Property Laws - Supreme Court Annual Digest 2025

Adoption and Property Rights - Doctrine of Relation Back - The appellant was adopted by defendant No.1, on 16.07.1994, after the death of her husband. The appellant claimed a half share in the suit schedule properties, arguing that he became the legal heir upon adoption. Held, under Section 12(c) of the Act an adopted child cannot divest any person of any estate that vested before the adoption. The court applied the "Doctrine of Relation Back," which states that adoption by a widow relates back to the date of the death of the adoptive father, creating an immediate coparcenary interest in the joint property. However, lawful alienations made by the widow before the adoption are binding on the adopted child. The court upheld the validity of the sale deed executed by defendant No.1 in favor of defendant Nos.2 and 3, as the alienation was made after defendant No.1 had become the absolute owner of the property. The appellant's challenge to the sale deed was dismissed. The court declared the gift deed executed by defendant No.1 in favor of defendant Nos.4 and 5 as null and void. The court found that the gift deed lacked the necessary prerequisites for a valid gift, such as delivery and acceptance of the property. The trial court's decision to grant the appellant the entire 'B' and 'C' schedule properties as the sole legal heir of defendant No.1 was restored. Sri Mahesh v. Sangram, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 6

Agreement to Lease - An agreement to lease does not automatically confer leasehold rights until a formal lease deed is executed. Where the Delhi Development Authority ("DDA") executed an agreement to lease in 1957 but a formal lease deed was never executed, and the property was subsequently sold through liquidation proceedings, the auction purchaser acquired only those rights, if any, held under the agreement to lease. The auction sale, conducted on an "as is where is" basis, did not confer ownership or leasehold rights upon the auction purchaser. The DDA retained the right to pursue remedies for possession and unearned income, and that any regularization of the transaction would require the auction purchaser to apply to the DDA and for the DDA to consider such application in accordance with law. Funds held in liquidation proceedings could not be appropriated for unearned income payments without considering the claims of other creditors, particularly where the liquidation was still ongoing. (Para 10 - 16) Delhi Development Authority v. S.G.G. Towers (P) Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 306 : 2025 INSC 337

Agreement to Sale – Suppression of Encumbrance – Refund of Advance – Suit for refund of advance money decreed in favour of the purchaser where the seller suppressed the existence of a prior mortgage - Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgment and restored the Trial Court's decree and held that the fraudulent suppression of encumbrances on the property in an agreement to sell constitutes a valid ground for refund of advance payment - Held that High Court laid "undue emphasis" on an abstract sentence in cross-examination suggesting the appellant had knowledge of the bank liability on August 25, 2008 - This was "totally misplaced" as the parties had no interaction prior to September 2008, a fact admitted by the respondent himself - The respondent's failure to reply to a legal notice alleging concealment and his subsequent agreement to reduce the sale price by ₹35 Lakhs were significant reflections of "deceit practiced by him" - Held that it is common practice for landowners to keep original title deeds in bank lockers. Therefore, the appellant's explanation for not insisting on inspecting original deeds at the time of the agreement (where only 10% of the consideration was paid) was "reasonable and justified" - Held that the Trial Court committed no error in decreeing the suit. The High Court's judgment was set aside. [Paras 29-32] Moideenkutty v. Abraham George, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1207 : 2025 INSC 1428

Alimony & Property Settlement – Held, alimony received after first divorce was not a relevant factor to determine the alimony payable after the divorce of the second marriage - The respondent's claim for Rs. 12 crores in permanent alimony and encumbrance-free ownership of the apartment as unjustified, considering that appellant-husband is an unemployed person and has responsibility of an autistic child - Appeal allowed. [Para 17, 20] A v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 773 : 2025 INSC 926

Article 300A – Compensation – Delay in Determination and Disbursal – Held, the appellants were deprived of their legitimate compensation for over 22 years due to the inaction and lethargy of the State and Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Board (KIADB). The delay violated the appellants' constitutional right under Article 300-A, which guarantees the right to property, mandating adequate and timely compensation for deprivation of property. The Court found that despite the statutory framework requiring prompt disbursal, the compensation was determined only in 2019 after contempt proceedings were initiated, using the market value from 2011 as the base. It was held that awarding compensation at the 2003 market value would result in gross injustice and render Article 300-A meaningless. In exercise of its powers under Article 142, the Supreme Court directed the Special Land Acquisition Officer (SLAO) to determine compensation based on the market value as of April 22, 2019, along with statutory benefits under the 1894 Land Acquisition Act. Additionally, the judgment and orders of the High Court's Division Bench were set aside, and the appellants' writ petition was allowed. The Court clarified that the inter se dispute between the State, KIADB, and Respondents 6 and 7 regarding the delay in compensation payment must be resolved as per the agreements between them, without affecting the appellants' entitlement. Respondents 6 and 7 were granted liberty to pursue remedies in law if aggrieved. Appeals allowed; fresh award to be determined within two months based on the 2019 market value; statutory benefits to be provided. Bernard Francis Joseph Vaz v. Government of Karnataka, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 2 : (2025) 7 SCC 580

Article 300A (Right to Property) - Freedom to Sell Property - Immovable Property Transactions - The constitutionally protected right to own immovable property inherently includes the freedom to freely acquire, possess, and dispose of it at will - Courts must balance the freedom to buy and sell property with the Governmental duty to ensure integrity in transactions - A requirement in rules/regulations that impedes or restrains easy and effective transfer of property is illegal, as it has the direct effect of 'depriving of property' and such delays impinge on the right to hold and dispose of property. [Paras 29, 30] Samiullah v. State of Bihar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1071 : 2025 INSC 1292

Article 300A - Delay in filing an appeal against a land acquisition compensation award does not justify denying landowners just, fair, and reasonable compensation. The Court allowed the appeal filed after a 4908-day (13.5-year) delay, overturning the High Court's dismissal for refusing to condone the delay. Emphasizing Article 300A of the Constitution, which guarantees the right to property and mandates fair compensation for land acquired under eminent domain, the Court reiterated a liberal approach to condoning delays in land acquisition cases, especially considering factors like poverty and illiteracy of land losers. However, no interest on compensation is payable for the delayed period. The case was remanded to the High Court for fresh consideration, excluding the issue of delay, with no interest awarded for the condoned delay period. [Paras 11 & 13] Suresh Kumar v. State of Haryana, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 473 : 2025 INSC 550

Article 300A - Right to Property - Deprivation without Compensation - Issuance of Pattadar Passbook vested property rights - Resumption of land for public purpose (DIET building) without due process or compensation violated Article 300A – “No compensation” clauses in assignments unconstitutional per Mekala Pandu, 2004 SCC OnLine AP 217 – Appellants entitled to market value compensation. (Para 121 - 125) Yerikala Sunkalamma v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 344 : 2025 INSC 383

Conditions in property transfers involving senior citizens - Tribunal's Power - Whether the High Court was correct in setting aside the Tribunal's order granting relief under Section 23 - Held, the Act is a welfare-oriented statute aimed at protecting the rights of senior citizens. It must be interpreted liberally to further its objectives. For a property transfer to be void under Section 23, it must be shown that the transfer was conditional upon the transferee maintaining the transferor and that the transferee failed to fulfill these conditions. The Court noted the appellant's allegations of neglect and abuse by the respondent, holding that such behavior violated the conditions implied in the Gift Deed and related promissory note. The Court reaffirmed the Tribunal's authority under the Act to cancel property transfers and order possession transfer if necessary to protect senior citizens. The appeal was allowed, setting aside the Division Bench judgment of the High Court, and the respondent was directed to restore possession of the property to the appellant. It restored the orders of the Single Judge and the Tribunal, quashing the Gift Deed executed by the appellant in favor of the respondent. The judgment reinforced the Act's purpose of providing senior citizens with simple, expedient remedies against neglect or abuse. Tribunal Powers. Urmila Dixit v. Sunil Sharan Dixit, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 3 : (2025) 2 SCC 787

Homebuyers cannot be forced to accept possession of a property after an undue delay and are entitled to a refund if the unit is not delivered within the agreed timeframe. (Para 14) Nagpur Housing and Area Development Board v. Manohar Burde, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 360 : 2025 INSC 398

Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007 (2007 Act) - Section 22-24 – Held, the Tribunal under the 2007 Act, has the power to order the eviction of a child from the property of the senior citizen, if there is a breach of obligation to maintain senior citizen - The High Court erred in allowing the appeal on the ground that the respondent was also a senior citizen as per Section 2(h) of the 2007 Act because at the time of filing the application before the Tribunal, the respondent was not yet a senior citizen (Respondent's age was 59 years at that time) - The relevant date is the date of filing of the application - 2007 Act being a welfare legislation should be construed liberally to advance its beneficent purpose of protecting senior citizens - It is well settled that the Tribunal can order eviction of a child or relative from the property of the senior citizen where there is a breach of obligation to maintain the senior citizen - The respondent, despite being financially sound, did not allow the appellant to reside in his properties, thereby frustrating the object of the Act - High Court's decision was untenable and erroneous - Appeal allowed. [Paras 6, 7] Kamalakant Mishra v. Additional Collector, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 947

Matruka Property (Inheritance) - Held that Matruka property is the property (both movable and immovable) left by a deceased Muslim - It simply refers to property left behind by the deceased person and nothing more - The scheme for distribution of matruka property first requires separating the part covered by a valid will (maximum one-third of the total matruka, and not in favor of an heir without other heirs' consent) - The balance is distributable among heirs as per Mohammedan Law rules of intestate succession – Held, the scheme for distribution of matruka property first requires separating the part covered by a valid will (maximum one-third of the total matruka, and not in favor of an heir without other heirs' consent) - Sharers are entitled to a prescribed share of the inheritance and wife being a sharer is entitled to 1/8th the share but where there is no child or child of a son how low so ever, the share to which the wife is entitled is 1/4th. [Relied on Trinity Infraventures Ltd. v. M.S. Murthy, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 738; Paras 8-15] Zoharbee v. Imam Khan, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1014 : 2025 INSC 1245

Power of Karta to alienate Joint Family Property - Legal necessity - Onus to proof - Supreme Court reiterated that the Karta of a Hindu undivided Family (HUF) has the power to alienate joint family property for legal necessity or benefit of estate, and such sale binds the interests of all undivided members, including minors and widows - The discretion of the Karta in determining legal necessity is wide and each case turns into its facts - Noted that family necessities may include payment of government revenue, marriage expenses (of male coparceners or daughters), maintenance, necessary litigation to recover property, funeral expenses, and debts for family business - The existence of legal necessity must be judged on the facts and circumstances of each case - Appeal allowed. [Paras 11, 20, 21] Dastagirsab v. Sharanappa @ Shivasharanappa, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 915 : 2025 INSC 1120

Partition of Joint Family Property – Self-Acquired Property – Whether the suit property, acquired by Defendant No. 1 post-partition, was ancestral (joint family) or self-acquired property. Held, upon partition of joint Hindu family property, shares allotted to coparceners become their self-acquired property, with absolute rights to sell, transfer, or bequeath. No presumption exists that property is joint family property merely due to the existence of a joint Hindu family; the claimant must prove it is joint family property, typically by showing a joint family nucleus used for its acquisition. Ancestral property is limited to that inherited from paternal ancestors within three generations. The doctrine of blending requires clear intention by the owner to relinquish self-acquired property into the joint family pool; mere use by family members or acts of generosity do not suffice. Here, Defendant No. 1's purchase of his brother's share post-partition, using a loan and not joint family funds, established the property as self-acquired. The subsequent sale to the Appellants was valid. The High Court's judgment, invalidating the sale by misapplying the doctrine of blending and overlooking evidence of independent acquisition, was set aside. Appeal allowed; suit property held to be self-acquired by Defendant No. 1, and sale to Appellants upheld. (Paras 13 - 20) Angadi Chandranna v. Shankar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 494 : 2025 INSC 532

Partnership Act, 1932; Section 14 - A contribution made by the partner to the partnership firm becomes the firm's property and neither the partner nor his legal heirs would have an exclusive right over the firm's property after the partner's death or retirement except the share in profit in proportion to the contribution made in partnership firm. No formal document is required to be made for transferring the property to the partnership firm, as the transfer occurs by virtue of the partner's contribution to the firm. However, a relinquishment deed could be made to formalise the transfer of property to the partnership firm. (Para 14 - 16) Sachin Jaiswal v. Hotel Alka Raje, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 342 : 2025 INSC 275

Property Rights - Unlawful Occupation - Held, Writ jurisdiction under Article 226 is discretionary and can be exercised in exceptional cases to address prolonged injustice, despite the availability of alternative remedies. The High Court erred in dismissing a writ petition seeking recovery of flats unlawfully occupied by the Maharashtra Police Department since 1940, without rent payment since 2008, by citing the availability of a civil suit. The rule of exclusion of writ jurisdiction due to alternative remedies is a rule of discretion, not compulsion. The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgment, criticizing its failure to consider the 84-year unlawful occupation, likely initiated by forcible taking during British rule in the 1940s. The Court directed the Deputy Commissioner of Police to file an affidavit undertaking to vacate the flats within four months and hand over possession to the appellants. Appeal allowed; Maharashtra Police Department ordered to vacate the flats within four months. Neha Chandrakant Shroff v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 430 : 2025 INSC 484

Property Settlement - Stamp Duty Exemption - Where parties in a transfer petition for divorce, referred to mediation, reached a mutual agreement to dissolve their marriage and settle their property dispute, the Supreme Court, exercising its powers under Article 142 of the Constitution of India, directed the dissolution of the marriage by mutual consent. The Court further directed the transfer of absolute ownership of a jointly owned flat to the wife, waiving stamp duty on registration, relying on Section 17(2)(vi) of the Registration Act, 1908, which exempts registration fees for decrees or orders of the Court, except compromises involving immovable property outside the subject matter of the proceedings. As the flat was the subject of the compromise within the proceedings, the exemption applied. The Court also directed the Sub-Registrar to register the flat in the wife's name without any encumbrances, and the wife waived her right to alimony. (Para 6 & 7) Arun Rameshchand Arya v. Parul Singh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 305

Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016 - Safeguarding the interests of homebuyers - Supreme Court directed every residential real estate transaction for new housing projects shall be registered with local revenue authorities upon payment of at least 20% of the property cost by buyer - To protect senior citizens and bona fide homebuyers, contracts that significantly deviate from the Model RERA agreement to sell, or that incorporate returns/buyback clauses where the allottee is over the age of 50, must be supported by an affidavit sworn before the competent Revenue Authority, certifying that the allottee understands the attendant risks - Held that in projects at nascent stages, 2 such as where land is yet to be acquired or construction has not commenced, proceed from allottees shall be placed in an escrow account and disbursed in phases aligned with project progress, as per a RERA-sanctioned SOP - Every RERA shall devise such SOPs within 6 months. [Paras 21] Mansi Brar Fernandes v. Shubha Sharma, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 903 : 2025 INSC 1110

Revenue Recovery Act, 1864 (Tamil Nadu) – Challenge to Public Auction Sale – Non-compliance with statutory remedy and limitation period - Sections 37-A and 38 - Noted that Sections 37-A and 38 provide a complete mechanism for setting aside a sale of immovable property, either by depositing the due amount or by challenging material irregularity, mistake, or fraud. Both provisions prescribe a mandatory limitation period of 30 days from the date of sale- Supreme Court found that the appellant admittedly failed to file any application under these sections within the prescribed 30-day limitation period, despite the auction sale occurring on July 29, 2005- The belated challenge, raised after more than four years, was held to be impermissible- Supreme Court clarified that there was no order staying the conduct of the auction itself, only the confirmation- The stay on confirmation does not suspend the statutory obligation to seek redress within 30 days as per Sections 37A or 38 of the Act- Appeal dismissed. [Relied on Lily Thomas v. Union of India 2000 6 SCC 224; Paras 16-18, 22-25] Kolanjiammal v. Revenue Divisional Officer Perambalur District, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1108 : 2025 INSC 1319

Self-Acquired Property - A 75-year-old appellant sought eviction of his son and daughter-in-law (Respondents 8 and 9) from his selfacquired property, used as a rest house, alleging encroachment, harassment, and threats of false criminal cases - Maintenance Tribunal ordered eviction; Single Judge upheld, but Division Bench set aside, suggesting rent determination - Held, Tribunal has authority under the Act to order eviction to ensure senior citizens' maintenance and protection, as affirmed by S. Vanitha v. Deputy Commissioner and Rule 21 (2) (i) of the Bihar Senior Citizens Rules, 2012 - Property was self-acquired, not ancestral - Respondents' worsening behavior justified eviction - The appeal was allowed, and the Division Bench's order was set aside. The Tribunal's eviction order was restored. (Para 10 – 12) Rajeswar Prasad Roy v. State of Bihar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 418

Suit for Partition and Separate Possession - Validity and Effect of Release Deeds – Admissibility of Unregistered Partition Deed (Palupatti) for Collateral Purposes – Computation of Shares under Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (Unamended Section 6) – Held, a registered relinquishment deed releasing share of a coparcener in the joint family property, operates immediately regardless of its implementation - Supreme Court set aside the concurrent findings of the High Court and Trial court, which refused to consider the Appellant's exclusive share in the suit property, despite there being a registered relinquishment deeds by Appellant's two brothers releasing their respective shares in Appellant's favor, and a subsequent family settlement (palupatti) in 1972, which formally recorded the separation of the remaining coparceners and delineated their respective shares, which had been independently managed ever since - A family arrangement recorded in writing, when relied upon only to explain how the parties thereafter held and enjoyed the properties, does not require registration for that limited collateral use - Appeal allowed. [Relied on Elumalai v. M. Kamala [(2023) 13 SCC 27; Thulasidhara v. Narayanappa [(2019) 6 SCC 409; Paras 7-9] P. Anjanappa v. A.P. Nanjundappa, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1074 : 2025 INSC 1286

Suit for possession - Void v. Voidable document – Held, an instrument of sale is not executed by the owner, it is void ab initio and considered a nullity - If a sale deed is executed without the payment of price, it is not a sale at all in the eyes of law, and would be void - In such a case, the owner is not required to seek cancellation of the instrument or a declaration that it is void - A suit for possession based on title can be filed, and it will governed by Article 65 of the Limitation Act, which provides a limitation period of 12 years from the date the defendant's possession becomes adverse to the plaintiff - Article 59, which provides a 3 year limitation period, applies to fraudulent transactions that are voidable, not void - High Court erred in applying Article 59 of the Limitation Act - When sale deed is void, suit possession governed by limitation period of 12 years under Article 65 instead of Article 59 - Appeal allowed. [Paras 28-31; 34, 39, 40] Shanti Devi v. Jagan Devi, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 900 : 2025 INSC 1105

Title through Court Auction - Validity of Subsequent Sale –The court auction sale on 04.05.1962, conducted while Somasundaram was alive, and the subsequent sale deed on 25.09.1963 vested absolute title in Padmini. Somasundaram's will (30.05.1962) could not override this, as he no longer held title at his death on 14.06.1962. Since the property was sold via court auction before the will's execution took effect, Defendant No. 1 inherited no rights, making the 1992 sale deeds to Defendant Nos. 3 to 6 void. Padmini's will (30.09.1975) explicitly bequeathed the Plaint Schedule to Vinayagamurthy and his children, not the Trust. Thus, the Trust had no claim to the property. The court justified moulding relief in favor of the executor (H.B.N. Shetty) to execute Padmini's will, citing judicial discretion to shorten litigation and ensure justice. Given the age of the surviving executor and the death of others, requiring a fresh suit would be unjust. The appellants (Defendant Nos. 3 to 6) were not prejudiced, as they fully contested the title issue. Under Article 136, the Supreme Court found no error in the High Court's exercise of discretion, emphasizing that moulding relief was appropriate to implement Padmini's testamentary intent without prolonging litigation. (Para 24) J. Ganapatha v. N. Selvarajalou Chetty Trust, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 353 : 2025 INSC 395

Validity of an oral gift (Hiba) - Succession rights - Limitation pertaining to declaratory suits regarding immovable property – Held, an oral gift (hiba) under the Muslim Law cannot be projected as a “surprise instrument” to stake claims over a property - To constitute, a valid Hiba, all its necessary ingredients - i. declaration by donor, ii. acceptance by donee and iii. taking possession of land - are done publicly rather than secretly - Oral gift (hiba) is permissible in Mohammedan law, the evidence of acting under the gift - such as collecting rent, holding title, or effecting mutation is essential to substantiate the claim of possession - Oral gift was not proved by contemporaneous delivery of possession - The registered sale deeds and mutations carry presumption of validity and unchallenged possession by the defendants - Lack of effecting mutation in revenue records can be a crucial factor invalidating such a claim of gift, in the absence of other evidence of possession - Set aside order - Appeal allowed. [Relied on: Mansoor Saheb v. Salima 2023 SCC OnLine SC 3809; Rasheeda Khatoon v. Ashiq Ali, (2014) 10 SCC 459; Paras 34-42, 49] Dharmrao Sharanappa Shabadi v. Syeda Arifa Parveen, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 973 : 2025 INSC 1187

Voidable transaction - Repudiation by Minor – Held, disposal of immovable property by a natural guardian in contravention of sub-Section (1) or sub-Section (2) of Section 8 (i.e., without the previous permission of the court) is voidable at the instance of the minor or any person claiming under him - It is not mandatory for a minor, upon attaining majority, to file a suit for the cancellation of a sale deed executed by their natural guardian in contravention of Section 8(2) of the Act - A voidable transaction executed by the guardian of the minor can be repudiated and ignored by the minor within the prescribed time on attaining majority either by instituting a suit for setting aside the voidable transaction or by repudiating the same by his unequivocal conduct - Avoidance or repudiation by conduct is permissible because - i. The minor may not be aware of the transaction and thus not in a position to institute a suit; ii. The transaction may not have been given effect to, and the party acquiring the right may not have possession, giving the impression that the property is intact in the minor's hands, making a suit seem unnecessary - Transferring the property himself on attaining majority within the prescribed time period is an example of an implied repudiation by conduct - Noted that such an act is sufficient to repudiate the earlier sale deed executed by the father/guardian - The effect of avoidance is that the voidable transaction becomes void from its very inception, and the avoidance relates back to the date of the transaction - Appeal allowed. [Relied on Madhegowda vs Ankegowda (2002) 1 SCC 178; G. Annamalai Pillai vs District Revenue Officer and Ors. (1993) 2 SCC 402; Paras 11-14, 22, 32, 34] K.S. Shivappa v. K. Neelamma, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 981 : 2025 INSC 1195

Whether a tribal woman or her legal heirs are entitled to an equal share in her ancestral property - Trial Court and High Court dismissed the suit filed by appellant (heirs of a tribal woman) citing that mother had no right in her father's property as members of Scheduled Tribe are not governed by the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 as per section 2(2) and nothing proved by custom - This Court Held - Exclusion of female from inheritance is unreasonable and discriminatory - that Hindu Succession Act is not applicable to the Scheduled Tribes, it does not mean that tribal women are automatically excluded from inheritance - it needs to be seen by Court whether there exists any prevailing custom restricting the female tribal right to share in the ancestral property - In this case parties could not establish the existence of any custom which excluded women from inheritance - Customs are too like the law, cannot remain stuck in time and others cannot be allowed to take refuge in customs or hide behind them to deprive others - Held in absence of any specific tribal custom or codified law prohibiting women's right, courts must apply “justice, equity and good conscience” - Where there is no custom prohibiting succession to women, still denying them succession is in violation of Article 14, 15 read with Articles 38 and 46, ensuring that there is no discrimination against women. Held legal heirs of tribal woman entitled to share in the property, set aside order of High Court. Appeal allowed. [Relied on Western U.P. Electric Power and Supply Co. ltd. v. State of U.P., (1969) 1 SCC 817; Para 13, 19, 20, 21] Ram Charan v. Sukhram, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 717 : 2025 INSC 865

Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988

Partition Suit - Exception Pleaded - A partition suit seeking division of joint family property cannot be dismissed under Order VII Rule 11 CPC at the preliminary stage when the plaintiff invokes an exception to the Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988. Rejection of a plaint under Order VII Rule 11(d) requires the suit to be manifestly barred by law without requiring evidence. However, determining whether properties are benami or joint family assets involves factual inquiries, such as the source of funds and family arrangements, necessitating a trial. When an exception to the Benami Act is pleaded, the plaint cannot be rejected at the pleading stage, as it raises disputed questions of fact requiring evidence-based adjudication. The Supreme Court dismissed the appellants' challenge to the trial court and High Court's refusal to reject the plaint, upholding the continuation of the partition suit for trial to resolve factual disputes regarding the nature of the property. Appeal dismissed; plaint upheld for trial. (Para 28) Shaifali Gupta v. Vidya Devi Gupta, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 604 : 2025 INSC 739

High Court cannot reject a plaint while exercising its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution, as this power is limited to ensuring courts/tribunals act within their jurisdiction - The Court set aside the High Court's decision to reject a plaint as barred by the Prohibition of Benami Property Transactions Act, emphasizing that such rejection is a function of the trial court under Order VII Rule 11 of the Civil Procedure Code (CPC), appealable under Section 96 - Article 227 cannot be used to usurp the trial court's original jurisdiction or bypass statutory remedies under the CPC - The Court criticized procedural shortcuts by an overburdened judiciary, stating they undermine the rule of law and procedural safeguards. (Paras 8 - 10) K. Valarmathi v. Kumaresan, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 515 : 2025 INSC 606

Conveyance

A lessee seeking conveyance of property must fulfill all statutory and contractual obligations, including payment of costs, to enforce such a claim. Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai v. Century Textiles and Industries Ltd; 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 34

Obligation to Convey - Whether the Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai (MCGM) was obligated to convey the leasehold property (Block-A) to Century Textiles and Industries Limited (Respondent No. 1) upon the expiration of the 28-year lease under the Bombay Improvement Trust Transfer Act, 1925. Century Textiles applied in 1918 under the City of Bombay Improvement Act, 1898, for a scheme to construct dwellings for poorer classes. The scheme was approved, and Century Textiles constructed 476 dwellings and 10 shops by 1925, less than the originally planned 980 dwellings and 20 shops. In 1927, Century Textiles requested an alteration to the scheme, which was approved by the Board, and a 28-year lease for Block-A was granted in 1928, expiring in 1955. After the lease expired, Century Textiles continued in possession of Block-A without any demand for conveyance until 2006, when it issued a legal notice. No suit was filed, and in 2016, Century Textiles filed a writ petition seeking conveyance of Block-A. The High Court allowed the writ petition, directing MCGM to execute the conveyance. MCGM appealed to the Supreme Court. Held, neither the lease deed nor the Board Resolution of 1927 obligated MCGM to convey Block-A to Century Textiles upon the expiration of the lease. The lease deed did not contain any clause mandating conveyance, and the Board Resolution did not approve the conveyance of Block-A. Section 51(2) of the 1925 Act, which provides for conveyance upon the expiration of the lease, must be read harmoniously with Section 48(a), which requires the lessee to leave the premises in good condition. The conveyance under Section 51(2) is contingent upon the lessee fulfilling its obligations, including payment of costs, which Century Textiles failed to do. Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai v. Century Textiles and Industries Ltd; 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 34

Registration Act, 1908

Property was partitioned orally in 1968 and subsequent registered sale deeds executed in 1978. Predecessors never challenged the partition or sale deeds during their lifetime. Held, party interested in property deemed to know about sale deed from registration date. Registered documents provide constructive notice, and a suit filed decades later without evidence of recent knowledge is barred by limitation. Plaintiffs' failure to address prior knowledge of the sale deeds and the long delay rendered the suit vexatious and meritless. The Trial Court correctly dismissed the suit, and the High Court erred in remanding it, as no triable issues existed. (Para 13 & 17) Uma Devi v. Anand Kumar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 382 : 2025 INSC 434 : [2025] 4 SCR 521 : (2025) 5 SCC 198

Presumptive Titling System - Future Reforms – Held, Indian property law sustains a dichotomy between registration and ownership - The Registration Act, 1908, mandates the registration of documents, not titles, forming the cornerstone of India's presumptive titling system. Registration creates a public record with presumptive evidentiary value, but it is never a conclusive proof of ownership - This presumption is rebuttable - Supreme Court noted the promise in emerging technologies such as Blockchain for transforming land registration into a more secure, transparent, and tamper-proof system - The Law Commission is requested to examine the issue of integrating the property registration regime with conclusive titling and restructuring existing laws, considering technological advancement. [Paras 32-34, 37, 38; K. Gopi v. Sub-Registrar and Others 2025 INSC 462] Samiullah v. State of Bihar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1071 : 2025 INSC 1292

Registration Rules, 2008 (Bihar) - Section 69, Rule 19 (xvii) and (xviii) - Constitutional Law - Right to Property - Subordinate Legislation - Ultra Vires - Dichotomy between Registration and Title – Held, the impugned sub-rules are ultra vires the rule-making power under Section 69 of the Registration Act, 1908 - Section 69, or any other provision of the Act, does not enable the Inspector General to make rules requiring the declaration or enclosure of proof of mutation in favor of the vendor as a condition precedent for registration - The existing grounds for refusal under Rule 19 (i) to (xv) relate to the identity of the property or the executant, or legal requirements (like fee/POA), and have no relation to proof of title - The impugned sub-rules are "qualitatively distinct" as they introduce 'mentioning' with 'proof' of a transaction under another statute (Bihar Land Mutation Act, 2011) as a precondition - The impugned sub-rules are arbitrary and illegal because they unduly restrict the constitutional right to acquire, possess, and dispose of immovable property - The interlinking of registration with mutation is illegal given the nascent stage of the mutation, survey, and settlement processes in Bihar (as acknowledged in the Bihar Special Survey and Settlement Act, 2011), where land records/Jamabandi are nowhere near completion. [Paras 11,12, 16, 17, 25, 29, 38] Samiullah v. State of Bihar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1071 : 2025 INSC 1292

Section 11 (5) - Maharashtra Ownership Flats (Regulation of the Promotion of Construction, Sale, Management and Transfer Act) 1963 (“MOFA”); Section 11(4) - Deemed Conveyance - Writ Court Interference - Scope of powers of the registration officer - Held, the competent authority under the MOFA has the power to grant deemed conveyance to flat purchasers when developers fail to execute formal conveyance. The MOFA, as welfare legislation, protects flat buyers from developer malpractices. High Courts, exercising writ jurisdiction, should refrain from interfering with deemed conveyance orders under Section 11(4) unless manifestly illegal, as such orders do not preclude aggrieved parties from pursuing civil suits. The competent authority's proceedings are summary in nature, requiring reasoned orders, and the registering officer's role is limited, with no appellate power over such orders. The appeal was dismissed, affirming the High Court's decision upholding deemed conveyance to a co-operative housing society. (Para 35 & 37) Arunkumar H Shah Huf v. Avon Arcade Premises Co-Operative Society, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 447 : 2025 INSC 524 : (2025) 7 SCC 249

Section 17(1)(e) — Deed Assigning Decree for Specific Performance of Agreement of Sale of Immovable Property — Whether such a deed requires compulsory registration - A deed assigning a decree for specific performance of an agreement of sale of immovable property is not compulsorily registrable under Section 17(1)(e) of the Registration Act, 1908 - The assignment deed in this case did not require registration because the decree itself, which is for specific performance, does not create or purport to create any right, title, or interest in any immovable property. [Relied on Babu Lal vs. M/s Hazari Lal Kishori Lal and others [(1982) 1 SCC 525; Suraj Lamp & Industries (P) Limited (2) through Director vs. State of Haryana and Another [(2012) 1 SCC 656; Paras 21, 25-28] Rajeswari v. Shanmugam, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1122 : 2025 INSC 1329

Sections 23, 34 – Unregistered Sale Agreement – Validity of Title – Subsequent Registration – Held, an unregistered sale agreement does not confer valid title, even if a subsequent instrument based on it is registered. Nonregistration of the 1982 sale agreement, as required under the Registration Act, cannot be cured by validation in 2006 without a fresh transaction. Section 23 mandates presentation of a document for registration within four months from its execution, with Section 34 allowing condonation of delay for an additional four months upon payment of a fine. The unregistered 1982 agreement is incapable of conferring title, and the High Court erred in granting protection from dispossession based on it. Appeal allowed; High Court's decision set aside. (Para 22) Mahnoor Fatima Imran v. Visweswara Infrastructure, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 679 : 2025 INSC 646

Sections 32(a), 32(c) - Persons to present documents for registration - Section 33 - POA recognizable for purposes of section 32 - Section 34 - enquiry before registration by registering officer - Section 35 – Issue - Whether a person executing a document under a Power of Attorney (POA) is considered the “executant' under section 32(a), enabling direct presentation for registration. Held - Court disagreed with finding given in Rajni Tandon v. Dulal Ranjan Ghosh Dastidar and another (2009) 14 SCC 782 that a power of attorney holder authorized to execute a document becomes the “executant” under section 32(a) of the Act - that POA holder executes and signs a document on behalf of the Principal and not in their own capacity and thus the principal remains the true 'executant' - POA holder acts as an 'agent' under section 32(c) of the Act, not as the “person executing” under section 32(a) - 'person executing' means a person actually executing the document and includes a principal who executes by means of an agent - Registering officers have a duty under section 34(3) to inquire whether the document was truly executed by purported persons, verify identities and confirm the agent's authority - noted that allowing a notarized or unregistered POA to bypass these stringent checks treating the agent as the 'executant' would create an “incongruous situation” - POA holder does not lose his status as an agent of that principal and become 'executant' in his own right - such an agent would therefore, continue to be covered by section 32(c) of the Act and must necessarily satisfy the requirements of sections 32(c), 33, 34, 35 of the Act. Court referred matter to a larger bench. [Para 8-10, 12-15, 17] G. Kalawathi Bai v. G. Shashikala, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 706 : 2025 INSC 851

Section 49 - Admissibility of an unregistered agreement to sell as evidence in a suit for specific performance – Held, an unregistered agreement to sell is admissible as evidence to prove the existence of a contract in a specific performance suit under the proviso to Section 49 of the Registration Act, 1908. The proviso allows such documents to be used as evidence of a contract or collateral transaction, despite being unregistered. (Para 9, 10, 11) Muruganandam v. Muniyandi, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 549 : 2025 INSC 652

Section 49 - The appellant relied on an unregistered agreement to sell (dated 01.01.2000) in a suit for specific performance, claiming part payment and possession of the property by the respondent, who failed to execute the sale deed. The trial court and High Court dismissed the suit, citing inadmissibility under the Stamp Act and Registration Act, as registration of such agreements is mandatory in Tamil Nadu due to a State amendment. Held, an unregistered document can be used to prove an oral agreement of sale in a specific performance suit, not as evidence of a completed transfer. The document was admissible under Section 49 to establish contract formation, not title. The Supreme Court set aside the lower courts' findings, allowed the appeal, and permitted the appellant to introduce the unregistered agreement as evidence of the oral agreement of sale. [Para 10] Muruganandam v. Muniyandi, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 549 : 2025 INSC 652

Section 69 – Registration of transfer document cannot be refused on ground that vendor's title deeds aren't produced or established. It is not the function of the Sub-Registrar or Registering Authority to ascertain whether the vendor has title to the property. The Act does not authorize the Registering Authority to deny registration of a transfer document on the ground that the vendor's title documents are not produced or that their title is unproven. Even if a person executing a sale deed or lease does not have title to the property, the registering authority cannot refuse to register the document, provided all procedural requirements are met and applicable stamp duty and registration fees are paid. (Para 11 & 15) K. Gopi v. Sub-Registrar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 402 : 2025 INSC 462

Section 69 – Registration Rules (Tamil Nadu); Rule 55A(i) - As per Rule 55A(i), the person seekig registration of a document was mandated to produce the previous original deed as per which he acquired title and encumbrance certificate. Unless this Rule is complied with, the document will not be registered. It was not within the mandate of the Sub-Registrar or Registering Authority under the 1908 Act to verify whether the vendor has valid title. Therefore, the Court struck down as unconstitutional Rule 55A(i) of the Tamil Nadu Registration Rules as inconsistent with the provisions of the Registration Act, 1908. Impugned High Court judgments relying on Rule 55A(i) quashed. Sale deed to be registered upon procedural compliance within one month. Appeal allowed. (Para 16 - 19) K. Gopi v. Sub-Registrar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 402 : 2025 INSC 462

Unregistered Sale Agreement – Title and Possession – An unregistered sale agreement does not confer valid title or entitle the claimant to protection from dispossession. The Supreme Court, in an appeal against a High Court Division Bench order, set aside the restraint on dispossession by Telangana State Industrial Infrastructure Corporation Ltd. (TSIIC). The respondents' claim, based on an unregistered 1982 sale agreement executed by a General Power of Attorney holder, was invalid. Unregistered agreements are not recognized as valid instruments for transferring immovable property. The respondents failed to establish valid title or rightful possession. The Single Judge's decision denying protection from dispossession was restored. [Relied on: Suraj Lamp & Industries Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Haryana, (2012) 1 SCC 656. (Paras 17 & 25)] Mahnoor Fatima Imran v. Visweswara Infrastructure, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 679 : 2025 INSC 646

Specific Relief Act, 1963

2018 Amendment - Supreme Court clarified that the 2018 amendment to the Act of 1963, which made the grant of specific performance of contracts a mandatory relief, has no retrospective effect and does not apply to suits or transactions that arose before its enforcement on October 1, 2018. [Relied on Katta Sujatha Reddy v. Siddamsetty Infra Projects (P) Ltd. 2023 1 SCC 355; Siddamsetty Infra Projects (P.) Ktd. V. Katta Sujatha Reddy 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3214; Paras 34-38] Annamalai v. Vasanthi, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1041 : 2025 INSC 1267

Decree for specific performance of contract for the sale or lease of immovable property - Where an appeal is filed against the decree passed by the trial court and the appeal is disposed of, the appellate court should specify time to deposit the balance sale consideration. (Para 50) Ram Lal v. Jarnail Singh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 283 : 2025 INSC 301

Nature of a Decree for Specific Performance — Transfer of Property Act, 1882 — Section 54 — Interest in Immovable Property- Held, a decree for specific performance merely recognizes a claim for specific performance of a contract and does not elevate the status of a decree-holder to that of the owner of the property in question - Neither a contract for sale nor a decree passed on that basis for specific performance gives any right or title to the decree-holder; the right and title passes only on the execution of the deed of sale (conveyance) and its registration - A contract for the sale of immovable property, by itself, does not create any interest in or charge on such property - The personal obligation created by an agreement of sale is described in Section 40 of the Transfer of Property Act as an obligation arising out of a contract and annexed to the ownership of property, but not amounting to an interest or easement therein - The contract between the parties is not extinguished by the passing of the decree for specific performance, and it subsists notwithstanding the decree - The suit is deemed to be pending even after such a decree, and the Court passing the decree continues to retain control - Appeal dismissed. [Relied on Amol and others vs. Deorao and others 2011 SCC OnLine Bom 11; Paras 16-21, 27] Rajeswari v. Shanmugam, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1122 : 2025 INSC 1329

Requirement of Declaration of Title and Recovery of Possession – Held where the plaintiff asserts title based on a Will but does not have possession (which is admitted to be with the defendant), a suit for injunction simpliciter cannot be maintained - The plaintiff should have sought a declaration of title and consequential recovery of possession - This is especially true when the defendant claims possession as a co-owner with absolute rights, having made valuable improvements - Appeal is disposed of with reservation of liberty to both parties to file a fresh suit for declaration of title and recovery of possession. [Paras 10-13] S. Santhana Lakshmi v. D. Rajammal, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1059 : 2025 INSC 1197

Section 10, Section 14, Section 20 (as prior to 2018 Amendment) - Code of Civil Procedure, 1908; Section 100 - Agreement for Sale of Immovable Property - Suit for Specific Performance - Readiness and Willingness - When should a plaintiff seeking specific performance of contract must also seek a declaration that the termination of the contract by the other party was invalid – Held, a suit for specific performance is maintainable without seeking a declaration that the termination of the agreement was invalid where the contract did not confer a right to unilaterally terminate, or where the right conferred was waived, and the termination was a unilateral act - The vendors, by accepting the additional amount, waived their right to forfeit the advance consideration and acknowledged the contract's subsistence; thus, their subsequent termination notice was a void act and a breach of contract by repudiation. The Plaintiff-Appellant had the option to treat the contract as subsisting and sue for specific performance. [Paras 31-33] Annamalai v. Vasanthi, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1041 : 2025 INSC 1267

Section 12 - Specific Performance of Part of Contract - Legal Principle - Section 12 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 allows specific performance of part of a contract only if: The plaintiff is ready and willing to perform their obligations. The contract terms are severable, and the plaintiff relinquishes all claims to the performance of the remaining part and to any compensation. Inability to perform may arise due to various factors, including legal prohibitions or deficiencies in quantity or quality of the subject matter. Vijay Prabhu v. S.T. Lajapathie, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 59

Section 12 (3) – Specific Performance of Part of Contract – Readiness and Willingness to Perform - The petitioner filed suit for specific performance of an agreement and delivery of possession of the suit property. In the alternative, he claimed damages of Rs. 60,00,000/- with interest. The Trial Court dismissed the prayer for specific performance, finding the petitioner was not ready and willing to perform his part of the contract, but directed a refund of Rs. 20,00,000/- with 12% interest. The High Court affirmed this decision, holding that Section 12(3) of the Specific Relief Act was not applicable as the petitioner had not relinquished all claims and was seeking damages. Whether the petitioner was entitled to specific performance of part of the contract under Section 12(3) of the Specific Relief Act despite not relinquishing all claims to performance of the remaining part of the contract or compensation. Held, Section 12(3) is a discretionary relief and cannot be invoked where the terms of the contract are not severable or when the plaintiff has not relinquished all claims to performance and compensation. Section 12(3) could not be invoked as the petitioner sought damages in addition to specific performance, indicating non-relinquishment of claims. The Supreme Court dismissed the Special Leave Petition, upholding the concurrent findings of the Trial Court and High Court that the petitioner was not ready and willing to perform his contractual obligations. Vijay Prabhu v. S.T. Lajapathie, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 59

Section 16(c) and 34 - Cancellation of Agreement to Sell - Maintainability of Suit - A suit for the specific performance of an agreement to sell, filed after its cancellation, is not maintainable unless it includes a prayer for declaratory relief under Section 34 of the Act challenging the validity of the cancellation. Declaratory relief challenging the validity of the cancellation was essential when seeking specific performance of the agreement to sell, as the suit could not be sustained without a valid and subsisting agreement. (Para 24, 26 & 27) Sangita Sinha v. Bhawana Bhardwaj, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 378 : 2025 INSC 450

Section 20 - Discretionary Relief of Specific Performance – Held, the High Court erred in declining the discretionary relief under Section 20 (pre-2018 Amendment) based on the unsustainable grounds of the plaintiff setting up a false claim of additional payment and of possession - The failure to prove possession alone does not make the claim false - Considering the payment of over 90% of the agreed consideration, the additional payment, and the non-bona fide conduct of the vendors in selling part of the property to a related party even before termination, the relief of specific performance should not have been denied - Appeal allowed. [Relied on Ravinder Singh v. Sukhbir Singh and Others, (2013) 9 SCC 245; Babu Lal v. Hazari Lal Kishori Lal, (1982) 1 SCC 525; Para 25-32, 38, 39] Annamalai v. Vasanthi, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1041 : 2025 INSC 1267

Section 22 - Refund of Advance Payment - Necessity of Specific Prayer in Plaint - Held, a refund of advance payment or earnest money as part of sale consideration cannot be granted unless specifically prayed for in the plaint or sought through an amendment under Section 22(2). The Court cannot suo moto grant such relief, as the inclusion of a specific prayer is a sine qua non. However, no express prayer is required for ancillary reliefs, such as delivery of possession, which naturally flow from a decree of specific performance, as clarified in Manickam @ Thandapani v. Vasantha, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 395. The forfeiture of earnest money is not penal under Section 74 of the Contract Act in the ordinary sense. In the present case, the appellant's failure to pay the balance sale consideration or fulfill the agreement terms necessitated a specific prayer for refund, which was absent, leading to dismissal of the claim. (Paras 34, 36, 37, 40 & 510) K.R. Suresh v. R. Poornima, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 522 : 2025 INSC 617

Section 28 - Doctrine of Merger - Whether the trial court's decree merges with the appellate court's decree, and whether the time limit for depositing the balance sale consideration, as stipulated in the trial court's decree, revives after the appellate court's decision. The plaintiffs filed suits for specific performance of agreements to sell, which were decreed by the trial court in 1994, directing the plaintiffs to deposit the balance sale consideration within 20 days. The defendants appealed, and the first appellate court reversed the trial court's decision. The plaintiffs then filed second appeals, which were allowed by the High Court in 2018, restoring the trial court's decree. The plaintiffs deposited the balance sale consideration in 2018, and the defendants filed applications under Section 28 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, seeking rescission of the contract, which were rejected by the executing court. The High Court upheld the executing court's decision, leading to the present appeals. Held, the doctrine of merger applies irrespective of whether the appellate court affirms, modifies, or reverses the trial court's decree. The doctrine of merger ensures that only one operative decree exists at any given time, and the appellate court's decree supersedes the trial court's decree. The trial court's decree merged with the High Court's decree in the second appeals. Since the High Court did not specify a time limit for depositing the balance sale consideration, the 20-day period stipulated by the trial court did not revive. The executing court has the discretion to extend the time for depositing the amount, and there was no unreasonable delay on the part of the plaintiffs. Balbir Singh v. Baldev Singh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 82 : (2025) 3 SCC 543

Section 28 – Execution of Decree for Specific Performance – Extension of Time for Deposit – Doctrine of Merger – The Supreme Court set aside a High Court judgment that had dismissed an execution petition due to a delay in depositing the balance sale consideration - held that the non-payment of balance consideration within the time fixed by the Trial Court does not automatically result in the rescission of the contract or make the decree inexecutable – The real test for the court is to determine if the plaintiff's conduct amounts to a positive refusal to perform their part of the contract - A "hyper-technical approach" regarding time limits should be eschewed if readiness and willingness are otherwise established. In this case, a delay of 27 days beyond the two-month period was held not to strike at the heart of the agreement – Held that the decree of the Trial Court merges with the final decision of the High Court in the appellate proceedings - Once the superior court disposes of the matter, its decree becomes the final, binding, and operative order – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Ram Lal v. Jarnail Singh, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 584; Balbir Singh & Anr. v. Baldev Singh, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 103; Ramankutty Gupta v. Avara, (1994) 2 SCC 642; Paras 7-12] Dr. Amit Arya v. Kamlesh Kumari, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1240 : 2025 INSC 1486

Section 28 - Rescission of Contract - Whether the defendants (judgment debtors) were entitled to rescind the contract on the grounds that the plaintiffs (decree holders) failed to deposit the balance sale consideration within the stipulated time. Held, under Section 28 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, the executing court retains jurisdiction to extend the time for depositing the balance sale consideration, even after the decree for specific performance has been passed. The court's power to extend time is discretionary and must be exercised based on the conduct of the parties and the facts of the case. The defendants were not entitled to rescind the contract under Section 28 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, as the plaintiffs had deposited the balance sale consideration promptly after the High Court's decision. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals, holding that the High Court committed no error in rejecting the defendants' applications for rescission of the contract. The Court reaffirmed the principles of the doctrine of merger and the discretionary powers of the executing court under Section 28 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. Balbir Singh v. Baldev Singh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 82 : (2025) 3 SCC 543

Section 31 and 34 - Plaintiff seeking declaration of title over a property is not required to seek cancellation of a sale deed executed by another party with whom the plaintiff has no privity of contract. Declaration of title is sufficient and equivalent to seeking cancellation of such a sale deed, as the proviso to Section 34 does not mandate seeking all possible reliefs, only those directly flowing from the declaration. A non-executant of a deed need only seek a declaration that the deed is invalid, void, or non-binding, not its cancellation under Section 31. The Court set aside the High Court's dismissal of the suit for not seeking cancellation of the sale deed, restoring the trial court's ruling upholding the plaintiff's title via a Gift Deed and declaring the defendant's sale deed void ab initio. (Referred: Suhrid Singh @ Sardool Singh v. Randhir Singh, (2010) 12 SCC 112; Paras 28 - 30 & 36) Hussain Ahmed Choudhury v. Habibur Rahman, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 466 : 2025 INSC 553

Section 38 (Perpetual Injunction) - Suit for Injunction Simpliciter - Declaration of Title - Recovery of Possession – Held, a suit filed for an injunction restraining alienation/encumbrance and interference with peaceful possession is an injunction simpliciter - When the plaintiff admits in the pleadings and oral evidence (witness box) that possession is with the defendant, an injunction against the interference of peaceful enjoyment of the property ought not to have been granted - Possession was admitted to be with the defendant in the original plaint on the basis of a tenancy arrangement and later in evidence as well. [Para 11] S. Santhana Lakshmi v. D. Rajammal, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1059 : 2025 INSC 1197

Section 39 - Mandatory Injunction - High Court granted relief to respondents by allowing their suit for mandatory injunction – Held, a grant of mandatory injunction under Section 39 of SRA is discretionary and can be granted only upon the breach of an enforceable legal obligation - It cannot be granted unless there exists a legal right and there's a breach of that legal right - Plaintiff in a suit instituted by him under Section 39 of SRA is obliged to satisfy the court with appropriate evidence that the defendant is committing breach of a particular obligation which is binding on him - If a scheme specifically provides that an oustee shall file an application in a specified format with certain deposit towards earnest money then it is obligation of allottee to do so - Conditions for granting a mandatory injunction - Obligation, breach, necessity, enforceability, balance of convenience, irreparable injury - Respondents instituted suit for mandatory injunction under section 39 SRA after 14-20 years, hence, suit is not maintainable on ground of limitation. Appeal allowed. [Para 74-76, 92, 93, 95] Estate Officer, Haryana Urban Development Authority v. Nirmala Devi, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 700 : 2025 INSC 843

Specific Performance — Agreement to Sell (ATS) — Subsequent Purchaser — Deemed Notice — Section 19(b) – Held, a subsequent purchaser cannot claim the protection of a 'bona fide purchaser for value without notice' under Section 19(b) of the Specific Relief Act if they had prior knowledge of the earlier Agreement to Sell (ATS) and were aware that the original vendees were still litigating to protect their rights under the Agreement to sell, even after the vendor claimed to have terminated the agreement - A subsequent purchaser who chooses to remain content with the unilateral assertions of the vendor regarding the termination of the ATS, and consciously abstains from making further inquiry into the subsisting interest of the original vendee, cannot escape the consequences of deemed notice - To invoke section 19(b) protection, a purchaser must establish - i. purchase for value; ii. Payment made in good faith; iii. Absence of notice of the earlier contract. [Relied on Manjit Singh v. Darshana Devi 2024 SCC OnLine 3431; Ram Niwas v. Bano 2000 6 SCC 685; Para 73-80] K.S. Manjunath v. Moorasavirappa @ Muttanna Chennappa Batil, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1084 : 2025 INSC 1298

Specific Performance – Limitation – Impleadment – Where defendants sought to raise a counter-claim for specific performance regarding an agreement dated 02.12.2002 in an impleading application filed only in the year 2006, Supreme Court held the claim was grossly delayed and hit by limitation – No liberty granted to file a separate suit as the claim could not survive. [Para 13, 15] Sanjay Tiwari v. Yugal Kishore Prasad Sao, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1097 : 2025 INSC 1310

Specific Performance — Termination of Agreement to Sell (ATS) — Failure to Seek Declaration of Invalidity — Maintainability – Held, where the vendor's notice of termination is based on their own inability and inconvenience rather than any breach by the vendee, and the vendee immediately replies challenging the termination and asserting the continuance of the contract, the subsequent suit for specific performance is not rendered non-maintainable solely because the plaintiff/vendee failed to include a specific prayer for a declaration that the termination notice is bad in law. The failure to specifically frame an issue on the maintainability of the suit for want of such declaration does not preclude an Appellate Court from examining whether the jurisdictional fact necessary for granting the relief of specific performance exists - A party cannot unilaterally terminate a non-determinable agreement to sell, except where the contract itself is expressly determinable in nature under Section 14 of the Act - Such invalid termination does not oblige the aggrieved party to first seek a separate declaration challenging the termination before pursuing a claim for specific performance -Appeal dismissed. [Relied on R. Kandasamy (Since Dead) v. T.R.K. Sarawathy, (2024 SCC OnLine SC 3377); Para 54-70] K.S. Manjunath v. Moorasavirappa @ Muttanna Chennappa Batil, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1084 : 2025 INSC 1298

The appellant, a stranger to the suit, sought impleadment in a specific performance suit, claiming rights to the suit property based on a registered sale deed. The plaintiff did not oppose the impleadment, but the High Court, under Article 227, overturned the trial court's order allowing the appellant's inclusion. Held, the genuineness of the transaction involving the appellant was disputed and required determination at trial. Impleading the appellant as a proper party would not prejudice the case and would enable effective adjudication. Relying on Sumtibai v. Paras Finance Co., (2007) 10 SCC 82, the Court affirmed that a third party showing a semblance of title or interest can seek impleadment under Order 1 Rule 10(2) of CPC, subject to the court's discretion. Appeal allowed; trial court's order permitting impleadment of the appellant as a proper party restored. (Para 33) J.N Real Estate v. Shailendra Pradhan, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 519 : 2025 INSC 611

Whether the plaint in the subsequent suit for specific performance is liable to be rejected on the ground that the suit is barred by the law of limitation. The dispute pertains to a 5.05-acre portion of a 6.48-acre property in Kodaikanal, originally purchased by American missionaries in 1912 and later transferred to the appellant (Indian Evangelical Lutheran Church Trust Association) in 1975. In 1991, the appellant entered into an agreement to sell the property to the respondent (Sri Bala & Co.) for ₹3.02 crores, with an advance payment of ₹10 lakhs. The respondent filed an unnumbered suit in 1993 for specific performance, which was rejected in 1998 due to non-payment of court fees. A second suit was filed in 2007 for the same relief, which the appellant sought to reject under Order VII Rule 11(d), arguing it was barred by limitation and res judicata. The trial court and the High Court dismissed the appellant's application, holding that the issue of limitation was a mixed question of fact and law to be decided after evidence. Held, the second suit was filed beyond the limitation period prescribed under Article 113 of the Limitation Act, 1963. The cause of action for the second suit arose on the rejection of the plaint in the first suit (12.01.1998), and the limitation period expired on 12.01.2001. The suit filed in 2007 was thus barred by limitation. The reliance on a letter dated 15.07.1991 to extend the limitation period was untenable, as it was not referenced in the first suit and contradicted the respondent's earlier stance. The plaint in 2007 was liable to be rejected under Order VII Rule 11(d) as the suit was barred by law. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the orders of the trial court and the High Court, and rejected the plaint in 2007 as barred by limitation. Indian Evangelical Lutheran Church Trust Association v. Sri Bala, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 37 : 2025 INSC 42 : [2025] 1 SCR 542 : AIR 2025 SC 522

Stamp Act

Stamp Act, 1899 – Section 9A (Bihar Amendment Act, 1988) – Exemption of Stamp Duty for Cooperative Societies – Held, Section 9A provides complete exemption of stamp duty on instruments relating to the transfer of premises by a Cooperative Society to its members - Supreme Court observed that this section creates a statutory right for societies and a corresponding duty for authorities to register such instruments without further requirements once the society's status is established. Adarsh Sahkari Grih Nirman Swawlambi Society Ltd. v. State of Jharkhand, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1175 : 2025 INSC 1389

Stamp Act, 1899 – Schedule 1-B – Articles 40 and 57 – Security Bond cum Mortgage Deed – Chargeability of Stamp Duty - Issue- Whether the stamp duty on the instrument "Security Bond cum Mortgage Deed" is chargeable under Article 40 or Article 57 of Schedule 1-B of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 – Held, Principle of Chargeability, in matters of stamp duty, the decisive factor is not the nomenclature assigned to the instrument, but the substance of rights and obligations it embodies - The Court is duty-bound to ascertain the true legal character of the instrument - Definition of Mortgage-Deed - Held that the instrument, in both cases, fulfils the essential characteristics of a mortgage deed as defined under Section 2(17) of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899, because it transfers, or creates, a right over specified property in favour of the creditor to secure the performance of an engagement (or repayment of a loan). Godwin Construction Pvt. Ltd. v. Commissioner, Meerut Division, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 992 : 2025 INSC 1207

Stamp Act, 1899 – Scope of Article 57 - Held that Article 57 of Schedule 1-B of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899, operates in two distinct limbs - The second limb, which refers to a deed "executed by a surety to secure the due performance of a contract," is restricted in its application to the execution of a security bond or mortgage deed by a surety to secure the obligations of another, and does not extend to cases where the principal itself executes the deed to secure its own obligations - Definition of Surety - Held that the term "surety" must be strictly understood in accordance with Section 126 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, which establishes that a contract of guarantee is inherently tripartite (surety, principal debtor, and creditor) - the essential requirement for invoking Article 57 is the presence of a surety distinct from the principal debtor - Where the principal debtor itself executes a deed mortgaging its own property, Article 57 is inapplicable - Appeals dismissed. [Paras 14-29] Construction Pvt. Ltd. v. Commissioner, Meerut Division, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 992 : 2025 INSC 1207

Stamp Act, 1899; Section 47-A – Tamil Nadu Stamp (Prevention of Undervaluation of Instruments) Rules, 1968; Rules 3, 4, 6, 7 – Forms I & II – Undervaluation of property in sale deeds – Reference to Collector for determination of market value – Validity of proceedings – Held, in case of undervaluation of property sale's price, the Registering Authority under the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 cannot mechanically make reference to the Collector (stamps) for determination of the correct market value of the property. Instead, an opportunity is to be provided to the party, and reasons have to be furnished by the Registering Authority for arriving at a conclusion that the property is undervalued. The Registering Officer must record reasons for believing undervaluation before referring the instrument to the Collector. A roving inquiry is impermissible. Form I notice must contain reasons for considering the document undervalued. Absence of reasons vitiates the inquiry. Collector (Stamps) must pass a provisional order under Rule 4(4) indicating the basis of valuation before issuing Form II. Issuing a final order directly without a provisional order and opportunity for representation violates Rules 4 and 6. "Reason to believe" under Section 47-A is not subjective satisfaction but must be based on material having a rational connection to the belief of undervaluation. The Registering Officer cannot refuse registration merely because the document is undervalued. Their power is limited, and they cannot conduct a detailed inquiry, which is the Collector's prerogative. The Collector's power to determine market value is quasi-judicial, requiring adherence to procedural rules and principles of natural justice. The High Court's view that Form I must contain reasons for undervaluation and the Collector must follow the prescribed procedure is upheld. Appeals dismissed. Chief Revenue Controlling Officer Cum Inspector General of Registration v. P. Babu, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 40

Stamp Act, 1958 (Maharashtra); Section 48(1) - Refund of stamp duty - Cancellation Deed - Applicability of Limitation Period - The Appellants entered into an Agreement to Sell on August 30, 2014, for the purchase of a residential flat in Mumbai, paying ₹27,34,500 as stamp duty. Due to delays in possession, the Appellants canceled the agreement, and a Cancellation Deed was executed on March 17, 2015, but registered on April 28, 2015. The Appellants applied for a refund of the stamp duty on August 6, 2016, contending that their case fell under the pre-amendment regime, which allowed a two-year window for refund claims. The CCRA initially granted the refund on January 8, 2018, but later recalled the order on March 3, 2018, citing the amended six-month limitation period. The High Court dismissed the Appellants' writ petition, holding that the amended limitation period applied, and the CCRA's recall of the refund order was valid. Whether the amended six-month limitation period under Section 48(1) of the Maharashtra Stamp Act, 1958, introduced on April 24, 2015, applies to the Appellants' claim for stamp duty refund, given that the Cancellation Deed was executed before the amendment but registered thereafter. Held, technicalities of limitation should not defeat legitimate claims, especially when the claimant is not at fault. The Appellants' right to claim a refund accrued on the date of execution of the Cancellation Deed (March 17, 2015), which was before the amendment. Therefore, the unamended two-year limitation period under Section 48(1) of the Maharashtra Stamp Act, 1958, applied. The Court emphasized that amendments reducing limitation periods cannot extinguish vested rights retrospectively. Harshit Harish Jain v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 110 : (2025) 3 SCC 365

Stamp Act, 1958 (Maharashtra); Section 48(1) - Refund of stamp duty - Whether the Chief Controlling Revenue Authority (CCRA) had the statutory power to review and recall its earlier order granting a refund of stamp duty. Held, the CCRA lacked statutory authority to review or recall its earlier order granting the refund. The subsequent orders recalling the refund were vitiated in law, as the CCRA had no express power of review under the Act. The statutory authorities cannot exercise powers not conferred upon them, such as reviewing their own orders without express statutory mandate. Harshit Harish Jain v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 110 : (2025) 3 SCC 365

Succession Act, 1925

Succession Act, 1925; Section 63(c) — Indian Evidence Act, 1872; Section 68 — Proof of Execution of Will — Examination of Attesting Witness — Leading Questions in Cross-Examination — Probative Value — Supreme Court set aside the concurrent findings of the Trial Court and High Court which had disbelieved a registered Will on the ground that the attesting witness did not explicitly depose to the attestation of the other witness in his examination-in-chief- Held that High Court erred in holding that an answer elicited through a leading question in cross-examination lacks probative value- If the cross-examiner puts a positive suggestion to a witness regarding the signatures of the testator and other attesting witnesses, and the witness affirms it, such testimony effectively supplies any "missing link" from the examination-in-chief. K.S. Dinachandran v. Shyla Joseph, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1218 : 2025 INSC 1451

Suspicious Circumstances vs. Rule of Prudence — Held that the exclusion of one child (who married outside the community) from a Will does not, by itself, constitute a suspicious circumstance that invalidates the document if the testator's desire is prompted by his own justifications- The "judicial conscience" must be satisfied by stepping into the "arm-chair of the testator" rather than substituting the Court's opinion for that of the testator- Held that when a witness is examined many years after the execution of a Will (24 years in this case), it is "puerile" to expect mathematical precision regarding dates or specific visits to the testator's house- Appeals allowed. [Relied on H. H. Maharaja Bhanu Prakash Singh v. Tika Yogendra Chandra (1989 Supp (1) SCC 16); H. Venkatachala Iyengar v. B.N. Thimmajamma (1959 Supp (1) SCR 426); Paras 15-29] K.S. Dinachandran v. Shyla Joseph, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1218 : 2025 INSC 1451

Section 2(h) – Will - A will is a legal declaration of a testator's wishes regarding their property, to be carried out after their death - A will is not a transfer inter vivos, it is a posthumous disposition and can be revoked at any time during the testator's lifetime - A will must be attested by two or more witnesses - To be proven in Court, at least one attesting witness must be called to prove its execution - The propounder of the will must also remove any legitimate suspicious circumstances surrounding its execution such as an unfair or unjust disposition circumstances surrounding its execution, such as an unfair or unjust disposition of property or the propounder themselves taking a substantial benefit - The mere fact that a will is registered does not automatically grant it validity - Suspicious circumstances surrounding the will has not been removed by the plaintiff - Appeal allowed and suit dismissed. [Paras 23-27] Ramesh Chand v. Suresh Chand, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 862 : 2025 INSC 1059

Sections 67 - Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Section 100 – Held, High Court should not frame and answer an additional substantial question of law under the proviso to Section 100(5) of CPC without a foundation in the pleadings, issues or evidence presented by the parties - Introducing a new legal argument, such as the applicability of Section 67 of the Indian Succession Act, at the stage of second appeal creates an entirely new case for the plaintiffs and is improper - The court must record specific reasons for framing such a question and the opposite party must be given a fair opportunity to respond - The Trial Court and the First appellate Court had already established that the testators had a sound mind and the will was validly executed without any suspicious circumstances - The valid and genuine will which was duly executed and proved must be given effect - Appeal allowed. [Paras 17 - 23] C.P. Francis v. C.P. Joseph, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 870 : 2025 INSC 1071

Section 63 - Evidence Act, 1872; Section 68 - Validity of a Will - Partition of Property – The Trial Court rejected the Will, holding it was not proved in accordance with the law, and granted the plaintiffs a 1/6th share in the properties. The High Court reversed this decision, upholding the validity of the Will and restricting the plaintiffs' share to Schedule A property alone. Held, a propounder who substantially benefits from a Will and participates in its execution raises suspicion, which must be dispelled with clear evidence. The propounder is expected to testify about the proper execution, the presence of attesting witnesses, and other key details. Under Section 68 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, presenting one attesting witness is insufficient to prove execution unless they confirm the presence and actions of the other attesting witnesses. The Will was not proved in accordance with Section 63 of the Indian Succession Act and Section 68 of the Evidence Act. The evidence of the attesting witnesses was insufficient, and the propounder of the Will failed to establish its due execution. The Court noted suspicious circumstances surrounding the execution of the Will, including the lack of proper attestation and the involvement of the propounder in its preparation. The Court set aside the High Court's judgment and restored the Trial Court's decision, granting the plaintiffs a 1/6th share in both Schedule A and Schedule B properties. The judgment reiterates the strict requirements for proving a Will under the Indian Succession Act and the Evidence Act, emphasizing the need for proper attestation and the removal of suspicious circumstances by the propounder. It also highlights the Court's role in ensuring that testamentary documents are executed freely and voluntarily by the testator. Chinu Rani Ghosh v. Subhash Ghosh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 56

Section 63(c) - Requirement of attestation "by the direction of the testator." - Whether the High Court erred in holding that the Will was not proved due to the absence of explicit testimony from the attesting witness regarding the testator's direction. Facts: Sanjhi Ram, the testator, executed a Will on November 7, 2005, bequeathing his property to his nephew, Gopal Krishan (Appellant No. 1). He passed away the next day. The Respondents (legal heirs of Sanjhi Ram) challenged the Will, alleging it was forged and the subsequent mutation of property was illegal. The Trial Court and the High Court held the Will invalid, citing suspicious circumstances, including the absence of testimony from the attesting witness that the testator directed the signing of the Will. The Lower Appellate Court, however, upheld the validity of the Will, ruling that the testator's mental faculties were sound, and the Will complied with legal requirements. Supreme Court's Decision: Interpretation of Section 63(c) of the Indian Succession Act, 1925: The Court clarified that Section 63(c) provides alternative conditions for attestation: (a) The attesting witness must have seen the testator sign or affix their mark to the Will; or (b) The witness must have seen another person sign the Will in the presence and by the direction of the testator. The use of the word "or" is disjunctive, meaning compliance with either condition suffices. The High Court erred in interpreting "or" as "and," thereby imposing an unnecessary requirement that the attesting witness explicitly state the testator's direction. Validity of the Will: The testimony of the attesting witness (DW-1) confirmed that he had seen the testator affix his mark to the Will. This alone satisfied Section 63(c). The requirement of the testator's direction applies only when another person signs the Will on the testator's behalf, which was not the case here. The High Court's finding that the Will was not proved due to the absence of testimony regarding the testator's direction was incorrect. Restoration of Lower Appellate Court's Judgment: The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgment and restored the Lower Appellate Court's decision, holding the Will valid. Consequently, the subsequent sale deeds executed by Gopal Krishan were also upheld. Conclusion: The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, ruling that the Will executed by Sanjhi Ram was valid and complied with the requirements of Section 63(c) of the Indian Succession Act, 1925. The High Court's interpretation of the attestation requirements was erroneous, and the Lower Appellate Court's judgment was reinstated. Gopal Krishan v. Daulat Ram, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 26 : (2025) 2 SCC 804

Section 63(c) - Requirement of attestation "by the direction of the testator." Whether the High Court erred in holding that the Will was not proved due to the absence of explicit testimony from the attesting witness that the Testator directed the signing of the Will. The testator executed a Will bequeathing his property to his nephew. He passed away the next day. The Respondents challenged the Will, alleging it was forged and the subsequent mutation of property was illegal. The Trial Court and the High Court held the Will invalid, citing suspicious circumstances, including the absence of a death certificate and irregularities in the Will's execution. The Lower Appellate Court, however, upheld the Will, finding no evidence that the testator was of unsound mind or that the Will was fabricated. Held, the High Court erred in interpreting Section 63(c). The phrase "by the direction of the testator" applies only when an attesting witness sees someone other than the testator sign the Will. In this case, the attesting witness had seen the testator affix his mark, which was sufficient to comply with Section 63(c). The Court emphasized that the word "or" in Section 63(c) is disjunctive, and the requirement of "direction" is not applicable when the witness has seen the testator sign the Will. The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgment and restored the Lower Appellate Court's decision, declaring the Will valid and the subsequent sale deeds executed lawful. The appeal was allowed, and the Will was upheld as valid. The Supreme Court clarified the interpretation of Section 63(c) of the Indian Succession Act, 1925, emphasizing that the requirement of "direction" is not necessary when the attesting witness has seen the testator sign the Will. Gopal Krishan v. Daulat Ram, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 21 : (2025) 2 SCC 804

Section 63 - Evidence Act, 1872; Section 68 - A finding of valid execution does not automatically imply genuineness. Suspicious circumstances must be addressed before concluding the genuineness of a Will. Mere registration of a Will does not validate it; it must be proved in accordance with legal mandates. Lilian Coelho v. Myra Philomena Coalho, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 15 : (2025) 2 SCC 633

Section 63 - Evidence Act, 1872; Section 68 - Requirements of - Validity of the Will – Mere proof of execution of a Will does not make it genuine if it is surrounded by suspicious circumstances. The defendants failed to prove that the testator executed the Will with a sound disposing mind and understood its contents. The stamp papers for the Will were purchased in the name of the first defendant and she played an active role in its execution, which cast doubt on its authenticity. The defendants' claim under the Will was rejected due to the suspicious circumstances surrounding its execution. Leela v. Muruganantham, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 8 : (2025) 4 SCC 289

Transfer of Property Act, 1881

Doctrine of Lis Pendens – Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 – The doctrine applies to suits where a right to immovable property is "directly and specifically in question"- This includes mortgage suits where the prayer is for the sale of the property to satisfy a debt- A pendente lite transferee is bound by the result of the litigation regardless of notice- held that the doctrine of lis pendens under Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 applies even to a money recovery suit where the debt is secured by a mortgage over immovable property, and that the bar on transfer operates irrespective of whether the proceedings are contested or ex parte- Section 52 casts an embargo on the parties to the suit from transferring the property in question, in order to preserve the subject matter of the lis and to prevent the rights of the parties from being defeated by alienations pendente lite. If the doctrine were made inapplicable to ex-parte proceedings, a party would deliberately abstain from appearing before the court, transfer the property during the pendency of the suit, and thus, render the adjudication of rights in the said suit, infructuous- Appeal allowed. [Relied on Celir LLP V. Sumati Prasad Bafna 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3727; Mahesh Prasad v. Musammat Mundar (1950 SCC OnLine All 16; Sanjay Verma v. Manik Roy (2006) 13 SCC 608; Paras 70-75, 220-222] Danesh Singh v. Har Pyari, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1211 : 2025 INSC 1434

Section 3 - Code of Civil Procedure, 1908; Order 7 Rule 11 - Suit filed after 45 Yrs - Limitation - Registered Sale Deeds - Constructive Notice - Property was partitioned orally in 1968 and subsequent registered sale deeds executed in 1978. Predecessors never challenged the partition or sale deeds during their lifetime. Held, party interested in property deemed to know about sale deed from registration date. Registered documents provide constructive notice, and a suit filed decades later without evidence of recent knowledge is barred by limitation. Plaintiffs' failure to address prior knowledge of the sale deeds and the long delay rendered the suit vexatious and meritless. The Trial Court correctly dismissed the suit, and the High Court erred in remanding it, as no triable issues existed. (Para 13 & 17) Uma Devi v. Anand Kumar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 382 : 2025 INSC 434 : [2025] 4 SCR 521 : (2025) 5 SCC 198

Section 10 - Applicability to Government Land Allotments - Restrictive Conditions - Resumption of Land - Held, Section 10 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, which prohibits absolute restraints on alienation, does not apply to government land allotments, as these are not inter vivos or commercial transactions but are governed by public interest. The Telangana government validly imposed conditions on land allotted for charitable purposes in 2001. The Respondent-Trust's subdivision and sale of the land breached these conditions, justifying the State's 2012 resumption order. The High Court's 2022 decision, which invalidated the resumption order as violating Section 10, was set aside, as government allotments are regulated by specific statutory frameworks (Rules 1975 and Board of Revenue Standing Orders), not the Transfer of Property Act. The appeal was allowed, affirming the State's authority to enforce conditions and resume land for public welfare. (Para 23) State of Telangana v. Dr. Pasupuleti Nirmala Hanumantha Rao Charitable Trust, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 564 : 2025 INSC 679 : AIR 2025 SC 2874

Section 41 and 122 - When a property transfer involves considerations such as love and affection while the donor retains a life interest, it qualifies as a settlement deed in the form of a gift. Once the donee accepts the gift through the settlement deed, the donor cannot unilaterally revoke it. Mere reservation of life interest of the donor and the postponement of the delivery of the possession to the donee would not make the document a Will. Delivery of possession is not sine qua non to validate a gift or settlement. Upon the retention of the life interest, the donor will continue only as an ostensible owner of the property. Delivery of possession is only one of the methods to prove acceptance and not the sole method. The receipt of the original document by the plaintiff and registration of the same, would amount to acceptance of the gift and the transaction satisfies the requirement of Section 122 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. (Para 18) N.P. Saseendran v. N.P. Ponnamma, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 345 : 2025 INSC 388 : AIR 2025 SC 1987 : (2025) 7 SCC 502

Section 52 — Usufructuary Mortgage — Right of Redemption — Limitation Period - Held that in the case of a usufructuary mortgage, the period of limitation for redemption does not commence from the date the mortgage is created - Instead, the right to seek redemption arises only when the mortgagor pays or tenders the mortgage money, or when the debt is discharged from the usufruct of the property - Mere expiry of the prescribed period does not extinguish the mortgagor's right to redeem - The right of the mortgagee to seek a declaration of title remains unaffected until such payment or discharge occurs – Appeal dismissed. [Relied on Singh Ram (Dead) through legal representatives Vs. Sheo Ram and Others (2014) 9 SCC 185; Paras 7-12] Dalip Singh v. Sawan Singh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1252 : 2025 INSC 1498

Section 52 - Code of Civil Procedure, 1908; Order I Rule 10 or Order XXII Rule 10 - Rights of transferees pendente lite - A transferee pendente lite is bound by the outcome of the litigation and may seek leave to appeal if their interests are affected. While a transferee pendente lite is not automatically entitled to be impleaded as a party, they may seek leave to appeal if their interests are prejudicially affected by the decree. However, such leave is discretionary and must be granted judiciously. In the present case, the Court found that the Respondent Nos. 1 and 2, who purchased the suit property during the pendency of litigation and while an injunction was in force, failed to establish a valid case for leave to appeal. The Court set aside the High Court's order granting leave, holding that the Respondents could pursue separate legal remedies if they believed they were defrauded by the original owner. H. Anjanappa v. A Prabhakar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 123

Section 52 - Transferee Pendente Lite - Discretionary Impleadment - No Automatic Right to Join or Appeal - Binding Effect of Decree - Leave to Appeal - Alternative Remedies - Whether a transferee pendente lite has an automatic right to be impleaded in a suit or to appeal a decree. Held, a transferee pendente lite (purchaser of suit property during litigation) has no automatic right to be impleaded under Order I Rule 10 or Order XXII Rule 10 CPC or to appeal a decree, except in exceptional circumstances where their rights are demonstrably prejudiced. Impleadment is discretionary, based on the suit's nature and evidence, and not a matter of right. Under Section 52 TPA, pendente lite transfers are subject to the suit's outcome, binding transferees to the decree, even if unrepresented. Failure to seek impleadment risks improper suit conduct by the plaintiff, but the decree remains binding. Transferees may seek leave to appeal only if they prove adverse impact as aggrieved parties. Separate legal remedies are available for recovery of consideration if cheated, but this does not confer impleadment rights. Respondents No. 1 and 2, pendente lite transferees, purchased suit property during a specific performance suit but were denied impleadment by the trial court, a decision that attained finality. The High Court erroneously allowed their appeal, citing adverse impact. The Supreme Court reversed this, holding that the transferees, bound by Section 52 TPA and purchasing during an active injunction, had no right to appeal without impleadment. Appeal allowed; High Court's decision set aside. (Paras 57 - 61) H. Anjanappa v. A Prabhakar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 123 : 2025 INSC 121

Section 53 - Attachment Before Judgment - Pre-existing Rights - Fraudulent Transfer - Claim Petition - Supreme Court examined whether attachment before judgment ordered under Order XXXVIII Rule 5 CPC could validly operate against a property already transferred by a registered sale deed executed prior to the institution of the suit, and whether a creditor could challenge such a transfer as fraudulent under Section 53 of the T.P. Act within the framework of a claim petition under Order XXXVIII Rule 8 read with Order XXI Rule 58 CPC - Held that essential condition for invoking attachment before judgment under Order XXXVIII Rule 5 CPC is that the property sought to be attached must belong to the defendant on the date of institution of the suit - Property already transferred prior to the suit cannot be attached under this provision. Order XXXVIII Rule 10 CPC safeguards the rights of strangers by clarifying that attachment before judgment does not affect pre-existing rights of non-parties - Attachment before judgment is only a protective measure and does not create any charge or ownership in favour of the plaintiff - Appeal allowed. L.K. Prabhu @ L. Krishna Prabhu v. K.T. Mathew @ Thampan Thomas, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1154 : 2025 INSC 1364

Section 53A - Bombay Stamp Act, 1958 - The appellant, already in possession of the suit property as a tenant, entered into an agreement to sell with the respondent-landlord. The agreement stipulated that physical possession remained with the appellant as tenant, with ownership-based possession to transfer only upon execution of the sale deed. The appellant filed a suit for specific performance of the agreement, while the respondent sought eviction. The trial court and High Court levied stamp duty on the agreement under the Bombay Stamp Act, treating it as a 'conveyance' due to the grant of possessory rights under Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. Whether an agreement to sell, executed when the purchaser is already in physical possession as a tenant and contemplating future ownership transfer, constitutes a 'conveyance' exigible to stamp duty under Explanation I to Article 25, Schedule I of the Bombay Stamp Act, 1958. Held, An agreement to sell granting or recognizing possession (including pre-existing tenancy possession intended for ownership conversion) is stampable as a conveyance under the Bombay Stamp Act, irrespective of deferred title transfer. The Supreme Court upheld the levy of stamp duty, observing stamp duty is levied on the instrument (agreement), not the underlying transaction. Where an agreement to sell includes delivery or prior grant of possession (even as tenant), it qualifies as a 'conveyance' under the Act, as it confers protected possessory rights under Section 53A of the TPA. The timing of possession transfer (before, during, or after the agreement) is immaterial; the instrument's effect—securing possession pending sale deed execution—triggers the duty. Appeal dismissed. [Relied on: Veena Hasmukh Jain v. State of Maharashtra, (1999) 5 SCC 725; Shyamsundar Radheshyam Agrawal v. Pushpabai Nilkanth Patil, (2024) 10 SCC 324] Ramesh Mishrimal Jain v. Avinash Vishwanath Patne, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 206 : 2025 INSC 213

Section 53A – Doctrine of Part Performance – Availability of Defence – Readiness and Willingness to Perform – Held, the defence of part performance under Section 53A of the TPA is only available if the transferee proves that he has performed or is willing to perform his part of the contract - Noted that appellant, by refusing the extraordinary monetary award granted by the Court and obstructing the execution of the decree, demonstrated a lack of willingness to perform, thereby disentitling himself to any equitable relief or protection under Section 53A - The Executing Court and the High Court were correct in directing the issuance of warrants of possession with police assistance, as the litigant had exhausted all remedies and was simply attempting to delay the inevitable execution - The maxim Actus Curiae Neminem Gravabit is intended to ensure that no party suffers due to a mistake of the court and must be exercised in furtherance of justice, not to the disadvantage of litigants - The maxim cannot be invoked by a party who seeks to exploit the process of law to perpetuate injustice and retain possession while spurning a court-moulded equitable relief - Appeal dismissed with costs of Rs. 10 Lakhs. [Relied on Shrimant Shamrao Suryavanshi and another vs. Pralhad Bhairoba Suryavanshi (dead) by LRS. And others 2002 3 SCC 676; Jang Singh v. Brij Lal 1963 SCC ONLine SC 219; Paras 6-10, 15, 16] Prem Aggarwal v. Mohan Singh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 996 : 2025 INSC 1214

Section 53A - Part Performance - Difference between a registered sale deed and an agreement for sale or a contract for sale – Held, the doctrine of part-performance can be invoked as a defence against a transferor trying to eject a transferee - A key requirement for this defence is that the transferee must have taken or continued possession of property in part performance of the contract - A contract for sale of immovable property is a contract that a sale of such property shall take place on terms settled between the parties - While a sale is a transfer of ownership; a contract for sale is merely a document creating a right to obtain another document, namely a registered sale deed to complete the transaction of sale of an immovable property. [Paras 12-16, 30, 31] Ramesh Chand v. Suresh Chand, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 862 : 2025 INSC 1059

Locus Standi of Proposed Purchaser under Agreement to Sell in Suit for Permanent Injunction against Third Party - Held, a proposed purchaser under an agreement to sell lacks locus standi to file a suit for a permanent injunction against a third party claiming independent title and possession of the property, as such an agreement does not confer proprietary rights. The rights under an agreement to sell are personal, enforceable only against the vendor or, in limited cases under Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, against a subsequent transferee with notice, but not against third parties with no privity of contract. The suit by the respondent (proposed purchaser) was not maintainable due to the absence of the vendor as a party and lack of enforceable rights against the appellant (third party). The Supreme Court set aside the trial court and High Court's dismissal of the appellant's application under Order VII Rule 11, allowed the appeal, and held the suit for permanent injunction unsustainable due to the respondent's lack of locus standi and absence of privity with the appellant. (Paras 15, 16) Correspondence RBANMS Educational Institution v. B. Gunashekar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 429 : 2025 INSC 490 : [2025] 5 SCR 94

Section 53A - Lis Pendens - Protection under Section 53A for a person possessing a property under part performance of a contract, is not available to a party who knowingly entered into the agreement despite being aware of pending litigation. (Para 9) Raju Naidu v. Chenmouga Sundra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 331 : 2025 INSC 368

Section 54 - Agreement to Sell - Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Section 100 - An agreement to sell does not, in itself, create any interest in or charge on the immovable property - A transfer of immovable property by way of sale can only be by a registered deed of conveyance (sale deed) - An agreement to sell, whether with or without possession, is not a conveyance and will not confer any title or transfer any interest in the immovable property (except for the limited right under Section 53-A of the TP Act) - Held that an Agreement to Sell does not confer any title, the property agreed to be sold but for which the sale deed was executed after the owner's death, was still the property of the deceased at the time of death and would be subject to division - When a Court forms the view that no substantial question of law arises for consideration in a Second Appeal, it has no choice but to dismiss the appeal in limine, though it must still give reasons for the dismissal. [Relied on Suraj Lamp & Industries (P) Ltd. (2) v. State of Haryana, (2012) 1 SCC 656; Para 7] Zoharbee v. Imam Khan, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1014 : 2025 INSC 1245

Section 54 - An agreement for sale of immovable property does not transfer title under Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. Title can only be transferred by a registered sale deed as per the Indian Registration Act, 1908. Indian Overseas Bank v. M.A.S Subramanian, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 77

Section 54 - Registration Act, 1908; Section 17, 49- In a dispute concerning an agreement to sell dated 24.05.2014, the appellant argued that the agreement was a security for a loan, akin to a mortgage, and sought to repay the loan to redeem the property. However, the agreement to sell, along with an unregistered power of attorney and related documents, was held incapable of conferring title, interest, or ownership rights in the immovable property, as per Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. These documents were revoked by the appellant on 24.05.2022 and 27.05.2022, prior to the execution of the impugned sale deeds. The absence of a suit for specific performance by Respondent No. 1 further weakened their claim, as an agreement to sell, without registration, does not convey title or create any interest in the property. This position was reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in Suraj Lamp & Industries (P) Ltd. v. State of Haryana, (2012) 1 SCC 656, which clarified that unregistered agreements to sell, even with possession, do not transfer title or interest, except to the limited extent provided under Section 53-A of the TP Act. The Court further held that a power of attorney does not transfer title and is revocable unless coupled with interest, and a will is not a transfer inter vivos, taking effect only post the testator's death. Transactions like SA/GPA/WILL do not constitute valid transfers of immovable property and cannot be relied upon for claiming ownership or effecting mutations in records. This legal position was reiterated in Cosmos Co. Operative Bank Ltd. v. Central Bank of India & Ors., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 352 and Shakeel Ahmed v. Syed Akhlaq Hussain, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1526, emphasizing that only a registered deed of conveyance can legally transfer title in immovable property, and unregistered documents cannot confer enforceable rights under the Registration Act, 1908, and the TP Act. (Para 9.2,9.3) Vinod Infra Developers Ltd. v. Mahaveer Lunia, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 630 : 2025 INSC 772 : AIR 2025 SC 2933

Section 54 - Sale of immovable property with a value over Rs. 100 must be made by a registered instrument - A contract for sale (agreement to sell) does not, by itself, create any interest in or charge on the property - At best, it gives the buyer the right to file a suit for specific performance if the seller avoids executing a sale deed - A GPA (General Power of Attorney) is an instrument that creates an agency, authorizing the grantee to perform specific acts on behalf of the grantor - A GPA does not, by itself, constitute an instrument of transfer of immovable property, even if it contains clauses making it irrevocable or authorizing the attorney to sell the property. [Paras 18-22] Ramesh Chand v. Suresh Chand, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 862 : 2025 INSC 1059

Section 54 - The appellant, Indian Overseas Bank, challenged the findings of the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT) regarding the ownership of a property allegedly agreed to be sold to a company in exchange for shares. The NCLAT held that the company was in possession of the property by way of part performance of the contract and that the sale deed executed by legal representatives was not binding on the company. Whether the NCLAT was correct in holding that the sale deed was not binding on the company based on the company's possession under part performance of an unregistered agreement. Held, the NCLAT exceeded its jurisdiction by declaring the sale deed as not binding, as no registered sale deed was executed. The Court reiterated that under Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, an agreement for sale does not transfer ownership rights. Consequently, the legal owner remained the same until a registered sale deed was executed. The Supreme Court partly allowed the appeals, setting aside the NCLAT's declaration regarding the non-binding nature of the sale deed. However, the Court clarified that no adjudication was made on the ownership rights claimed by the parties, and all remedies for seeking declarations or enforcing rights were kept open. This judgment reinforces the principle that title to immovable property can only be transferred through a duly registered sale deed and not merely by possession under an agreement for sale. Indian Overseas Bank v. M.A.S Subramanian, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 77

Sections 54, 58(e), and 78 - A mortgage created by deposit of title deeds constitutes a legal mortgage and prevails over an equitable mortgage created by deposit of an unregistered agreement to sell, as the latter does not create any interest or charge on the property. An equitable mortgage operates in personam and does not bind third parties, unlike a legal mortgage, which creates a charge enforceable in rem. The equitable mortgage of the Central Bank of India (Respondent No. 1), based on an unregistered agreement to sell, was subservient to the legal mortgage of Cosmos Co-operative Bank Ltd. (Appellant), created by deposit of a share certificate equivalent to title deeds. Under Section 78 of the TP Act, the respondent's equitable charge was postponed due to lack of public notice and failure to deposit title deeds, prioritizing the appellant's legal mortgage. Appeal allowed. (Para 42, 43, 47, 52) Cosmos Co-operative Bank Ltd. v. Central Bank of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 226 : 2025 INSC 243

Section 55 - Specific Relief Act 1963; Sections 22 and 28(3) - Specific Performance - Possession of Suit Property - In a suit for specific performance, where exclusive possession of the suit property is with the defendant at the time of the decree, the relief of transfer of possession is implicit in the decree directing the execution of a sale deed in favor of the plaintiff. A separate claim for possession is not mandatory in such cases, as per the combined reading of Sections 22 and 28(3) of the Specific Relief Act and Section 55 of the Transfer of Property Act. (Para 64, 65) Sulthan Said Ibrahim v. Prakasan, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 622 : 2025 INSC 764 : AIR 2025 SC 2979

Section 122 - Once the document is declared as “gift”, Defendant No.1 had no right to cancel the same unilaterally and the Sub Registrar had no right to register the cancellation deed. Once the document is categorized as a gift, in the absence of any clause or reservation to cancel, the executant has no right to cancel the same. The reasons for cancellation or revocation of gift have to be proved in a court of law. Therefore, the unilateral cancellation of the document is void and as a natural corollary, the sale deed dated 19.10.1993 executed by Defendant No.1 / father also, is invalid. (Para 18) N.P. Saseendran v. N.P. Ponnamma, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 345 : 2025 INSC 388 : AIR 2025 SC 1987 : (2025) 7 SCC 502

Trust

Constructive Trust - Supreme Court laid down tentative list which may signify that the society may be considered as a 'constructive trust' - i. the method of devolution of property to the institution or its acquisition and circumstances along with the intention behind the grant of property i.e. whether it was for the benefit of the organization/public beneficiaries or for the personal benefit of any particular individual/family; ii. Whether grant is accompanied with any obligation or qualified with a condition, either express or implied, regarding its use by the grantee; iii. Whether the 'dedication' was complete i.e. whether there was an absolute cessation or complete relinquishment of ownership of property on part of the grantor and subsequent vesting of the property in another individual for the said object; iv. Whether public user or an unascertained class of individuals could exercise any 'right' over the organization and its properties; v. the manner of use of profits accrued, more particularly, whether it is applied/re-applied towards the benefit of the organization and its objectives etc. [Para 137] Operation Asha v. Shelly Batra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 775

Indian Trusts Act, 1882 - Sections 3, 13 - Issue - Whether a criminal complaint under Section 138 of the NI Act is maintainable against the Chairman/a Trustee of a Trust, who signed the dishonoured cheque on behalf of the Trust, without arraying the Trust itself as an accused – Held, cheque dishonour complaint maintainable against trustee without arraying trust as accused- Trust is not a Legal Entity/Juristic Person - A 'Trust' under the Indian Trusts Act, 1882, is defined as an obligation annexed to the ownership of property, and not a legal entity with a separate existence capable of suing or being sued - It is the Trustee(s) who are legally bound to maintain and defend all suits for the preservation of the trust property- Therefore, a Trust is not like a corporation or 'body corporate' - Liability of Cheque Signatory - Held that the signatory of a cheque that is dishonoured is clearly responsible for the incriminating act and will be covered under sub-section (2) of Section 141 (by analogy to a company officer) - For such a person, there is no need to make a specific averment that he was in charge of and responsible to the entity for the conduct of its business - Appeal allowed. [Relied on SMS Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. Neeta Bhalla, (2005) 8 SCC 89; K K Ahuja v. V K Vora, (2009) 10 SCC 48; Paras 18, 22, 23, 25- 27] Sankar Padam Thapa v. Vijaykumar Dineshchandra Agarwal, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 991 : 2025 INSC 1210

Public Charitable Trusts - Constructive Trust - Maintainability Suit – Held, a formal 'entrustment' of property or funds by a third party is not a necessary ingredient to deem a society for public charitable purposes, by its very nature, is intended for the benefit of those in need, thereby becoming property 'entrusted' to it, thus acquiring the character of a 'constructive trust' - A constructive trust arises by operation of law where a person holding title to property would profit by a wrong or be unjustly enriched - Appellant is engaged in a 'public purpose of charitable nature' given its principal activity of providing healthcare services to underprivileged sections - Supreme Court reiterated that the 'dominant purpose' of the suit, accessible strictly from the plaint's allegations, determines whether leave must be granted under Section 92 CPC, and that such suits are of a representative character for vindication of public rights, not merely personal rights - Entity won't lose character of public trust by mere registration under Societies Registration Act - There's no bar to a representative suit under Section 92 of CPC against a society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860, if it qualifies as a 'Constructive Trust' - Appellantentity was not a registered 'trust', it functions at par with a 'constructive trust' because its funds are meant solely for public benefit - Appeal dismissed. [Paras 42-55, 90, 107, 136] Operation Asha v. Shelly Batra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 775

Will

Partition - Family Settlement - Oral family settlement - Registered will - Where a will distributes properties in defines proportions among family members and an oral family settlement also distributes properties in almost the same properties and there is material to establish that the testator anticipated conflicts and divided properties to avoid them - Then the existence and persuasive nature of the oral family settlement can be countenanced - especially when supported by the fact of possession of the properties - Supreme Court upheld genuineness of will [Paras 9,10-12] Metpalli Lasum Bai v. Metapalli Muthaih, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 734 : 2025 INSC 879

Will - Registered Will - Proof of execution - Presumption of Genuineness - Burden of Proof – Held, a registered will carries a presumption of genuineness - The burden of proof to establish that a registered will was not executed as alleged or that suspicious circumstances render it doubtful, lies on the party disputing its existence. The genuineness of the registered will was beyond doubt - Set Aside order of High Court and restored order of Trial Court - Appeals allowed. [Para 9] Metpalli Lasum Bai v. Metapalli Muthaih, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 734 : 2025 INSC 879

Moulding of relief - The concept of moulding of relief refers to the ability of a court to modify or shape a relief sought by a party in a legal proceeding based on the circumstances of the case and the facts established after a full-fledged trial. The principle enables the court to grant appropriate remedies even if the relief requested in the pleading is not exact or could not be considered by the court or changed circumstances have rendered the relief obsolete. The court aims that justice is served while taking into account the evolving nature of a case. The above road map is pursued by a court based on the notion of flexibility in relief, equitable jurisdiction, and is tempered by judicial discretion. When moulding the relief, the court considers the issues and circumstances established during the full-fledged trial, looks at shortening the litigation, and then in its perspective, renders complete justice to the issue at hand. The converse of the above is that the moulded relief should not take the aggrieved party by surprise or cause prejudice. The relief is moulded as an exception and not as a matter of course. (Para 20) J. Ganapatha v. N. Selvarajalou Chetty Trust, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 353 : 2025 INSC 395

Moulding of relief - Shortening Litigation - It would not be in the interest of justice to make the executor-HBN Shetty (80 years) to file another suit to oblige the terms of the Will of the testatrix, who was found as a real owner of the property. Therefore, instead of asking him to file another suit, the High Court was justified in moulding the relief in favor of the executor so that the fruits of the Will could be reaped by the beneficiary- Vinayagamurthy and his children. (Para 22 & 24) J. Ganapatha v. N. Selvarajalou Chetty Trust, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 353 : 2025 INSC 395

Validity of will - Rajasthan Escheats Regulation Act, 1956 - Probate of will – Held, State cannot invoke Doctrine of Escheat to challenge a will which is granted probate - Government is a stranger to the property when a Hindu hireless male dies with a will - The state's locus standi to assail the probate grant was negated by the Court, as the case involved testamentary succession, not intestate succession attracting Section 29 of HAS - The Court emphasized the doctrine of escheat under section 29 applies only when an intestate leaves no heir qualified under the HAS - It has to be ascertained as to whether there are any Class1 or Class 2 heirs, agnates or cognates - Only on the failure of any qualified heir being present to succeed to the properties, under the HAS Act, Section 29 of the said Act would apply as it would be a case of failure of heirs - Since probate was granted by the High Court, the legatees under the will, had the right to succeed - Held that it is only in the event of intestate succession. Section 29 of the HAS Act applying that there would be a devolution of the estate of a deceased male Hindu on the government and not otherwise - Supreme Court imposed Rs. 1 lakh each on Petitioners for suppression and clarified that only heirs or persons entitled to succeed could seek revocation under Section 263 of Indian Succession Act, if probate was wrongfully granted. Appeal dismissed. [Paras 5 - 6] State of Rajasthan v. Ajit Singh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 906