amalgamation, the charge under Section 28 crystallises only upon the allotment of new shares, as this is when the assessee receives realisable instruments capable of valuation in money's worth - At the stages of the "appointed date" or "date of court sanction," no such benefit accrues or is received - The profit arising on receipt of the amalgamated company's shares may be taxed under Section 28 where the shares allotted are tradable and possess a definite market value - This is a fact-sensitive test to be determined based on the realisability of the shares in each case. [Relied on Commissioner of Income-tax, Cochin v. Grace Collis and others (2001) 3 SCC 430; Orient Trading Company Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Calcutta (1997) 3 SCC 340; R. Nagaraj v. Rajamani 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 416; Shiv Raj Gupta v. Commissioner of Income-Tax, Delhi (2020) 425 ITR 420 (SC); Paras 18 - 31] Jindal Equipment Leasing Consultancy Services Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax Delhi – II, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 37 : 2026 INSC 46
Income Tax Act, 1961 – Section 90 – Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement (DTAA) – India-Mauritius Treaty – Tax Residency Certificate (TRC) – Supreme Court clarified that while a TRC is a valid piece of evidence to establish residence in a contracting state, it does not act as a complete bar to further enquiry by the Revenue - If the Revenue establishes that a Mauritian company was interposed merely as a "conduit" or a "device" to avoid tax, the tax authorities are entitled to "look through" the entity and discard the device to tax the real transaction - The dispute involved the sale of shares of a Singapore-based entity (Flipkart) that derived its value substantially from assets located in India - held that even if the transfer involved shares of a non-resident company (Singapore), the capital gains are taxable in India if the value is derived from Indian assets - The AAR found that the exemption under the India-Mauritius DTAA was intended for the alienation of shares of an Indian company and did not automatically extend to shares of a company resident in a third country (Singapore). Authority For Advance Rulings v. Tiger Global International II Holdings, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 50 : 2026 INSC 60
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 – Section 2(k), Section 10(1), and Section 12 – Existence of Industrial Dispute – Requirement of Prior Demand – The Supreme Court held that a formal written demand by a workman/Union to the employer is not a sine qua non (indispensable condition) for an industrial dispute to exist under Section 2(k) - The ID Act does not prescribe a specific manner for a dispute to arise - Supreme Court distinguished between an existing dispute and an "apprehended" dispute, noting that under Section 10(1), the appropriate Government has the administrative power to refer a matter if it forms an opinion that a dispute is either existing or apprehended – Held that the initiation of conciliation proceedings via a representation to the Conciliation Officer without a prior demand notice to the Management is not ex-facie illegal. Premium Transmission v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 86 : 2026 INSC 87
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 – Section 33(1) – Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 – Interim Relief – Status of Workman – The Supreme Court set aside the orders of the Industrial Court and the High Court which had directed the Management to provide work and pay wages to contract labourers during the pendency of a dispute - held that the restrictions under Section 33 of the ID Act against changing service conditions are attracted only if the relationship of "workman" and "management" is established - Where workers are engaged through a registered contractor, their status as direct employees of the management is a matter of adjudication - Granting interim relief that directs continuation or regularization at the preliminary stage amounts to a "virtual pre-judgment" of the main dispute. Premium Transmission v. Kishan Subhash Rathod, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 87
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 – Section 33(1) – Interim Relief for Contract Labour – Supreme Court set aside interim orders directing the Management to provide work and pay wages to contract labourers during the pendency of a dispute regarding their status - held that the restrictions under Section 33(1) regarding changes to service conditions are only attracted if a direct master-servant relationship is established - Granting such interim relief amounts to a "virtual pre-judgment" of the main dispute where the workers' status as "workmen" of the principal employer is still under adjudication. Premium Transmission v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 86 : 2026 INSC 87
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 vs. CLRA Act, 1970 – Comparative Scope of "Workman" – Supreme Court observed that while the definition of "workman" in Section 2(1)(i) of the CLRA is textually derived from Section 2(s) of the ID Act, they differ in juridical scope - The ID Act requires a direct master-servant relationship (privity of contract), whereas the CLRA recognizes a tripartite relationship where the workman is hired through a contractor - Unlike the ID Act, the CLRA specifically excludes "out-workers" and does not extend the definition to include terminated employees for the purpose of locus standi in disputes. Premium Transmission v. Kishan Subhash Rathod, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 87
Industrial Policy – New Industrial Unit vs. Expansion - Amalgamation and Transfer of Rights to Subsidies - Doctrine of Promissory Estoppel and Legitimate Expectation- Determination of whether an industrial unit qualifies as a "new industrial unit" under the Industrial Policy of 1989 - held that even if an entity has existing units, a newly established unit with fresh capital investment, separate registration, independent industrial license, and distinct physical location must be treated as a "new industrial unit" – Held that upon the amalgamation of companies, all properties, rights, and interests, including sanctioned subsidies and incentives, stand transferred to the successor-in-interest (the amalgamated company) as per the scheme sanctioned by the High Court - The State and its instrumentalities are bound by unequivocal promises made in Industrial Policies and specific sanction letters - Once an entrepreneur acts upon such promises by making substantial investments and setting up a unit, the authorities cannot arbitrarily resile from or retrospectively amend the policy to deny sanctioned benefits - Supreme Court noted that the MM Plant unit satisfied all criteria for a new unit: investment made after the policy's effective date, independent license, separate electricity connection, and distinct physical location (Sheds 19 & 22 vs. the old unit's Sheds 7 & 8) - The rejection based on an internal instruction from 1994 and a retrospective amendment in 2008 was held to be illegal, as the MM Plant was a "new industrial unit" and not an expansion/modernization project - Noted that the respondents' "volte-face" after sanctioning the subsidies and allowing the appellant to continue production was unfair and untenable - The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court's judgment, and directed the respondents to disburse ₹11,14,750 with 9% p.a. interest within three months. [Relied on Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Uttar Pradesh (1979) 2 SCC 409; Gujarat State Financial Corpn. v. Lotus Hotels (P) Ltd. (1983) 3 SCC 379; State of Punjab v. Nestle India Ltd. (2004) 6 SCC 465; State of Jharkhand v. Brahmputra Metallics Ltd. (2023) 10 SCC 634; Paras 75-80, 90- 93, 103, 135] IFGL Refractories Ltd. v. Orissa State Financial Corporation, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 18 : 2026 INSC 18
Informed Consent vs. Patient Choice - Supreme Court clarified that while patients have the autonomy to "opt in" or "opt out" of offered treatments, they do not have a right to demand a particular form of treatment - Valid "informed consent" requires "adequate information" concerning the nature, risks, and benefits of a treatment - Because scientific evidence for stem cell therapy in ASD is currently non-existent or inconclusive, practitioners cannot provide the "adequate information" necessary for a valid consent. [Relied on Samira Kohli v. Dr. Prabha Manchandra and Another (2008) 2 SCC 1; Common Cause (A Registered Society) v. Union of India and Another, reported in (2018) 5 SCC 1; Paras 92-95, 131, 151] Yash Charitable Trust v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 93 : 2026 INSC 96
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016; Section 7 and Section 31 — Contract Act, 1872; Section 126 — "See to it" Guarantee — Distinction between an Undertaking to Infuse Funds and a Contract of Guarantee — Extinguishment of Debt against Third-Party Sureties - Contract of Guarantee vs. Deed of Undertaking - A "Deed of Undertaking" requiring a promoter to arrange for the infusion of funds into the borrower to comply with financial covenants does not, by itself, constitute a contract of guarantee under Section 126 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 - To constitute a guarantee, there must be a direct and unambiguous promise to the creditor to perform the promise or discharge the liability of the third person in case of default - An obligation to facilitate the borrower's compliance with covenants is not equivalent to a promise to discharge the borrower's liability to the lender. [Para 20-22] UV Asset Reconstruction Company v. Electrosteel Castings, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 33 : 2026 INSC 14
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 - Extinguishment of Debt under Resolution Plan - The approval of a Resolution Plan under Section 31 of the IBC does not ipso facto result in the extinguishment of the entire debt against third-party sureties or security providers unless expressly provided for in the plan - Where a Resolution Plan (specifically Clause 3.2(ix) in this case) explicitly reserves the rights of financial creditors to proceed against third parties or promoters for the "unsustainable debt" portion, the discharge of the Corporate Debtor does not bar claims against such third-party security providers – Appeal dismissed. [Relied on Lalit Kumar Jain v. Union of India (2021) 9 SCC 321; Paras 23-25] UV Asset Reconstruction Company v. Electrosteel Castings, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 33 : 2026 INSC 14
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Object of Code – Resolution vs. Recovery – The fundamental object of the IBC is resolution and revival, not mere recovery - the concept of revival does not exclude recovery altogether; it only excludes the abuse of insolvency as a pressure tactic - Alternative remedies under SARFAESI or RERA remain available, but the presence of such recovery proceedings does not bar the initiation of CIRP under Section 7. [Para 10, 12] Elegna Co-Op. Housing and Commercial Society v. Edelweiss Asset Reconstruction, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 51 : 2026 INSC 58
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Protection of Homebuyers – Specific Directions – To ensure transparency and safeguard homebuyer interests during CIRP - issued mandatory directions: (i) The Information Memorandum must disclose comprehensive details of all allottees; (ii) The CoC must record specific written reasons if they find it not viable to approve handover of possession under Regulation 4E; and (iii) Any recommendation for liquidation must be accompanied by a reasoned justification. [Relied on Innoventive Industries Ltd. v. ICICI Bank (2018) 1 SCC 407; Pioneer Urban Land and Infrastructure Ltd v. Union of India (2019) 8 SCC 416; GLAS Trust Co. LLC v. BYJU Raveendran (2025) 3 SCC 625; Swiss Ribbons (P) Ltd. v. Union of India (2019) 4 SCC 17; Para 15] Elegna Co-Op. Housing and Commercial Society v. Edelweiss Asset Reconstruction, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 51 : 2026 INSC 58
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Section 14 – Moratorium – Liability of Natural Persons – While a moratorium under Section 14 shields the corporate debtor, it does not extend to its directors or promoters - the mere absence of a moratorium-related bar does not automatically make directors liable in execution proceedings unless their independent liability was established during the adjudicatory process - A company is a distinct legal entity from its shareholders and directors - The doctrine of "piercing the corporate veil" is an exceptional measure that requires specific pleadings and a determination of fraud or dishonest misuse of the corporate personality, which cannot be introduced for the first time at the execution stage. [Relied on Rajbir v. Suraj Bhan (2022) 14 SCC 609; Electronics Corpn. of India Ltd. v. Secy., Revenue Deptt., Govt. of A.P. (1999) 4 SCC 458; Paras 11-20] Ansal Crown Heights Flat Buyers Association v. Ansal Crown Infrabuild Pvt. Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 40 : 2026 INSC 51
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Section 60(5)(c) – Jurisdiction of Adjudicating Authority (NCLT) – Declaration of Title to Assets – Held, the NCLT cannot exercise its residuary jurisdiction under Section 60(5)(c) to adjudicate upon complex disputes of title to property (such as trademarks) that are dehors the insolvency proceedings - The nexus with the insolvency of the Corporate Debtor must exist for the NCLT to exercise power under this section – Noted that in the present case, where the approved Resolution Plan itself recognized rival claims and "beliefs" regarding the ownership of the "Gloster" trademark rather than an undisputed assertion of title, the NCLT exceeded its jurisdiction by recorded a finding that the trademark was an asset of the Corporate Debtor. Gloster Cables Ltd. v. Fort Gloster Industries Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 80 : 2026 INSC 81
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Section 7 – Admission of CIRP – Mandatory Nature – Discretion of Adjudicating Authority – Supreme Court issued a set of directions regarding the functioning of the Committee of Creditors (CoC) under the Insolvency & Bankruptcy Code, noting that while the commercial wisdom of the CoC is paramount, such power must be exercised with responsibility, transparency and proper application of mind, particularly in real estate insolvencies where homebuyers' interests are deeply involved - Held, the inquiry under Section 7(5)(a) is confined strictly to the determination of debt and default - Once the Adjudicating Authority is satisfied that a financial debt exists and a default has occurred, it must admit the application unless it is incomplete - Considerations such as project viability, business status (going concern), stage of completion, or perceived prejudice to homebuyers are extraneous and irrelevant at the admission stage. [Para 12] Elegna Co-Op. Housing and Commercial Society v. Edelweiss Asset Reconstruction, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 51 : 2026 INSC 58
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Section 7 – Locus Standi of Homebuyer Societies – Held, a society or Resident Welfare Association (RWA) does not possess locus standi to intervene in Section 7 proceedings at the pre-admission stage - At this stage, proceedings are in personam between the applicant creditor and the corporate debtor - While individual allottees are "financial creditors" under the Explanation to Section 5(8)(f), this status does not automatically extend to a society unless it is a creditor in its own right or a statutorily recognized authorized representative. [Para 13] Elegna Co-Op. Housing and Commercial Society v. Edelweiss Asset Reconstruction, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 51 : 2026 INSC 58
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Sections 31, 43, and 45 – Modification of Resolution Plan – Avoidance Transactions – Noted that the NCLT cannot, while adjudicating a miscellaneous application, grant rights to a Successful Resolution Applicant (SRA) that are better than or different from those recognized in the Committee of Creditors (CoC) approved Resolution Plan - Any such declaration amounts to an impermissible modification of the approved plan - the NCLT cannot suo motu or "by a sidewind" neutralize transactions as preferential (Section 43) or undervalued (Section 45) without a formal application by the Resolution Professional (or under Section 47 by a creditor) and without providing the affected party clear notice and a fair opportunity to respond - Such summary findings are perverse and violate principles of natural justice. Gloster Cables Ltd. v. Fort Gloster Industries Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 80 : 2026 INSC 81
Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968 – Section 3(2) First Proviso – Interpretation – Joint Committee – Supreme Court dismissed the writ petition filed by Justice Yashwant Varma of the Allahabad High Court challenging the Lok Sabha Speaker's decision to form an inquiry committee as per the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968, in the impeachment motion moved against him in relation to the discovery of unaccounted cash at his official residence - The first proviso to Section 3(2) of the Inquiry Act mandates the constitution of a Joint Committee only in the specific situation where notices of motion are given in both Houses of Parliament on the same day and are subsequently admitted by both Houses - The proviso is situational and not exhaustive; it does not contemplate or govern scenarios where a notice is admitted in one House but rejected in the other - Rejection of a motion in one House does not render the other House incompetent to proceed independently - To hold otherwise would allow for the scuttling of proceedings through the deliberate introduction of defective notices in one House to frustrate a valid motion in the other. [Relied on Sub-Committee on Judicial Accountability v. Union of India, (1991) 4 SCC 699; Tribhovandas Haribhai Tamboli v. Gujarat Revenue Tribunal, (1991) 3 SCC 442; Amina Marwa Sabreen v. State of Kerala, (2018) 14 SCC 193; Paras 12, 14-22, 29- 45] X v. Speaker of the House of the People, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 53 : 2026 INSC 65
Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968 – Section 3 – Role of the Secretariat – The Secretariat of a House should exercise restraint and confine its role to administrative scrutiny, such as verification of procedural compliance (e.g., signature verification) - It cannot assume quasi-adjudicatory functions by performing a substantive assessment of the merits of allegations or the correctness of facts pleaded in a notice of motion - The final decision on the admission of a motion rests solely with the Speaker or the Chairman as the case may be. [Paras 49 - 54] X v. Speaker of the House of the People, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 53 : 2026 INSC 65
Judicial Conduct – Appellate Court's handling of Non-Appearance – The Supreme Court expressed that it was "appalling and shocking" for an Appellate Court to insist on the appearance of an appellant on every date despite a suspension of sentence - If a counsel is not assisting or has been changed frequently, the appropriate course is for the Court to appoint an amicus curiae or allow the accused to make alternative arrangements, rather than immediately cancelling bail and issuing Non-Bailable Warrants (NBW). Meenakshi v. State of Haryana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 60
Judicial Discipline and Precedent – Supreme Court emphasized that once a declaration of law is made by a High Court and affirmed by the Supreme Court, it acquires binding normative force - A coordinate Bench of the High Court cannot deny relief for a subsequent period when the underlying legal framework and factual footing remain unchanged - The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's 2019 judgment and directed the refund of customs duty collected for the period from 16 September 2010 to 15 February 2016. [Paras 89-91] Adani Power Ltd. v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 3 : 2026 INSC 1
Judicial Independence – Fearless Trial Judiciary – Role of High Courts – Held that fearless judge is the bedrock of an independent judiciary - High Courts, while exercising supervisory control, must ensure that judicial officers are not put through the ordeal of disciplinary proceedings for mere errors of judgment - The "lurking fear" of administrative action often leads trial judges to shirk their responsibility in bail matters, resulting in the flooding of High Courts and the Supreme Court with bail applications. Nirbhay Singh Suliya v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 2 : 2026 INSC 7
Judicial Propriety – Right of Hearing – Held, that the High Court should not have entertained and disposed of the matter without issuance of notice to either the State or the Defacto Complainant – Noted that in petitions praying for the quashing of an FIR, the High Court should not pass orders directing compliance with Section 41-A Cr.PC (or Section 35(3) BNSS) as it indirectly amounts to granting relief that should only be considered if a prima facie case for quashing is established. [Relied on Neeharika Infrastructure (P) Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra (2021) 19 SCC 401; Paras 9-13] Practical Solutions Inc. v. State of Telangana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 74
Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 — Section 94 — Mandatory Procedure for Age Determination — The procedure for determining the age of a victim or juvenile is strictly governed by Section 94(2) of the JJ Act - Priority must be given to: (i) school/matriculation certificates, or (ii) birth certificates from local authorities - Medical age determination (ossification test) can only be resorted to in the absence of such documentary evidence – Held that the High Court erred in holding that medical reports could prevail over school records at the bail stage. State of Uttar Pradesh v. Anurudh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 29 : 2026 INSC 47
Labor Law — The Building and Other Construction Workers (Regulation of Employment and Conditions of Service) Act, 1996 (BOCW Act) and The Building and Other Construction Workers' Welfare Cess Act, 1996 (Cess Act) — Implementation and Levy: Held, that although the BOCW Act and Cess Act were enacted in 1996, they remained "dormant" in various states until the necessary machinery, specifically the Welfare Boards under Section 18, was constituted - The constitution of Welfare Boards is a sine qua non (condition precedent) for the levy and collection of cess - While the registration of workers is not a prerequisite for collecting cess, the existence of a Board to receive and utilize the funds is essential. [Paras 36, 50, 59] National Highways Authority of India v. Gammon Atlanta (JV), 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 71 : 2026 INSC 76
Land Acquisition (Special Railway Projects) Rules, 2016 — Railways Act, 1989 — Section 20-F — Setting aside of Award — Scope of judicial interference — Representative Capacity — The Supreme Court held that the setting aside of a compensation award on grounds of excessive payment, collusion, or "colourable exercise of powers" against specific land owners does not ipso facto result in the entire acquisition award being set aside for all beneficiaries - Noted that out of 550 land owners, only a few were specifically impleaded and alleged to have received unjust enrichment - Since the appellant was not part of the inquiry report, not arrayed as an accused in the FIR, and his specific award was not challenged by the Railways, the High Court erred in applying a blanket cancellation of his award based on a separate judgment involving different parties - noted that the Railways Act, 1989, does not confer any power of review on the Competent Authority or the Arbitrator appointed under the Rules of 2016 - The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's orders and restored the initial award and the arbitral enhancement in favor of the appellant, directing disbursement within three months with interest and solatium – Appeal allowed. [Paras 10-14] Niraj Jain v. Competent Authority-cum-Additional Collector, Jagdalpur, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 83 : 2026 INSC 86
Land Acquisition – Disparity in Compensation Mechanism – National Highways Act, 1956 vs. Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 – Supreme Court observed a lack of "intelligible differentia" in the treatment of land owners whose land is acquired under the 1956 Act compared to those under the 2013 Act - While 2013 Act acquisitions involve judicial oversight by District Judges, the 1956 Act relies on administrative officers (Collectors/Commissioners) acting as arbitrators who may lack a "judicially trained mind" to adjudicate complex market value issues – Noted that the Union of India to revisit the legislative scheme to bring parity in the mechanism for determining market value with reference to Article 300-A of the Constitution – Supreme Court directed that the Interim orders to continue; Registry directed to forward the order to the Attorney General and Solicitor General of India for consideration. [Relied on Union of India & another vs. Tarsem Singh & others, (2019) 9 SCC 304; Para 5-12] Riar Builders Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 65
Legitimate Expectation – Duty to Allot – In the absence of fraud, collusion, or material irregularity, the highest bidder whose bid exceeds the reserve price has a legitimate expectation to receive an allotment letter. The returning of earnest money does not legitimize an arbitrary cancellation – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Eva Agro Feeds (P) Ltd. vs. Punjab National Bank (2023) 10 SCC 189; K. Kumara Gupta vs. Sri Markendaya & Sri Omkareswara Swamy Temple (2022) 5 SCC 710; Subodh Kumar Singh Rathour vs. Kolkata Metropolitan Development Authority (2024) 15 SCC 461] Golden Food Products India v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 22 : 2026 INSC 22
Limitation Act - Distinction Between Section 5 and Section 14 of Limitation Act — Supreme Court highlighted a "vital distinction": Section 5 involves a discretionary power to extend time based on "sufficient cause," whereas Section 14 is a mandatory provision for the exclusion of time if specific conditions are met - Principles of Section 14 may be applied by analogy to tribunals to prevent manifest injustice, but the discretionary power under Section 5 must be specifically granted by the legislature - Procedural laws like limitation can have substantive effects by depriving a party of an accrued right to plead a time-bar - Since the respondent's remedy was already time-barred under the old regime before Section 433 of the Act, 2013 came into force, the change in law cannot ensure to their benefit – Held that The High Court erred in affirming the CLB's order condoning a 249-day delay - The CLB lacked the authority to apply Section 5 of the Limitation Act to an appeal under Section 58(3) of the Act, 2013 – The mechanism envisaged under Section 5 is proximally bound and tethered to the discretion with which a civil court is empowered and that under Section 14 is anchored on restoring the right of a litigant to institute an appeal or application, as the case may be, within the prescribed period of limitation - Both provisions work in the interest of the litigant and seek to further the cause of substantive justice, the kind and nature of the power exercised under the two provisions, as well as the mechanism envisaged therein, are quite distinct - Appeal allowed. Property Company (P) Ltd. v. Rohinten Daddy Mazda, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 19 : 2026 INSC 33
Matrimonial Litigation – Misuse of Courts – Perjury and Costs - Supreme Court criticized the practice of warring couples treating courts as "battlefields" to settle scores, noting that the parties had filed over 40 cases against each other - While disposing of all matrimonial disputes, the Court specifically directed that applications related to perjury (Section 340 CrPC / Section 379 BNSS) must continue, as no one can be permitted to "pollute the stream of justice" - imposed a token cost of ₹10,000 on each party for choking the judicial system with numerous litigations - Supreme Court emphasized that earnest efforts should be made for pre-litigation mediation and counselling - It observed that the immediate initiation of criminal proceedings often destroys any chance of reconciliation and leads to a "point of no return," especially if arrests occur. [Relied on Shilpa Sailesh vs. Varun Sreenivasan, (2023) 14 SCC 231; Achin Gupta vs. State of Haryana, (2024) 6 SCR 129; Rakesh Raman vs. Kavita, (2023) 3 SCR 552; Paras 11 – 15, 26-32] Neha Lal v. Abhishek Kumar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 73 : 2026 INSC 73
Medical Negligence and Standard of Care: Permissibility of Stem Cell "Therapy" for Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) - held that every medical practitioner owes a fiduciary duty to exercise a reasonable degree of care, skill, and knowledge expected of a prudent practitioner - A practitioner fails to meet this standard if they administer an intervention that lacks credible scientific evidence of safety and efficacy, or is explicitly not recommended by authoritative medical bodies - Since therapeutic use of stem cells in ASD is not recognized as a "sound and relevant medical practice" by the ICMR or NMC, offering it as a routine clinical service outside an approved clinical trial constitutes a failure to meet the reasonable standard of care. [Relied on Indian Medical Association v. V.P. Shantha and others (1996) 86 COMP 806; Jacob Mathew v. State of Punjab (2005) 6 SCC 1; M.A. Biviji v. Sunita and Others, reported in (2024) 2 SCC 242; Paras 59, 61, 63, 70, 90, 151] Yash Charitable Trust v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 93 : 2026 INSC 96
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988; Section 2(28) — Gujarat Motor Vehicles Tax Act, 1958; Section 3 — Constitution of India; Seventh Schedule, List II, Entry 57 — Taxability of Heavy Earth Moving Machinery/Construction Equipment Vehicles - The Supreme Court held that heavy earth moving machinery and construction equipment vehicles (such as Dumpers, Loaders, Excavators, etc.) designed for off-road use within factory or enclosed premises are excluded from the definition of "motor vehicle" under the second part of Section 2(28) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 – Supreme Court made following findings- i. Definition of Motor Vehicle: While such vehicles may fall under the inclusive first part of Section 2(28), they are specifically excluded by the second part of the definition, which omits "a vehicle of a special type adapted for use only in a factory or in any other enclosed premises"; ii. Constitutional Limitation: Entry 57 of List II of the Seventh Schedule only permits states to tax vehicles "suitable for use on roads”- Noted that if a vehicle is designed for off-road operations and does not derive benefit from public road infrastructure, it cannot be burdened with motor vehicle tax; iii. Gujarat Tax Act Deficiency: noted that Schedule I of the Gujarat Motor Vehicles Tax Act, 1958, mentions construction equipment vehicles but prescribes no corresponding rate of tax for them - no tax can be levied or collected from such vehicles; iv. Status of Registration: Merely because such vehicles are registered under the Act does not estop the owner from challenging the liability to pay road tax if the vehicles do not ply on public roads – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Bolani Ores Ltd. vs. State of Orissa (1974) 2 SCC 777; Tarachand Logistic Solutions Limited vs. State of Andhra Pradesh 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1851; Paras 37-39, 42-45, 55] Ultratech Cement Ltd. v. State of Gujarat, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 27 : 2026 INSC 43
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 – Grant of Anticipatory Bail – Co-accused Statements – Noted that the appellant was arraigned as an accused solely on the basis of a statement made by a co-accused (who was apprehended with 6.330 kg of Ganja) - noted that the actual complicity of the appellant is a matter to be thrashed out during trial - Supreme Court restored the bail and directed that the appellant be released on anticipatory bail by the jurisdictional Investigating Officer – Appeal allowed. [Paras 5-8] Rambali Sahni v. State of Bihar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 61
National Green Tribunal Act, 2010 – Section 14 – Jurisdiction – Substantial Question Relating to Environment –The NGT's jurisdiction is limited to civil cases involving a "substantial question relating to environment" arising from enactments in Schedule I - Held: Issues intrinsically connected to building plan violations and land-use disputes already under adjudication by the High Court do not qualify as substantial environmental questions for NGT intervention - Every dispute pertaining to the environment is not a "substantial question" under Section 2(1)(m) of the Act. [Relied on Bharat Singh v. State of Haryana, AIR 1988 SC 534; Auroville Foundation v. Navroz Kersasp Mody, (2025) 4 SCC 150; State of M.P. v. Centre for Environment Protection Research & Development, (2020) 9 SCC 781; Paras 104 - 106] Raj Singh Gehlot v. Amitabha Sen, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 72 : 2026 INSC 77
National Green Tribunal Act, 2010 – Section 15 – Remedial Jurisdiction – Enhancement of Compensation – The NGT is competent to enhance compensation recommended by a Joint Committee if it finds the amount inadequate to reflect the scale and impact of violations - Such an exercise of informed discretion, where expert findings are filtered and integrated into a reasoned outcome, does not amount to an abdication of adjudicatory functions. Rhythm County v. Satish Sanjay Hegde, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 98 : 2026 INSC 102
National Green Tribunal Act, 2010 – Sections 15 and 20 – Environmental Compensation – Quantification Metrics – Project Cost and Turnover – The Supreme Court upheld the power of the National Green Tribunal (NGT) to use project cost or turnover as a relevant yardstick for calculating environmental compensation - held that while a uniform formula is not prescribed by statute, linking the scale of operations to environmental harm is a permissible exercise of discretion under the 'Polluter Pays' principle - Larger operations signify a larger environmental footprint, and it is logical for companies profiting from scale to bear higher responsibility for environmental costs. Rhythm County v. Satish Sanjay Hegde, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 98 : 2026 INSC 102
Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881; Section 138 and 142(1)(b) - The Supreme Court set aside an order of the Karnataka High Court that had treated the sequence of condoning delay and taking cognizance as interchangeable or a "curable irregularity" – Noted that under the proviso to Section 142(1)(b) of the NI Act, the power to take cognizance of a complaint filed after the prescribed period is expressly subject to the complainant first satisfying the Court that there was sufficient cause for the delay – Held that an order taking cognizance before the delay is formally condoned is legally unsustainable and satisfaction of the Court regarding sufficient cause for delay must precede the act of taking cognizance of a belated complaint - Supreme Court made following Findings: i. Mandatory Sequence: The satisfaction of the Court regarding "sufficient cause" resulting in the condonation of delay must precede the act of taking cognizance; ii. Irregularity not Curable: Held that High Court's view that taking cognizance before condoning delay is a "curable irregularity" is not in keeping with the statutory mandate of the proviso to Section 142(1)(b); iii. Impact of Misrepresentation: noted that the respondent (complainant) contributed to the procedural error by erroneously stating in her complaint that it was filed within time – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Dashrath Rupsingh Rathod vs. State of Maharashtra and another (2014) 9 SCC 129; Paras 13-15] S. Nagesh v. Shobha S. Aradhya, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 13 : 2026 INSC 27
Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 – Section 138 – Separate Cause of Action – Held that a separate cause of action arises upon each dishonour of a cheque, provided the statutory sequence of presentation, dishonour, notice, and failure to pay is complete - The fact that multiple cheques arise from a single transaction does not merge them into a single cause of action - Once a cheque is issued in discharge of liability and subsequently dishonoured, a presumption of liability in favour of the complainant arises - The burden of proving the absence of a debt or liability lies with the accused and must be discharged during the trial – Noted that the High Court, while exercising power under Section 482, must avoid conducting a "mini-trial" or usurping the function of the Trial Court when disputed factual questions exist - The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's finding that maintaining two separate complaints for the same underlying debt (one for personal cheques and one for firm cheques) amounted to parallel prosecution - held that since the instruments were distinct, drawn on different accounts, and presented on different dates, the law does not bar separate prosecutions - Questions regarding whether cheques were issued as alternative securities or in substitution of one another are mixed questions of fact that cannot be resolved at the threshold under Section 482 - Noted that statutory weight must be given to the presumption under Section 139 - Quashing proceedings prematurely overlooks this legal presumption which operates in favor of the complainant. [Relied on State of Haryana and Others vs. Bhajan Lal and Others, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335; Neeharika Infrastructure Private Limited vs. State of Maharashtra and Others, (2021) 19 SCC 401; Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd. vs. Pennar Peterson Securities Ltd. and Others, (2000) 2 SCC 745 M.M.T.C. Ltd. and Another vs. Medchl Chemicals and Pharma (P) Ltd. and Another, (2002) 1 SCC 234; Paras 26-45] Sumit Bansal v. MGI Developers and Promoters, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 34 : 2026 INSC 40
Penal Code, 1860; Section 300 Exception 4, Section 302 and Section 304 Part II — Culpable Homicide Not Amounting to Murder — Free Fight and Private Defence — The appellant was initially convicted under Section 302/149 for the death of the deceased during a group clash - The High Court altered the conviction to Section 304 Part II, holding that in a "free fight" involving two rival groups where both sides sustained injuries, a common object for an unlawful assembly cannot be easily inferred - The Supreme Court upheld this alteration, noting that the appellant acted without premeditation in the midst of a sudden commotion - While the appellant's use of a lathi on the deceased's head established "knowledge" that the injury was likely to cause death, the lack of specific intent to cause death in the context of a group fight justifies the invocation of Section 304 Part II. Shrikrishna v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 35 : 2026 INSC 45
Penal Code, 1860 – Sections 302, 120-B, 201, 506 r/w 34 – Circumstantial Evidence – Reliability of Sole Eye-Witness – In a case primarily resting on circumstantial evidence and the testimony of a purported eye-witness, Supreme Court found the evidence insufficient to sustain conviction - Noted significant discrepancies: the eye-witness failed to report the incident for 21 days, alleged threats were not substantiated, and the witness was treated as partially hostile - medical evidence regarding the time of death (10 days prior to post-mortem) conflicted with the prosecution's timeline (21 days prior) - held that the prosecution failed to establish a complete and unbroken chain of circumstances - Required – Conspiracy cannot be presumed and requires proof of a meeting of minds, prior agreement, and concerted action - Mere suspicion, association, or the existence of civil disputes cannot substitute for proof of a criminal conspiracy – Appeals allowed. [Relied on Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar v. State of Karnataka, 2024 (8) SCC 149; Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar, (2022) 3 SCC 471; Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415; Ramesh v. State of Uttarakhand, 2020 (20) SCC 522; Paras 7, 24, 25] Tulasareddi @ Mudakappa v. State of Karnataka, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 59 : 2026 INSC 67
Penal Code, 1860 - Sentencing Policy — Advanced Age of Appellant — While upholding the conviction under Section 304 Part II, the Supreme Court reduced the sentence to the period already undergone (approximately six years and three months) – Held that since the appellant is now over 80 years old, sending him back to prison would be "harsh and inadvisable," emphasizing that courts should not be insensitive to the advanced age of convicts – Appeal dismissed. [Relied on Kesar Singh and Another vs. State of Haryana, (2008) 15 SCC 753; Paras 5, 6] Shrikrishna v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 35 : 2026 INSC 45
Pharmacy Act, 1948 – Pharmacy Practice Regulations, 2015 – Repugnancy – Classification and Equality – Articles 14 and 16 - Supreme Court ruled out repugnancy between the State Cadre Rules and Central legislation/regulations - While the Pharmacy Act and 2015 Regulations govern professional standards and create a "pool" of registered pharmacists, they do not mandate that every registered pharmacist must be considered for public employment. The State Cadre Rules operate in the distinct domain of public recruitment – The prescription of a Diploma as an essential qualification is not arbitrary or irrational - noted a valid "intelligible differentia" based on:i. Course Structure: Diploma holders undergo 500 hours of compulsory hospital training compared to 150 hours for B.Pharma students; ii. Employment Avenues: Diploma holders have more limited career opportunities compared to degree holders, who can apply for higher posts like Drug Inspectors or industrial roles. [Relied on Zahoor Ahmad Rather & Ors. v. Sheikh Imtiyaz Ahmad & Ors. (2019) 2 SCC 404; Maharashtra Public Service Commission v. Sandeep Shriram Warade & Ors. (2019) 6 SCC 362; &K Service Selection Recruitment Board & Anr. v. Basit Aslam Wani & Ors. (2020); Paras 47-55, 59 – 64] MD. Firoz Mansuri v. State of Bihar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 57 : 2026 INSC 68
Police Manual - Media Briefing - The Supreme Court directed all States to formulate a policy for police media briefing, taking into account a "Police Manual for Media Briefing" furnished before it by amicus curiae. The Court has given 3 months' time to the states to do the needful. Peoples Union for Civil Liberties v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 77
Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, 1882; Section 41 — Non-arbitrability and Public Policy — Merely because a statute (like Section 41 of the 1882 Act) confers exclusive jurisdiction on a specific court for certain types of disputes (licensor-licensee/landlord-tenant), it does not ex proprio vigore (by its own force) neutralize arbitration clauses in private agreements. The Court distinguished the present case - where possession had already been handed over and the dispute was purely a monetary claim from cases requiring special statutory protection - Arbitration clauses find their roots in Section 28 of the Contract Act - Exceptions 1 and 2 to Section 28 expressly provide that a contract to refer disputes to arbitration is not rendered illegal or void as a restraint of legal proceedings – Appeal dismissed. [Relied on In re Interplay Between Arbitration Agreements under Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 & Stamp Act, 1899, (2024) 6 SCC 1; Paras 19–26] Motilal Oswal Financial Services v. Santosh Cordeiro, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 32 : 2026 INSC 5
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988; Section 17A — Constitutional Validity — Reading Down (per K.V. Viswanathan; J) — The Supreme Court delivered a split verdict, holding the constitutional validity of Section 17A but read it down to mandate an independent screening mechanism - held that the "previous approval" of the Government/Competent Authority for conducting an enquiry, inquiry, or investigation must be preceded by an independent screening of the information/complaint by the Lokpal (for Central Government employees) or Lokayukta (for State Government employees) - The recommendation of the Lokpal/Lokayukta shall be binding on the Government/Authority. Centre for Public Interest Litigation v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 43 : 2026 INSC 55
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988; Section 17 — Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Section 4 and 156 — Jurisdiction of State Anti-Corruption Bureau (ACB) over Central Government Employees — The Supreme Court upheld the Rajasthan High Court's finding that the State ACB has the jurisdiction to register criminal cases, investigate, and file charge-sheets against Central Government employees for offences committed within the State's territorial jurisdiction - Noted that the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act (DSPE Act), 1946, is permissive and does not expressly or impliedly divest regular State police authorities of their power to investigate offences under the PC Act - While an internal arrangement exists where the CBI typically handles Central Government employees and the ACB handles State employees to avoid duplication, this does not exclude the State's legal power to investigate - The only mandatory requirement is that the investigating officer must hold the rank specified under Section 17 of the PC Act – Key findings by Supreme Court – i. CrPC as Parent Statute: Unless a special law provides a separate, exclusive procedure for investigation, the general provisions of Section 156 CrPC (powers of police to investigate cognizable offences) prevail; ii. Non-Exclusivity of CBI: The DSPE Act (which governs the CBI) does not impair any other law empowering State police authorities to investigate offences - It is incorrect to claim that only the CBI has the authority to institute such prosecutions; iii. Validity of Charge-sheet: A charge-sheet filed by a State agency against a Central Government employee without the prior consent or approval of the CBI is valid in law – Appeal dismissed. [Relied on A.C. Sharma v. Delhi Administration (1973) 1 SCC 726; Paras 3-9] Nawal Kishore Meena @ N.K Meena v. State of Rajasthan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 68 : 2026 INSC 71
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 - Difference between Section 6A (DSPE Act) and Section 17A (PC Act) — While Section 6A was struck down in Subramanian Swamy for being discriminatory (protecting only high-ranking officers), Section 17A is applicable to all levels of public servants - the requirement for an independent screening mechanism remains a constitutional necessity to prevent the "chilling effect" on honest officials while ensuring the accountability of the corrupt - In cases where the public servant is not covered under the jurisdiction of the Lokpal/Lokayukta, the competent authority must commission an appropriate independent investigative agency to screen the information before granting or refusing approval. [Relied on Vineet Narain vs. Union of India (1998) 1 SCC 226; Subramanian Swamy vs. Director, CBI (2014) 8 SCC 682; K. Veeraswami vs. Union of India (1991) 3 SCC 655; Lalita Kumari vs. Govt. of U.P. (2014) 2 SCC 1: Paras 50, 81, 93, 98-100] Centre for Public Interest Litigation v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 43 : 2026 INSC 55
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 - Rule of Law — Independence of Investigative Agency — The executive cannot have the unbridled power to foreclose an enquiry into corruption allegations against its own officials, as this would violate the "rule of law" and the principle of independent investigation - Any decision to block an enquiry must be taken by a body independent of the executive - SOP) — Held that the existing SOP (dated 03.09.2021) governing Section 17A to be "wholly unsatisfactory" as it failed to provide for an independent screening mechanism and allowed the executive to judge the actions of its own limbs. Centre for Public Interest Litigation v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 43 : 2026 INSC 55
Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 – Section 45 – Grant of Regular Bail – Right to Speedy Trial – The Supreme Court granted bail to accused, emphasizing that prolonged incarceration of an undertrial without the commencement of trial violates the fundamental right to liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution of India - Supreme Court observed that statutory restrictions under special acts like the PMLA cannot be permitted to result in indefinite pretrial detention - Noted that the trial had not yet commenced and was only at the stage of scrutiny of documents - A significant delay of eight months was attributed to the Directorate of Enforcement (ED) due to its challenge of a procedural order by the Special Judge, which was later withdrawn - With 208 witnesses cited and over 63,000 pages of documents, there was no likelihood of the trial concluding in the near future – Held that the appellant had joined the investigation on multiple occasions even prior to his arrest - found the ED's allegations of witness tampering and dissipation of properties to be "incredulous" and "untenable," as the appellant was in custody when these alleged events occurred, and no material link was established between the appellant and the entities involved in the property transfers – Appeal allowed. [Relied on V. Senthil Balaji v. Deputy Director, Enforcement Directorate, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2622; Satender Kumar Antil v. CBI (2022) 10 SCC 51; P. Chidambaram v. Directorate of Enforcement, (2020) 13 SCC 791; Paras 15- 23] Arvind Dham v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 7 : 2026 INSC 12
Preventive Detention – Telangana Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Boot-Leggers, Dacoits, Drug-Offenders, Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offender Act, 1986 – Section 2(a), 2(f) and 3 – Detention of "Drug Offender" – Law and Order vs. Public Order - Subjective Satisfaction and Extraneous Factors - Supreme Court observed that the Detaining Authority manifested an intention to detain the detenu "at any cost" - held that preventive detention should not be used as an alternative to the ordinary criminal law or to "clip the wings" of an accused when the State fails to resist bail – Held that if the detenu violated bail conditions, the appropriate remedy was to seek cancellation of bail under ordinary law, which the State failed to do - Resorting to the extraordinary measure of preventive detention to circumvent ordinary criminal procedure is unsustainable – Held that mere registration of three criminal cases involving "Ganja" does not automatically impact "public order" unless there is specific material showing the activities caused harm, danger, or a feeling of insecurity among the general public - The detention order failed to indicate how the detenu's acts were prejudicial to the maintenance of public order as opposed to mere "law and order" - Law of preventive detention is a "hard law" and must be strictly construed - Liberty cannot be jeopardized unless the case falls squarely within the four corners of the relevant statute – Held that simply declaring the detenu a 'habitual drug offender' was not sufficient for preventive detention unless shown how detenu's actions specifically threatened public order – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Ameena Begum vs. State of Telangana and Others 2023 INSC 788; Vijay Narain Singh vs. State of Bihar 1984 3 SCC 14; Paras 8-10] Roshini Devi v. State of Telangana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 30 : 2026 INSC 41
Primacy of Statutory Rules over Executive Orders - Supreme Court addressed a conflict between the NDCT Rules, 2019 and a DHR Order dated March 3, 2024, which attempted to remove the Department of Health Research (DHR) from its regulatory role in stem cell research - held that executive instructions cannot supplant or whittle down the effect of statutory rules - Clause 2(vi) of the March 3, 2024 order was declared non est to the extent of its conflict with Rules 17 and 18 of the NDCT Rules - The administration, promotion, or advertisement of stem cell therapy for ASD outside an approved clinical trial setting is categorized as "professional misconduct" under Regulation 7.22 of the IMC (Professional Conduct, Etiquette and Ethics) Regulations, 2002 - Errant clinics are liable for cancellation of registration and penalties under the Clinical Establishments Act, 2010 - Held that stem cell therapies for ASD cannot be offered as a commercial service and must be restricted to clinical trial settings - To protect patients currently undergoing treatment, the Secretary, MoHFW is directed to consult with AIIMS and the NMC to provide a solution for re-routing these patients to institutions conducting legitimate clinical trials, with a compliance report due within four weeks. [Relied on State of M.P. v. G.S. Dall and Flour Mills 1992 Supp (1) SCC 150; Paras 136-138, 151, 123, 145-151] Yash Charitable Trust v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 93 : 2026 INSC 96
Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 – Section 12 – Effect of Probation on Conviction and Departmental Action – The Supreme Court reiterated that the release of an offender on probation does not obliterate the stigma of conviction - The conviction of the accused or the finding of the court that he is guilty remains untouched, as it is the sine qua non for an order of release on probation – Held that in a case where a workman obtained employment as a Helper by using his brother's educational certificates and impersonating him, Supreme Court held that such misconduct justifies departmental action - that Section 12 of the Probation of Offenders Act does not preclude a department from taking action for misconduct leading to an offence or conviction – Noted that Section 12 only removes "disqualifications" provided by other laws (e.g., for holding office or seeking elections) but does not sweep away the factum of guilt or the misconduct resulting in conviction - a person dismissed from service due to conviction is not entitled to reinstatement merely because they were granted the benefit of probation - While the Supreme Court set aside the High Court's observation that conviction alone is not a ground for removal, it declined to interfere with the modified punishment of "compulsory retirement" in this specific instance, noting that the respondent-workman had since passed away and the appellant did not wish to unsettle benefits accrued to the family. [Relied on Union of India Vs. Bakshi Ram (1990) 2 SCC 426; Paras 9-13] Superintending Engineer v. Labour Court Madurai, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 78
Procedural Fairness – Right to Cross-Examination – Supreme Court noted that the finding of professional misconduct was based merely on "bald allegations" in the complaint without the complainant being examined on oath or the appellant-advocate being afforded the right of cross-examination – Held that such findings are legally unsustainable when the substratum of the complaint has ceased to exist due to an amicable settlement between the parties. [Paras 7- 10] Monty Goyal v. Navrang Singh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 91 : 2026 INSC 94
Public Auction – Duty of Disclosure – Failure to disclose pending litigation – Refund with Interest – The Supreme Court set aside a Punjab and Haryana High Court judgment that had dismissed a writ petition filed by an auction purchaser - The appellant had purchased property in an open auction conducted by The Improvement Trust, Ludhiana, but the Trust failed to disclose that the property was subject to a pending lawsuit - Held, it is the legal duty of authorities (such as banks, recovery officers, or state bodies) conducting public auctions to disclose all known encumbrances and litigation in the auction notice - Suppressing such material facts invalidates the sale and renders the auction fraudulent or vitiated by material irregularity - Public auctions must ensure fairness, objectivity, and be free from suspicion or bias - emphasized that restitution is a "moral imperative" and an inherent jurisdiction of every court to prevent unjust enrichment - An innocent auction purchaser who acts in good faith and pays hard-earned money should be restored to their original position if the auction lacks legitimacy - directed the Trust to refund the deposit of Rs.1,57,04,580/- with interest at 9% per annum from the date of deposit (19.07.2021) within six weeks – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Delhi Development Authority vs. Corporation Bank & Ors, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 953; Paras 9 – 13] Viney Kumar Sharma v. Improvement Trust, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 69
Public Interest Litigation (PIL) - Property Rights - The Supreme Court set aside a Calcutta High Court judgment that had ordered the demolition of a residential building constructed by the appellant near Visva-Bharati University – Noted that the High Court had initially ruled the construction illegal on the grounds that it was raised on preserved "khoai" land and lacked approval from the competent authority (Panchayat Samiti) - Supreme Court found that the High Court's conclusions were based on conjectures rather than scientific evidence and failed to account for the appellant's right to property under Article 300A of the Constitution - Key Legal Issues & Findings – i. Burden of Proof in PIL and Disputed Facts: The Court emphasized that in a PIL, the burden lies squarely on the petitioners to provide clear, cogent, and reliable material - held that writ jurisdiction should not be invoked to resolve contested factual issues—such as the geological nature of land—which cannot be determined solely on affidavits; ii. Nature of "Khoai" Land - noted that "khoai" is not a recognized category under West Bengal revenue laws but a colloquial term for geological formations - Reports from the District Magistrate and the West Bengal Pollution Control Board (WBPCB) failed to provide objective or scientific evidence that the specific subject plot was "khoai" land; iii. Procedural Irregularities vs. Substantive Illegality - held that even if the Gram Panchayat was not the competent authority to sanction the building plan (vesting instead with the Panchayat Samiti), such a lapse constituted a "minor procedural irregularity" that was curable, especially since the plan had been vetted by the higher-tier Zilla Parishad - This did not warrant the "draconian consequence" of demolition; iv. Procedural Irregularities vs. Substantive Illegality - held that even if the Gram Panchayat was not the competent authority to sanction the building plan (vesting instead with the Panchayat Samiti), such a lapse constituted a "minor procedural irregularity" that was curable, especially since the plan had been vetted by the higher-tier Zilla Parishad - This did not warrant the "draconian consequence" of demolition; v. Bona Fides and Concealment of Facts: Noted that the PIL lacked bona fides as several writ petitioners owned existing residential structures within the same tract of land, a fact they failed to disclose - The petition "selectively targeted" the appellant's construction while ignoring similar surrounding structures - set aside the High Court's demolition order, and expunged adverse remarks against the Sriniketan Santiniketan Development Authority (SSDA). Due to the lack of bona fides and non-disclosure of material facts, the Court imposed costs of ₹1,00,000 on the writ petitioners. Appeals allowed. [Relied on Sushanta Tagore and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors., (2005) 3 SCC 16; Chairman, Grid Corporation of Orissa Ltd. (GRIDCO) v. Sukamani Das, (1999) 7 SCC 298; Shubhas Jain v. Rajeshwari Shivam, (2021) 20 SCC 454; Paras 36, 45 - 47, 49 – 52, 58] Aarsuday Projects & Infrastructure v. Jogen Chowdhury, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 90 : 2026 INSC 93
Registered Documents – Presumption of Validity – Standard of Proof to Declare a Registered Sale Deed as "Sham" – A registered Sale Deed carries a formidable presumption of validity and genuineness. Registration is a solemn act imparting a high degree of sanctity to the document; therefore, courts must not lightly or casually declare it a "sham" - The burden of proof to displace this presumption rests heavily upon the challenger, requiring material particulars and cogent evidence to demonstrate that the Deed was never intended to operate as a bona fide transfer of title. [Paras 31 - 33] Hemalatha v. Tukaram, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 79 : 2026 INSC 82
Reservation – Purpose and Function of Roster/Register – Supreme Court clarified that a reservation roster or register is an administrative, post-based instrument maintained to record cadre composition and monitor representation over time - It is not a parallel selection mechanism used during the recruitment process to displace candidates who secure an unreserved place on their own merit – Noted that the roster defines the number of vacant posts for advertisement and ensures that the lawful quota for specific categories is not exceeded within the cadre. [Relied on Rajasthan High Court & Anr. v. Rajat Yadav & Ors. (Civil Appeal No. 14112 of 2024); Indra Sawhney v. Union of India (1992 Supp (3) SCC 217; Saurav Yadav v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2021) 4 SCC 542; Paras 27 – 34] Airport Authority of India v. Sham Krishna B, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 63 : 2026 INSC 69
Retrospective Application of Cess — Execution Proceedings: Noted that in the case of Prakash Atlanta (JV), the Court held that NHAI could not unilaterally deduct cess during execution proceedings for a contract that was terminated in 2008, based on a State notification issued in 2010 - Such a deduction was an "afterthought" and lacked contractual or statutory basis for retrospective application to a closed contract. [Paras 43, 54, 60] National Highways Authority of India v. Gammon Atlanta (JV), 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 71 : 2026 INSC 76
Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 – Five Duty Bearers – Supreme Court identified five core duty bearers responsible for the realization of the right to education: (i) the appropriate government, (ii) local authority, (iii) neighbourhood schools, (iv) parents/guardians, and (v) primary school teachers. [Para 6, 15] Dinesh Biwaji Ashtikar v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 45 : 2026 INSC 56
Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 – Section 12(1)(c) – Admission of children from weaker sections and disadvantaged groups – Constitutional Mandate and Fraternity – The Supreme Court issued a slew of directions for the effective implementation of Section 12(1)(c) of the Right to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 (RTE Act) - Noted that the 25% reservation in unaided neighbourhood schools is a deliberate constitutional strategy to operationalize equality of status and social integration - It seeks to concretize the principle of fraternity by creating shared institutional spaces where children from diverse socio-economic backgrounds can form solidaristic bonds and "lose suspect identities" based on caste or class. [Paras 7–10] Dinesh Biwaji Ashtikar v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 45 : 2026 INSC 56
Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 – Section 12(1)(c) – Implementation Hurdles – Digital Literacy and Transparency – Supreme Court noted significant barriers to accessing the 25% quota, including digital illiteracy regarding online application processes, language barriers, and a lack of information on seat availability - Noted that despite RTI information showing vacant seats, eligible children are often turned away due to procedural technicalities. [Paras 5-7] Dinesh Biwaji Ashtikar v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 45 : 2026 INSC 56
Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 – Section 38 – Direction to Frame Rules –Finding that the Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) issued by the NCPCR are merely guidelines and lack the character of enforceable rules, Supreme Court directed "appropriate authorities" to prepare and issue necessary rules and regulations under Section 38 of the Act - Such subordinate legislation must prescribe the specific method and manner for admissions under Section 12(1)(c) to ensure the statutory policy does not remain a "dead letter." [Paras 15–16] Dinesh Biwaji Ashtikar v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 45 : 2026 INSC 56
Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 — Sections 3 and 19 — Mandatory Norms and Standards — Held that "Free education" under Section 3 includes the removal of any financial or gender-specific barrier, such as the cost of sanitary napkins, that prevents a child from pursuing education - The provision of separate toilets and "barrier-free access" under Section 19 and the Schedule is a mandatory constitutional and statutory obligation that cannot be avoided by pleading a paucity of funds - Key Directions Issued by the Court: i. Toilets - Provision of functional, gender-segregated toilets with usable water and hand-washing facilities in all schools; ii. Menstrual Absorbents - Free distribution of oxo-biodegradable sanitary napkins and the establishment of "MHM Corners" with spare uniforms and innerwear; iii. Disposal - Installation of safe, hygienic, and environmentally compliant disposal mechanisms; iv. Awareness - Integration of gender-responsive curricula by NCERT/SCERT and sensitization of both male and female teachers; v. Monitoring - Periodic inspections by District Education Officers (DEO) including anonymous student feedback. [Relied on: Right to Education: Mohini Jain (Miss) v. State of Karnataka (1992) 3 SCC 666; Unni Krishnan, J.P. v. State of A.P.(1993) 1 SCC 645; Joseph Shine v. Union of India (2019) 3 SCC 39; Janhit Abhiyan v. Union of India (2023) 5 SCC 1; Gaurav Kumar v. Union of India (2025) 1 SCC 641; Common Cause v. Union of India (2018) 5 SCC 1; Rajiv Raturi v. Union of India (2024) 16 SCC 654; Vikash Kumar v. UPSC (2021) 5 SCC 370; Society for Unaided Private Schools of Rajasthan v. Union of India (2012) 6 SCC 1; State of Orissa v. Mamata Mohanty(2011) 3 SCC 436; Paras 159 – 172, 173-180] Dr. Jaya Thakur v Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 94 : 2026 INSC 97
Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 – Intersectionality and Gender Justice – Supreme Court highlighted that disability-based discrimination is often intersectional, particularly for women, who face multiple axes of discrimination. Redressal of disadvantage must account for these intersecting identity markers to ensure substantive equality is not rendered unworkable by a "parochial understanding of discrimination." - Disability inclusion is a vital component of the "Social" dimension in the Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) framework - Enterprises have an obligation to view disability rights from a non-discrimination angle and as a strategic advantage rather than just a compliance issue. Sujata Bora v. Coal India Ltd; 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 46 : 2026 INSC 53
Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 – Section 2(y) and Section 2(s) – Concept of Reasonable Accommodation – Intersectionality of Disability and Gender – The Supreme Court set aside the Division Bench order of the Calcutta High Court which had denied employment to a female candidate with 57% disability (visual impairment and partial hemiparesis) on the technical grounds of the recruitment panel having expired - held that "reasonable accommodation" is a fundamental "gateway right" rooted in Articles 14, 21, and 41 of the Constitution, essential for substantive equality - Technicalities such as the expiry of a recruitment panel cannot obstruct "complete justice" when the denial of employment was due to the employer's failure to recognize multiple disabilities and provide necessary adjustments. Sujata Bora v. Coal India Ltd; 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 46 : 2026 INSC 53
Service Law – Appointment of Vice-Chancellor – Conflict between State/UT Act and UGC Regulations – Legislative Competence – Doctrine of Repugnancy - The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court's decision to strike down Section 14(5) of the Puducherry Technological University Act, 2019 (PTU Act) for being inconsistent with Regulation 7.3 of the UGC Regulations, 2018 - held that since UGC Regulations trace their source to Entry 66 of List I (Union List), they possess an overriding effect over State/UT legislations enacted under Entry 25 of List III (Concurrent List) - The Search-cum-Selection Committee for a Vice-Chancellor must necessarily include a nominee of the Chairman, UGC, and its members must not be connected with the University - Key Legal Issues & Rulings – i. Primacy of Entry 66 List I over Entry 25 List III - Supreme Court reiterated that while both the Union and States can legislate on "Education" under Entry 25 of List III, such power is expressly subject to Entry 66 of List I (Coordination and determination of standards) - Any State legislation that impinges upon or dilutes the standards prescribed by the Union under Entry 66 is ultra vires; ii. Mandatory Nature of UGC Regulations - Regulation 7.3 of the UGC Regulations, 2018, which mandates the inclusion of a UGC nominee in the Search-cum-Selection Committee, is an integral component of "standards in higher education." - Section 14(5) of the PTU Act, which omitted this requirement and included a government official (Pro-Chancellor) in the committee, was declared invalid; iii. Doctrine of Repugnancy and Article 254(2) - noted that the doctrine of repugnancy under Article 254 and the need for Presidential assent apply only when both Central and State legislations operate within the Concurrent List - Since the UGC Act and Regulations are referable to List I (Entry 66), the question of curing repugnancy via Article 254(2) does not arise; iv. Exercise of Article 142 Powers - Despite finding the appointment procedure illegal, Supreme Court invoked its extraordinary powers under Article 142 to allow the appellant to complete his tenure (ending December 2026) - This was done to avoid "grave stigma" to the academician and administrative disruption, noting there were no allegations against the appellant's integrity or merit. [Relied on Hoechst Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. State of Bihar (1983) 4 SCC 45; Gambhirdhan K. Gadhvi v. State of Gujarat (2022) 5 SCC 179; Paras 37-43, 46-48, 51-52] Dr. S. Mohan v. Puducherry Technological University, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 96 : 2026 INSC 100
Service Law – Contractual Employment through Third-Party Contractor vs. Direct Contractual Employment – Claim for Minimum Time Scale of Pay – Distinction in Law – The Supreme Court set aside a High Court order directing the Municipal Council to pay the minimum time scale of pay to workers engaged through third-party contractors - held that a valid distinction exists between persons employed directly by a State entity and those engaged through an intermediary contractor - While regular employment involves transparent, merit-based procedures open to all citizens, contractors have absolute discretion in selecting personnel to be sent to the principal employer - Granting equal benefits and status to contractor-engaged workers would sanction an arbitrary recruitment process and bypass constitutional safeguards for public employment. [Relied on Bharat Heavy Electricals Limited vs. Mahendra Prasad Jakhmola and others, (2019) 13 SCC 82; Joint Secretary, Central Board of Secondary Education and Another Vs. Raj Kumar Mishra and Another, Civil Appeal No. 4014 of 2025; Paras 8-11] Municipal Council v. K. Jayaram, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 38
Service Law – Departmental Enquiry – Post-Superannuation – Lack of Jurisdiction – Adoption of Rules – The Supreme Court quashed a departmental enquiry initiated against a retired employee of the Maharashtra State Warehousing Corporation (MSWC) approximately 11 months after his superannuation - Held that in the absence of specific provisions in the Maharashtra State Warehousing Corporation (Staff) Service Regulations, 1992, the Corporation could not ipso facto apply the Maharashtra Civil Services (Pension) Rules, 1982, to initiate proceedings against a retired employee without a conscious decision or resolution by the Board of Directors to adopt such rules - that a public-sector corporation cannot initiate or continue disciplinary proceedings against an employee after retirement in the absence of an express enabling provision in its service regulations. Kadirkhan Ahmedkhan Pathan v. Maharashtra State Warehousing Corporation, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 10 : 2026 INSC 16
Service Law – Disciplinary Proceedings against Judicial Officers – Removal from service based solely on judicial orders – Permissibility – Appellant, a judicial officer with 27 years of unblemished service, was removed for granting bail in four cases under the M.P. Excise Act without expressly mentioning the "twin conditions" of Section 59-A - Held: Merely because a judicial order is wrong, erroneous, or fails to refer to a statutory provision, it cannot be the basis for disciplinary action unless there is evidence of corrupt motive or extraneous consideration - The High Court must exercise great caution and protect honest officers from unmerited onslaughts based on motivated complaints. Order of removal set aside with full back wages. Nirbhay Singh Suliya v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 2 : 2026 INSC 7
Service Law – General Provident Fund (Central Service) Rules, 1960 – Rule 33(ii) – Provident Funds Act, 1925 – Sections 4 & 5 – Rights of Nominee – Release of GPF Dues – The Supreme Court dismissed a Special Leave Petition filed by the Union of India challenging a High Court order that directed the release of GPF amounts to the nominee of a deceased employee - The Government argued that under Section of the Provident Funds Act, 1925, amounts exceeding Rs. 5,000/- require a succession certificate/probate even for a nominee – Supreme Court rejected this, holding that the Rs. 5,000/- threshold established in 1925 has lost relevance due to inflation - held that Rule 33(ii) of the 1960 Rules, framed by the Government itself, stipulates that GPF amounts shall be payable to the nominee regardless of the amount – Held that Section 5(1) of the Act contains a non-obstante clause giving primacy to a valid nominee to receive the funds to the exclusion of others - Sections 4 and 5 of the Act and Rule 33(ii) must be construed harmoniously to avoid rendering the nomination process "otiose" – Noted that a nominee is a "mere trustee" to collect funds and not the beneficial owner - Releasing funds to a nominee does not bar other legal heirs from claiming their share in a competent court – Noted that the Government should not involve itself in protracted litigation regarding the estates of deceased employees, as requiring probate in cases of valid nominations unnecessarily makes the state a party to private disputes – Petition dismissed. [Relied on CIT vs. Hindustan Bulk Carriers, (2003) 3 SCC 5; Sarbati Devi vs. Usha Devi, (1984) 1 SCC 424; Paras 9-15] Union of India v. Paresh Chandra Mondal, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 42
Service Law – Recruitment and Selection – Right to Appointment – Doctrine of Legitimate Expectation – Change in Policy – The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's direction to appoint candidates who completed the Ayurvedic Nursing Training Course from Government institutions without a fresh selection process - held that mere admission to a training course does not confer an automatic right to appointment, especially when the policy environment has shifted – noted that respondents claimed a right to appointment based on a decades-old practice where all 20 candidates from the sole Government college were absorbed into service - Supreme Court noted that since 2012, the State permitted private institutions to impart the same training, leading to an exponential increase in candidates (from 20 seats to 311 institutions by 2019-20) – Held that the doctrine of legitimate expectation cannot be applied where a substantial shift in circumstances and limited vacancies make the earlier practice impossible to sustain. State of Uttar Pradesh v. Bhawana Mishra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 26 : 2026 INSC 38
Service Law – Recruitment – Reserve List/Waiting List – Validity Period – Locus Standi of Public Service Commission (PSC) – The Supreme Court set aside the judgments of the Rajasthan High Court which had directed the appointment of wait-listed candidates after the statutory expiry of the reserve list – Supreme Court noted down following points- i. Locus Standi of PSC to Appeal - held that the Rajasthan Public Service Commission (RPSC) has the locus standi to maintain a writ appeal even if the State (Appointing Authority) does not challenge the order - As a constitutional body under Article 315, the PSC is a "person aggrieved" when judicial directions mandate recommendations that bypass statutory rules or its independent advisory role; ii. Nature of Waiting List: A waiting list is not a perennial source of recruitment and does not confer an indefeasible right to appointment - Its purpose is to address contingencies such as non-joining of selected candidates within the same recruitment cycle; iii. Operation and Expiry of Reserve List (Rule 24/Rule 21): Under Rule 24 of the Rajasthan Legal State and Subordinate Services Rules, 1981, and Rule 21 of the Rajasthan Agriculture Subordinate Service Rules, 1978, the reserve list remains valid for only six months from the date the original list is forwarded to the Appointing Authority; iv. held that the period of validity must be calculated from the date of recommendation, not from the date a vacancy arises due to non-joining; v. Mandamus cannot be issued to "pick up" names from a list that has already expired by the time the writ petition is filed – Supreme Court rejected the plea that because some candidates were recommended after the expiry of the list, others must also be recommended - Article 14 constitutes a positive concept; a court cannot mandate the State to perpetuate an illegality or irregularity committed in favour of others – Appeals allowed. [Relied on U.P. Public Service Commission v. Surendra Kumar, (2018) 10 SCC 535; A.P. Public Service Commission v. Baloji Badhavath, (2009) 5 SCC 1; Tinku v. State of Haryana, 2024 INSC 72; Paras 46-90] Rajasthan Public Service Commission v. Yati Jain, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 52 : 2026 INSC 64
Service Law – Rule 27 of Maharashtra Civil Services (Pension) Rules, 1982 – Mandatory Requirement of Sanction – Held that even if assumed that the 1982 Pension Rules were applicable through the residuary Clause 110 of the 1992 Regulations, observed that Rule 27(2)(b)(i) mandates prior sanction of the Government for instituting proceedings after retirement - rejected the Corporation's argument that a "general sanction" was accorded at the time the 1992 Regulations were originally approved, clarifying that the word 'shall' in the rule implies a mandatory safeguard for each specific case to prevent unwarranted proceedings against superannuated employees – Regulation 110 of the 1992 Regulations is a miscellaneous/residuary provision intended to cover silent areas - it does not confer automatic jurisdiction to initiate departmental enquiries against retired employees unless the Corporation has formally adopted the relevant Government rules at an appropriate level – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Bhagirathi Jena v. Board of Directors, O.S.F.C. and Others, (1999) 3 SCC 666; Girijan Cooperative Corporation Limited Andhra Pradesh v. K. Satyanarayana Rao, (2010) 15 SCC 322; Anant R. Kulkarni v. Y.P. Education Society and Others, (2013) 6 SCC 515; Paras 18-30] Kadirkhan Ahmedkhan Pathan v. Maharashtra State Warehousing Corporation, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 10 : 2026 INSC 16
Service Law – Selection and Recruitment – Migration of Reserved Category Candidates to Unreserved Category – Own Merit – The Supreme Court reiterated the settled legal position that a candidate belonging to a reserved category (SC/ST/OBC) who secures marks higher than or equal to the cut-off marks of the General (Unreserved) category, without availing any concession or relaxation, must be treated as a General category candidate and adjusted against unreserved posts - Such candidates are "own merit" candidates and their selection does not count against the quota earmarked for the backward classes - Migration or "Merit Induced Shift" of reserved category candidates to the open category is a manifestation of the principle of equality - The "Open Category" is not a quota but is available to all candidates regardless of their social category, provided they meet the criterion of merit. Airport Authority of India v. Sham Krishna B, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 63 : 2026 INSC 69
Service Tax — Finance Act, 1994 — Sections 65(40), 65(41), 65(105)(zu), 66A — Reverse charge — “Event Management Service” — Fees paid to foreign booking agencies for procuring speakers for Hindustan Times Leadership Summit — HELD: Not taxable as Event Management Service — Booking of speakers is distinct from managing, organizing, planning, or presenting an event — Mere procurement of speakers does not amount to “event management” — Presence of speakers being essential to the Summit does not convert booking agents into “event managers” — Tax cannot be imposed by stretching the statutory definition — Strict interpretation of taxing statutes must prevail – Further held that i. The contracts with Washington Speakers Bureau and Harry Walker Agency were speaker-booking contracts, not contracts for event management; they did not involve management of venue, logistics, stage, publicity, sound, light, security, invitations, or coordination of the event; ii. “Event management” under Section 65(40) requires services relating to planning, promotion, organizing, or presentation of an event; mere facilitation of a speaker's appearance does not satisfy this test; iii. The CBIC/TRU Circular dated 08.08.2002 supports the assessee, as it contemplates an event manager as one who manages venue, stage, artists, logistics, and production of the event — functions absent in the present case; iv. Even if speakers are central to the Summit, participation in the event is not equivalent to managing the event; booking agents cannot be treated as “event managers”; v. Applying the principle of strict interpretation of taxing statutes, tax cannot be imposed by analogy or inference if the service does not fall squarely within the statutory entry; vi. Applying the common parlance test, ordinary understanding of “event management” does not cover speaker-booking services – Appeals allowed. [Relied on: Shiv Steels v. State of Assam, 2025 SCC Online SC 2006; CST v. Jaswant Singh Charan Singh, 1967 SCC Online SC 154 (Para 46); Indo International Industries v. CST, (1981) 2 SCC 528; Paras 28, 37-41, 44-48] HT Media Ltd. v. Principal Commissioner Delhi South Goods and Service Tax, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 55 : 2026 INSC 66
Specific Relief Act, 1963; Section 41(h) — Injunction when refused — Maintainability of suit for injunction simpliciter when title and possession are in dispute — The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court's decision that a suit for a bare mandatory injunction is not maintainable when there is a serious cloud over the title and possession of the property - the appropriate and efficacious remedy is to seek a decree for possession and declaration of title, rather than mere injunction - A suit for mandatory injunction without seeking possession is barred under Section 41(h) as an equally efficacious relief can be obtained through the usual mode of a suit for possession. [Para 13, 16, 22, 23] Sanjay Paliwal v. Bharat Heavy Electricals Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 54 : 2026 INSC 61
Specific Relief Act, 1963 – Specific Performance – Necessary Parties – While a lis pendens transferee is not a necessary party, the vendor remains a necessary party in a suit for specific performance to fulfill contractual obligations and special covenants - if the vendor's estate is represented by multiple substituted heirs, the death of one such heir without timely substitution of their own LRs does not lead to the abatement of the entire appeal if other heirs of the vendor are still on record – Appeals allowed. [Relied on Mahabir Prasad v. Jage Ram & Others (1971) 1 SCC 265; Bhurey Khan v. Yaseen Khan (Dead) by LRs & Ors. 1995 Supp (3) SCC 331; Satyadhyan Ghosal & Ors. v. Deorajin Debi (Smt.) & Anr. AIR 1960 SC 941; Lala Durga Prasad and Others v. Lala Deep Chand and Others (1953) 2 SCC 509; Shivashankara v. H.P. Vedavyasa Char 2023 LiveLaw SC 261; Paras 36 - 44] Kishorilal v. Gopal, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 39 : 2026 INSC 48
Specific Relief Act, 1963 – Specific Performance – Readiness and Willingness – Equitable Relief – Refund and Restitution – Complete Justice - In a suit for specific performance concerning an Agreement to Sell from 2008, the Supreme Court upheld the High Court's finding that the appellant failed to prove readiness and willingness as he lacked the financial wherewithal to pay the balance consideration of Rs. 5.21 crores on the due date and failed to visit the Sub-Registrar's office - Noted that the respondents also failed to fulfill contractual obligations regarding property mutation and conversion - Holding that the grant of specific performance is not an equitable relief after a passage of seventeen years – Supreme Court emphasized that equity must prevent unjust enrichment and restore parties to their original positions when both are at fault - To adjust equities and bring quietus to a dispute protracted for over a decade, the Supreme Court modified the High Court's order (which had allowed forfeiture of Rs. 60 lakhs earnest money) and directed the respondents to pay a lumpsum amount of Rs. 3,00,00,000/- (Rupees Three Crores) to the appellant for full restitution – Appeal partly allowed. [Paras 5-8] Subhash Aggarwal v. Mahender Pal Chhabra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 6 : 2026 INSC 11
Stamp Act - Agreement to Sell - Stamp Duty - Possession - Relationship between Landlord and Tenant - Andhra Pradesh Stamp Act, 1922 - The Supreme Court addressed whether an agreement to sell, entered into by a tenant who had been in possession of the property for fifty years, should be treated as a "conveyance" for the purpose of charging stamp duty under Explanation I to Article 47A of Schedule I-A of the Andhra Pradesh Stamp Act, 1922 – Supreme Court noted Key Findings – i. Nexus of Possession: For Explanation I to Article 47A to apply, the delivery of possession must have a nexus to the agreement to sell meaning it must "follow" the agreement or be "evidenced" by it as a result of the sale transaction; ii. Continuance of Tenancy: Supreme Court noted that the appellant's possession remained that of a tenant and was not converted to that of a vendee - This was evidenced by the fact that the respondent successfully pursued an eviction order against the appellant as a tenant even after the agreement to sell was executed; iii. Nature of Agreement: Since the possession was not "followed by" or "evidenced" as a result of the agreement to sell, but rather preceded it by fifty years due to a pre-existing tenancy, the agreement did not constitute a "deemed conveyance" - The Supreme Court set aside the orders of the Trial Court and High Court, ruling that the appellant was not liable for additional stamp duty or penalty and directing the Trial Court to mark the agreement as an Exhibit. [Distinguished from Ramesh Mishrimal Jain vs. Avinash Vishwanath Patne, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 329; Paras 6-12] Vayyaeti Srinivasarao v. Gaineedi Jagajyothi, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 49 : 2026 INSC 59
Tender Process – Comparison of Dissimilar Plots – Irrationality – the Ghaziabad Development Authority (GDA) cancelled the appellant's bid for a 3150 sq. metre plot on the ground that smaller plots (123-132 sq. metres) fetched higher rates per square metre - Held, the subject plot (large industrial area) cannot be compared with smaller plots as demand for the former is scarce - Cancelling a bid based on such comparison constitutes an "irrelevant consideration" and is "arbitrary, whimsical, and irrational". Golden Food Products India v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 22 : 2026 INSC 22
Trademarks Act, 1999 – Title and Registration – The Supreme Court clarified that the NCLT and NCLAT are not the appropriate fora to decide highly contentious issues of trademark title involving technical collaboration agreements, contingent assignments, and the effect of BIFR restraint orders - Supreme Court set aside findings on title from both the NCLT and NCLAT, leaving the parties free to litigate the issue of title before a competent civil court or authority. [Relied on Gujarat Urja Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Amit Gupta (2021) 7 SCC 209; Tata Consultancy Services Ltd. v. SK Wheels (P) Ltd. (2022) 2 SCC 583; SREI Multiple Asset Investment Trust Vision India Fund v. Deccan Chronicle Marketeers (2023) 7 SCC 295; Ebix Singapore (P) Ltd. v. Educomp Solutions Ltd. (CoC) (2022) 2 SCC 401; Paras 26- 47] Gloster Cables Ltd. v. Fort Gloster Industries Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 80 : 2026 INSC 81
Transfer of Property Act, 1882 – Section 52 – Doctrine of Lis Pendens – Specific Performance – Execution of Decree – Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Order XXI Rules 35, 97, 98, 101, and 102 – Specific Relief Act, 1963 – Section 19(b) – The Supreme Court reaffirmed that a purchaser who acquires property during the pendency of litigation, as a transferee pendente lite, has no right to obstruct the execution of the decree and remains bound by the outcome of the proceedings, holding the transfer strictly subservient to the decree - Key findings held i. Doctrine of Lis Pendens and Transferee Pendente Lite: The principle of lis pendens enshrined in Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, is based on equity, good conscience, justice, and public policy - A transferee pendente lite is bound by the ultimate decree of the court, irrespective of whether they had notice of the pending suit or acted in good faith; ii. Registration of Lis Pendens (Bombay Amendment): Under the Maharashtra amendment to Section 52, once a notice of lis pendens is registered, the property cannot be transferred or dealt with so as to affect the rights of any party under a subsequent decree - The lack of knowledge of the proceedings is not a valid defense against the application of this doctrine; iii. Execution against Obstructionists: In execution proceedings for the delivery of immovable property, the Executing Court has the mandate under Order XXI Rule 97 and Rule 98 CPC to remove any person bound by the decree, including a transferee pendente lite, who resists or obstructs possession; iv. Adjudication of Rights in Execution: All questions relating to the right, title, or interest of an obstructionist arising under Order XXI Rule 97 must be determined by the Executing Court under Rule 101 and not by a separate suit - For transferees pendente lite, their title is subservient to the decree and is effectively extinguished by the court-executed sale deed; v. Interplay between Specific Relief Act and Transfer of Property Act: While Section 19(b) of the Specific Relief Act protects subsequent transferees for value without notice at a stage prior to the institution of a suit, it must give way to Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act once a suit is instituted – Appeals dismissed. [Relied on Celir LLP v. Somati Prasad Bafna (2024 SCC Online SC 3727); Sanjay Verma v. Manik Roy (2006) 13 SCC 608; Guruswamy Nadar v. P. Lakshmi Ammal (2008) 5 SCC 796; Jayaram Mudaliar v. Ayyaswami (1972) 2 SCC 200; Danesh Singh v. Har Pyari (2025 SCC OnLine SC 2805); Paras 41-64] Alka Shrirang Chavan v. Hemchandra Rajaram Bhonsale, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 44 : 2026 INSC 52
Transfer of Property Act, 1882 – Section 58(c) – Mortgage by Conditional Sale vs. Outright Sale – No transaction shall be deemed a mortgage by conditional sale unless the condition for reconveyance is embodied in the document that effects or purports to effect the sale - In the absence of such a clause in the registered Sale Deed, the transaction cannot be construed as a mortgage by conditional sale. [Paras 44 - 49] Hemalatha v. Tukaram, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 79 : 2026 INSC 82
Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 – Sections 43D(5), 13, 15, 16, 17 and 18 – Grant of Bail – Prolonged Incarceration vs. Statutory Bar – Constitutional Perspective under Article 21 – Role Differentiation in Conspiracy – Governing Principles for Bail under UAPA - emphasized that the "prima facie true" standard under Section 43D(5) does not reduce the judicial role to a mechanical acceptance of prosecution assertions, but requires a threshold inquiry of real content- i. Contextual Inquiry into Delay - that the constitutional inquiry into delay is not an inquiry into guilt, but whether continued detention remains constitutionally permissible. This is "necessarily contextual" and includes factors like the nature of allegations, the trial's realistic trajectory, and causes contributing to delay – ii. Individualized Role Differentiation- Supreme Court rejected a "case-centric" approach in favor of an "accused-specific" one. It distinguished between those with "strategic, organisational, or ideological centrality" and those whose roles were "peripheral or episodic"- iii. Speedy Trial vs. Statutory Embargo - While recognizing the right to a speedy trial as a foundational guarantee under Article 21, the Court held that "delay simpliciter" does not automatically eclipse the statutory regime enacted by Parliament for special category offences. Gulfisha Fatima v. State (Govt of NCT of Delhi), 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 1 : 2026 INSC 2
Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 (ULC Act) — Section 10(3), 10(5) and 10(6) — Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Repeal Act, 1999 — Sections 3 and 4 — Mandatory requirement of notice for taking possession - The Supreme Court examined whether the mere "paper possession" recorded by the State, without serving the mandatory notice under Section 10(5) to the actual possessors of the land, would prevent the abatement of proceedings under Section 4 of the Repealing Act – Supreme Court of India has held that proceedings under the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 would abate under the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Repeal Act, 1999 if the State failed to take actual physical possession of the excess land in accordance with law, including by serving mandatory notice on the persons in possession under Section 10(5) of the ULC Act - Held that section 10 of the ULC Act distinguishes between the "vesting" of land (acquisition of title/interest) and the "taking of possession." Under Section 10(3), what vests is de jure possession, not de facto (actual physical) possession – For the State to acquire de facto possession, it must follow one of three methods: i. Voluntary surrender by the landholder; ii. Peaceful surrender following a mandatory written notice under Section 10(5) served upon the person in possession; iii. Forceful dispossession under Section 10(6) only if the person fails to comply with the Section 10(5) notice - In the absence of evidence showing actual physical possession was taken after serving notice on the appellants (who were in actual possession), the State's claim of "paper possession" is insufficient. Consequently, the proceedings relating to the land abate by operation of law under Section 4 of the Repealing Act – Appeal allowed. [Relied on State of Uttar Pradesh vs. Hari Ram, (2013) 4 SCC 280; AP Electrical Equipment Corporation vs. Tahsildar, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 447; Paras 19-23] Dalsukhbhai Bachubhai Satasia v. State of Gujarat, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 20 : 2026 INSC 21
Waqf Act, 1995 – Effect of 2013 Amendment – Overruling of Precedents – Noted that the 2013 Amendment removed the sub-stratum of the decision in Ramesh Gobindram v. Sugra Humayun Mirza Wakf only regarding the Tribunal's lack of power to remove encroachers (now covered under Section 54) - the larger principle that the Tribunal's jurisdiction is limited to specific statutory powers remains valid - Supreme Court found the expansive interpretation of Section 83 in Rashid Wali Beg v. Farid Pindari to be divergent from the correct legal position established in Ramesh Gobindram. Habib Alladin v. Mohammed Ahmed, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 88 : 2026 INSC 90
Waqf Act, 1995 – Sections 6, 7, 83, and 85 – Jurisdiction of Waqf Tribunal vs. Civil Court – Ouster of Civil Court Jurisdiction – Rejection of Plaint under Order VII Rule 11 CPC – The Supreme Court reaffirmed that the jurisdiction of the Waqf Tribunal to determine whether a property is a waqf property or not is limited to properties specified in the "list of auqaf" - The "list of auqaf," as expanded by the 2013 Amendment, includes both lists published after a survey under Chapter II and registrations made under Chapter V (Section 37) - Section 83 is not an omnibus provision conferring expansive jurisdiction on the Tribunal for any dispute relating to waqf; rather, it enables the constitution of the Tribunal for matters specifically required "under the Act" to be determined by it - The ouster of Civil Court jurisdiction under Section 85 is not absolute and is confined only to matters expressly conferred upon the Tribunal by the statute. Habib Alladin v. Mohammed Ahmed, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 88 : 2026 INSC 90