Administrative Law — Public Trust Doctrine — Prospective Regularisation based on Market Value — Reference date for valuation – Held that accepting the Banthia Committee's methodology, once an allotment is judicially declared illegal, the original concessional price becomes entirely irrelevant - Regularisation is not a continuation of the original transaction but a prospective...
Administrative Law — Public Trust Doctrine — Prospective Regularisation based on Market Value — Reference date for valuation – Held that accepting the Banthia Committee's methodology, once an allotment is judicially declared illegal, the original concessional price becomes entirely irrelevant - Regularisation is not a continuation of the original transaction but a prospective fresh grant of legal legitimacy - The entity seeking regularisation must bear the full cost of legality based on the fair market value (Ready Reckoner rate) as on the date of the High Court's judgment declaring the illegality (November 2014), along with interest, rather than a discounted historical price. [Paras 34 - 37] K. Raheja Corp. v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 575 : 2026 INSC 551
Administrative Law — Regularisation Terms and Pricing — Methodology for Financial Restitution — Rejection of Parity Principle — Computation of regularisation premium for an illegal allotment - Developer sought parity with other co-operative housing societies and individual allottees regularised under a 2005 policy based on historical rates – Held - The principle of equality under Article 14 does not require unequals to be treated as equals - A large commercial enterprise developing a 10,50,000 sq. feet complex cannot claim parity with housing societies or individuals - historical valuations frozen at the time of the irregular allotment (2005 Sankaran Committee methodology) cannot form the baseline for regularisation decades later, as it allows the wrongdoer to benefit from frozen lower land values. [Paras 30 - 33] K. Raheja Corp. v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 575 : 2026 INSC 551
Anticipatory Bail - Cancellation of - Abuse of Authority by Law Enforcers - The Supreme Court set aside the order of the High Court granting anticipatory bail to three police officers accused of extorting cash from a citizen in exchange for a gold bar recovered during a search. The anticipatory bail granted by the High Court was cancelled. When police officers, who are duty-bound to protect citizens, themselves indulge in extortion, it creates a serious dilemma for citizens who have no option but to seek protection from the very authority that is abusing its power. The Court expressed strong disapproval of such uniformed excesses. State of Maharashtra v. Rahul Datta Bhosale, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 592 : 2026 INSC 596
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 - Directions - Appeal by MPRDC against the arbitral award of ₹49 crores + 14.75% pre-award interest dismissed - High Court directed to release the deposited amount with interest to the respondent within two weeks. Appellant directed to pay the balance award amount with accrued interest within three months. Madhya Pradesh Road Development Corporation Ltd. v. Jabalpur Corridor Pvt. Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 580 : 2026 INSC 590
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 - Ease of Doing Business & Foreign Investment - Uniformity, predictability, certainty, and finality in arbitral proceedings and their enforcement are essential for improving India's ease of doing business and attracting foreign investment. Excessive judicial re-examination of evidence and contractual terms at Sections 34/37 undermines party autonomy and investor confidence. Madhya Pradesh Road Development Corporation Ltd. v. Jabalpur Corridor Pvt. Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 580 : 2026 INSC 590
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 - Finality and Res Judicata in Arbitration - Once a jurisdictional issue (here, arbitrability vis-à-vis the Madhya Pradesh Madhyastham Adhikaran Adhiniyam, 1983) has been raised, adjudicated by the arbitral tribunal, and affirmed through multiple judicial forums including the Supreme Court, it attains finality between the parties. A subsequent change in law (e.g., *LG Chaudhary II*) cannot be used to reopen the issue at the execution/enforcement stage. Attempting to do so amounts to abuse of process. Madhya Pradesh Road Development Corporation Ltd. v. Jabalpur Corridor Pvt. Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 580 : 2026 INSC 590
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 - Judicial Interference in Arbitration - Arbitration as a dispute resolution mechanism has not failed in India; however, courts have sometimes failed arbitration by excessive and unwarranted interference. Judicial intervention has often proved to be “a cure without a disease”. Madhya Pradesh Road Development Corporation Ltd. v. Jabalpur Corridor Pvt. Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 580 : 2026 INSC 590
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 - Judicial Restraint - Judges handling arbitration matters must remain conscious of the foundational objectives of the Arbitration Act — speedy resolution, finality, and minimal judicial interference. Inconsistent judicial approaches cast a shadow on the viability of arbitration in India. Judicial restraint is the cornerstone of a successful arbitration ecosystem. Once an arbitral award attains finality on jurisdictional and other issues, repeated attempts to reopen it through successive proceedings must be firmly discouraged. Madhya Pradesh Road Development Corporation Ltd. v. Jabalpur Corridor Pvt. Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 580 : 2026 INSC 590
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 - Pre-Award Interest - A contractually agreed pre-award interest rate cannot be assailed as being contrary to public policy of India under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. Madhya Pradesh Road Development Corporation Ltd. v. Jabalpur Corridor Pvt. Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 580 : 2026 INSC 590
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; Section 33 & Section 34(3) – Limitation for filing Application to set aside Arbitral Award – Commencement of Limitation after disposal of Section 33 application - The Supreme Court held that once the jurisdiction of the Arbitral Tribunal under Section 33 of the Act is formally invoked, the limitation period of three months prescribed under Section 34(3) for challenging the arbitral award commences only from the date on which the Section 33 request is disposed of by the Tribunal - Supreme Court clarified that Section 34(3) does not distinguish between applications under Section 33 that are ultimately allowed or dismissed, nor does it restrict the benefit of deferred limitation only to applications that are found to be "maintainable" - Whether the application under Section 33 succeeds, fails, or is found to warrant no modification is not determinative; what matters is that the jurisdiction was formally invoked and the proceedings remained pending. [Paras 13-19] National Highway Authority of India v. T. Younis, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 589 : 2026 INSC 616
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; Section 33 & Section 34(3) – Prevention of Abuse of Process - Supreme Court cautioned that where applications under Section 33 are found to be sham, frivolous, or mala fide, or solely filed to defeat the limitation under Section 34(3) of the Act, courts are justified in imposing exemplary and punitive costs to maintain the balance between preserving legitimate remedies and preventing the abuse of the process of law. [Para 17, 18] National Highway Authority of India v. T. Younis, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 589 : 2026 INSC 616
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; Section 34(3) – Distinction from cases without formal invocation - The Supreme Court distinguished the present case from its earlier ruling in State of Arunachal Pradesh v. Damani Construction Co. (2007) 10 SCC 742 - held that the reliance on Damani Construction is misplaced where formal applications under Section 33 are admittedly filed within the statutory period and entertained by the Tribunal - In Damani Construction, the party had merely written a letter seeking a review/clarification outside the contours of Section 33 without formally invoking the Tribunal's jurisdiction. [Para 16] National Highway Authority of India v. T. Younis, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 589 : 2026 INSC 616
Bail - Cancellation of - A coordinate Bench of the High Court is not powerless to cancel bail granted by another coordinate Bench where the bail was secured by placing incorrect or wrong facts before the Court. If it comes to the notice of the Court that bail has been obtained by suppression or misrepresentation of material facts, it can always examine the matter and pass appropriate orders, including cancellation of bail. Suraj Mahananda v. State of West Bengal, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 586
Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) — Section 442 (erstwhile Section 401 of CrPC) — Revisional Jurisdiction of the High Court — Judicial Restraint vs. Indulgence — High Court's order permitting the accused to travel to the USA for medical treatment, on the ground that he appeared before the Magistrate on 12 previous occasions and undertook to return within 6 months, held to be an unsustainable exercise of indulgence rather than judicial restraint - The Supreme Court observed that the trial had not commenced even after 10 years of filing the chargesheet due to the proactive role of the accused in initiating multifarious proceedings and securing interim protections, including the misuse of an order suspending a Look Out Circular (LoC) to leave the country without court permission - comparable medical facilities exist domestically in India. [Paras 8, 9] Seesa Santosh v. State of Telangana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 603 : 2026 INSC 628
Central Excise Act, 1944 – Section 2(f) – Burden of Proof and Standard of Proof for Marketability – The burden of establishing that a transformed product is "marketable" or "capable of being marketed" lies entirely on the Revenue - Marketability is a question of fact that must be proved through objective evidence of trade parlance and commercial understanding, showing that the product can stand independently in the market as a distinct article - A mere assertion, a hypothetical possibility of sale, or the mistaken past conduct of an assessee paying duty under a bona fide error cannot discharge this burden - The standard of proof to be met by the Revenue is that of preponderance of probabilities, calibrated proportionately to the nature, rarity, or character of the specific goods in question. [Relied on Navin Chemicals Manufacturing & Trading Co. Ltd. v. Collector of Customs, (1993) 4 SCC 320; Servo-Med Industries (P) Ltd. v. CCE, (2015) 14 SCC 47; Union of India v. Delhi Cloth & General Mills Co. Ltd., 1962 SCC OnLine SC 148; Moti Laminates (P) Ltd. v. CCE, (1995) 3 SCC 23 ; Paras 84-95] Alupro Building Systems Pvt. Ltd v. Commissioner of Central Excise Bangalore-II, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 599 : 2026 INSC 582
Central Excise Act, 1944 – Section 2(f) – Definition of "Manufacture" – Two-fold Test – Transformation and Marketability – Process of cutting, grooving (routing), and bending Aluminum Composite Panels (ACPs) to specific sizes for installation on building facades does not amount to "manufacture" – What enters the process is an ACP consisting of two aluminum sheets bonded to a polyethylene core, and what emerges is still an ACP cut to a particular size – The essential character, material properties, and commercial identity of the goods remain entirely unchanged – The process merely adapts the dimensions and shape of the panels to facilitate their specific use or installation as cladding, which amounts to superficial changes rather than a transformation into a distinct commercial product. [Paras 65 - 76] Alupro Building Systems Pvt. Ltd v. Commissioner of Central Excise Bangalore-II, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 599 : 2026 INSC 582
Central Excise Act, 1944 – Section 35G(1) and Section 35L(1)(b) – Appellate Jurisdiction of High Court vs. Supreme Court – Dispute on Excisability of Goods – An appeal involving the determination of the taxability or excisability of goods goes to the root of assessment and is intrinsically connected with the "rate of duty" - Under Section 35G(1), the High Court's appellate jurisdiction explicitly excludes orders relating to the determination of any question having a relation to the rate of duty of excise or the value of goods for the purpose of assessment - the appropriate remedy against an order of the Appellate Tribunal determining the excisability of a product lies exclusively before the Supreme Court under Section 35L, and not the High Court. [Paras 19-38] Alupro Building Systems Pvt. Ltd v. Commissioner of Central Excise Bangalore-II, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 599 : 2026 INSC 582
Central Excise Act, 1944 – Section 35L(2) [as inserted by the Finance (No. 2) Act, 2014] – Nature of Amendment – Clarificatory and Retrospective Application – Sub-section (2) of Section 35L, which explicitly states that the determination of any question having relation to the rate of duty shall include the determination of taxability or excisability of goods, is clarificatory and declaratory in nature - It does not create new liabilities or a new right of appeal, but merely makes explicit what was already implicit in the structural scheme of Sections 35G and 35L - the presumption against retrospectivity does not apply, and the amendment operates retrospectively. [Paras 43-53] Alupro Building Systems Pvt. Ltd v. Commissioner of Central Excise Bangalore-II, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 599 : 2026 INSC 582
Civil and Criminal Remedies – Parallel Proceedings – Inordinate Delay in Filing FIR - A long, unexplained delay in lodging an FIR in a case arising from a civil dispute raises strong suspicion of mala fide intent, vengeance, or an attempt to harass the other party after failing or anticipating failure in the civil proceedings. A frustrated litigant cannot be permitted to use criminal machinery as a weapon of harassment. The absence of a limitation period for criminal prosecution does not justify inordinate delay when the facts were known to the complainant for decades. Appeal allowed. Criminal proceedings quashed. [Relied on: Kishan Singh v. Gurpal Singh, (2010) 8 SCC 775] Nazibul Rahim Khan v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 608 : 2026 INSC 619
Civil and Criminal Remedies – Parallel Proceedings – Inordinate Delay in Filing FIR - Where civil and criminal remedies are available on the same cause of action and based on the same set of facts, both proceedings can be maintained. However, if an aggrieved person elects to invoke both remedies, there must not be an unreasonable or inordinate delay between the institution of the civil suit and the lodging of the FIR. An unexplained delay of 23 years in filing the FIR after instituting a civil suit on identical allegations is sufficient ground to quash the criminal proceedings. The Supreme Court quashed the FIR registered in 2024 against the appellants in respect of a property dispute involving an allegedly forged Power of Attorney and sale deed, when the respondent-complainant had already filed a civil suit in 2001 raising the very same allegations. Nazibul Rahim Khan v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 608 : 2026 INSC 619
Civil Services (Compassionate Financial Assistance or Appointment) Rules, 2019 (Haryana) — Rules 2, 5(1)(a), 5(1)(b), 5(1)(f), 5(1)(g), 7, and 23 — Compassionate Appointment vs. Compassionate Financial Assistance — Structural Distinction — Applicability of Suspension Clause during Pendency of Criminal Proceedings – Held that Rule 23(1) Applies Exclusively to Financial Assistance, Not Compassionate Appointment - The plain, unambiguous language and text of Rule 23(1), as well as its marginal heading, confine its operation strictly to "compassionate financial assistance" - It contains no express or implicit reference to "compassionate appointment" - Extending a provision textually confined to financial assistance to cover compassionate appointment would amount to judicial legislation rather than statutory interpretation - Purposive construction cannot be used to override unambiguous text or plug a perceived legislative gap - The Rules of 2019 maintain a meticulous and deliberate structural separation between the two forms of relief across all definitional, procedural, eligibility, and administrative domains - Rule 5(1)(a) defines financial assistance as a monthly monetary payment, whereas Rule 5(1)(b) defines compassionate appointment as public employment - The two are qualitatively distinct forms of relief - The omission of "compassionate appointment" from Rule 23(1) must be regarded as deliberate - Absence of Sequential Hierarchical Bar for Compassionate Appointment - Rule 5(1)(f) (defining family for financial assistance) utilizes a strict cascading sequencing mechanism using the word "failing" across multiple sub-clauses, creating a mandatory priority bar - Rule 5(1)(g) (defining family for compassionate appointment) merely lists eligible categories (widow/widower, children, dependent siblings) and completely omits any "failing" or conditional language - no absolute statutory bar prevents the consideration of a child's claim for compassionate appointment solely because the widow's claim has not been conclusively determined, particularly where the widow has explicitly renounced her claim - Constitutional Validity of Rule 23(1) Upheld within its Proper Domain - Rule 23(1) is constitutionally valid and does not offend Article 14 of the Constitution - It is a temporary, regulatory, and preventive measure not a penal one aimed at preventing a person criminally culpable for an employee's death from accessing the welfare scheme - The classification has a rational nexus with its object - its validity does not extend its applicability to the field of compassionate appointment, which it does not govern – The Supreme Court noted a significant anomaly in the Rules of 2019: the lesser form of relief (financial assistance) is suspended during criminal trials for the murder of the employee, while the substantially greater form of relief (permanent public employment) lacks a corresponding safeguarding provision - While the Court cannot rewrite the rules to rectify this lacuna, it is strongly desirable for the State Government to introduce appropriate amendments to bridge this legislative gap. [Relied on Tinku v. State of Haryana, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 329; M.P. State Agricultural Marketing Board v. Harpal Singh, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2925; Paras 15-45] Atul Chauhan v. State of Haryana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 630 : 2026 INSC 640
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Order VIII Rule 9 - A defendant cannot be permitted to radically alter or retract her stand in a civil suit by filing an additional written statement under Order VIII Rule 9 CPC after the commencement of trial, particularly when the new plea is wholly inconsistent with the original defence. A party cannot, under the garb of an additional written statement, introduce a completely contradictory case to achieve what is otherwise barred by the proviso to Order VI Rule 17 CPC (amendment of pleadings after trial has begun). Such an attempt amounts to an abuse of process of court and is impermissible under Order VI Rule 7 CPC, which prohibits a party from raising allegations inconsistent with its previous pleadings except by way of amendment. Mondira Ghosh v. Chaitali Ghosh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 579 : 2026 INSC 545
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Order VIII Rule 9 - The plaintiff filed a suit for declaration of unlawful possession and eviction. In her original written statement, the defendant claimed to be a bona fide co-sharer. After framing of issues and extensive cross-examination of the plaintiff's witness, the defendant sought to file an additional written statement along with a counterclaim, claiming instead that she was a tenant under the plaintiff. The Trial Court rejected the application. The High Court, however, permitted filing of the additional written statement (subject to costs) while rejecting the counterclaim. Allowing the plaintiff's appeal, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court's order and restored the Trial Court's rejection. The Court held that the defendant's attempt was a clear volte-face and a belated attempt to overcome the statutory embargo on amendments after trial had commenced. The filing of such an application at an advanced stage of the trial was held to be a clear abuse of process. Mondira Ghosh v. Chaitali Ghosh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 579 : 2026 INSC 545
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Order XII Rule 6 – Judgment on Admission – In a dispute relating to distribution of sale proceeds of a jointly owned agricultural property sold for ₹15.31 crore, the plaintiff sought a decree under Order XII Rule 6 CPC against defendant No.3 for recovery of ₹44,79,167/- on the basis of an alleged admission in the written statement that each co-owner had received ₹3 crore under a family settlement. The District Court rejected the application, holding that the matter required trial. The High Court allowed the revision and decreed the suit. The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's order and restored the District Court's order, holding that there was no clear, unconditional admission of liability by defendant No.3, and the issues involved disputed questions of fact which could only be decided after full trial. Pushpa v. Dayawati, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 610 : 2026 INSC 603
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Order XII Rule 6 – Judgment on Admission – Key principles laid down: 1. Every statement made by a party in the pleadings does not automatically entitle the plaintiff to a decree under Order XII Rule 6 CPC. The admission must be unambiguous and must clearly establish the liability of the defendant towards the plaintiff. 2. Pleadings cannot be read in a piecemeal manner; they must be construed holistically. 3. Disputed questions of fact cannot be resolved by way of judgment on admission. 4. Revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 CPC is limited and cannot be exercised by the High Court to substitute its own interpretation of the written statement merely because another view is possible, in the absence of jurisdictional error or material irregularity. Pushpa v. Dayawati, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 610 : 2026 INSC 603
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Order XII Rule 6 – Judgment on Admission – Requirements of clear, unequivocal and unconditional Admission - Held, a decree under Order XII Rule 6 CPC can be passed only where the admission by the defendant is clear, categorical, unconditional and unequivocal. A mere reference to statements or inconsistencies does not amount to an admission sufficient for granting judgment on admission when disputed questions of fact exist which require adjudication in a full-fledged trial. Pushpa v. Dayawati, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 610 : 2026 INSC 603
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Second Appeal under Section 100 CPC – Reversal of Concurrent Decrees on Irrelevant Considerations – Substitution of Relief Without Prayer or Consent – Permissibility – Held that the High Court cannot set aside a concurrent decree for mandatory injunction and compel the plaintiffs to accept monetary compensation in the absence of any prayer for damages/compensation made by the plaintiff or consent given by their legal heirs - The High Court committed a grave error by reversing the well-reasoned decrees of the Trial Court and first Appellate Court to direct the Executing Court to assess the value of an illegal construction for monetary compensation - Such a course is entirely unsupported by Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, because once a decree is set aside, no executable decree remains in the field for the Executing Court to act upon - a Second Appeal cannot be disposed of by answering hypothetical questions in favor of the defendants without properly formulating and adjudicating actual substantial questions of law under Section 100 CPC - Impugned judgments set aside, and matters remanded to the High Court for fresh, expeditious disposal on merits - the Supreme Court explicitly held that modifying decrees and awarding monetary compensation without entering into the merits of the controversy or framing substantial questions of law is legally impermissible - The High Court's failure to adhere to this binding historical remand order in the same case structure forms the primary basis of the current reversal. [Relied on Rajat Kumar & Ors. v. S D Adarsh Jain Kanya Maha Vidyalaya Sadhaura & Ors. (Civil Appeal Nos. 8203 of 2013 and 8281 of 2013; Paras 5, 6] Rajat Kumar v. S.D. Adarsh Jain Kanya Maha Vidyalaya Sadhaura, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 637 : 2026 INSC 648
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Section 100 – Second Appeal – Scope of interference with concurrent findings –High Court is not justified in interfering with concurrent findings of fact unless such findings are shown to be perverse, based on no evidence, or suffering from material illegality or misreading of evidence - Merely because another possible view may arise from the same material on record does not justify interference under Section 100 CPC – noted that to emphasize that where two inferences are possible from a set of circumstances, the one drawn by the lower appellate court is binding on the High Court in second appeal. [Relied on Kondiba Dagadu Kadam v. Savitribai Sopan Gujar (1999) 3 SCC 722] A. Shahul Hameed v. N. Malligarjuna, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 604 : 2026 INSC 573
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Section 392 – Anomalous and Irrational Consequences – The Supreme Court pointed out that a mechanical application of Sajjan Singh could lead to highly undesirable or discriminatory results under Article 14 - if a Division Bench unanimously decides to acquit two convicts but divides on the third, sending the entire composite appeal to a third Judge could put the unanimously acquitted persons at risk of conviction - in a State appeal against acquittal, it could risk the conviction of individuals whose acquittals were unanimously favoured by the Division Bench - Expressing its respectful disagreement with the coordinate bench ruling in Sajjan Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (1999) 1 SCC 315, the Bench referred the question of whether Sajjan Singh lays down the correct law to a larger Bench to be constituted by the Hon'ble Chief Justice of India. [Paras 35-41] Dr. Rakesh Kumar Gupta v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 615 : 2026 INSC 632
Code of criminal procedure, 1973 – section 392 – scope of referee judge's jurisdiction in composite appeals – difference of opinion – Whether a third Judge, upon a reference under Section 392 CrPC due to a division of opinion regarding one co-accused, can reopen and examine the case of other co-accused whose convictions were unanimously upheld by the Division Bench – Supreme Court doubted the correctness of its two-judge bench decision in Sajjan Singh v. State of M.P. (1999) – Matter referred to a larger Bench - Statutory Interpretation of Section 392 CrPC – "An Appeal" vs "The Appeal" – The Supreme Court highlighted the significant linguistic shift from Section 429 of the 1898 Code (which used "the case") to Section 392 of the 1973 Code (which uses "an appeal" and "the appeal") - Highlighting the anaphoric use of the definite article, the Supreme Court observed that while the indefinite article "an appeal" triggers the provision for any appeal resulting in a divided opinion, the definite article "the appeal" limits the referee Judge's jurisdiction strictly to the specific instance or individual appeal where the division occurred - Merely because multiple convicts file a composite joint appeal, it cannot mean that a unanimous decision dismissing the appeal against some convicts can be reopened by the third Judge if the division of opinion relates only to another co-accused. [Relied Bhagat Ram v. State of Rajasthan, (1972) 2 SCC 466; Paras 29 – 32] Dr. Rakesh Kumar Gupta v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 615 : 2026 INSC 632
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 — Section 464 — Defect, Omission, or Irregularity in Charge — Absence of Prejudice - No finding or sentence is invalid due to an error, omission, or defect in the framing of charges unless a failure of justice has been occasioned - Where the accused's name was initially included in the charge framing order for offenses under Sections 302/120-B IPC, and the accused pleaded not guilty and claimed trial, they were fully cognizant of the case against them - If the witnesses were thoroughly cross-examined by the defense counsel regarding the murder charge, no prejudice is caused to the accused, and the trial is not vitiated. [Paras 41 - 43] Gopi Chand @ Pappu v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 609 : 2026 INSC 598
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) — Section 482 — Quashing of FIR — Civil Dispute Given a Criminal Colour — Extraordinary Delay — Improvement in Subsequent Complaint - Criminal proceedings cannot be permitted to become a weapon of harassment and coercion in disputes predominantly concerning title over immovable property - High Court erred in refusing to exercise its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the CrPC where a long-standing property dispute pending before civil courts since the year 2000 was converted into criminal proceedings - In frivolous or vexatious proceedings, the Supreme Court owes a duty to look into attending circumstances emerging from the record over and above the averments in the FIR - Where the initial complaint dated 21.05.2009 did not contain any allegation of extortion, demand of money, or criminal intimidation, but a subsequent FIR lodged after seven months introduced these grave allegations for the first time, such material improvements support the contention that the criminal proceedings are an afterthought to criminalize a civil dispute - An unexplained and extraordinary delay of nearly eight to nine years in registering the FIR (incidents pertaining to 2001, FIR registered in 2009), coupled with circumstances creating serious doubt about the genuineness of the prosecution, warrants quashing - A State Government Circular discouraging registration of FIRs in civil disputes cannot justify the complete inaction of the complainant who was actively litigating before civil courts and had alternative legal remedies available under Sections 154(3), 156(3), and 200 of the CrPC. [Relied on Mohd. Wajid v. State of U.P., (2023) 20 SCC 219; State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, AIR 1992 SC 604; Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 315; Paras 30-60] Bhikhubhai Govindbhai Patel v. State of Gujarat, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 593 : 2026 INSC 532
Companies Act, 2013 – Voting Rights at AGM by Juristic Members (Societies/Trusts) – “Vote-Cast-First” Rule Rejected - Where rival groups within a society/trust claim authority to exercise voting rights attached to shares held by such juristic member in a company's Annual General Meeting, the validity of the vote is not determined by priority in point of time. The vote must be cast only by the person(s) lawfully authorised under the society's governing documents (such as its constitution, rules, or trust deed) and in accordance with the statutory framework under the Companies Act, 2013 and the Companies (Management and Administration) Rules, 2014. The Supreme Court held that the statutory scheme relating to remote e-voting does not recognise chronology as the basis for determining the validity of a vote. Once a valid vote is cast on behalf of a member, the member cannot vote again. Courts cannot substitute the principle of “first in time” for the requirement of lawful authority. The High Court's direction that the first vote cast on behalf of a society would prevail, irrespective of the source of authority (Board of Trustees or Managing Committee), was set aside as being contrary to law. The validity of a vote cast on behalf of a society cannot be determined merely by priority in point of time and must rest upon lawful authority traceable to the governing documents of the society and the statutory framework governing voting. Hindustan Medical Institution v. Birla Corporation, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 583 : 2026 INSC 554
Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953 (U.P.) - Jurisdiction of Consolidation Authorities vis-à-vis Registered Instruments – Void vs. Voidable Documents – While Consolidation Authorities are exclusively invested with powers to adjudicate claims and can choose to disregard a document that is void ab initio, they possess no jurisdiction or power to cancel or ignore a "voidable" document - A voidable document continues to remain valid and binding upon the Consolidation Authorities until and unless it is explicitly set aside or cancelled by a competent Civil Court. [Relied on Khursheed and Another vs. Shaqoor, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2929; Ram Sakal Singh vs. Mosamat Monako Devi, (1997) 5 SCC 192; Paras 46 – 49] Sarafat Ali v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 642 : 2026 INSC 652
Constitution of India - Article 235 - The Registrar General of a High Court has no independent or suo motu authority to initiate disciplinary proceedings against a judicial officer. The power of disciplinary control over judicial officers under Article 235 of the Constitution is vested collectively in the High Court, comprising the Chief Justice and the companion Judges. The Registrar General can act only as a delegate on behalf of the Chief Justice or a committee of Judges duly constituted by the Chief Justice. Any disciplinary action initiated without the approval or authorisation of the Chief Justice or such a committee suffers from a jurisdictional infirmity and is void ab initio. High Court of Uttarakhand v. Deepali Sharma, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 623
Constitution of India - Article 329 - Representation of the People Act, 1951 - A writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution challenging the rejection of a nomination paper by the Returning Officer during an election process is not maintainable in view of the constitutional bar contained in Article 329(b). The proper and exclusive remedy for challenging the improper rejection of a nomination lies in an election petition under the Representation of the People Act, 1951, after the declaration of results. The Supreme Court cannot carve out exceptions based on the alleged “glaring”, “manifest”, or “arbitrary” nature of the rejection of nomination, as doing so would amount to rewriting Article 329 and creating an impermissible parallel jurisdiction between writ courts and election tribunals. The Court refrained from expressing any opinion on the merits of the challenge regarding the non-disclosure of a private criminal complaint in Form 26 affidavit. Meenakshi Natarajan v. Election Commission of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 627 : 2026 INSC 643
Constitution of India - Article 329 - Representation of the People Act, 1951 - The petitioner's nomination for Rajya Sabha from Madhya Pradesh was rejected by the Returning Officer on the ground that she failed to disclose a pending private complaint filed against her in a Court, despite receiving summons. The petitioner contended that disclosure was not required under Section 33A of the RP Act as no cognizance had been taken and no charge had been framed. She argued that the rejection was arbitrary and prevented a contested election. Article 329 imposes a clear constitutional embargo on judicial interference in electoral matters except through the mechanism provided by law (election petition). The Court rejected the petitioner's reliance on Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commissioner to justify pre-result interference, holding that the cited observations do not dilute the bar under Article 329. Allowing writ jurisdiction in “glaring” cases while relegating others to election petitions would lead to splitting of jurisdiction and judicial overreach. The right to contest an election is a statutory right, not a fundamental right, reinforcing the inapplicability of Article 32. Writ petition dismissed as non-maintainable with liberty to the petitioner to file an election petition. No order as to costs. The Court clarified that it has not made any observation on the merits of the case. Meenakshi Natarajan v. Election Commission of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 627 : 2026 INSC 643
Constitution of India – Article 21 – Criminal Procedure – Right to Speedy Trial and Timely Investigation – Duty of Constitutional Courts - Inordinate Delay in Investigation – Appeal against High Court order dismissing a writ petition seeking directions to file a charge-sheet in a criminal complaint pending for nearly two decades – Constitutional courts cannot remain mute spectators to prolonged and endless investigations – Right to speedy trial is an intrinsic facet of Article 21 of the Constitution, which inherently includes the timely completion of investigations – If an investigation continues for an unduly long period without adequate justification, the High Court ought to exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction to intervene instead of dismissing the plea on technical or alternative-remedy grounds. [Paras 10 - 13] Sahil Abdulsattar Mansuri v. Safimahamad Fafirbhai Mansuri, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 601 : 2026 INSC 626
Constitution of India – Article 142 – Complete Justice – Enhancement of Compensation – Permanent Disability – Paraplegia - Even though the claim under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 was not strictly appropriate as the vehicle was not the proximate cause of the accident, the Supreme Court invoked its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 142 to prevent a person with life-altering, grievous injuries (total paraplegia with bladder and bowel incontinence) from being left in the lurch by another round of litigation - Finding the High Court's assessment technically restrictive and insufficient, the Supreme Court enhanced the total compensation to ₹25,00,000/- with interest from the date of the claim petition, keeping the original apportionment of liability undisturbed to serve the ends of justice. [Paras 12-15] Commissioner, Bruhat Bangalore Mahanagara Palike v. K.K. Umesh Kumar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 621 : 2026 INSC 637
Constitution of India – Article 142(1) – Dissolution of Marriage on Irretrievable Breakdown - The Supreme Court possesses the inherent, discretionary jurisdiction under Article 142(1) to dissolve a marriage on the ground of its irretrievable breakdown to do "complete justice," even if the facts do not strictly satisfy a statutory ground under the prevailing personal law - This power is exercised with great care and caution when the Court is fully convinced that the marriage is totally unworkable, emotionally dead, beyond salvation, and that the continuation of a formal legal tie on paper is unjustified and merely perpetuates frustration - Given that the parties were living separately for over 15 years, mediation had failed, and both were financially independent doctors with no children from the wedlock, it was deemed a fit case to sever the ties and put an end to a stale, frozen relationship. [Relied on Samar Ghosh v. Jaya Ghosh, (2007) 4 SCC 511; Nayan Bhowmick v. Aparna Chakraborty, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2798; Vikas Kanaujia v. Sarita, (2025) 3 SCC 748; Shilpa Sailesh v. Varun Sreenivasan, (2023) 14 SCC 231; R. Srinivas Kumar v. R. Shametha, (2019) 9 SCC 409; Paras 29-37] Sonal Talpada v. Veerbhan Singh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 594 : 2026 INSC 620
Constitution of India – Judicial Review of Employer's Decision on Suitability – Appointment to Disciplined Force – Criminal Antecedents and Acquittal via Compounding - Even after a truthful disclosure of past criminal cases ending in acquittal, an employer retains the discretion to assess a candidate's suitability for appointment - such a decision cannot be arbitrary - To survive judicial review, it must be supported by material on record demonstrating that an offence involving moral turpitude was indeed committed and that the candidate was linked to it, despite earning an acquittal on technical grounds, benefit of doubt, or due to witnesses turning hostile or being won over. [Para 14] Gajula Thirupathi v. Telangana State Level Police Recruitment Board, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 606 : 2026 INSC 493
Constitution of India – Seventh Schedule, List II, Entry 34 – Betting and Gambling – Online Gaming – Games of Skill vs. Games of Chance – Scope of legislative competence of States – Interpretation of the conjunction "and" – Article 14 – Manifest Arbitrariness – Article 19(1)(g) – Res Extra Commercium – List II, Entry 1 – Public Order - The Supreme Court set aside the findings of the Madras High Court and Karnataka High Court which held that Entry 34 of List II is restricted to games of chance - The expression "betting and gambling" cannot be split disjunctively or interpreted narrowly as "betting on gambling" to provide immunity to games of skill played for stakes - Entry 34 of List II empowers the State Legislatures to regulate or prohibit betting activities on both games of chance and games of skill when played for stakes. [Relied on: State of U.P. v. Lalta Prasad Vaish, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3029; Welfare Association v. Ranjit P. Gohil, (2003) 9 SCC 358; Paras 217-228, 267 – 273] State of Tamil Nadu v. Junglee Games India Pvt. Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 591 : 2026 INSC 594
Constitution of India — Article 311(1) — Scope of Protection — Employees of Statutory Corporations/Public Sector Undertakings - The protection of Article 311(1) of the Constitution of India providing that a member of a civil service or a holder of a civil post shall not be dismissed by an authority subordinate to the appointing authority applies strictly to persons holding civil posts under the Union or a State - Employees of a public sector company or corporation (such as MSEDCL) having a distinct legal personality independent of the Government do not hold a civil post merely because of government ownership or control - Their disciplinary competence is governed entirely by the internal Service Regulations of the Corporation and not by Article 311. [Relied on S.L. Agarwal v. General Manager, Hindustan Steel Ltd., (1970) 1 SCC 177; Paras 80-110] Surekha Domaji Bele v. Executive Engineer, Testing Division, MSEDCL, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 624 : 2026 INSC 639
Constitution of India, 1950 — Article 14 — Public Interest Litigation — Regularisation vs. Demolition — Doctrine of Proportionality and Irreversibility — Irregular allotment of land by City and Industrial Development Corporation Limited (CIDCO) to a private developer without a competitive tender process - The High Court declared the allotment illegal and ordered restoration/demolition but granted liberty to apply for regularisation – Held that demolition of a fully operational commercial complex (shopping mall and hotel) after 17 years, an investment of ₹450 crores, 8,000 livelihoods, and ₹100 crores of annual tax revenue would not vindicate public interest - The severity of a remedial measure must bear a rational and proportionate relationship to the nature and magnitude of the wrong - Financial prejudice to the public authority can be remedied through a rigorous financial recovery mechanism, whereas demolition causes catastrophic and irreparable socio-economic harm - Public law must distinguish between remedies that restore public welfare and those that merely punish at the cost of the public - Demolition order set aside. [Paras 22, 23, 24, 26] K. Raheja Corp. v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 575 : 2026 INSC 551
Constitution of India, 1950 — Article 19(1)(d), Article 19(1)(a), Article 19(1)(b), Article 19(1)(c), and Article 21 — Fundamental Right to Walk and Access Demarcated Footpaths — Priority over Motorised Vehicles - The Supreme Court declared that the "Right to Walk" is a fundamental right guaranteed under Part III of the Constitution of India - It is inextricably connected to life and is integral to the right to move freely throughout the territory of India - This right takes within its sweep the right to safe, comfortable, and well-demarcated footpaths alongside motorised roads, which must be treated as primary and take priority over the movement of motorized vehicles - Walking also embodies expressional, congregational, and associational rights. [Paras 20] Maniyar Iliyaz Shaik Riyaz v. P. Ayyappan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 632 : 2026 INSC 647
Constitution of India, 1950 — Article 21 — Fundamental Right to Travel Abroad vs. Right to Speedy Trial and Societal Interest — Interplay and Balancing of Rights — While Article 21 guarantees the fundamental right to personal liberty, including the right to travel abroad, such a right is not absolute and cannot be viewed in isolation - A balance must be struck between the individual liberty of the accused on one hand, and the victim's right to a speedy trial along with the larger societal interest in ensuring the effective administration of criminal justice on the other. [Para 10] Seesa Santosh v. State of Telangana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 603 : 2026 INSC 628
Constitution of India, 1950 — Article 226(1) and Article 226(2) — Territorial Jurisdiction of High Court — Central Armed Police Forces (CAPF) / Border Security Force (BSF) — Dismissal from Service — Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens - Key Legal Principles Summarized by Supreme Court – i. Territorial Jurisdiction based on Situs of Office: Even if the entire cause of action arises outside the territorial limits of the Delhi High Court (e.g., the misconduct occurred and the dismissal order was issued elsewhere), a member of the Central Armed Police Forces (CAPF), including the BSF, can maintain a writ petition before the Delhi High Court under Article 226(1) of the Constitution - This is because the overall command, administration, and superintendence vest in authorities whose offices are situated in New Delhi (the Union of India and the Director General, BSF); ii. Inapplicability of Forum Non Conveniens to Article 226(1) Writs - The doctrine of forum non conveniens is misapplied when used by a High Court to refuse to exercise discretionary writ jurisdiction invoked under Article 226(1) based on the situs of the respondent's office - When a suitor chooses a forum that is highly convenient to the respondents themselves, and where the official records are readily available or can be summoned, applying the doctrine of forum non conveniens becomes self-defeating and denies access to justice. [Relied on Shri Ranjeet Mal v. General Manager, Northern Railway (1977) 1 SCC 484; Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd. v. Union of India (2004) 6 SCC 254; Dinesh Chandra Gahtori v. Chief of Army Staff (2001) 9 SCC 525; Eastern Coalfields Ltd. v. Kalyan Banerjee (2008) 3 SCC 456; Paragraph 21-40] Baksish Ahmad v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 616 : 2026 INSC 630
Constitutional & Administrative Law — Correlative Public Duties of Local Authorities — Maintenance of Pedestrian Infrastructure – The Supreme Court ruled that the fundamental right to walk on demarcated footpaths carries a corresponding, enforceable legal duty upon public authorities - Wherever a road exists, there is a strict public duty to ensure a footpath is demarcated, constructed, and safely maintained - The primary duty-bearers responsible for provisioning and safeguarding this pedestrian infrastructure are Urban Development Authorities, Municipal Corporations, Municipalities, and Panchayats. [Paras 7 - 10] Maniyar Iliyaz Shaik Riyaz v. P. Ayyappan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 632 : 2026 INSC 647
Constitutional Law – Right to Pension – Nature of Pension – Plea of Financial Burden – Constitution of India, 1950 – Article 300A – Held that Pension is not a bounty, grace, or a matter of financial convenience dependent on the employer - It is a deferred wage and a hard-earned benefit amassed by virtue of long and continuous service, constituting "property" within the meaning of Article 300A of the Constitution - A constitutional right cannot be rendered illusory or defeated on account of administrative inaction or the plea of financial burden. [Paras 41-74] Bhikhani Devi v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 582 : 2026 INSC 612
Constructive Res Judicata – Governing Principles - Constructive Res Judicata (Explanation IV to Section 11 CPC) applies not only to issues actually raised and decided but also to all grounds which might and ought to have been raised in the earlier proceedings. Parties cannot escape the bar by pleading negligence, inadvertence, or accident. The doctrine is a deeming fiction founded on public policy to prevent multiplicity of proceedings and to ensure that a litigant is not vexed twice over for the same kind of litigation. It applies equally to civil suits as well as writ petitions under Articles 226 and 32 of the Constitution. The expression “ought” in the phrase “might and ought” implies a higher threshold than mere possibility. It must be examined through the lens of reasonable diligence and the legitimate scope of the earlier litigation. Courts must ascertain whether the omitted ground properly arose from the dispute and whether a reasonably diligent litigant would have raised it. The applicability of constructive res judicata is fact-specific and not uniform. It depends on: The ambit and nature of the earlier proceedings; The nexus between the omitted ground and the controversy involved in those proceedings. A party who fails to raise a ground that might and ought to have been raised does so at their own peril. The requirements of “might” and “ought” operate cumulatively and without exception. Makardhwaj Ram v. Jagdish Rai, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 626 : 2026 INSC 636
Constructive Res Judicata – The dispute related to a 1960 family land transfer of 95.80 acres by Mahabir Rai in favour of his mother and son (appellant Makardhwaj Ram). Subsequent sales made by a power of attorney holder were challenged in two earlier suits, which were dismissed. When mutation proceedings were initiated in respect of the remaining land, the appellant filed a fresh suit for declaration of title and possession. The High Court dismissed the suit as barred by constructive res judicata, holding that the appellant ought to have asserted title based on the 1960 deed in the earlier suits. The Supreme Court reversed the High Court's judgment, holding that there was no occasion for the appellant to seek a declaration of title over the larger parcel in the earlier suits, which were limited to challenging specific sale transactions. The ownership flowing from the 1960 deed was not in dispute in those proceedings. Applying constructive res judicata in these facts would cause an unduly harsh and inequitable result. The Court emphasised that in family property disputes, particularly long-pending ones, rigid application of technical rules without regard to surrounding facts and circumstances is inappropriate. Judges must understand the context and apply law equitably. Appeal allowed. High Court judgment set aside. Suit restored. Makardhwaj Ram v. Jagdish Rai, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 626 : 2026 INSC 636
Consumer Protection – Contract of Insurance – Privity of Contract – Third-Party Claim – Maintainability – Held that a contract of insurance is a personal contract strictly between the insurer and the insured - No third party can raise any claims under such a contract - Financier / Pledgee Claim – Failure to prove nature of agreement and surrender – The appellant/financier claimed that the insured had surrendered the vehicle to him, following which it was stolen from his custody - the appellant failed to produce documents proving the surrender, nor did he provide specific details of the theft (place, date, and time), which cast aspersions on his case - Even assuming the vehicle was surrendered, the financier cannot automatically be considered the owner of the vehicle - the insurance company cannot be compelled to indemnify a third-party financier when it was not a party to the contract/loan agreement between the financier and the insured, and had no notice of the same. [Paras 10-15] K. Prakashchand v. Oriental Insurance, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 634
Consumer Protection Act, 1986 - Section 3 - The mere existence of an arbitration clause in a consumer agreement does not bar or oust the jurisdiction of the Consumer Fora to entertain and adjudicate a consumer complaint on merits. Once a consumer complaint is admitted by the District Forum, it cannot be referred to arbitration, as the statutory remedy provided under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 is additional and not in derogation of other remedies. T.K.A. Padmanabhan v. Abhiyan Cooperative Group Housing Society Ltd, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 633
Consumer Protection Act, 1986 - Section 12(4) - The Act creates a special adjudicatory mechanism for expeditious resolution of consumer disputes. A private contractual arbitration clause cannot override or defeat this statutory remedy. After admission of the complaint, the District Forum is statutorily restrained under the proviso to Section 12(4) from transferring the matter to any other court, tribunal, or authority, including an arbitral tribunal. The consumer cannot be driven out of the statutory forum merely because of an arbitration agreement. [Relied on: Emaar MGF Land Ltd. v. Aftab Singh, (2019) 12 SCC 751] T.K.A. Padmanabhan v. Abhiyan Cooperative Group Housing Society Ltd, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 633
Consumer Protection Act, 1986 - The appellant filed a consumer complaint alleging deficiency in service due to delay in handing over possession of a residential flat. Despite admitting the complaint and issuing notice, the District Forum referred the matter to arbitration solely on the ground of the arbitration clause in the flat purchase agreement. This order was upheld by the State Commission and the NCDRC. The Supreme Court set aside the orders of all three Fora. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and directed the District Forum to decide the consumer complaint on merits expeditiously, preferably within one year. T.K.A. Padmanabhan v. Abhiyan Cooperative Group Housing Society Ltd, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 633
Criminal Jurisprudence – Pre-marital and Consensual Relationships – Offence of Cheating based on False Promise to Marry - Physical relationships between consenting unmarried adults do not automatically warrant an adverse inference against a candidate's character - Where a relationship spans a considerable period, a presumption of valid consent arises - Merely because a long-standing relationship between adult neighbors does not culminate in marriage, it cannot be logicized that an offence of cheating was committed or that a subsequent compromise before a Lok Adalat amounts to an admission of guilt. [Paras 18-20] Gajula Thirupathi v. Telangana State Level Police Recruitment Board, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 606 : 2026 INSC 493
Criminal Jurisprudence – Presumption of Innocence – Evidentiary Value of Police Report in Compounded Cases - Unless a charge is proven in a court of law, the presumption of innocence prevails - Where an offence like cheating depends entirely on the subjective deception of the prosecutrix, and the prosecutrix chooses to compound the matter before a Lok Adalat without any evidence of coercion or threat, a mere indictment in a police report (based on statements recorded during investigation) cannot form the sole basis for an employer to draw an adverse inference regarding the candidate's character. [Relied on Avtar Singh v. Union of India and Others, (2016) 8 SCC 471; Ravindra Kumar v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Others, (2024) 5 SCC 264; Commissioner of Police v. Mehar Singh, (2013) 7 SCC 685; Paras 22 - 25] Gajula Thirupathi v. Telangana State Level Police Recruitment Board, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 606 : 2026 INSC 493
Criminal Jurisprudence — Sentencing — Principle of Proportionality — Mitigating Circumstances — Reduction of Sentence to Period Already Undergone — Appeal confined strictly to the quantum of sentence - The appellant was convicted under Sections 420, 467, 468, and 471 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, for using a forged revenue document (Bhu Adhikar Rin Pustika) to furnish surety/bail in judicial proceedings, and was sentenced to five years of rigorous imprisonment on each count – Held that while offences involving forgery and the production of fabricated documents before a Court of law strike at the purity of the administration of justice and cannot be treated lightly, the sentencing process must remain central to the principle of proportionality - It cannot be reduced to a purely retributive exercise divorced from the factual matrix of the case and the overall circumstances of the offender - The Supreme Court observed that the occurrence pertained to the year 2014, and the appellant had endured the rigors of criminal proceedings for more than a decade - there were no subsequent criminal antecedents, the appellant was not a habitual offender, and the forgery was detected at the threshold stage during bail scrutiny, avoiding irreversible pecuniary or proprietary losses - Noting that the appellant had already undergone over two years of actual incarceration, the Supreme Court found it fit to modify the substantive sentence to the period already undergone while keeping the fine unaltered. [Relied on Padum Kumar vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2020) 3 SCC 35; Paras 13-26] Israfil @ Pappu @ Naimuddin Khan v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 639 : 2026 INSC 654
Criminal Justice Administration – Loss of Case Records during Active Investigation – Misplacement of original case papers and FSL reports in transit between police station and Magistrate – Held, such incidents strike at the very core of the criminal justice system and render bona fide complaints inactionable – Even if records are lost or witnesses are untraceable, the investigating agency cannot keep the investigation pending indefinitely; it must either reconstruct records or file an appropriate closure report before the Magistrate – State directed to conclude the investigation within six weeks and file an explanatory compliance affidavit. [Relied on Robert Lalchungnunga Chongthu v. State of Bihar, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2511; Paras 16, 17, 18] Sahil Abdulsattar Mansuri v. Safimahamad Fafirbhai Mansuri, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 601 : 2026 INSC 626
Criminal Law - Quashing of FIR - Recording of FIR Contents in Quashing Orders - Delay not a Ground for Quashing FIR - Duty of High Court while Quashing FIR - While quashing an FIR, the High Court must give a fair idea in its order regarding the contents of the FIR and the nature of allegations levelled therein. Reproduction of the entire FIR is not necessary, but sufficient reference to the nature of the crime and allegations is expected so that the higher courts can meaningfully assess whether there was proper application of mind by the High Court. Delay in lodging the FIR by itself, without anything more, cannot be a ground to quash the FIR. Delay is a factor that may be considered by the Trial Court while appreciating evidence during trial. At the stage of considering a petition for quashing of FIR, the High Court is required to examine whether the FIR discloses the commission of any cognizable offence. The Court must advert to the nature of the crime and the allegations made in the FIR. The Supreme Court set aside the judgment of the High Court which had quashed an FIR registered under Sections relating to attempt to murder and other offences under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS) solely on the ground of 24 days' delay in lodging the FIR, without examining the contents of the FIR or the nature of allegations. The Supreme Court restored the FIR and allowed the police to proceed in accordance with law. Pushpendra v. State of U.P., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 584
Criminal Procedure – Faulty Investigation – Impact on Prosecution Case - Supreme Court further observed that while the investigating agency was expected to act with greater sensitivity given that it was a case of multiple murders, a faulty or sub-standard investigation cannot be a sole ground to discard other reliable, substantial material evidence brought on record by the prosecution - The concurrent findings of the Trial Court and the High Court were based on a proper appreciation of circumstantial evidence and called for no interference. [Relied on Rameshbhai Mohanbhai Koli v. State of Gujarat, (2011) 11 SCC 111; Modan Singh v. State of Rajasthan, (1978) 4 SCC 435; Anter Singh v. State of Rajasthan, (2004) 10 SCC 657; Mallikarjun v. State of Karnataka, (2019) 8 SCC 359; Paras 12-20] Uperndra Khare v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 607 : 2026 INSC 538
Criminal Procedure — Release of Passport vs. Permission to Travel Abroad — Reversal of High Court and Sessions Court orders - The Supreme Court restored the Magistrate's order directing the release of the passport to the accused, while clarifying that such release does not automatically amount to a permission to leave the country - The accused is restricted from flying out of India without obtaining the express permission of the Sessions Court post-committal of the case. [Relied on Rajesh Ranjan Yadav v. CBI, (2007) 1 SCC 70; Paras 11 - 14] Seesa Santosh v. State of Telangana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 603 : 2026 INSC 628
Criminal Trial – Interested / Related Witness - Testimony of the victim's father (PW-1) and sisters (PW-2 and PW-3) cannot be discarded solely on account of relationship - Relationship is not a ground to affect the credibility of a witness if the ocular testimony is otherwise natural, trustworthy, and cogent – Held that the appellants cannot claim the benefit of parity merely because some co-accused were acquitted - An order of acquittal for other co-accused does not lead as a necessary corollary to the acquittal of the convicts if the evidence against the latter stands on a substantially distinct and higher footing (direct eyewitness accounts and precise Section 27 recoveries). [Relied on Shaik Ahmed v. State of Telangana, (2021) 9 SCC 59; Willian Stephen v. The State of Tamil Nadu and Anr., (2024) 5 SCC 258; Wahid v. State Govt. of NCT of Delhi, (2025) 3 SCC 341; Goverdhan & another v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2025) 3 SCC 378; Paras 21-30] Harjindra Singh v. State of U.P., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 598 : 2026 INSC 569
DNA test - Paternity Disputes - An acquittal in a criminal prosecution for rape under Section 376 IPC does not operate as a bar to the determination of paternity in a civil suit and does not preclude the court from directing a DNA test. An acquittal in a criminal case merely means that the prosecution failed to prove the charge beyond reasonable doubt; it does not conclusively negate the existence of a biological relationship between the parties. In paternity disputes, especially where inheritance rights are claimed, DNA profiling constitutes the most reliable and scientific method of determining biological parentage when other evidence is inconclusive. The right to know one's biological father and the consequent legal rights flowing therefrom must be balanced against the alleged father's right to privacy. In appropriate cases, the interest of the child in establishing parentage outweighs privacy concerns, particularly when there is no material to show that the mother had any other relationship during the relevant period. Chaturbhuj Pradhan v. Amar Pradhan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 612 : 2026 INSC 600
DNA test - Paternity Disputes - The respondent, born in 1999, instituted a civil suit after attaining majority seeking a declaration that he is the biological son of the appellant and is entitled to a share in his property. The appellant had been acquitted in a rape case filed by the respondent's mother. Relying on the acquittal and earlier proceedings, the appellant opposed the suit and resisted a DNA test order passed by the Trial Court and affirmed by the High Court. Dismissing the appeal, the Supreme Court held that the respondent had lived his entire life under the shadow of disputed parentage. Leaving the issue unresolved would potentially deny him legitimate rights if he is found to be the biological son. The Court emphasized the indispensable nature of DNA evidence in modern paternity disputes and directed the appellant to undergo DNA profiling. Chaturbhuj Pradhan v. Amar Pradhan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 612 : 2026 INSC 600
Essential Commodities Act, 1955 – Section 3 – Uttar Pradesh Essential Commodities (Regulation of Sale and Distribution Control) Order, 2016 – Clause 2(p) – Government Order No. 6 of 2019 dated 05.08.2019 – Paragraph IV(10) and Paragraph V – Compassionate Appointment / Allotment of Fair Price Shop – Exclusion of 'Married Daughter' from the definition of 'Family' – Constitution of India – Articles 14 and 15(1) – Gender-based Stereotype - Key Issue - Whether the blanket exclusion of a 'married daughter' from the definition of 'family' for the purpose of allotment of a fair price shop under the dependent/compassionate quota is constitutionally sustainable – Supreme Court held – i. Gender Discrimination and Arbitrary Classification - The Supreme Court held that the exclusion of a married daughter from the definition of "family" under Clause 2(p) of the 2016 Order and Paragraph IV(10) of the G.O. fails the test of reasonable classification and is manifestly arbitrary - The distinction lacks any intelligible differentia having a rational nexus with the welfare-oriented object of the scheme, which is to provide immediate financial relief to the dependent family of a deceased dealer; ii. Impermissible Stereotypes - Supreme Court observed that while a married son continues to be considered a part of the family, a daughter is excluded solely because of her marriage - This distinction is founded upon a gender-based stereotype that a daughter loses all ties with her natal family upon marriage which is incompatible with the constitutional guarantees of equality under Articles 14 and 15(1) of the Constitution; iii. Dependency as a Question of Fact - Dependency is a question of fact to be determined in each individual case and cannot be conclusively or speculatively presumed based entirely on marital status or assumptions regarding local residence; iv. Doctrine of Purposive Construction Applied - Applying the doctrine of purposive construction to avoid an unjust or arbitrary result, the Court read down the provision - The expression "daughter" in Clause 2(p) of the 2016 Order must be interpreted to include a married daughter, provided she establishes factual dependency on the deceased dealer, submits a dependency certificate along with No Objection Certificates (NOCs) from other adult family members, and satisfies all other eligibility criteria, including local residence. [Relied on Shri Ram Krishna Dalmia & Ors. v. Shri Justice S.R. Tendolkar & Ors., 1958 SCC OnLine SC 6; Budhan Choudhry v. State of Bihar & Ors., (1954) 2 SCC 791; Shailesh Dhairyawan v. Mohan Balkrishan Lulla, (2016) 3 SCC 619; Paras 18-27] Kulsum Nisha v. State of U.P., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 588 : 2026 INSC 617
Evidence Act, 1872 – Section 9 – Test Identification Parade (TIP) vs. Dock Identification & Section 27 Recoveries - The appellants contended that the absence of a formal TIP vitiated their identification – Held that A TIP is corroborative and not a substantive piece of evidence - The eyewitnesses (PW-2 and PW-3) had a clear daylight opportunity to observe the kidnappers - More crucially, the identity is decisively cemented by infallible recoveries made pursuant to disclosures under Section 27 of the Evidence Act specifically, the recovery of the living child at the behest of one appellant and the recovery of the crime weapon (.315 bore pistol) at the behest of the other. These direct recoveries negate the necessity of a formal TIP. [Paras 26 - 28] Harjindra Singh v. State of U.P., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 598 : 2026 INSC 569
Evidence Act, 1872 – Section 27 – Recovery of Incriminating Articles – Hostile Panch/Seizure Witnesses – Value of Investigating Officer's Testimony - Appeal against the dismissal of a criminal appeal by the Madhya Pradesh High Court, which upheld the Trial Court's order convicting the appellant under Section 302 read with Section 149 of the IPC for the murder of four family members - The appellant challenged the conviction, arguing inter alia that the recovery of the incriminating articles (empty phials of Calmpose injection, clothes, and rope) under Section 27 of the Evidence Act was unreliable because the independent panch/seizure witnesses turned hostile – Held that dismissing the appeal, the Supreme Court ruled that it is a well-settled principle of law that a recovery under Section 27 of the Evidence Act cannot be discarded or vitiated merely because the panch witnesses turned hostile, provided that the recovery is otherwise convincingly proved through the testimony of the Investigating Officer - The prosecution successfully proved the recovery at the instance of the appellant through the credible testimony of the Investigating Officer (PW-24), which was further corroborated by the postmortem and viscera reports showing traces of "Diazepham" (Calmpose). Uperndra Khare v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 607 : 2026 INSC 538
Evidence Act, 1872 — Section 133 r/w. 114, Illustration (b) — Accomplice/Approver Testimony — Worthiness of Credit and Prudence of Corroboration - The combined result of Section 133 and Illustration (b) to Section 114 is that an accomplice is a competent witness, and a conviction based on uncorroborated testimony is not illegal per se - as a rule of prudence, courts require corroboration in material particulars to safely connect the accused with the crime - The corroboration need not be direct and can be circumstantial, nor must it confirm every single material fact independently Creditworthiness is evaluated cumulatively, the approver must not be a planted witness, their testimony must be intrinsically natural, and it must be inculpatory rather than exculpatory - If the disclosure is complete and inspires confidence, it cannot be discarded merely because the approver did not inflict the fatal blow or implicate himself to the exact same extent as the other co-accused. [Paras 24 - 36] Gopi Chand @ Pappu v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 609 : 2026 INSC 598
General Clauses Act, 1897 – Section 24 – Continuation of orders/regulations issued under repealed and re-enacted provisions – Section 24 has no application where the existing rules or regulations are completely inconsistent with the newly re-enacted or substituted statutory provision - Subordinate legislation cannot override or fetter the plenary legislative power of Parliament to amend the principal Act. [Paras 76 - 83] Rajesh Sharma v. North Delhi Municipal Corporation, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 640 : 2026 INSC 646
Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 – Section 13(1)(ia) – Mental Cruelty – Denial of Conjugal Rights & Persistent Refusal of Sexual Intercourse - Denial of conjugal rights, including the persistent refusal of sexual intercourse without a reasonable cause, constitutes mental cruelty and serves as a valid ground for divorce under Section 13(1)(ia) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 - Withholding sexual intimacy inflicts severe emotional distress and fundamentally undermines the bedrock of marriage. [Para 19] Sonal Talpada v. Veerbhan Singh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 594 : 2026 INSC 620
Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 – Section 13(1)(ia) – Mental Cruelty – Long Separation & Rigid Approaches - Where a couple has lived separately for a substantial duration (over 15 years in this case) with no hope for reconciliation, forcing them to live together after such a prolonged period itself constitutes cruelty to both sides - In matrimonial matters involving two individuals, it is not for the society or the Court to sit in judgment over which spouse's approach is correct - their strongly held, unaccommodating views and persistent refusal to adjust over a long span of time amount to mutual cruelty. [Paras 23, 24, 25] Sonal Talpada v. Veerbhan Singh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 594 : 2026 INSC 620
Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 – Section 13(1)(ia) & Section 13(1)(ib) – Desertion – Evolution into Mental Cruelty & Conduct During Pendency of Litigation - Even if the statutory ground of 'desertion' under Section 13(1)(ib) has not been formally pleaded, an Appellate Court is justified in examining the overall conduct of the parties and the manner in which they discharged matrimonial obligations - Appeal is a continuation of the suit - If a statutory period of desertion continues indefinitely during the pendency of litigation without any genuine effort at reconciliation or cohabitation, it aggravates marital agony - An Appellate Court can legitimately treat such prolonged physical separation, geographical estrangement, and complete emotional alienation as a realistic indicator of mental cruelty under Section 13(1)(ia) of the HMA - In such instances, the confirmation of a divorce decree by the Appellate Court is a lawful application of the statutory ground of cruelty, not an automatic invocation of Article 142. [Paras 21 – 27] Sonal Talpada v. Veerbhan Singh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 594 : 2026 INSC 620
Hindu minority and guardianship act, 1956 – section 8 – doctrine of parens patriae – judicial scrutiny - Doctrine of Parens Patriae and Judicial Oversight - Section 8 of the HMGA embodies the doctrine of parens patriae (parent of the nation), framing guardianship as a strictly Court-supervised fiduciary responsibility where the welfare of the minor reigns paramount - The statutory requirement of seeking prior judicial approval before alienating a minor's immovable property reflects legislative caution to protect proprietary interests against irreversible decisions - Supreme Court's role under Section 8 is to perform an independent, rigorous, and forward-looking assessment of risk versus benefit, balancing the genuine welfare of the minor against the economic rights of adult co-owners to derive reasonable value from the property. Shephali Chakraborty v. State of West Bengal, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 597 : 2026 INSC 621
Hindu minority and guardianship act, 1956 – section 8 – transfer of minor's immovable property – development agreement – best interest of the child - Alienation of Minor's Property via Development Agreement - The appellant (mother/natural guardian of the minor) sought permission under Section 8 of the HMGA to transfer the minor's undivided share in a joint family property to a developer in exchange for a monetary sum and a residential flat ( share in a flat) - The District Court and High Court rejected the application holding that the "necessity or evident advantage" to the minor was not adequately demonstrated beyond a bald statement - Allowing the appeal, the Supreme Court held that an undivided share in undeveloped land often remains a passive, notional interest with minimal immediate utility and is susceptible to encroachment or disputes - transitioning this illiquid asset into a constructed residential unit along with liquid cash transforms it into immediate usable property capable of funding the minor's education, health, and advancement – Supreme Court clarified that while this is not an absolute proposition of law and must be assessed on a case-by-case basis, in the present facts, the conversion was demonstrably for the minor's "evident advantage" under Section 8(4) of the Act - The permission was granted subject to protective conditions, including depositing the minor's monetary share into a nationalized bank with auto-renewal until majority. Shephali Chakraborty v. State of West Bengal, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 597 : 2026 INSC 621
Hindu Succession Act, 1956 – In the present case, the second wife and four daughters of the deceased each inherited a 1/5th share as tenants-in-common. The sale of a portion of the property by the widow purportedly as Karta for legal necessity (sister's marriage) was held invalid to the extent it affected the shares of the daughters. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the decree in favour of the daughters. [Relied on: M. Arumugam v. Ammaniammal, (2020) 11 SCC 103] Darubai v. Kamalabai, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 581 : 2026 INSC 613
Hindu Succession Act, 1956 – Sections 8 & 19 – Intestate Succession – Nature of Property Inherited by Heirs – Tenants-in-Common vs. Joint Tenancy – Karta and Legal Necessity - Heirs inheriting property of a Hindu male dying intestate under Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, take the property as tenants-in-common with definite and separate shares, and not as joint family/coparcenary property or as joint tenants. The concept of “Kartaship” does not apply to such property. Consequently, no co-heir can alienate the shares of other co-heirs by invoking the doctrine of legal necessity while acting as Karta of the family. Darubai v. Kamalabai, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 581 : 2026 INSC 613
Hindu Succession Act, 1956 – Sections 8 & 19 – Intestate Succession – Upon intestate succession under the HSA, each heir acquires a distinct, identifiable share which is heritable by their own legal heirs and does not pass by survivorship. Property inherited under Section 8 retains its individual and statutory character and does not automatically become coparcenary property in the hands of the heirs. A co-heir (including a widow) has full rights only over her own share and cannot alienate any portion of the shares belonging to other co-heirs on the ground of legal necessity. Darubai v. Kamalabai, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 581 : 2026 INSC 613
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – No Condonation of Re-filing Delay Beyond 28 Days for IBC Appeals - While the Supreme Court Rules, 2013 (SCR) allow a 28-day window for curing defects and permit discretionary condonation of re-filing delay for general laws, this relaxation cannot override the express statutory edict of the IBC - An appeal under Section 62 must be defect-free to be considered validly instituted within the limitation period - Litigants cannot circumvent the rigorous timelines of the IBC by filing a defective appeal as a device to save limitation and curing defects at leisure - Once the 60-day statutory window under the IBC and the 28-day curing window under the SCR close, the right to appeal stands frozen and extinguished – Supreme Court has no power to condone any re-filing delay beyond the permissible 28 days for an appeal under Section 62 of the IBC. [Paras 15 - 25] CA Ramchandra Dallaram Choudhary v. Adani Infrastructure and Developers, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 611 : 2026 INSC 629
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – No Differentiated Threshold for Neutral Officers / Liquidators - Serial Indulgence Impermissible – Noted that the fact that the appellant is a neutral officer (Liquidator) acting for the benefit of stakeholders does not permit the Supreme Court to invoke its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution to dilute or override the express statutory timeframes of the IBC - The statute does not carve out a separate threshold or relaxation for such officers - A litigant who has previously secured a liberal construction of "sufficient cause" and condonation of re-filing delay at an earlier appellate stage (e.g., under Section 61 before the NCLAT) cannot claim a similar exercise of judicial discretion automatically at successive appellate stages - The discipline of limitation under the IBC does not countenance serial condonations of delay, as it would defeat the legislative objective of expedition and finality. [Relied on Mobilox Innovations (P) Ltd. v. Kirusa Software (P) Ltd. (2018) 1 SCC 353; Kalparaj Dharamshi v. Kotak Investment Advisors Limited (2021) 10 SCC 401; Saturn Ventures and Advisors Pvt. Limited v. S. Gopalakrishnan (2025 SCC OnLine SC 2484); Distinguished from CA Ramchandra Dallaram Choudhary v. Adani Infrastructure & Developers (P) Ltd. (2025 SCC OnLine SC 1406); Paras 19-24] CA Ramchandra Dallaram Choudhary v. Adani Infrastructure and Developers, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 611 : 2026 INSC 629
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Section 62 – Supreme Court Rules, 2013 – Order VIII Rule 6(3) & (4) – Condonation of Delay in Filing and Re-filing Appeal – Insurmountable Jurisdictional Bar - Strict Timelines under IBC Prevail over Procedural Rules - The statutory scheme of limitation under the IBC is strict and time-bound - An appeal under Section 62 of the IBC must be presented within 45 days, with an extendable grace period of only 15 days upon showing sufficient cause - The absolute statutory outer limit is 60 days, beyond which the Supreme Court's jurisdiction to condone filing delay ceases entirely. [Para 20-25] CA Ramchandra Dallaram Choudhary v. Adani Infrastructure and Developers, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 611 : 2026 INSC 629
Interpretation of Statutes – Amendment by Substitution – Retrospectivity – "Pen and Ink" Theory – Mere use of the word "substitute" or "substitution" in an amending Act does not automatically make the substituted provision relate back to the date of enforcement of the original provision - Unless an express or implied legislative intent dictates otherwise, a substituted provision operates prospectively from the date it is introduced into the statute book. [Relied on Ram Narain v. Simla Banking and Industrial Company Limited, (1956) 2 SCC 75; Property Owners Association & Others v. State of Maharashtra & Others, (2024) 18 SCC 1 (Para 43); Shamarao V. Parulekar v. District Magistrate, Thana, (1952) 2 SCC 1; Paras 38, 44, 46 & 52] Rajesh Sharma v. North Delhi Municipal Corporation, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 640 : 2026 INSC 646
Interpretation of Statutes – Meaning of the phrase "May Be" / "May Be Made" – The expression "may be" is predominantly used with reference to the future rather than the past or present - In Section 59(d), the words "may be made" signify the legislative intent to exclude existing regulations - Any interpretation rendering the words "may be made" redundant or superfluous must be avoided. [Relied on Vijay Kumar Shukal v. Lakhpat Ram and Another, (1990) 4 SCC 246; Paras 72-74] Rajesh Sharma v. North Delhi Municipal Corporation, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 640 : 2026 INSC 646
Interpretation of Statutes — Special or Local Law vis-à-vis General Law of Limitation — Exclusion of Section 5, Limitation Act — Principles restated — Held: While a special statute may prescribe a distinct period of limitation, that by itself does not automatically exclude the operation of Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act - The exclusion must be founded on clear statutory language or a legislative scheme indicating that the prescribed limitation is absolute and incapable of enlargement - Section 9 of the Adhiniyam merely provides a thirty-day limitation period but lacks restrictive expressions such as "but not thereafter" or "not exceeding", nor does it provide a specific, limited grace period - The absence of such prohibitive language demonstrates that the legislature did not intend to insulate the enactment from the general law of limitation. [Paras 23-24] Sardari Lal v. Bishan Dass, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 645 : 2026 INSC 669
Jurisprudence – Ex ante vs. Ex post judicial scrutiny - Distinction Between Post-Facto Liability and Preventive Assessment - Supreme Court demarcated the conceptual difference between ex ante mechanisms (preventive, forward-looking assessments made before harm or conduct occurs) and ex post mechanisms (retrospective scrutiny determining legality, liability, or punishment after the fact) - Section 8 of the HMGA is an illustrative example of an ex ante statutory mechanism, mandating prior judicial assessment to forestall foreseeable harm to a minor's proprietary rights before any transaction can validly take effect. [Relied on Vishwambhar & Ors. v. Laxminarayan, (2001) 6 SCC 163; Nangali Amma Bhavani Amma v. Gopalkrishnan Nair, (2004) 8 SCC 78; Saroj v. Sunder Singh, (2013) 15 SCC 727; Annie Besant v. G. Narayaniah, 1914 SCC OnLine PC 40; Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia v. State of Punjab, (1980) 2 SCC 565; Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248; Samar Ghosh v. Jaya Ghosh, (2007) 4 SCC 511; Bhuwan Mohan Singh v. Meena, (2015) 6 SCC 353; Paras 1018] Shephali Chakraborty v. State of West Bengal, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 597 : 2026 INSC 621
Labour Law - An employer is entitled to send communications to the address furnished by the employee. If the employee changes his residence without informing the employer, he cannot take advantage of his own omission and raise a plea of non-receipt of notice. An employee who remains absent without authorization and fails to produce any documentary evidence in support of the alleged reason for absence (such as mother's illness) cannot justify such unauthorized absence on the basis of unsubstantiated oral assertions. Mere verbal intimation to a superior officer, without any written communication or leave application during the period of absence, is insufficient to explain prolonged unauthorized absence. Rifilis Engineering Pvt. Ltd. v. Arjun Gupta, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 636
Land Acquisition Act, 1894 - The Supreme Court dismissed the State of Chhattisgarh's appeal as “absolutely frivolous” and imposed costs of ₹2 lakh on the State for re-litigating a settled issue and causing harassment to the landowners. The Court upheld the High Court's order directing the State to pay enhanced compensation at ₹5,380 per square metre along with statutory interest. State of Chhattisgarh v. Parikshit Singh Gupta, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 635
Land Disposal/Allotment Policy — New Bombay Disposal of Lands Regulations, 1975 — Regulation 4 — Modes of Disposal — Mode of allotment through individual application – Held that since Regulation 4 permits disposal of CIDCO plots not only by auction or tender but also by considering individual applications as determined from time to time, an allotment on an individual application where earlier tender attempts had failed was not per se illegal - The legal infirmity lay in the pricing mechanism and the absence of a transparent competitive process, not in the mode of allotment itself. [Paras 18 - 21] K. Raheja Corp. v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 575 : 2026 INSC 551
Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957 — Section 9 — Royalty cannot be frozen by contract — Interpretation of "Dispatch" – The Supreme Court clarified that the word "applicable" regarding the royalty rate denotes applicability at the relevant time of removing the goods and does not freeze the rate of royalty to the date of the auction agreement - Relying on the 9-Judge Bench decision, the Supreme Court reiterated that royalty is fundamentally payable on the dispatch/movement of minerals from the leased area - If the movement of minerals occurs after a statutory revision, the buyer cannot escape the liability of the enhanced rate due to a piecemeal or delayed approach in transporting the mineral. [Relied on Mineral Area Development Authority v. SAIL, (2024) 10 SCC 1; Paras 9 - 13] Director of Mines and Geology v. BMM Ispat, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 600 : 2026 INSC 627
Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957 — Section 9 — Subsequent Statutory Enhancement of Royalty — Contractual terms vs. Statutory Amendment — Liability to pay enhanced royalty on dispatch - The Supreme Court held that the enhancement of a mineral's royalty rate via statutory amendment overrides pre-existing contractual arrangements or tender conditions limiting a bidder's liability - Royalty is legally linked to the dispatch or removal of minerals from the leased area, not the date of auction or contract finalization - Successful auction purchasers who remove or transport the mineral after a statutory rate revision comes into force are legally liable to pay the enhanced royalty rate - Contractual provisions must give way to statutory amendments. [Paras 11-13] Director of Mines and Geology v. BMM Ispat, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 600 : 2026 INSC 627
Motor Accident Compensation — Fatal Accident of a Minor Child — Recalculation of Loss of Dependency and Conventional Heads - In assessing the compensation for the death of a 5-year-old child caused by a speeding tanker, the High Court erred in reducing the MACT's award - Applying established legal principles for minor victims, the daily wage was assessed based on the skilled worker rates under the Minimum Wages Act, 1948, evaluating annual income with a 40% addition for future prospects and a 50% deduction for personal expenses - Applying a multiplier of 18, the Supreme Court enhanced the total compensation to ₹11,44,628/-, distributed across loss of dependency, consortium, estate, and funeral expenses. [Relied on Karuna Parmar v. Prakash Sinha, 2025 INSC 1244; In Re: Phalodi Accident, 2026 INSC 388; Lucknow Public School, Eldico v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 INSC 422; Paras 17-19] Maniyar Iliyaz Shaik Riyaz v. P. Ayyappan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 632 : 2026 INSC 647
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 - Conventional Heads – Omission of Filial Consortium – The Tribunal and High Court failed to award any amount under the head of consortium - Held: The Motor Vehicles Act is a beneficial legislation, and courts must ensure 'just compensation' is awarded even if a legitimate conventional head has been omitted below - The parents of the deceased unmarried son are entitled to filial consortium - Compensation enhanced by Rs. 40,000/- each to both parents (Total Rs. 80,000/-) – Held that the Supreme Court does not ordinarily interfere with concurrent findings of fact returned by the Tribunal and the High Court unless such findings are shown to be perverse, manifestly erroneous, or based on no evidence. [Relied on National Insurance Company Limited vs. Pranay Sethi and Others, (2017) 16 SCC 680; Magma General Insurance Company Limited vs. Nanu Ram alias Chuhru Ram and Others, (2018) 18 SCC 130; Paras 24-29] Oriental Insurance Co Ltd v. Kalu Ram, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 643 : 2026 INSC 653
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 - Section 166 – Negligence vs. Contributory Negligence – Stationary Vehicle Hazard – A truck was left stationed in the middle of the road at 3:00 a.m. without parking lights, indicators, reflectors, or warning signs - A Wagon-R car rammed into the truck from behind - The driver and owner of the truck did not step into the witness box to substantiate their plea of tyre puncture - Held: The mere fact that a vehicle collides with a truck from behind cannot automatically lead to an inference of negligence or contributory negligence - A stationary vehicle occupying the road in the dead of night without any warning signs poses an evident hazard - In the absence of evidence from the truck driver, the adverse inference drawn by the Tribunal was justified - The proximate cause of the accident was the negligent act of leaving the vehicle unattended on the road without precautionary measures. [Paras 14-18] Oriental Insurance Co Ltd v. Kalu Ram, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 643 : 2026 INSC 653
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 - Section 166 & 168 – Just Compensation – Educational Profile and Future Prospects of a Student – Death of a 20-year-old bachelor pursuing Chartered Accountancy (Final) and undergoing articleship - The Tribunal departed from the actual proved stipend income and assessed the income at Rs. 55,500/- per month by factoring in his professional trajectory, educational progression, and imminent entry into the CA profession – Held that while compensation cannot be founded on pure speculation or salary benchmarks of unrelated professionals, the determination of 'just compensation' does not admit to mathematical exactitude - The forward-looking assessment made by the Tribunal sufficiently accounted for the professional potential of the deceased - Reducing the compensation payable to the parents at this stage on account of a technical overlap in methodology (adding 50% future prospects over a forward-looking multiplicand) would not advance substantive justice given the long passage of time since the accident. [Paras 19- 23] Oriental Insurance Co Ltd v. Kalu Ram, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 643 : 2026 INSC 653
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 – Section 165(1) & Section 166 – Scope of "Arising out of the use of motor vehicles" – Liability for Natural Calamities / Act of God – Injury caused by the falling of a roadside tree/branch on a stationary vehicle parked to take shelter from rain – Held that for a claim under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act to be maintainable, the motor vehicle itself must play an active role or be part of the proximate cause of the accident - While the term "use" has been liberally interpreted to include stationary or parked vehicles, the mere presence of a victim inside a stationary vehicle where the injury is caused entirely by an external natural event (like a falling tree branch during heavy rain) does not satisfy the requirement of proximate cause under the Act - The vehicle did not play an active role in the accident, as a pedestrian standing under the tree would have faced the same risk - It would be unfair to fasten liability upon the Municipal Corporation under the Motor Vehicles Act for an unfortunate natural occurrence that was not within the contemplation of the authorities. [Paras 10-13] Commissioner, Bruhat Bangalore Mahanagara Palike v. K.K. Umesh Kumar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 621 : 2026 INSC 637
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — Inordinate Institutional Delay in Motor Accident Claims — Guidelines for Expediting Claim Disposals — Adoptions of Summary Procedure – The Supreme Court took serious note of the regular feature of systemic, decades-long delay in the adjudication of motor accident claims at the High Court and Tribunal levels, noting an average pendency of 8 years in High Courts and 6 years in Tribunals - Since the Act is a piece of beneficial legislation, long pendency directly denudes its salutary values - Procedural Directives Issued – i. Mandatory Annexures with Claim Petitions - To eliminate repeated adjournments, claimants must strictly accompany petitions with explicit official proof of age (excluding Aadhaar card), formal disability certificates detailing functional impairment from competent doctors, authentic ITRs/salary slips for income claims, and certified medical bills; ii. Listing and Bench Management - Chief Justices of High Courts are requested to issue directives to list matters pending over four years based strictly on chronological order of institution and evaluate increasing the number of MACT roster benches; iii. Summary Procedure Enforcement - Under Section 169 of the Act, Tribunals are encouraged to adopt summary procedures to accelerate expediency - If a Tribunal chooses not to adopt a summary procedure, it must explicitly record reasons for the same. [Relied on Lata Wadhwa v. State of Bihar, (2001) 8 SCC 197; Arun Kumar Agrawal v. National Insurance Co. Ltd., (2010) 9 SCC 218; National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Pranay Sethi, (2017) 16 SCC 680; Rajesh v. Rajbir Singh, (2013) 9 SCC 54 and Magma General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Nanu Ram, (2018) 18 SCC 130; Paras 19-24] Shishupal @ Shish Ram v. Surjeet, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 617 : 2026 INSC 634
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — Introduction of "Loss of Domestic Care" as a Distinct Head - clarified that while 'Loss of Consortium' exclusively addresses the emotional aspects of loss (love, affection, companionship) under the principles laid down in Pranay Sethi, it fails to properly account for the economic lens of domestic contribution - To mitigate this systemic undervaluing, the Court directed that where a case involves the death of a homemaker, a composite sum of Rs.30,000/- per month shall be added under the head of 'Loss of Domestic Care' as a stand-in basic minimum monthly income (provided structural domestic conditions are met) - In cases where the homemaker is also part of the formal workforce, this component shall be in addition to their proven monthly income - This determination is subject to a 10% cumulative revision every three years. [Paras 12 - 20] Shishupal @ Shish Ram v. Surjeet, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 617 : 2026 INSC 634
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — Section 166 — Claim Petition — Double Benefit / Deduction of Ex-gratia Financial Assistance — Interplay with State Welfare Rules — Eligibility of Mother as a Dependent – i. Deduction of Financial Assistance under Service Rules – held that the High Court was fully justified in deducting the ex-gratia financial assistance amount receivable by the eligible dependents under the Haryana Compassionate Assistance to the Dependents of Deceased Government Employees Rules, 2006 from the total compensation assessed under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 - The component of "loss of income" or "pay and allowances" cannot be paid a second time to the claimants, as it would exceed the actual pecuniary loss suffered and operate as a financial windfall/windfall profit; ii. Independent Entitlement of a Dependent Mother - While statutory rules must be strictly interpreted, courts cannot lose sight of the paramount object of social welfare legislations, which is to award just and adequate compensation to all dependents - Under the Haryana Pension Scheme of 1964 (read with the 2006 Rules), a dependent parent is ineligible for ex-gratia financial assistance if the deceased employee leaves behind a widow or children - this statutory ineligibility under service rules does not diminish or negate the independent legal injury suffered by the mother under the Motor Vehicles Act; iii. Prevention of Unjust Enrichment by Insurer - Setting off the entire financial assistance amount against the collective pool of compensation thereby depriving a dependent mother of her rightful share under the head of loss of dependency amounts to an illegal and unjust enrichment of the Insurance Company at the cost of a dependent parent - The mother's distinct share ( share of the total loss of dependency) cannot be set off or consumed by the service benefits paid exclusively to the widow and daughter. [Relied on Reliance General Insurance Company Ltd. v. Shashi Sharma and Others, (2016) 9 SCC 627; Sarla Verma and Others v. Delhi Transport Corporation and Anr., (2009) 6 SCC 121; State of Haryana and Another v. Jasbir Kaur and Others, (2003) 7 SCC 484; Ram Kala Devi v. State of Haryana and Another, 2025 SCC OnLine P&H 12159; Paras 15-25] Sarla Devi v. Reliance General Insurance Company, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 578 : 2026 INSC 575
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — Section 166 — Computation of Future Prospects — Calculation Error by High Court – Held that When an appellate court enhances the base monthly income of a claimant, the percentage towards future prospects must be calculated on the revised/recalculated income, rather than mechanically applying it to the lower income initially assessed by the Tribunal – Held that the claimant suffered an above-the-knee amputation, he will require continuous medical assistance, rehabilitation, and periodic replacement/maintenance of the prosthesis throughout his lifespan - The compensation under this head enhanced from Rs. 1,00,000/- to Rs. 2,00,000/-. [Relied on Raj Kumar v. Ajay Kumar and Another, (2011) 1 SCC 343; Paras 14-27] M. Paramesh v. VRL Logistics Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 641 : 2026 INSC 655
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — Section 166 — Permanent Disability vs. Functional Disability — Enhancement of Compensation — Amputation of right leg above the knee — Claimant working as a mason — Assessment of loss of earning capacity – Held that while determining compensation in personal injury cases, the physical disability assessed by medical authorities cannot be mechanically equated with the loss of earning capacity or economic loss - The real test is the assessment of functional disability with reference to the specific nature of the avocation, profession, and age of the injured prior to the accident - Application to Case - The appellant, a 30-year-old mason, suffered a 70% physical permanent disability owing to the amputation of his right leg above the knee - The work of a mason is heavily manual and physically demanding, requiring the continuous use and support of both legs - Because of the amputation, the appellant completely lost his capacity to execute his specific livelihood/trade - Restricting his economic loss to 70% based purely on physical disability was unjustified. Consequently, the functional disability must be assessed at 100%. [Paras 20 - 30] M. Paramesh v. VRL Logistics Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 641 : 2026 INSC 655
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — Section 166 & Section 168 — Just and Fair Compensation — Death of a Homemaker — Valuation of Unpaid Domestic and Caregiving Labour — Concepts of 'Loss of Consortium' vs. 'Loss of Domestic Care' — The Supreme Court introduced a new specific head called "Loss of Domestic Care" to overcome the inherent disadvantage faced by homemakers due to overly conservative notional income estimations – i. The Status of a Homemaker – Supreme Court observed that it is ironic to describe a homemaker as dependent on earning members when the household's functioning depends substantially on them - Elevating the terminology from "housewife" to "homemaker" and ultimately recognizing them as "Nation Builders", the Supreme Court emphasized that a homemaker's contribution is critical to human capital formation, social stability, and economic productivity. Shishupal @ Shish Ram v. Surjeet, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 617 : 2026 INSC 634
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — Statutory Limitations regarding Pedestrian Rights — Regulatory Framework Deficiencies - The Supreme Court observed that the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (and its 1939 predecessor) is primarily built around the "vehicle" as its subject, making human/pedestrian interests merely incidental - While the Motor Vehicles (Driving) Regulations, 2017 impose general safety duties on drivers regarding vulnerable road users, they fail to recognize the fundamental right to walk or prioritize footpaths over motorized roads - The Parliament has not yet established a full-time regulatory body for motor transport or pedestrian safety under the Act. [Paras 6-14] Maniyar Iliyaz Shaik Riyaz v. P. Ayyappan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 632 : 2026 INSC 647
Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 (Delhi) – Section 59(d) [as substituted by Amendment Act 67 of 1993] & Section 92, Section 95(1) – Delhi Municipal Corporation Service (Control and Appeal) Regulations, 1959 – Disciplinary Authority – Competency of the Commissioner to dismiss a Category 'A' Officer – Interpretation of the phrase "subject to any regulation that may be made in this behalf" – The short question was whether the Commissioner was competent to inflict the punishment of dismissal upon a Category 'A' officer, given that the Schedule to the 1959 Regulations designated the 'Corporation' as the competent authority for Category 'A' posts – Held that consequent to the substitution of Clause (d) to Section 59 by Act 67 of 1993 (w.e.f. 01.10.1993), the Commissioner was designated as the disciplinary authority for all municipal officers and employees - The phrase "subject to any regulation that may be made in this behalf" explicitly refers to regulations framed after the date of the amendment (01.10.1993) and does not subject the statutory power to the pre-existing 1959 Regulations - The use of the future-oriented phrase "may be made" denotes futurity and prevents the 1993 statutory amendment from being tethered to older, inconsistent subordinate legislation - the Commissioner is the competent disciplinary authority to pass dismissal orders. [Paras 63-83] Rajesh Sharma v. North Delhi Municipal Corporation, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 640 : 2026 INSC 646
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 - Criminal Antecedents Relevant - Previous involvements in similar NDPS offences are a strong indicator that the accused is likely to indulge in similar offences if released on bail, thereby failing the second condition under Section 37. State of Punjab v. Balraj Singh @ Billa, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 590 : 2026 INSC 618
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 - Prolonged Incarceration - Mere detention for a period of one year and seven months, where the accused faces a possible sentence of up to 20 years, does not by itself justify grant of bail on the ground of violation of Article 21 of the Constitution, particularly when statutory restrictions under special enactments like the NDPS Act are in play. State of Punjab v. Balraj Singh @ Billa, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 590 : 2026 INSC 618
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 - Sovereignty over Personal Liberty in Drug Cases - In matters involving the supply of narcotic drugs, which constitute a war against the nation affecting public health and the national economy, the sovereignty of the country must prevail over the personal liberty of the accused. State of Punjab v. Balraj Singh @ Billa, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 590 : 2026 INSC 618
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 - Strict Compliance with Section 37 NDPS Act - While dealing with applications for bail in cases involving commercial quantities of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, courts are mandatorily required to satisfy the twin conditions under Section 37 of the NDPS Act, 1985 — i.e., (i) there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty of the offence, and (ii) that the accused is not likely to commit any offence while on bail. Failure to record such satisfaction renders the order granting bail unsustainable. State of Punjab v. Balraj Singh @ Billa, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 590 : 2026 INSC 618
Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 - Conviction and sentence under Section 138 of the N.I. Act for dishonour of cheque can be quashed, if the parties enter into a settlement and the offence is compounded under Section 147 of the NI Act. Parsharvanath Weld Wires v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 585
Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 - Section 138 - When a company or NGO authorises a specific individual to sign and issue cheques on its behalf, along with the responsibility of making payments under an agreement, such person is treated as the 'drawer' of the cheque and attracts criminal liability under S. 138 NI Act, upon dishonour. The Treasurer of an NGO, who was appointed as the authorised signatory to execute an MoU, sign cheques, and make payments to the respondent, was the 'face' of the organisation and solely responsible for the consequences of the dishonoured cheque. The Court clarified that the liability arises when the conditions under Section 141 NI Act are satisfied, even for authorised signatories. Mere designation as an authorised signatory does not automatically absolve personal liability if the person is the one who actually signed the cheque and was entrusted with the payment obligation. Reliance on Shri Gurudatta Sugars Marketing Pvt. Ltd. v. Prithviraj Sayajirao Deshmukh (2024) was held to be misplaced in the facts of this case. The conviction was upheld; however, considering the appellant was only the Treasurer, the sentence was modified. The appellant was directed to pay a fine of ₹1.5 crore to the respondent (TSSPDCL) within two months, with default rigorous imprisonment of one year. K. Ranganayakulu v. State of Telangana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 605 : 2026 INSC 555
Official Secrets Act, 1923 - The appellant, a retired Major General and former Joint Secretary in the Cabinet Secretariat (R&AW), was prosecuted under Sections 3 and 5 of the Official Secrets Act, 1923 read with Sections 409 and 120B IPC for publishing a book containing allegedly classified information relating to India's external intelligence. The CBI filed a chargesheet and sought to keep the relied-upon classified documents in a sealed cover. The Trial Court directed supply of the documents to the accused under Section 207 Cr.P.C. The High Court modified this order and permitted only inspection of the documents. The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's order. Documents forming part of the chargesheet which are relied upon by the prosecution must ordinarily be supplied to the accused. Withholding them merely on the ground that the case involves the Official Secrets Act is impermissible. The Court relied upon Superintendent and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs, West Bengal v. Satyen Bhowmick, (1981) 2 SCC 109, held that Section 14 of the OSA does not take away the valuable right of the accused to receive copies of relied-upon documents. The apprehension of the prosecution regarding national security is not sufficient to override this right. Adequate safeguards exist under Section 5 of the OSA, which penalises any unauthorised disclosure of such documents even by the accused or his lawyers outside the court proceedings. The Supreme Court directed the CBI to supply typed copies of the documents sought by the appellant under Section 207 Cr.P.C. within two months. Inspection of the documents, if required, may be permitted during court proceedings by the Trial Court. This judgment reinforces the primacy of fair trial rights even in cases involving national security and official secrets. V.K. Singh v. CBI, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 602 : 2026 INSC 614
Official Secrets Act, 1923 - the invocation of the Official Secrets Act, 1923 does not bar or justify the denial of supply of documents relied upon by the prosecution in the chargesheet to the accused. Mere apprehension that supply of such documents would endanger the safety and security of the country is not a valid ground to withhold them. An accused has a statutory and fundamental right under Section 207 Cr.P.C. to receive copies of the documents relied upon in the chargesheet, as denial of the same would cause serious prejudice to his right to a fair trial and effective defence. V.K. Singh v. CBI, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 602 : 2026 INSC 614
Online Gaming - Alternative Source of State Legislative Competence – Entry 1 of List II ("Public Order") - Independent of Entry 34, the State Legislatures derive complete competence to regulate and ban online staking platforms under Entry 1 of List II ("Public Order") - Public order is an expression of wide connotation that encompasses public safety, social tranquillity, and the prevention of social and economic disorders - The rampant, digitally-mediated addiction and massive financial accumulation by online platforms trap vulnerable sections and disrupt the "even tempo of the life of the community," creating an immediate threat to the orderly state of society. [Relied on: Romesh Thappar v. State of Madras, AIR 1950 SC 124; State of Rajasthan v. Shri G. Chawla, AIR 1959 SC 544; Rev. Stainislaus v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (1977) 1 SCC 677; Arun Ghosh v. State of West Bengal, (1970) 1 SCC 98; Shreya Singhal v. Union of India, (2015) 5 SCC 1; Paras: 332 – 357] State of Tamil Nadu v. Junglee Games India Pvt. Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 591 : 2026 INSC 594
Online Gaming - Distinction and Correct Application of Landmark Precedents (RMDC Line & K.R. Lakshmanan) - Supreme Court clarified that the landmark rulings in RMDC-I, RMDC-II, and K.R. Lakshmanan were misunderstood by the High Courts - None of these decisions foreclosed the State's power over betting on games of skill – i. RMDC-I & RMDC-II Clarified - In RMDC-I, the definition of "prize competitions" was held to be a gambling adventure as it invited the general public to forecast uncertain future events where common masses lacked statistical expertise – the Supreme Court in RMDC-I approvingly cited Hamilton's Hedaya, which explicitly states that even chess (a game of pure skill) constitutes gambling if anything is staked - RMDC-II explicitly left scope for States to step in if games of substantial skill started to pose problems for the State or cause public harm; ii. K.R. Lakshmanan Clarified - The immunity granted to horse-racing was based on a specific statutory exception carved out by the legislature itself and was limited to highly-regulated betting inside the physical club premises on the day of the race. It cannot shield the "veil of invisibility" and uncontained access inherent in online cyberspace gaming. [Distinguished: State of Bombay v. R.M.D. Chamarbaugwala (RMDC-I), AIR 1957 SC 699; R.M.D. Chamarbaugwala v. Union of India (RMDC-II), AIR 1957 SC 628; Dr. K.R. Lakshmanan v. State of Tamil Nadu, (1996) 2 SCC 226; Paras 244-245, 251-253, 279, 282-289] State of Tamil Nadu v. Junglee Games India Pvt. Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 591 : 2026 INSC 594
Online Gaming - Introduction of Stakes Converted Games of Skill into Betting/Gambling – Res Extra Commercium – Supreme Court ruled that while a genuine skill-based competition played without stakes does not amount to gambling, the moment real monetary stakes are introduced, the activity constitutes betting and gambling - A player or third person placing a bet on the uncertain outcome of a game of skill with the hope of winning more than what was staked transforms the business into a betting enterprise. [Relied on: M.J. Sivani v. State of Karnataka, AIR 1995 SC 1770; P.N. Krishna Lal v. Govt. of Kerala, 1995 Supp (2) SCC 187; Paras 264-320] State of Tamil Nadu v. Junglee Games India Pvt. Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 591 : 2026 INSC 594
Online Gaming - No Manifest Arbitrariness under Article 14 – Empirical Evidence and Policy Decisions - The amended provisions do not suffer from manifest arbitrariness or discrimination under Article 14 - The classification and prohibition of staking money in cyberspace are backed by empirical studies, expert committee reports (such as the Justice K. Chandru Committee), and large-scale public surveys detailing severe socio-economic distress, gaming addiction, financial ruins, and child development harms - The State is fully competent to take such policy decisions for public welfare. [Relied on: Polestar Electronic (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Additional Commissioner, Sales Tax, (1978) 1 SCC 636; Paras 292, 305, 306 – 331, 350-365] State of Tamil Nadu v. Junglee Games India Pvt. Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 591 : 2026 INSC 594
Parental Alienation Syndrome (PAS) and False Memory Creation - Invocation of PAS in Bitter Custody Disputes – Duty of Caution - The Respondent-father raised apprehensions of the child being tutored, developing "parental alienation syndrome," and falling victim to "false memory creation – Held that Parental Alienation Syndrome (PAS) is a highly convoluted and intricate phenomenon that cannot be attributed or imputed to an individual parent routinely or routinely used as a straitjacket formula - Corroborating contemporary mental health developments, the Court observed that PAS is not a diagnosable clinical syndrome but rather a process of manipulation through "alienating behaviours." – held that the Courts must look at specific, identified behaviours found to have taken place within the individual family and must not prematurely label any parent as a promoter of such behaviour without proper, clear material evidence. [Relied on Sakshi v. Union of India, (2004) 5 SCC 518; Gaurav Nagpal v. Sumedha Nagpal, (2009) 1 SCC 42; Vivek Singh v. Romani Singh, (2017) 3 SCC 231; Col. Ramneesh Pal Singh v. Sugandhi Aggarwal, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 847; Paras 84-98] Sheetal Vasant Thakur v. Chirag Arora, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 618 : 2026 INSC 638
Penal Code, 1860 - Section 498A - Mere refusal by a husband to talk to his wife for 13 days does not, by itself, constitute “cruelty” within the meaning of Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code. Differences and occasional non-communication are natural parts of marital life and cannot be treated as wilful conduct driving the wife to suicide unless supported by cogent evidence of persistent harassment or cruelty. The Supreme Court set aside the conviction and sentence of the husband under Section 498A IPC, holding that the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the alleged non-communication caused the wife's suicide. Jayesh Kanna v. Assistant Commissioner Law and Order (West), 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 620 : 2026 INSC 615
Penal Code, 1860 – Section 364A – Demand for Ransom – Proof through Oral Testimony - The defence argued that the absence of Call Detail Records (CDRs) and a Section 65-B certificate under the Evidence Act was fatal to establishing a ransom demand – Held that Unlike cases purely dependent on electronic evidence, the present case features consistent, unshaken, and corroborative oral testimonies from multiple witnesses (PW-1, PW-2, and PW-3) coupled with the Investigating Officer's testimony (PW-7) proving a ransom demand of Rs. 5 Lakhs - The lack of a CDR from a rural telephone exchange in 2003 cannot paralyze the criminal justice system when substantive oral evidence remains cogent and unimpeached. [Paras 23-30] Harjindra Singh v. State of U.P., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 598 : 2026 INSC 569
Penal Code, 1860 – Section 364A & Section 368 – Kidnapping for Ransom – Ingredients and Proof – Arms Act, 1959 – Section 25 – Conviction Upheld -– Threat to Life or Hurt – Firearm Usage - The appellants challenged their conviction under Section 364A IPC contending that no explicit threat to cause death or hurt was administered to the 8-year-old victim - Held that stopping young, defenceless children on their way to school by brandishing a .315 bore country-made pistol inherently constitutes a severe threat to cause death or hurt - The active use of a lethal weapon satisfies the statutory requirement of a threat under Section 364A IPC. [Paras 21-30] Harjindra Singh v. State of U.P., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 598 : 2026 INSC 569
Penal Code, 1860 — Section 120-B — Criminal Conspiracy to Commit Murder — Liability for Foreseeable Crimes - To establish criminal conspiracy under Section 120-A, a meeting of minds to execute an illegal act or a legal act by illegal means is vital - Direct evidence is rarely available, and conspiracy can be inferred from surrounding circumstances and conduct - One who enters into a conspiratorial relationship is jointly liable for every reasonably foreseeable crime committed by other members in furtherance of the common design, irrespective of whether they directly participated in or had specific knowledge of the collateral act - Where a group forcefully separates victims to steal a vehicle using deadly weapons (Gandasa), causing grievous hurt or murder is a foregone, foreseeable conclusion - The conspirator maintaining a vigil while co-participants execute the killings is justifiably liable under Section 302 read with Section 120-B IPC. [Paras 50 – 55] Gopi Chand @ Pappu v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 609 : 2026 INSC 598
Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) — Section 420 — Cheating — Essential Ingredients - To constitute the offence of cheating, there must exist deception, fraudulent inducement, and consequential delivery of property coupled with dishonest intention at the inception of the transaction - A disputed civil claim pending before a competent civil court cannot automatically be treated as a fraudulent misrepresentation so as to attract Section 420 of the IPC, especially in the absence of any allegation that the complainant delivered any property, money, or valuable security to the accused. Bhikhubhai Govindbhai Patel v. State of Gujarat, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 593 : 2026 INSC 532
Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) — Sections 384, 504, 506, and 511 — Extortion & Criminal Intimidation — Vague Allegations - Where the FIR fails to specify the date, place, or exact circumstances of the alleged demand of money, and no property or money was actually delivered pursuant to such a threat, the ingredients of extortion under Section 384 are absent - General observations that the accused "tried" to extort money cannot automatically attract Section 511 of the IPC when the substantive allegations are completely vague - allegations under Sections 504 and 506 fail when the FIR does not disclose the exact words uttered or the surrounding circumstances of intimidation - when substantive offences are not made out, the charge of conspiracy under Section 120-B necessarily fails - Criminal antecedents cannot constitute the sole or even the primary basis to decline the quashing of criminal proceedings under Section 482 of the CrPC - It is the duty of the Court to see whether the essential ingredients of the alleged offences in the impugned FIR are prima facie made out - General observations regarding the "modus operandi" or "proclivity" of the accused cannot replace the requirement of fulfilling the basic ingredients of the offences. Bhikhubhai Govindbhai Patel v. State of Gujarat, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 593 : 2026 INSC 532
Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) — Sections 463, 464, 465, 467, 468, and 471 — Forgery — Making of a "False Document" — Disputed Claim of Title - The essential ingredient of forgery is the making of a "false document" as defined under Section 464 of the IPC - When a person executes a document (such as a Power of Attorney) claiming a property as their own or asserting a share pursuant to revenue entries, they are not pretending to be someone else, nor is it a case of impersonation or forged signatures - A disputed claim of title, whether ultimately sustainable in law or not, cannot be equated with the making of a false document - If the document is not a false document, there is no forgery, and Sections 467 and 471 of the IPC are not attracted. [Relied on Mohd. Ibrahim v. State of Bihar, (2009) 8 SCC 751] Bhikhubhai Govindbhai Patel v. State of Gujarat, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 593 : 2026 INSC 532
Pre-Conception and Pre-Natal Diagnostic Techniques (Prohibition of Sex Selection) Act, 1994 (PCPNDT Act) - Maintenance of Records under PCPNDT Act - Reaffirming the earlier judgment in Federation of Obstetrics & Gynaecological Societies of India v. Union of India, the Court held that non-maintenance or deficiencies in mandatory records (particularly Form F) is not a mere technical or clerical lapse, but a serious violation that serves as a springboard for the offence of female foeticide. Proper record-keeping is essential to prevent misuse of diagnostic techniques for illegal sex determination. Dr. Ramesh v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 619
Pre-Conception and Pre-Natal Diagnostic Techniques (Prohibition of Sex Selection) Act, 1994 (PCPNDT Act) - Sex Ratio Data & Continuing Concern - While acknowledging improvement in sex ratio at birth (from 896 females per 1,000 males in 2015-17 to 918 in 2022-24 and NFHS-5 figures showing 929), the Court noted that it still remains below the biologically expected level (~950+). Several States continue to report below-national-average ratios. The progress was described as “incomplete and uneven” and only a “partial course correction.” The Court referred to the decline in India's ranking in the World Economic Forum's Global Gender Gap Report 2025. Dr. Ramesh v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 619
Pre-Conception and Pre-Natal Diagnostic Techniques (Prohibition of Sex Selection) Act, 1994 (PCPNDT Act) - Societal Change Required - The Court observed that true equality and change in societal mentality — where the birth of a girl child is no longer considered a matter of concern — is still a distant goal. Government schemes such as Beti Bachao Beti Padhao, Sukanya Samriddhi Yojana, and others reflect continued efforts to combat systemic bias, but these do not warrant any relaxation in the enforcement of the PCPNDT Act. Dr. Ramesh v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 619
Pre-Conception and Pre-Natal Diagnostic Techniques (Prohibition of Sex Selection) Act, 1994 (PCPNDT Act) - Strict Enforcement of PCPNDT Act - the PCPNDT Act must continue to be enforced with utmost strictness. Despite improvement in overall sex ratio, sex-selection practices and deep-rooted patriarchal preference for the male child persist in the country. Dilution of the provisions or leniency towards infractions cannot be countenanced. Dr. Ramesh v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 619
Pre-Conception and Pre-Natal Diagnostic Techniques (Prohibition of Sex Selection) Act, 1994 (PCPNDT Act) - The appellant-doctor faced prosecution under Section 23 of the PCPNDT Act for alleged violations of Sections 4(3), 5, 6, 29 and the Rules, due to deficiencies and blanks in Form F maintained at his sonography centre. The Supreme Court upheld the cognisance taken by the Judicial Magistrate and the refusal of the High Court to quash the proceedings, finding no merit in the challenge regarding the competence of the Appropriate Authority (District Civil Surgeon) or the nature of the violations. The Special Leave Petition was dismissed. The criminal proceedings against the appellant were allowed to continue. Dr. Ramesh v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 619
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 - Criminal courts cannot, by judicial directions, introduce a new procedural stage not contemplated under the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC)/Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS) for the conduct of trials. The procedure for criminal trials, including prosecutions under the PC Act, must be strictly followed as laid down in the CrPC/BNSS read with the provisions of the PC Act. Courts cannot create an additional pre-charge stage for examining sanctioning authorities. Section 311 CrPC, being a general provision relating to inquiries and trials, cannot be interpreted to override or bypass the specific stages of trial prescribed in the Code, particularly the stage of framing of charges. A High Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution cannot rewrite the procedural law or issue directions that require all Sessions Courts/Special Courts to examine sanctioning authorities before framing of charge or commencement of trial. The Supreme Court emphasised that while the validity of sanction can be challenged at appropriate stages as per law (including under Section 19(4) of the PC Act), it does not warrant creation of a mandatory pre-trial examination procedure through judicial fiat. Directions issued by the High Court were accordingly set aside. State of Madhya Pradesh v. Ravi Shankar Singh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 647 : 2026 INSC 650
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 - Demand of Bribe - Mere presence of a public servant at the place where a superior officer allegedly accepts a bribe is not enough to infer criminal conspiracy under Section 120B IPC. The prosecution must establish a prior meeting of minds and a shared criminal intent through cogent and substantive evidence. In the absence of proof of demand of illegal gratification by the accused, conviction under Section 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act cannot be sustained. State of Uttar Pradesh v. A.K. Gaba, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 644 : 2026 INSC 568
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 - Ingredients of Criminal Conspiracy — Conspiracy cannot be inferred on the basis of suspicion or mere association. There must be clear material showing a meeting of minds to commit an illegal act or a legal act by illegal means. The offence is complete only when such a meeting of minds is established. The prosecution failed to produce any evidence of prior agreement or concert between the respondents and the principal accused. Mere presence during the alleged transaction does not establish the necessary mens rea for criminal conspiracy. Additionally, the withholding of the tape recording of the alleged demand justified drawing an adverse inference against the prosecution. The appeals were dismissed. State of Uttar Pradesh v. A.K. Gaba, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 644 : 2026 INSC 568
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 – Section 7 read with Explanation 2 – Liability of public servant for indirect demand of bribe through subordinates – Scope of “attempt to obtain undue advantage for another person - A public servant is liable under Section 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 even if he does not personally demand or receive the bribe, provided he attempts to obtain an undue advantage through a third party or for the benefit of another person (including subordinates). Explanation 2 to Section 7 expressly covers situations where the illegal gratification is sought indirectly or for another person, and the actual receipt of the bribe is not essential for attracting liability at the prima facie stage. The Supreme Court set aside the judgment of the High Court which had quashed an FIR against a Police Sub-Inspector on the ground that there was no direct demand or acceptance of bribe by him. The Court held that the Sub-Inspector's alleged instructions to the complainant to “do something for the other police officials” or “make those boys happy”, coupled with a demand of ₹50,000 routed through a third person and subordinates, constituted a veiled demand and an “attempt to obtain undue advantage for another person” within the meaning of Section 7(a) read with Explanation 2 of the PC Act. State by Lokayuktha Police v. Sri K. Rangayya, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 587 : 2026 INSC 574
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 – Section 7 read with Explanation 2 – The requirement of a direct, personal and express demand by the public servant himself is not warranted by the statute. Explanation 2 broadens the scope to include indirect demands and benefits to others. Senior public servants cannot escape liability by orchestrating the collection of bribes through subordinates while maintaining personal deniability. A narrow interpretation of Section 7 would create a dangerous loophole in anti-corruption law and render Explanation 2 redundant. At the stage of quashing an FIR, the Court must examine whether the allegations prima facie disclose commission of the offence. Questions of guilt or innocence are to be decided at trial. The FIR and all consequential proceedings against the accused public servant were restored. State by Lokayuktha Police v. Sri K. Rangayya, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 587 : 2026 INSC 574
Privity of Contract – Notice to Insurer – Essentiality - Since the insurance company was neither made a party to the agreement between the appellant and the insured, nor was a copy of the agreement supplied to it, the insurer cannot be called upon to make good the loss suffered by the appellant - A letter of subrogation issued unilaterally by the financier without the execution/participation of the insured person is legally invalid – held that the principle in Sundaram Finance Ltd. regarding ownership under a hire-purchase agreement can only be applied when the precise nature of the executed agreement is clear. In the present case, the nature of the agreement/endorsement (whether it was a "Hire-purchase", "Hypothecation", or "Lease") was not clearly specified. [Para 10, 11, 12] K. Prakashchand v. Oriental Insurance, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 634
Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 - Custody and Child Psychological Evaluation – Child-Centric Jurisprudence - Sections 24, 33(5), 36, and 39 – Family Courts Act, 1984 – Section 12 – Psychological Evaluation of a Child Victim Intersecting with Custody/Visitation Disputes - The High Court modified its initial order for a single independent expert by constituting a four-member multi-layered panel of experts to evaluate a 10-year-old child victim for facilitating reconnection with the father, who is facing active criminal prosecution under the POCSO Act – Held that the High Court's approach suffered from a fundamental flaw as it failed to examine the detrimental impact that a multi-layered evaluative process conducted by numerous professionals could have on the psychological well-being of the child - Legal procedures involving child victims must remain child-sensitive, trauma-informed, and protective of their emotional security - The statutory framework of the POCSO Act, particularly the principle of minimum exposure under Section 33(5), consciously recognizes that repeated legal or forensic engagement carries a severe risk of "secondary victimisation" and "re-traumatisation" - While courts exercising parens patriae jurisdiction are not altogether precluded from seeking expert psychological assistance when POCSO allegations are pending, any such process must strictly adhere to the requirements of demonstrable necessity, institutional neutrality, proportionality, and minimum intrusion – The Supreme Court further emphasized that the emotional growth and welfare of a child are deeply intertwined with the parental subsystem - courts should focus on calling for psychological assessment reports of the parents themselves before subjecting the child to further forensic or clinical scrutiny - The impugned orders of the High Court were modified, and the matter was remitted to the Family Court to evaluate the parent's mental health first and coordinate with the child's existing therapeutic counsellor. [Paras 31, 41- 82, 85-93] Sheetal Vasant Thakur v. Chirag Arora, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 618 : 2026 INSC 638
Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 - In exercise of its plenary powers under Article 142 of the Constitution, the Supreme Court set aside the conviction and sentence of the appellant under Sections 5(1) and 6 of the POCSO Act, 2012 (10 years rigorous imprisonment) after the appellant and the victim solemnised their marriage following the victim attaining the age of majority and the appellant paid ₹10,00,000 as compensation to the victim. The Court took note of subsequent events, including the victim's statements expressing her desire to settle the matter and live with the appellant as his spouse, and the absence of any objection from the State (subject to the order not being treated as a precedent). The appeals were allowed and the judgments of the Trial Court and Madras High Court were set aside. The appellant and the victim were left free to live peacefully as spouses in society. Maruthupandi v. State, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 614
Public Services and Recruitment – Disclosure of Marks for Candidates Outside Zone of Consideration - The TNPSC challenged the direction to individual candidates to reveal the marks of those who failed to fall within the zone of consideration – Held that where a recruitment process has been heavily gridlocked in litigation for over five years, it is in the interest of justice and public interest to disclose individual marks to provide transparency and bring closure to the dispute, provided that the candidates are not granted copies of their physical answer sheets. [Relied on Joint Directors and Central Public Information Officer and Another v. T.R. Rajesh, 2018 INSC 179; Paras 20- 22] S. Senthil Kumaran Bose v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 631 : 2026 INSC 645
Public Services and Recruitment – Persons Studied in Tamil Medium (PSTM) Quota – noted that the TNPSC contested the eligibility of candidates claiming the PSTM quota based on certificates issued by the Heads of their respective educational institutions, arguing for independent verification through the Directorate of Technical Education - Held: A certificate issued by the Head of the Institution certifying that the candidate pursued their education/diploma course in the Tamil medium is sufficient to act upon, especially when the recruitment notification did not prescribe any additional criteria or require a verification letter from the Directorate of Technical Education. [Paras 19-21] S. Senthil Kumaran Bose v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 631 : 2026 INSC 645
Public Services and Recruitment – Selection Process – Experience Criteria – Retrospective Renewal of Workshop Approvals – Persons Studied in Tamil Medium (PSTM) Quota – Disclosure of Marks – Broad-based Level Playing Field - Workshop Experience Criteria & Retrospective Approval - Recruitment to 113 posts of Motor Vehicle Inspector-Grade II by the Tamil Nadu Public Service Commission (TNPSC) pursuant to a 2018 notification became heavily mired in litigation - The Division Bench of the Madras High Court directed a fresh recruitment exercise after verifying candidate experience in petrol and diesel fitted engines, and instructed the State to take a decision on granting retrospective renewals to the respective workshops where candidates gained experience – Held that the High Court's directions were cogent and legally sound - Due to the lack of a uniform policy regarding retrospective workshop approval, decisions left to the sole discretion of the Director were arbitrary - Candidates who gained experience at workshops acting on behalf of the Government, or whose renewal applications were pending, cannot be penalized for administrative delays beyond their control - Directing a conscious decision on retrospective renewal ensures a level playing field, bringing more meritorious candidates into a larger selection pool, which aligns with public interest - No vested right to appointment is created merely by inclusion in a previously revised selection list when the right to participate in the fresh process is preserved. [Paras 15, 16, 17] S. Senthil Kumaran Bose v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 631 : 2026 INSC 645
Rajya Suraksha Adhiniyam, 1990 (Chhattisgarh) — Section 9 — Limitation Act, 1963 — Section 5 and Section 29(2) — Applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act to statutory appeals under the Adhiniyam — Condonation of delay — Held: Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 is not excluded either expressly or by necessary implication from proceedings under Section 9 of the Chhattisgarh Rajya Suraksha Adhiniyam, 1990 - The appellate authority retains the discretion to condone delay in appropriate cases upon sufficient cause being shown. [Paras 25, 26] Sardari Lal v. Bishan Dass, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 645 : 2026 INSC 669
Registered Sale Deed – Presumption of Validity and Genuineness – Minor discrepancies in Attestation – A registered sale deed carries a formidable presumption of validity, sanctity, and genuineness which cannot be lightly brushed aside on conjectures or insignificant peripheral variations - The heavy burden to dislodge this presumption rests on the challenger to prove fraud, coercion, or fundamental illegality - Unlike wills or gifts, attestation is not a statutory requirement for the execution or legal validity of a sale deed - minor variations in the description or residential details of an attesting witness, recorded decades after execution, cannot be treated as material contradictions striking at the root of the transaction or dislodging the statutory presumption. [Relied on Hemalatha (D) by LRs vs. Tukaram (D) by LRs and Others, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 106; Jamila Begum (Dead) Through LRs. vs. Shami Mohd. (Dead) Through LRs., (2019) 2 SCC 727; Rattan Singh vs. Nirmal Gill, (2021) 15 SCC 300; Paras 51- 59] Sarafat Ali v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 642 : 2026 INSC 652
Remedies — Restitutionary Remedy vs. Motor Vehicles Act Claims — Independent Action for Rights Violation - The Supreme Court distinguished between claims arising out of motor accidents and the violation of pedestrian rights - If the fundamental right to walk on a demarcated footpath is violated due to the failure of state/local actors, citizens are fully entitled to invoke constitutional remedies or public law restitutionary remedies (such as under Sections 38–40 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963) against the defaulting local bodies - This restitutionary remedy is independent of, and distinct from, any statutory compensation claim made under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. [Paras 15 - 20] Maniyar Iliyaz Shaik Riyaz v. P. Ayyappan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 632 : 2026 INSC 647
Right of Appeal — Nature of Remedy — Fair Procedure — Externment Orders — Civil and Criminal Consequences — Held: A right of appeal is a substantive right and an integral component of fair procedure, particularly where the impugned orders (such as externment) entail serious civil and criminal consequences affecting the liberty, movement, livelihood, and reputation of a person - In the absence of an express legislative command to the contrary, an interpretation that preserves the appellate remedy and advances substantial justice must be preferred over a technicality that defeats it. [Relied on Garikapati Veeraya v. N. Subbiah Choudhry, AIR 1957 SC 540; Hukumdev Narain Yadav v. Lalit Narain Mishra, (1974) 2 SCC 13; Commissioner of Customs and Central Excise v. Hongo India Private Limited, (2009) 5 SCC 791; Paras 20-27] Sardari Lal v. Bishan Dass, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 645 : 2026 INSC 669
Right to Information Act, 2005 — Section 24(4) — Exclusion of Madhya Pradesh Special Police Establishment (SPE) from RTI Purview — Validity of Notification — SPE Not an "Intelligence and Security Organisation – The Supreme Court held that the Madhya Pradesh Special Police Establishment (SPE) cannot be classified as an "intelligence and security organisation" within the meaning of Section 24(4) of the Right to Information Act, 2005 - the State Government's Notification dated August 25, 2011, to the extent that it sought to completely exclude the SPE from the application of the RTI Act, is excessive, does not conform to the parent statute, and is bad in law - The sphere of operation of the SPE under the MP Special Police Establishment Act, 1947 is strictly confined to investigating specified offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, and certain provisions of the Indian Penal Code (Sections 409, 420, and Chapter XVIII) - It serves as an investigative arm to assist the Lokayukt or Up-Lokayukt under Section 7 of the MP Lokayukt Evam Up-Lokayukt Adhiniyam, 1981, which only deals with complaints of corruption, misconduct, or malfeasance against public servants. Neither the Lokayukt nor the SPE is conferred with any jurisdiction or mandate relating to internal security or state/national intelligence - the principle of institutional parity with central intelligence or security organisations listed in the Second Schedule of the RTI Act does not apply. [Paras 13-22] Special Police Establishment v. Kamta Prasad Mishra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 629 : 2026 INSC 644
Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 (RPwD Act) - Persons who are forcibly made to consume acid and those who suffer internal injuries due to acid attack, even without external disfigurement, are included within the definition of 'acid attack victims' under the RPwD Act. Shaheen Malik v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 646
Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 — Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules, 2002 — Rule 9(3), Rule 9(4), and Rule 9(5) — Mandatory Nature of Timelines for Payment of Auction Sale Consideration — Absence of Written Agreement for Extension of Time — Effect of Non-Compliance - Setting aside the auction sale, the Supreme Court held that the provisions of Rule 9 of the SARFAESI Rules are not ornamental or directory, but are couched in mandatory terms that go to the root of the validity of the sale - Under Rule 9(4), the balance purchase price must be paid within fifteen days of the confirmation of the sale, or within such extended period as agreed upon in writing between the parties - Any deviation from this timeline, in the absolute absence of a demonstrably valid written agreement for an extension executed prior to the payment, constitutes a material irregularity that completely vitiates the auction process - The failure of the borrower or guarantor's legal heirs to liquidate outstanding dues cannot serve to validate or sanctify a sale process that is fundamentally infirm and non-compliant with the governing statutory rules. [Relied on Sri Siddeshwara Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. Ikbal, (2013) 10 SCC 83; IDBI Bank Ltd. v. Ramswaroop Daliya, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2878; Paras 25 – 42] M.R. Vasumathi v. Authorized Officer, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 613 : 2026 INSC 633
Sentence Modification — Substitution of Life Imprisonment with Period Already Undergone - While maintaining the conviction under Section 302 read with Section 120-B IPC, the Supreme Court took into account that the incident dated back to 1984, the co-convicts had been granted state remission, and the appellant had served over 18 years of actual imprisonment - Modifying a life sentence to a fixed-term sentence or the period already undergone is permissible provided the sentence served exceeds 14 years - Sentence modified to the period already undergone, and immediate release directed. [Paras 45 - 62] Gopi Chand @ Pappu v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 609 : 2026 INSC 598
Service Jurisprudence – Delay and Laches – Continuing Cause of Action – Arrears Limitation – Held - Pensionary benefits constitute a recurring and continuing cause of action - A substantive claim for pension cannot be rejected or defeated solely on the ground of delay and laches - the grant of financial arrears must be balanced with settled principles of limitation; where the claim was not raised prior to approaching the court, arrears shall remain restricted to a period of three years and two months preceding the filing of the Original Application before the Tribunal. [Relied on Jagrit Mazdoor Union (Regd.) and Others v. Mahanagar Telephone Nigam Ltd. and Another, 1990 Supp SCC 113; Yashwant Hari Katakkar v. Union of India and Others, (1996) 7 SCC 113; M.L. Patil (Dead) through LRs v. State of Goa and Another, (2023) 1 SCC 660; Vinod Kumar and Others v. Union of India and Others, (2024) 9 SCC 327; Jaggo v. Union of India and Others, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3826; Paras 79-83] Bhikhani Devi v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 582 : 2026 INSC 612
Service Jurisprudence – State as a Model Employer – Constitution of India, 1950 – Articles 14, 38, 39, and 43 – Equity and Social Justice – Held that long-serving employees who have rendered continuous, uninterrupted service spanning decades and have been functionally assimilated into the regular framework cannot be retained in a precarious status to deny them social security - The distinction between temporary and permanent employment becomes substantively illusory when the nature of duties performed is identical to regular employees - The State, as a model employer, is bound by constitutional mandates to ensure fair conditions of work and economic justice. [Paras 35-40] Bhikhani Devi v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 582 : 2026 INSC 612
Service Law - A person with higher qualification cannot be appointed to a post exclusively reserved for candidates with lower educational qualifications - Suppression of higher qualification renders appointment non-est. The Supreme Court held that when a post is specifically earmarked for candidates possessing lower educational qualifications (e.g., up to 10th standard), a candidate who possesses higher qualifications and suppresses the same to secure appointment deprives genuinely eligible and deserving candidates of the opportunity. Such an appointment is liable to be cancelled. The State, as a model employer, is justified in reserving certain posts for less educated persons so that they are not required to compete with more highly qualified candidates. Permitting over-qualified candidates to occupy such posts would defeat the very object of the reservation. General Manager (Hr) v. K. Poovarasan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 595 : 2026 INSC 581
Service Law - Appeals by Group-A officers of CRPF, BSF, SSB, ITBP, and CISF seeking OGAS status and relief from promotional stagnation due to IPS deputation - Directions - Complete cadre review for all CAPFs within six months. Review and amend service and recruitment rules within six months with cadre officers' inputs. DoPT to decide on action taken reports within three months. Progressively reduce deputation posts up to SAG level within two years. [Relied: Union of India v. Harananda, (2019) 14 SCC 126] (Para 45) Sanjay Prakash v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 625 : 2025 INSC 779
Service Law - Central Armed Police Forces (CAPFs) - Whether CAPFs qualify as Organised Group-A Services (OGAS) for cadre-related matters, including cadre review and service benefits, and whether deputation of Indian Police Service (IPS) officers to CAPFs causes promotional stagnation for CAPF officers, necessitating reduction. Held, CAPFs are recognised as OGAS for all purposes, including cadre management and service benefits, as per DoPT OM dated 12 July 2019. All OGAS benefits must extend to CAPFs. Central Government directed to complete cadre reviews for all CAPFs and amend recruitment rules within six months to align with OGAS status. To address promotional stagnation, deputation posts up to Senior Administrative Grade (SAG) level to be progressively reduced within two years to enhance promotion prospects for CAPF officers. Ministry of Home Affairs to review service and recruitment rules with inputs from CAPF cadre officers within six months; DoPT to act on reports within three months. Deputation policies remain Central Government's prerogative, but CAPF officers' grievances regarding stagnation and recognition must be addressed to uphold morale. (Paras 43 & 44) Sanjay Prakash v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 625 : 2025 INSC 779
Service Law - The respondent was appointed as a temporary Bank Attendant in Syndicate Bank against a post reserved for candidates having qualifications up to the 10th standard. He concealed the fact that he was a graduate. The Management terminated his services upon discovering the suppression. The High Court set aside the termination and ordered reinstatement. The Supreme Court reversed the High Court's order. Held, Mere possession of higher qualification does not entitle a candidate to claim appointment to a post for which lower qualification is prescribed. - Suppression of higher educational qualification in such cases amounts to fraud on the public employment process. - Public employment must be offered strictly in accordance with the prescribed qualifications so that all eligible candidates get a fair opportunity. Appeal allowed. Termination of the respondent upheld. [Relied on: Jomon K.K. v. Shajimon P. & Ors., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 381. General Manager (Hr) v. K. Poovarasan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 595 : 2026 INSC 581
Service Law – Annual Confidential Reports (ACRs) – Non-communication of Entries: Obligation to communicate ACR entries, adverse or otherwise - The respondents contended that prior to the 2008-09 policy shift, only 'Average' or 'Below Average' gradings were communicable – Held that the nomenclature of an entry is immaterial; its determinative effect is what matters - Even a 'Good' or 'Very Good' entry becomes adverse in character if it makes an incumbent ineligible for promotion or prejudicially affects empanelment prospects - Non-communication of such entries carries civil consequences, depriving the employee of a fair opportunity to seek redressal or make representations. [Paras 12 – 17] Dr. Indira Saranath v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 577 : 2026 INSC 553
Service Law – Department of Posts – Casual Labourers (Grant of Temporary Status and Regularisation) Scheme, 1991 – Circular dated 30.11.1992 – Rule 10(1-B) of the Central Civil Services (Temporary Service) Rules, 1965 – Entitlement of temporary status casual labourers to pensionary benefits in the absence of formal regularisation – Held - A casual labourer, upon conferment of "temporary status" and subsequent completion of three years of continuous service in that capacity, is treated at par with temporary Group 'D' employees - This parity functions as a parity in substantive service benefits (including leave, increments, GPF, and pensionary benefits) rather than an identity of formal service status - The expression "after regularisation" in Clause 6 of the 1991 Scheme does not restrict or act as a mandatory prerequisite for the core entitlement to a pension; rather, it provides an additional benefit of counting 50% of the past temporary status service towards retirement benefits once a formal order of regularisation is passed - The foundational right to a pension for such employees flows independently from the operational framework of the Scheme, the Departmental Circular dated 30.11.1992, and Rule 10(1-B) of the CCS (Temporary Service) Rules, 1965 - If a temporary status casual labourer completes the minimum qualifying service of 10 years after attaining parity with temporary Group 'D' employees, they are entitled to superannuation pension, retirement gratuity, and family pension upon death, even in the absolute absence of a formal order of regularisation. [Paras 47-76] Bhikhani Devi v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 582 : 2026 INSC 612
Service Law – Destruction of Records – Weeding Out During Pendency of Litigation – Adverse Inference - The respondents admitted that the appellant's original ACR service records were destroyed/weeded out in 2013, despite the active pendency of the present civil appeal before the Supreme Court filed in 2009 – Held that Service records are mandatorily required to be retained until the final conclusion of judicial proceedings - The destruction of the records during the pendency of the litigation severely prejudiced the appellant's case and precluded judicial scrutiny - a strong adverse inference is liable to be drawn against the employer-respondents. [Paras 15-17] Dr. Indira Saranath v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 577 : 2026 INSC 553
Service Law – Direct Recruitment – Recruitment Procedure – Primary Cooperative Marketing-cum-Processing Societies Limited Staff Service Rules, 2003 – Rule 3, Rule 14(a) & Rule 15 – Haryana Cooperative Societies Act, 1984 – Section 36 – Validity of appointments challenged on the ground of non-compliance with amended Rule 3 due to the absence and lack of concurrence of the mandatory official members (Assistant Registrar Cooperative Societies, Inspector Cooperative Societies, and District Manager, HAFED) in the Board of Directors (BOD) meeting finalizing the appointments – Held, that a public recruitment process can be split into three distinct stages: (i) notification/advertisement, (ii) method of selection (interview/written test), and (iii) final appointment by the competent authority - If the first two stages do not suffer from any fundamental defects (such as lack of publicity, fraud, manipulation, or appointment of unqualified candidates), the entire recruitment process cannot be rendered void ab initio due to a procedural loophole at the third stage - The requirement under Rule 3 regarding the presence and concurrence of non-elected official members is supervisory and salutary in nature, designed to ensure cross-checking and adherence to norms - The absence of such officials constitutes a curable procedural irregularity, not a fatal illegality going to the root of the selection - Candidates who entered service in good faith through an advertised, merit-based process cannot be made to suffer for institutional lapses or procedural omissions committed by the authorities - The third stage of the recruitment process is severable from the first two - The defect is rectifiable by directing the Cooperative Society to reconvene the BOD meeting in strict compliance with Rule 3 to re-examine the qualifications and recommendations of the selected candidates, without reopening the validly concluded initial phases of advertisement and interview - Impugned judgment of the High Court set aside and appeal allowed with directions. [Paras 20-22, 40-52, 60-64] Gaurav Mehla v. State of Haryana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 628 : 2026 INSC 641
Service Law – Fixation of Pay – Weightage for Past Service – Promissory Estoppel – Withdrawal of pay weightage benefits on the ground that Railway Service is not Central Government Civil Service – Held that unjustified, The Board, having explicitly accepted the pro-rata pension contribution from the Railways and acted upon its own "Board Orders" and settlements for years, is estopped from unilaterally withdrawing the benefit of weightage from the appellant - The High Court erred in holding that because the CCS (Conduct) Rules, 1964 and CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 do not apply to railway servants, their service cannot be reckoned for pay fixation. [Relied on Parshotam Lal Dhingra v. Union of India, AIR 1958 SC 36; Moti Ram Deka v. North East Frontier Railway, AIR 1964 SC 60; State of Assam v. Kanak Chandra Dutta, AIR 1967 SC 884; Paras 32-39, 44 - 47] Bency John v.Kerala State Electricity Board, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 576 : 2026 INSC 562
Service Law – Promotion – Applicable Rules – Date of Vacancy vs. Date of Consideration – Recruitment Rules – Amendment by Substitution – Meaning and Effect - Held that the right to be considered for promotion is governed exclusively by the statutory rules in force at the time the actual consideration for promotion takes place, and not by the rules that existed when the vacancies originally arose - Public servants do not possess a vested right to be considered under the old or repealed rules - Held that the term "substitution" used in amending or subordinate legislation ordinarily has the effect of deleting the old provision and bringing the new provision into existence in its place - The old rule ceases to exist from the text, and subsequent consideration must be done under the newly substituted rules unless the legislature intended otherwise - Where promotions were granted on a purely ad-hoc basis subject to the outcome of a pending litigation, they do not constitute a "completed act" or create a vested right to protection under the repealed rules - Allowing the Civil Appeal, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgment - The Apex Court held that the legal foundation applied by the High Court was incorrect in view of the three-Judge bench decision in State of Himachal Pradesh v. Raj Kumar (2022), which explicitly overruled the Y.V. Rangaiah doctrine - Supreme Court ordered that all existing vacancies must be filled strictly in accordance with the 2016 Rules. [Relied on State of Himachal Pradesh & Others v. Raj Kumar & Others, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 680; State of Odisha & Ors. v. Sreepati Ranjan Dash, 2026 INSC 505; Gottumukkala Venkata Krishamraju v. Union of India & Others, (2019) 17 SCC 590; Zile Singh v. State of Haryana & Others, (2004) 8 SCC 1; Paras 20- 30] Jagdish Prasad v.P.M. Manoj Kumar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 596 : 2026 INSC 572
Service Law – Promotion – Indian Railway Medical Service – Evaluation Criteria & Allocation of Points - Challenge to non-promotion to the post of Chief Medical Director in Higher Administrative Grade (HAG) - The Railway Board's promotion policy dated 22.05.1996 prescribed a whole-number point system for Annual Confidential Report (ACR) gradings - The Selection Committee awarded the appellant a fractional score of 19.5 points despite her five-year ACR grading being uniformly 'Very Good' (which mandated 20 points) – Held that there is no provision in the promotion policy for awarding points in fractions - The assessment was made without an objective basis, and the appellant must be deemed to have secured 20 points based on her consistent 'Very Good' gradings. [Paras 16] Dr. Indira Saranath v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 577 : 2026 INSC 553
Service Law – Retrospective Promotion – Retiral Benefits vs. Arrears of Salary - Appellant retired from service during the pendency of litigation – Held that where an employee is found to have been treated unfairly in the promotional evaluation, but the original service records are unavailable due to inadvertent weeding out, granting dynamic monetary relief like arrears of salary on a 'no work, no pay' relaxation may not be feasible - the ends of justice are met by directing the grant of notional promotion from the date her juniors were promoted, along with a mandatory re-fixation of pension and payment of retiral arrears. [Relied on Prabhat Ranjan Singh v. R.K. Kushwaha, 2018 INSC 796; Dev Dutt v. Union of India, 2008 INSC 630; distinguished from Union of India v. Chaman Rana, 2018 INSC 230; Paras 18, 19] Dr. Indira Saranath v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 577 : 2026 INSC 553
Service Law – Status of Railway Servants – Civil Post under the Union – Article 309 and Article 311 of the Constitution of India – Whether a railway servant ceases to be a member of the civil service of the Union merely because separate service rules govern their recruitment, conduct, control, and pension – Held that No, A railway servant remains a person holding a civil post in connection with the affairs of the Union under the administrative control of the Central Government - The delegation of powers to the Railway Board does not separate the status of a railway servant from that of a Central Government employee, as the Railway Board functions as the Government of India itself for railway administration - Service under the Railway Board is service under the Central Government. [Paras 42, 43] Bency John v.Kerala State Electricity Board, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 576 : 2026 INSC 562
Service Law — Disciplinary Proceedings — De Novo Adjudication before Labour Court — Right to Fresh Post-Enquiry Show-Cause Notice on Quantum of Punishment - Where a domestic enquiry is found to be defective/perverse and the employer successfully proves the misconduct by leading independent evidence de novo before the Labour Court, the disciplinary authority cannot mechanically impose the penalty of dismissal by relying solely on the original show-cause notice that was founded upon the vitiated domestic enquiry - Even if the finding of misconduct attains finality, the regulatory mandate of an explicit post-enquiry notice (such as Regulation 88(j) of the MSEDCL Employees Services Regulations, 2005) requires a fresh application of mind by the disciplinary authority to the findings that ultimately survived the de novo adjudication - The delinquent employee must be given a fresh opportunity to show cause and plead mitigating or extenuating circumstances against the proposed punishment in light of the post-remand findings. [Relied on Managing Director, ECIL v. B. Karunakar, (1993) 4 SCC 727; Workmen of Firestone Tyre & Rubber Co. of India (P) Ltd. v. Management, (1973) 1 SCC 813; Paras 38-56] Surekha Domaji Bele v. Executive Engineer, Testing Division, MSEDCL, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 624 : 2026 INSC 639
Service Law — Proportionality of Punishment — Doctrine of Proportionality — Dismissal from Service - Dismissal from service is the severest form of penalty which leaves a permanent stigma, impairs future public employment prospects, and devastates the employee and their dependent family members - The mere fact that a proved act falls within the broad head of "misconduct" does not mean dismissal must follow as a matter of course - Where the charges involve internal office indiscipline, insubordination, or minor tampering with office documents, but completely lack any element of financial misappropriation, corruption, moral turpitude, or proven pecuniary loss to the employer, a punishment of dismissal is shockingly disproportionate for an employee with over two decades of unblemished service - The disciplinary authority must carefully evaluate mitigating factors such as length of service, age, past record, and the absence of dishonesty to examine whether a lesser penalty would meet the ends of justice. [Relied on Ranjit Thakur v. Union of India, (1987) 4 SCC 611; B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India, (1995) 6 SCC 749; Chairman-cum-Managing Director, Coal India Ltd. v. Mukul Kumar Choudhuri, AIR 2010 SC 75; Paras 105-111] Surekha Domaji Bele v. Executive Engineer, Testing Division, MSEDCL, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 624 : 2026 INSC 639
Service Law — Quantum of Punishment — Amalgam of Penalties — Double Punishment for Single Misconduct - A disciplinary authority acts illegally and without jurisdiction if it creates an amalgam of separate substantive penalties for the same misconduct unless expressly authorized by the rules - Where an employee is visited with the ultimate penalty of dismissal, an additional direction in the same order treating the entire past period of suspension pending enquiry as a substantive "punishment" is impermissible and cannot operate as an independent or additional penalty - The monetary and service consequences of the suspension period must strictly be decided only in terms of the regulatory provisions governing regularizations (Regulation 88(a)(v)), which explicitly protect subsistence allowance already paid or payable. [Relied on Union of India v. S.C. Parashar, (2006) 3 SCC 167; Paras 84-89] Surekha Domaji Bele v. Executive Engineer, Testing Division, MSEDCL, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 624 : 2026 INSC 639
Service Law — Suspension — Prolonged Suspension and Entitlement to Subsistence Allowance — Continuous Reporting Conditions - Suspension is not an indefinite condition of civil and economic disability - Under the MSEDCL Service Regulations, any suspension continuing beyond six months mandates a formal review and recommendation by a higher authority - In the absence of an order on record reviewing or validly continuing the suspension beyond the initial six months, an employer cannot perpetually rely on a week-to-week office reporting condition to mechanically deny subsistence allowance for a prolonged suspension spanning nearly eleven years - While non-compliance with the reporting condition may be scrutinized for the initial regulatory period of six months, the employee is legally eligible for subsistence allowance for the remaining post-six-month period up to the date of final dismissal. [Relied on State of Maharashtra v. Chandrabhan Tale, (1983) 3 SCC 387; O.P. Gupta v. Union of India, (1987) 4 SCC 328; Paras 58-73] Surekha Domaji Bele v. Executive Engineer, Testing Division, MSEDCL, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 624 : 2026 INSC 639
Specific Relief Act, 1963 – Discretionary Relief – Impact of Unexplained Delay / Laches in Filing Suit – Approaching Court at the Fag End of Limitation - For claiming an equitable relief like specific performance, the plaintiff's conduct must be beyond reproach - Merely filing a suit within the three-year statutory limitation period prescribed under the Limitation Act is not enough - The plaintiff must approach the Court promptly and with diligence - An unexplained delay or waiting until the fag end of the limitation period to file a suit after a categorical refusal/breach by the defendant reflects a clear lack of continuous readiness and willingness, thereby disentitling the plaintiff to discretionary relief. [Relied on N.P. Thirugnanam (Dead) by LRs. v. Dr. R. Jagan Mohan Rao, (1995) 5 SCC 115; His Holiness Acharya Swami Ganesh Dassji v. Sita Ram Thapar, (1996) 4 SCC 526; Umabai v. Nilkanth Dhondiba Chavan (Dead) by LRs., (2005) 6 SCC 243; Man Kaur (Dead) by LRs. v. Hartar Singh Sangha, (2010) 10 SCC 512; Rajesh Kumar v. Anand Kumar, (2024) 13 SCC 80; Atma Ram v. Charanjit Singh, (2020) 3 SCC 311; Paras 35-42] Mohammed Khaleel v. Jayamma, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 638 : 2026 INSC 651
Specific Relief Act, 1963 – Key Legal Findings by Supreme Court – i. Validity of Agreement- The Supreme Court restored the Trial Court's finding that the sale agreement was genuine and valid, noting that the defendant's plea of it being a "security document" was an improbable afterthought unsupported by evidence; ii. Adverse Inference- The defendants' failure to reply to the plaintiff's legal notice creates an adverse inference against them; iii. Readiness and Willingness Established - The Supreme Court held that the plaintiff, by paying approximately 93% of the consideration and issuing a legal notice promptly after the defendants became evasive, demonstrated sufficient continuous readiness and willingness under Section 16(c) of the Act. A. Shahul Hameed v. N. Malligarjuna, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 604 : 2026 INSC 573
Specific Relief Act, 1963 – Section 16(c) – Financial Readiness – Evaluation of Financial Documents Generated Post-Suit - To establish financial readiness, the plaintiff must place reliable and acceptable evidence on record proving the availability of sufficient funds at the relevant time namely, within the contractually stipulated period or at the time of filing the suit - Financial documents, such as Fixed Deposit Receipts (FDRs), generated several years after the institution of the suit cannot be accepted as proof of financial readiness during the crucial interregnum between the agreement's execution and the suit's filing. [Paras 35-43] Mohammed Khaleel v. Jayamma, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 638 : 2026 INSC 651
Specific Relief Act, 1963 – Section 16(c) – Readiness and Willingness – Requirement of – Readiness and willingness must be gathered from the entirety of facts and circumstances, including the overall conduct of parties - It is not a theoretical requirement; payment of a substantial portion of the sale consideration can be a significant indicator of the plaintiff's readiness - so long as a suit for specific performance is filed within the period of limitation, mere delay cannot be a ground for refusing the relief - reiterated that the question of readiness and willingness is a question of fact to be determined based on the conduct of the parties and material circumstances. [Relied on Madhukar Nivrutti Jagtap v. Pramilabai Chandulal Parandekar (2020) 15 SCC 731; Paras 11-21] A. Shahul Hameed v. N. Malligarjuna, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 604 : 2026 INSC 573
Specific Relief Act, 1963 – Section 16(c) (Prior to 2018 Amendment) – Specific Performance of Contract – Continuous Readiness and Willingness – Nature, Burden of Proof, and Financial Capacity - The relief of specific performance is an equitable remedy rooted in discretion and governed by settled legal principles - Section 16(c) mandatorily requires a plaintiff seeking specific performance to explicitly aver and continuously prove both "readiness" (signifying financial capacity) and "willingness" (reflecting conduct and intent) from the date of the execution of the agreement right up to the date of the decree - Failure to satisfy these requirements disentitles the plaintiff to relief. [Paras 29-31] Mohammed Khaleel v. Jayamma, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 638 : 2026 INSC 651
Subordinate Legislation — Grounds of Challenge — Distinction from Plenary Legislation – Held that A piece of subordinate legislation does not enjoy the same degree of immunity as a statute enacted by a competent legislature. It can be validly challenged and struck down if it fails to conform to the parent statute under which it is made, exceeds the limits of authority conferred by the enabling Act, or is contrary to any other law of the land - The Supreme Court dismissed the Criminal Appeal filed by the Special Police Establishment - maintained the judgment of the Madhya Pradesh High Court directing the supply of information regarding the prosecution sanction process to the respondent - The Notification dated August 25, 2011, issued by the General Administration Department of Madhya Pradesh, was struck down to the extent that it excluded the SPE from the applicability of the RTI Act - The Supreme Court clarified that it did not examine the notification's validity regarding the State Bureau of Investigation of Economic Offences, which will continue to operate normally. [Relied on Indian Express Newspapers (Bombay) Private Ltd. and Others v. Union of India and Others (1984 INSC 231); State of Tamil Nadu and Another v. P. Krishnamurthy and Others (2006 INSC 177); Para 15-22] Special Police Establishment v. Kamta Prasad Mishra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 629 : 2026 INSC 644
Subordinate Legislation — Suo Motu Jurisdiction of Constitutional Courts — Striking Down an Invalid Rule/Notification in the Absence of Explicit Challenge or Prayers in Pleadings - The absence of a specific prayer or explicit pleadings challenging the validity of a piece of subordinate legislation (such as a government notification) does not deter a Constitutional Court from evaluating and declaring it invalid if it patently violates fundamental rights or exceeds the authority conferred by the enabling parent statute – Held that while suo motu powers to strike down subordinate legislation must be exercised sparingly and with caution, a writ court as the "sentinel on the qui vive" has the plenary duty to guard against breaches of law and logic. When a party relies heavily on an invalid notification to deny statutory rights (like information under the RTI Act), the Court can test its vires, provided a full and fair opportunity is afforded to the State to defend the legislation - In the present case, since the Advocate General and Senior Counsel for the State of Madhya Pradesh were heard extensively and allowed to file written submissions to justify the Notification's validity, the lack of an initial challenge by the writ petitioner before the High Court was not fatal. [Relied on Bharathidasan University and Another v. All India Council for Technical Education and Others (2001 INSC 454); Union of India and Others v. Manjurani Routray and Others (2023 INSC 787); Paras 8-11] Special Police Establishment v. Kamta Prasad Mishra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 629 : 2026 INSC 644
Succession Act, 1925 - An application for revocation of probate under Section 263 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 filed in 2022 to revoke a probate granted in 1995 was barred by limitation. The limitation period under Article 137 begins to run from the date the applicant acquires knowledge (including constructive knowledge) of the grant of probate. Initiation of mutation proceedings pursuant to the probate and service of notice thereon in 2011/2013 constitutes constructive notice to the predecessors-in-interest of the respondents. Failure to inquire into the basis of such notice precludes a later plea of ignorance in 2019. A party receiving notice from a Court is expected to make reasonable inquiries regarding the same. The Supreme Court set aside the Division Bench's order and restored the Single Judge's judgment dismissing the revocation application as time-barred. Dhiraj Dutta v. Anirban Sen, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 622 : 2026 INSC 602
Succession Act, 1925 - Revocation of Probate – Limitation – Article 137 of Limitation Act, 1963 applies - Where the Indian Succession Act, 1925 does not prescribe any period of limitation for grant of probate or for filing an application for revocation of probate already granted, such proceedings are governed by the residuary Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963, which provides a limitation period of three years from the date when the right to apply accrues. Dhiraj Dutta v. Anirban Sen, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 622 : 2026 INSC 602
Vested Rights & Equity – Long Unblemished Service – Vitiation Ex Post Facto - Equity & Proportionality – Appellants rendered more than a decade of continuous, unblemished service from 2014 onwards without any personal allegations of fraud, malpractice, or lack of eligibility – High Court invalidated appointments after 10 years based on internal procedural non-compliance – Supreme Court held that it is highly inequitable to deprive employees of their livelihood after long years of service due to institutional lapses over which they exercised no control - The interest of justice is served by treating the defect as curable and reviewing the third stage rather than directing a total invalidation of the recruitment process. [Relied on State of U.P. v. Johri Mal, (2004) 4 SCC 714; disctinguished from Ramjit Singh Kardam v. Sanjeev Kumar, (2020) 20 SCC 209; Paras 49-62] Gaurav Mehla v. State of Haryana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 628 : 2026 INSC 641
Wildlife (Protection) Act, 1972 - Custody & Welfare of Captive Elephant - The Supreme Court directed the State of Kerala to immediately take over the custody of the captive elephant Raman (Kerala's tallest elephant) and house it in an appropriate rescue or rehabilitation centre. Courts “cannot be a mute spectator” in matters concerning the welfare of voiceless animals. Turning a blind eye to the commercial exploitation of animals, especially in violation of court orders and undertakings, would amount to failure in judicial duty. Jayakrishna Menon v. Krishnankutty, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 625
Zamindari Abolition And Land Reforms Act, 1950 (U.P.) - Sections 154 & 163 (Prior to omission) – Restriction on transfer by a Bhumidhar – Nature of transfer violating ceiling limits – Void or Voidable – A transfer of holding made by a bhumidhar in contravention of the ceiling limits prescribed under Section 154 is not void ipso facto or void ab initio under the unamended statutory regime - Section 163 merely exposes the transferee to the consequence of ejectment contingent upon a suit filed by the Gaon Sabha - Till such action is taken by the Gaon Sabha within the prescribed limitation period, the transferee continues to validly enjoy the property - any transfer violating Section 154 is not void but merely voidable at the instance of the Gaon Sabha to the extent of the excess over the prescribed limit. [Relied on Kripashanker vs. Director of Consolidation and Others, (1979) 4 SCC 199; Paras 23-34] Sarafat Ali v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 642 : 2026 INSC 652
Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950 (U.P.) – Sections 166 & 167 (as amended by U.P. Act No. 20 of 1982) – Prospective vs. Retrospective application – Accrued Rights – Amending Act which alters substantive rights or introduces a new disability/obligation in respect of transactions already accomplished is presumed to be prospective - The 1982 amendment expanding Sections 166 and 167 to declare all transfers in contravention of the Act as void with automatic vesting in the State introduced a substantive alteration in legal consequences - In the absence of an express or implied legislative intent, it cannot be applied retrospectively to invalidate a registered sale deed executed decades prior (in 1957) under the older regime where such transfer was merely voidable - Superimposing the amended framework retrospectively would create an irreconcilable statutory dichotomy and unsettling of vested rights. [Relied on Zile Singh vs. State of Haryana and Others, (2004) 8 SCC 1; State of Kerala vs. Philomina, (1976) 4 SCC 314; Paras 36-42] Sarafat Ali v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 642 : 2026 INSC 652