Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 - Section 15 - Karnataka State Administrative Tribunal (KSAT) - Maintainability of Writ Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution - Service Law - Recruitment Disputes - Alternate Remedy - Jurisdiction of High Court – Held, High Courts should not entertain Writ Petition in matters within domain of Tribunals - The High Court erred in...
Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 - Section 15 - Karnataka State Administrative Tribunal (KSAT) - Maintainability of Writ Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution - Service Law - Recruitment Disputes - Alternate Remedy - Jurisdiction of High Court – Held, High Courts should not entertain Writ Petition in matters within domain of Tribunals - The High Court erred in entertaining the writ petition challenging the provisional select list, as an efficacious alternative remedy was available before the KSAT - The Tribunal is the Court of first instance for all service disputes, and litigants cannot directly approach the High Courts, even to question the vires of statutory legislations - The present case does not fall under the recognized exceptions to the rule of alternative remedy, e.g., enforcement of fundamental rights, violation of natural justice, lack of jurisdiction, or challenge to the vires of the parent legislation - Appeals dismissed. [Relied on L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India and Ors., (1997) 3 SCC 261; T.K. Rangarajan v. Government of T.N. and Others, (2003) 6 SCC 581; Paras 27-29, 32, 49-51] Leelavathi N. v. State of Karnataka, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1013 : 2025 INSC 1242
Advocate - Procedure for Summoning an Advocate (in exceptional cases) - Status of in-house counsel - Supreme Court laid down procedure for summoning advocates in exceptional cases - i. An Investigating Officer (I.O.) can only summon an Advocate if the I.O. has knowledge of an issue that falls under the exceptions to Section 132 of the BSA (e.g., communication made in furtherance of an illegal purpose)- In such a case, the summons must specifically mention the exception under which the Advocate is being summoned; ii. Any summons issued against an Advocate by an I.O. must be with the prior approval and satisfaction of the hierarchical Superior, not below the rank of a Superintendent of Police (SP), and a reasoned order must be recorded; iii. In-house counsel are not entitled to the professional privilege under Section 132 of the BSA since they are not Advocates practicing in Courts as spoken of in the BSA- they would be entitled to the protection under Section 134 insofar as any communication made to the legal advisor of their employer- The protection under Section 134 cannot be claimed for the communications between the employer and the In-house counsel themselves. [Relied on Jacob Mathew v. State of Punjab, (2005) 6 SCC 1; Paras 48-50, 59-67] In Re : Summoning Advocates, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1051 : 2025 INSC 1275
Advocate - Treatment of Advocate's Digital Devices and Confidentiality- Supreme Court held that - i. While examining any digital device of an Advocate, care shall be taken by the Court not to impair the confidentiality with respect to the other clients of the Advocate; ii. The discovery shall be strictly confined to the information sought by the Investigating Officer, provided it is found to be permissible and admissible. [Paras 54 - 58] In Re : Summoning Advocates, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1051 : 2025 INSC 1275
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (1966 Act) - Section 11(6), 12(5) - Limitation Act, 1963 - Section 19 - Article 137 – Limitation - Arbitration Clause - Disqualification of Named Arbitrator - that the arbitration clause in the General Conditions of the Contract (GCC) named the Managing Director of Bharat Oman Refineries Limited or an officer nominated by him as the arbitrator - Subsequent amendments in the 1996 Act, specifically Section 12(5) read with the Seventh Schedule (as amended by Act 3 of 2016 w.e.f. 23.10.2015), rendered the Managing Director and his nominee ineligible to act as an Arbitrator due to the legislative intent to secure neutrality of arbitrators – Held, merely because the procedure for appointment in the clause became inoperative due to statutory changes, the core agreement to refer the dispute to arbitration is not rendered nugatory - The arbitration agreement must be interpreted purposively, and the Court is vested with the power to appoint an independent arbitrator under Section 11(6) - The amendment in the statute has been enacted with the legislative intent to enforce neutrality of the arbitrator and bring impartiality - It will not be justified to literally interpret the clause in the contract - Noted that the right to apply under Section 11 (6) accrues from the date when the final bill became due - Matter was referred to the Delhi International Arbitration Centre, which was directed to appoint an arbitrator - Set aside order of High Court. [Relied on Perkins Eastman Architects DPC and Another v. HSCC (India) Limited (2020) 20 SCC 760; TRF Limited v. Energo Engineering Projects Limited (2017) 8 SCC 377; Geo Miller & Co. Pvt. Ltd. v. Rajasthan Vidyut Utpadan Nigam Ltd (2020) 14 SCC 643; Paras 16-24] Offshore Infrastructures v. Bharat Petroleum, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 982 : 2025 INSC 1196
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 - Arbitral Award - Unexplained Delay – Validity – Held, an inordinate and unexplained delay in the pronouncement of an arbitral award (in the pre-Section 29A era) is not, per se, a ground for setting aside an award under Section 34. However, where the negative effect of such delay is explicit and adversely reflects on the findings in the award, it can be construed to be in conflict with the public policy of India or vitiated by patent illegality - Section 14(2) not mandatory pre-condition: An aggrieved party is not required to invoke the remedy under Section 14(2) of the Act (termination of the arbitrator's mandate) as a condition precedent to laying a challenge to a delayed and tainted award under Section 34, as both provisions operate independently. [Para 19, 20, 48, 63] Lancor Holdings v. Prem Kumar Menon, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1056 : 2025 INSC 1277
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – Section 34 Proviso to Section 34(2)(a)(iv)- Held that the authority of a Court under Section 34 to set aside an arbitral award in part, by severing the invalid portion from the valid portion, is inherent in the Court's jurisdiction - The doctrine of omne majus continet in se minus (the greater power includes the lesser) squarely applies, holding that the power to set aside an award necessarily encompasses the power to set it aside in part - The proviso to Section 34(2)(a)(iv) is clarificatory in nature, confirming this pre-existing inherent power - Petition dismissed. [Para 128-130] Urban Infrastructure Real Estate Fund v. Neelkanth Realty Pvt. Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1028 : 2025 INSC 1255
Arbitration And Conciliation Act, 1996 – Sections 34, 37, 19(1)- Limitation Act, 1963 – Section 3- Code Of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Order Vii Rule 11(D)- Held that A preliminary issue of limitation, even if decided by an Arbitral Tribunal on the basis of demurrer (where the opponent accepts the claimant's averments as true for argument's sake), cannot be final and cannot foreclose the issue for all future proceedings - The issue of limitation is a mixed question of fact and law which goes to the root of the claim - A decision on demurrer checks maintainability on the face of the pleadings, similar to a motion under Order VII Rule 11(d) CPC - A preliminary finding on maintainability on the point of limitation, decided solely on demurrer, does not preclude a final determination on the merits of the issue based on evidence and other materials that may be adduced later by the parties - The Arbitral Tribunal is under a positive duty, stemming from Section 3 of the Limitation Act, 1963, to adjudicate the question of limitation and dismiss the claim if found to be barred, even if limitation is not set up as a defence or if a preliminary issue on demurrer was decided against the bar of limitation - The procedure adopted by an Arbitral Tribunal that treats a decision on demurrer as final and foreclosed, particularly when the arbitrator noted that adducing evidence might lead to a contrary finding, is contrary to the fundamental policy of Indian law and offends the most basic notions of justice. [Relied on Ramesh B. Desai and Others v. Bipin Vadilal Mehta and Others (2006) 5 SCC 638; Angelo Brothers Limited v. Bennett, Coleman and Co. Ltd. & Anr., 2017 SCC OnLine Cal 7682; Paras 98, 100, 130, 134-137] Urban Infrastructure Real Estate Fund v. Neelkanth Realty Pvt. Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1028 : 2025 INSC 1255
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 - Unworkable Award - Patent Illegality - Public Policy – Held, the very basis and public policy underlying the process of arbitration is the achievement of a speedy and final resolution of disputes. An arbitral award that is unworkable in that it fails to finally settle the disputes but instead irrevocably alters the parties' pre-existing balance and compels them to initiate a fresh round of arbitration/litigation defeats this public policy - Such an unworkable arbitral award would not only be in conflict with the public policy of India under Section 34(2)(b)(ii) but would also be patently illegal on the face of it under Section 34(2A). [Relied on Shilpa Sailesh v. Varun Sreenivasan 2023 14 SCC 231; Para 20, 48, 55, 58, 59, 63] Lancor Holdings v. Prem Kumar Menon, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1056 : 2025 INSC 1277
Army Act, 1950 - Sections 63, 69, 70, 162 - Armed Forces Tribunal Act, 2007 - Section 15(6) - Arms Act, 1959 - Sections 3, 25(1-B) - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Section 222 - Substitution of Conviction - Act Prejudicial to Good Order and Military Discipline - Possession of Ammunition - Scope of AFT's Power to Substitute Finding – Held, Section 15(6)(a) of the Armed Forces Tribunal Act, 2007, vests the Tribunal with the power to substitute a finding of guilty for any other offence for which the offender could have been lawfully found guilty by the court martial and pass a sentence afresh - This power is in pari materia with Section 162 of the 1950 Act and akin to Section 222 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, which permits conviction for a lesser or cognate offence on the same set of facts - Noted that the legislative intent is that the appellate forum is not denuded of power to render a lawful finding where the evidence sustains a different, though related, offence - The twin conditions for exercising this power are fulfilled: (i) the accused could have been lawfully found guilty of the substituted offence by the original court-martial based on the evidence presented; and (ii) the Tribunal may pass a new sentence - The concurrent findings of fact regarding the recovery of ammunition from the appellant's possession were not assailed as perverse - Since the recovery of old, aged ammunition was established, this factual foundation clearly disclosed an act or omission prejudicial to good order and military discipline under Section 63 of the 1950 Act, reflecting the appellant's failure to follow mandatory procedure for disposal and accounting of old ammunition - The appellant could lawfully have been convicted under Section 63 of the 1950 Act based on the proved facts - The scope of interference by the Supreme Court in an appeal under Section 30 of the 2007 Act is limited - It would interfere only if the order is shown to be arbitrary, unreasonable, or capricious - This exercise of discretion was found to be just and proportionate, balancing disciplinary needs with fairness, and thus did not call for any interference - Appeal dismissed. [Relied on: Union of India & Ors. v. R. Karthik, (2020) 2 SCC 782; Paras 17-27] S.K. Jain v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 994 : 2025 INSC 1215
Arrest - Grounds of Arrest v. Reasons for Arrest – Held that there is a significant difference between the phrase "reasons for arrest" and "grounds of arrest" - Reasons for arrest are purely formal parameters and are general in nature (e.g., to prevent further offense, proper investigation, prevent tampering with evidence) - Grounds of arrest must be personal to the accused and required to contain all basic facts in the hand of the investigating officer which necessitated the arrest, to provide the accused an opportunity of defending himself against custodial remand and to seek bail. Ahmed Mansoor v. State, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1026
Bharatiya Nagarika Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) - Section 528 - Inherent Power of High Court - Review/Recall of Own Order - Held that the inherent power of the High Court under Section 528 BNSS [Section 482 CrPC] cannot be invoked to review or recall its own judgment or order on merits, as the power of review is specifically barred under Section 403 BNSS [Section 362 CrPC], except for the purpose of correcting clerical or arithmetical errors - The inherent power cannot be exercised for doing that which is specifically prohibited by the Code - Held that High Court grievously erred in recalling/reviewing its reasoned order dated January 16, 2025, on the ground of an "inadvertent clerical mistake" when the subsequent application was, in effect, a prayer for review of the earlier order by acceding to the initial prayer for transfer of investigation, which the earlier order had consciously declined - The Supreme Court quashed the High Court's orders dated January 24, 2025 (recalling the earlier order) and February 4, 2025 (transferring investigation to CBI), as they were based on an erroneous premise of a clerical mistake and amounted to an impermissible review of a reasoned order passed under the inherent jurisdiction - Appeal allowed. [Relied on Simrikhia v. Dolley Mukherjee and Chhabi Mukherjee and Another (1990) 2 SCC 437; Para 18, 20, 26-31] State of Rajasthan v. Parmeshwar Ramlal Joshi, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 984 : 2025 INSC 1205
Bhartiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (BSA); Section 132 – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS); Section 179 – Constitution of India; Articles 14, 21 – Advocate-Client Privilege - Advocate-Client Privilege – Summoning of Advocates by Investigating Agencies – Held, Investigating Agency/Prosecuting Agency/Police cannot directly summon a lawyer who is appearing in a case to elicit details of the case, as this would violate the statutory privilege conferred by Section 132 of the BSA and infringe upon the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution (Articles 14 and 21) - The privilege is a fundamental feature of a fair and free legal system, which requires an atmosphere of uninhibited communication between a client and their legal representative. [Paras 24-28] In Re : Summoning Advocates, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1051 : 2025 INSC 1275
CBI Investigation - Extraordinary Powers of Constitutional Courts - Reiterated that the extraordinary power under Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution to direct a CBI investigation must be exercised sparingly, cautiously and in exceptional situations - Such an order is not to be passed as a matter of routine or merely because a party has levelled some allegations against the local police - Held that it must be necessary to provide credibility and instil confidence in investigations or where the incident may have national and international ramifications or where such an order may be necessary for doing complete justice and enforcing fundamental rights. [Relied on State of W.B. v. Committee for Protection of Democratic Rights 2010 3 SCC 517; Paras 12-41] Tamilaga Vettri Kazhagam v. P.H. Dinesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 999 : 2025 INSC 1224
Circumstantial Evidence - Last Seen Theory - Absence of Test Identification Parade (TIP) - Value of Scientific Evidence – Principles - The Supreme Court reiterated the 'five golden principles' for sustaining a conviction on circumstantial evidence - the circumstances must be fully established, consistent only with the hypothesis of guilt, of a conclusive nature, must exclude every possible hypothesis except that of guilt, and must form a complete chain of evidence leaving no reasonable ground for a conclusion consistent with innocence - Held dock identification without Test Identification parade unreliable when witness had no familiarity with accused - noted that It is well settled that dock identification without a prior TIP has little evidentiary value where the witness had no prior familiarity with the accused - Both witnesses identified the Appellants for the first time in court, which, in the absence of a TIP, renders their dock identification less credible - Their testimonies, therefore, cannot constitute reliable evidence of identification - Appeal allowed. [Relied on Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra 1984 4 SCC 116; P. Saikumar v. State; Paras 27-28] Nazim v. State of Uttarakhand, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1019 : 2025 INSC 1184
Civil Procedure – Compromise/Settlement – Mediation – Supreme Court – Power of Trust, Simplicity, and Efficacy in Dispute Resolution - A protracted litigation, spanning almost four decades, was successfully resolved through mediation efforts undertaken by Senior Advocate, appointed by the Court, who travelled to Hamirpur, Himachal Pradesh, interacted with rival family members, and inspected the properties - Supreme Court lauded the efforts, noting that the resolution was a direct consequence of the parties trusting the mediator. Raksha Devi v. Parkash Chand, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 998 : 2025 INSC 1216
Cochin Devaswom Board - License fee – Held, appellants herein only challenged specific fee enhancement orders - By directing fresh fixation and inquiry, High Court introduced new issues outside the pleadings, in violation of judicial discipline and the principle of natural justice, as the appellants were not put to notice before passing an adverse direction against them - If without putting parties on notice, the Court travels beyond the scope of the petition, takes parties by surprise and makes any strong observations and directions, it will create a chilling effect on other prospective litigants too - Even if in exceptional case, Court feels the need to travel beyond the scope of writ petition and make observations, the least a party is entitled to, is an opportunity to explain and defend themselves - The High Court exceeded its jurisdiction - Appeal allowed. [Relied on Pradeep Kumar v. Union of India, (2005) 12 SCC 219; Ashok Kumar Nigam v. State of U.P., (2016) 12 SCC 797; Paras 23-32] P. Radhakrishnan v. Cochin Devaswom Board, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 970 : 2025 INSC 1183
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) —Order VIII Rule 10 - Right to Cross-Examination — Held, the reason given by the Trial Court for taking the cross-examination of the Defendant as "Nil" (failure to file WS) is perverse and contrary to the right of defence available to the defendant - Even if a defendant does not file a Written Statement, and the suit proceeds ex-parte, the limited defence, including the right to cross-examine the plaintiff's witnesses to prove the falsity of the plaintiff's case, is not foreclosed - The denial of the right to cross-examine cannot be taken away when the WS was not allowed to be taken on record, as cross-examination is vital to elicit the truth and impeach the witness's credibility - Appeal allowed. [Relied on Ranjit Singh v. State of Uttarakhand, 2024 INSC 724; Paras 31] Anvita Auto Tech Works Pvt. Ltd. v. Aroush Motors, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 988 : 2025 INSC 1202
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) - Order XLI Rule 5 - Stay of execution of money decree - Whether deposit or security is an absolute precondition for staying a money decree – Held, it is not mandatory for the Appellate Court to impose a condition for deposit of the amount in dispute for grant of stay of execution under Order XLI Rule 5 CPC - The provisions of Order XLI Rule 1(3) and Rule 5(5) of CPC, which require an appellant to deposit the decretal amount or furnish security, are directory, not mandatory - Non-compliance may normally lead to rejection of a stay application, Appellate Courts retain discretion to grant stay in “exceptional cases” even without such a deposit. Importantly, the Court stressed that failure to deposit cannot result in dismissal of the appeal itself - Order XLI Rule 5 of the CPC, uses the word “shall”, yet a combined reading of the sum and substance of Rule(s) 1(3) and 5(5) would reveal, that for the grant of stay of execution, it is not mandatory for the appellate court to impose a condition for deposit of the amount in dispute. [Relied on Sihor Nagar Palika v. Bhabhlubhai Virabhai Co. (2005) 4 SCC 1; Pam Developments Pvt. Ltd. v. State of West Bengal (2019) 8 SCC 112; Paras 59-63, 64-67, 68-70, 82-86, 79-81, 95- 117] Lifestyle Equities C.V. v. Amazon Technologies Inc., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 974 : 2025 INSC 1190
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Order VII Rule 11(d) - Suit Barred by Law (Limitation) - Plaint Rejection – Principles – Held, when considering a plaint rejection application under Order 7 Rule 11(d) (suit barred by law), the Court must look only at the averments made in the plaint and accompanying documents, and not the defence - Where a suit seeks multiple reliefs, and any one of the reliefs is within the period of limitation, the plaint cannot be rejected as barred by law under Order 7 Rule 11(d) of the CPC - For a suit for declaration with a further relief, the limitation is governed by the Article governing the suit for such further relief - Whether the suit is barred by any law or not is to be determined on the basis of averments made in the plaint. - Appeal allowed. [Relied on Indira v. Arumugam & Anr. 1998 1 SCC 614; Paras 15- 23] Karam Singh v. Amarjit Singh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1011 : 2025 INSC 1238
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Bhartiya Nayaya Sanhita, 2023 - Karur Stampede Incident - Transfer of Investigation to CBI - Formation of Supervisory Committee - Supreme Court takes cognizance of the Karur stampede incident that resulted in the death of 41 persons and injuries to over 100 people during a political rally organized by Tamilaga Vettri Kazhagam (TVK) - Noted that top police officials publicly defended the actions of subordinate officers, creating doubt about the investigation's impartiality in the minds of the general public - Observed a contradiction between the Madras High Court, Madurai Bench, which denied CBI investigation holding local police investigation was not flawed, and a Single Judge of the Main Seat, who suo moto directed the formation of a Special Investigation Team (SIT) - Held that Due to the political undertone, the gravity of the incident with wide ramifications, the need to restore public faith in the criminal justice system, and to ensure an impartial and fair investigation - Court directed the transfer of investigation to the CBI - The direction for the appointment of the SIT and the one-man enquiry commission set up by the Chief Minister were suspended - A three-member Supervisory Committee, headed by Hon'ble Mr. Justice Ajay Rastogi (Retd.), was constituted to monitor the CBI investigation. [Relied on State of W.B. V. Committee for Protection of Democratic Rights 2010 3 SCC 517; Paras 33-35] Tamilaga Vettri Kazhagam v. P.H. Dinesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 999 : 2025 INSC 1224
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Section 378 - Appeal against acquittal - When an order of acquittal passed by the Trial Court can be interfered with by the Appellate Court – Held, the order of acquittal passed by the Trial Court was not open to interference by the First Appellate Court until and unless the findings recorded by the Trial Court were per se perverse or erroneous - It is safer and more appropriate to rely upon the findings of the Trial Court which has seen the demeanour of the witnesses rather than to rely upon the findings of the First Appellate Court - The High Court erred in reversing the finding of the Trial Court without coming to the conclusion that the findings of the Trial Court were perverse. [Para 35] Rajendra Singh v. State of Uttaranchal, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 980 : 2025 INSC 1193
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Section 482 - Quashing of Criminal Complaint - Caste Certificate – Held, the High Court committed a grave error by conducting a 'mini-trial' at the stage of considering a petition for quashing a criminal complaint under Section 482 C.r.P.C. - The question of whether the offences under Sections 467, 468, and 471 IPC (Forgery related offences) or Section 420 IPC (Cheating) are made out will depend on the evidence adduced at the trial - At the stage of quashing, it cannot be said that the prosecution should be nipped in the bud - High Court's findings about "legal illiteracy" were conjectural and patently erroneous - Appeal allowed. [Relied on Kumari Madhuri Patil and Another vs Addl. Commissioner, Tribal Development and Others, (1994) 6 SCC 241; Paras 13, 23, 26, 27, 28] Komal Prasad Shakya v. Rajendra Singh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1004
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Cr.P.C.) – Section 482 – Constitution of India – Article 226 & 32 – Quashing of Criminal Proceedings – Second FIR - Held that the Court has a self-imposed discipline to ordinarily direct petitioners to the High Court, Article 32, being a fundamental right, cannot be rendered nugatory. The Supreme Court can entertain a petition under Article 32 to quash an FIR in glaring cases of deprivation of liberty - The power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is not restricted to the stage of the FIR; the High Court/Supreme Court can exercise jurisdiction even when a charge-sheet has been filed, to prevent abuse of process or miscarriage of justice - A second FIR in respect of the same cognizable offence or an occurrence that constitutes a single, composite transaction is not maintainable. Subsequent complaints that are merely counter-versions, modifications, or supplemental in nature to the first one must be treated as a part of the first FIR and investigated accordingly. [Relied on State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) 335; Para 84, 95, 100-105, 145] Rajendra Bihari Lal v. State of U.P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1021 : 2025 INSC 1249
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) - Section 313 - Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) - Section 302 - Indian Evidence Act, 1872 - Section 8 (Conduct) and Section 27 (Discovery) - Circumstantial Evidence - Five Golden Principles - i. The circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is drawn should be fully established ("must" or "should" be proved, not "may be" proved); ii. The established facts should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, excluding every other hypothesis; iii. The circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency; iv. They should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved; v. There must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human probability the act must have been done by the accused - Supreme Court observed that the prosecution had failed to establish a cogent link in the cabin of circumstances and did not satisfy the principles laid down in Sharad Birdhichand Sardas case - Appeal allowed. [Relied on Sharad Birdhichand Sarda vs. State of Maharashtra, (1984) 4 SCC 116; Paras 25, 39, 56-58] Nilesh Baburao Gitte v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 985 : 2025 INSC 1191
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) — Section 389 - Suspension of Sentence and Bail - Supreme Court expressed dismay at an order passed by the Madhya Pradesh High Court which suspended the sentences of two murder convicts on the condition to plant 10 saplings each as a matter of social cause - Held that Order did not disclose any reason whatsoever as to the basis on which the bail had been granted - Noted that the High Court imposed a condition that the accused persons, convicted under Section 302 IPC, must "carry out plantation of saplings on the premise that it would serve social cause" - The Supreme Court expressed dismay and surprise, noting that the High Court seemed "to have got swayed to grant the prayer for suspension of sentence and grant of bail on the basis they (accused persons) would purge in their misdeeds" - Held that granting bail based on this condition, without considering the merits of the suspension of sentence, could not stand the test of law - Appeal allowed. [Paras 5, 6] Surajpal Singh Jadon v. Prashant Sikarwar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1049
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Quashing of FIR - Wildlife (Protection) Act, 1972 - Supreme Court Quashes FIR For Possession of Reindeer Horn - Notes reindeer not a protected species - Invokes Article 142 - The Supreme Court noted it was not in dispute that the reindeer is not a species covered under the category of a protected or prohibited animal as per the schedule of the Wildlife (Protection) Act, 1972 – Held, recovered article did not violate any statute and the petitioner's 14 day incarceration, Supreme Court found that allowing further prosecution would amount to gross abuse of the process of the Court - There is an imminent need to require jurisdictional agencies at international airports to sensitize their officers in the prevailing laws before taking drastic steps like detention and arrest of international travellers - Such steps should not be taken in haste and must be preceded by appropriate legal opinion and pragmatic approach - Supreme Court referred the current case and a recent incident at Jaipur International Airport involving the arbitrary seizure of a lawfully owned Rolex watch - Such ill-advised actions tend to bring disrepute to the country and breach human rights guarantees. [Paras 15-19] Rocky Abraham v Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1020
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Section 482 – Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 - Section 3 - Quashing – Held, the appellants had already availed of the statutory appellate remedy before the Appellate Tribunal under Section 26 of PMLA, which remains pending - The PMLA provides a complete and self-contained adjudicatory framework under Sections 5, 8, and 26 - Judicial interference at this stage would prejudge issues within the Tribunal's domain - The ECIR did not name JSW-appellant as accused, and the CBI charge sheet also dropped it from prosecution, indicating absence of a live predicate offence - However, the ED's action was confined to recovery of INR 33.80 crore allegedly arising from the attached bank accounts - When an efficacious statutory remedy under PMLA is being pursued before the Appellate Tribunal, the Supreme Court ordinarily refrains from exercising extraordinary jurisdiction to interfere with ongoing proceedings - Alleged possession or use of attached property constitutes a matter for adjudication under PMLA's internal mechanism, not for pre-emptive quashing - The Court declined to quash proceedings, observing that the dispute regarding the characterization of attached funds as “proceeds of crime” must first be adjudicated by the Appellate Tribunal - Appeals dismissed. [Relied on Vijay Madanlal Choudhary v. Union of India, (2023) 12 SCC 1; State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335; Paras 21, 24, 33-40] JSW Steel Limited v. Deputy Director, Directorate of Enforcement, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 977 : 2025 INSC 1194
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Special Leave Petition (Criminal) - Delay - Legal Aid - National Legal Services Authority (NALSA) Scheme - Misuse of Process - Supreme Court noted that SLP was filed with a delay of 2298 days by a convict and held that the petition was filed merely under a legal aid programme without the convict's consent, and that such a practice amounts to misuse of process - Held that since the petitioner never expressed any desire to file the Special Leave Petition, its filing only in view of the NALSA programme is a misuse of the process - Noted that that the delay in filing the same does not stand explained at all - Petition dismissed. [Paras 4, 5] Kamaljit Kaur v State of Punjab, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1035
Commercial Courts Act, 2015 — Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) — Order VIII Rule 1 (Proviso) (as amended by Commercial Courts Act, 2015) — Written Statement — Extension of Limitation (COVID-19 Pandemic) — Right to Cross-Examine Witnesses (Even without Written Statement) — Appeal against rejection of Written Statement and decreeing of suit - The Supreme Court noted that the period for filing the Written Statement (WS) fell within the duration (15.03.2020 to 28.02.2022) excluded for the purpose of computing limitation - Held that WS filed belatedly in a commercial suit after the mandatory period of 120 days cannot be rejected when it was filed during COVID-19, as the delay fell entirely within the COVID-19 limitation extension ordered by Supreme Court. [Relied on In Re: Cognizance for Extension of Limitation (2022) 3 SCC 117; Aditya Khaitan & Ors. v. IL & FS Financial Services Limited 2023 INSC 867; Paras 28, 29] Anvita Auto Tech Works Pvt. Ltd. v. Aroush Motors, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 988 : 2025 INSC 1202
Commercial Courts Act, 2015 – Section 12A – Legal Test for rejection of plaint and adjudication of interim relief – Held, the Court is required to look at the plaint, pleadings, and supporting documents to decide whether urgent interim relief is genuinely contemplated - includes looking for the immediacy of the peril, irreparable harm, or where delay would render eventual relief ineffective - The court is not concerned with the merits of the urgent relief; if the relief sought seems to be plausibly urgent from the standpoint of the plaintiff, the requirement under Section 12A can be dispensed with - A proforma or anticipatory prayer for urgent relief used as a device to skip mediation will be ignored and the court can require the parties to comply with Section 12A of the Act - Appeal allowed. [Relied on Midas Hygiene Industries Private Ltd. & Anr. v. Sudhir Bhatia & Ors. (2004) 3 SCC 90; Paras 15-27] Novenco Building and Industry v. Xero Energy Engineering Solutions, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1027 : 2025 INSC 1256
Commercial Courts Act, 2015 – Section 12A – Pre-Institution Mediation and Settlement – Interpretation of the expression 'contemplates any urgent interim relief' in the context of Intellectual Property (IP) infringement suits – Held, requirement of pre-institution mediation under Section 12A of the Commercial Courts Act cannot be mechanically applied in cases involving continuing infringement of intellectual property rights, such as trademark violations - Insisting on mediation before filing a suit in such situations would effectively leave the plaintiff without a remedy, allowing the infringer to continue profiting under the cover of procedural formalities - The provision was never intended to produce such an “anomalous result - Scope of “urgency” under Section 12A - when a case involves ongoing infringement, the element of urgency must be assessed in light of the continuing injury and the public interest in preventing deception - Mere delay in filing a suit does not by itself negate the urgency of relief, so long as the infringement is ongoing - The court cannot be unmindful of the public interest element in IP disputes, which involves preventing confusion in the market and protecting consumers from deception, which further imparts a colour of immediacy to the reliefs sought. Novenco Building and Industry v. Xero Energy Engineering Solutions, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1027 : 2025 INSC 1256
Constitution of India, 1950 - Article 142 - Scope of power to do complete justice - Supreme Court is justified in exercising its plenary power under Article 142 of the Constitution, without being bound by procedural provisions, where it is required and necessary to bring the litigation or dispute to an end - When setting aside an unworkable or patently illegal award, relegating the parties to fresh arbitration/litigation after a protracted period (e.g., 16 years) would be a travesty of justice - In such cases, the exercise of jurisdiction under Article 142 is the only viable alternative. [Relied on Gayatri Balasamy vs. ISG Novasoft Technologies Limited 2025 7 SCC 1; Paras 58, 60] Lancor Holdings v. Prem Kumar Menon, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1056 : 2025 INSC 1277
Constitution of India, 1950 - Article 19(1)(g) – Issue - Whether the impugned tender condition prescribing past local supply experience is reasonable, non-arbitrary, and constitutionally valid under Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) of the Constitution, or whether it constitutes an artificial barrier excluding competent bidders and violating the doctrine of level playing field – Held, government discretion in tender conditions is subject to the tests of reasonableness, fairness and non-arbitrariness - The principle of non-discrimination under Article 14 and the right to carry on business under Article 19(1)(g) were applied, including the doctrine of level playing field that mandates equal opportunity to equally placed competitors - The tender condition restricting eligibility to bidders with past supply experience specifically in Chhattisgarh was held arbitrary and disproportionate to the objective of ensuring effective supply - Noted that such restriction encourages cartelization and violates constitutional provisions by closing the market to competent outside bidders without sufficient justification - The State's justification based on Maoist affected areas was rejected as untenable since the tender concerned non-security sensitive goods and localized conditions did not justify exclusion - Held tender condition requiring past supply within one state irrational, violates Article 19(1)(g) - Set aside High Court order and Appeal allowed. [Relied on Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. International Airport Authority of India 1973 3 SCC 489; Paras 16-21] Vinishma Technologies Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 971 : 2025 INSC 1182
Constitution of India, 1950 - Article 21 – Right to Livelihood and Dignity – Held, termination of a qualified transgender teacher solely on the ground of her gender identity is a violation of her right to dignity and livelihood – Mandamus - Supreme Court issued a continuing mandamus and comprehensive directions to remedy administrative lethargy - i. Compensation: Directed the payment of ₹50,000 each by the discriminating private school, the Union of India, the State of Uttar Pradesh, and the State of Gujarat to the Petitioner for the violation of her rights and the lack of proper redressal mechanisms; ii. constituted an Advisory Committee (headed by Justice Asha Menon, Retd. Judge, Delhi High Court) to draft a comprehensive National Equal Opportunity Policy for transgender persons; iii. Directed the Union of India to bring forth its own Equal Opportunity Policy within three months of the Committee's report. The Court mandated that this Union Policy shall be enforceable at any establishment that fails to frame its own policy; iv. Directed States/UTs to immediately establish Transgender Welfare Boards and Transgender Protection Cells; v. Directed all establishments to designate Complaint Officers and designated the State Human Rights Commission (SHRC) as the appellate authority for grievances against the establishment head's decision. [Paras 164-174, 217] Jane Kaushik v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1018 : 2025 INSC 1248
Constitution of India - Article 22(1) - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) - Section 50A – Held that requirement of communicating the grounds of arrest in writing is not merely a formality but is essential for actualising the fundamental right to liberty and life as guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution - The purpose of communicating the grounds of arrest to the detenue and their relatives is to enable them to take prompt actions to secure the release of the arrested person, which includes engaging lawyers and seeking bail at the earliest. [Relied on Pankaj Bansal v. Union of India & Ors. (2024) 7 SCC 576]; Prabir Purkayastha v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2024) 8 SCC 254] Ahmed Mansoor v. State, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1026
Constitution of India - Article 226 – CBI investigation - Power of the High Court to direct a Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) inquiry - Judicial restraint in ordering CBI investigation - Held, the power of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution to direct a CBI inquiry must be exercised sparingly, cautiously, and in exceptional situations - It should not be passed as a matter of routine or merely because a party levels allegations against the local police - There must be sufficient material to come to a prima facie conclusion that there is a need for such an inquiry, and a commission of a criminal offence is prima facie disclosed - The direction is justified only when the integrity of the process is compromised to a degree that shakes the conscience of the Courts or public faith, often involving high-ranking officials or systemic failure - In matters relating to recruitment, it would not be appropriate to direct CBI investigation in the routine course unless the facts are so abnormal that they shake the conscience of the Court - The High Court's direction for a CBI inquiry was based on mere 'doubt,' 'assumption,' and 'inexplicable details' concerning the external agency's master data, which did not satisfy the prima facie threshold required for such an investigation - Supreme Court set aside order of High Court and directed a CBI enquiry into alleged irregularities in the recruitment process for the U.P. Legislative council and Assembly Secretaries - Appeal allowed. [Relied on State of W.B. v. Committee for Protection of Democratic Rights; Paras 11, 14- 23] Legislative Council U.P. Lucknow v. Sushil Kumar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1012 : 2025 INSC 1241
Constitution of India—Article 366(29-A)(b)—Uttar Pradesh Trade Tax Act, 1948— Sections 2(d), 2(h), 2(m), 3F(1)(b)- Sales Tax—Works Contract—Transfer of Property in Goods—Levy of tax on the value of ink and processing material/chemicals used by the assessee for printing lottery tickets—Assessee contended that these materials were 'consumables' not subject to tax, and that lottery tickets, being 'actionable claims', were not 'goods'- Supreme Court upholds tax in ink & chemicals used to print lottery tickets, says their deemed sale occurs with lottery sale - U.P. Trade Tax Act, 1948 (1948 Act) - Levy of Tax - The levy of tax on the value of ink and processing material/chemicals used in the printing of lottery tickets under Section 3F(1)(b) of the 1948 Act, is upheld - i. Works Contract (Printing): The contract for printing lottery tickets, where the paper is supplied by the customer, constitutes a works contract; ii. Transfer of Property in Goods (Ink & Chemicals): When the ink, after being diluted with the processing chemical, is applied to the paper, a tangible transfer of the diluted ink (a composite good) occurs, and it becomes a part of the final lottery ticket; iii. Since the property in the ink and chemicals has been transferred in the execution of the works contract, the value of these materials is subject to tax under Section 3F(1)(b) and does not qualify as an excluded consumable under Section 3F(2)(b)(x). [Paras 72-75, 132, 151-154] Aristo Printers Pvt. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Trade Tax, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 975 : 2025 INSC 1188
Core legal test - Transfer of goods not consumption - 1948 Act - Section 3f(1)(B) - Held that three conditions must be fulfilled - i. there must be a works contract; ii. The goods should have been involved in execution of the works contract; and iii. Property in those goods must be transferred to a third party either as goods or in some other form - The Court said that the moment the ink (a composite of ink and chemicals) is applied to the paper, the property in that good is transferred to the customer. The subsequent drying or chemical change is irrelevant, as the transfer has already happened - The judicial reasoning focused on how the inherent properties of the goods were physically incorporated and remained as a component of the works delivered to the customer. [Relied on Xerox Modicorp Ltd. v. State of Karnataka 2005 7 SCC 380] Aristo Printers Pvt. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Trade Tax, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 975 : 2025 INSC 1188
Criminal Appeal — Sections 302, 307, 148, 149 of IPC — Liability of members of unlawful assembly under Section 149 IPC — Common object — Proof by eyewitnesses — Role of injured witnesses — Appreciation of evidence — Distinction between innocent bystander and member of unlawful assembly — Principle of constructive liability —Standard for conviction — Supreme Court examined the principles related to the common object of an unlawful assembly and the scope of constructive liability under Section 149 IPC- Held that- i. Section 149 IPC makes every member of an unlawful assembly guilty of an offence committed by any member thereof in furtherance of the common object of the assembly if such offence was likely to be committed. The assembly must have five or more persons, and the common object must be proved from conduct and circumstances; (ii) Mere presence at the scene does not render a person a member of such assembly. The prosecution must show that the accused shared the common object. The test for distinguishing an innocent bystander from a member focuses on time, place, conduct, collective behaviour, motive, and manner of occurrence; (iii) Eyewitnesses' oral testimony, particularly of injured witnesses who suffer from injuries inflicted by the accused, holds great evidentiary value and deserves careful appreciation, unless compelling reasons exist to discard it; (iv) Evidence involving large assemblies requires careful scrutiny; the Court should separate the guilty from innocent spectators by relying on consistent identification from at least two witnesses and material evidence to avoid wrongful conviction; (v) Delay in forwarding the FIR or registration does not per se vitiate it if there is no material contradiction affecting the case; (vi) Convictions under Section 302 read with Section 149 IPC were sustained against those positively identified as having shared the common object and who committed overt acts in furtherance thereof; others acquitted on benefit of doubt as passive onlookers. [Relied on: Musa Khan v. State of Maharashtra, (1977) 1 SCC 733; Ranvir Singh Ors. v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2023) 14 SCC 41; Paras 34-37, 45, 46, 48, 49, 53, 54, 57-66, 44, 73-75] Zainul v. State of Bihar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 979 : 2025 INSC 1192
Criminal Law – Bail - Juvenile Justice - Sexual Offences - Sex Education - Supreme Court reiterated its direction to the State of Uttar Pradesh to file an additional affidavit informing the Court on how sex education is provided as a part of the curriculum in higher secondary schools (Classes IX to XII) so that young adolescents are made aware of the hormonal changes that come with puberty and the consequences that may flow therefrom — Pursuant to the direction, an additional affidavit was filed detailing the curriculum provided by the Secondary Education Department, Uttar Pradesh, for classes IX to XII, which was stated to be in keeping with the directives of the National Council of Educational Research & Training (NCERT)— Need for earlier implementation — Supreme Court opined that sex education should be provided to the children from a younger age and not class IX onwards — It is for the authorities concerned to apply their mind and take corrective measures, so that children are informed of the changes that happen after puberty and the care and cautions to be taken in relation thereto — That aspect was left open for the authorities concerned to take necessary steps. [Para 7-10] Juvenile X v. State of U.P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 989
Criminal Law - Kidnapping, Rape, POCSO, SC/ST Act - Concurrent Convictions - Evidence - Reliability of Victim's Testimony - Proof of Age - Evidence Act, 1872 - Section 154 - Hostile Witness - Judicial Discretion - Supreme Court expressed concern over the indiscriminate granting of permission to declare a witness hostile - Held that before a witness can be declared hostile and cross-examined by the party calling him, there must be some material to show that the witness is not speaking the truth or has exhibited an element of hostility - The contingency of cross-examining one's own witness is an extraordinary phenomenon, and permission should be given only in special cases after the Court scans and weighs the circumstances properly - Small or insignificant omissions cannot be the basis for treating a witness hostile - The permission to cross-examine one's own witness should only be granted when- i. the witness exhibits 'an element of hostility'; ii. The witness has resiled from a “material statement” made earlier; iii. The court is satisfied the witness is “not speaking the truth” - Appeal dismissed. [Relied on Sri Rabindra Kumar Dey v. State of Orissa 1976 4 SCC 233; Dahyabhai Chhaganbhai Thakker v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1964 SC 1563 Paras 10-15, 19] Shivkumar @ Baleshwar Yadav v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1006
Demurrer - Supreme Court summarised the position of law prevailing in India on demurrer as follows - i. The plea of demurrer is an act of objecting or taking exception or a protest. It is a pleading made by one party which “assumes” the truth of the matter as alleged by the opposite party, but sets up that it is insufficient in law to sustain the claim, or that there is some other defect in the pleadings which constitutes a legal reason as to why the suit must not be allowed to proceed further - In other words, that even assuming those facts as pleaded are true, the court does not have jurisdiction as a matter of law; ii. a decision on demurrer has to be determined ex-facie the plaint; iii. Certain objections are capable of being decided by way of demurrer. Only those objections which do not involve questions of facts nor the adducing of any further evidence, could be decided by way of demurrer; iv. The rule that when a mixed question of law and fact is decided on the basis of a demurrer, the issue would not be permanently foreclosed; v. Disputed questions cannot, as a matter of rule, be decided while considering an application filed under Order VII Rule 11(d). What has to be decided is whether on the face of it, the averments made in the plaint, without any doubt or dispute, show that the suit is or is not barred by limitation or any other law in force; vi. Therefore, it is inherent in the nature of a decision as regards the rejection of a plaint that, if the court deems it fit to not reject the plaint at the threshold upon an examination of the averments in the plaint, the ground that the suit is still barred by any law can be taken by the defendant in the course of the suit proceedings, after leading evidence; vii. It cannot be said that at the stage of rejection of plaint, the defendant/respondent chooses to waive his right to plead and instead, adopts the course of only testing the sufficiency of the plaint in law- At this stage, there is no choice between either pleading or demurring and the defendant/respondent cannot be taken to have elected to demur instead of pleading- This is simply because, there exists no burden of proof on him, at that stage, to plead. [Relied on Man Roland Druckimachinen AG v. Multicolour Offset Ltd. and Another; 2004 7 SCC 447; Indian Mineral & Chemical Co. and Others v. Deutsche Bank reported in (2004) 12 SCC 376; Ramesh B. Desai and Others v. Bipin Vadilal Mehta and Others reported in (2006) 5 SCC 638; Paras 63-75] Urban Infrastructure Real Estate Fund v. Neelkanth Realty Pvt. Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1028 : 2025 INSC 1255
Dying Declaration – Multiple dying declarations – Evidentiary value – Corroboration by independent evidence - Supreme Court dismissed the appeal against the High Court's order, affirming the conviction – Held, in a case of multiple dying declarations, each must be considered independently - The first dying declaration given to the independent witness, which stated the appellant poured kerosene and set the deceased ablaze, and disclosed the motive, was found to be duly proved and trustworthy - Minor discrepancies in subsequent statements do not weaken first dying declaration if found reliable and consistent - Appeal dismissed. [Relied on Nallam Veera Stayanandam & Ors. v. Public Prosecutor, High Court of A.P., (2004) 10 SCC 769; Paras 10-14] Jemaben v. State of Gujarat, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1042 : 2025 INSC 1268
Employees Compensation Act, 1923 - Section 2(1)(d)(ii)(d) - "dependent" - Whether the definition of "dependent" as per Section 2(1)(d)(ii)(d) of the Act, specifically whether widowed sisters of the deceased, who were not minors, could be considered dependents entitled to compensation – Held, Section 2(1)(d)(ii)(d) of the 1923 Act defines dependents to include a "minor brother, or an unmarried sister, or a widowed sister if a minor" and noted the incongruity with present-day realities, referring to the context of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, which makes the occurrence of a "widowed minor sister" unlikely - Supreme Court declined to interfere with the High Court judgment which treated widowed adult sisters as dependents, allowing compensation - Supreme Court left the question of law about the definition of "dependent" open and recommended the Law Commission of India to consider suitable amendments to the Employees Compensation Act to reflect current social realities. [Paras 2 - 6] New India Assurance Company Ltd. v. Kogga, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1039
Environmental Law – Wetlands (Conservation and Management) Rules, 2017 – Rule 2(1)(g) - Definition, Applicability and Public Trust Doctrine – Held, the Futala Tank, Nagpur, being a man-made lake constructed in 1799 for irrigation and drinking water purposes, does not fall within the statutory definition of 'wetland' under Rule 2(1)(g) 2017 Rules, as the definition expressly excludes human-made waterbodies specifically constructed for recreation, aquaculture, salt production, and irrigation purposes - affirmed the High Court's observation that although Futala Lake is not a statutory wetland, the restrictions under Rule 4(2)(vi) concerning prohibition on permanent construction may still apply in spirit to preserve the ecological integrity of such waterbodies, consistent with the Office Memorandum dated 08.03.2022 of the MoEFCC - It reiterated the Public Trust Doctrine, affirming that the State is a trustee of natural and environmental resources, which are meant for public use and cannot be converted for private or commercial purposes - This doctrine extends not only to natural but also man-made environmental assets that promote ecological balance and sustainable development - Recreational and beautification projects such as the Viewer's Gallery, Musical Fountain, and Artificial Banyan Tree were found to be within permitted construction norms and adequately sanctioned by competent authorities, without any proven ecological detriment - The Banyan Tree structure was held temporary and removable, not amounting to a permanent construction- upholding the High Court's balanced directives for maintaining Futala Lake in an ecologically sustainable manner while allowing limited public utility and recreational use - Appeal dismissed. [Relied on M.K. Balakrishnan v. Union of India, W.P. (C) No. 230 of 2001; M.C. Mehta v. Kamal Nath, (1997) 1 SCC 388; Paras 5-11] Swacch Association v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 978 : 2025 INSC 1199
Environment Pollution - Air Quality – Firecrackers - Green Crackers - Delhi-NCR Ban - Right to Life - Right to Profession - Relaxation; Diwali – NEERI - Supreme Court allows limited sale and use of NEERI-approved Green Crackers in NCR for a specified period (18 October 2025 till 20 October, 2025) around Diwali as a temporary 'test case' measure, relaxing the previous complete ban - Directs strict compliance with time restrictions and regulatory terms - Supreme Court decided to take a balanced approach to avoid compromising environmental concerns while acknowledging the interests of the industry and the practical difficulty in enforcing a complete ban - Noted that the situation is different now as both the Central and NCTD Governments are seeking relaxation of the ban. [Relied on Arjun Gopal & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors. W.P. (C) No. 728, 2025; Paras 20-23] M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1005
Environment Pollution - Supreme Court issued directions - i. Sale shall only be from designated locations in the entire NCR, to be identified by District Collectors/Commissioners in consultation with the District Superintendent of Police and given wide publicity; ii. Use of firecrackers shall be confined between 6:00 AM to 7:00 AM and 8:00 PM to 10:00 PM on the two days, i.e., the one before and on the Diwali day; iii. Only green crackers as uploaded on the NEERI website, manufactured by those registered with NEERI and licensed by PESO; iv. Banned items like firecrackers joined in series, barium, no sale or purchase through e-commerce networks; v. Patrolling teams shall be constituted to keep vigil, conduct regular reconnaissance, take random samples for analysis, and ensure only permitted products with QR Codes are sold; vi. Violations will lead to penalties and cancellation of PESO/NEERI licence/registration. [Para 24] M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1005
Evidence Act, 1872; Sections 25, 26, and 27 - Confession to Police Officer and Discovery of Fact - Admissibility - Held that – i. Section 27 is an exception to the substantive provisions of Sections 25 and 26; ii. Sections 25 and 26 provide that no confession made to a police officer or to any person while in custody of the police, shall be admissible against a person accused of any offence; iii. Section 27 provides an exception, stating that so much of the information received from an accused person in custody of the police, whether in the nature of confession or otherwise, as related distinctly to the fact thereby discovered, may be admissible; iv. Only the part of the statement which leads the police to the recovery of the weapons is admissible, and not the part which alleges that the weapons recovered were actually the weapons of crime; v. The statement of the appellants that the weapons recovered were the weapons of crime cannot be read against them in view of Sections 25 and 26 read with Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 - The recovery of the weapons of crime, allegedly on the pointing out of the appellants, was not sufficient to connect the appellants with the crime as no effort was made to match the blood on said weapons with that of the deceased - No report of the forensic laboratory was produced to establish that the weapons so recovered were smeared with the blood of the deceased to prove that they were actually used in the murder. [Relied Pulukuri Kottaya and Ors. vs. The King Emperor 1947 MWN CR 45; Manjunath and Ors. vs. State of Karnataka 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1421; Paras 28, 29, 31, 33] Rajendra Singh v. State of Uttaranchal, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 980 : 2025 INSC 1193
Evidence Act, 1872 - Evidence of Eye-witnesses – Reliability – Held, when the genesis and manner of the incident itself are doubtful, conviction cannot be sustained - When the prosecution has suppressed the origin and genesis of the occurrence, the proper course is to grant the accused the benefit of doubt - The conflicting versions given by the eye-witnesses, coupled with the suppression of the genesis of the occurrence and the shifting of the place of the incident, demolish the very substratum of the prosecution case - It is unsafe to uphold a conviction based on testimony full of contradictions and inherent improbabilities - Appeal allowed. [Relied on Pankaj v. State of Rajasthan, (2016) 16 SCC 192; Bhagwan Sahai and Another v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 2016 SC 2714; Paras 57-60] Kannaiya v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1016 : 2025 INSC 1246
Evidence Act, 1872 – Quality vs. Quantity of Evidence – Classification of Witnesses - Supreme Court reiterated the guiding principles for assessing the credibility of witnesses, classifying them into: (1) Wholly reliable; (2) Wholly unreliable; and (3) Neither wholly reliable nor wholly unreliable - For the third category, corroboration in material particulars by reliable testimony is required - Held that the Court is concerned with the quality and not with the quantity of the evidence. [Relied on Vadivelu Thevar v. State of Madras AIR 1957 SC 614; Para 28] Kannaiya v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1016 : 2025 INSC 1246
Evidence Act, 1872 - Section 106 - Burden of Proof - Circumstantial Evidence – Murder - Acquittal Reversal – Held, a conviction for murder can solely rest on circumstantial evidence if the chain of circumstances is complete and consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused - When an accused offers a false explanation regarding the cause of death that took place within the confines of his house, such falsity becomes an additional link in the chain of circumstances pointing to the guilt of the accused - While the general burden of proof is on the prosecution, Section 106 applies to exceptional cases where it would be impossible or disproportionately difficult for the prosecution to establish facts pre-eminently or exceptionally within the knowledge of the accused - Supreme Court reverses acquittal of man for daughter-in-law's murder - Appeal allowed. [Relied on Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra (1984) 4 SCC 116; Trimukh Maroti Kirkan v. State of Maharashtra (2006) 10 SCC 681; Shambu Nath Mehra v. State of Ajmer (1956) 1 SCC 337; State of West Bengal v. Mir Mohammad Omar & Others (2000) 8 SCC 382; Paras 12-21] State of Madhya Pradesh v. Janved Singh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1003 : 2025 INSC 1229
Evidence Act, 1872 - Section 27 - Disclosure Statement - Circumstantial Evidence, DNA Report - The theory of a confessional/disclosure statement under Section 27 leading to the discovery of incriminating articles and the body was held to be a "creation of the Investigating Officer - This was because the officer had already shared the minute details of the crime and the body's location with the complainant before the appellant's purported confession was recorded - The DNA report was rendered redundant as the prosecution miserably failed to prove the chain of custody of the forensic samples (seized articles and blood samples) from the time of seizure till they reached the FSL, thereby breaching the sanctity of the procedure - Held that prosecution had failed to prove the 'last seen' circumstance, the credibility of the CCTV footage, the validity of confessional statements, and the integrity of forensic/DNA evidence, rendering the chain of circumstantial evidence incomplete. Appeals allowed. [Relied on Prakash Nishad @ Kewat Zinak Nishad v. State of Maharashtra 2023 SCC OnLine SC 666; Para 54, 60, 71, 74, 76] Dashwanth v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 983 : 2025 INSC 1203
Evidence Law - Extra-Judicial Confession - Held that an extra-judicial confession is considered a weak piece of evidence and must be accepted with great care and caution - Standard of Proof: The prosecution must establish beyond reasonable doubt that the confession was genuinely made, voluntary, and its contents were true - The standard is even higher when the entire case rests on the EJC – Corroboration - Held that the court will generally look for independent, reliable corroboration before relying on an EJC, especially if suspicious circumstances surround it - Held that the circumstances, taken together, do not conclusively establish the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt, as required for a conviction, even in the case of a heinous crime - Supreme Court held that evidence not clear, there can't be moral conviction - Appeal allowed. [Relied on Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra: (1984) 4 SCC 116 Para 35; Pritinder Singh alias Lovely v. State of Punjab: (2023) 7 SCC 727; Paras 15, 16, 19, 20, 24, 25] Sanjay v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1033 : 2025 INSC 317
Evidence Law - Principles for Conviction Based on Circumstantial Evidence - Supreme Court reiterated the established principles governing cases of circumstantial evidence, noting that the chain of events must be so established that the Court has no option but to come to one and only one conclusion: the guilt of the accused person. If any doubt creeps in at any stage, the benefit must flow to the accused. The chain of circumstances must be so complete as to lead to only one conclusion, the guilt of the accused, and mere suspicion, however strong, cannot be a substitute for proof. If two views are possible on the evidence, one pointing to guilt and the other to innocence, the view favorable to the accused must be adopted - Supreme Court pointed out several deficiencies in prosecution's case - i. Non-examination of material witness; ii. Doubtful arrest and recovery; iii. Lack of forensic; iv. Last seen theory weakness - Set aside order of High Court - Appeal allowed. [Relied on Karakkattu Muhammed Basheer v. State of Kerala, (2024) 10 SCC 813; Kali Ram v. State of Himachal Pradesh, (1973) 2 SCC 808; Paras 13-18, 20-30] Mohamed Sameer Khan v. State Represented By Inspector Of Police, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1045 : 2025 INSC 1269
Forest and Environment Law – Judicial Discipline – Interference with Pending Supreme Court Proceedings – Contempt of Court - Supreme Court has strongly criticised the Uttarakhand High Court for entertaining a plea and staying a sanction order that was passed during the pendency of proceedings before the Apex Court concerning illegal constructions and felling of trees in the Corbett Tiger Reserve - The High Court, no doubt, is a Constitutional Court and not inferior to this Court. However, in judicial matters, when this Court is seized of the matter, it is expected of the High Courts to keep their hands away - Notice is issued to Shri Rahul (IFS), Chief Conservator of Forests, to remain present and show cause as to why an action for committing contempt of this Court be not initiated against him. [Paras 9 - 13] In Re: T.N. Godavarman Thirumulpad v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1046
Hindu Law - Temples and Religious Practices - Interim Relief Granted - Supreme Court grants interim relief in a Petition for Special Leave to Appeal, directing the Respondents to continue performing the Udayasthamana Pooja at the Guruvayur Sree Krishna Temple on Vrishchikam Ekadasi (01.12.2025), strictly in accordance with the temple's tradition and without any change - Any ritual which has become a long-standing tradition and assumed religious significance "ought not be unsettled on the apprehension that there would be potential public inconvenience"- The "faith of the worshippers at large ought not to be put aside on the anvil of managerial and administrative concerns and must be given precedence and respect as far as possible" - Inconvenience to the public cannot be a ground to discontinue / alter the rituals / pooja to be performed on the sacred day for the deity. [Paras 5 - 8] P.C. Hary v. Guruvayoor Devaswom Managing Committee, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1055
Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956 - Section 8(2) and (3) - Voidable transaction - Repudiation by Minor – Held, disposal of immovable property by a natural guardian in contravention of sub-Section (1) or sub-Section (2) of Section 8 (i.e., without the previous permission of the court) is voidable at the instance of the minor or any person claiming under him - It is not mandatory for a minor, upon attaining majority, to file a suit for the cancellation of a sale deed executed by their natural guardian in contravention of Section 8(2) of the Act - A voidable transaction executed by the guardian of the minor can be repudiated and ignored by the minor within the prescribed time on attaining majority either by instituting a suit for setting aside the voidable transaction or by repudiating the same by his unequivocal conduct - Avoidance or repudiation by conduct is permissible because - i. The minor may not be aware of the transaction and thus not in a position to institute a suit; ii. The transaction may not have been given effect to, and the party acquiring the right may not have possession, giving the impression that the property is intact in the minor's hands, making a suit seem unnecessary - Transferring the property himself on attaining majority within the prescribed time period is an example of an implied repudiation by conduct - Noted that such an act is sufficient to repudiate the earlier sale deed executed by the father/guardian - The effect of avoidance is that the voidable transaction becomes void from its very inception, and the avoidance relates back to the date of the transaction - Appeal allowed. [Relied on Madhegowda vs Ankegowda (2002) 1 SCC 178; G. Annamalai Pillai vs District Revenue Officer and Ors. (1993) 2 SCC 402; Paras 11-14, 22, 32, 34] K.S. Shivappa v. K. Neelamma, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 981 : 2025 INSC 1195
Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (HSA) – Section 2 (2) – Applicability to Scheduled Tribes – Held, HSA does not apply to members of STs - Section 2(2) of the HSA, 1956 explicitly states that nothing contained in the Act shall apply to the members of any Scheduled Tribe within the meaning of clause (25) of Article 366 of the Constitution, unless the Central Government, by notification in the Official Gazette, otherwise directs - The words of the section are explicit, and the HSA, 1956, cannot apply to Scheduled Tribes - Supreme Court set aside High Court's order directing that daughters in tribal areas in the state of H.P. shall inherit property in accordance with HSA and not as per customs and usages - High Court's directions were beyond the scope of the appeal, as the issue was neither directly nor substantially involved in the intra-party appeal, and the directions were not emanating from any of the issues framed or pleas raised by the parties - Set aside order of High Court. [Relied on Tirith Kumar & Ors. vs. Daduram & Ors., (2024) SCC OnLine SC 3810; Paras 4-6] Nawang v. Bahadur, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1025
Income Tax Act, 1961 - Section 37(1) - Business Expenditure – Deduction – Held, a "lull in business" for a non-resident company engaged in oil drilling activities, due to the non-procurement of a contract during the relevant assessment years (1996- 97, 1997-98, 1999-2000), does not amount to a "cessation of business" - Where the company continued to engage in systematic and organized activities, such as continuous business correspondence with ONGC regarding manpower supply and submitting an unsuccessful bid, it demonstrated a clear intention to carry on business - the company was entitled to claim deduction of business expenditure (administrative charges, audit fees, etc.) under Section 37(1). Pride Foramer S.A. v. Commissioner of Income Tax, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1015 : 2025 INSC 1247
Income Tax Act, 1961 - Section 71 - Set-off of Loss from Other Heads - Interpretation of 'Business' – Held, the expenditure, though disallowed as a deduction under the head 'Income from Business' by the ITAT (as the only income was 'Interest on Tax Refunds' taxable as 'Income from Other Sources'), was allowed to be set off against the 'Income from Other Sources' under Section 71 of the Act, on the finding that the appellant was still carrying on business - The word 'business' has a wide import and connotes a "real, substantial and systemic or organised course of activity or activity with a set purpose" - The expression 'for the purpose of business' is wider than 'for the purpose of earning profits' and includes "many other acts incidental to the carrying on of a business". Pride Foramer S.A. v. Commissioner of Income Tax, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1015 : 2025 INSC 1247
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 — Section 2(s) — Master and Servant Relationship — Canteen Employees — Non-Statutory Canteen Run by a Co-operative Society — Test to Determine Employer-Employee Relationship – Held, the employees working in a non-statutory canteen, run by a Co-operative Society on the Bank's premises with the Bank providing significant financial subsidy (75% of wages) and infrastructure, cannot be deemed to be the employees of the Bank (principal employer) - The mere act of a Bank playing a pivotal role in setting up the canteen, or providing necessary infrastructure, finance, subsidies, and controlling the working hours/days, is an "obligation to provide facilities to run canteen," which is distinct from a statutory or implicit "obligation to provide a canteen." - This does not make the canteen a part of the establishment - Appellant-Bank lacked the right to supervise and control the work done by the canteen employees, or to take any disciplinary action against them, the relationship of master and servant did not exist - Appeal allowed. [Relied on Parimal Chandra Raha v. LIC of India, 1995 Supp (2) SCC 611; Balwant Rai Saluja v. Air India Ltd. (2014) 9 SCC 407; Paras 36-40, 46-48] General Manager, U.P. Cooperative Bank Ltd v. Achchey Lal, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1024 : 2025 INSC 1175
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 — Supreme Court laid down tests to determine employer employee relationship to be kept in mind while deciding matters arising from legislations like industrial disputes act, 1947, the factories act, 1948 etc - Factors to be considered include - (1) Control Test- (a) who appoints workers; (b) who pays the salaries/remuneration; (2) who has the authority to dismiss; (3) Organisation Test- who can take disciplinary action; (4) whether there is continuity of service; and (5) extent of control and supervision, i.e., whether there exists complete control and supervision. [Relied on Shivanandan Sharma v. Punjab National Bank Ltd. (AIR 1955 SC 404; Silver Jubilee Tailoring House v. Chief Inspector of Shops and Establishments (1974) 3 SCC 498; Workmen of Nilgiri Coop. Marketing Society Ltd. v. State of T.N. (2004) 5 SCC 514; Paras 37, 74-76] General Manager, U.P. Cooperative Bank Ltd v. Achchey Lal, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1024 : 2025 INSC 1175
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC) - Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) – Section 7 IBC – Financial Creditor – Financial Debt – Cumulative Redeemable Preference Shares (CRPS) – Commercial Effect of Borrowing (Section 5(8)(f) IBC – Held, a holder of Cumulative Redeemable Preference Shares (CRPS) is a shareholder and not a financial creditor and cannot initiate the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) under Section 7 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC) against the Corporate Debtor. EPC Constructions v. Matix Fertilizers and Chemicals, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1036 : 2025 INSC 1259
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC) - CRPS Holder is a Shareholder, Not a Creditor - A CRPS is part of the company's share capital, and the amount paid is neither a loan nor a debt - Difference between Debt and Preference share - Held that Preference shareholders are not in the position of creditors and cannot, as a matter of right, claim a return of their share money except in a winding-up - An unredeemed preference shareholder does not automatically assume the character of a 'creditor' - Held that preference shares are part of the company's share capital and the amounts paid up on them are not loans. Dividends are paid on the preference shares when company earns a profit-if the dividends were paid without profits or in excess of profits made, it would amount to an illegal return of the capital - Amount paid up on preference shares not being loans, they do not qualify as a debt. [Relied on Lalchand Surana vs. M/s Hyderabad Vanaspathy Ltd 1988 SCC OnLine AP 290.; Para 19, 20, 26, 27] EPC Constructions v. Matix Fertilizers and Chemicals, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1036 : 2025 INSC 1259
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC) - Financial Debt - Test of Time Value of Money - Held that for a debt to be classified as a 'financial debt' under Section 5(8) of the IBC, the basic element is that it ought to be a disbursal against the consideration for the time value of money - The requirement of a 'debt' and 'disbursal against consideration for the time value of money' remains an essential part of all sub-clauses of Section 5(8) - The paid-up amounts towards shares, being part of the share capital, do not possess the character of a debt and, therefore, do not fall within the definition of 'financial debt' - Appeals dismissed. [Para 29-42, 47, 48] EPC Constructions v. Matix Fertilizers and Chemicals, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1036 : 2025 INSC 1259
Insurance Law - Fire Insurance Policy - Accidental Fire – Held, once it is established that the loss is due to fire and there is no allegation/finding of fraud or that the Insured is the instigator of the fire, the cause of fire is immaterial, and it must be assumed and presumed that the fire is accidental and falls within the scope of the fire policy. The precise cause of a fire remains immaterial, provided the claimant is not the instigator of the fire - The final Surveyor's conclusion that the fire was not accidental was held to be incorrect, especially when the report did not conclude that the fire fell within the exception/exclusion clause or that the Insured caused the fire, fraud, or intentional damage -The final Surveyor's report was found to be perverse and to have misdirected itself in law for: i. Failing to deal with the 5,855 pages of documents provided by the Insured; ii. Ignoring the Cost Sheets for each item maintained in the regular course of business, which tallied with primary documents like purchase orders; iii. Arbitrarily assigning a uniform average unit price of ₹450/- for all identifiable damaged stock (e.g., leather jacket, leather belt, polyester lining), without considering the nature of the stock or the value of non-identifiable (charred) goods. [Relied on New India Assurance Company Limited and Others vs. Mudit Roadways, (2024) 3 SCC 193; Paras 32-43] National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Orion Conmerx Pvt. Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1047 : 2025 INSC 1271
Insurance Policy - Interpretation of - Coverage of 'FFF' – Held, the phrase 'FFF' under the head "Description of Risk" in the policy clearly means Furniture, Fixtures, and Fittings, and the Insured was entitled to the claim amount under this head, contrary to the Surveyor and National Commission's view - Coverage provisions should be interpreted broadly, and in case of ambiguity, the same should be resolved in favour of the Insured - The exclusion clauses must be read narrowly - It is settled law that the contract of fire insurance is a contract to indemnify the Insured against loss by fire, the court said, while specifying the following rules to determine whether in a particular case, the loss is caused by fire: a) There must be an actual fire; hence mere heating or fermentation will not be sufficient to render the insurers liable for loss occasioned thereby; b) There must be something on fire which ought not to have been on fire; c) There must be something in the nature of an accident, but a fire occasioned by the wilful act of a third person without the consent of the Insured, is to be regarded as accidental for the purpose of this rule - If these requisites are satisfied, any loss attributable to the fire, whether by actual burning or otherwise, is within the contract - Appeal dismissed. [Relied on Canara Bank vs. United India Insurance Company Limited and Others, (2020) 3 SCC 455; Paras 44-60] National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Orion Conmerx Pvt. Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1047 : 2025 INSC 1271
Interpretation of Power Purchase Agreement (PPA) and allocation of electricity in proportionate shares—Reimbursement of fixed charges and compensation for diversion of electricity—Application of principles as per Supreme Court judgments and earlier orders of State authorities- Emphasized the need to interpret the PPA as a whole, considering the entire context rather than isolated paragraphs, aligning with principles laid down in prior judgments - Noted that the obligations to declare the capacity of the entire plant and issue dispatch instructions emerged only after the declaration of availability, consistent with earlier rulings - Held that the proportionate principle for allocation of electricity and fixed charges adhered to the terms of the PPA, as interpreted in previous Supreme Court and GERC decisions - It clarified that any wrongful diversion of electricity to sister companies like ESL entitles the generator to compensation based on the HTP-1 Tariff Energy Charge, not just fixed charges, in accordance with principles established in prior case law - Rejected the APTEL's reversal of the reimbursement claim, reaffirming the earlier order of GERC and the Supreme Court, emphasizing adherence to the restitution principle for amounts paid without due supply - Supreme Court reaffirmed that the half-hourly metering and computation methodology, adopted at the behest of the parties and approved by the CEA, must be applied consistently for quantifying diversion-based claims - Clarified that the claim for damages or compensation must align with the interpretation of the PPA and the order principles laid down - Directed for fresh computation of the total dues owed to appellant, incorporating legal principles. [Relied on Gujarat Urja Vikas Nigam Limited v. Essar Power Limited (2016) SCC 103; Paras 12, 14-16, 20-22, 31-33, 34, 38-41] Gujarat Urja Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Essar Power Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 972 : 2025 INSC 1160
Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 (JJ Act) – Section 7-A - Children's Act, 1960 – Article 21 of the Constitution of India – Illegal Detention/Breach of Article 21 - Murder Convict – Claim of Juvenility - Supreme Court ordered release of the murder convict under the JJ Act, after finding he was a juvenile at the time of commission of offence in 1981 – Held, JJ Act is retrospective in operation, and applies to offences pre-dated the enforcement of the JJ Act - The plea of juvenility, which can be raised at any stage, is governed by Section 7-A of the JJ Act, 2000 - This section mandates that courts are under an obligation to consider the plea and grant appropriate relief if the convict was a juvenile on the date of the offence - The maximum period of detention for a juvenile under the JJ Act, 2000, is 3 years as per Section 15(1)(g) - Since the petitioner was a child at the time of the offence and had been behind bars for more than 3 years, his liberty was curtailed "not in accordance with procedure established by law." Breach of the right guaranteed by Article 21 of the Constitution is "writ large," thereby extending the benefit of release from detention - The Court considered the respondent's contentions regarding the heinous nature of the offence (murder) and the petitioner's act of absconding and evading arrest from 2009 to 2022. However, the Court granted relief, noting that the petitioner had "suffered incarceration for more than the period permissible in law - Appeal allowed. [Relied on Pratap Singh v. State of Jharkhand 2005 3 SCC 551; Dharambir v. State (NCT of Delhi) 2010 5 SCC 344; Para 4, 5, 12-14] Hansraj v. State of U.P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 993 : 2025 INSC 1211
Land Acquisition Act, 1894 - Section 5-A, Section 6, Section 11 - Singur Land Acquisition - Restoration of Acquired Land – Held, the remedial framework in Kedar Nath Yadav (supra) was anchored in the recognition that the acquisition disproportionately affected vulnerable communities ("poor agricultural workers") lacking financial resources and institutional access to challenge governmental action - Relief conceived to prevent impoverishment among the disadvantaged farmers cannot be extended to commercial enterprises with financial capacity and institutional sophistication, as this would defeat the remedy's foundational intent - The entity is precluded by its conduct and the principle of estoppel from claiming restoration after a delay of an entire decade - Held that land acquisition can/t be challenged after accepting compensation. [Relied on Kedar Nath Yadav v. State of West Bengal, AIR 2016 SC 4156] State of West Bengal v. Santi Ceramics Pvt. Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1000 : 2025 INSC 1222
Legal Principle (Post-46th Amendment) - Following the Constitution (Forty-sixth Amendment) Act, 1982, the principle of 'dominant intention' is irrelevant for levying sales tax on a works contract, as the contract is by legal fiction divisible into a contract for the sale of goods and a contract for labour and services - Held that the 'dominant intention' test for works contracts, is no longer good law - Appeals dismissed. [Larsen and Toubro Limited & Anr. v. State of Karnataka & Anr.; overruled-Rainbow Colour Lab & Anr v. State of M.P & Ors. 2014 1 SCC 708, (2000) 2 SCC 385; Paras 132, 154] Aristo Printers Pvt. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Trade Tax, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 975 : 2025 INSC 1188
Mediation – Swadeshi Mediation – Lawyers as Mediators – Cultivating New Skills- Supreme Court emphasized the power of trust, simplicity, and efficacy of persuasion through mediation as opposed to adversarial litigation - Observed that if lawyers are to evolve as mediators, they must cultivate a distinct set of skills and adopt a new attitude towards dispute resolution, one that diverges from adversarial litigation - The fundamental principle for this evolution is to "listen, rather than speak," where "Mediators speak by listening" - The model envisioned by the Court, termed "Swadeshi Mediation," involves transcending the binary often embedded in western approaches that separate professionalism from individual character, by affirming that "Goodness is an essential value, it is neither divorced from professionalism nor unattainable through power of the will" - This process requires the mediator to shed argumentative skills and adversarial demeanour. [Paras 5-8] Raksha Devi v. Parkash Chand, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 998 : 2025 INSC 1216
Mohammedan Law - Matruka Property (Inheritance) - Held that Matruka property is the property (both movable and immovable) left by a deceased Muslim - It simply refers to property left behind by the deceased person and nothing more - The scheme for distribution of matruka property first requires separating the part covered by a valid will (maximum one-third of the total matruka, and not in favor of an heir without other heirs' consent) - The balance is distributable among heirs as per Mohammedan Law rules of intestate succession – Held, the scheme for distribution of matruka property first requires separating the part covered by a valid will (maximum one-third of the total matruka, and not in favor of an heir without other heirs' consent) - Sharers are entitled to a prescribed share of the inheritance and wife being a sharer is entitled to 1/8th the share but where there is no child or child of a son how low so ever, the share to which the wife is entitled is 1/4th. [Relied on Trinity Infraventures Ltd. v. M.S. Murthy, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 738; Paras 8-15] Zoharbee v. Imam Khan, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1014 : 2025 INSC 1245
Mohammedan Law - Validity of an oral gift (Hiba) - Succession rights - Limitation pertaining to declaratory suits regarding immovable property – Held, an oral gift (hiba) under the Muslim Law cannot be projected as a “surprise instrument” to stake claims over a property - To constitute, a valid Hiba, all its necessary ingredients - i. declaration by donor, ii. acceptance by donee and iii. taking possession of land - are done publicly rather than secretly - Oral gift (hiba) is permissible in Mohammedan law, the evidence of acting under the gift - such as collecting rent, holding title, or effecting mutation is essential to substantiate the claim of possession - Oral gift was not proved by contemporaneous delivery of possession - The registered sale deeds and mutations carry presumption of validity and unchallenged possession by the defendants - Lack of effecting mutation in revenue records can be a crucial factor invalidating such a claim of gift, in the absence of other evidence of possession - Set aside order - Appeal allowed. [Relied on: Mansoor Saheb v. Salima 2023 SCC OnLine SC 3809; Rasheeda Khatoon v. Ashiq Ali, (2014) 10 SCC 459; Paras 34-42, 49] Dharmrao Sharanappa Shabadi v. Syeda Arifa Parveen, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 973 : 2025 INSC 1187
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988: Section 149 (Insurance of Motor Vehicles against Third Party Risks) – 'Pay and Recover' Principle – Applicability when a vehicle deviates from the prescribed route as per its permit - Whether a deviation from the prescribed route in a transport vehicle's permit impacts the Insurance Company's liability for an accident occurring on the deviated route – Held, insurance companies cannot deny compensation to accident victims merely because the vehicle involved had deviated from its permitted route- Emphasising the social purpose of motor vehicle insurance, held that to deny compensation on such a technical ground would be “offensive to the sense of justice”- to deny compensation to the victim's dependents because the accident occurred outside the bounds of the permit would be offensive to the sense of justice, as the accident was not their fault; thus, the Insurance Company must pay - Since the contract of insurance operates within certain bounds, expecting the insurer to pay compensation for an incident clearly outside the bounds of the agreement (violation of the permit condition) would be unfair to the insurer - Balancing the need for compensation to the victim with the interests of the insurer, the Supreme Court upheld the High Court's order applying the 'pay and recover' principle in cases of deviation from the permitted route, finding it entirely justified and requiring no interference. [Relied on National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Swaran Singh (2004) 3 SCC 297, New India Assurance Co. v. Kamla (2001) 4 SCC 342, Parminder Singh v. New India Assurance Co. Ltd (2019) 7 SCC 217, S. Iyyapan v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd (2013) 7 SCC 62; M/s Chatha Service Station v. Lalmati Devi & Ors. 2025 SCC OnLine SC 756; Paras 7 - 10] K. Nagendra v. New India Insurance Co. Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1044 : 2025 INSC 1270
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 – Assessment of Compensation – Deceased Employed in Foreign Country – Divergent Views on 'Double Deduction' and Moderation of Foreign Income - The Supreme Court referred the issue of assessing compensation in motor accident cases where the deceased was employed in a foreign country to a Larger Bench, noting divergent judicial views on the application of "double deduction" - Held that the issue had “wide ramifications” given the growing number of Indians working overseas, especially in the IT sector, the Bench stated that there being divergent views on the application of double deduction, the issue deserves to be resolved by a larger Bench. [Paras 11 - 15] Tharunoju Eshwaramma v. K. Ram Reddy, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1053
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 - Road Accidents – Issue - Whether the State and roadowning authorities are constitutionally and statutorily obligated to ensure pedestrian safety, enforce lane discipline, mandate helmet usage, and curb misuse of dazzling lights and unauthorized sirens to mitigate alarming rates of road fatalities in India - Supreme Court emphasized that safe, encroachment free and well-maintained footpaths constitute a judicially recognized right under Article 21 of the constitution – Held; The State, National Highways Authority of India (NHAI), and municipal authorities are duty-bound to ensure the construction, maintenance, and safety of pedestrian infrastructure in accordance with statutory mandates and standards laid down by the Indian Roads Congress (IRC) and the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 - The Court noted that in 2023 alone, 1,72,890 lives were lost in road accidents—35,221 of them pedestrians- Footpaths are vital for pedestrians' right to safe mobility - Pedestrian deaths indicate grave governance and planning failure - The Ministry of Road Transport and Highways (MoRTH) must strictly implement IRC Guidelines 103–2022 to make roads safe - The right to safe pedestrian access flows from precedents - Pedestrian safety is an essential part of the fundamental right to life under Article 21. Non-compliance with prescribed road safety standards constitutes a violation of that right. State inaction regarding pedestrian infrastructure amounts to dereliction of constitutional duty, warranting judicial intervention and binding directives. [Relied on Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation, (1985) 3 SCC 545; Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation v. Nawab Khan Gulab Khan, (1997) 11 SCC 121; Sudhir Madan v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi, (2009) 17 SCC 332; M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, (2019) 10 SCC 614; Paras 7-14, 18-24] S. Rajaseekaran v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 976 : 2025 INSC 1189
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 - Section 149(2) - Insurance - Breach of Policy Condition - Fake Driving Licence - Owner's Liability - 'Pay and Recover' Directions - Proof of Wilful Breach by Insured – Held, the owner of a vehicle, an employer, is not expected to verify the authenticity of the driving licence from the licensing authority; they can only rely on the licence produced by the prospective driver seeking employment - For the insurance company to avoid liability or get 'pay and recover' rights against the insured-owner on the ground of a fake driving licence, the insurance company must establish that the breach was on the part of the insured, meaning the insured had deliberately committed a breach in entrusting the vehicle to a driver who had a fake licence or that the owner did not employ due diligence at the time of entrustment - The mere production of the driving licence by the owner before the Court, or the driver keeping away from the witness box, does not lead to a valid inference of collusion between the employer and the employee - In the absence of pleading or substantiation that the owner allowed the driver to drive the vehicle knowing the licence was fake, or failed to employ due diligence in the driver's employment/entrustment, the High Court erred in issuing 'pay and recover' directions against the insured-owner - The insurance company must prove the insured's wilful breach of the policy condition (entrusting the vehicle to a driver without a valid licence) to be entitled to the right of recovery against the insured, even if the driver's licence is fake - Appeal allowed. [Relied on: IFFCO Tokio General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Geeta Devi, 2023 LiveLaw (SC) 938; United India Insurance Company v. Lehru and Ors., (2003) 3 SCC 338; Paras 6-10] Hind Samachar Ltd. v. National Insurance Company Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 987 : 2025 INSC 1204
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — Section 166 — Motor Accident Compensation — Denial of 'Future Prospects' Benefit – Held, deceased being a self-employed person in a foreign country (USA), the law laid down by the Constitution Bench in National Insurance Company v. Pranay Sethi, (2017) 16 SCC 680 must be followed and applied to determine just compensation - As the deceased was 31 years old (below 40) at the time of the accident and was self-employed, an addition of 40% of the established income must be made towards future prospects as per the principles in Pranay Sethi - The multiplier of 16 applied by the High Court (having regard to the deceased's age of 31 years) was correctly applied and is in consonance with Pranay Sethi - The amounts awarded under conventional heads must be rectified as per Pranay Sethi - i. Loss of Estate: Rs. 15,000/- (Revised from Rs. 10,000/-); ii. Funeral Expenses: Rs. 15,000/- (Revised from Rs. 25,000/-); iii. Loss of Consortium: Rs. 40,000/- per claimant. (Four dependents—wife, daughter, son, and parents —were considered for consortium, totalling Rs. 1,60,000/-) - The High Court's award of Rs. 1,00,000/- for loss of consortium and love and affection was set aside - Total compensation enhanced from Rs. 1,17,20,200/- to Rs. 1,60,15,280/-, granting an additional compensation of Rs. 42,95,080/- with 6% interest. [Relied on National Insurance Company v. Pranay Sethi, (2017) 16 SCC 680; Paras 4-6] Kulwinder Kaur v. Prashant Sharma, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1052 : 2025 INSC 950
Municipal Laws - Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957- Master Plan for Delhi (MPD) 2021 -Shop-cum-Residence (LSC) Conversion - Misuse and Unauthorised Construction - The Supreme Court rejected the applicant's Interlocutory Application (I.A.) for de-sealing of Shop/Plot situated in New Rajinder Nagar Market, New Delhi and the prayer for permitting the use of upper floors as commercial – Held, the applicant's property was sanctioned as a “shop-cum-residence”, permitting commercial use only on the ground floor, while the upper floors, which the applicant himself had sought and obtained for residential use, were being illegally utilized for commercial purposes - The classification of New Rajinder Nagar Market as a "designated Local Shopping Centre (LSC)", a shop-cum-residence complex where only the ground floor is meant for commerce, and the upper floors are residential - Directed the MCD to conduct a fresh inspection of the premises and to issue a detailed order identifying non-compoundable violations that must be demolished, calculating the requisite conversion charges for changing the land use, and imposing penalty charges for the excess construction - The applicant was permitted to seek de-sealing of the property only after removing non-compoundable constructions and paying all prescribed charges in full. [Paras 21 - 24] M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1050
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (Seizure, Storage, Sampling and Disposal) Rules, 2022 – Held, NDPS Act does not divest the Special Courts under the NDPS Act of their jurisdiction to entertain an application for interim custody or release of a seized conveyance under Section 451 & 457 CrPC - The Rules of 2022, being subordinate legislation, are only supplemental to the scheme of disposal contemplated under the NDPS Act and cannot supersede the provisions of the parent legislation - The Rules are notably silent on the rights of persons whose property (like a conveyance) is affected by the disposal process - A conjoint and holistic reading of Sections 60(3) and 63 of the NDPS Act makes it abundantly clear that the power to determine whether a seized conveyance is liable to confiscation vests in the Special Court, not in any administrative or executive authority such as the DDC- i. Section 60(3) provides a defence to the owner to prove that the conveyance was used without their knowledge or connivance and that they had taken all reasonable precautions; ii. Section 63 mandates that no final order of confiscation can be passed without affording an opportunity of hearing to the person claiming ownership - Mere fact that a vehicle may be liable to confiscation under Section 60 cannot, by itself, operate to deny interim custody to a bona fide owner in the absence of an express bar under the NDPS Act - Confiscation is a measure resulting in deprivation of property and must be preceded by a prior hearing to ensure an innocent owner is not subjected to undue hardship - When the owner of a vehicle establishes that it was used for transporting narcotics substances without his knowledge or connivance, he cannot be denied interim custody of the vehicle pending trial- Appeal allowed. [Relied on Bishwajit Dey v. State of Assam 2025 INSC 32; (Criminal Appeal No. 1305 of 2025) Paras 13-19, 24- 34] Denash v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1032 : 2025 INSC 1258
Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 - Sections 138, 141 - Criminal Liability - Maintainability of Complaint without arraying Trust as Accused - Indian Trusts Act, 1882 - Sections 3, 13 - Issue - Whether a criminal complaint under Section 138 of the NI Act is maintainable against the Chairman/a Trustee of a Trust, who signed the dishonoured cheque on behalf of the Trust, without arraying the Trust itself as an accused – Held, cheque dishonour complaint maintainable against trustee without arraying trust as accused- Trust is not a Legal Entity/Juristic Person - A 'Trust' under the Indian Trusts Act, 1882, is defined as an obligation annexed to the ownership of property, and not a legal entity with a separate existence capable of suing or being sued - It is the Trustee(s) who are legally bound to maintain and defend all suits for the preservation of the trust property- Therefore, a Trust is not like a corporation or 'body corporate' - Liability of Cheque Signatory - Held that the signatory of a cheque that is dishonoured is clearly responsible for the incriminating act and will be covered under sub-section (2) of Section 141 (by analogy to a company officer) - For such a person, there is no need to make a specific averment that he was in charge of and responsible to the entity for the conduct of its business - Appeal allowed. [Relied on SMS Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. Neeta Bhalla, (2005) 8 SCC 89; K K Ahuja v. V K Vora, (2009) 10 SCC 48; Paras 18, 22, 23, 25- 27] Sankar Padam Thapa v. Vijaykumar Dineshchandra Agarwal, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 991 : 2025 INSC 1210
Omission of Names in FIR – Held, failure to name two of the three Appellants in the First Information Report (FIR), despite the complainant's familiarity with them, cast a serious shadow on the subsequent attempt to implicate them - Such a significant omission in the earliest version of events raises a legitimate inference of false implication and undermines the prosecution narrative - Omissions of important facts affecting the probabilities of the case are relevant under Section 11 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, in judging the veracity of the prosecution case. [Relied on Ram Kumar Pandey v. State of Madhya Pradesh (1975) 3 SCC 815, Para 29] Nazim v. State of Uttarakhand, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1019 : 2025 INSC 1184
Orders in personam vs. in rem - Held that orders quashing acquisition on grounds personal to individual objectors (like vitiated consideration of specific Section 5-A objections) operate in personam and benefit only those who contested the matter - Benefits of quashing do not accrue to non-parties unless the entire acquisition is struck down on fundamental grounds applicable to all - Filing objections under Section 5-A, which are subsequently rejected, does not exhaust the remedies; failure to pursue judicial challenge renders the notification conclusive proof of waiver. [Paras 19, 20] State of West Bengal v. Santi Ceramics Pvt. Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1000 : 2025 INSC 1222
Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 - Section 14 - Assam Financial Corporation (Amendment) Staff Regulations, 2007 - Regulation 107 - Gratuity Ceiling - Employee's right to higher gratuity ceiling – Held, when a statutory corporation's service regulation (Assam Financial Corporation's 2007 Staff Regulation, Regulation 107) itself provides for the payment of gratuity at a maximum limit, which is either an amount fixed by the Corporation or "as notified by the Govt. of Assam from time to time," the Regulation must be interpreted to be in favor of the employees - The right of the employees to the higher ceiling flows from the beneficial interpretation of the Regulation itself - Once the State's regulation specifies a higher limit for the grant of gratuity, then there can't be discrimination regarding the disbursal of the amount of gratuity and every employee shall be given equal treatment - Appeal dismissed. [Paras 16 - 21] Assam Financial Corporation Ltd. v. Bhabendra Nath Sarma, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1057 : 2025 INSC 1264
Penal Code, 1860 (IPC); Section 195A – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC); Sections 154, 156, 195(1)(b)(i), 195A, 340 - Threatening a person to give false evidence –Procedure for taking cognizance – Cognizable or Non-Cognizable Offence – Held, offense of threatening a witness under Section 195A IPC is a cognizable offense, empowering the police to directly register an FIR and investigate, without waiting for a formal complaint from a court - Offence under Section 195A IPC is a cognizable offence - The procedure under Section 195(1)(b)(i) CrPC is not applicable to the offence under Section 195A IPC - Section 195A IPC was conceptualized as distinct and different from the offences under Sections 193 to 196 IPC - The threat to a witness under Section 195A IPC may be given long before they come to Court, and making it cognizable allows for immediate steps to be taken - Requiring the victim to go before the Court concerned and necessitate a complaint under Section 195(1)(b)(i) CrPC along with an inquiry under Section 340 CrPC would cripple and hamper the process - Section 195A CrPC provides an additional remedy - The use of the word 'may' in Section 195A CrPC means it is not compulsory for the threatened person to only approach the Magistrate - Since the offence is cognizable, the police have the power to take action under Sections 154 CrPC and 156 CrPC - Argument that Section 195A IPC should be split into two categories (one requiring a Court complaint if committed in relation to a proceeding, and the other allowing a private complaint otherwise) was rejected as it would require rewriting the provision - Applied the rule of harmonious construction to synchronize the provisions and give full effect to the legislation - Appeals allowed. [Relied on Abdul Razzak v. State of M.P. and another, 2023 SCC OnLine MP 7152; Paras 22-29] State of Kerala v. Suni @ Sunil, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1034 : 2025 INSC 1260
Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) – Section 306, 107 - Quashing of FIR / Criminal Proceedings under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. - Core Ingredients – Refusal to Marry -Held, to constitute the offence of abetment of suicide under Section 306 IPC, two basic ingredients must be present: suicidal death and abetment thereof - Abetment, as defined under Section 107 IPC, requires either instigation, conspiracy, or intentionally aiding the doing of a thing - Conviction under Section 306 IPC requires a clear mens rea and an active or direct act on the part of the accused to instigate or aid the commission of suicide, which must have led the deceased to commit suicide leaving no option - Mere refusal to marry, even if true, by itself, would not amount to 'instigation' as explained under Section 107 of the IPC - His refusal to marry, or even his statement that he "does not care in case she dies" made when the deceased threatened suicide, could not be said to have been made with the intention to push the deceased into a situation where she was left with no option but to commit suicide - The ingredients necessary to constitute the offence of abetment punishable under Section 306 IPC were not borne out - Putting the accused to trial would be a travesty of justice and an empty formality - Appeal allowed. [Relied on Nipun Aneja and Others Versus State of Uttar Pradesh SCC OnLine SC 4091; Geo Varghese v. State of Rajasthan, (2021) 19 SCC 144; Paras 15, 17-21] Yadwinder Singh @ Sunny v. State of Punjab, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1058
Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) - Sections 147, 148, 149, 302, 304 Part II, 307 - Unlawful Assembly - Murder and Attempt to Murder - Interference with Concurrent Findings (Article 136 of the Constitution of India) - The Supreme Court reiterated that it generally exercises caution in interfering with concurrent findings of fact unless there is a manifest illegality or grave and serious miscarriage of justice on account of misreading or ignoring material evidence, or where the conclusions are manifestly perverse and unsupportable from the evidence on record - Noted that present case did not meet this threshold - Supreme Court noted that there was - i. delay in FIR and non-recovery of weapon not fatal, where there is consistent medical evidence and ocular evidence; ii. Testimonies of injured eye witness holds presumption of truth; iii. Intention to cause death can be gathered from various factors like attacking with lathis, spades, phawadas etc - Held that appellants, in furtherance of their common intention, formed an unlawful assembly, and some were armed with sharp-edged deadly weapons, committing the murder of the deceased and attempting to murder the injured witness - The conviction and sentence were upheld - Appeals dismissed. [Relied on Ekala Sivaiah v. State of Andhra Pradesh and Shahaja alias Shahajan Ismail Mohd. Shaikh v. State of Maharashtra 2023 12 SCC 558; State of H.P. Vs. Gian Chand 2001 6 SCC 71; Jarnail Singh & Ors. v State of Punjab 2009 9 SCC 719; Paras 24, 25, 33-39, 42, 43, 46-48, 49, 50]. Om Pal v. State of U.P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1037 : 2025 INSC 1262
Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) – Sections 147, 148, 149, 302, 307 – Unlawful Assembly – Vicarious Liability – Reversal of Acquittal by High Court – Scope of Appellate Interference – Held, interference with an acquittal order must be exercised with caution, but it is justified if the Trial Court's findings are manifestly perverse, unreasonable, or contrary to the evidence on record – The Trial Court's acquittal suffered from a fundamental misappreciation of evidence, specifically by overlooking the consistent testimony of injured eyewitnesses and failing to appreciate the legal effect of the appellants' active participation in an unlawful assembly. The High Court's reversal was based on a proper appraisal of the record and was well-reasoned - The nature of the weapons used, the ferocity and precision of the attack, and the joint execution unmistakably demonstrated that the common object extended to the commission of murder - Upheld order of High Court - Appeals dismissed. [Relied on Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415; Masalti v. State of U.P., AIR 1965 SC 202; Paras 29-30, 41-44] Haribhau @ Bhausaheb Dinkar Kharuse v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1043 : 2025 INSC 1266
Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) — Sections 302, 376(2)(G) and 201- Circumstantial Evidence — Extra-Judicial Confession — Last Seen Theory- Case based on Circumstantial Evidence- Held that in a case based on circumstantial evidence, the prosecution must establish that the circumstances point conclusively toward the guilt of the accused alone, excluding any other hypothesis, including the possibility of innocence or third-party involvement - The chain of evidence must be so complete as to leave no reasonable ground for a conclusion consistent with the accused's innocence - Explained Principle of Two Views - Held where a perusal of the evidence in a circumstantial case allows for two views, the one favourable to the accused must be adopted. Suspicion, however strong, cannot replace proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Sanjay v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1033 : 2025 INSC 317
Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) - Sections 302 - Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO Act) - Section 6 r/w 5(m), 8 r/w 7 - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) - Section 207, 366 - Indian Evidence Act, 1872 - Section 27- Constitutional Right to Fair Trial & Legal Aid - Violation of Articles 21 & 22(1) - CrPC Section 207 – Held that the trial was vitiated due to a denial of effective opportunity for defence - The mandatory requirement of providing copies of relied-upon documents under Section 207 CrPC was not complied with before charges were framed - The legal aid counsel was appointed only four days before the commencement of the prosecution evidence, giving insufficient time to prepare the matter and conduct effective cross-examination. [Relied on Anokhilal v. State of Madhya Pradesh 2019 SCC OnLine SC 1637; Para 35, 38] Dashwanth v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 983 : 2025 INSC 1203
Permanent Establishment (PE) / Business Connection (BC) – Held, absence of a Permanent Establishment (PE) in India is not mandatory for a non-resident company to be considered as carrying on business or to have a Business Connection (BC) in India - A non-resident can be in business "de hors" the permanent establishment - The issue of PE is primarily relevant for availing the beneficial provisions of the Double Tax Avoidance Agreement (DTAA), which was not the core consideration for allowing deductions under the Income Tax Act in this case - The High Court's view that business communications from a foreign office meant the non-resident was not carrying on business in India was held to be "wholly fallacious and contrary to the very scheme of the Act" and "wholly anachronistic" with the modern globalized trade environment - Appeals allowed. [Relied on CIT v. Vikram Cotton Mills ((1988) 169 ITR 597 (SC); Paras 11, 12, 14, 15. 17-21] Pride Foramer S.A. v. Commissioner of Income Tax, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1015 : 2025 INSC 1247
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 – Proof of demand and acceptance of bribe – Held, for an offence under Section 7 of the PC Act, the demand of illegal gratification is a sine qua non to prove the guilt - Mere recovery of currency notes cannot constitute an offence unless it is proved beyond reasonable doubt that the accused voluntarily accepted the money, knowing it to be a bribe - The proof of acceptance can follow only if there is proof of demand - Sole testimony of the complainant, who is an interested witness, cannot be relied upon without corroboration with independent evidence - Statutory presumption under Section 20 of the PC Act is not automatic and arises only once the foundational facts of demand and acceptance are proved - Suspicion, however strong, cannot take the place of proof - Appeal allowed. [Relied on Rajesh Gupta vs. State through Central Bureau of Investigation, 2022 INSC 359; Panna Damodar Rathi vs. State of Maharashtra, (1979) 4 SCC 526; Ayyasami vs. State of Tamil Nadu, (1992) 1 SCC 304; Paras 18, 19, 33] P. Somaraju v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1040 : 2025 INSC 1263
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 – Sections 7, 13(1)(d), 13(2), and 20 – Demand and acceptance of illegal gratification – Statutory presumption – Failure of prosecution to prove foundational facts – Held, an appellate Court has full power to review, reappreciate, and reconsider the evidence - However, due to the reinforced or 'double' presumption of innocence after acquittal, interference must be limited - If two reasonable views are possible on the basis of the record, the acquittal should not be disturbed. Judicial intervention is only warranted where the Trial Court's view is perverse, based on misreading or ignoring material evidence, or results in manifest miscarriage of justice - The Appellate Court must address the reasons given by the Trial Court for acquittal before reversing it and assigning its own. [Relied on Chandrappa & Ors. vs. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415 (Para 11); Mallappa & Ors. vs. State of Karnataka, 2024 INSC 104; Ballu @ Balram @ Balmukund & Anr. vs. The State of Madhya Pradesh, 2024 INSC 258; Paras 11-14] P. Somaraju v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1040 : 2025 INSC 1263
Primary School Teacher Appointment Rules, 2012 (Jharkhand) - Rule 4 (Eligibility) vs. Rule 21 (Merit List) - Calculation of Marks in Intermediate Examination - Exclusion of Vocational Subject Marks - Supreme Court set aside suspension of school teachers in Jharkhand, finding that they were declared ineligible based on a different charge, which was never labelled against them in the show cause notice – Held, Rule 21 A (ii) (A) of the 2012 Rules, which excludes marks obtained in the "additional subject" for the purpose of calculating the "educational merit point" for preparation of the "Merit List," is not applicable for determining the "minimum qualification" or "eligibility" of a candidate - Rule 4, which deals with eligibility to appear in the Teacher Eligibility Test, does not provide for the exclusion of marks secured in the vocational subject - The method of calculation provided on the reverse side of the marksheet - which includes the bonus marks secured in the vocational subject (over and above the pass marks) to the aggregate to improve the result - must be followed for determining the minimum eligibility marks in the absence of a bar or an alternate method in the eligibility rule (Rule 4) - Department erred in applying Rule 21 for the purpose of deciding the eligibility criteria, an error also committed by the Division Bench of the High Court - Supreme Court set aside the High Court Division Bench's judgment, which upheld the termination of the appellants' services (Intermediate Trained Teachers for Classes I-V) - The termination was based on two grounds: (i) invalid graduation certificates and (ii) securing less than the minimum qualifying marks (40% for Scheduled Tribe candidates) in the intermediate examination. [Paras 10 - 29] Ravi Oraon v. State of Jharkhand, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1009 : 2025 INSC 1212
Private Forests (Vesting and Assignment) Act, 1971 (Kerala) – Sections 3(1), 3(2) & 3(3) – Private Forest – Exemption for Bona Fide Plantation - Burden of Proof and standard of proof – Held, burden of proof to claim exemption from vesting under Section 3(2) or Section 3(3) of the Act lies on the claimant (owner) - the standard of proof in such civil proceedings is merely the preponderance of probabilities, not proof beyond reasonable doubt - The claimant is required to lead evidence from which a reasonable fact-finder can conclude that the ingredients of the exemption are more likely than not satisfied - The concurrent factual findings of the Forest Tribunal and the High Court are liable to be overturned where they are vitiated by a clear disregard of relevant materials or an application of wrong legal standards, such as an unrealistic burden of proof - Supreme Court observed while declaring that 37.5 acres of land in South Wayanad, cultivated with coffee and cardamom, is private plantation land and not a vested forest under the Kerala Private Forests (Vesting and Assignment) Act, 1971 - Appeals allowed. [Relied on Joseph & Another v. State of Kerala & Another (2007) 6 SCR 347; Paras 33-43] M. Jameela v State of Kerala, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1023 : 2025 INSC 1254
Prohibition of Unlawful Conversion of Religion Act, 2021 (Uttar Pradesh Conversion Act) – Section 4 (Unamended) – Locus Standi to lodge FIR - Locus Standi is Restricted – Held that the right to initiate criminal proceedings under the U.P. Conversion Act is strictly circumscribed and can only be set in motion at the behest of the aggrieved converted individual, or their immediate family members or blood relatives - This restriction is rooted in the recognition that the freedom to profess, practice, or propagate religion (and the liberty to convert) is a facet of the fundamental rights guaranteed under Articles 21 and 25 of the Constitution of India - This liberty lies in the innermost domain of human conscience and decisional autonomy - To permit the initiation of criminal proceedings at the instance of strangers or unrelated third parties would amount to an impermissible intrusion into this protected sphere of individual freedom and would open the door to frivolous or motivated litigations - Held that criminal law cannot be allowed to be made a tool of harassment of innocent persons, allowing prosecuting agencies to initiate prosecution at their whims and fancy, on the basis of completely incredulous material. [Paras 110-111, 139] Rajendra Bihari Lal v. State of U.P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1021 : 2025 INSC 1249
Protection of Children from Sexual Offences (POCSO) Act, 2012 - Quashing of Conviction and Sentence - Article 142 of the Constitution of India – Held, quashing of conviction under Section 366 IPC and Section 6 of POCSO Act using Article 142 power of "complete justice" where the appellant and victim married and have a child - Supreme Court invoked its extraordinary power under Article 142 of the Constitution of India to quash the criminal proceedings, including the conviction and sentence, against the appellant for offences under Section 366 of the Indian Penal Code, 1872 and Section 6 of the POCSO Act, 2012 - Supreme Court acknowledged that while the law provides that proceedings for a heinous offense cannot be quashed on the basis of a compromise, ignoring the wife's cry for compassion and empathy would not serve the ends of justice - This is a case where the law must yield to the cause of justice - The appellant was subjected to the specific condition of not deserting his wife and child and to maintain them for the rest of their life with dignity - Appeal allowed. [Paras 8 - 13] K. Kirubakaran v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1048 : 2025 INSC 1272
Public Interest Litigation (PIL) Jurisdiction - PIL enables representation of similarly situated vulnerable persons who lack means to approach courts individually. A financially resourceful entity that failed to pursue available statutory remedies falls outside this representative framework - Permitting an industrial entity to claim benefits from litigation secured by others would incentivize strategic inaction and undermine the fundamental principle that legal benefits flow from the active pursuit of remedies, not passive opportunism - Appeal allowed. [Para 21, 23, 26, 27] State of West Bengal v. Santi Ceramics Pvt. Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1000 : 2025 INSC 1222
Qualitative Distinction in Work - Supreme Court noted the finding in Dr. P.A. Bhatt case that Allopathy practitioners deal with critical care, immediate life-saving measures, invasive procedures including surgeries, and postmortem, none of which can be performed by practitioners of indigenous systems of medicine - This fundamental distinction, along with the dissimilar diagnostic methods, contrasting treatment philosophies, and disparate medicine composition, puts allopathy doctors in a different class who can be classified differently for service conditions - The classification of different retirement ages and better pay scales for allopathy doctors has a reasonable nexus with the object sought to be achieved: the sufficiency of qualified and experienced MBBS doctors with longer service and better pay, addressing the concern of the dearth of allopathy doctors - The "footfalls" in allopathy institutions are also noted to be far more than in institutions administering indigenous systems of medicine. [Relied on: State of Gujarat & Ors. v. Dr. P.A. Bhatt & Ors. 2023 SCC OnLine SC 503; Dr. Solamon A. v. State of Kerala and Ors. Special Leave Petition (C) No.3946 of 2023; Paras 7-11] State of Rajasthan v. Anisur Rahman, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1017
Quashing of Proceedings – FIR and Chargesheet – CBI Investigation – Consent under Section 6 - Delhi Special Police Establishment (DSPE) Act, 1946 - Requirement of State Government's Consent - Held, Lack of consent from the State Government under Section 6 of the DSPE Act, 1946, for a CBI investigation ought to be raised soon after the registration of the FIR - Once the investigation is complete, a chargesheet has been filed, and the court of competent jurisdiction has taken cognizance of the chargesheet, the plea regarding the lack of consent cannot be raised to vitiate the validity of the order taking cognizance - This general rule is subject to exceptions: (i) when raising the plea causes severe miscarriage of justice; or (ii) where proceedings for quashing the FIR were initiated, and the chargesheet was filed during the pendency of the quashing proceedings - Appeal allowed. [Paras 10-12] Central Bureau of Investigation v. Narayan Niryat India Pvt. Ltd,, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1001
Railways Act, 1989 - Section 124A – Untoward Incident – Compensation – Proof of Bonafide Passenger Status- Evidentiary Burden - Hyper Technical Approach – Welfare Legislation – Held, the Supreme Court set aside the concurrent findings, allowed the appeal in part, and directed the Railways to pay compensation of Rs. 8,00,000/-- Initial burden on the claimants to prove the deceased was travelling in the train was discharged by the sworn statement of the deceased's wife and reliance on the Divisional Railway Manager (DRM) which, inter alia, indicated the deceased was traveling and had fallen from the train, sustaining fatal injuries, which the High Court itself found to fall under 'untoward incident' - Initial burden on the claimant can be discharged by filing an affidavit of relevant facts, upon which the burden shifts to the Railways - Mere absence of a ticket with the deceased does not negate the claim of being a Bonafide passenger - Proceedings under Section 124A are governed by principles of preponderance and probabilities, not the standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt required in criminal trials - Once foundational facts - i. possession or issuance of a valid ticket and ii. The occurrence of an accidental fall from train - are established through credible material, it must be statutorily presumed that the victim was a bona fide passenger - A hyper-technical approach that frustrates the object of providing relief to victims must be eschewed - The absence of a seizure memo or inability to preserve physical evidence cannot by itself defeat a legitimate claim when the totality of circumstances supports the claimant's version - This principle shall guide all future tribunals and High Courts - Appeal partly allowed. [Relied on Union of India v. Rina Devi (2019) 3 SCC 572: (2019) 2 SCC (Civ) 198; Doli Rani Saha vs. Union of India (2024) 9 SCC 656 (Para 11); Kamukayi and Others v. Union of India & Others 2023 19 SCC 116; Paras 9, 11, 12] Rajni v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 986 : 2025 INSC 1201
Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (2013 Act) – Sections 26, 28 – Land Acquisition – Determination of Market Value – Rental Compensation/Mesne Profits for Illegal Occupation – Held, the Reference Court's enhancement of compensation under Section 26 of the 2013 Act was justified as it correctly adopted the "average sale price" method by considering one-half of the highest-priced sale instances, along with a 10% annual increase for the time gap, as mandated by Section 26(1)(b) read with Explanations 1 and 2 - The Special Land Acquisition Officer (SLAO) erred in relying solely on the ready reckoner rates while ignoring genuine and undisputed sale instances of similar land in the vicinity - High Court was wrong to interfere with the Reference Court's finding on market value - Noted that the 'rental compensation' in land acquisition proceedings is granted only when the owner is completely deprived of its property's use - that rental compensation requires complete deprivation of property; denies Rs. 238 Crore claim against respondent - Appeal allowed. [Relied on R.L. Jain v. DDA 2004 4 SCC 79; Shankarrao Bhagwantrao Patil and Others v. State of Maharashtra (2022) 15 SCC 657; Paras 24-35] Pradyumna Mukund Kokil v. Nashik Municipal Corporation, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1007 : 2025 INSC 1236
Scheduled Tribes and Other Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights) Act, 2006 (FRA); Section 3(2) - Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980 (FCA) - Basic Housing for Forest Dwellers - Whether the construction of a pakka (permanent) dwelling house for a forest dweller is an exempted facility under Section 3(2) of the FRA, thereby overriding the requirement for prior approval under the FCA – Held, Section 3(2) is a limited exception - Section 3(2) of the FRA, which contains a non-obstante clause, provides an exemption from the mandate of the Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980 (FCA), but this exemption is strictly limited to the facilities specifically provided therein and to activities undertaken by the Government -Exemption does not include pakka houses - The construction of a pakka dwelling house is not included in the list of exempted activities/facilities specified under Section 3(2) of the FRA - Duty to Balance Rights and Conservation - The issue requires the Court to balance the important value of providing minimum basic housing to forest dwellers with the State's and citizen's obligation to protect the national forest resource - Direction to Government for Mechanism - Since pakka housing is not covered by the Section 3(2) exemption, the Supreme Court directed the Union of India (through the Ministry of Tribal Affairs and the Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change) to file an affidavit setting out the mechanism or policy that the Government proposes to frame to address the need for basic housing for forest dwellers while ensuring full compliance with the mandate of the FCA. [Paras 4-6] Sugra Adiwasi v. Pathranand, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 995
Scientific Evidence – Inconclusive FSL Report – Motive – Held, the Forensic Science Laboratory (FSL) reported that no complete DNA profile could be generated from the exhibits (rope, axe, and clothes), making the only scientific evidence neutral, as it neither connected the Appellants to the crime nor corroborated the oral testimony - Noted that an inconclusive or exculpatory scientific report cannot be dismissed as inconsequential in a circumstantial evidence case, and to convict on doubtful testimony while ignoring scientific tests is to substitute suspicion for proof - The alleged motive of revenge for an insult was vague and unproven - Noted that the absence of motive in a circumstantial case assumes significance and tilts the balance in favor of the accused. [Relied on Kali Ram v. State of Himachal Pradesh (1973) 2 SCC 808; Paras 52- 56] Nazim v. State of Uttarakhand, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1019 : 2025 INSC 1184
Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (SARFAESI ACT) - Section 17(5) - Expeditious Disposal of Securitisation Application (S.A.) - Time Limit – Held, any application made under sub-section (1) of Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act must be dealt with by the Debts Recovery Tribunal (DRT) as expeditiously as possible and disposed of within sixty days from the date of such application - The DRT may extend the sixty-day period for reasons to be recorded in writing, provided that the total period of pendency of the application with the DRT shall not exceed four months from the date of making of such application - Once the statute itself mandates that the DRT should dispose of the matter within the stipulated time, it is incumbent upon the DRT to abide thereby - In the event the DRT fails to dispose of the matter within the stipulated time, the proviso to Section 17(5) ordains that reasons need to be recorded. Indian Overseas Bank v. Radhey Infra Solutions (Pvt.) Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 997
Service Law – Appointment in excess of advertised vacancies – Termination – Justification of termination – Scope of Rule 12 of the relevant Rules – Maintenance of Wait List – Complete Justice- Held that Rule 12 was interpreted in Naseem Ahmad case to permit a waiting list of 'reasonable dimensions' to be maintained, which is adequate to meet vacancies that might be available within a reasonable period in the year of recruitment or the year succeeding thereto - The explicit rider in the advertisement that the vacancies could be increased or decreased indicated the Appointing Authority's intention to maintain a wait list to fill up excess vacancies, as permissible under the rules - Given that the next advertisement was only after 8 years (in 2008), it was evident that vacancies arose within that period, justifying the appellants' appointments subsequent to the twelve advertised vacancies - Held that the termination was found to be unjustified. [Relied on Naseem Ahmad and Others v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Another, (2011) 2 SCC 734; Paras 6,7,10,11,12] Sanjay Kumar Mishra v. District Judge, Ambedkar Nagar (UP), 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1031
Service Law – Departmental Enquiry – Natural Justice – Non-examination of Complainant – Perverse Findings - Where the Enquiry Officer relied upon a written complaint of bribery without examining the complainant and the other witnesses did not support the charge, such findings are perverse and cannot sustain a dismissal order – Held, the Central Administrative Tribunal (CAT) was justified in setting aside the penalty - the High Court erred in interfering with such findings - Non-examination of a material witness whose statement formed the foundation of the charge and was never subjected to cross-examination vitiates the enquiry for denial of fair hearing - Noted that While the High Court held that judicial review could not be exercised over findings of fact, the Supreme Court clarified that when findings are based on “completely misleading material” or are perverse, interference is justified - Judicial review is permissible where the conclusion of guilt is unsupported by evidence or based on no evidence - Appeal allowed. [Relied on State of Andhra Pradesh v. S. Sree Rama Rao, AIR 1963 SC 1723; Kuldeep Singh v. Commissioner of Police, (1999) 2 SCC 10; Union of India v. H.C. Goel, AIR 1964 SC 364; Paras 17-19] V.M. Saudagar v. Central Railway, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1029 : 2025 INSC 1257
Service Law – Directions in Exercise of Complete Justice - Held, the appellants were out of employment for almost 17 years and had worked for eight years, the Court issued specific directions, making it clear that they were in the peculiar circumstances of the case and shall not be a precedent – Directed - i. To be accommodated in existing Class IV vacancies in the District Judgeship of Ambedkar Nagar - If no vacancies exist, they shall be appointed in a supernumerary post, to be adjusted against future vacancies or cease on retirement, whichever is earlier; ii. Appellants who have crossed the age of superannuation: To be entitled to minimum pension dehors (irrespective of) completing only 8 years in employment; iii. Appointed appellants: Shall be continued without any seniority but the prior service period shall be reckoned for determining pensionable service, and they shall be granted pension at the minimum; iv. Intervening period (17 years) shall not be treated as notional service or for computing pensionable service. [Paras 11] Sanjay Kumar Mishra v. District Judge, Ambedkar Nagar (UP), 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1031
Service Law – Parity in Service Conditions – Doctors (Allopathy vs. Indigenous Systems of Medicine) – Retirement Age and Pay Scales – Reference to Larger Bench - Parity in service conditions - The Supreme Court referred the issue of whether doctors practicing Allopathy and those practicing Indigenous Systems of Medicine (like Ayurveda, Homeopathy, Unani, etc.) can be treated equally for determining service conditions, specifically the retirement age and pay packages, to a larger Bench for an authoritative pronouncement - The Court noted a divergence of opinion between its previous judgments regarding whether MBBS doctors and doctors practicing indigenous systems of medicine can be treated equally for service conditions - Held that the consideration for parity in service conditions should ideally be on the touchstone of identity of functions, similarity in work carried out, and comparable duties assigned. [Paras 4-6] State of Rajasthan v. Anisur Rahman, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1017
Service Law - Principles of Natural Justice - Termination of Service - The termination orders were vitiated for violation of the principles of natural justice - The termination orders were held to be violative of the principles of natural justice because the Department shifted the basis for termination to the exclusion of vocational marks after the appellants had successfully replied to the original charges in the show cause notice- This new reason, which was not alleged in the show cause notice, denied them a fair opportunity to defend themselves. [Relied on Escorts Farms Ltd. v. Commissioner, Kumaon Division, Nainital, V.P. & others, (2004) 4 SCC 281; Paras 30-36] Ravi Oraon v. State of Jharkhand, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1009 : 2025 INSC 1212
Service Law – Recruitment – Wait List/Reserved Panel – Right to Appointment – Binding Nature of Concession on Law – Held, a candidate on a wait list/reserved panel has no vested right to be appointed - The right to be considered arises only if a selected candidate does not join, and the wait list operates for a limited period, not indefinitely, and certainly not after a fresh recruitment process has commenced - Since all selected candidates had joined, the respondent's right as a waitlisted candidate was extinguished - The statement/concession made by the appellants' counsel in 1999 that the respondent would be considered for a future vacancy in the SC quota cannot bind the appellants as it runs contrary to the statutory Recruitment Rules - Giving effect to such a concession would amount to extending the life of the wait list and filling a post in a subsequent recruitment on the basis of a previous, concluded recruitment exercise, which is impermissible and prejudices future candidates - It is open for a party to place the correct position of law before the Court and urge that it should not be compelled to give effect to an erroneous concession if compliance would result in the violation of any statutory rules or regulations - Appeal allowed. [Relied on Gujarat State Dy. Executive Engineers' Association Vs. State of Gujarat and others 1994 INSC 199; Paras 12-17] Union of India v. Subit Kumar Das, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1010 : 2025 INSC 1235
Specific Relief Act, 1963 - 2018 Amendment - Supreme Court clarified that the 2018 amendment to the Act of 1963, which made the grant of specific performance of contracts a mandatory relief, has no retrospective effect and does not apply to suits or transactions that arose before its enforcement on October 1, 2018. [Relied on Katta Sujatha Reddy v. Siddamsetty Infra Projects (P) Ltd. 2023 1 SCC 355; Siddamsetty Infra Projects (P.) Ktd. V. Katta Sujatha Reddy 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3214; Paras 34-38] Annamalai v. Vasanthi, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1041 : 2025 INSC 1267
Specific Relief Act, 1963 - Requirement of Declaration of Title and Recovery of Possession – Held where the plaintiff asserts title based on a Will but does not have possession (which is admitted to be with the defendant), a suit for injunction simpliciter cannot be maintained - The plaintiff should have sought a declaration of title and consequential recovery of possession - This is especially true when the defendant claims possession as a co-owner with absolute rights, having made valuable improvements - Appeal is disposed of with reservation of liberty to both parties to file a fresh suit for declaration of title and recovery of possession. [Paras 10-13] S. Santhana Lakshmi v. D. Rajammal, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1059 : 2025 INSC 1197
Specific Relief Act, 1963 - Section 10, Section 14, Section 20 (as prior to 2018 Amendment) - Code of Civil Procedure, 1908; Section 100 - Agreement for Sale of Immovable Property - Suit for Specific Performance - Readiness and Willingness - When should a plaintiff seeking specific performance of contract must also seek a declaration that the termination of the contract by the other party was invalid – Held, a suit for specific performance is maintainable without seeking a declaration that the termination of the agreement was invalid where the contract did not confer a right to unilaterally terminate, or where the right conferred was waived, and the termination was a unilateral act - The vendors, by accepting the additional amount, waived their right to forfeit the advance consideration and acknowledged the contract's subsistence; thus, their subsequent termination notice was a void act and a breach of contract by repudiation. The Plaintiff-Appellant had the option to treat the contract as subsisting and sue for specific performance. [Paras 31-33] Annamalai v. Vasanthi, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1041 : 2025 INSC 1267
Specific Relief Act, 1963 - Section 20 - Discretionary Relief of Specific Performance – Held, the High Court erred in declining the discretionary relief under Section 20 (pre-2018 Amendment) based on the unsustainable grounds of the plaintiff setting up a false claim of additional payment and of possession - The failure to prove possession alone does not make the claim false - Considering the payment of over 90% of the agreed consideration, the additional payment, and the non-bona fide conduct of the vendors in selling part of the property to a related party even before termination, the relief of specific performance should not have been denied - Appeal allowed. [Relied on Ravinder Singh v. Sukhbir Singh and Others, (2013) 9 SCC 245; Babu Lal v. Hazari Lal Kishori Lal, (1982) 1 SCC 525; Para 25-32, 38, 39] Annamalai v. Vasanthi, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1041 : 2025 INSC 1267
Specific Relief Act, 1963 - Section 38 (Perpetual Injunction) - Suit for Injunction Simpliciter - Declaration of Title - Recovery of Possession – Held, a suit filed for an injunction restraining alienation/encumbrance and interference with peaceful possession is an injunction simpliciter - When the plaintiff admits in the pleadings and oral evidence (witness box) that possession is with the defendant, an injunction against the interference of peaceful enjoyment of the property ought not to have been granted - Possession was admitted to be with the defendant in the original plaint on the basis of a tenancy arrangement and later in evidence as well. [Para 11] S. Santhana Lakshmi v. D. Rajammal, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1059 : 2025 INSC 1197
Stamp Act, 1899 – Schedule 1-B – Articles 40 and 57 – Security Bond cum Mortgage Deed – Chargeability of Stamp Duty - Issue- Whether the stamp duty on the instrument "Security Bond cum Mortgage Deed" is chargeable under Article 40 or Article 57 of Schedule 1-B of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 – Held, Principle of Chargeability, in matters of stamp duty, the decisive factor is not the nomenclature assigned to the instrument, but the substance of rights and obligations it embodies - The Court is duty-bound to ascertain the true legal character of the instrument - Definition of Mortgage-Deed - Held that the instrument, in both cases, fulfils the essential characteristics of a mortgage deed as defined under Section 2(17) of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899, because it transfers, or creates, a right over specified property in favour of the creditor to secure the performance of an engagement (or repayment of a loan). Godwin Construction Pvt. Ltd. v. Commissioner, Meerut Division, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 992 : 2025 INSC 1207
Stamp Act, 1899 – Scope of Article 57 - Held that Article 57 of Schedule 1-B of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899, operates in two distinct limbs - The second limb, which refers to a deed "executed by a surety to secure the due performance of a contract," is restricted in its application to the execution of a security bond or mortgage deed by a surety to secure the obligations of another, and does not extend to cases where the principal itself executes the deed to secure its own obligations - Definition of Surety - Held that the term "surety" must be strictly understood in accordance with Section 126 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, which establishes that a contract of guarantee is inherently tripartite (surety, principal debtor, and creditor) - the essential requirement for invoking Article 57 is the presence of a surety distinct from the principal debtor - Where the principal debtor itself executes a deed mortgaging its own property, Article 57 is inapplicable - Appeals dismissed. [Paras 14-29] Construction Pvt. Ltd. v. Commissioner, Meerut Division, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 992 : 2025 INSC 1207
Stay of execution of a decree - Order XLI Rule 5 - Supreme Court summarized law regarding grant of benefit of stay of execution of a decree by an appellate court - i. Order XLI Rule 5 contains the provision for the grant or refusal of stay of execution of the decree by the appellate court under the CPC. It categorically stipulates that mere filing of an appeal against an order of execution, shall not ipso facto operate as stay of proceedings. Any execution proceeding or an order therein, shall be stayed only if a specific, reasoned order granting such stay is passed by the Appellate Court, after proper application of mind; ii. For the grant of stay of execution of a decree in terms of Order XLI, a prayer to such effect has to be specifically made to the Appellate Court and the Appellate Court has the discretion to grant an order of stay or to refuse the same; iii. Order XLI Rule 5(3) of the CPC provides for satisfaction regarding sufficient cause as a pre-condition for granting benefit of stay of execution of decree, and it casts an obligation upon the appellate court to record its satisfaction for stay of execution such decree; iv. The power of the Appellate Court to order stay of execution of the decree is circumscribed and made subject to the existence of a “sufficient cause” in favour of the appellant being shown. In order to ascertain whether a “sufficient cause” exists for the grant of stay of execution of a decree under Order XLI of the CPC, the appellate court as per sub-rule (3) of Rule 5 is required to examine: - a. Whether there will be substantial loss to the party applying for stay; b. Whether the application has been made without unreasonable delay; and c. Whether security has been given by the applicant for due performance of the decree; v. For the grant of stay of execution of the decree, the appellate court is required, after perusing the materials on record, 2 to assign reasons for its satisfaction regarding the existence of a “sufficient cause”. Such reasons should be cogent and adequate. The reasons assigned must indicate the necessity for the status quo prevailing on the date of the decree and/or the date of making of the application for stay, to continue by granting stay, and not merely the reasons why stay should be granted; vi. Although, Order XLI Rule 5 of the CPC, uses the word “shall”, yet a combined reading of the sum and substance of Rule(s) 1(3) and 5(5) would reveal, that for the grant of stay of execution, it is not mandatory for the Appellate Court to impose a condition for deposit of the amount in dispute. The aforesaid provisions make it abundantly clear that the Appellate Court, for the grant of stay of execution, has a discretion to impose a condition of deposit of the amount depending on the facts and circumstances of each case; vii. A deposit is not a condition precedent for an order of stay of execution of the decree by the appellate court. The only guiding factor and statutory mandate, for the grant of such stay of execution as indicated in Rule 5, is the existence of “sufficient cause” in favour of the appellant, on the availability of which the appellate court would be inclined to pass an order of stay; viii. For the grant of benefit of an unconditional stay of execution of a decree, an exceptional case has to be made out before the Appellate Court. This discretion of the Appellate Court to grant an unconditional stay of execution of decree must not be exercised arbitrarily. It must be exercised sparingly and only if an exceptional case is made out for such stay in view of the peculiar facts and attending circumstances of the case before it; ix. A lodestar for bringing a case within the purview of “exceptional case” for the purpose of granting benefit of unconditional stay of the execution of money decree by the appellate court would be, if the money decree in question: - (a) is egregiously perverse; (b) is riddled with patent illegalities; (c) is facially untenable; and/or; (d) such other exceptional causes similar in nature; x. For the purpose of the grant or refusal of stay of execution of the decree under Rule 5 of Order XLI, it is immaterial whether the decree is a money decree or any other decree. The language couched in the said provision is very clear. Order XLI, Rule 5 of the makes no distinction between a money decree and other decrees, and the said provision applies with full rigour in both instances. Yet as a rule of prudence and established practice evolved over a period of time, no stay of execution of a money decree should be granted, except on the condition that the decretal amount be deposited in the court. However, such condition for deposit cannot be said to be mandatory and non-prescription thereof does not operate as a bar to staying the execution of a money decree; (XI) There is no provision under Order XLI Rule 5 of the CPC imposing a mandate to deposit cash security as the only mode of security for execution of the decree. Security, for the purpose of the said provision, can be in the shape of property, bond and or in the form of an appropriate undertaking from the appellant to abide by the decree, seeking stay of execution. [Para 134] Lifestyle Equities C.V. v. Amazon Technologies Inc., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 974 : 2025 INSC 1190
Supreme Court issued key directions to ensure safety - i. Pedestrian Safety Audits: NHAI and road-owning agencies in 50 major cities to audit existing footpaths and prioritize vulnerable areas; ii. Compliance with IRC Guidelines: All pedestrian crossings to conform to IRC 103-2022 standards; iii. Encroachments: Phased removal of obstruction from footpaths with GIS monitoring; iv. Foot Overbridges & Subways: Audits on safety aspects—lighting, CCTV, and panic alert systems; v. High-Risk Zones: Application of data to identify accident-prone pedestrian stretches—especially near schools, hospitals, and transit zones; vi. Online Grievance System: Municipal and highway authorities to create complaint portals for encroachments and maintenance lapses; vii. Helmet Enforcement: States and UTs directed to ensure mandatory wearing of helmets under Sections 128–129 and 194-D of the Motor Vehicles Act; viii. Lane Discipline: Curb wrong-lane driving through automated cameras and fines; ix. Dazzling Lights & Unauthorized Hooters: Ban on non-compliant LED beams, illegal sirens, and strobes; penalties and awareness campaigns mandated; x. Framing of State Rules: States and UTs to frame rules under Sections 138(1A) and 210-D of the MV Act within six months. [Para 35] S. Rajaseekaran v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 976 : 2025 INSC 1189
Supreme Court orders – Modification of - Expunging observations regarding conduct of counsel – Waiver of costs imposed while dismissing SLP – Decorum of proceedings – Role and duty of counsel – Held, once a Bench has indicated its inclination and requested counsel to refrain from making further submissions, such direction must be respected, as continued insistence thereafter serves no purpose and affects the decorum of proceedings - Emphasized that persistent submissions despite the Court expressing its mind is improper and undermines court decorum - Acknowledged the assurance from senior bar leaders that such conduct would not reoccur and the advocate's remorse - Considering the apology and it being a first instance, the application was allowed with a caution, deleting adverse remarks and waiving the costs - Advocates are bound to respect the Court's indication and maintain decorum to ensure orderly proceedings - however, genuine remorse and apology may warrant recall of adverse observations and costs - Application allowed. [Paras 5 - 9] State Election Commission v. Shakti Singh Bharthwal, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1038 : 2025 INSC 1261
Surrogacy (Regulation) Act, 2021; Section 4(iii)(c)(I) — Retrospective Application — Vested Rights — Reproductive Autonomy — Article 21 – Held, the age-restriction prescribed for 'intending couples' under Section 4(iii)(c)(I) of the Surrogacy (Regulation) Act, 2021 (which limits the female age to 50 years and the male age to 55 years for eligibility certification) does not have retrospective operation and, consequently, does not apply to intending couples who had commenced the surrogacy procedure prior to the Act's commencement on January 25, 2022 - Right to Surrogacy & Article 21 - The right of a couple, medically incapable of conceiving/bearing children naturally, to pursue surrogacy is an exercise of their decisional and reproductive autonomy, which is a fundamental right under Article 21 of the Constitution. Arun Muthuvel v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 990 : 2025 INSC 1209
Surrogacy (Regulation) Act, 2021 - Commencement of Procedure – Held, for the purpose of non-retrospective application, the 'commencement' of the surrogacy process is defined as the stage where the intending couple has completed the extraction and fertilisation of gametes and has frozen the embryo with the intention of transfer to the womb of the surrogate mother - This stage constitutes the crystallization of the process - The age restriction under Section 4(iii)(c)(I) will not apply if an intending couple had: (i) commenced the surrogacy procedure prior to January 25, 2022; (ii) were at the stage of creation and freezing of embryos after extraction of gametes; and (iii) were on the threshold of transfer of embryos to the uterus of the surrogate mother. Such couples are exempted from seeking certification on the qualifying age. [Relied on A vs. State of Maharashtra, (2024) 6 SCC 32; K. Gopinathan Nair vs. State of Kerala, (1997) 10 SCC 1; Paras 7, 9-18] Arun Muthuvel v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 990 : 2025 INSC 1209
Surrogacy (Regulation) Act, 2021 - Rule Against Retrospectivity – Held, the Act does not contain a manifest intention to apply the age-limits retrospectively. Where a statutory provision which is not expressly made retrospective seeks to affect vested rights and corresponding obligations, such a provision cannot be said to have any retrospective effect by necessary implication - The right to make autonomous decisions regarding the age at which one wished to pursue surrogacy had already vested in the intending couples. Arun Muthuvel v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 990 : 2025 INSC 1209
Tender — Technical Bid Disqualification — 'Haisiyat Praman Patra' (Solvency Certificate) Requirement - Principle of Judicial Review in Tender Matters – Held, neither Clause 18 nor any other condition in the NIT (Notice Inviting Tender) specified that the 'haisiyat praman patra' must be issued only by a District Magistrate in terms of the Uttar Pradesh government notification dated 29.10.2018. Since the terms of an NIT must be clear and unambiguous, if the Mandi Parishad intended for the certificate to be issued by the District Magistrate alone, it ought to have specified so in the NIT conditions - Having failed to specify the issuing authority, the 1st respondent-Mandi Parishad could not have rejected the certificate simply because it was not issued by a District Magistrate - The appellant's certificate was issued by an experienced valuer registered with the Income Tax Department, who is otherwise competent to issue such a certificate - The power of judicial review should only be exercised if the tendering authority's decision is dehors the terms of the NIT or is patently arbitrary - The rejection of the appellant's technical bid on the ground that the certificate was not issued by the District Magistrate was held to be dehors the terms of the NIT and is liable to be quashed - Set aside the order of High Court and remanded the same - Appeal allowed. [Relied on Tata Cellular v. Union of India, (1994) 6 SCC 651; Mohinder Singh Gill & Anr. v. The Chief Election Commissioner, New Delhi & Ors., (1978) 1 SCC 405; Paras 12-18] Kimberley Club Pvt. Ltd. v. Krishi Utpadan Mandi Parishad, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1054 : 2025 INSC 1276
Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (TPA) – Section 53A – Doctrine of Part Performance – Availability of Defence – Readiness and Willingness to Perform – Held, the defence of part performance under Section 53A of the TPA is only available if the transferee proves that he has performed or is willing to perform his part of the contract - Noted that appellant, by refusing the extraordinary monetary award granted by the Court and obstructing the execution of the decree, demonstrated a lack of willingness to perform, thereby disentitling himself to any equitable relief or protection under Section 53A - The Executing Court and the High Court were correct in directing the issuance of warrants of possession with police assistance, as the litigant had exhausted all remedies and was simply attempting to delay the inevitable execution - The maxim Actus Curiae Neminem Gravabit is intended to ensure that no party suffers due to a mistake of the court and must be exercised in furtherance of justice, not to the disadvantage of litigants - The maxim cannot be invoked by a party who seeks to exploit the process of law to perpetuate injustice and retain possession while spurning a court-moulded equitable relief - Appeal dismissed with costs of Rs. 10 Lakhs. [Relied on Shrimant Shamrao Suryavanshi and another vs. Pralhad Bhairoba Suryavanshi (dead) by LRS. And others 2002 3 SCC 676; Jang Singh v. Brij Lal 1963 SCC ONLine SC 219; Paras 6-10, 15, 16] Prem Aggarwal v. Mohan Singh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 996 : 2025 INSC 1214
Transfer of Property Act, 1882 - Section 54 - Agreement to Sell - Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Section 100 - An agreement to sell does not, in itself, create any interest in or charge on the immovable property - A transfer of immovable property by way of sale can only be by a registered deed of conveyance (sale deed) - An agreement to sell, whether with or without possession, is not a conveyance and will not confer any title or transfer any interest in the immovable property (except for the limited right under Section 53-A of the TP Act) - Held that an Agreement to Sell does not confer any title, the property agreed to be sold but for which the sale deed was executed after the owner's death, was still the property of the deceased at the time of death and would be subject to division - When a Court forms the view that no substantial question of law arises for consideration in a Second Appeal, it has no choice but to dismiss the appeal in limine, though it must still give reasons for the dismissal. [Relied on Suraj Lamp & Industries (P) Ltd. (2) v. State of Haryana, (2012) 1 SCC 656; Para 7] Zoharbee v. Imam Khan, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1014 : 2025 INSC 1245
Transfer Petition — Priority in Filing — Substantial Overlap of Issues — Patents Act, 1970, Sections 104, 106, 108 — Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC), Section 25 – Issue - Whether the Suit for Infringement (Delhi Suit) should be transferred to the Bombay High Court, or the Suit for Groundless Threat of Infringement (Bombay Suit) should be transferred to the Delhi High Court - Supreme Court allowed the transfer petition filed by petitioner - The Delhi Suit is transferred to the Bombay High Court to be tried along with the Bombay Suit - Noted that the omission of the proviso from Section 106 of the Patents Act, 1970 (which existed in the pari materia provision in the Indian Patents and Designs Act, 1911) signifies that a suit for groundless threat of Infringement has an independent cause of action from a suit for infringement - Held that Despite the independent cause of action, the questions of fact, law, and issues to be determined in both suits are substantially overlapping - To avoid duplication, multiplicity of proceedings, and the risk of conflicting judgments, it is expedient to transfer the subsequent suit to the court where the prior suit is pending - Transfer petitio allowed. [Relied on Chitivalasa Jute Mills v. Jaypee Rewa Cement, (2004) 3 SCC 85; Paras 9-13] Atomberg Technologies Private Ltd. v. Eureka Forbes Ltd, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1030 : 2025 INSC 1253
Transgender Persons (Protection of Rights) Act, 2019 - Substantive Equality – Reasonable Accommodation – Held, the concept of 'Reasonable Accommodation' is an implied obligation under the 2019 Act and a non-negotiable facet of Substantive Equality under Article 14 of the Constitution – The duty to provide such accommodation, which involves providing additional support to vulnerable persons, applies horizontally to both State and non-State actors – The Court analysed the doctrine through the four-dimensional approach to substantive equality propounded by Sandra Fredman - Horizontal Application of Fundamental Rights – The statutory prohibitions against discrimination in the 2019 Act, particularly Section 3, act as a vehicle for the indirect horizontal application of Fundamental Rights, thereby binding private institutions (like schools/employers) to the constitutional ethos of Articles 14, 15, and 21 – The obligations of equality and non-discrimination bind both State and non-State actors - The failure of the Union and State Governments to implement the mandatory provisions of the 2019 Act and its Rules (such as establishing Welfare Boards, Protection Cells, and designating Complaint Officers) amounts to 'omissive discrimination', violating the fundamental rights of transgender persons – Such inaction is liable for judicial scrutiny - Supreme Court held that transgender persons Act reduced to dead letter and inaction seems intentional. [Relied on National Legal Services Authority v. Union of India & Ors. (2014) 5 SCC 438 (NALSA); Paras 52, 125-127] Jane Kaushik v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1018 : 2025 INSC 1248
Transgender Persons – Held, transgender and gender-diverse persons are not required to seek permission from their employers to undergo gender affirmation or surgical intervention - asserting that the right to self-determination of gender is a matter of personal autonomy and dignity - the employers must be given a reasonable notice, but that should purely be to make the requisite changes and modifications in documents, etc. Jane Kaushik v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1018 : 2025 INSC 1248
Unconditional Stay - Supreme Court laid down the concrete criteria for when unconditional stay may be justified - Held that such a stay is permissible where the order - i. is egregiously perverse; ii. Is riddles with patent illegalities; iii. Is facially untenable and/or; iv. Such other exceptional causes similar in nature. Lifestyle Equities C.V. v. Amazon Technologies Inc., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 974 : 2025 INSC 1190
Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (UAPA) - Section 43B - Arrest - Furnishing of Grounds of Arrest - Constitutional Mandate – Held that the explanation given by the jurisdictional Court at the time of remand, followed by the remand order which indicates that the grounds of arrest were explained, is not sufficient compliance with the mandatory requirement of furnishing the grounds of arrest at the time of securing the accused. Ahmed Mansoor v. State, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1026
Value Added Tax (VAT) - Input Tax Credit (ITC) - Delhi Value Added Tax Act, 2004 (DVAT Act) - Section 9(2)(g) - Entitlement of Purchasing Dealer when Selling Dealer Fails to Deposit Tax - Whether the benefit of Input Tax Credit (ITC) is available to registered purchaser dealers who paid taxes to registered seller dealer(s) through valid invoices, even though the seller dealer(s) did not deposit the collected tax with the Government – Held, the Input Tax Credit (ITC) on goods purchased from registered dealers cannot be denied to bona fide purchasers merely because the seller failed to deposit - There is no dispute that the selling dealer was registered on the date of transaction and neither the transactions nor invoices were doubted, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeals, finding no good reason to interfere with the High Court's order directing the grant of ITC benefit after due verification. [Relied on Quest Merchandising India Pvt. Ltd. vs. Government of NCT of Delhi and Ors., 2017 SCC OnLine Delhi 13037; Paras 3-7] Commissioner Trade and Tax Delhi v. Shanti Kiran India (P) Ltd; 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1008
Voice Sample Test - Power of Magistrate to Direct a Witness to Give Voice Sample - Criminal Procedure Code (Cr.P.C.) – Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS), 2023 – Constitution of India, Article 20(3) - Rule against Self-Incrimination – Held, the Magistrate has the power to order any person (not just an accused) to give a voice sample for the purpose of investigation - Reiterated that compelling a person to give a specimen handwriting, signature, finger impression, or a voice sample does not amount to 'testimonial compulsion' and thus does not violate the protection against self-incrimination under Article 20(3) - These samples are considered "material evidence" for comparison, not oral or documentary testimony which would, by itself, have the tendency to incriminate the accused - Held that CrPC lacked an explicit provision, whereas precedents conceded the power to the Judicial Magistrate to order a voice sample by adopting the identical principle from Kathi Kalu Case, which dealt with handwriting, signature and finger impressions - This power was conceded to the Magistrate until explicit provisions were incorporated - With the advent of the Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS), 2023, Section 349 now specifically incorporates the provision empowering the Magistrate to direct a person to provide a voice sample - Held that whether the CrPC or BNSS is applicable, the Magistrate was empowered to pass the order. [Relied on Ritesh Sinha v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr. (2019) 8 SCC 1; State of Bombay v. Kathi Kalu Oghad (AIR 1961 SC 1808); Paras 4-11] Rahul Agarwal v. State of West Bengal, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1002 : 2025 INSC 1223
Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 - Section 19 – Liability of Insurer – Compensation Claim – Scope of Commissioner's power – Whether an insurer can be made jointly and severally liable with the employer despite the absence of a provision like Section 149 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 – Held, the issue is no longer res integra and stands settled by the decision in Gottumukkala Appala Narasimha Raju - The Commissioner has the power to determine the liability of a person who is required to indemnify the employer - The 1923 Act is a social welfare legislation, and its object is to provide a speedy and efficacious remedy to the workman - While Section 3 fixes liability on the employer, excluding the insurer from being jointly and severally liable, where the liability is covered by insurance, would have a deleterious effect and render the remedy illusory - If the insurer is only liable to reimburse the employer, the workman would be left without compensation if the employer fails to pay due to financial incapacity - By virtue of the power to determine liability under Section 19, the Commissioner has the power to make the insurer jointly and severally liable with the employer to pay compensation if it falls within the scope of the contract of insurance - The High Court's modification, substituting the direction to the insurer to pay with a direction to the employer to pay and seek reimbursement, was held to be unjustified - The appropriate course was to make the employer and the insurer jointly and severally liable - Appeal allowed. [Relied on Gottumukkala Appala Narasimha Raju and others v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. [(2007) 13 SCC 446; Mahendra Rai vs. United India Insurance Company Ltd. & Anr. (Civil Appeal No.6697 of 2014; Paras 10-20] Alok Kumar Ghosh v. New India Assurance Company Ltd; 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1022 : 2025 INSC 1239
Writ Petition - High Court Jurisdiction & Propriety - Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) for Rallies – Supreme Court expressed concern and sought an explanation from the Registrar (Judicial) of the Madras High Court as to how a Writ Petition (Criminal) was entertained for the relief of framing SOP/Guidelines for political rallies, which affects the general public at large, and why such matters were not treated as Public Interest Litigation (PIL) and listed before a Division Bench - Noted the impropriety of a Single Judge entertaining a matter, the cause of action of which (Karur stampede) fell under the jurisdiction of the Madurai Bench, without the Chief Justice's order, especially when similar matters were pending before the Division Bench in Madurai. Tamilaga Vettri Kazhagam v. P.H. Dinesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 999 : 2025 INSC 1224