Subject Index - Supreme Court Quarterly Digest Jan - Mar, 2026

Administrative Law

Administrative Law — Doctrine of Legitimate Expectation — Policy Change — Lack of Probity and Transparency - Service/Education Law — Alteration of the "Rules of the Game" - Supreme Court found that the policy modification was prompted by an undisclosed representation from the father of a high-ranking candidate who failed to disclose his private interest - Such a change, introduced after the issuance of the prospectus and the submission of applications, violates the principle of fairness and predictability - Reiterated the well-settled principle that the criteria for selection/admission cannot be altered by the authorities once the process has commenced - Noted that the State adopted "double standards" as the expanded criteria were not applied to other allied medical courses during the same session – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation vs. Rajendra Bhimrao Mandve (2001) 10 SCC 51; K. Manjusree vs. State of Andhra Pradesh (2008) 3 SCC 512; Tej Prakash Pathak vs. Rajasthan High Court (2025) 2 SCC 1; Mandeep Singh vs. State of Punjab (2025) INSC 834; Paras 20-40] Divjot Sekhon v. State of Punjab, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 12 : 2026 INSC 26

Administrative Law – Interest Liability – Delay by Government Authority: The Supreme Court upheld the TDSAT's finding that the Department of Telecommunications (DoT) could not levy interest for the period during which it "slept over the matter." - Interest is only payable from the expiry of the notice period stipulated in the show-cause notice (December 8, 2014), rather than the date of the Court's order in 2013, as the delay in issuing the demand was attributable solely to the DoT - For successful bidders in the fresh auction, the liability to pay the interim reserve price ceases on the date the Letter of Intent (LoI) is issued, as the LoI stipulates the commencement of the new 20-year term – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Centre for Public Interest Litigation and others vs. Union of India and others (2012) 3 SCC 1; Paras 14-17] Union of India v. Sistema Shyam Teleservices, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 184 : 2026 INSC 174 : AIR 2026 SC 1123

Administrative Law – Publication and Promulgation – Noted that Law, to bind, must first exist and be made known in the manner ordained by the legislature - The requirement of publication in the Official Gazette for delegated legislation is not an "empty formality" but a dual-purpose constitutional requirement to ensure accessibility to the governed and accountability in the exercise of executive power - Until publication, a Notification is merely an "intention" and has not crossed the threshold to become a legal "obligation." Viraj Impex Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 76 : 2026 INSC 80

Administrative Law – Retrospective Validation – Ex Post Facto Approval – Whether subsequent Board approval can cure a jurisdictional defect in a CLU issued without statutory backing. Held: When a statute prescribes a particular manner for doing an act, it must be done in that manner and no other - A CLU that is unlawful on the date of its grant for want of statutory authority does not become lawful merely because of a later administrative decision, unless the statute expressly confers power for retrospective validation. [Paras 41-48, 53-59] Harbinder Singh Sekhon v. State of Punjab, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 162 : 2026 INSC 159

Administrative Remedy

Administrative Remedy – Representation to Chief Justice – Re-employment – Supreme Court granted liberty to the petitioner to make a representation before the Chief Justice of the High Court - The Chief Justice is requested to gather information regarding disparities in superannuation ages across States and engage with the State Government on the administrative side - Decisions regarding re-employment and continuation in service must be taken by the Chief Justice in consultation with puisne Judges. [Paras 3-5] Ranjeet Kumar v. State of Jharkhand, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 123

Amicus Curiae

Amicus Curiae - Procedure for Appointing Amicus Curiae for Absentee Appellants – Guidelines – To prevent technical pleas of unfairness, the Supreme Court directed that when appointing an Amicus Curiae due to the absence of a convict's counsel, the Registry should issue notice to the convict's address via the jurisdictional police station - If the convict remains dormant despite service (including service by pasting on the premises), the Supreme Court may proceed to decide the appeal - This process ensures the Court knows if the appeal survives or has abated after long periods. Bhola Mahto v. State of Jharkhand, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 265 : 2026 INSC 257

Anticipatory Bail

Anticipatory Bail – Conditional Orders for Deposit: The Supreme Court criticized the Jharkhand High Court for making the grant of anticipatory bail contingent upon the deposit of a specific sum – Noted that High Court had directed the petitioners to file a supplementary affidavit showing payment of Rs. 9,12,926.84/- to the complainant, failing which the bail application would stand dismissed - Held, that the grant of regular or anticipatory bail should not be subject to the deposit of any amount - If a case for bail is made out, the court should pass an appropriate order; if not, it may decline - the court should not pass a conditional order for deposit and then exercise its discretion. [Relied on: Gajanan Dattatray Gore vs. State of Maharashtra & Another [(2025) SCC Online 1571; Paras 8 - 10] Prantik Kumar v. State of Jharkhand, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 131

Anticipatory Bail – Grounds for Grant – Civil Dispute and Parity – In a case involving alleged trespass and theft under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, Supreme Court found the appellant entitled to anticipatory bail based on three key factors- i. The appellant appeared before the IO as directed by the interim protection order; ii. The nature of the dispute appears to be a civil matter regarding immovable property (possession based on an agreement to sell); iii. Other co-accused in the same FIR had already been granted bail, establishing a ground for parity – Appeal allowed. [Paras 6, 7] Shally Mahant @ Sandeep v. State of Punjab, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 146

Anticipatory Bail — Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 — Section 18 — Cancellation of Anticipatory Bail - The Supreme Court allowed the appeals and cancelled the anticipatory bail granted to the respondents, observing that a prima facie case under the SC/ST Act was established - noted that while the High Court relied on the absence of casteist slurs in the initial FIR (lodged by a police official based on a social media video), it failed to exercise sufficient caution in examining other records - an affidavit filed by the Deputy Superintendent of Police and statements of various persons clearly alleged the use of casteist slurs and violence by the upper-caste respondents against marginalized community members over a drainage dispute – noted that the bar under Section 18 of the SC/ST Act, which precludes the grant of anticipatory bail, is applicable when the ingredients of the offence are prima facie disclosed - In this case, investigation reports indicated offences under the SC/ST Act, the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, and the Arms Act - noted that mere attempts at reconciliation by the police cannot prevent the taking of cognizance for criminal acts - Supreme Court found that the High Court erred in concluding there was no prima facie culpability, as subsequent investigation reports and affidavits by high-ranking police officials corroborated allegations of caste-based abuse and firearm discharge – Appeals allowed. [Relied on Shajan Skaria v. State of Kerala, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2249; Paras 8-15] Kuldeep Singh v. State of Punjab, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 239

Allocation of Cadre

Indian Police Service (IPS) – Request for re-allocation to 'insider' vacancy – Finality of Selection – The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals of an IPS officer seeking re-allocation from the Tamil Nadu cadre to an 'insider' vacancy in the Rajasthan cadre from the 2004 examination batch - held that cadre allocation cannot remain fluid indefinitely, as it would lead to a "chain reaction" of reshuffling among selected candidates from the same batch – Noted that the appellant, who was third in the merit list for the 'insider' vacancy, raised his grievance in 2010, six years after the selection process - noted that the appellant had already served in the Tamil Nadu cadre for over two decades by the time of the final hearing. Rupesh Kumar Meena v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 122 : 2026 INSC 119 : AIR 2026 SC 900

Allotment of Housing

Eligibility Criteria – Nepotism and Self-Aggrandizement – Supreme Court set aside the allotment of super deluxe flats to a Governing Body member (Respondent No. 3) and his subordinate (Respondent No. 4) – i. Ineligibility of Respondent No. 3: The allotment was deemed a "blatant display of self-aggrandizement" as the respondent did not satisfy the mandatory six-month deputation period at the time of application and had not submitted a timely application or earnest money deposit (Para 13, 14); ii. Ineligibility of Respondent No. 4: The Court found that Respondent No. 4 did not fall within the stipulated pay-band level (Level 10 to 20) and that the Governing Body's decision to "regularize" the allotment by carving out an exception was an arbitrary exercise of power. [Paras 15, 16] Dinesh Kumar v. State of Haryana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 171 : 2026 INSC 163 : AIR 2026 SC 1495

Appointment

Appointment of Director General of Police (DGP) – Role of UPSC and State Government – Delay in submitting proposals – Selection Guidelines – i. Mandate for Regular Appointment: The Supreme Court reiterated the necessity of appointing a regular Director General of Police (Head of Police Force) in accordance with the time-frame and scheme established in Prakash Singh vs. Union of India, (2006) 8 SCC 1; ii. Obligation of UPSC: Despite inordinate delays by State Governments in submitting proposals, the UPSC is obligated to convene the Empanelment Committee Meeting (ECM) to prevent further aggravation of the situation and to ensure meritorious senior officers are not overlooked; iii. Ad hoc Arrangements Criticized: The Supreme Court expressed concern over States preferring ad hoc arrangements (appointing acting DGPs) instead of regular appointments, which led to the UPSC inserting paragraph 4(xii) into its guidelines requiring States to seek leave from the Supreme Court for delayed submissions; iv. Enforcement Mechanism: To ensure compliance with the Prakash Singh mandate, the UPSC is authorized to: a. Write to State Governments for timely proposals whenever a vacancy arises; b. Move an application before the Supreme Court for enforcement if a State fails to submit a timely proposal; v. Accountability: held that those responsible for the delay in submitting proposals shall be held accountable. [Paras 7-11] Union Public Service Commission v. T. Dhangopal Rao, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 144

Appointment of Vice-Chancellor – Conflict between State/UT Act and UGC Regulations – Legislative Competence – Doctrine of Repugnancy - The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court's decision to strike down Section 14(5) of the Puducherry Technological University Act, 2019 (PTU Act) for being inconsistent with Regulation 7.3 of the UGC Regulations, 2018 - held that since UGC Regulations trace their source to Entry 66 of List I (Union List), they possess an overriding effect over State/UT legislations enacted under Entry 25 of List III (Concurrent List) - The Search-cum-Selection Committee for a Vice-Chancellor must necessarily include a nominee of the Chairman, UGC, and its members must not be connected with the University - Key Legal Issues & Rulings – i. Primacy of Entry 66 List I over Entry 25 List III - Supreme Court reiterated that while both the Union and States can legislate on "Education" under Entry 25 of List III, such power is expressly subject to Entry 66 of List I (Coordination and determination of standards) - Any State legislation that impinges upon or dilutes the standards prescribed by the Union under Entry 66 is ultra vires; ii. Mandatory Nature of UGC Regulations - Regulation 7.3 of the UGC Regulations, 2018, which mandates the inclusion of a UGC nominee in the Search-cum-Selection Committee, is an integral component of "standards in higher education." - Section 14(5) of the PTU Act, which omitted this requirement and included a government official (Pro-Chancellor) in the committee, was declared invalid; iii. Doctrine of Repugnancy and Article 254(2) - noted that the doctrine of repugnancy under Article 254 and the need for Presidential assent apply only when both Central and State legislations operate within the Concurrent List - Since the UGC Act and Regulations are referable to List I (Entry 66), the question of curing repugnancy via Article 254(2) does not arise; iv. Exercise of Article 142 Powers - Despite finding the appointment procedure illegal, Supreme Court invoked its extraordinary powers under Article 142 to allow the appellant to complete his tenure (ending December 2026) - This was done to avoid "grave stigma" to the academician and administrative disruption, noting there were no allegations against the appellant's integrity or merit. [Relied on Hoechst Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. State of Bihar (1983) 4 SCC 45; Gambhirdhan K. Gadhvi v. State of Gujarat (2022) 5 SCC 179; Paras 37-43, 46-48, 51-52] Dr. S. Mohan v. Puducherry Technological University, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 96 : 2026 INSC 100 : AIR 2026 SC 730

Acquittal

Distinction between "Honourable Acquittal" and "Acquittal on Benefit of Doubt" – An honourable acquittal occurs when the court definitively concludes that the accused did not commit the offence - In contrast, an acquittal based on a "benefit of doubt" due to a weak prosecution case or lack of credible evidence is a technical consideration and does not constitute a "clean chit". [Para 5] State of Madhya Pradesh v. Rajkumar Yadav, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 234 : 2026 INSC 225 : AIR 2026 SC 1471

Auction Law

Auction Law – Cancellation of Highest Bid – Arbitrariness – Whether a valid auction can be cancelled solely on the expectation of obtaining a higher price in a subsequent auction – Held, No – An auction process has a sanctity attached to it - The highest bid can only be discarded for valid reasons when the auction is otherwise held in accordance with law - Merely because an authority expects a higher bid than what was offered cannot be a reason to discard the highest bid, especially when it is above the reserve price - held that once a person is declared the highest bidder in an auction for a plot, it crystalises the future rights and obligations between the parties. Golden Food Products India v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 22 : 2026 INSC 22

Campus Suicide

Campus Suicide – Mandatory registration of FIR – Higher Educational Institutions (HEIs) - Institutional Responsibility vs. Student Autonomy - Mandatory Directions under Article 142 - The Supreme Court addressed the alarming rise in student suicides across Higher Educational Institutions (HEIs) in India - Recognized student suicide as the "visible tip of a much larger iceberg of student distress," Supreme Court noted that the legal and moral obligation of educational authorities to create safe, inclusive, and nurturing environments - Supreme Court reviewed an interim report by a National Task Force (NTF) and issued several mandatory directions under Article 142 of the Constitution to address structural, social, and academic stressors - Key Legal Issues & Rulings held – i. Mandatory Registration of F.I.R. for Campus Suicides – Noted that educational institutions have an unequivocal legal obligation to promptly lodge an F.I.R. with appropriate authorities if an incident of suicide occurs on campus - This follows the clarification of law regarding mandatory registration of F.I.R.s in the event of disclosure of a cognizable offence; ii. Institutional Responsibility vs. Student Autonomy - Supreme Court criticized the tendency of HEIs to "shift the blame" onto the individual autonomy of the deceased student to avoid institutional responsibility - held that HEIs cannot shirk their fundamental duty to ensure institutions are safe and conducive spaces for learning; iii. Mandatory Directions under Article 142 - Data Maintenance: SRS data on suicides for the 15-29 age group must be centrally maintained - The NCRB must distinguish between school-going and higher education students in its reports; iv. Reporting Protocol - HEIs must report all student suicides or unnatural deaths (on or off-campus) to police immediately - Annual reports of such incidents must be submitted to regulatory bodies like UGC, NMC, BCI, etc; v. Faculty Vacancies - All vacant faculty positions, with priority to reserved categories (SC/ST/OBC/PwD), must be filled within four months; vi. Scholarship Disbursements: Pending scholarship backlogs must be cleared within four months - HEIs are strictly prohibited from barring students from exams or hostels due to administrative delays in scholarship disbursals; vii. Regulatory Compliance - HEIs must strictly adhere to UGC regulations concerning Ragging (2009), Equity (2012), Sexual Harassment (2016), and Grievance Redressal (2023); viii. Accessibility and Mental Health - Supreme Court mandated accessibility audits for marginalized groups (PwDs and Transgender students) and emphasized the need for student-friendly mental health services provided by qualified professionals rather than untrained faculty members. [Relied on Sukdeb Saha v. The State of Andhra Pradesh, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1515; Paras 19-39; 44, 45] Amit Kumar v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 56 : 2026 INSC 62

Certified Copy

Certified Copy - The Supreme Court has reiterated that a statutory appeal cannot be entertained without a certified copy of the impugned judgment. Central Bank of India v. Bijendra Kumar Jha, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 273

Cinema

The Supreme Court dismissed a writ petition seeking a stay on release of the film “Yadav Ji ki Love Story”, holding that the title of the movie does not portray the Yadav community in a negative manner. A bench of Justice BV Nagarathna and Justice Ujjal Bhuyan noted that the title did not contain any adjective or word that attached any negative meaning to the community. Awdesh Kumar Yadav v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 215

Civil Law

Civil Law – Hereditary Pujari Rights – Suit for Possession – Effect of Withdrawing Previous Suit – The Appellants claimed hereditary pujariki (priest) rights based on a 1901 decree - noted that the Appellants' predecessor had filed a subsequent suit specifically seeking possession of the temple and an injunction - This subsequent filing constituted a categorical admission that the Appellants were not in possession at that time - held that a party in settled possession does not sue for possession - the Appellants withdrew the 1944 suit with liberty to file a fresh one but failed to do so for 36 years, leading to an "inevitable inference" that they had reconciled with the factual reality of not having possession. [Paras 18–20] Ogeppa v. Sahebgouda, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 198 : 2026 INSC 191

Construction of Documents

Construction of Documents — Literal Rule vs. Purposive Construction — Supreme Court emphasized that a contract must first be constructed in its plain, ordinary, and literal meaning - If the words are clear, the intention of the parties must be derived directly from the text. Reliance on the ex-post facto conduct of parties (such as the lessor continuing to occupy a portion not demised) is unnecessary and improper when the literal expression is unambiguous – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Associated Hotels of India Ltd. v. R.N. Kapoor, AIR 1959 SC 1262; Paras 15-21] General Secretary, Vivekananda Kendra v. Pradeep Kumar Agarwalla, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 204 : 2026 INSC 199

Contractual Employment

Contractual Employment through Third-Party Contractor vs. Direct Contractual Employment – Claim for Minimum Time Scale of Pay – Distinction in Law – The Supreme Court set aside a High Court order directing the Municipal Council to pay the minimum time scale of pay to workers engaged through third-party contractors - held that a valid distinction exists between persons employed directly by a State entity and those engaged through an intermediary contractor - While regular employment involves transparent, merit-based procedures open to all citizens, contractors have absolute discretion in selecting personnel to be sent to the principal employer - Granting equal benefits and status to contractor-engaged workers would sanction an arbitrary recruitment process and bypass constitutional safeguards for public employment. [Relied on Bharat Heavy Electricals Limited vs. Mahendra Prasad Jakhmola and others, (2019) 13 SCC 82; Joint Secretary, Central Board of Secondary Education and Another Vs. Raj Kumar Mishra and Another, Civil Appeal No. 4014 of 2025; Paras 8-11] Municipal Council v. K. Jayaram, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 38

Custody of Minors

Custody of Minors – Paramount Consideration vs. Holistic Factors - The Supreme Court held that while the welfare of the child is the "paramount consideration" in custody disputes, the High Court erred in holding that other factors—such as the conduct of the parents, financial capacity, standard of living, and the child's education are not relevant – Noted that these factors have a cumulative effect and are necessary for determining a custody arrangement - noted that the respondent-wife had removed the children from Qatar to India mid-academic session without the father's consent or original passports, using "fake or duplicate" documents - This conduct, coupled with her violation of a court undertaking to return the children to Qatar for which she was found guilty of contempt constituted material aspects that the High Court failed to consider - Supreme Court highlighted that the High Court ignored the impact of the Qatar Court's order (dated 31.10.2023), which had revoked the wife's custody due to her misconduct in removing the children from its jurisdiction - The Supreme Court observed that, at the time of the High Court's judgment, there was no subsisting order of custody in favor of the mother; rather, an order existed in favor of the father as the guardian - Relying on mediation reports and interviews, noted that both minor children expressed an inclination to join their father in Qatar, despite limited memory of life there - The elder child felt his father's presence was sufficient for his care, and both appeared comfortable being without their mother - The High Court judgment was set aside for ignoring "material and crucial aspects." The matter was remanded for reconsideration on merits within four months – Appeal allowed. [Paras 22-33] Mohtashem Billah Malik v. Sana Aftab, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 115

Delay

Condonation of Delay – Special Leave Petition – Consistent Negligence by Statutory Body – The Supreme Court dismissed a Special Leave Petition filed by the Delhi Development Authority (DDA) due to an unexplained and "fatal" delay of 235 days - noted a pattern of consistent delay by the DDA, highlighting prior delays of 685 days in filing a Letters Patent Appeal (LPA) and 577 days in filing a review petition before the High Court - clarified that a development authority cannot be granted special indulgence or immunity from limitation periods simply by virtue of its status - The explanation provided for the delay was deemed neither satisfactory nor sufficient in law – Noted that that the DDA should implement a robust litigation policy and screening process for cases before filing them belatedly, noting that such actions contribute to "docket explosion" and the unnecessary consumption of judicial time - The petition was dismissed on the grounds of delay with a cost of Rs. 10,000/- to be paid to the Supreme Court Legal Services Committee within six weeks. Delhi Development Authority v. Shilya, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 75

Delay - Important Observations on Incarceration & Procedural Delay - i. Attribution of Delay - noted that procedural history did not support the claim that delay was solely due to prosecutorial or judicial inaction. It observed that at various stages, the prosecution was ready to proceed, while the defense raised objections, requested deferments, or filed successive applications; ii. Complexity of the Case - noting the volume of documentary and electronic evidence and the nature of the "structured and continuing conspiracy," noted that the proceedings are inherently time-consuming; iii. Threshold for Constitutional Intervention- held that for constitutional intervention to override a statutory embargo, there must be a finding that continued detention has become "punitive or unconscionable". [Relied on Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb (2021) 3 SCC 713; National Investigation Agency v. Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali (2019) 5 SCC 1; Union of India v. Saleem Khan (2025) SCC OnLine SC 1754; Paras 104-106, 387-390, 430, 431] Gulfisha Fatima v. State (Govt of NCT of Delhi), 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 1 : 2026 INSC 2 : 2026 1 Crimes (SC) 32

Delay and Laches - Reopening of Concluded Litigation – "Fence-sitters" – The Supreme Court dismissed Special Leave Petitions filed by primary school teachers seeking to revive a service dispute that had attained finality over a decade ago - The petitioners sought directions similar to a 2021 High Court order which directed the consideration of a representation for higher grade pay scales - held that the petitioners, whose services were terminated in 1994 and whose prior challenges were dismissed in 2009 and 2011, were not "identically situated" to the 2021 petitioner who was still in service. Damor Nanabhai Manabhai v. State of Gujarat, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 104

Digitalization

Digitalization of Judiciary — e-Courts Project — Handwritten Orders — Supreme Court expressed concern over Tribunals continuing to use handwritten, illegible order sheets despite the national e-Courts project started in 2007 - High Courts directed to ensure computers provided are utilized and that officers' names and UID numbers are clearly mentioned on orders. [Relied on Parminder Singh v. Honey Goyal and Others, 2025 INSC 361: (2025) 9 SCC 539; Paras 10-18] National Insurance Company Ltd v. Rathlavath Chandulal, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 149 : 2026 INSC 146

Disciplinary Inquiry

Disciplinary Inquiry – Standard of Proof and Perversity – Administrative Law – Maxim “Nemo Firut Repente Turpissimus” - While a Court does not typically act as an appellate authority over an inquiry report, it can interfere if the findings are "perverse," meaning no reasonable person would have reached such a conclusion on the available material – Held in this case, neither the complainant nor the stenographer (alleged to be the conduit for bribes) was examined, and the Public Prosecutor testified that the bail orders were proper- Held that Authorities should not ignore the long-standing reputation of an officer when evaluating a sudden allegation of "doubtful integrity" based on a mere hunch or hypothesis. [Relied on Sadhna Chaudhary v. State of U.P. (2020) 11 SCC 760; R.R. Parekh v. High Court of Gujarat (2016) 14 SCC 1; Union of India v. K.K. Dhawan (1993) 2 SCC 56; Ishwar Chand Jain v. High Court of Punjab and Haryana (1988) 3 SCC 370; Krishna Prasad Verma v. State of Bihar (2019) 10 SCC 640; Paras 29-40] Nirbhay Singh Suliya v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 2 : 2026 INSC 7

Disciplinary Inquiry – Principles of Natural Justice – The appellant alleged a gross breach of natural justice, claiming the inquiry officer abruptly closed proceedings on August 1, 2017, preventing the completion of cross-examination of management witnesses - The High Court erred by not considering these allegations of procedural lapses and the merits of the Tribunal's original findings while ordering a remand. Hemlata Eknath Pise v. Shubham Bahu Uddeshiya Sanstha Waddhamna, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 177 : 2026 INSC 147

Disciplinary Proceedings against Judicial Officers – Removal from service based solely on judicial orders – Permissibility – Appellant, a judicial officer with 27 years of unblemished service, was removed for granting bail in four cases under the M.P. Excise Act without expressly mentioning the "twin conditions" of Section 59-A - Held: Merely because a judicial order is wrong, erroneous, or fails to refer to a statutory provision, it cannot be the basis for disciplinary action unless there is evidence of corrupt motive or extraneous consideration - The High Court must exercise great caution and protect honest officers from unmerited onslaughts based on motivated complaints. Order of removal set aside with full back wages. Nirbhay Singh Suliya v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 2 : 2026 INSC 7

Disciplinary Proceedings – Continuance after Superannuation – Permissibility of Punishment – Punjab and Sind Bank Officers' Service Regulations, 1982; Regulation 20(3)(iii) – Punjab and Sind Bank Employees' Pension Regulations, 1995; Regulation 48 - The Supreme Court upheld the dismissal of a writ petition filed by a retired bank officer challenging a punishment of "reduction by three stages in the time scale of pay" imposed after his superannuation - Key Findings by Supreme Court – i. Continuance of Proceedings: If service rules permit, disciplinary proceedings initiated before superannuation can be continued and brought to a logical conclusion even after the employee attains the age of superannuation; ii. Legal Fiction of Service - Regulation 20(3)(iii) of the Service Regulations creates a legal fiction where the officer is deemed to be in service until the proceedings are concluded; iii. Implementability of Punishment - The Court rejected the argument that only penalties under Pension Regulations could be imposed post-retirement - held that a punishment of reduction in pay scale relates back to the date of superannuation and is implementable because pension is computed based on the salary last drawn/payable; iv. Misconduct by Bank Officers: A bank officer holds a position of trust - Failure to ensure the end-use of a loan constitutes a financial irregularity that exposes the bank to risk and amounts to misconduct, regardless of whether an actual loss was suffered. [Relied on Chairman-cum-Managing Director, Mahanadi Coalfields Ltd. vs. Rabindranath Choubey (2020) 18 SCC 71; Ramesh Chandra Sharma vs. Punjab National Bank and Another (2007) 9 SCC 15; State Bank of India vs. Ram Lal Bhaskar (2011) 10 SCC 249; Paras 25-37] Virinder Pal Singh v. Punjab and Sind Bank, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 268 : 2026 INSC 266

Disciplined Force

Character and Suitability for Disciplined Force – Held that a candidate for the police force must possess impeccable character, rectitude, and integrity - The employer, through a screening committee, has a wide realm of discretion to assess the suitability of a candidate based on their criminal antecedents, even if an acquittal has been recorded - An acquittal based on technical grounds or "benefit of doubt" does not automatically entitle a candidate to appointment. State of Madhya Pradesh v. Rajkumar Yadav, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 234 : 2026 INSC 225 : AIR 2026 SC 1471

Dearness Allowance (DA)

Legally Enforceable Right — Financial Inability of State — The Supreme Court held that the right to receive Dearness Allowance is a legally enforceable right that accrued in favor of the employees of the State of West Bengal – Held that while the State has the discretion to formulate its pay structure, once it incorporates a specific standard (like the All-India Consumer Price Index - AICPI) into its statutory rules (ROPA Rules, 2009), it cannot deviate from that mechanism through executive memoranda. State of West Bengal v. Confederation of State Government Employees, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 120 : 2026 INSC 123 : AIR 2026 SC 1213

Departmental Enquiry

Post-Superannuation – Lack of Jurisdiction – Adoption of Rules – The Supreme Court quashed a departmental enquiry initiated against a retired employee of the Maharashtra State Warehousing Corporation (MSWC) approximately 11 months after his superannuation - Held that in the absence of specific provisions in the Maharashtra State Warehousing Corporation (Staff) Service Regulations, 1992, the Corporation could not ipso facto apply the Maharashtra Civil Services (Pension) Rules, 1982, to initiate proceedings against a retired employee without a conscious decision or resolution by the Board of Directors to adopt such rules - that a public-sector corporation cannot initiate or continue disciplinary proceedings against an employee after retirement in the absence of an express enabling provision in its service regulations. Kadirkhan Ahmedkhan Pathan v. Maharashtra State Warehousing Corporation, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 10 : 2026 INSC 16

Departmental Inquiry — Proof of Misconduct — Fabrication of Medical Certificate — Graver the charge, greater the need for caution and circumspection — Findings of Inquiry Officer based on "word against word" without expert verification held perverse — Where a charge of forgery entails mandatory dismissal, fair play requires a thorough investigation consistent with principles of natural justice – Facts - The appellant, a Court Attender, was dismissed from service on charges of unauthorized absence and submitting a fabricated medical certificate. The Inquiry Officer relied on the statement of a Medical Practitioner (PW-2) who denied issuing the certificate, despite admitting the appellant consulted him and that the letterhead belonged to him - The High Court upheld the dismissal - Supreme Court Findings – i. Perversity in Findings: The Supreme Court held that the Inquiry Officer's conclusion was perverse as it was based on no credible evidence - noted that the rubber stamp on the disputed certificate was identical to the one used by the doctor on official notices; ii. Need for Handwriting Expert: Since the certificate was fully handwritten and the doctor's undisputed signatures varied, the Inquiry Officer should have referred the matter to a handwriting expert before recording a finding of forgery; iii. Standard of Proof for Grave Charges: When charges involve consequences like loss of livelihood, investigations must be consistent with the requirement of the situation and fair play. [Relied on Sawai Singh vs. State of Rajasthan (1986) 3 SCC 454; Paras 31-45] K. Rajaiah v. High Court for the State of Telangana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 140 : 2026 INSC 142 : AIR 2026 SC 890

Doctrines

Doctrine of Manifest Arbitrariness – Evolution and Application – Held: Manifest arbitrariness is a well-settled ground for striking down plenary legislation under Article 14. A law is manifestly arbitrary when it is "capricious, irrational, or not guided by any principle" or is "excessive and disproportionate" - A legislative enactment that targets a specific entity for total deprivation of management and property rights without following due process, providing adequate compensation, or establishing a clear public necessity (beyond mere "better management") is hit by Article 14 of the Constitution – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Shayara Bano v. Union of India (2017) 9 SCC 1; E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu (1974) 4 SCC 3; Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (1978) 1 SCC 248; Paras 35-50] Anurag Krishna Sinha v. State of Bihar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 226 : 2026 INSC 219

Doctrine of Estoppel – Participation in Selection Process – The Supreme Court rejected the High Court's view that the appellant was estopped from challenging the allotment simply because he participated in the draw of lots. The Court held that participation does not bar a challenge when the process is marred by bias and arbitrary exercise of power - Supreme Court imposed costs of ₹1 lakh on the Society (HEWO), ₹50,000 on Respondent No. 3, and ₹25,000 on Respondent No. 4. It directed a fresh draw of lots among the four eligible applicants who were available at the earlier point of time – Appeal allowed. [Paras 15 - 18] Dinesh Kumar v. State of Haryana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 171 : 2026 INSC 163 : AIR 2026 SC 1495

Doctrine of Lis Pendens in Money Decrees – Supreme Court rejected the argument that lis pendens does not apply to simple money suits - If Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act were excluded from money suits, a judgment-debtor could easily defeat the decree by alienating property before execution, rendering the judicial process meaningless - Noted that "the true difficulties of a litigant begin only after they have obtained a decree". R. Savithri Naidu v. Cotton Corporation of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 151 : 2026 INSC 150 : AIR 2026 SC 913

Doctrine of Merger - Effect of Granting Leave - Once the Supreme Court grants leave in a Special Leave Petition and the appeal is thereafter decided, the doctrine of merger applies, whether the Supreme Court's order is one of reversal, modification, or mere affirmation - Distinguished cases where SLP is dismissed without granting leave, where no merger occurs – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Kunhayammed & Ors. v. State of Kerala & Anr., (2000) 6 SCC 359; Khoday Distilleries Limited & Ors. v. Sri Mahadeshwara Sahakara Sakkare Karkhane Limited, Kollegal, (2019) 4 SCC 376; Paras 11-12] United Labour Federation v. Gagandeep Singh Bedi, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 208 : 2026 INSC 204

Doctrine of Promissory Estoppel — Statutory Power — The doctrine of promissory estoppel cannot be used to manifest an outcome that precludes the State from exercising its statutory power to withdraw an exemption in the public interest - While the State can withdraw a concession, the principles of fairness and legitimate expectation require that such withdrawal should not cause "undue hardship" to those who structured their financial planning based on the earlier concession. State of Maharashtra v. Reliance Industries Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 304 : 2026 INSC 296

Economic Policy

Economic Policy and Legislative Intent — Excessive Judicial Review — Supreme Court cautioned against the strategic use of litigation by unsuccessful resolution applicants to delay the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP). Excessive judicial scrutiny beyond narrow statutory boundaries leads to value destruction, erodes the going-concern status of the Corporate Debtor, and discourages future bidders by introducing legal uncertainty - The IBC prioritizes speed, finality, and predictability to ensure efficient resource allocation in the economy. [Relied on Committee of Creditors of Essar Steel India Limited vs. Satish Kumar Gupta, (2020) 8 SCC 531; Kalyani Transco vs. Bhushan Power & Steel Ltd., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2093; Swiss Ribbons Private Ltd. vs. Union of India, (2019) 4 SCC 17; Pratap Technocrats Private Ltd. vs. Monitoring Committee of Reliance Infratel Limited, (2021) 10 SCC 623; Paras 7-14] Torrent Power v. Ashish Arjunkumar Rathi, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 207 : 2026 INSC 206 : AIR 2026 SC 1347

Economic Viability and Fiscal Prudence – Comparative data from Rajasthan reveals OCIs are significantly more cost-effective than closed prisons - Per-prisoner per-day expenditure in closed prisons is approximately Rs. 333.12, whereas in open prisons, it is only Rs. 49.60 - Staffing ratios also show marked efficiency: 6:1 in closed prisons versus 80:1 in open camps - While "Prisons" is a State subject (Schedule VII, List II), States are urged to implement the Model Prison Manual, 2016 and the Model Prisons and Correctional Services Act, 2023 to ensure uniformity and modernization - Specific Directions – i. Establishment of High-Powered Committee (HPC): Constituted under the Executive Chairmanship of Hon'ble Mr. Justice S. Ravindra Bhat (Retd.) to formulate Common Minimum Standards for OCI governance, eligibility, and management; ii. Expansion of Infrastructure: States lacking OCIs (e.g., Arunachal Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Telangana) must assess feasibility and develop protocols for establishment within three months; iii. Mandatory Monitoring: All High Courts directed to register a suo motu writ petition as a continuing mandamus to oversee compliance; iv. State Monitoring Committees: Every State/UT to constitute a committee headed by the Executive Chairman of the State Legal Services Authority within four weeks. [Relied on D. Bhuvan Mohan Patnaik v. State of Andhra Pradesh (1975) 3 SCC 185; Mohammed Giasuddin v. State of Andhra Pradesh (1977) 3 SCC 287; Dharambir v. State of Uttar Pradesh (1979) 3 SCC 645; Vikram Deo Singh Tomar v. State of Bihar (1988) SCC OnLine SC 450; Paras 33-36, 47-51, 67-71, 73] Suhas Chakma v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 205 : 2026 INSC 198

Election

Election - The Supreme Court urged the Election Commission of India to consider the suggestions put forth by a petitioner regarding measures to curb excessive election expenditures observing that the suggestions given by the petitioner are "worth consideration". Prabhakar Deshpande v. Chief Election Commissioner of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 218

Election - Where only two candidates contested an election, setting aside the winning candidate's election does not warrant a fresh poll; instead, the runner-up should be declared elected. The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's decision to direct a fresh election, after the winning candidate's election as Panchayat Samiti Chairperson was declared null and void. Ramadebi Rautray v. State of Odisha, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 260 : 2026 INSC 243

Environmental Law

Environment (Protection) Act, 1986 – Section 5 – Directions for Implementation – To bridge significant implementation gaps and ensure readiness for the 2026 Rules, Supreme Court issued nationwide directions: i. Three-Tier Enforcement: Failure to comply shall be treated as more than an administrative lapse, involving: Tier 1 (immediate fines), Tier 2 (criminal prosecution), and Tier 3 (prosecution of responsible officials for neglect of oversight duties); ii. Role of Elected Representatives: Mayors, Councillors, and Ward Members are designated as lead facilitators for source-segregation education; iii. Infrastructure and Monitoring: Mandated infrastructure audits by District Collectors and the establishment of multi-tier monitoring task forces by 15.03.2026; iv. Bulk Waste Generators (BWGs): Must register on a centralized portal and operate on-site wet waste processing facilities or procure EBWGR certificates by 31.03.2026. [Paras 12-19] Bhopal Municipal Corporation v. Dr. Subhash C. Pandey, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 182

Environmental Law – CPCB Methodology for Environmental Compensation – Scope and Applicability – The Central Pollution Control Board (CPCB) is a facilitative and indicative tool, not a rigid or exhaustive code - While primarily designed for industrial sectors, its adoption by the NGT for residential projects is not legally impermissible, especially when the resulting quantification is not arbitrary or disproportionate. Rhythm County v. Satish Sanjay Hegde, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 98 : 2026 INSC 102 : AIR 2026 SC 1523

Environmental Law – Principle of Correlation – Actual Damage vs. Statutory Violation – While mere violation of law without demonstrable harm may not automatically warrant compensation in all cases, activities with the potential to degrade the environment or those involving "flagrant violations" (such as continuing construction despite stop-work orders) justify the imposition of deterrent and restorative damages – Appeal dismissed. [Relied on M/s. Goel Ganga Developers India Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India (2018) 18 SCC 257; Deepak Nitrite Ltd. v. State of Gujarat (2004) 6 SCC 402; Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai v. Ankita Sinha (2022) 13 SCC 401; Research Foundation for Science (18) v. Union of India (2005) 13 SCC 186; Paras 21-46] Rhythm County v. Satish Sanjay Hegde, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 98 : 2026 INSC 102 : AIR 2026 SC 1523

Environmental Law – Siting Norms – Proximity to Schools and Habitations – Mandatory nature of buffer zones and siting distances. Held: Preventive safeguards and siting norms (e.g., PPCB notification dated 02.09.1998) are designed to operate in advance to prevent avoidable risk to sensitive receptors - Demonstrable compliance based on objective, verified measurements of emission sources is required at the threshold; assumptions of compliance to be tested at a later stage (Consent to Operate) are legally insufficient. [Relied on Vellore Citizens' Welfare Forum v. Union of India (1996) 5 SCC 647; K. Ramadas Shenoy v. Town Municipal Council, Udipi (1974) 2 SCC 506; A.P. Pollution Control Board v. Prof. M.V. Nayudu (1999) 2 SCC 718; Paras 26-33] Harbinder Singh Sekhon v. State of Punjab, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 162 : 2026 INSC 159

Equitable Relief

Equitable Relief — Enhanced Interest for Delay — While recognizing the membership, Supreme Court provided liberty to aggrieved members to seek "enhanced interest" or "additional amounts" due to the significant delay (from 1995/2005 to 2025) in making the contribution – Appeals allowed. [Para 47] Shashin Patel v. Uday Dalal, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 125 : 2026 INSC 125

Equitable Relief - Creation of Supernumerary Post – To balance the equities between a candidate already in service (Appellant) and a deserving candidate deprived of selection due to a contested answer (Respondent No. 3), Supreme Court directed the creation of a supernumerary post – Appellant to retain seniority over the new appointee. [Relied on Vikas Pratap Singh and Others vs. State of Chhattisgarh and Others (2013) 14 SCC 494; Paras 7 - 11] Charan Preet Singh v. Municipal Corporation Chandigarh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 253 : 2026 INSC 248 : AIR 2026 SC 1436

Equity

Equity – Fixation of Reasonable Penal Rent – While upholding the right to deduct penal rent, the Supreme Court noted that full enforcement of the management's penal policy might entirely extinguish the gratuity of retired skilled/semi-skilled workers - In an equitable exercise of jurisdiction, the Court fixed a reasonable sum of Rs. 1,000 per month as penal rent for the period beyond the grace period, balancing the interests of both parties. [Relied on Secretary, ONGC Ltd. v. V. U. Warrier (2005) 5 SCC 245; Paras 16 - 21] Management of Steel Authority of India v. Shambhu Prasad Singh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 262 : 2026 INSC 263

Estates Acquisition

Estates Acquisition Act, 1953 (West Bengal) – Sections 6(1)(j), 53, 57A, and 57B – Power of Review – Jurisdiction of Revenue Officer – Quasi-Judicial Authorities – Separation of Powers - Whether a Revenue Officer, as a quasi-judicial authority under the West Bengal Estates Acquisition (WBEA) Act, 1953, possesses the inherent or statutory power to review a vesting order that has attained finality, especially in the absence of an express legislative mandate - Key Findings of the Court – i. No Inherent Power of Review - Supreme Court reiterated that the power of review is not an inherent power; it must be expressly conferred by statute or by necessary implication - Quasi-judicial authorities can only exercise those powers specifically bestowed upon them by law; ii. Interpretation of Section 57A - held that Section 57A, which allows the State to invest authorities with the "powers of a Civil Court," does not amount to a blanket conferment of the power of substantive review - Such an interpretation would conflict with Section 57B(3), which expressly prohibits Revenue Officers from reopening matters already decided or determined; iii. Separation of Powers & Basic Structure - Conferring judicial functions like the power of review upon executive functionaries (like Revenue Officers), who lack judicial training or independence from executive control, blurs the demarcation between the executive and judiciary - This encroaches upon the Separation of Powers, which is part of the Basic Structure of the Constitution; iv. Failure on Merits of Review – Held that even if jurisdiction existed, the 2008 review failed the criteria under Order XLVII Rule 1 of the CPC - The respondent-company failed to prove it was "exclusively engaged in farming" as of January 1, 1952, despite ample opportunities in 1971 - Subsequent economic considerations or "amicable settlements" are not legally sustainable grounds for review – v. Nullity of Orders without Jurisdiction - An order passed by an authority lacking inherent jurisdiction is void ab initio and a nullity. Its invalidity can be challenged at any stage, including collateral proceedings. [Relied on: Patel Narshi Thakershi v. Pradyuman Singhji, (1971) 3 SCC 844; Kalabharati Advertising v. Hemant Vimalnath Narichania, (2010) 9 SCC 437; Union of India v. Madras Bar Assn., (2010) 11 SCC 1; Balvant N. Viswamitra v. Yadav Sadashiv Mule, (2004) 8 SCC 706; Paras 31-89] State of West Bengal v. Jai Hind Pvt. Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 126 : 2026 INSC 132

Estoppel

Estoppel and Participation – Jurisdictional Nullity – Participation in arbitral proceedings does not confer jurisdiction where an arbitration agreement is inherently absent. Since the arbitrator lacked inherent jurisdiction, the proceedings were a nullity (coram non judice) and the award was non-est - The Municipal Council was not estopped from challenging the award as it was "forced" into arbitration without consent while functioning under a State-appointed Administrator - Supreme Court rejected the application of these precedents, affirming the High Court's finding that there is no acquiescence or estoppel where a party is compelled to participate in proceedings that are a jurisdictional nullity. [Relied on N. Chellappan v. Secretary, Kerala State Electricity Board and Anr. (1975) 1 SCC 289; Inder Sain Mittal v. Housing Board, Haryana and Ors. (2002) 3 SCC 175; Paras 19-26] Bharat Udyog Ltd. v. Ambernath Municipal Council, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 291 : 2026 INSC 288

Eviction

Eviction Procedure – Procedural Safeguards – Supreme Court recorded and approved a policy mechanism evolved by the State of Assam to ensure fairness in removing encroachments: i. Committee Constitution: A committee comprising forest and revenue officials will be formed to oversee the process; ii. Notice and Hearing: Alleged unauthorized occupants must be served a notice and granted an opportunity to produce evidence of their right to occupy the land; iii. Revenue vs. Forest Land: If land is found within revenue limits and outside notified forest areas, the matter must be referred to the Revenue Department; iv. Speaking Order: If an occupation is found to be unauthorized after scrutiny, a speaking order must be passed and served; v. Grace Period: A 15-day notice period must be granted to vacate the premises after the speaking order is served. Abdul Khalek v. State of Assam, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 134 : 2026 INSC 140 : AIR 2026 SC 933

Exam

Exam Rules, 2013 & Cadre Allocation Policy – Rule 1, 13, 14, and 17 of Exam Rules read with Paragraph 9 of the Policy – Interpretation of "General Standards - Emphasized that the IFS examination is a "two-tier" process where the Preliminary Examination is an integral stage - Under the proviso to Rule 14(ii), a reserved category candidate can only be adjusted against unreserved vacancies if they have been recommended without resorting to any relaxation/concession in eligibility or selection criteria at "any stage of the examination" – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Deepa E.V. v. Union of India and Ors. (2017) 12 SCC 680; Gaurav Pradhan v. State of Rajasthan (2018) 11 SCC 352; Niravkumar Dilipbhai Makwana v. Gujarat Public Service Commission (2019) 7 SCC 383; Union of India v. Sajib Roy (2025) SCC OnLine SC 1943; Paras 25-36] Union of India v. G. Kiran, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 8

Execution

Execution of Award — Procedure of Attachment — Fairness — The Tribunal issued warrants for the attachment of office furniture, fixtures, and computers of a Public Sector Undertaking (PSU) shortly after the execution petition was filed - Held: Such a process paralyzes the working of the company – Noted that while awards must be satisfied, the Executing Court should adopt fair procedures, such as the attachment of bank accounts, rather than coercive attachment of essential office equipment without judicial mind. National Insurance Company Ltd v. Rathlavath Chandulal, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 149 : 2026 INSC 146

Foreign Trade

Foreign Trade (Development and Regulation) Act, 1992 – Section 3 – Minimum Import Price (MIP) – Commencement of Delegated Legislation – The Supreme Court held that a Notification issued under Section 3 of the Act acquires the force of law only upon its publication in the Official Gazette - The expression "date of this Notification" used in such instruments must necessarily be construed as the date of its publication in the Gazette (in this case, 11.02.2016), rather than the date it was signed or uploaded on a website (05.02.2016). Viraj Impex Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 76 : 2026 INSC 80

Foreign Trade Policy (2015-2020) – Paragraph 1.05(b) – Transitional Protection – Importers who opened irrevocable Letters of Credit prior to the actual date of Gazette publication (11.02.2016) are entitled to the transitional protection under Para 1.05(b) of the FTP - Supreme court rejected the argument that "uploading" a notification on a website constitutes sufficient notice to curtail rights before formal Gazette publication – Appeal allowed. [Relied on B.K. Srinivasan & Ors. v. State of Karnataka & Ors. (1987) 1 SCC 658; Paras 16-23] Viraj Impex Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 76 : 2026 INSC 80

Forest Law

Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980 – Ecological Balance vs. Invasive Species – Held that the mere presence of dense vegetation does not automatically signify a natural forest ecosystem, especially if the growth consists primarily of invasive alien species like Prosopis juliflora (Vilayati Kikar), which can disrupt native biodiversity - Environmental management should prioritize the restoration of native/indigenous species over the protection of harmful invasive monocultures - reiterated that tribunals and courts should not interfere with the implementation of a long-approved Master Plan under the guise of environmental principles once that plan has attained statutory finality - Harmonizing the right to a clean environment under Article 21 with the right to development, the Court noted that integrated transport projects (like the Bijwasan Railway Station redevelopment) serve public interest by decongesting urban zones and optimizing land use. [Relied on The Auroville Foundation v. Navroz Kersasp Mody and Others (2025) 4 SCC 150; Paras 42-65] Naveen Solanki v. Rail Land Development Authority, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 277 : 2026 INSC 270

Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980 – Section 2 – Deemed Forest – Interplay between Statutory Master Plan and Subsequent Vegetation Growth – The Supreme Court held that land earmarked for a project under an approved Master Plan, which was not recorded as forest or deemed forest at the time the Plan came into force, cannot be subsequently declared a "deemed forest" due to the natural proliferation of vegetation or invasive species over time - Noted that the statutory binding force and sanctity of a Master Plan must prevail to ensure certainty and stability in urban planning - The relevant date for determining whether a parcel of land qualifies as a "deemed forest" is the date of the coming into force of the Master Plan, not the date when project work actually commences on the ground. Naveen Solanki v. Rail Land Development Authority, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 277 : 2026 INSC 270

Forest Rights – Recognition of Legal Occupation – Supreme Court noted that certain residents, such as those in "Forest Villages" listed in the 'Jamabandi Register' or title holders under the Scheduled Tribes and Other Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights) Act, 2006, are legally authorized and not liable for eviction - directed the parties to maintain status quo regarding the land in occupation until a speaking order is passed and the subsequent 15-day notice period expires. [Paras 9-13] Abdul Khalek v. State of Assam, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 134 : 2026 INSC 140 : AIR 2026 SC 933

Forest Service (IFS)

Cadre Allocation – Migration of Reserved Category Candidate to Unreserved Vacancy – Effect of relaxation at Preliminary Examination stage – The Supreme Court held that a reserved category candidate who avails "relaxed standards" (concessions) at the Preliminary Examination stage cannot be treated as a candidate selected on "General Standards" for the purpose of cadre allocation against an unreserved vacancy, even if they secure higher marks than a general category candidate in the final merit list - rejected the High Court's view that "General Standards" only refers to the qualifying marks in the Main Examination - If a candidate's entry into the Main Examination was made possible only through a relaxed cut-off in the Preliminary Examination, they are ineligible to claim an unreserved/General Insider vacancy. Union of India v. G. Kiran, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 8

Frivolous and Vexatious Proceedings

Frivolous and Vexatious Proceedings – Duty of Court – Held that when quashing is sought on grounds that proceedings are frivolous or malicious, the Court must examine the matter with "greater care" - The Court is not restricted to the averments in the complaint alone but must look into attending circumstances and "read in between the lines" - Noted that the appellant had registered the synopsis and scripts for the film between 2012 and 2013, well before the complainant allegedly met the appellant in June 2015 or registered his script in July 2015 - Since the appellant's work preceded the complainant's script, the question of infringement does not arise - the Screen Writers Association (SWA) Dispute Settlement Committee had already found no similarity between the works, a fact suppressed by the complainant - The proceedings were found to be manifestly frivolous and vexatious - The summoning order and the High Court's judgment are quashed and set aside - Appeal allowed. [Relied on Mohd. Wajid & Anr. v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors., (2023) 20 SCC 219; Pepsi Foods Ltd. & Anr. v. Special Judicial Magistrate & Ors., (1998) 5 SCC 749; Paras 13-20] Sujoy Ghosh v. State of Jharkhand, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 271 : 2026 INSC 267 : AIR 2026 SC 1552

Gangsters and Anti-Social Activities

Gangsters and Anti-Social Activities (Prevention) Act, 1986 (Uttar Pradesh) – Joint Meeting Requirement – Under Section 5(3) of the Rules, the approval of the Gang Chart must occur after a joint meeting between the District Magistrate and the Superintendent of Police – Held that no indication of such a meeting in the records, which constitutes a violation of the prescribed rules - Relying on the principle that when a statute prescribes a thing to be done in a particular manner, it must be done in that manner or not at all - Noted that since the Act permits the mere naming of a person as a "gangster" with "perilous consequences" to individual liberty, the prescribed procedure must be followed scrupulously – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Vinod Bihari Lal v. State of Uttar Pradesh [2025 SCC Online SC 1216; Paras 8-12] Gabbar Singh v. State of U.P., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 275 : 2026 INSC 271

Gangsters and Anti-Social Activities (Prevention) Act, 1986 (Uttar Pradesh) – Section 3(1) – Uttar Pradesh Gangsters and Anti-Social Activities (Prevention) Rules, 2021 – Rules 5 and 16 – Quashing of FIR – Procedural Irregularity in Gang Chart – The Supreme Court quashed an FIR registered under the Act of 1986 on the grounds that the accompanying Gang Chart was not prepared in accordance with the statutory mandate – Held that a valid Gang Chart requires the recommendation of the Nodal Officer (SHO) and the Additional Superintendent of Police, followed by approval from the Superintendent of Police and the District Magistrate - These recommendations must be in written form and approvals must be evidenced by signatures - In the present case, a certified copy of the Gang Chart obtained from the Court lacked these necessary signatures and recommendations. Gabbar Singh v. State of U.P., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 275 : 2026 INSC 271

Hindu Law

Hindu Law – Alienation – Legal Necessity – Karta's Power - held that alienations by a Karta in favor of a single coparcener must be strictly proved to be for legal necessity - Vague or general recitals in sale deeds regarding "family needs" or "debts" are insufficient to bind the interests of other coparceners - upheld the item-wise scrutiny performed by the lower courts to distinguish between proved legal necessity and impermissible alienations. [Para 33] Dorairaj v. Doraisamy, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 119 : 2026 INSC 126

Hindu Law – Joint Family Property – Burden of Proof - Supreme Court affirmed that while the mere existence of a joint family does not render all properties joint, once it is established that ancestral properties yielding income existed and acquisitions were made during the subsistence of the joint family, the burden shifts to the person asserting self-acquisition to prove the same - noted that Hindu law does not require coparceners to establish the exact source of funds for every acquisition made by the Karta if a sufficient nucleus is shown. [Relied On Shrinivas Krishnarao Kango v. Narayan Devji Kango and Ors. (1954) 1 SCC 544; Pattusami Padayachi v. Mullaiammal and others MLJ (II) 1976 225; Paras 29, 30] Dorairaj v. Doraisamy, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 119 : 2026 INSC 126

Hindu Law – Wills – Suspicious Circumstances - upheld the rejection of an unregistered Will executed 72 hours prior to the testator's death - Key suspicious circumstances included the use of a thumb impression by a testator who was literate and habitually signed documents, the involvement of a close relative as a scribe instead of a professional, and the exclusion of natural heirs - since the Appellant did not challenge the Trial Court's rejection of the Will at the First Appeal stage, the finding attained finality - The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals, finding no ground to interfere with the High Court's judgment, which had correctly applied principles of Hindu Law regarding coparcenary property and legal necessity – Appeals dismissed. Dorairaj v. Doraisamy, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 119 : 2026 INSC 126

Indian Navy

Grant of Permanent Commission (PC) to Short Service Commission Officers (SSCOs) – Selection Process Fairness – Annual Confidential Reports (ACRs) – Appeal against Armed Forces Tribunal (AFT) order directing fresh Selection Boards for SSCOs who were denied PC in 2020 and 2022 – Appellants contended that ACRs were "casually graded" during periods when they were ineligible for PC, leading to an inherently skewed merit assessment - Held, the appraisal process was inevitably affected from its inception because Reporting Officers were conscious that these officers had no avenue for career progression – High gradings in a bell-curve system were reserved for those with future prospects, while ineligible officers received average marks serving no institutional purpose – The conversion of "Not Recommended for PC" endorsements (recorded when officers were ineligible as a matter of policy) into substantive disqualifications once they became eligible is arbitrary – This circularity, where past ineligibility was transformed into "deemed unsuitability," resulted in an uneven playing field. [Para 16-17] Yogendra Kumar Singh v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 285 : 2026 INSC 282

Industrial Policy

Industrial Policy – New Industrial Unit vs. Expansion - Amalgamation and Transfer of Rights to Subsidies - Doctrine of Promissory Estoppel and Legitimate Expectation- Determination of whether an industrial unit qualifies as a "new industrial unit" under the Industrial Policy of 1989 - held that even if an entity has existing units, a newly established unit with fresh capital investment, separate registration, independent industrial license, and distinct physical location must be treated as a "new industrial unit" – Held that upon the amalgamation of companies, all properties, rights, and interests, including sanctioned subsidies and incentives, stand transferred to the successor-in-interest (the amalgamated company) as per the scheme sanctioned by the High Court - The State and its instrumentalities are bound by unequivocal promises made in Industrial Policies and specific sanction letters - Once an entrepreneur acts upon such promises by making substantial investments and setting up a unit, the authorities cannot arbitrarily resile from or retrospectively amend the policy to deny sanctioned benefits - Supreme Court noted that the MM Plant unit satisfied all criteria for a new unit: investment made after the policy's effective date, independent license, separate electricity connection, and distinct physical location (Sheds 19 & 22 vs. the old unit's Sheds 7 & 8) - The rejection based on an internal instruction from 1994 and a retrospective amendment in 2008 was held to be illegal, as the MM Plant was a "new industrial unit" and not an expansion/modernization project - Noted that the respondents' "volte-face" after sanctioning the subsidies and allowing the appellant to continue production was unfair and untenable - The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court's judgment, and directed the respondents to disburse ₹11,14,750 with 9% p.a. interest within three months. [Relied on Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Uttar Pradesh (1979) 2 SCC 409; Gujarat State Financial Corpn. v. Lotus Hotels (P) Ltd. (1983) 3 SCC 379; State of Punjab v. Nestle India Ltd. (2004) 6 SCC 465; State of Jharkhand v. Brahmputra Metallics Ltd. (2023) 10 SCC 634; Paras 75-80, 90- 93, 103, 135] IFGL Refractories Ltd. v. Orissa State Financial Corporation, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 18 : 2026 INSC 18

Informed Consent vs. Patient Choice

Supreme Court clarified that while patients have the autonomy to "opt in" or "opt out" of offered treatments, they do not have a right to demand a particular form of treatment - Valid "informed consent" requires "adequate information" concerning the nature, risks, and benefits of a treatment - Because scientific evidence for stem cell therapy in ASD is currently non-existent or inconclusive, practitioners cannot provide the "adequate information" necessary for a valid consent. [Relied on Samira Kohli v. Dr. Prabha Manchandra and Another (2008) 2 SCC 1; Common Cause (A Registered Society) v. Union of India and Another, reported in (2018) 5 SCC 1; Paras 92-95, 131, 151] Yash Charitable Trust v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 93 : 2026 INSC 96

Interpretation of Statutes

Interpretation of Statutes – Omission of Provisions – Where a statutory provision is unconditionally omitted without a saving clause, all proceedings founded upon such provision must lapse - noted that while the diversion of government property might attract the Indian Penal Code, the investigating agency failed to invoke those provisions, and the High Court cannot substitute a conviction under a distinct statutory offense for the first time in appeal – Appeals allowed. [Relied on Kolhapur Canesugar Works Ltd. v. Union of India (2000) 2 SCC 536; Paras 16-25] Manoj v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 157 : 2026 INSC 152

Interpretation of Statutes - Statutory Interpretation – Harmonious Construction – Conflict between IBC and Telecommunication Laws – Where two special statutes contain non-obstante clauses, the court must analyze the dominant purpose of each - The IBC focuses on the reorganization of the corporate debtor, whereas the Telegraph Act, Wireless Telegraphy Act, and TRAI Act form an exhaustive code for the telecom sector - The IBC cannot be permitted to make inroads into the telecom sector to restructure rights and liabilities arising from the administration of spectrum, which falls under the exclusive legal province of the Union and the Regulator. [Relied on Centre for Public Interest Litigation v. Union of India, (2012) 3 SCC 1; Natural Resources Allocation, In Re, Special Reference No. 1 of 2012, (2012) 10 SCC 1; Embassy Property Developments (P) Ltd. v. State of Karnataka, (2020) 13 SCC 308; Union of India v. Association of Unified Telecom Service Providers of India, (2011) 10 SCC 543; Swiss Ribbons (P) Ltd. v. Union of India, (2019) 4 SCC 17; Paras 64, 66, 67] State Bank of India v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 152 : 2026 INSC 153

Intervenors/Non-Parties

Intervenors/Non-Parties — Right to Seek Review — Even a non-party to the proceedings can seek a review of an order if they perceive themselves to be an "aggrieved person" and satisfy the court of such a standing - Judgments in service matters often affect a class of employees beyond the immediate parties. Such judgments are not strictly in personam and can adversely affect the rights of others who were not joined in the original litigation. [Relied on Union of India v. Nareshkumar Badrikumar Jagad (2019) 18 SCC 586; Ajit Babu v. Union of India (1997) 6 SCC 473; K. Ajit Babu v. Union of India (1997) 6 SCC 473; Paras 13-20] Dr. Jiji K.S. v. Shibu K., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 212 : 2026 INSC 207

Investigation

Investigation - Lapses in Investigation – Failure to Secure Crime Scene and Independent Witnesses - Held: Overzealous or lethargic investigations are equally fatal to the prosecution - The failure of the Investigating Officer (I.O.) to draw a scene mahazar, conduct forensic examinations to rule out accidental fire (e.g., cylinder burst), or examine independent witnesses despite their presence at the scene constitutes a serious lacuna – Appeal dismissed. [Relied on Atbir v. Government of NCT of Delhi (2010) 9 SCC 1; Laxman v. State of Maharashtra (2002) 6 SCC 710; Paras 10-31] Sanjay Kumar Sharma v. State of Bihar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 230 : 2026 INSC 223

Judiciary

Guide for Judicial Magistrates – Discretionary Power - The use of the word "may" in Section 175(4) signifies discretionary power- i. If the Magistrate is prima facie satisfied the act was in the discharge of official duty, they must follow the Section 175(4) procedure; ii. If they are satisfied the act had no reasonable nexus to official duty, they may proceed under the general procedure of Section 175(3); iii. Magistrates are not required to wait indefinitely for a report from superior officers; if a report is not submitted within a reasonable time, the Magistrate may proceed based on the public servant's version if available - Supreme Court reiterated that a judicial order passed by a Magistrate in criminal matters (such as calling for a report under Section 175(4)) cannot be challenged through a writ petition under Article 226 - The appropriate remedy is a petition under Section 528 of the BNSS or Article 227 of the Constitution. [Paras 46-55] xxx v. State of Kerala, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 85 : 2026 INSC 88

Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968 – Section 3(2) First Proviso – Interpretation – Joint Committee – Supreme Court dismissed the writ petition filed by Justice Yashwant Varma of the Allahabad High Court challenging the Lok Sabha Speaker's decision to form an inquiry committee as per the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968, in the impeachment motion moved against him in relation to the discovery of unaccounted cash at his official residence - The first proviso to Section 3(2) of the Inquiry Act mandates the constitution of a Joint Committee only in the specific situation where notices of motion are given in both Houses of Parliament on the same day and are subsequently admitted by both Houses - The proviso is situational and not exhaustive; it does not contemplate or govern scenarios where a notice is admitted in one House but rejected in the other - Rejection of a motion in one House does not render the other House incompetent to proceed independently - To hold otherwise would allow for the scuttling of proceedings through the deliberate introduction of defective notices in one House to frustrate a valid motion in the other. [Relied on Sub-Committee on Judicial Accountability v. Union of India, (1991) 4 SCC 699; Tribhovandas Haribhai Tamboli v. Gujarat Revenue Tribunal, (1991) 3 SCC 442; Amina Marwa Sabreen v. State of Kerala, (2018) 14 SCC 193; Paras 12, 14-22, 29- 45] X v. Speaker of the House of the People, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 53 : 2026 INSC 65

Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968 – Section 3 – Role of the Secretariat – The Secretariat of a House should exercise restraint and confine its role to administrative scrutiny, such as verification of procedural compliance (e.g., signature verification) - It cannot assume quasi-adjudicatory functions by performing a substantive assessment of the merits of allegations or the correctness of facts pleaded in a notice of motion - The final decision on the admission of a motion rests solely with the Speaker or the Chairman as the case may be. [Paras 49 - 54] X v. Speaker of the House of the People, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 53 : 2026 INSC 65

Judicial Conduct – Appellate Court's handling of Non-Appearance – The Supreme Court expressed that it was "appalling and shocking" for an Appellate Court to insist on the appearance of an appellant on every date despite a suspension of sentence - If a counsel is not assisting or has been changed frequently, the appropriate course is for the Court to appoint an amicus curiae or allow the accused to make alternative arrangements, rather than immediately cancelling bail and issuing Non-Bailable Warrants (NBW). Meenakshi v. State of Haryana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 60

Judicial Discipline and Binding Precedents – Noted that Subordinate authorities must follow the orders of higher appellate authorities unreservedly - Disregarding the law laid down in previous decisions or overreaching superior court orders subverts the Rule of Law and undermines constitutional authority. [Relied on Baradakanta Misra v. Bhimsen Dixit, (1973) 1 SCC 446; Union of India v. Kamlakshi Finance Corpn. Ltd., 1992 Supp (1) SCC 443; C. Ravichandran Iyer v. Justice A.M. Bhattacharjee, (1995) 5 SCC 457; Paras 11- 15] Rajesh Goyal v. Laxmi Constructions, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 297 : 2026 INSC 299

Judicial Discipline and Precedent – Supreme Court emphasized that once a declaration of law is made by a High Court and affirmed by the Supreme Court, it acquires binding normative force - A coordinate Bench of the High Court cannot deny relief for a subsequent period when the underlying legal framework and factual footing remain unchanged - The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's 2019 judgment and directed the refund of customs duty collected for the period from 16 September 2010 to 15 February 2016. [Paras 89-91] Adani Power Ltd. v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 3 : 2026 INSC 1

Judicial Discipline – Supreme Court observed that when proceedings are terminated due to the existence of an alternative remedy, the proceedings do not survive and must end immediately - Passing interim orders in such circumstances "circumvents" statutory provisions and exceeds the scope of Article 226. [Relied on State of Orissa v. Madan Gopal Rungta (1952) AIR 1952 SC 12; Paras 6, 7, 8] Mangal Rajendra Kamthe v. Tahsildar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 194 : 2026 INSC 185

Judicial Discipline vs. Economic Implications – While judicial discipline is a cornerstone of justice, it cannot be used by "tardy litigators" to jeopardize public funds or put the economy in a "hostage situation." - In cases with significant economic implications, the larger national interest of rehabilitating an industry and ensuring financial probity takes pre-eminence – Appeals allowed. [Relied on A. Navinchandra Steels (P) Ltd. v. Srei Equipment Finance Ltd. (2021) 4 SCC 435; Paras 13-20] Omkara Assets Reconstruction v. Amit Chaturvedi, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 191 : 2026 INSC 189 : AIR 2026 SC 1205

Judicial Independence – Fearless Trial Judiciary – Role of High Courts – Held that fearless judge is the bedrock of an independent judiciary - High Courts, while exercising supervisory control, must ensure that judicial officers are not put through the ordeal of disciplinary proceedings for mere errors of judgment - The "lurking fear" of administrative action often leads trial judges to shirk their responsibility in bail matters, resulting in the flooding of High Courts and the Supreme Court with bail applications. Nirbhay Singh Suliya v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 2 : 2026 INSC 7

Judicial Propriety – Right of Hearing – Held, that the High Court should not have entertained and disposed of the matter without issuance of notice to either the State or the Defacto Complainant – Noted that in petitions praying for the quashing of an FIR, the High Court should not pass orders directing compliance with Section 41-A Cr.PC (or Section 35(3) BNSS) as it indirectly amounts to granting relief that should only be considered if a prima facie case for quashing is established. [Relied on Neeharika Infrastructure (P) Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra (2021) 19 SCC 401; Paras 9-13] Practical Solutions Inc. v. State of Telangana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 74

Judicial Scrutiny of Bail Orders – Held that the High Court's decision to grant bail by dissecting medical evidence and questioning the "intent to kill" due to a gap between the assault and death (septicaemia) was found to be premature - Such detailed analysis is reserved for the trial - The presence of multiple injuries, including cerebral damage from blunt trauma, outweighed the "extraneous considerations" of pending civil litigation and lack of specific role attribution – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Ajwar v. Waseem (2024) 10 SCC 768: (2025) 1 SCC (Cri) 320; Shabeen Ahmad v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr. (2025) 4 SCC 172; Victim 'XX' v. State of Bihar & Anr. (2025) INSC 877; Paras 21, 22, 29 - 31] Shobha Namdev Sonavane v. Samadhan Bajirao Sonvane, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 188 : 2026 INSC 181 : 2026 (1) Crimes (SC) 278

Judicial Sensitivity – Protection of Vulnerable Victims – Guidelines – Taking note of the "insensitivity" and "impassive judicial decisions" in cases involving sexual offences, the Supreme Court directed the National Judicial Academy to constitute a Committee of Experts to draft comprehensive guidelines - These guidelines aim to inculcate compassion and empathy into the judicial process, specifically for cases involving children and women. [Relied on State of Madhya Pradesh v. Mahendra alias Golu, (2022) 12 SCC 442; Paras 11-24] In Re: Order Dated 17.03.2025 Passed by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 168 : 2026 INSC 165

Judicial Review

Limited Scope of Judicial Review – Held that courts should not override the wisdom of the employer or substitute their own view regarding a candidate's suitability unless the decision is demonstrably mala fide, arbitrary, or whimsical - The Division Bench erred by intruding into the functional realm of the screening committee – Appeals allowed. [Relied on Commissioner of Police, New Delhi & Anr. Vs. Mehar Singh (2013) 7 SCC 685; Union Territory, Chandigarh Administration & Ors. Vs. Pradeep Kumar & Anr. (2018) 1 SCC 797; State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors. Vs. Parvez Khan (2015) 2 SCC 591; Para 7-9] State of Madhya Pradesh v. Rajkumar Yadav, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 234 : 2026 INSC 225 : AIR 2026 SC 1471

Judicial Review – Recruitment Process – Interference with Answer Key – Power of High Court to act as Subject Expert – Held: The High Court, while exercising its power of judicial review, cannot assume the role of a "super-examiner" or subject expert - Even in examinations for judicial services where Judges may have vast legal experience, the exercise of re-evaluating or re-considering an answer key should ordinarily be left to domain experts. Jharkhand Public Service Commission v. State of Jharkhand, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 138

Juvenile Justice

Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 — Section 94 — Mandatory Procedure for Age Determination — The procedure for determining the age of a victim or juvenile is strictly governed by Section 94(2) of the JJ Act - Priority must be given to: (i) school/matriculation certificates, or (ii) birth certificates from local authorities - Medical age determination (ossification test) can only be resorted to in the absence of such documentary evidence – Held that the High Court erred in holding that medical reports could prevail over school records at the bail stage. State of Uttar Pradesh v. Anurudh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 29 : 2026 INSC 47

Labour Law

Labour Law — The Building and Other Construction Workers (Regulation of Employment and Conditions of Service) Act, 1996 (BOCW Act) and The Building and Other Construction Workers' Welfare Cess Act, 1996 (Cess Act) — Implementation and Levy: Held, that although the BOCW Act and Cess Act were enacted in 1996, they remained "dormant" in various states until the necessary machinery, specifically the Welfare Boards under Section 18, was constituted - The constitution of Welfare Boards is a sine qua non (condition precedent) for the levy and collection of cess - While the registration of workers is not a prerequisite for collecting cess, the existence of a Board to receive and utilize the funds is essential. [Paras 36, 50, 59] National Highways Authority of India v. Gammon Atlanta (JV), 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 71 : 2026 INSC 76

Land Law

Land Acquisition (Special Railway Projects) Rules, 2016 — Railways Act, 1989 — Section 20-F — Setting aside of Award — Scope of judicial interference — Representative Capacity — The Supreme Court held that the setting aside of a compensation award on grounds of excessive payment, collusion, or "colourable exercise of powers" against specific land owners does not ipso facto result in the entire acquisition award being set aside for all beneficiaries - Noted that out of 550 land owners, only a few were specifically impleaded and alleged to have received unjust enrichment - Since the appellant was not part of the inquiry report, not arrayed as an accused in the FIR, and his specific award was not challenged by the Railways, the High Court erred in applying a blanket cancellation of his award based on a separate judgment involving different parties - noted that the Railways Act, 1989, does not confer any power of review on the Competent Authority or the Arbitrator appointed under the Rules of 2016 - The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's orders and restored the initial award and the arbitral enhancement in favor of the appellant, directing disbursement within three months with interest and solatium – Appeal allowed. [Paras 10-14] Niraj Jain v. Competent Authority-cum-Additional Collector, Jagdalpur, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 83 : 2026 INSC 86

Land Acquisition Act, 1894; Section 28-A - Delay and Redetermination – Noted that the fact that landowners received compensation based on an earlier Section 28-A application is irrelevant to their right to seek further parity with enhanced awards passed by higher courts for similarly placed landowners - The purpose of Section 28-A is to remove inequality between affluent landowners who can afford litigation and poor landowners who cannot - Acquisition – When an appeal is preferred against an award of the Reference Court, the High Court's decision becomes the operative award - The principle of merger ensures that the finality of the compensation is determined by the highest court that has adjudicated the matter. [Relied on Union of India v. Pradeep Kumari (1995) 2 SCC 736; Bharatsing v. State of Maharashtra (2018) 11 SCC 92; Paras 15-27] Andanayya v. Deputy Chief Engineer, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 300 : 2026 INSC 293

Land Acquisition Act, 1894; Section 28-A - Re-determination of Compensation - Maintainability of second application - Doctrine of Merger – The Supreme Court held that landowners are entitled to seek re-determination of compensation based on a subsequent High Court award even if they had previously filed an application based on a Reference Court award – Noted that once a Reference Court's award is challenged and decided by the High Court, the lower award merges into the High Court's judgment - there is no legal bar for appellants to seek re-determination based on the High Court's award, as the earlier Reference Court award no longer exists independently. Andanayya v. Deputy Chief Engineer, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 300 : 2026 INSC 293

Land Acquisition – Disparity in Compensation Mechanism – National Highways Act, 1956 vs. Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 – Supreme Court observed a lack of "intelligible differentia" in the treatment of land owners whose land is acquired under the 1956 Act compared to those under the 2013 Act - While 2013 Act acquisitions involve judicial oversight by District Judges, the 1956 Act relies on administrative officers (Collectors/Commissioners) acting as arbitrators who may lack a "judicially trained mind" to adjudicate complex market value issues – Noted that the Union of India to revisit the legislative scheme to bring parity in the mechanism for determining market value with reference to Article 300-A of the Constitution – Supreme Court directed that the Interim orders to continue; Registry directed to forward the order to the Attorney General and Solicitor General of India for consideration. [Relied on Union of India & another vs. Tarsem Singh & others, (2019) 9 SCC 304; Para 5-12] Riar Builders Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 65

Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 (ULC Act) — Section 10(3), 10(5) and 10(6) — Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Repeal Act, 1999 — Sections 3 and 4 — Mandatory requirement of notice for taking possession - The Supreme Court examined whether the mere "paper possession" recorded by the State, without serving the mandatory notice under Section 10(5) to the actual possessors of the land, would prevent the abatement of proceedings under Section 4 of the Repealing Act – Supreme Court of India has held that proceedings under the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 would abate under the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Repeal Act, 1999 if the State failed to take actual physical possession of the excess land in accordance with law, including by serving mandatory notice on the persons in possession under Section 10(5) of the ULC Act - Held that section 10 of the ULC Act distinguishes between the "vesting" of land (acquisition of title/interest) and the "taking of possession." Under Section 10(3), what vests is de jure possession, not de facto (actual physical) possession – For the State to acquire de facto possession, it must follow one of three methods: i. Voluntary surrender by the landholder; ii. Peaceful surrender following a mandatory written notice under Section 10(5) served upon the person in possession; iii. Forceful dispossession under Section 10(6) only if the person fails to comply with the Section 10(5) notice - In the absence of evidence showing actual physical possession was taken after serving notice on the appellants (who were in actual possession), the State's claim of "paper possession" is insufficient. Consequently, the proceedings relating to the land abate by operation of law under Section 4 of the Repealing Act – Appeal allowed. [Relied on State of Uttar Pradesh vs. Hari Ram, (2013) 4 SCC 280; AP Electrical Equipment Corporation vs. Tahsildar, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 447; Paras 19-23] Dalsukhbhai Bachubhai Satasia v. State of Gujarat, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 20 : 2026 INSC 21

Legal Profession

Legal Profession – Professional Misconduct – Supreme Court expressed concern over the "sorry state of affairs" where legal professionals turned into perpetrators of violence - noted that while fraternity among lawyers is understandable, it cannot justify lawlessness or the burning of a colleague's property for defending an accused - The Bar Council of India was directed to take appropriate action against the erring members. [Paras 12-17] Vishvjeet v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 257 : 2026 INSC 254

Legitimate Expectation

Legitimate Expectation – Duty to Allot – In the absence of fraud, collusion, or material irregularity, the highest bidder whose bid exceeds the reserve price has a legitimate expectation to receive an allotment letter. The returning of earnest money does not legitimize an arbitrary cancellation – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Eva Agro Feeds (P) Ltd. vs. Punjab National Bank (2023) 10 SCC 189; K. Kumara Gupta vs. Sri Markendaya & Sri Omkareswara Swamy Temple (2022) 5 SCC 710; Subodh Kumar Singh Rathour vs. Kolkata Metropolitan Development Authority (2024) 15 SCC 461] Golden Food Products India v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 22 : 2026 INSC 22

Maternity Benefit

Maternity Benefit – Adoptive Mothers – Constitutional Validity of Section 60(4) of the Code on Social Security, 2020 (pari materia with Section 5(4) of the Maternity Benefit Act, 1961) – Age Limit for Adoption – The Supreme Court struck down the three-month age limit prescribed for an adopted child to entitle the adoptive mother to maternity benefits - held that the distinction between women adopting a child below three months and those adopting an older child lacks a rational nexus with the object of the legislation, which is to dignify motherhood and ensure child welfare - Key Findings noted – i. Motherhood vs. Childbirth: Supreme Court emphasized that maternity benefit is associated with the process of motherhood rather than the biological process of childbirth - Motherhood is a gradual process that takes shape in the heart, and the bond formed outside the womb is as crucial as that formed inside; ii. Article 14 (Equality): The three-month cap was found to be discriminatory and under-inclusive - Adoptive mothers are similarly situated regardless of the child's age, as the need for emotional bonding, nurturing, and family integration remains constant; iii. Article 21 (Reproductive Autonomy): Adoption is an expression of reproductive and decisional autonomy - Denying benefits based on an arbitrary age threshold violates the mother's right to a dignified life and the child's right to holistic care; iv. Practical Unworkability: noted that the legal procedure to declare a child "legally free for adoption" under the Juvenile Justice Act and CARA Regulations typically exceeds two to three months - Thus, the age limit rendered the statutory benefit illusory and otiose in practice; v. Best Interest of the Child: The principle of "best interest" is a continuing obligation that persists throughout the integration period; vi. Judicial Redrafting of Section 60(4): directed that the provision must now be meaningfully read as: "A woman who legally adopts a child or a commissioning mother shall be entitled to maternity benefit for a period of twelve weeks from the date the child is handed over"; vii. Paternity Leave: Supreme Court urged the Union of India to recognize paternity leave as a social security benefit, noting that shared parenting is essential for a child's development and for dismantling gendered roles. [Relied on Municipal Corpn. of Delhi v. Female Workers (Muster Roll), (2000) 3 SCC 224; Deepika Singh v. PGIMER, Chandigarh, (2023) 13 SCC 681; State of Gujarat v. Shri Ambica Mills Ltd., (1974) 4 SCC 656; State of Gujarat v. Shri Ambica Mills Ltd., (1974) 4 SCC 656; Lakshmi Kant Pandey v. Union of India, (1984) 2 SCC 244; State of Kerala v. Unni, (2007) 2 SCC 365; Paras 66-69, 75-82, 131-136, 146-152, 155-158, 166] Hamsaanandini Nanduri v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 250 : 2026 INSC 246

Matrimonial Litigation

Matrimonial Litigation – Misuse of Courts – Perjury and Costs - Supreme Court criticized the practice of warring couples treating courts as "battlefields" to settle scores, noting that the parties had filed over 40 cases against each other - While disposing of all matrimonial disputes, the Court specifically directed that applications related to perjury (Section 340 CrPC / Section 379 BNSS) must continue, as no one can be permitted to "pollute the stream of justice" - imposed a token cost of ₹10,000 on each party for choking the judicial system with numerous litigations - Supreme Court emphasized that earnest efforts should be made for pre-litigation mediation and counselling - It observed that the immediate initiation of criminal proceedings often destroys any chance of reconciliation and leads to a "point of no return," especially if arrests occur. [Relied on Shilpa Sailesh vs. Varun Sreenivasan, (2023) 14 SCC 231; Achin Gupta vs. State of Haryana, (2024) 6 SCR 129; Rakesh Raman vs. Kavita, (2023) 3 SCR 552; Paras 11 – 15, 26-32] Neha Lal v. Abhishek Kumar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 73 : 2026 INSC 73

Medical Law

Medical Ethics – Best Interest Principle – Substituted Judgment Standard – For incompetent patients, the decision to withdraw treatment must be grounded in the "best interest of the patient" - Held: The inquiry is not whether it is in the patient's best interest to die, but whether it is in their best interest to prolong life artificially through futile treatment - The "Substituted Judgment" standard—ascertaining what the patient would have wanted if competent is a critical component of determining their best interest from a dignity-centric lens. [Paras 131, 228, 229] Harish Rana v Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 229 : 2026 INSC 222

Medical Ethics – Procedural Guidelines – Minimal Judicial Intervention – Supreme Court emphasized that judicial intervention under Article 226 is only a fallback mechanism when medical boards disagree or hospitals fail to act. In the ordinary course, hospitals must constitute Primary and Secondary Medical Boards as per the Common Cause framework - Implementation of the boards' decision must follow a mandatory "Reconsideration Period" of 30 days to allow aggrieved parties to seek legal recourse. [Relied on Common Cause v. Union of India, (2018) 5 SCC 1; Paras 23, 109, 274, 322] Harish Rana v Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 229 : 2026 INSC 222

Medical Evidence vs. Ocular Testimony — Victim Anonymity — Section 228-A IPC — Held that medical evidence is corroborative and an expert opinion - While it may be ignored if it contradicts credible ocular evidence, in this case, the medical findings of lacerated wounds and a torn hymen squarely supported the victim's version - Supreme Court deprecated the practice of freely using the victim's name in court records, despite the 1983 amendment and subsequent mandates intended to prevent social stigma - Directed all Registrars General of High Courts to ensure strict compliance with the proscription of disclosing a victim's identity. [Relied on State of Rajasthan v. Chatra (2025) 8 SCC 613; State of M.P. v. Balveer Singh (2025) 8 SCC 545; State of Himachal Pradesh v. Manga Singh (2019) 16 SCC 759; State of U.P. v. Ajmal Beg 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2801; State of U.P. v. M. K. Anthony (1985) 1 SCC 505; Para 12- 15] State of Himachal Pradesh v. Hukum Chand @ Monu, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 294 : 2026 INSC 290

Medical Jurisprudence — Postmortem Examination — Professional Misconduct — Premature Disclosure to Media - Held: The conduct of an autopsy surgeon in furnishing an erroneous report based on "naked eye" observations—without waiting for forensic (FSL) results and publicizing sensational claims to the media constitutes professional misconduct and contempt of court - Such actions spread misinformation, erode trust in investigative agencies, and violate the sub judice rule - Justice is served by truth established through impartial investigation, not by following majority sentiment or public pressure amplified by premature media reports. [Relied on Munna Kumar Upadhyay Alias Munna Upadhyaya vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, (2012) 6 SCC 174; State of W.B. vs. Mir Mohammad Omar & Ors., (2000) 8 SCC 382; Raj Kumar vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2014) 5 SCC 353; Abhinav Mohan Delkar vs. State of Maharashtra, 2025 SCC Online SC 1725; Patel Babubhai Manohardas vs. State of Gujarat, 2025 SCC Online SC 503; Paras 102-106, 110, 117-119] Gudipalli Siddhartha Reddy v. State C.B.I., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 166 : 2026 INSC 160 : AIR 2026 SC 950

Medical Law – Clinically Assisted Nutrition and Hydration (CANH) – Definition of "Medical Treatment" – Supreme Court clarified that CANH (enteral or parenteral nutrition via tubes) is a technologically mediated medical intervention, not mere basic care or sustenance - Held: Since CANH involves specialized medical protocols, risks of complications, and clinical assessment, it constitutes "medical treatment" amenable to withdrawal or withholding under the Common Cause guidelines. [Paras 118, 125, 128, 130] Harish Rana v Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 229 : 2026 INSC 222

Medical Negligence and Standard of Care: Permissibility of Stem Cell "Therapy" for Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) - held that every medical practitioner owes a fiduciary duty to exercise a reasonable degree of care, skill, and knowledge expected of a prudent practitioner - A practitioner fails to meet this standard if they administer an intervention that lacks credible scientific evidence of safety and efficacy, or is explicitly not recommended by authoritative medical bodies - Since therapeutic use of stem cells in ASD is not recognized as a "sound and relevant medical practice" by the ICMR or NMC, offering it as a routine clinical service outside an approved clinical trial constitutes a failure to meet the reasonable standard of care. [Relied on Indian Medical Association v. V.P. Shantha and others (1996) 86 COMP 806; Jacob Mathew v. State of Punjab (2005) 6 SCC 1; M.A. Biviji v. Sunita and Others, reported in (2024) 2 SCC 242; Paras 59, 61, 63, 70, 90, 151] Yash Charitable Trust v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 93 : 2026 INSC 96

Medical Termination of Pregnancy – Reproductive Autonomy and Bodily Integrity – Right to Life and Liberty under Article 21 – Supreme Court allowed the medical termination of a 30-week pregnancy of a girl who conceived as a minor – Supreme Court set aside the Bombay High Court's order which had declined termination on the grounds of foetal viability and the possibility of adoption - Key Principles Established – i. Priority of Maternal Rights: held that the reproductive autonomy and bodily integrity of the pregnant woman must be given sufficient emphasis over the rights of an unborn foetus; ii. Decisional Autonomy: A woman's right to choose whether to carry a pregnancy to term is firmly rooted in her right to bodily autonomy – Noted that forcing a woman to continue an unwanted pregnancy causes "visceral" trauma and ignores the physical and mental transformations a woman's body undergoes; iii. Irrelevance of Foetal Viability: When a pregnant woman is determined to terminate and has detached herself from the pregnancy, considerations such as whether the child would be born healthy or is viable are not relevant; iv. Status of the Mother: The fact that the daughter had crossed 18 years of age by the time of the High Court order was deemed "irrelevant," as she was a minor at the time of conception and the pregnancy resulted from a relationship outside of wedlock. [Relied on X vs. Health & Family Welfare Department, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1321; Paras 15-17] A (Mother of X) v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 160

Military

Military Pension – Disability Pension – Attributes of Service – Impact of Lifestyle Habits – The Supreme Court upheld the denial of disability pension to an army personnel suffering from "Stroke Ischemic RT MCA TERRITORY" - Noted that the disease was neither attributable to nor aggravated by military service, as the Medical Board clearly opined that the condition could have been occasioned by the appellant's habit of smoking ten bidis per day. Sarevesh Kumar v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 163

Municipality

Municipal Councils, Nagar Panchayats and Industrial Townships Act, 1965 (Maharashtra) – Section 143-A(3) – The State Government lacks the authority under Section 143-A(3) to unilaterally "foist" arbitration on parties governed by a concluded contract - The power of the State to issue directions under this section is limited to regulating the manner and procedure of octroi collection and does not extend to appointing an arbitrator for the Municipal Council and its agent. Bharat Udyog Ltd. v. Ambernath Municipal Council, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 291 : 2026 INSC 288

Onus of Proof and Collusion

Onus of Proof and Collusion – Noted that appellant, being the mother of the Managing Director of the judgment-debtor company, failed to produce the tripartite agreement that allegedly facilitated the sale - Held that the sale cannot be deemed to be "without notice" of the existing liability, especially given the relationship between the parties and the long-standing nature of the dispute – Appeal dismissed. [Relied on Danesh Singh and others v. Har Pyari (Dead) Thr. LRs. (2025 INSC 1434); Usha Sinha v. Dina Ram (2008) 7 SCC 144; Jini Dhanrajgir v. Shibu Mathew (2023) 20 SCC 76; Paras 10-13] R. Savithri Naidu v. Cotton Corporation of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 151 : 2026 INSC 150 : AIR 2026 SC 913

Other Backward Classes (OBC)

Other Backward Classes (OBC) – Reservation – Creamy Layer Exclusion – Validity of Clarificatory Letter dated 14.10.2004 vs. Office Memorandum dated 08.09.1993 – Equality Doctrine - Key Principles Held – i. Primacy of the 1993 Office Memorandum (OM): A mere executive letter of clarification (dated 14.10.2004) cannot override or alter the substantive framework of a parent policy like the 1993 OM - If a clarification introduces new conditions that alter rights, it ceases to be clarificatory and becomes an impermissible amendment; ii. Exclusion of Salary and Agricultural Income: Under the 1993 OM, income from salaries and agricultural land must be excluded from the "Income/Wealth Test" (Category VI) - Supreme Court affirmed that income from salaries alone cannot be the sole criterion for Creamy Layer status; parental status and category of post are essential factors; iii. Hostile Discrimination: Denying OBC-Non-Creamy Layer (NCL) status to children of PSU/private employees based on salary while granting it to similarly placed Government servants (Group C and D) who reach similar income levels is "hostile discrimination." - It treats equals as unequals; iv. Constitutional Imperative: The exclusion of the creamy layer is a constitutional necessity to ensure benefits reach the truly backward - this exercise must be rational and non-arbitrary - directed the Union of India/DoPT to consider the claims of respondent candidates and intervenors based on these principles and to create supernumerary posts as required to accommodate those who satisfy the NCL criteria. [Relied on Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, 1992 Supp (3) SCC 217; State of Kerala v. N.M. Thomas, (1976) 2 SCC 310; Ashok Kumar Thakur v. Union of India, (2008) 6 SCC 1; Paras 24 33, 37-43] Union of India v. Rohith Nathan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 232 : 2026 INSC 230

Other Backward Classes (OBC) – Reservation – Creamy Layer Exclusion – Validity of Clarificatory Letter dated 14.10.2004 vs. Office Memorandum dated 08.09.1993 – Equality Doctrine - The Supreme Court dismissed a batch of appeals filed by the Union of India against various High Court judgments which had ruled in favor of candidates from the OBC category - The central controversy was whether the salary of parents employed in Public Sector Undertakings (PSUs) or private sectors could be the sole basis for "Creamy Layer" exclusion in the absence of established "equivalence" with government posts - held that treating PSU/private employees differently from Government servants (where salary is excluded from the income test) constitutes hostile discrimination and violates Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. Union of India v. Rohith Nathan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 232 : 2026 INSC 230

Paucity of Funds as a Defense

Supreme Court categorically rejected the State's plea of financial inability or paucity of funds as a ground to deny the payment of statutory dues like DA - Once a legal right is established, the State, as a "model employer," must honor its obligations regardless of the financial burden - Findings returned in the first round of litigation, which declared DA a legally enforceable right and were reaffirmed by the dismissal of a review petition, attain conclusive finality and bind the parties. [Relied on Francis Coralie Mullin v. Administrator, Union Territory of Delhi (1981) 1 SCC 608; Sivanandan CT v. High Court of Kerala (2024) 3 SCC 799; Jitendra Kumar v. State of Haryana (2008) 2 SCC 161; hayara Bano v. Union of India (2017) 9 SCC 1; Assn. for Democratic Reforms v. Union of India (2024) 5 SCC 1; Lily Thomas v. Union of India (2000) 6 SCC 224; Paras 39-59] State of West Bengal v. Confederation of State Government Employees, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 120 : 2026 INSC 123 : AIR 2026 SC 1213

Payment of Gratuity

Retention of Staff Quarters – Adjustment of Penal Rent from Gratuity – Reciprocal Obligations – The management of Steel Authority of India (SAIL) challenged the High Court's direction to release the full gratuity with interest to retired employees who had failed to vacate official accommodation – Held that the obligation of an ex-employee to vacate staff quarters and the obligation of the management to release gratuity are mutual and reciprocal - Neither can be enforced in isolation - Under Rule 3.2.1(c) of the SAIL Gratuity Rules, 1978, the management is expressly empowered to withhold gratuity for non-vacation of company accommodation - no interest is payable on the gratuity amount withheld during the period of unauthorized occupation. [Paras 19 & 20] Management of Steel Authority of India v. Shambhu Prasad Singh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 262 : 2026 INSC 263

Pension

Pension as Property – Article 300A of the Constitution of India – Pension is not a bounty or a matter of largesse; it is a deferred portion of compensation for past service that matures into a vested and enforceable right - Withholding accrued arrears of disability pension, which became due following judicial determination and government policy, constitutes a deprivation of property under Article 300A – Noted that the decision in Union of India v. Ram Avtar (2014) is a judgment in rem - Therefore, the Union of India should have extended the benefit of broad banding to all eligible ex-servicemen automatically rather than requiring them to file individual applications. Union of India v. Sgt Girish Kumar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 148 : 2026 INSC 149

Pension Regulations for the Army, 1961 – Regulation 125 & 266 – Pension Regulations for the Army, 2008 – Regulation 44, 173 & 175 – Defence Security Corps (DSC) – Second Service Pension – Condonation of Deficiency in Service – The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals filed by the Union of India, holding that personnel of the Defence Security Corps (DSC) are entitled to seek condonation of shortfall in their qualifying service (up to one year) for the purpose of a second service pension - Key Findings – i. DSC as Part of Armed Forces: DSC constitutes a "Corps" of the Indian Army under the Army Act, 1950, and its personnel are recognized as "Armed Forces personnel"; ii. Applicability of General Rules: Paragraph 266 (1961 Regulations) and Paragraph 173 (2008 Regulations) stipulate that pensionary awards for DSC shall be governed by the same rules applicable to the Regular Army, unless specifically inconsistent; iii. No Inconsistency: There is no "inconsistency" or express prohibition in the DSC - specific chapters against the condonation of shortfall provided in Regulation 125 (1961) or Regulation 44 (2008); iv. Calculation of Service: Before applying condonation, the length of service must be determined by treating a fraction of a year between 3 to 6 months as a completed half-year, as per Note 5 of the MoD letter dated 30th October 1987; v. Executive Letters vs. Regulations: The Government cannot override or amend statutory Pension Regulations through administrative letters (such as those dated 20th June 2017 and 22nd March 2022) to bar condonation benefits. [Relied on Union of India v. Surender Singh Parmar, (2015) 3 SCC 404; Paras 31-48] Union of India v. Balakrishnan Mullikote, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 292 : 2026 INSC 286

Pension Regulations for the Army, 1961 – Regulation 173 – Guide to Medical Officers, 2002 – Paragraph 6 – Supreme Court noted that compensation cannot be awarded for any disablement or death arising from intemperance in the use of alcohol, tobacco, or drugs, as these are matters within the member's own control – Appeal dismissed. Sarevesh Kumar v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 163

Key Directions issued – i. Deemed Service for Pension: SSCWOs released from service during the pendency of litigation (excluding JAG and AEC cadres) are deemed to have completed 20 years of substantive qualifying service and are entitled to pension and consequential benefits; ii. Grant of PC: SSCWOs currently in service who secured the 60% cut-off in the 2020/2021 Selection Boards shall be granted Permanent Commission, subject to medical and disciplinary clearance; iii. Policy Review: The Army is directed to review the method of evaluation of ACRs and cut-offs for future batches to address the disproportionate impact on women officers. [Para 66, 67] Lt Col Pooja Pal v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 283 : 2026 INSC 281

Pensionary Benefits - Representation for Compassionate Consideration — While refusing to interfere with the dismissal order due to the appellant's history of multiple offenses (imprisonment in 1980 and severe reprimands in 1989 and 1994), Supreme Court permitted the appellant to submit a representation to the authorities for the grant of pension - The authorities are at liberty to consider this on its own merits, taking into account the appellant's 36 years of service, though this is not a mandatory direction to grant such pension. [Relied on Yasodhar Kamat Vs. Director General, Border Security Force and Ors., (2021) 13 SCC 333; Para 7]. Bhagirath Choudhary v. Border Security Force, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 165

Rule 27 of Maharashtra Civil Services (Pension) Rules, 1982 – Mandatory Requirement of Sanction – Held that even if assumed that the 1982 Pension Rules were applicable through the residuary Clause 110 of the 1992 Regulations, observed that Rule 27(2)(b)(i) mandates prior sanction of the Government for instituting proceedings after retirement - rejected the Corporation's argument that a "general sanction" was accorded at the time the 1992 Regulations were originally approved, clarifying that the word 'shall' in the rule implies a mandatory safeguard for each specific case to prevent unwarranted proceedings against superannuated employees – Regulation 110 of the 1992 Regulations is a miscellaneous/residuary provision intended to cover silent areas - it does not confer automatic jurisdiction to initiate departmental enquiries against retired employees unless the Corporation has formally adopted the relevant Government rules at an appropriate level – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Bhagirathi Jena v. Board of Directors, O.S.F.C. and Others, (1999) 3 SCC 666; Girijan Cooperative Corporation Limited Andhra Pradesh v. K. Satyanarayana Rao, (2010) 15 SCC 322; Anant R. Kulkarni v. Y.P. Education Society and Others, (2013) 6 SCC 515; Paras 18-30] Kadirkhan Ahmedkhan Pathan v. Maharashtra State Warehousing Corporation, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 10 : 2026 INSC 16

Police

Police Manual - Media Briefing - The Supreme Court directed all States to formulate a policy for police media briefing, taking into account a "Police Manual for Media Briefing" furnished before it by amicus curiae. The Court has given 3 months' time to the states to do the needful. Peoples Union for Civil Liberties v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 77

Practice and Procedure

Practice and Procedure – Miscellaneous Application for Recall – An application for recall of an order dismissing an SLP cannot be used as a "second innings" to litigate issues that were not part of the original proceedings - noted that the original SLP arose from a suit for specific performance, whereas the MA attempted to introduce new grievances related to separate insolvency proceedings - While fraud can vitiate proceedings, such a claim must be proven and cannot be invoked on mere assertion. [Paras 10-15] Lamba Exports Pvt. Ltd. v. Dhir Global Industries Pvt. Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 286 : 2026 INSC 275

Practice and Procedure – Misconceived SLPs – Article 136 – The Supreme Court observed that the petitions were "misconceived at the threshold" as they combined a challenge to a High Court order with a prayer to secure the benefits of that very same order - Discretionary jurisdiction under Article 136 cannot be invoked to grant relief that does not arise from an adjudication of the petitioners' rights on merits. Damor Nanabhai Manabhai v. State of Gujarat, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 104

Practice and Procedure – Remand by High Court – Requirement of Deciding All Issues – The Supreme Court set aside a High Court order that had remanded a service matter to the School Tribunal based on a single technical point regarding the Secretary's authorization to initiate proceedings - Held: When several issues arise for determination, a Court should ideally record findings and reasons for each issue rather than focusing on just one "decisive" point - This approach ensures clarity, provides finality for litigants, and assists the appellate court with a reasoned decision. Hemlata Eknath Pise v. Shubham Bahu Uddeshiya Sanstha Waddhamna, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 177 : 2026 INSC 147

Practice and Procedure – The "Consider Jurisprudence" – The Supreme Court criticized the routine practice of courts issuing directions to "consider" or "reconsider" claims as a means to "throw the ball out of the Court" - Such practice is counterproductive, harms the legal system, and delays justice - Courts must articulate directions in clear terms, specifying the method and manner of compliance to leave the government with no choice but to comply, appeal, or face contempt. Mahendra Prasad Agarwal v. Arvind Kumar Singh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 195 : 2026 INSC 175

Precedent and Res Judicata

Distinction Between Precedent and Res Judicata — Section 11(7) — Held that while a "precedent" operates in rem and serves as a source of law for other parties, "res judicata" operates in personam between the same parties to ensure finality in litigation - Even if other benches of a High Court interpreted an identical clause differently in separate litigations (precedent), the specific order appointing the arbitrator between the current parties constitutes res judicata regarding the existence of the arbitration agreement - The correctness of the initial decision is immaterial unless it relates to a lack of inherent jurisdiction. Eminent Colonizers v. Rajasthan Housing Board, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 109 : 2026 INSC 116

Preventive Detention

Preventive Detention – Telangana Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Boot-Leggers, Dacoits, Drug-Offenders, Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offender Act, 1986 – Section 2(a), 2(f) and 3 – Detention of "Drug Offender" – Law and Order vs. Public Order - Subjective Satisfaction and Extraneous Factors - Supreme Court observed that the Detaining Authority manifested an intention to detain the detenu "at any cost" - held that preventive detention should not be used as an alternative to the ordinary criminal law or to "clip the wings" of an accused when the State fails to resist bail – Held that if the detenu violated bail conditions, the appropriate remedy was to seek cancellation of bail under ordinary law, which the State failed to do - Resorting to the extraordinary measure of preventive detention to circumvent ordinary criminal procedure is unsustainable – Held that mere registration of three criminal cases involving "Ganja" does not automatically impact "public order" unless there is specific material showing the activities caused harm, danger, or a feeling of insecurity among the general public - The detention order failed to indicate how the detenu's acts were prejudicial to the maintenance of public order as opposed to mere "law and order" - Law of preventive detention is a "hard law" and must be strictly construed - Liberty cannot be jeopardized unless the case falls squarely within the four corners of the relevant statute – Held that simply declaring the detenu a 'habitual drug offender' was not sufficient for preventive detention unless shown how detenu's actions specifically threatened public order – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Ameena Begum vs. State of Telangana and Others 2023 INSC 788; Vijay Narain Singh vs. State of Bihar 1984 3 SCC 14; Paras 8-10] Roshini Devi v. State of Telangana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 30 : 2026 INSC 41 : 2026 (1) Crimes (SC) 161

Primacy of Statutory Rules over Executive Orders

Supreme Court addressed a conflict between the NDCT Rules, 2019 and a DHR Order dated March 3, 2024, which attempted to remove the Department of Health Research (DHR) from its regulatory role in stem cell research - held that executive instructions cannot supplant or whittle down the effect of statutory rules - Clause 2(vi) of the March 3, 2024 order was declared non est to the extent of its conflict with Rules 17 and 18 of the NDCT Rules - The administration, promotion, or advertisement of stem cell therapy for ASD outside an approved clinical trial setting is categorized as "professional misconduct" under Regulation 7.22 of the IMC (Professional Conduct, Etiquette and Ethics) Regulations, 2002 - Errant clinics are liable for cancellation of registration and penalties under the Clinical Establishments Act, 2010 - Held that stem cell therapies for ASD cannot be offered as a commercial service and must be restricted to clinical trial settings - To protect patients currently undergoing treatment, the Secretary, MoHFW is directed to consult with AIIMS and the NMC to provide a solution for re-routing these patients to institutions conducting legitimate clinical trials, with a compliance report due within four weeks. [Relied on State of M.P. v. G.S. Dall and Flour Mills 1992 Supp (1) SCC 150; Paras 136-138, 151, 123, 145-151] Yash Charitable Trust v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 93 : 2026 INSC 96

Prison Reforms

Prison Reforms – Open Correctional Institutions (OCIs) – Overcrowding – Constitutional Rights of Prisoners – Gender Discrimination – Cost-Effectiveness – Supreme Court issues comprehensive directions for the assessment, establishment, and expansion of Open Correctional Institutions (OCIs) and open/semi-open barracks across all States and Union Territories to address chronic prison overcrowding (occupancy rate of 120.8% nationally) and facilitate the reformative objective of punishment. Suhas Chakma v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 205 : 2026 INSC 198

Procedural Fairness

Procedural Fairness – Right to Cross-Examination – Supreme Court noted that the finding of professional misconduct was based merely on "bald allegations" in the complaint without the complainant being examined on oath or the appellant-advocate being afforded the right of cross-examination – Held that such findings are legally unsustainable when the substratum of the complaint has ceased to exist due to an amicable settlement between the parties. [Paras 7- 10] Monty Goyal v. Navrang Singh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 91 : 2026 INSC 94

Promotion

Accelerated Promotion - Counter-Extremism/Naxal Activities – Parity in Treatment – Judicial Review of Committee Decisions – The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's direction to grant accelerated promotion to a police constable (Respondent) who resisted a Naxalite attack on a police station - The State had denied the promotion claiming the Respondent's role was "nominal" compared to a colleague (G. Venkat Reddy) who received the benefit – Supreme Court found the Committee's assessment "perverse" as it was admitted that the Respondent, while on roof-top guard sentry duty, fired more rounds at the Naxalites than the promoted colleague and was instrumental in repelling the attack - Held, when collective efforts repel an attack, it is unfair to belittle the role of individual personnel to deny them benefits intended to boost the morale of the force - While the Court's intervention in decisions taken by specialized Committees for out-of-turn promotion is minimal, such decisions are not immune to interference if they are found to be unfair or based on perverse findings – Appeal dismissed. [Relied on State of Madhya Pradesh & Anr. vs. Sanjay Shukla (Civil Appeal No. 2040 of 2023, decided on March 27, 2023; Paras 9, 10] State of Telangana v. P. Srinivas, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 263 : 2026 INSC 258

Property Law

Property Law — Declaration of Title — Adverse Possession — A claim for perfection of title by adverse possession cannot be sustained against the State/Union regardless of the duration of possession if the claimant fails to prove the specific point of time and basis upon which their predecessors entered possession - a decree obtained in an earlier suit where the true owner (Union of India) was not impleaded is non-est and not binding upon the Union – Appeals dismissed. [Relied on Union of India v. Ibrahim Uddin, (2012) 8 SCC 148; State of Karnataka v. K.C. Subramanya, (2014) 13 SCC 468; Paras 7- 11] Gobind Singh v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 221 : 2026 INSC 211 : AIR 2026 SC 1303

Provident Fund

General Provident Fund (Central Service) Rules, 1960 – Rule 33(ii) – Provident Funds Act, 1925 – Sections 4 & 5 – Rights of Nominee – Release of GPF Dues – The Supreme Court dismissed a Special Leave Petition filed by the Union of India challenging a High Court order that directed the release of GPF amounts to the nominee of a deceased employee - The Government argued that under Section of the Provident Funds Act, 1925, amounts exceeding Rs. 5,000/- require a succession certificate/probate even for a nominee – Supreme Court rejected this, holding that the Rs. 5,000/- threshold established in 1925 has lost relevance due to inflation - held that Rule 33(ii) of the 1960 Rules, framed by the Government itself, stipulates that GPF amounts shall be payable to the nominee regardless of the amount – Held that Section 5(1) of the Act contains a non-obstante clause giving primacy to a valid nominee to receive the funds to the exclusion of others - Sections 4 and 5 of the Act and Rule 33(ii) must be construed harmoniously to avoid rendering the nomination process "otiose" – Noted that a nominee is a "mere trustee" to collect funds and not the beneficial owner - Releasing funds to a nominee does not bar other legal heirs from claiming their share in a competent court – Noted that the Government should not involve itself in protracted litigation regarding the estates of deceased employees, as requiring probate in cases of valid nominations unnecessarily makes the state a party to private disputes – Petition dismissed. [Relied on CIT vs. Hindustan Bulk Carriers, (2003) 3 SCC 5; Sarbati Devi vs. Usha Devi, (1984) 1 SCC 424; Paras 9-15] Union of India v. Paresh Chandra Mondal, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 42

Public Auction

Public Auction – Duty of Disclosure – Failure to disclose pending litigation – Refund with Interest – The Supreme Court set aside a Punjab and Haryana High Court judgment that had dismissed a writ petition filed by an auction purchaser - The appellant had purchased property in an open auction conducted by The Improvement Trust, Ludhiana, but the Trust failed to disclose that the property was subject to a pending lawsuit - Held, it is the legal duty of authorities (such as banks, recovery officers, or state bodies) conducting public auctions to disclose all known encumbrances and litigation in the auction notice - Suppressing such material facts invalidates the sale and renders the auction fraudulent or vitiated by material irregularity - Public auctions must ensure fairness, objectivity, and be free from suspicion or bias - emphasized that restitution is a "moral imperative" and an inherent jurisdiction of every court to prevent unjust enrichment - An innocent auction purchaser who acts in good faith and pays hard-earned money should be restored to their original position if the auction lacks legitimacy - directed the Trust to refund the deposit of Rs.1,57,04,580/- with interest at 9% per annum from the date of deposit (19.07.2021) within six weeks – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Delhi Development Authority vs. Corporation Bank & Ors, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 953; Paras 9 – 13] Viney Kumar Sharma v. Improvement Trust, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 69

Public Interest Litigation (PIL)

Public Interest Litigation (PIL) - Property Rights - The Supreme Court set aside a Calcutta High Court judgment that had ordered the demolition of a residential building constructed by the appellant near Visva-Bharati University – Noted that the High Court had initially ruled the construction illegal on the grounds that it was raised on preserved "khoai" land and lacked approval from the competent authority (Panchayat Samiti) - Supreme Court found that the High Court's conclusions were based on conjectures rather than scientific evidence and failed to account for the appellant's right to property under Article 300A of the Constitution - Key Legal Issues & Findings – i. Burden of Proof in PIL and Disputed Facts: The Court emphasized that in a PIL, the burden lies squarely on the petitioners to provide clear, cogent, and reliable material - held that writ jurisdiction should not be invoked to resolve contested factual issues—such as the geological nature of land—which cannot be determined solely on affidavits; ii. Nature of "Khoai" Land - noted that "khoai" is not a recognized category under West Bengal revenue laws but a colloquial term for geological formations - Reports from the District Magistrate and the West Bengal Pollution Control Board (WBPCB) failed to provide objective or scientific evidence that the specific subject plot was "khoai" land; iii. Procedural Irregularities vs. Substantive Illegality - held that even if the Gram Panchayat was not the competent authority to sanction the building plan (vesting instead with the Panchayat Samiti), such a lapse constituted a "minor procedural irregularity" that was curable, especially since the plan had been vetted by the higher-tier Zilla Parishad - This did not warrant the "draconian consequence" of demolition; iv. Procedural Irregularities vs. Substantive Illegality - held that even if the Gram Panchayat was not the competent authority to sanction the building plan (vesting instead with the Panchayat Samiti), such a lapse constituted a "minor procedural irregularity" that was curable, especially since the plan had been vetted by the higher-tier Zilla Parishad - This did not warrant the "draconian consequence" of demolition; v. Bona Fides and Concealment of Facts: Noted that the PIL lacked bona fides as several writ petitioners owned existing residential structures within the same tract of land, a fact they failed to disclose - The petition "selectively targeted" the appellant's construction while ignoring similar surrounding structures - set aside the High Court's demolition order, and expunged adverse remarks against the Sriniketan Santiniketan Development Authority (SSDA). Due to the lack of bona fides and non-disclosure of material facts, the Court imposed costs of ₹1,00,000 on the writ petitioners. Appeals allowed. [Relied on Sushanta Tagore and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors., (2005) 3 SCC 16; Chairman, Grid Corporation of Orissa Ltd. (GRIDCO) v. Sukamani Das, (1999) 7 SCC 298; Shubhas Jain v. Rajeshwari Shivam, (2021) 20 SCC 454; Paras 36, 45 - 47, 49 – 52, 58] Aarsuday Projects & Infrastructure v. Jogen Chowdhury, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 90 : 2026 INSC 93

Quantum Of Maintenance

Quantum Of Maintenance – Factors To Be Considered – While Fixing the quantum, courts must consider the status of the parties, reasonable needs of the wife and dependent children, the husband's actual income, and his liabilities - The financial position of the wife's parents is immaterial - The fact that a wife is educated or capable of earning is not a sufficient ground to deny or reduce maintenance if her independent income is insufficient to maintain the lifestyle of the matrimonial home – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Bhuwan Mohan Singh v. Meena and others (2015) 6 SCC 353; Rajnesh v. Neha and another (2021) 2 SCC 324; Manish Jain v. Akanksha Jain (2017) 15 SCC 801; Shailji v. Khobbanna (2018) 2 SCC (Civ) 712; Paras 10-15] Anamika Jain v. Dr. Atul Jain, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 111

Railway

Railway - Passengers purchasing railway tickets over the counter cannot be denied the benefit of travel insurance when the same facility is available to those booking tickets online. Union of India v. Radha Yadav, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 231

"Ratio" vs "Quota"

Interpretation of "Ratio" vs "Quota" – The Supreme Court clarified that the 11% allocation was intended to upgrade the cadre by ensuring experienced graduates are appointed to Supervisor posts, previously filled from the open category direct recruitment - This earmarking did not reduce the chances of SSLC-only holders, as their 29% ratio remained intact and was not reduced by the amendment. Shiny C.J. v. Shalini Sreenivasan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 247 : 2026 INSC 242 : AIR 2026 SC 1452

Real Estate

Real Estate and Statutory Compliances – Occupancy Certificate (OC) – A developer cannot compel a purchaser to accept possession without a valid Occupancy Certificate - Obtaining an OC is a statutory pre-condition integral to the lawful delivery of possession - Failure to obtain the same constitutes a deficiency in service. [Paras 25 - 29] Parsvnath Developers Ltd. v. Mohit Khirbat, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 178 : 2026 INSC 170 : AIR 2026 SC 1101

Real Estate - Subsequent Purchasers – Right to Compensation – A subsequent purchaser is entitled to seek the same relief as the original allottee - The right to claim compensation for deficiency in service travels with the allotment and cannot be denied merely because the party stepped into the shoes of the original allottee at a later stage – Appeals dismissed. [Relied on Pioneer Urban Land & Infrastructure Ltd. v. Govindan Raghavan (2019) 5 SCC 725; IREO Grace Realtech Private Limited v. Abhishek Khanna (2021) 3 SCC 241; Bangalore Development Authority v. Syndicate Bank (2007) 6 SCC 71; Samruddhi Cooperative Housing Society Ltd. v. Mumbai Mahalaxmi Construction (P) Ltd. (2022) 4 SCC 103; Dharmendra Sharma v. Agra Development Authority 2024 INSC 667; Para 18-22] Parsvnath Developers Ltd. v. Mohit Khirbat, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 178 : 2026 INSC 170 : AIR 2026 SC 1101

Recovery Proceedings

Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 – Auction Sale – Finality of Sale vs. Adequacy of Valuation – Limited Remand – The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's direction to remit the matter to the Debts Recovery Tribunal (DRT) for the limited purpose of reconsidering the valuation of properties, even after the auction sale was confirmed - While the rights of a bona fide auction purchaser deserve protection, this protection is not absolute - If credible issues regarding the adequacy of valuation or the fairness of the reserve price fixation arise, the court may invoke its supervisory jurisdiction to ensure the recovery process realized the maximum possible value for the secured asset. Om Sakthi Sekar v. V. Sukumar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 240 : 2026 INSC 237 : AIR 2026 SC 1460

Recovery Proceedings – Objective of Auction – The primary goal of an auction is to obtain the most remunerative price for a property through competitive bidding, ensuring transparency and fairness - A process that compromises competitive bidding increases the risk of underbidding or inadequate pricing - The principle of finality in judicial sales does not shield the process from examination regarding valuation or reserve price fixation - Recovery processes must be fair, transparent, and based on proper value assessments to balance the interests of both creditors and borrowers – Appeal dismissed. [Relied on Rajiv Kumar Jindal v. BCI Staff Welfare Association (2023) 238 Comp Cas 227: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 507; Paras 15-19] Om Sakthi Sekar v. V. Sukumar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 240 : 2026 INSC 237

Recruitment and Selection

Recruitment and Selection — Migration from Reserved to General Category — Teachers Recruitment — The principal issue is whether candidates belonging to reserved categories, who have availed relaxation in a qualifying examination (TET) to become eligible for the main selection process (TAIT), are entitled to migrate to the open/unreserved category on the basis of merit secured in the main examination - Held - The requirement of obtaining 60% marks in the Teachers Eligibility Test (TET) is not an essential eligibility condition, as the NCTE guidelines permit the appropriate Government to grant relaxation to reserved category candidates - Relaxation in qualifying marks for an eligibility test merely creates a "level playing field" and does not amount to a concession in the actual selection process - If a reserved category candidate secures higher marks in the final merit list (TAIT) than the last selected candidate in the general category, they are entitled to be adjusted against the general category - The High Court's view that such candidates are ineligible for the open category is erroneous. [Relied on Jitendra Kumar Singh & Anr. v. State of U.P. & Ors. (2010) 3 SCC 119; Vikas Sankhala & Ors. v. Vikas Kumar Agarwal & Ors. (2017) 1 SCC 350; Paras 22-32] Chaya v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 281 : 2026 INSC 277

Right to Appointment – Doctrine of Legitimate Expectation – Change in Policy – The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's direction to appoint candidates who completed the Ayurvedic Nursing Training Course from Government institutions without a fresh selection process - held that mere admission to a training course does not confer an automatic right to appointment, especially when the policy environment has shifted – noted that respondents claimed a right to appointment based on a decades-old practice where all 20 candidates from the sole Government college were absorbed into service - Supreme Court noted that since 2012, the State permitted private institutions to impart the same training, leading to an exponential increase in candidates (from 20 seats to 311 institutions by 2019-20) – Held that the doctrine of legitimate expectation cannot be applied where a substantial shift in circumstances and limited vacancies make the earlier practice impossible to sustain. State of Uttar Pradesh v. Bhawana Mishra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 26 : 2026 INSC 38

Recruitment – Integrated Child Development Scheme (ICDS) – Kerala Social Welfare Subordinate Services – Selection to the post of Supervisor – Eligibility of Graduate Anganwadi Workers to compete in the 29% quota reserved for SSLC holders - Special Rules for the Kerala Social Welfare Subordinate Services, 2010 – Amendment effective from 01.01.2014 – Distribution of Vacancies – Held that the 11% ratio carved out specifically for Anganwadi Workers with a graduate degree does not exclude such graduates from applying under the 29% quota earmarked for Anganwadi Workers with SSLC and 10 years' experience - held that graduates naturally possess the lower SSLC qualification; therefore, unless the rules expressly prohibit higher qualifications or exclude graduates from the general pool, they are eligible to compete in both categories. Shiny C.J. v. Shalini Sreenivasan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 247 : 2026 INSC 242 : AIR 2026 SC 1452

Recruitment – Judicial Review of Answer Keys – Ambiguity in Multiple Choice Questions (MCQs) – Selection for the post of Law Officer – Dispute over the correct answer to a question regarding the immunity of the Ninth Schedule of the Constitution from judicial review – Recruiting body considered "Ninth Schedule" (Option B) as correct, while the respondent claimed "None of the above" (Option D) was correct based on the 'Basic Structure' doctrine – Held: When High Court Judges themselves hold divergent views on the interpretation of Constitutional provisions and Supreme Court precedents spanning decades, law graduates appearing for a recruitment exam cannot be expected to reach a singular "correct" conclusion by such complex interpretation – Both candidates found to be deserving of accommodation as both answers could be considered correct from different perspectives. Charan Preet Singh v. Municipal Corporation Chandigarh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 253 : 2026 INSC 248 : AIR 2026 SC 1436

Recruitment – Karnataka Recruitment of Gazetted Probationers (Appointment by Competitive Examinations) Rules, 1997 – Additional/Waiting List – Key Principle – Absence of Waiting List – Under the 1997 Rules, there is no provision for the preparation or operation of an additional or waiting list - A vacancy arising from a selected candidate's failure to report for duty or complete pre-appointment formalities must be treated as a fresh vacancy for subsequent recruitment – Noted that once a select list is exhausted or finalized as per the statutory rules, its operation cannot be enlarged to fill vacancies caused by non-joining – Appeal allowed. [Paras 16-21] State of Karnataka v. Santhosh Kumar C., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 282 : 2026 INSC 276

Recruitment – Karnataka Recruitment of Gazetted Probationers (Appointment by Competitive Examinations) Rules, 1997 – Additional/Waiting List – The Supreme Court set aside a High Court judgment that directed the State to consider a candidate for a post left vacant due to the non-joining of a selected candidate - held that when recruitment rules specifically define the contours of a select list and do not provide for a reserve or additional list, a post left unfilled cannot be claimed as a right by the next candidate in line. State of Karnataka v. Santhosh Kumar C., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 282 : 2026 INSC 276

Recruitment – Reserve List/Waiting List – Validity Period – Locus Standi of Public Service Commission (PSC) – The Supreme Court set aside the judgments of the Rajasthan High Court which had directed the appointment of wait-listed candidates after the statutory expiry of the reserve list – Supreme Court noted down following points- i. Locus Standi of PSC to Appeal - held that the Rajasthan Public Service Commission (RPSC) has the locus standi to maintain a writ appeal even if the State (Appointing Authority) does not challenge the order - As a constitutional body under Article 315, the PSC is a "person aggrieved" when judicial directions mandate recommendations that bypass statutory rules or its independent advisory role; ii. Nature of Waiting List: A waiting list is not a perennial source of recruitment and does not confer an indefeasible right to appointment - Its purpose is to address contingencies such as non-joining of selected candidates within the same recruitment cycle; iii. Operation and Expiry of Reserve List (Rule 24/Rule 21): Under Rule 24 of the Rajasthan Legal State and Subordinate Services Rules, 1981, and Rule 21 of the Rajasthan Agriculture Subordinate Service Rules, 1978, the reserve list remains valid for only six months from the date the original list is forwarded to the Appointing Authority; iv. held that the period of validity must be calculated from the date of recommendation, not from the date a vacancy arises due to non-joining; v. Mandamus cannot be issued to "pick up" names from a list that has already expired by the time the writ petition is filed – Supreme Court rejected the plea that because some candidates were recommended after the expiry of the list, others must also be recommended - Article 14 constitutes a positive concept; a court cannot mandate the State to perpetuate an illegality or irregularity committed in favour of others – Appeals allowed. [Relied on U.P. Public Service Commission v. Surendra Kumar, (2018) 10 SCC 535; A.P. Public Service Commission v. Baloji Badhavath, (2009) 5 SCC 1; Tinku v. State of Haryana, 2024 INSC 72; Paras 46-90] Rajasthan Public Service Commission v. Yati Jain, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 52 : 2026 INSC 64

Recruitment to Police Force – Criminal Antecedents and "Honourable Acquittal" – Scope of Judicial Review – The Supreme Court set aside the High Court Division Bench's order which had directed the State to treat a candidate's acquittal as "honourable" and reconsider him for the post of constable (driver) - The respondent was previously charged with serious offences involving moral turpitude, including kidnapping and rape (Sections 363, 366, 376(2)(c) IPC), but was acquitted by the trial court by being given the "benefit of doubt". State of Madhya Pradesh v. Rajkumar Yadav, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 234 : 2026 INSC 225 : AIR 2026 SC 1471

Re-evaluation

Re-evaluation of Answer Sheets – Absence of Statutory Provision – Held: The High Court rightly restated the settled legal position that re-evaluation of an answer sheet is impermissible unless the governing rules, regulations, or policy expressly provide for it – Held that if an answer key has been vetted by the High Court on the administrative side, any judicial challenge to its correctness should ideally be referred back to an administrative committee or a committee of subject experts (including eminent law professors and language experts) for reassessment – Supreme Court should not take the responsibility of determining the correctness of specific answers itself - The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's directions to award marks for specific questions and delete others - The matters were referred to an administrative committee of the High Court to re-examine the disputed questions (Nos. 8, 74, and 96) and provide an opinion to the Public Service Commission. [Paras 7-9] Jharkhand Public Service Commission v. State of Jharkhand, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 138

Registered Documents

Registered Documents – Presumption of Validity – Standard of Proof to Declare a Registered Sale Deed as "Sham" – A registered Sale Deed carries a formidable presumption of validity and genuineness. Registration is a solemn act imparting a high degree of sanctity to the document; therefore, courts must not lightly or casually declare it a "sham" - The burden of proof to displace this presumption rests heavily upon the challenger, requiring material particulars and cogent evidence to demonstrate that the Deed was never intended to operate as a bona fide transfer of title. [Paras 31 - 33] Hemalatha v. Tukaram, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 79 : 2026 INSC 82

Reservation

Reservation – Purpose and Function of Roster/Register – Supreme Court clarified that a reservation roster or register is an administrative, post-based instrument maintained to record cadre composition and monitor representation over time - It is not a parallel selection mechanism used during the recruitment process to displace candidates who secure an unreserved place on their own merit – Noted that the roster defines the number of vacant posts for advertisement and ensures that the lawful quota for specific categories is not exceeded within the cadre. [Relied on Rajasthan High Court & Anr. v. Rajat Yadav & Ors. (Civil Appeal No. 14112 of 2024); Indra Sawhney v. Union of India (1992 Supp (3) SCC 217; Saurav Yadav v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2021) 4 SCC 542; Paras 27 – 34] Airport Authority of India v. Sham Krishna B, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 63 : 2026 INSC 69 : AIR 2026 SC 463

Retrospective Application

Retrospective Application of Cess — Execution Proceedings: Noted that in the case of Prakash Atlanta (JV), the Court held that NHAI could not unilaterally deduct cess during execution proceedings for a contract that was terminated in 2008, based on a State notification issued in 2010 - Such a deduction was an "afterthought" and lacked contractual or statutory basis for retrospective application to a closed contract. [Paras 43, 54, 60] National Highways Authority of India v. Gammon Atlanta (JV), 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 71 : 2026 INSC 76

Revision

Revisional Jurisdiction of High Court — Failure to Apply Judicial Mind — Held: The High Court "ignominiously" reduced the sentence without stating cogent reasons or considering that the Trial Court had already shown leniency by awarding only three years against a maximum of ten years under Section 307 IPC - The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgment and restored the Trial Court's sentence, directing the respondents to surrender within four weeks. [Relied on State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Saleem Alias Chamaru and Another (2005) 5 SCC 554; State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Suresh (2019) 14 SCC 151; Shivani Tyagi vs. State of U.P. & Another 2024 SCC OnLine SC 842; Hazara Singh vs. Raj Kumar and others (2013) 9 SCC 516; Paras 22-34] Parameshwari v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 169 : 2026 INSC 164

Regularization

Regularization of Casual Workers - Parity in Treatment - Irregular vs. Illegal Appointment - The Appellants, engaged as daily-wage workers (Sweepers and Cook) with the Income Tax Department since the 1990s, sought regularization of their services - The Tribunal and High Court denied relief, citing non-fulfillment of the 10-year continuous service criteria as of 10.04.2006 per the Umadevi (3) judgment - Held: The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgment, noting that the Appellants were similarly situated to other daily-wage workers whose services were already regularized under Court orders – Noted that "irregular" appointments (where procedures like interviews were followed) should be distinguished from "illegal" backdoor entries - It observed that the perennial nature of the work, evidenced by subsequent outsourcing, necessitated regular posts - Denying regularization by misapplying Umadevi (3) to long-serving employees performing indispensable duties is contrary to equity - Services ordered to be regularized from 01.07.2006 with consequential benefits – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Ravi Verma and Ors. Vs. Union of India and Ors. (Civil Appeal Nos. 2795-2796 of 2018); Raman Kumar and Ors. Vs. Union of India and Ors. (Civil Appeal No. 4146 of 2023); Jaggo Vs. Union of India and Ors. (2024 INSC 1034); Paras 7-10] Pawan Kumar v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 159 : 2026 INSC 156 : AIR 2026 SC 997

Relief

One-time Measure to Prevent Protracted Litigation – Supreme Court noted this was the third round of litigation and a fourth round (fresh Selection Board) would not yield equitable results due to inherently skewed ACRs – Supreme Court modified AFT directions to grant PC directly to specific categories: (a) SSCWOs inducted prior to January 2009; (b) SSCWOs inducted after January 2009 in branches other than Law, Education, and Naval Architecture; and (c) Male SSCOs barred by initial terms, subject to medical and disciplinary clearance – Released officers within these categories deemed to have completed 20 years of service for pensionary benefits. [Relied on Union of India v. Annie Nagaraja (2020) 13 SCC 1; Lt. Col. Nitisha & Ors v. Union of India (2021) 15 SCC 125; Amit Kumar Sharma v. Union of India (2023) 20 SCC 486; Shankarsan Dash v. Union of India (1991) 3 SCC 47; Para 54-56] Yogendra Kumar Singh v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 285 : 2026 INSC 282

Relief – Superannuation during Pendency – Held that since the appellant has reached the age of superannuation, reinstatement is no longer possible - The High Court, on fresh consideration, must determine: (i) whether the Tribunal's interference with the disciplinary action was justified, and (ii) the appellant's entitlement to back wages and retiral benefits – Appeal allowed. [Paras 9-11] Hemlata Eknath Pise v. Shubham Bahu Uddeshiya Sanstha Waddhamna, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 177 : 2026 INSC 147

Rent Control

Urban Premises Rent Control Act, 2021 (UP); Section 38(2) - Jurisdiction of Rent Authority - Judicial Discipline - The Supreme Court censured the Rent Authority for entertaining a restoration application and staying eviction after the Supreme Court had already dismissed the tenant's Special Leave Petition and Review Petition with a direction to vacate - Supreme Court emphasized that under Section 38(2), the Rent Authority's jurisdiction is limited to tenancy agreements and does not extend to questions of title or ownership. An order passed without jurisdiction is a nullity. Rajesh Goyal v. Laxmi Constructions, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 297 : 2026 INSC 299

Role of the Bar

Role of the Bar – Professional Ethics – Supreme Court emphasized that the Bar has an important role in ensuring litigation does not become endless - Counsel are expected to place the full procedural history with clarity and advise litigants against pursuing repetitive proceedings that seek to reopen concluded issues. [Relied on Union of India v. M.K. Sarkar, (2010) 2 SCC 59; State of Uttar Pradesh v. Arvind Kumar Srivastava, (2015) 1 SCC 347; Paras 7-9] Damor Nanabhai Manabhai v. State of Gujarat, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 104

Salary

Salary Payment and Creation of Posts – Private Aided vs. Self-Financed Schemes – Respondents (lecturers) sought government salary payments and post sanctions for subjects run under a self-financed scheme - The High Court had repeatedly issued "reconsideration" directions without deciding the existence of a legal right, leading to a "Second Season" of episodic litigation spanning 16 years - Held: Constitutional and statutory remedies are not for academic discourse; if a case deserves relief, it must be granted "then and there, unflinchingly". Mahendra Prasad Agarwal v. Arvind Kumar Singh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 195 : 2026 INSC 175

Securities Law

Securities Law – SEBI (Prohibition of Fraudulent and Unfair Trade Practices Relating to Securities Market) Regulations, 2003 (PFUTP) – Regulations 3 and 4 – Fraudulent Diversion of Funds – Ratification by Shareholders – Legality of Post-Facto Approval - Core Issue: Whether a company that raises funds through preferential allotment for specific disclosed objects can, after immediately diverting those funds for unauthorized purposes, legitimize the illegality through a subsequent shareholders' resolution – Supreme Court noted the following – i. PFUTP and Fraud: The definition of "fraud" under PFUTP Regulations is expansive and does not require a strict "deceit" element as per common law - Diversion of funds raised for a specific object to an undisclosed purpose constitutes a breach of Regulation 3 and Regulations 4(2)(f), (k), and (r); ii. Irregularity vs. Illegality: Supreme Court distinguished between an "irregularity," which can be regularized, and an "illegality," which cannot - An act that is "ultra vires" or violates statutory regulations impacting public interest and multiple stakeholders cannot be ratified even if all shareholders agree; iii. Public Interest Dimensions: SEBI Regulations have public law dimensions designed to protect the integrity of the market - A private resolution by shareholders cannot wipe off a crystallized liability or waive rights involving public policy; iv. Parallel Proceedings: Held, that the Whole Time Member (WTM) and the Adjudicating Officer (AO) operate in separate fields the former for protective measures/disgorgement and the latter for imposing penalties and both proceedings are maintainable on the same set of facts. [Relied on SEBI v. Kanaiyalal Baldevbhai Patel (2017) 15 SCC 1; Shri Lachoo Mal v. Shri Radhey Shyam (1971) 1 SCC 619; Government of Andhra Pradesh v. K. Brahmanandam (2008) 5 SCC 241; SEBI v. Kishore R. Ajmera (2016) 6 SCC 368; Paras 41-66] Securities and Exchange Board of India v. Terrascope Ventures, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 248 : 2026 INSC 245

Sentencing

Sentencing Discretion – While the statutory minimum was six months, Supreme Court exercised its discretion to reduce the three-year rigorous imprisonment sentence to the period already undergone (approximately one year) - This decision was based on the advanced age of the surviving appellants, the fact that the incident occurred nearly four decades ago (1985), and the prolonged pendency of the proceedings – Appeals partly allowed. [Relied on K.I. Pavunny v. Assistant Collector (HQ), Central Excise Collectorate, Cochin (1997) 3 SCC 721; Paras 20-22, 27-28] Amad Noormamad Bakali v. State of Gujarat, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 190 : 2026 INSC 180

Sentencing – Mitigating Circumstances – Delay and Age – While sustaining the conviction, the Court modified the sentence due to the passage of time and the appellant's advanced age - The appellant was approximately 40 years old at the time of the offense (1990) and 75 years old at the time of the final judgment – Supreme Court reduced the sentence to the statutory minimums: 6 months for Section 7 and 1 year for Section 13(2) of the P.C. Act. [Paras 15-25] Raj Bahadur Singh v. State of Uttarakhand, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 242 : 2026 INSC 239 : AIR 2026 SC 1506

Selection and Recruitment

Merit-Based Selection - No Edge for Graduates – The selection process, involving an OMR and main written test focusing on pediatric health, provided a level playing field - The fact that non-graduates significantly outnumbered graduates in the final selection (235 out of 317) dispelled any apprehension that graduation conferred an unfair advantage or "edge" in the examination – Noted that The High Court's interpretation that the quotas were mutually exclusive was termed a "judicial fiat" that interfered with the executive's rule-making authority. "What the executive did not think fit to do by prescription in the Rules, could not have been done by a judicial fiat" – Appeals allowed. [Relied on Sanjay Kumar v. Narinder Verma (2006) 6 SCC 467; Paras 13-23] Shiny C.J. v. Shalini Sreenivasan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 247 : 2026 INSC 242 : AIR 2026 SC 1452

Migration of Reserved Category Candidates to Unreserved Category – Own Merit – The Supreme Court reiterated the settled legal position that a candidate belonging to a reserved category (SC/ST/OBC) who secures marks higher than or equal to the cut-off marks of the General (Unreserved) category, without availing any concession or relaxation, must be treated as a General category candidate and adjusted against unreserved posts - Such candidates are "own merit" candidates and their selection does not count against the quota earmarked for the backward classes - Migration or "Merit Induced Shift" of reserved category candidates to the open category is a manifestation of the principle of equality - The "Open Category" is not a quota but is available to all candidates regardless of their social category, provided they meet the criterion of merit. Airport Authority of India v. Sham Krishna B, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 63 : 2026 INSC 69 : AIR 2026 SC 463

Selection Criteria – Criteria Appointments and Career-Enhancing Courses – Supreme Court found that SSCWOs were systematically denied criteria appointments and access to important courses (e.g., Junior Command Course) due to their perceived lack of a "future" in the Army - While these may not have a high numerical weightage in computerized evaluation, they significantly influence the "Value Judgement" component (5 marks), which often becomes determinative when officers miss the cut-off by narrow margins. Lt Col Pooja Pal v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 283 : 2026 INSC 281

Seniority

Inter-se Seniority - Direct Recruits vs. Internally Selected Candidates – Reckoning of Seniority from Date of Appointment/Training vs. Date of Commencement of Probation - Tamil Nadu Electricity Board (Service Regulations), 1967 – Regulations 10(9), 87(1), and 97 – Determination of Seniority: The Supreme Court set aside the High Court Division Bench's judgment which had ruled that seniority for direct recruits should only commence from the date their probation started (after completion of training) - held that according to the plain language of the Regulations, a person is considered to be "on duty" and "appointed to a class of service" from the moment they perform duties or commence prescribed training/instruction. [Relied on Govt. of A.P. v. P. Bhaskar (2008) 11 SCC 687; 2008 INSC 267; Paras 19-24] M. Thanigivelu v. Tamil Nadu Electricity Board, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 233 : 2026 INSC 229

Seniority from Initial Joining - Administrative Instructions vs. Statutory Regulations - Supreme Court clarified that the period of training is an integral part of service and must be counted for seniority - Regulation 97 specifies that seniority is determined by the rank in the list of approved candidates, and the date of joining duty marks the commencement of the relationship with the service, regardless of whether the candidate is on a consolidated pay during training or a regular scale during probation - rejected the application of the "cyclic order" (Proviso to Regulation 97) because the direct recruits were selected/appointed in 2000 and 2001, while the internal candidates were promoted in May 2002 - Since they were not recruited in the same calendar year, the direct recruits appointed earlier maintain their seniority over those appointed later - noted that any Board Proceedings (BPs) or terms in appointment letters that run contrary to the statutory Regulations (10(9) and 87) cannot override the legal position that seniority counts from the first date of joining for training. M. Thanigivelu v. Tamil Nadu Electricity Board, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 233 : 2026 INSC 229

Service Jurisprudence

Deemed Permanency and Substantive Appointment – Supreme Court ruled that instructors continuing for over ten years in a row against mandatory student-teacher ratio requirements acquire a degree of permanency - Even if originally contractual, these appointments are treated as "substantive in character" because they were made through a public selection process and the nature of work is permanent and integral to the institution - The PAB is the sole central authority with financial powers to approve budgets and fix honoraria under the scheme - Once the PAB approved a proposal to pay ₹17,000/- per month, the State Executive Committee had no authority to unilaterally reduce or ignore this determination. U.P. Junior High School Council Instructor Welfare Association v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 110

Service Tax

Service Tax — Finance Act, 1994 — Sections 65(40), 65(41), 65(105)(zu), 66A — Reverse charge — “Event Management Service” — Fees paid to foreign booking agencies for procuring speakers for Hindustan Times Leadership Summit — HELD: Not taxable as Event Management Service — Booking of speakers is distinct from managing, organizing, planning, or presenting an event — Mere procurement of speakers does not amount to “event management” — Presence of speakers being essential to the Summit does not convert booking agents into “event managers” — Tax cannot be imposed by stretching the statutory definition — Strict interpretation of taxing statutes must prevail – Further held that i. The contracts with Washington Speakers Bureau and Harry Walker Agency were speaker-booking contracts, not contracts for event management; they did not involve management of venue, logistics, stage, publicity, sound, light, security, invitations, or coordination of the event; ii. “Event management” under Section 65(40) requires services relating to planning, promotion, organizing, or presentation of an event; mere facilitation of a speaker's appearance does not satisfy this test; iii. The CBIC/TRU Circular dated 08.08.2002 supports the assessee, as it contemplates an event manager as one who manages venue, stage, artists, logistics, and production of the event — functions absent in the present case; iv. Even if speakers are central to the Summit, participation in the event is not equivalent to managing the event; booking agents cannot be treated as “event managers”; v. Applying the principle of strict interpretation of taxing statutes, tax cannot be imposed by analogy or inference if the service does not fall squarely within the statutory entry; vi. Applying the common parlance test, ordinary understanding of “event management” does not cover speaker-booking services – Appeals allowed. [Relied on: Shiv Steels v. State of Assam, 2025 SCC Online SC 2006; CST v. Jaswant Singh Charan Singh, 1967 SCC Online SC 154 (Para 46); Indo International Industries v. CST, (1981) 2 SCC 528; Paras 28, 37-41, 44-48] HT Media Ltd. v. Principal Commissioner Delhi South Goods and Service Tax, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 55 : 2026 INSC 66 : AIR 2026 SC 560

Short Service Commission

Short Service Commission — Grant of Permanent Commission (PC) — Indian Air Force — Retrospective evaluation based on Annual Confidential Reports (ACRs) — Validity of Minimum Performance Criteria — Pregnancy and Medical Category - Key Findings - i. Structural Distortion in Evaluation: ACRs authored in an environment where SSCOs had no future in the service are "structurally distorted" and cannot be deployed to their disadvantage when they are suddenly placed in a competitive fray for PC; ii. Arbitrary Implementation of Policy: The hurried implementation of Human Resource Policy (HRP) 01/2019, which introduced new criteria like "Categorisation" and "Mandatory In-Service Courses" (MISCs) without providing a reasonable gestation period, deprived officers of a meaningful opportunity to meet eligibility requirements; iii. Pregnancy and Gender Equality: The failure to accommodate officers who lost a round of consideration due to a temporary lowering of medical category on account of pregnancy amounts to arbitrariness - The choice to become a parent cannot be equated with an unwillingness to pursue professional advancement. [Relied on Yogendra Kumar Singh v. Union of India and Ors (Civil Appeal No. 14681/2024); AU Tayyaba v. Union of India (2023) 5 SCC 688; Lt. Col. Nitisha & Ors v. Union of India & Ors (2021) 15 SCC 125; Paras 14-17, 26-32, 35-39] Wg Cdr Sucheta EDN v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 284 : 2026 INSC 280

Short Service Commission — Grant of Permanent Commission (PC) — Indian Air Force — Retrospective evaluation based on Annual Confidential Reports (ACRs) — Validity of Minimum Performance Criteria — Pregnancy and Medical Category - The Supreme Court has held that evaluating Short Service Commission Officers (SSCOs) for Permanent Commission based on ACRs authored during a period when they were ineligible for PC is inherently unfair and arbitrary - Supreme Court held that the evaluative lens applied by assessing officers is conditioned by the available career trajectory; thus, reports intended only to assess suitability for short-term extension cannot be retrospectively treated as reliable indicators for long-term retention or advanced leadership potential - While declining reinstatement for released officers due to operational effectiveness, Supreme Court directed that SSCOs considered in the 2019–2021 Boards be deemed to have completed 20 years of substantive qualifying service for pensionary benefits as a one-time measure - For future Boards, the Air Force must disclose vacancies and detailed evaluation criteria prior to the selection process. Wg Cdr Sucheta EDN v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 284 : 2026 INSC 280

Society

Society - Autonomy of Society — General Body Resolutions — Supreme Court emphasized that the Society's General Body, in an AGM held on September 30, 2025, had ratified the membership of the appellants and the subsequent purchaser – Noted that the High Court's conclusion that the Revisional Authority acted in excess of jurisdiction was unsustainable, especially since the appellants had initially approached the Society's Authorised Officer and only then availed statutory remedies under the MCS Act. [Paras 43-44] Shashin Patel v. Uday Dalal, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 125 : 2026 INSC 125

Special Courts

Special Courts Act, 2009 (Bihar) — Confiscation of Property — Death of Public Servant during pendency of Appeal — Effect on Confiscation Proceedings against spouse/relative - The Supreme Court held that confiscation proceedings initiated under the Bihar Special Courts Act, 2009 (BSCA) do not automatically abate or get set aside upon the death of the public servant if the property is held by a relative or spouse who was also put to notice – Noted that "abatement" in criminal proceedings discontinuation due to the death of the accused is distinct from "acquittal" and does not constitute a comment on the merits of the case - Under Section 19 of the BSCA, confiscated property can only be returned in two specific scenarios: (a) modification or annulment of the order by the High Court, or (b) acquittal by the Special Court - Since the Act does not account for the death of a public servant as a ground for returning property, and because non-public servants can be proceeded against for holding illegally acquired assets, the High Court is required to decide such appeals on their merits rather than dropping them due to the death of the primary accused. [Relied on Yogendra Kumar Jaiswal v. State of Bihar (2016) 3 SCC 183; Gurmail Singh v. State of U.P. (2022) 10 SCC 684; P. Nallammal v. State (1999) 6 SCC 559; Para 8-12] State of Bihar v. Sudha Singh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 276 : 2026 INSC 272

Sports Law

Sports Administration – Applicability of S. Nithya Directions to Cricket Associations – Mandatory Inclusion of Sports Persons – The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's directions which had applied the mandate from S. Nithya v. Union of India (requiring 75% of members and key office bearers to be eminent sports persons) to a District Cricket Association - Held, the directions in S. Nithya arose from the specific context of athletics governance and are inapplicable to Cricket associations, which are governed by the specialized regulatory framework established in the BCCI case. Tiruchirappalli District Cricket Association v. Anna Nagar Cricket Club, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 154 : 2026 INSC 154 : AIR 2026 SC 1051

Sports - Cricket Administration – District Cricket Associations – Conformity with BCCI Constitution – Held, the judgment in BCCI v. Cricket Assn. of Bihar does not mandate that District Associations must model their regulations and bye-laws on the exact lines of the BCCI Constitution - While State Associations are required to bring their constitutions in conformity with the BCCI, this requirement does not automatically extend to the internal composition and business of District-level bodies through judicial review. Tiruchirappalli District Cricket Association v. Anna Nagar Cricket Club, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 154 : 2026 INSC 154 : AIR 2026 SC 1051

Sports - Public Character of Sports – Material Resources of the Community – The Court emphasized that sporting facilities and opportunities are "material resources of the community" under Article 39(b) and organizers are "institutions of the national life" under Article 38 - District Associations should volunteer to adopt "Sadhana" (endeavor) toward good governance, transparency, and the exclusion of conflicts of interest to ensure sports do not remain a privilege of the urban economic elite – Appeal allowed. [Relied on BCCI v. Cricket Assn. of Bihar (2016) 8 SCC 535; Paras 13-23] Tiruchirappalli District Cricket Association v. Anna Nagar Cricket Club, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 154 : 2026 INSC 154 : AIR 2026 SC 1051

Sports - The Supreme Court lifted the ban imposed on BJP Leader Anurag Thakur from holding office in the Board of Control for Cricket in India (BCCI). Board of Control for Cricket in India v. Cricket Association of Bihar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 143

Stale Claims and Representations

The Supreme Court reiterated that the practice of reviving stale or dead claims by making repeated representations followed by a prayer to "consider" them is disapproved - Rejection of a belated representation does not furnish a fresh cause of action - Courts must satisfy themselves that a claim relates to a "live issue" before issuing directions for consideration. Damor Nanabhai Manabhai v. State of Gujarat, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 104

Stamp Act

Stamp Act - Agreement to Sell - Stamp Duty - Possession - Relationship between Landlord and Tenant - Andhra Pradesh Stamp Act, 1922 - The Supreme Court addressed whether an agreement to sell, entered into by a tenant who had been in possession of the property for fifty years, should be treated as a "conveyance" for the purpose of charging stamp duty under Explanation I to Article 47A of Schedule I-A of the Andhra Pradesh Stamp Act, 1922 – Supreme Court noted Key Findings – i. Nexus of Possession: For Explanation I to Article 47A to apply, the delivery of possession must have a nexus to the agreement to sell meaning it must "follow" the agreement or be "evidenced" by it as a result of the sale transaction; ii. Continuance of Tenancy: Supreme Court noted that the appellant's possession remained that of a tenant and was not converted to that of a vendee - This was evidenced by the fact that the respondent successfully pursued an eviction order against the appellant as a tenant even after the agreement to sell was executed; iii. Nature of Agreement: Since the possession was not "followed by" or "evidenced" as a result of the agreement to sell, but rather preceded it by fifty years due to a pre-existing tenancy, the agreement did not constitute a "deemed conveyance" - The Supreme Court set aside the orders of the Trial Court and High Court, ruling that the appellant was not liable for additional stamp duty or penalty and directing the Trial Court to mark the agreement as an Exhibit. [Distinguished from Ramesh Mishrimal Jain vs. Avinash Vishwanath Patne, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 329; Paras 6-12] Vayyaeti Srinivasarao v. Gaineedi Jagajyothi, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 49 : 2026 INSC 59 : AIR 2026 SC 637

Superannuation Age

Superannuation Age of Judicial Officers – Jharkhand Superior Judicial Service (Recruitment, Appointment and Conditions of Service) Rules, 2001 – Article 233 and 309 of the Constitution of India – Petitioner, a Principal District and Sessions Judge, sought enhancement of retirement age to 61 or 62 years - Held, enhancement of retirement age requires a policy decision and consequential amendment in Service Rules - While some States have enhanced the age to 61/62 years to match government departments, such issues should not be resolved through judicial orders for individual benefit - A holistic view is required by stakeholders to ensure parity across States - Writ Petition under Article 32 not entertained. Ranjeet Kumar v. State of Jharkhand, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 123

Telecom Law

Telecom Law – Spectrum Allocation – Liability for Reserve Price – Effective Date for Commencement of Liability - The Supreme Court held that telecom licensees whose Unified Access Service (UAS) licences were quashed by the Court on February 2, 2012, but who continued operations to ensure non-disruption of services to the general public, are liable to pay the reserve price fixed for the November 2012 auction starting from February 2, 2012 – Held that the liability commences from the date the original licences were declared illegal and quashed, not from the date of subsequent orders or the date of fresh auctions. Union of India v. Sistema Shyam Teleservices, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 184 : 2026 INSC 174 : AIR 2026 SC 1123

Tender Process

Tender Process – Comparison of Dissimilar Plots – Irrationality – the Ghaziabad Development Authority (GDA) cancelled the appellant's bid for a 3150 sq. metre plot on the ground that smaller plots (123-132 sq. metres) fetched higher rates per square metre - Held, the subject plot (large industrial area) cannot be compared with smaller plots as demand for the former is scarce - Cancelling a bid based on such comparison constitutes an "irrelevant consideration" and is "arbitrary, whimsical, and irrational". Golden Food Products India v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 22 : 2026 INSC 22

Termination of Service

Validity of Degrees – Prospective Application of Judicial Declaration – Protection of Students' Careers - The appellants were appointed as librarians by the State of Bihar in 2010 based on Bachelor of Library Science (B.Lib) degrees obtained in 2004 from the University of Technology and Science, Raipur - This university was established under the Chhattisgarh Niji Kshetra Vishwavidyalaya Act, 2002 - in Professor Yash Pal v. State of Chhattisgarh (2005) 5 SCC 420, the Supreme Court had declared the 2002 Act ultra vires, resulting in the cessation of all universities established under it - Relying on this, the State of Bihar terminated the appellants' services in 2015, contending their degrees were unrecognized - The Patna High Court upheld the termination - Held: The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgment and the termination orders – i. Protection of Students' Interests: In Professor Yash Pal, Supreme Court specifically directed the State to protect students currently studying by affiliating their institutions with existing State universities - held that this logic extends to students who had already passed out before the Act was struck down, provided the university was not bogus and actual study was imparted; ii. No Fault of Appellants: The appellants could not be held at fault for studying in a university established under a then-valid State law - the State of Bihar appointed them in 2010—years after the Yash Pal judgment—meaning the State was or should have been aware of the legal status but allowed them to work for over five years; iii. Relief: directed the reinstatement of the appellants with continuity of service - back wages were denied as the appellants had not performed duties during the intervening period and the State was not solely at fault – Appeals allowed. [Relied on Prof. Yashpal and Anr. v. State of Chhattisgarh and Ors. (2005) 5 SCC 420; Paras 12-18] Priyanka Kumari v. State of Bihar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 173 : 2026 INSC 167 : AIR 2026 SC 1500

Town Planning

Regional and Town Planning and Development Act, 1995 (Punjab) – Sections 70, 75, 76, 79, 80 and 81 – Master Plan – Change of Land Use (CLU) – Legality of granting CLU for a 'Red' category industry in a 'Rural Agricultural Zone' contrary to the notified Master Plan. Held: A Master Plan is a statutory instrument, not a mere policy document. Once published in the Official Gazette, it binds both authorities and the public - Land use permissibility must be determined with reference to operative zoning; it cannot be displaced by ad hoc permissions or internal administrative file notings. Harbinder Singh Sekhon v. State of Punjab, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 162 : 2026 INSC 159

Trial Delay and Witness Management

Noted that the prosecution expressed intent to examine 159 witnesses - noted that even examining 50% of these witnesses would take a "pretty long time" and questioned the necessity of multiplying witnesses on the same issues – noted that the prosecution should focus on important witnesses to establish its case rather than prolonging the trial - While acknowledging the gravity of the NDPS charges, exercised its discretion in favor of the petitioner due to the overall delay and the age of pending cases in the Trial Court - Bail granted subject to terms imposed by the Trial Court and specific conditions including a travel restriction to Ankleshwar, Gujarat, and surrender of passport. [Paras 5-11] Chintan Rajubhai Panseriya v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 99

Vacancy

Consumption of Vacancy – Supreme Court observed that even if a senior candidate (Rishikesh Meena or Rajesh Kumar) does not join or accept an 'insider' vacancy, the next candidate in the merit list does not gain an automatic right to claim allocation to that specific post - Finality must be attached to the selection and allocation process to prevent administrative instability – Appeals dismissed. [Paras 9-12] Rupesh Kumar Meena v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 122 : 2026 INSC 119 : AIR 2026 SC 900

Vacancy Cap – Sanctity of 250-Vacancy Ceiling – Supreme Court rejected the Union's contention that the annual cap of 250 vacancies for PC is sacrosanct - Historical data revealed the cap was frequently breached for exigencies like the Kargil War or policy transitions - held that the vacancy cap cannot act as a shield against remedial action where the method of assessment is found to be unfair and discriminatory - Male officers cannot claim a legitimate expectation to compete only against other males for PC vacancies - Following the Delhi High Court's 2010 judgment in Babita Puniya, all parties were aware that women were entitled to PC consideration - Any expectation that runs contrary to the constitutional mandate of gender equality is inherently illegitimate. [Relied on Lt. Col. Nitisha v. Union of India (2021) 15 SCC 125; Paras 32-64] Lt Col Pooja Pal v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 283 : 2026 INSC 281

Vacancy Computation – Dynamic Vacancy Model – Validity of the methodology used in the December 2020 Selection Board – Held, the "Dynamic Vacancy Model" was a rational one-time mechanism to distribute vacancies across 24 batches while maintaining the Navy's pyramidal structure and operational agility – The use of '15' as a divisor is anchored in service realities, representing the approximate years of service accompanying a grant of PC – The methodology does not suffer from arbitrariness or discrimination - Held, unlike the Army and Air Force, the Navy's failure to disclose the evaluation framework and vacancy computation methodology prior to the 2020 and 2022 Boards violated basic norms of fairness and transparency. [Para 25, 38-48] Yogendra Kumar Singh v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 285 : 2026 INSC 282

Value Added Tax

Value Added Tax Act, 2008 (UP) – Schedule II, Part A, Entry 103 vs. Schedule V, Entry 1 (Residuary Entry) – Classification of "Sharbat Rooh Afza" - The Supreme Court held that "Sharbat Rooh Afza" is classifiable as a "fruit drink" under Entry 103 of Schedule II, Part A of the UPVAT Act, taxable at the concessional rate of 4%, rather than as an unclassified item under the residuary entry taxable at 12.5%; held that - 1. Inclusive Nature of Entry 103 - Supreme Court observed that Entry 103 is an inclusive and umbrella entry covering "processed or preserved vegetables and fruits, fruit drink and fruit juice."- Since the entry does not prescribe a minimum quantitative threshold for fruit content, it is improper to read a rigid percentage requirement into it that the Legislature did not provide; 2. Essential Character Test - Supreme Court applied the "Essential Character Test" as embodied in Rule 3(b) of the HSN Explanatory Notes - It held that while invert sugar syrup constitutes 80% of the volume, it merely acts as a carrier and preservative - The flavor, aroma, and beverage identity are derived from the 10% fruit juice and herbal distillates, which impart the product's distinctive character as a refreshing drink; 3. Common Parlance vs. Regulatory Classification - Supreme Court clarified that regulatory classifications under food safety laws (like the Fruit Products Order, 1955) are intended for quality control and safety, not fiscal classification - A fiscal statute must be interpreted based on how the product is understood in common or commercial parlance; 4. Burden of Proof on Revenue for Reclassification - Supreme Court reiterated that the burden of proof lies squarely on the Revenue to establish that a product falls within a residuary entry or an entry different from that claimed by the assessee - In this case, the Revenue failed to produce trade inquiries or market evidence to displace the appellant's classification; 5. Avoidance of Residuary Clause - Recourse to a residuary entry is impermissible when a commodity can reasonably be brought within the ambit of a specific entry. Denying a product "parentage" in a specific entry and consigning it to the "orphanage of the residuary clause" is against the principles of classification – Appeals allowed. [Relied on Dunlop India Ltd v. Union of India (1976) 2 SCC 241; Reserve Bank of India v. Peerless General Finance & Investment Co. Ltd. (1987) 1 SCC 424; Hindustan Ferodo Ltd v. Collector of Central Excise (1997) 2 SCC 677; CCE v. Connaught Plaza Restaurant (P) Ltd (2012) 13 SCC 639; Paras 16, 19-22, 24-27, 30] Hamdard (Wakf) Laboratories v. Commissioner of Commercial Tax, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 197 : 2026 INSC 195

Victimology vs. Penology

Victimology vs. Penology — Compensation as a Substitute for Punishment — Held: Victim compensation under Section 395 of the Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (or Section 357 CrPC) is an addition to, and not an alternative for, the sentence imposed - Compensation is restitutory, whereas punishment is punitive and intended to create deterrence - Reducing a sentence for a grave offence (Section 307 IPC) in exchange for monetary payment is a "dangerous" practice akin to "Blood Money" and is not acceptable in the Indian criminal justice system. Parameshwari v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 169 : 2026 INSC 164

Water Disputes

Water Disputes - The Supreme Court directed constitution of a Tribunal for resolving disputes pending between the States of Tamil Nadu and Karnataka over sharing of Pennaiyar river water resources. The Court ordered the constitution of a Water Disputes Tribunal by the Central Government within 1 month. State of Tamil Nadu v. State of Karnataka, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 106