Supreme Court Quarterly Digest 2026 - Administrative, Labour & Service Laws [July - September 2026]

Administrative Law — Extraordinary Jurisdiction — Article 142 Powers - The invocation of extraordinary powers under Article 142 of the Constitution to do complete justice is contextual and cannot be exercised mechanically - The Supreme Court will not invoke Article 142 to protect the services of irregularly or illegally appointed teachers at the cost of the students' future and the integrity of public employment streams. [Para 27-32] Najma Khatun v. State of West Bengal, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 667 : 2026 INSC 691

Administrative Law — Precedents & Internal Departmental Notings — Legal Efficacy - Internal Departmental File Notings — Held - Departmental file notings do not carry the sanction of law to become an executable order - A noting recorded by an officer (such as the Executive Director / LAD of SEBI) represents mere internal viewpoints/opinions expressed for internal deliberations and does not constitute a final binding adjudication or confer legal rights/immunities upon an assessee/noticee. [Relied On: M/s Sethi Auto Service Station & Anr. v. Delhi Development Authority & Ors., (2009) 1 SCC 180; Paras 26–28] Securities and Exchange Board of India v. Vedanta Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 919 : 2026 INSC 978

Administrative Law — Rules of Business under Article 166 of the Constitution — Financial Implication and Deemed Consent - A delegated legislation/notification enhancing royalty rates approved by the Chief Minister (who is also the Minister-in-Charge of Mining) cannot be invalidated for want of explicit approval from the Council of Ministers or formal concurrence from the Finance Department, especially when there is no evidence of disagreement by the Finance Minister - In matters involving the collective responsibility of the Council, where a decision is taken by the Chief Minister at the helm, a deemed consent of the Finance Minister can be inferred under the peculiar facts and circumstances. [Paras 51-63] State of Haryana v. Faridabad Gurgaon Minerals, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 673 : 2026 INSC 690

Administrative Law & Judicial Discipline – Subsistence of Interim Judicial Direction vs. Subsequent Executive Action - An executive authority cannot, during the subsistence of an operative interim direction issued by a constitutional court granting provisional permission, render that direction ineffective or redundant by passing an administrative order inconsistent with it - If the authorities find compliance impracticable or contrary to rules, the appropriate course is to approach the court for modification, clarification, or stay. [Paras 25, 26] Indian Kayaking and Canoeing Association v. Union Territory of J&K, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 922 : 2026 INSC 981

Administrative Law & Public Services – Interview/Viva-Voce Benchmarks – Administrative Necessity - Prescription of Minimum 25% Qualifying Marks in Viva-Voce – The introduction of a minimum qualifying benchmark for the interview stage is neither arbitrary nor whimsical; it is rooted in profound administrative necessity to preserve the integrity, calibre, and quality of judicial administration - While a written examination evaluates academic legal knowledge, the viva-voce is essential to judge crucial personal and intellectual qualities such as alertness, resourcefulness, dependability, and decisive capability required for a high judicial office like an Additional District Judge - A candidate cannot claim a right to appointment based solely on a high aggregate score if they fail to clear the minimum interview threshold. [Relied on Mehmood Alam Tariq v. State of Rajasthan, (1988) 3 SCC 241; Paras 19-25] Manoj Goyal V. Rajasthan High Court, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 695 : 2026 INSC 699

Administrative Law & Revenue Jurisprudence — Revisional Power to be Exercised within Reasonable Time — Doctrine of Stale Claims - Even where an enactment does not explicitly prescribe a period of limitation for the exercise of suo motu revisional power, such power must be exercised within a "reasonable time" - Factors such as the nature of the statute, accrued rights/liabilities, prejudice caused, and the creation of third-party interests must be weighed - Public interest demands that authorities do not reopen settled, stale matters - Where the statute affirmatively specifies a 3-year outer limit, initiating an inquiry after 35–40 years and after third-party apartment owners have acquired rights is without statutory mooring and void at its very inception. [Relied on State of Gujarat v. Patil Raghav Natha and Others, (1969) 2 SCC 187; Securities and Exchange Board of India v. Sunil Krishna Khaitan and Others, (2023) 2 SCC 643; Mansaram v. S.P. Pathak and Others, (1984) 1 SCC 125; Government of India v. Citedal Fine Pharmaceuticals, Madras, and Others, (1989) 3 SCC 483; State of Orissa and Others v. Brundaban Sharma and Another, 1995 Supp (3) SCC 249; State of Punjab and Others v. Bhatinda District Cooperative Milk Producers Union Ltd., (2007) 11 SCC 363; Paras 14-16] M.R.R. Setty (Dead), by LRs Versus Government of Karnataka, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 889 : 2026 INSC 944

Administrative Law & Service Law – Deputation / NOC for National Sports Assignments – Exercise of Administrative Discretion – Article 14 of the Constitution – Duty of Timely Consideration - Although a government employee or a borrowing sports federation does not possess an absolute or vested right to claim deputation, relieving, or foreign travel permission, the absence of an absolute right cannot be equated with the absence of a right to a fair, reasonable, non-arbitrary, and timely consideration of a request - Administrative discretion must be exercised on relevant considerations, excluding extraneous ones, and within a reasonable timeframe - Where an assignment involves representing or coaching the Indian National Team at time-sensitive international events (such as the Asian Games or World Cups), delay itself defeats the object of the power exercised - A belated rejection order passed after an international event has already concluded cannot retrospectively cure prolonged executive inaction. [Paras 21–32] Indian Kayaking and Canoeing Association v. Union Territory of J&K, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 922 : 2026 INSC 981

Armed Forces Pension — Disability Pension — Entitlement Rules for Casualty Pensionary Awards, 1982 vs. Entitlement Rules for Casualty Pensionary Awards, 2008 — Burden of Proof and Presumption of Attributability/Aggravation — Judicial Review of Release Medical Board (RMB) Opinions - Substantive Continuity Between 1982 and 2008 Regimes - The Entitlement Rules 2008 substantially reproduce the 1982 scheme concerning causal connection, onus of proof, and attributability/aggravation - Although Rule 5 of the 2008 Rules withdraws the initial presumption that any deterioration in health is deemed service-related by clarifying that mere manifestation of a disease in service does not per se establish attributability or aggravation, it does not dismantle the protective framework for service personnel - Under Rule 7 of the 2008 Rules, read with Rule 10(b)(iii), Rule 11, and Regulation 423 of the Regulations for the Medical Services of the Armed Forces (RMSAF), 2010, the primary burden of disproving entitlement still rests on the employer establishment - If the cause of a disease remains unknown and the presumption of entitlement in favour of the claimant is not rebutted, attributability must be conceded. [Paras 29 - 34] Union of India v. Col. NC Isaac (Retd.), 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 935 : 2026 INSC 993

Armed Forces Pension — Legality and Uncertainty Surrounding Promulgation of Entitlement Rules 2008 - The Union failed to establish the precise source, timeline, and valid promulgation through which the 2008 Rules officially superseded the 1982 Rules, rendering them a mere collation of executive instructions - Under the Allocation of Business Rules, 1961, the Department of Pension and Pensioners' Welfare (DoPPW) not the Department of Ex-Servicemen Welfare (DESW) holds jurisdiction over policy formulation on retirement benefits - Compelling necessity highlighted for the competent authority to authoritatively notify transparent, clear, and uniform rules/regulations - Batch of 271 appeals dismissed on grounds of severe limitation/delay as well as lack of merit - The Union's failure to implement the 2015 Raksha Mantri Expert Committee recommendation regarding the withdrawal of pending appeals against disabled soldiers deprecated. [Relied on Dharamvir Singh v. Union of India, (2013) 7 SCC 316; Rajumon T.M. v. Union of India, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1064; Union of India v. Rajbir Singh, (2015) 12 SCC 264; Paras 20–28, 36-39] Union of India v. Col. NC Isaac (Retd.), 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 935 : 2026 INSC 993

Armed Forces Pension — Limited Qualification under Rule 7 Proviso — Belated Claims Beyond 15 Years - The sole significant departure in the Entitlement Rules 2008 from Rule 9 of the 1982 Rules is the proviso introduced to Rule 7 - Where a claim for disability pension is preferred after 15 years of discharge, retirement, invalidment, or release by which time service documents are typically weeded out the onus of proving entitlement reverses and shifts entirely onto the claimant - Tribunals and Courts cannot mechanically apply the Dharamvir Singh presumptions to allow routine applications filed after 15 years without a detailed scrutiny of the claimant's evidence. [Paras 30–39] Union of India v. Col. NC Isaac (Retd.), 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 935 : 2026 INSC 993

Armed Forces Pension — Weight Accorded to Release Medical Board Opinion - The Medical Board is an expert body, and its scientific opinion on medical causation is entitled to due deference and weight - Courts and the Armed Forces Tribunal ought not to substitute their own views merely because an alternative medical conclusion is plausible - Judicial interference is warranted only where there is an absence of reasons, omission of germane facts, or a patent defect in the decision-making process - Where an unreasoned Medical Board opinion is set aside, the appropriate course is ordinarily to direct a review/reconstitution of the Medical Board rather than judicial substitution of medical findings. [Paras 31- 39] Union of India v. Col. NC Isaac (Retd.), 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 935 : 2026 INSC 993

Constitution of India, 1950 — Article 142 — Invalidation of Scheduled Tribe Certificate — Protection of Pensionary and Retiral Dues — Scope of equitable relief - The appellant was appointed as Junior Engineer (Civil) in 1994 on the basis of a caste certificate certifying him as belonging to the "Tokre Koli" Scheduled Tribe and retired on superannuation on 30.06.2025 after more than three decades of service - The Scrutiny Committee invalidated and confiscated his caste certificate, and the High Court dismissed his writ petition relying on pre-constitutional family records showing the caste of his paternal ancestors as "Koli" - Affirming the findings of the Scrutiny Committee and the High Court on the invalidity of the caste claim, the Supreme Court considered the question of protecting his retiral benefits – The Supreme Court observed that while ordinarily an appointment obtained on the basis of an invalid caste certificate would not survive, in exceptional circumstances where equities of the case so warrant, the Supreme Court may exercise its power under Article 142 of the Constitution of India to render complete justice - Taking note that the appellant had rendered more than 30 years of unblemished service until superannuation, and filed an affidavit stating that he has no children and no member of his family had derived any benefit from the invalidated certificate, the Court directed that the service rendered by the appellant from 21.10.1994 to 30.06.2025 shall stand protected for the limited purpose of computation and release of his retiral and pensionary benefits - It was explicitly clarified that such protection shall neither amount to validation/recognition of the caste claim nor entitle the appellant or his family to claim future benefits. [Relied on Chairman and Managing Director, Food Corporation of India & Ors. v. Jagdish Balaram Bahira & Ors., (2017) 8 SCC 670; R. Sundaram v. Tamil Nadu State Level Scrutiny Committee, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 287; Surekha Baljorsingh Thakur v. Caste Scrutiny Committee & Anr., Civil Appeal No. 4586 of 2024; Paras 11–16] Shirish Pandharinath Patil v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 898 : 2026 INSC 949

Constitution of India – Article 226 – Maintainability of Writ Petition vs Alternative Remedy - The existence of an alternative remedy (such as raising a dispute under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947) does not operate as an absolute bar to the exercise of writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, particularly where the challenge is directly to the legality and validity of the order of termination itself. [Relied on Avtar Singh v. Union of India and Others, (2016) 8 SCC 471; Ravindra Kumar v. State of U.P. and Others, 2024 INSC 131; Umesh Chandra Yadav v. Inspector General and Chief Security Commissioner, Railway Protection Force, Northern Railway, New Delhi and Others, (2022) 14 SCC 244; Paras 18-25]. Shatrughn Yadav v. Fertilizers and Chemicals Travancore Ltd. (F.A.C.T.), 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 789 : 2026 INSC 829

Constitution of India – Article 311(2) – Protection of Civil Servants – Termination of Confirmed Employees Without Departmental Enquiry – Permissibility - The Supreme Court held that the termination of services of confirmed government servants through a simpliciter administrative order, without conducting a departmental enquiry, is a manifest violation of the procedural safeguards guaranteed under Article 311(2) of the Constitution – The Supreme Court emphasized that confirmation in service is not a mere administrative formality; it confers a substantive status carrying an enhanced security of tenure and constitutional protection - Even if an allegation exists that the initial appointments were irregular or illegal (e.g., made against vacancies in excess of those advertised), the protected status acquired by the civil servants cannot be undone by an administrative order bypassing the mandatory requirements of Article 311(2) - The holding of an inquiry remains the constitutional rule, and the executive cannot dispense with it at its convenience unless the case strictly falls within the narrowly tailored exceptions under the second proviso to Article 311(2). [Paras 14-21] Debashish Mohapatra v. District and Session Judge, Jagatsinghpur, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 721 : 2026 INSC 743

Constitution of India, 1950 — Article 338 — Powers and Functions of National Commission for Scheduled Castes (NCSC) — Nature of Orders / Directives — Recommendatory vs. Adjudicatory Powers — Scope of Civil Court Powers under Article 338(8) - The Supreme Court reiterated that the National Commission for Scheduled Castes (NCSC) established under Article 338 of the Constitution of India is a constitutional body with a recommendatory and advisory role, but it does not possess adjudicatory powers - The NCSC cannot take over the functions of a court or an adjudicatory tribunal to pass mandatory orders or grant consequential service benefits such as directing the payment of arrears. Mumbai Port Authority v. National Commission For Scheduled Caste, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 729 : 2026 INSC 755

Constitution of India, 1950 — Interpretation of "Rights and Safeguards" - Under Article 338(5)(b), the duty of the NCSC to inquire into specific complaints regarding the deprivation of "rights and safeguards" does not confer an independent enforcement mechanism - The words "rights and safeguards" must be read together as a bundle - The provision of safeguards is a function of the Legislature, and the NCSC's role is merely to monitor, evaluate, record factual findings, and make recommendations to the Union or State Government for effective implementation - The Supreme Court set aside the High Court judgment and held that the directions issued by the NCSC demanding the employer to pay service arrears to the employee within 30 days were beyond its constitutional powers and non-est in law. [Relied on All India Indian Overseas Bank SC and ST Employees' Welfare Assn. v. Union of India, (1996) 6 SCC 606; Collector v. Ajit Jogi, (2011) 10 SCC 357; Bhabani Prasad Jena v. Orissa State Commission for Women, (2010) 8 SCC 633; Paras 9-14] Mumbai Port Authority v. National Commission For Scheduled Caste, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 729 : 2026 INSC 755

Constitution of India, 1950 — Limited Scope of Civil Court Powers - The powers of a civil court granted to the NCSC under Article 338(8) are limited strictly to procedural matters required for facilitating an investigation or inquiry (e.g., summoning persons, discovery of documents, receiving evidence on affidavits) - The use of the word "namely" in Article 338(8) underscores the restricted scope of these powers - Such procedural powers do not convert the NCSC into a civil court, nor do they grant it the authority to pass final adjudicatory orders, issue temporary or permanent injunctions, or grant binding reliefs. [Paras 9 – 11] Mumbai Port Authority v. National Commission For Scheduled Caste, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 729 : 2026 INSC 755

Constitution of India, 1950 — Articles 14, 16, and 32 — Service Law — Pay Fixation & Parity — Central Government Industrial Tribunals-cum-Labour Courts (CGIT-cum-LCs) — Re-employed Judicial Officers — Claim for 6th Central Pay Commission (CPC) Pay Scales at par with other Central Tribunals vs. Pay Scales applicable to District Judiciary based on Justice E. Padmanabhan Committee / Shetty Commission Recommendations — Permissibility of reasonable classification — Scope of Judicial Review - Petitioners, retired judicial officers appointed on a re-employment basis as Presiding Officers of Central Government Industrial Tribunals-cum-Labour Courts (CGIT-cum-LCs), challenged the denial of 6th CPC pay scales and their equation with the District Judiciary for pay fixation – Held - Classification of re-employed pensioners as a distinct class for pay fixation is valid and does not violate Articles 14 or 16 of the Constitution - Upon re-employment after superannuation, such officers cease to be homogeneous vis-à-vis regular government employees and are governed by a special scheme under the Central Civil Services (Fixation of Pay of Re-employed Pensioners) Orders, 1986 - The determination of pay structures and equation of posts is an executive function based on expert body recommendations (such as the Shetty Commission and Justice E. Padmanabhan Committee) - The Industrial Tribunals/Labour Courts in which petitioners are appointed are established within the State; thus, equating their pay scale with that of the District Judiciary carries a rational and intelligible differentia and is free from arbitrariness - Judicial review in pay fixation is limited and courts must refrain from interfering with the executive domain unless patent arbitrariness, malafides, or apparent anomalies are demonstrated. [Relied on State of U.P. and Others v. J.P. Chaurasia and Others, (1989) 1 SCC 121; Union of India v. Dineshan K.K., (2008) 1 SCC 586; Union of India v. Indian Navy Civilian Design Officers Association and Another, (2023) 19 SCC 482; Union of India v. T.V.L.N. Mallikarjuna Rao, (2015) 3 SCC 653; Charanjit Lal Chowdhury v. Union of India, 1950 SCC 833; Paras 5 - 6] R.K. Yadav v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 801 : 2026 INSC 848

Constitution of India, 1950 — Subordinate Judiciary — Judicial Service Rules — Recruitment to the post of Civil Judge (Junior Division) — Eligibility Criteria — Requirement of 3 years' practice at the Bar — Modification/Review of Judgment dated 20.05.2025 — Transitional Scheme vs. Post-Transitional Scheme - The Supreme Court had, vide its Judgment dated 20.05.2025 in All India Judges Association v. Union of India(Judgment under Review), restored the mandatory requirement of a minimum 3 years' practice at the Bar to be eligible to appear for the Civil Judge (Junior Division) examination - On review and clarification petitions, the Court examined the disproportionate impact and hardship caused to law graduates, women, and marginalized candidates due to the abrupt restoration of the 3-year practice rule - Held (per Surya Kant, CJI. and Augustine George Masih, J) - While the institutional necessity for prior exposure to court functioning before assuming judicial office is neither unreasonable nor displaced, the 3-year practice requirement cannot be applied in a manner that abruptly excludes candidates who arranged their careers under the pre-existing regime - The judgment under review stands modified to balance practical readiness with intellectual merit by prescribing a phased transitional model and a restructured post-transitional framework. Bhumika Trust v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 841 : 2026 INSC 904

Constitution of India, 1950 — Subordinate Judiciary — Judicial Service Rules — Recruitment to the post of Civil Judge (Junior Division) — Eligibility Criteria — Requirement of 3 years' practice at the Bar — Modification/Review of Judgment dated 20.05.2025 — Transitional Scheme vs. Post-Transitional Scheme - Dissenting Opinion (Per K. Vinod Chandran, J.) - No Ground for Review - There is no error apparent on the face of the record to warrant reviewing the well-considered judgment restoring the 3-year practice requirement - Impracticability of the Two-Year Training Model - Requiring candidates to undergo two years of post-selection training/clerkship on half-pay prejudices recruits, creates unviable financial and administrative burdens on the exchequer, and leaves courts undermanned - making confirmation contingent on the subjective satisfaction of a High Court Judge creates arbitrary hurdles and results in disparate classes of recruits - Distinction from Civil Services - Judicial service cannot be equated with executive services like IAS/IPS; judicial officers exercise unhindered adjudicatory discretion from day one without hierarchical supervisory control over their judicial decisions - Courtroom practice is irreplaceable by pre-service training. [Paras 4-10] Bhumika Trust v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 841 : 2026 INSC 904

Constitution of India, 1950 — Subordinate Judiciary — Judicial Service Rules — Recruitment to the post of Civil Judge (Junior Division) — Eligibility Criteria — Requirement of 3 years' practice at the Bar — Modification/Review of Judgment dated 20.05.2025 — Transitional Scheme vs. Post-Transitional Scheme - Key Holdings & Scheme Framed By Majority – i. Transitional Period (For advertisements/notifications issued after 20.05.2025 up to 31.03.2027) - Deemed Practice Exemption - All law graduates are eligible to apply without having to satisfy the 3-year actual bar practice requirement. Candidates are deemed to have completed one year of active practice, and no separate Certificate of Practice is required for this deemed period - Two-Year Training & Clerkship Model - Selected candidates shall be designated as "Trainee Judicial Officers"and must complete - Compulsory 1 year of intensive training at the State Judicial Academy (treated as equivalent to 1 year of practice at the Bar) with fixed emoluments equal to half the salary of a Judicial Magistrate First Class - Compulsory 1 year of structured Law Clerkship (6 months under a Principal District/District and Sessions Judge or Higher Judicial Service Member, and 6 months under a sitting High Court Judge), also treated as equivalent to 1 year of practice at the Bar - Confirmation: Trainee Judicial Officers shall be appointed to regular cadres carrying full pay scales only upon a satisfactory, reasoned evaluation report submitted by the supervising High Court Judge - ii. Post-Transitional Period (For advertisements/notifications issued on or after 01.04.2027) - 1-Year Actual Practice Mandatory: Candidates must possess at least 1 year of actual practice in the District Courts, verified through a Certificate of Practice showing recorded presence and participation in effective judicial proceedings - Subsequent Training: Selected candidates must undergo 1 year of institutional training at the State Judicial Academy, followed by 6 months of Law Clerkship in District Courts and 6 months of Law Clerkship under a sitting High Court Judge - iii. Higher Legal Education Not Countable as Practice - The duration spent pursuing higher legal education (LL.M., etc.) cannot be counted towards the mandatory practice requirement, as it does not foster the requisite familiarity with courtroom processes and practical court functioning - iv. Operation & Review of the Scheme - The scheme shall operate for five years, following which empirical data regarding its efficacy, recruitment quality, and officer performance shall be placed before the Supreme Court for reconsideration. [Relied on Re: Recruitment of Visually Impaired in Judicial Services, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 481; All India Judges Association v. Union of India (Judgment under Review / 6th AIJA Case), 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1184; Paras 58–80] Bhumika Trust v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 841 : 2026 INSC 904

Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 (CLRA Act) - Section 21(4) - Payment of Wages Act, 1936 - Section 2(vi) - A principal employer cannot be held liable to pay gratuity to workers engaged through a contractor when there is no employer-employee relationship between the principal employer and such contractual workmen. The Court set aside a Bombay High Court order holding Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Ltd. (ONGC) liable to pay gratuity to workers engaged through a contractor, holding that the Controlling Authority cannot decide who is liable to pay gratuity. Oil and Natural Gas Corporation v. Suryakand D. Lad, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 961 : 2026 INSC 1019

Employees' Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 — Section 14B & Section 7Q — Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC) — Liability of Successful Resolution Applicant (SRA) — Mandatory vs. Discretionary Nature of Damages under Section 14B — Reference to Larger Bench - Liability of SRA to Clear EPF Dues - Provident fund and gratuity dues fall outside the liquidation estate under Section 36(4)(b)(iii) of the IBC and cannot be subjected to the waterfall mechanism under Section 53(1) - In terms of Section 11(2) of the EPF & MP Act, statutory first charge is created in respect of workmen dues (including Section 7Q interest and Section 14B damages), which overrides non-obstante priority clauses in subsequent legislation - the Successful Resolution Applicant (SRA) is liable to pay provident fund and gratuity dues in full to save the resolution plan from being hit by Section 30(2)(e) of the IBC. Kerala Industrial Infrastructure Development Corporation v. Central Board of Trustees, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 933 : 2026 INSC 990

Employees' Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 — Rehabilitation Mechanism and Power of Central Board under Second Proviso to Section 14B - The Second Proviso to Section 14B empowers the Central Board to reduce or waive damages for an establishment undergoing rehabilitation under the now-repealed SICA - Since the IBC superseded SICA for corporate turnaround, a resolution plan under IBC is functionally akin to a scheme of rehabilitation sanctioned by BIFR - The Central Board is competent to consider an application for reduction or waiver of damages preferred by an SRA under the Second Proviso. [Paras 6-18] Kerala Industrial Infrastructure Development Corporation v. Central Board of Trustees, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 933 : 2026 INSC 990

Employees' Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 — Discretion of Authorized Officer to Impose Damages under Section 14B — Doubt Cast on Horticulture Experiment Station: A doubt was expressed regarding the ratio in Horticulture Experiment Station Gonikoppal v. Regional Provident Fund Organization, (2022) 4 SCC 516, which held that imposition of damages under Section 14B is strictly automatic and mandatory upon civil default without requiring discretion - The phrase 'may recover from the employer by way of penalty such damages' in the post-1988 amended Section 14B indicates that the Authorized Officer retains quasi-judicial discretion to decide whether or not to levy penalty/damages at all under extenuating circumstances - If the officer decides to impose damages, only the quantum is rigidly regulated by the scheme under Paragraph 32A - Statutory interest under Section 7Q is purely compensatory and distinct from the punitive damages under Section 14B - Question referred to a Larger Bench - Appellants directed to deposit outstanding EPF dues and Section 7Q interest in four quarterly installments, subject to final determination of waiver/damages by the competent forum. [Relied on Maharashtra State Cooperative Bank Limited v. Assistant Provident Fund Commissioner, (2009) 10 SCC 123; Jalgaon District Central Coop. Bank Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2513; State Bank of India v. Murari Lal Jalan & Florian Fritsch (Consortium), (2025) 4 SCC 354; Jet Aircraft Maintenance Engineers Welfare Assn. v. Ashish Chhawchharia, 2022 SCC OnLine NCLAT 418; Paras 7– 20] Kerala Industrial Infrastructure Development Corporation v. Central Board of Trustees, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 933 : 2026 INSC 990

Industrial Disputes (Amendment) Act, 1982 & Industrial Relations Code, 2020 (IR Code) — Legal Impact on Section 2(j) of the ID Act — Status of Bangalore Water Supply as an interpretive guide for future enactments - The Industrial Disputes (Amendment) Act, 1982 (Act 46 of 1982) was never notified by the Central Government and thus remained inchoate without acquiring operative legal force - The IR Code, 2020, which came into force on 21.11.2025 repealing the ID Act, constitutes an independent legislative scheme - The provisions and definitions under the IR Code must be interpreted on their own terms, text, and statutory context - Bangalore Water Supply shall not be regarded as the sheet anchor for interpreting the definition of "industry" under the IR Code. [Paras 81, 279–284, 287]. State of U.P. v. Jai Bir Singh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 848 : 2026 INSC 897

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 - Per B.V. Nagarathna, J. (Dissenting / Separate Concurring in Result) - Reconsideration of Bangalore Water Supply was wholly unnecessary and the reference itself was unjustified - The Five-Judge Bench in Jai Bir Singh misinterpreted an apparent factual distinction between Jagannath Kondhare and Pratamsingh Parmar as a legal conflict - With the ID Act having been repealed w.e.f. 21.11.2025 and replaced by the IR Code, embarking upon an interpretive re-engineering of Section 2(j) is an entirely academic exercise - In an era of post-1991 Liberalisation, Privatisation, and Globalisation (LPG), an expansive definition of "industry" as articulated by Krishna Iyer, J. and concurred with by Beg, C.J. and Chandrachud, C.J. (constituting a clear 5:2 majority) remains vital to safeguard vulnerable workmen against imbalances in bargaining power - The ratio and Triple Test in Bangalore Water Supply require no modification or dilution whatsoever. [Paras 1.1–1.4, 3, 4, 12.1–12.6, 17.1–17.8, 18.3–18.11, 19.1–19.8]. State of U.P. v. Jai Bir Singh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 848 : 2026 INSC 897

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 - Per Dipankar Datta, J., on behalf of himself and Ujjal Bhuyan, J. - Constitution of India — Article 145(5) — Jurisprudential Precedent and Bench References — Maintainability and Effect of Repeal - A Bench of lesser quorum cannot question the substantive soundness of a decision delivered by a larger Bench (Bangalore Water Supply, 7-Judges) merely because of divergent subsequent opinions - Doubting the correctness of an expansive interpretation that has settled industrial relations across the nation disrupts the bedrock principle of certainty - With the enforcement of the Industrial Relations Code, 2020 on 21.11.2025 and the repeal of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, settled rights of workmen in pending legacy proceedings cannot be destabilized by rewriting or reading down Bangalore Water Supply under the guise of calibrating the Triple Test. [Relied on Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerage Board v. A. Rajappa, (1978) 2 SCC 213; State (NCT of Delhi) v. BSK Realtors LLP, (2024) 7 SCC 370; Trimurthi Fragrances Pvt. Ltd. v. Govt. of NCT of Delhi, (2024) 20 SCC 709]. State of U.P. v. Jai Bir Singh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 848 : 2026 INSC 897

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 — Per Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha, J. - Practice and Procedure — Maintainability of Reference to Larger Bench — Stare Decisis and Res Judicata — Doctrine of Judicial Discipline - A preliminary objection to maintainability raised on the ground of res judicata (citing Coir Board (II) which earlier declined a reference) and stare decisis is untenable - Res judicata applies to determinations in personam arising from a specific cause of action, not to pure questions of law or reference of legal precedents - A Five-Judge Bench, being superior in strength to a Three-Judge Bench, was fully competent to refer doubts to the Chief Justice of India for placing before a larger Bench - Institutional prudence and the necessity of bringing finality to decades of conflicting jurisprudence override procedural technicalities. [Relied on Bangalore Water Supply & Sewerage Board v. A. Rajappa, (1978) 2 SCC 213; Central Board of Dawoodi Bohra Community v. State of Maharashtra, (2005) 2 SCC 673; Chief Conservator of Forests v. Jagannath Maruti Kondhare, (1996) 2 SCC 293; Trimurthi Fragrances Private Ltd. v. Government of NCT of Delhi, (2024) 20 SCC 709; State (NCT of Delhi) v. BSK Realtors LLP, (2024) 7 SCC 370; Paras 90–96, 110–116, 118–127, 131–138]. State of U.P. v. Jai Bir Singh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 848 : 2026 INSC 897

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 — Section 2(j) — Constitution of India, Articles 14, 38, 39, and 43 — Per Joymalya Bagchi, J. - Sovereign Functions Exception — Government Welfare Schemes and Bottom-rung Employees - A blanket exclusion of government welfare departments and schemes from Section 2(j) is unconstitutional and offensive to the equality code under Article 14. A gardener, driver, clerk, or maintenance employee does not perform a different species of physical or operational labour simply because their payslip bears the seal of the State - The sovereign functions exemption must strictly remain confined to the inalienable, non-justiciable core of Statehood (such as defense, foreign affairs, coinage, administration of justice, and legislative enactment) - Extending "sovereign immunity" to developmental or socio-economic welfare schemes strikes hardest at vulnerable daily-rated and precarious workers who most require industrial protection - The Triple Test laid down in Bangalore Water Supply embodies the constitutional vision of social justice and correctly brings such employment within the statutory shield. [Relied On: Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerage Board v. A. Rajappa, (1978) 2 SCC 213; Corporation of the City of Nagpur v. Its Employees, AIR 1960 SC 675; Chief Conservator of Forests v. Jagannath Maruti Kondhare, (1996) 2 SCC 293]. State of U.P. v. Jai Bir Singh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 848 : 2026 INSC 897

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 — Section 2(j) — Definition of "Industry" — Triple Test laid down in Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerage Board v. A. Rajappa, (1978) 2 SCC 213 — Scope, calibration, and prospective effect of reformulation — Commercial character restored as an essential element - The Seven-Judge Bench decision in Bangalore Water Supply erred to the extent of completely discarding the rule of noscitur a sociis, leading to an overly expansive construction that decoupled the definition of "industry" from its traditional economic and commercial underpinnings - The inquiry had erroneously shifted almost entirely toward the presence of an employer-employee relationship, relegating the functional nature and character of the activity to the background - Held (per Majority — Surya Kant, C.J.I., Satish Chandra Sharma, Alok Aradhe, and Vipul M. Pancholi, JJ.) - (i) While the core framework of the Triple Test has largely stood the test of time, it required calibration and refinement - The test ought to be reformulated to require: (a) systematic activity; (b) organized through cooperation between employer and employee; and (c) the production, distribution, or provision of goods or services possessing a discernible commercial character that is analogous to trade or business to satisfy material human wants and wishes - (ii) The absence of a profit motive remains irrelevant; an enterprise may have a commercial character without an intention to maximize profits - (iii) However, to avoid prejudice and instability, this refined formulation operates purely prospectively and remains our considered opinion/hypothesis for future guidance - All matters currently pending before Labour Courts, Tribunals, High Courts, and the Supreme Court under the ID Act shall continue to be governed and decided strictly in accordance with the Triple Test as laid down in Bangalore Water Supply. [Paras 216–220, 230–236, 246–250, 274–278, 287]. State of U.P. v. Jai Bir Singh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 848 : 2026 INSC 897

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 — Section 2(j) — Sovereign Functions Exception and State Welfare Activities — Applicability to Government Departments - Welfare schemes and socio-economic activities undertaken by the State or its instrumentalities in furtherance of Directive Principles under Part IV and Fundamental Rights under Part III cannot be presumed to automatically constitute an "industry" simply because they involve organized employment - Governmental undertakings must be evaluated on their true substance and functional character rather than mere form - Where functions are governed by separate constitutional/statutory frameworks (e.g., Articles 310 and 311 of the Constitution) or lack an analogy to trade or commerce, they stand outside Section 2(j) - public utility services and substantially severable units carrying on commercial-type operations within government departments remain amenable to Section 2(j). [Paras 261–287]. State of U.P. v. Jai Bir Singh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 848 : 2026 INSC 897

National Coal Wage Agreement - VI (NCWA) – Clause 9.3.4 – Compassionate Appointment – Age Eligibility – Relevant Date for Determining Upper Age Limit – Administrative Delay by Employer – Welfare Nature of Scheme - The Supreme Court held that the age eligibility of a candidate seeking compassionate appointment under Clause 9.3.4 of the National Coal Wage Agreement (NCWA) cannot be reckoned with reference to the date of consideration of the application where the delay is attributable to the employer - An otherwise eligible dependent who was within the prescribed upper age limit (35 years) on the date of death of the employee and when the compassionate appointment process commenced (marked by the employer directing police verification) cannot be rendered ineligible merely because administrative formalities or processing took time - Employers cannot be permitted to defeat the claim of an eligible dependent by taking advantage of their own administrative delay. [Paras 15 - 26] Raspelli Bhagya Kishaiya v. General Manager Western Coalfields, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 811 : 2026 INSC 841

National Coal Wage Agreement - VI (NCWA) – Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) / Circular Reference No. 1416/2020-21 – Commencement of Process - Directive issued by the employer requiring the applicant to undergo police verification is an intrinsic part of the compassionate appointment process under the SOP and cannot take place unless a claim has already been initiated - Rejection of the claim on the ground that the formal application was received on a later date when the candidate had crossed 35 years is legally unsustainable when the process was initiated prior to the applicant crossing the age limit - Allowing the appeal against the judgment of the Bombay High Court, the Supreme Court directed the respondent-authorities to reconsider the claim of Appellant No. 2 for compassionate appointment by treating him as eligible in age and to verify only the remaining eligibility conditions within 8 weeks, with appointment to be offered within 4 weeks thereafter if found eligible. [Relied on Malaya Nanda Sethy v. State of Orissa & Ors., (2024) 15 SCC 766; Paras 17-23] Raspelli Bhagya Kishaiya v. General Manager Western Coalfields, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 811 : 2026 INSC 841

Recruitment - A challenge to the correctness of an answer key selected by an examining body can be entertained only where the error is so glaring and apparent that it can be detected without any resort to any interferential reasoning. It set aside an Allahabad High Court order that had awarded a disputed mark to a candidate in a Village Development Officer recruitment examination conducted by the Uttar Pradesh Subordinate Service Selection Commission (UPSSSC). Uttar Pradesh Subordinate Service Selection Commission v. Ashok Yadav, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 937 : 2026 INSC 991

Service Law — the doctrine of 'equal pay for equal work' cannot be mechanically applied merely on the ground that two categories of employees perform functionally similar duties, and that a difference in experience between directly recruited and promoted employees can constitute a valid basis for a difference in pay scales. G.P. Sangeetha v. State of Kerala, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 948 : 2026 INSC 1004

Service Law — A senior employee holding the same post cannot be paid less than a junior unless the disparity is supported by valid and demonstrable factors. It is fundamental that a senior officer cannot be paid less than a junior officer holding the same post. A junior receiving a higher pay compared to the pay of the senior has to be justified with reference to valid factors. Jai Prakash Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 993

Service Law — Precedent — Distinction between Officiating and Provisional/Ad Hoc Appointees - Candidates holding higher posts merely on an officiating basis are strictly governed by the ratio in BSNL v. Mishri Lal, and cannot claim parity with candidates who were provisionally promoted under earlier rules and had vested rights recognized as a one-time measure under Rule 10(3) of the 2002 Rules as dealt with in Medini C. v. BSNL – Appeals allowed. [Relied on CMD/Chairman, Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited & Ors. v. Mishri Lal & Ors., (2011) 14 SCC 739; State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. v. Raj Kumar & Ors., (2023) 3 SCC 773; Distinguished from Medini C. & Ors. v. Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited & Ors., (2022) 4 SCC 562; Paras 8–10] Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd. v. G.N. Mani Ravinder, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 951 : 2026 INSC 1007

Service Law — Promotion — Officiating Appointments — Claim for Consideration under Old/Repealed Rules — Vested Right — Rajbhasha Adhikari Recruitment Rules, 2005 - Employees holding a post purely on a local officiating basis have no vested legal right to seek regular promotion under repealed administrative instructions or obsolete statutory rules that were never brought into operation - The right to be considered for promotion arises only under the rules prevailing on the date when the candidature is considered - An employer/State is entitled to take a conscious, non-arbitrary policy decision altering the method of recruitment (e.g., introducing a Limited Internal Competitive Examination under the 2005 Rules for executive cadre posts) - The High Court erred in directing consideration of officiating employees under pre-2005 provisions. [Paras 8, 10–12] Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd. v. G.N. Mani Ravinder, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 951 : 2026 INSC 1007

Service Law — Recruitment & Selection — Disregard of essential eligibility criteria in advertisement — Erroneous clarification by subordinate authority — Fraud on public - When an employment notification/advertisement specifies an essential eligibility requirement (e.g., 10 years of service as Anganwadi Sevika within the same district), an appointment made in disregard thereof is illegal and amounts to a fraud on the public, as it excludes eligible candidates who did not apply on the faith of the terms - A subordinate authority like a Divisional Commissioner has no power or jurisdiction to issue an administrative clarification overriding Government Resolutions or the advertisement; any genuine doubt must be referred to the appropriate Government Department - In the absence of an express relaxation clause in the advertisement, an ineligible candidate acquires no right to the post despite selection or continuance in service. [Relied on Distt. Collector & Chairman, Vizianagaram Social Welfare Residential School Society v. M. Tripura Sundari Devi, (1990) 3 SCC 655; Paras 5–13] Sunita Lahu Panchpande v. District Collector, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 947 : 2026 INSC 1002

Service Jurisprudence – Principle of 'No Work, No Pay' – Inapplicability when non-employment is created by the Employer – Held that where an employee is illegally ousted or denied alternative employment mandated by a social welfare statute, the employer cannot take shelter behind the principle of 'no work, no pay' - The situation of non-employment being entirely the creation of the appellants, the respondent is entitled to full restitution, back wages, interest, and costs. [Relied on Kunal Singh v. Union of India & Anr. (2003) 4 SCC 524; Bhagwan Dass v. Punjab State Electricity Board (2008) 1 SCC 57; Ravinder Kumar Dhariwal v. Union of India (2023) 2 SCC 209; Federation of Indian Mineral Industries v. Union of India (2017) 16 SCC 186; Distinguished: Union of India v. Dileep Kumar Singh (2015) 4 SCC 421; Para 79-81] Union of India v. Bali Ram No. 850808321, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 668 : 2026 INSC 689

Service Jurisprudence & Judicial Appointments – Doctrine of Estoppel – Challenge to Recruitment Rules by Unsuccessful Candidate - Rajasthan Judicial Service Rules, 2010 – Rule 41 (as amended in 2011) – A candidate who willingly participates in a recruitment process with full knowledge of the prevailing rules, takes a calculated chance, and appears for the viva-voce examination cannot turn around and challenge the validity of the recruitment criteria or qualifying benchmarks upon being declared unsuccessful - The doctrine of estoppel operates fully against such a candidate who attempts to approbate and reprobate. [Relied on Om Prakash Shukla v. Akhilesh Kumar Shukla and Ors., (1986) Supp SCC 285; Madan Lal and Others v. State of J & K and Ors., (1995) 3 SCC 486; Dhananjay Malik and Others v. State of Uttaranchal and Ors., (2008) 4 SCC 171; Paras 20-30] Manoj Goyal V. Rajasthan High Court, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 695 : 2026 INSC 699

Service Law – Cooperative Central Bank Employee Service (Employment, Terms and their Working Conditions) Rules, 1982 / Chhattisgarh Ke Jila Sahkari Kendriya Bank Karmachari Seva (Niyojan, Nibandhan, Tatha Unki Karya Sthiti) Niyam, 1982 — Rule 5(3)(a) — Deletion of Rule — Power to Amend Statutory Rules — Effect of Non-Tabling of Rules Before Legislative Assembly — Executive Instructions vs Statutory Authority – Held - i. Power to Amend Rules — Applicability of Section 21 of General Clauses Act, 1897 - Chhattisgarh Cooperative Societies Act, 1960 — Section 55(1) The Registrar, Cooperative Societies, possesses the statutory power under Section 55(1) of the 1960 Act to frame rules governing the terms and conditions of employment in cooperative societies - Applying Section 21 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, the statutory authority conferred to frame rules inherently includes the power to amend, alter, vary, or rescind such rules - The deletion of Rule 5(3)(a) of the Niyam, 1982 by the Registrar was a valid exercise of statutory rule-making power and was not a mere executive instruction – ii. Nature of Laying Requirement — Mandatory vs. Directory - Chhattisgarh Cooperative Societies Act, 1960 — Section 95(3) Section 95(3) mandates that all rules made under the Act shall be laid before the Legislative Assembly - in the absence of any prescribed statutory consequences or penalty for non-laying, the provision is directory and not mandatory - Non-compliance with the laying procedure does not invalidate the rules or defeat the statutory exercise of power by the Registrar – iii. Exercise of Power — Nomenclature and Style of Order - Where a statutory power exists and is validly exercised, the style, nomenclature, or format of the notification (e.g., being styled as a "circular" or letter) does not denude or weaken the statutory authority enabling the act - A wrong reference or improper nomenclature does not vitiate the action if it can be justified under an existing power – iv. Setting Aside Promotion After Long Passage of Time - Where an employee continued to function on a promotional post for 13 years during the pendency of litigation, and the promotion was made pursuant to a valid exercise of statutory power, setting aside such promotion was erroneous - The appellant is entitled to restoration of status, protection of seniority, promotional benefits, and 50% back wages. [Relied on K.T. Plantation (P) Ltd. v. State of Karnataka, (2011) 9 SCC 1; State of M.P. v. Hukum Chand Mills Karamchari, (1996) 7 SCC 81; Kiran Devi v. Bihar State Sunni Wakf Board, (2021) 15 SCC 15; Paras 10-16] S.P. Chandrakar v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 743 : 2026 INSC 769

Service Law – Compassionate Appointment – Scheme for Compassionate Appointment in Public Sector General Insurance Companies – Clause 1.1 – Age Threshold Limitation – Effect of Administrative Delay – Employee applied for voluntary retirement on medical grounds before crossing the prescribed age threshold of 55 years and submitted a Civil Surgeon's incapacitation certificate – Employer kept the application pending, failed to communicate any deficiency regarding the medical certificate, and demanded a Medical Board certificate only after the employee crossed 55 years of age – Claim for compassionate appointment subsequently rejected by the employer on the ground that the employee retired after attaining 55 years of age – Held: An employer cannot rely upon the consequence of its own administrative delay to defeat a time-sensitive beneficial claim – The requirement that a claim must remain within the four corners of a scheme does not release the employer from its duty to administer it fairly and within a reasonable time – A technical construction enabling the employer to control eligibility through delayed processing would place the scheme at the mercy of administrative inaction and defeat its inherent fairness – High Court judgment set aside – Rejection communication quashed – Direction issued to grant compassionate appointment to the dependent candidate with necessary age relaxation if required. [Paras 18, 21, 25, 26, 28, 31, 32] Rahul Ramnarayan Madankar v. New India Assurance, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 693 : 2026 INSC 710

Service Law – Ad Hoc Promotion – Seniority – Consultation with Public Service Commission – Directory Nature of Statutory Consultation - Uttaranchal Civil Services (Executive Branch) Rules, 2005 – Rule 24(1), Rule 24(4) Proviso – Uttaranchal Public Service Commission (Limitations of Functions) Regulations, 2003 – Regulation 5(a) – Ad hoc promotion – Counting of continuous ad hoc service within quota for computing seniority – Requirement to consult Public Service Commission for extension of ad hoc service beyond one year under Regulation 5(a) is directory and not mandatory – Held – i. Non-consultation with PSC does not invalidate appointment: Non-consultation with the Public Service Commission does not invalidate an ad hoc promotion or render the service non-est, especially when the default is attributable solely to the State's inaction over a period of time – ii. No fault of employee: Appointees have no control over the State's failure to refer ad hoc promotions to the Public Service Commission; the State cannot be permitted to take advantage of its own wrong/default to deprive promotees of their statutory rights – iii. Entitlement to Seniority: Where promotees were appointed on an officiating/ad hoc basis within their prescribed quota through a duly constituted DPC and continued uninterruptedly till regularisation, they are entitled to the benefit of the Proviso to Rule 24(4) to count their entire continuous officiating service towards inter-se seniority - The Supreme Court allowed the appeal filed by the promotee officers and held that 19 vacancies were available in the promotee quota for the recruitment year 2007–2008, establishing that the promotees were promoted within their prescribed quota – The Supreme Court held that the requirement under Regulation 5(a) of the 2003 Regulations to consult the Public Service Commission for continuing ad hoc appointments beyond one year is directory in nature - the failure of the State to seek consultation cannot disentitle the promotee officers to the benefit of the proviso to Rule 24(4) of the 2005 Rules - The promotee Deputy Collectors are entitled to the benefit of regular appointment with effect from 01.10.2007 (the date of initial ad hoc promotion) and to count their continuous officiating service for seniority. [Relied on Biswanath Khemka v. The King Emperor, 1945 SCC OnLine FC 7; State of Uttar Pradesh v. Manbodhan Lal Srivastava, (1957) 2 SCC 759; Suraj Parkash Gupta & Ors. v. State of J&K & Ors., (2000) 7 SCC 561; Direct Recruit Class II Engineering Officers' Association v. State of Maharashtra & Ors., (1990) 2 SCC 715; P. Rammohan Rao v. K. Srinivas & Ors., (2025) 4 SCC 127; Paras 28–38] State of Uttarakhand v. Jagdish Chandra Kandpal, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 739 : 2026 INSC 759

Service Law – Appointment by Transfer vs. Direct Recruitment Quota – Illegality of Absorption against Direct Recruitment Posts - Where statutory rules prescribe recruitment solely through two regular modes (50% direct recruitment and 50% promotion), appointment by transfer under Rule 10 is an exceptional mode permissible only in "special circumstances" with Commission approval - Because Rule 2(9) expressly excludes appointment by transfer from the definition of direct appointment, an officer cannot be absorbed/appointed by transfer against a vacancy earmarked for direct recruitment - Facilitating absorption of officers who failed or bypassed regular competitive selection amounts to achieving indirectly what could not be achieved directly, constituting an impermissible backdoor entry. [Paras 46 – 93] Hemant Kumar v. State of Haryana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 822 : 2026 INSC 878

Service Law — Back Wages and Arrears on Re-Fixation of Scale - Where the original judgment quashing the discharge order directed reinstatement with all consequential benefits but restricted back wages to 50%, the financial arrears resulting from the retroactive grant of Selection Scale and Super Time Scale must also be computed by giving effect to the 50% back wages limitation for the period the officer remained out of service. [Relied on Union of India v. K.V. Jankiraman, (1991) 4 SCC 109; Central Bank of India v. Dragendra Singh Jadon, (2022) 8 SCC 378; R.K. Jibanlata Devi v. High Court of Manipur, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 178; Sukhdev Singh v. Union of India, (2013) 9 SCC 566; Para 40-43] High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan v. Abhay Jain, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 733 : 2026 INSC 762

Service Law – Chhattisgarh State Universities Service Rules, 1983 – Rule 10 – Finality of Commission's Decision on Eligibility – Scope of Reassessment/Verification by Appointing Authority - Under Rule 10 of the Service Rules, 1983, the decision of the Public Service Commission regarding the eligibility of a candidate is final and binding - The Appointing Authority cannot usurp or supplant the constitutional and statutory domain of the Commission by undertaking an exhaustive, subjective, or de novo inquiry through an independently constituted expert committee to redetermine eligibility on materials already scrutinised by the Commission - The power of the Appointing Authority to verify documents before issuing an appointment order is strictly confined to – i. Checking the genuineness and authenticity of certificates/documents (e.g., detecting fraud, forgery, or impersonation); ii. Detecting fundamental, patent, and demonstrable deficiencies in eligibility without an exhaustive inquiry; iii. Evaluating new materials brought to its notice that clearly establish ineligibility - If the Appointing Authority entertains any doubt or reservation concerning a candidate's eligibility, it cannot unilaterally declare the candidate ineligible; it is duty-bound to refer the matter back to the Commission with reasons for its view - An administrative stipulation in a recommendation letter requiring "verification and satisfaction regarding eligibility" cannot dilute or override the statutory finality attached under Rule 10 - Held, the inquiry report dated 28.06.2023 constituted by the State was unsustainable in law and liable to be ignored. [Relied On Ram Ashray Yadav (Dr), Chairman, Bihar Public Service Commission, In Re, (2000) 4 SCC 309; Ram Kumar Kashyap v. Union of India, (2009) 9 SCC 378; Paras 51-68] Shailendra Kumar Patel v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 838 : 2026 INSC 902

Service Law – Deputation, Absorption, and Appointment by Transfer – Punjab Service of Engineers, Class II, P.W.D. (Buildings and Roads Branch) Rules, 1965, Rules 2(9), 6, 10, 11, 12 – Backdoor Entry – Political Machination – Meaning of "Special Circumstances" – Revocation/Revival of Lien - Deputation and Consensual Tripartite Nature - Deputation means service outside the cadre or parent department on a temporary basis to meet exigencies of public service - It is essentially consensual and requires consensus among the lending authority, the borrowing authority, and the employee concerned - A deputationist per se has no vested right to claim permanent absorption unless supported by statutory rules - The initiation of deputation directly by probationary officers through personal overtures or through political recommendations of outside ministers bypassing service discipline is completely alien to the concept of deputation and constitutes manifest illegality. [Paras 49–53, 70–78] Hemant Kumar v. State of Haryana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 822 : 2026 INSC 878

Service Law – Direct Recruitment vs. Promotion – Distinct Eligibility Criteria - Eligibility criteria for appointment by direct recruitment and appointment by promotion are distinct and governed by separate requirements under the rules - A candidate's eligibility for direct recruitment cannot be determined or evaluated with reference to the statutory criteria prescribed for promotion. [Para 66] Shailendra Kumar Patel v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 838 : 2026 INSC 902

Service Law – Equity and Fairness – Absence of Fraud or Wrongdoing by Employees – The Supreme Court highlighted that where no allegation of fraud, misrepresentation, or mala fides is leveled against the employees, and they merely participated in a regular recruitment process on merit, it would be wholly inequitable to penalize them for any alleged irregularities attributable solely to the appointing authority - Depriving employees of their livelihood after years of service and formal confirmation, in the absence of any wrongdoing on their part, lacks justification. [Paras 30-33] Debashish Mohapatra v. District and Session Judge, Jagatsinghpur, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 721 : 2026 INSC 743

Service Law – Extinguishment and Revival of Lien - No government servant can simultaneously hold two liens across different cadres - While permanent substantive absorption in a borrowing department extinguishes past lien, such lien automatically revives in the parent department once the deputation and absorption are quashed as illegal, null, and void - The officers must be repatriated to their parent cadre with seniority fixed immediately above those who were junior to them at the time of leaving. [Relied on Kunal Nanda v. Union of India, (2000) 5 SCC 362; CBI v. Ramesh Chander Diwan, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 871; Secretary, State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (3), (2006) 4 SCC 1; Paras 115 - 117] Hemant Kumar v. State of Haryana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 822 : 2026 INSC 878

Service Law – Fundamental Rule 56(j) – Holistic Evaluation of Service Dossier vs. Unsubstantiated Adverse Notes – Selective Application of Precedents - The Review Committee cannot selectively rely on judgments permitting consideration of past adverse entries while failing to adhere to the equally binding principles that the entire service record must be evaluated, the immediate past must be accorded due weight, and a merit-based promotion inures to the benefit of the officer - An unverified, hearsay confidential note prepared by a superior officer recording oral allegations from private industry representatives unsupported by written complaints or proof cannot form the basis of compulsory retirement of an officer with decades of unblemished service. [Relied on Baikuntha Nath Das v. District Medical Officer, (1992) 2 SCC 299; State of Gujarat v. Umedbhai M. Patel, (2001) 3 SCC 314; Rajasthan SRTC v. Babu Lal Jangir, (2013) 10 SCC 551; Central Industrial Security Force v. Om Prakash, (2022) 5 SCC 100; Paras 45–57] S.S. Das v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 921 : 2026 INSC 980

Service Law – Fundamental Rule 56(j) – While assessing the employee's suitability for retention in service, the employer is not obligated to take a decision based on the recent service record of the employee; rather, the decision shall be guided by the entire service record of the employee. This means the "washed-off theory", which wipes out adverse entries once an employee is promoted, has no application when assessing an employee's suitability for retention in service. Sushil Sharma v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 768 : 2026 INSC 809

Service Law – Fundamental Rule 56(j) – Premature / Compulsory Retirement – Scope of Judicial Review – Effect of Regular Promotion on Merit Preceding Compulsory Retirement – Non-punitive character of FR 56(j) is not a blanket immunity - The Supreme Court held that while an order of compulsory retirement in the public interest under FR 56(j) is not per se punitive, it is bound by the precincts of public power and cannot be elevated into a mantra to repel all judicial challenges - A merit-based promotion granted shortly before an order of compulsory retirement stands as proof of a recent, objective assessment of the officer's entire service record and fitness to shoulder higher responsibilities - Such a promotion is irreconcilable with, and directly negates, the conclusion that the officer has become 'dead wood' or is of doubtful integrity - An order of compulsory retirement cannot be invoked as a shortcut to bypass disciplinary safeguards under Article 311 of the Constitution, nor can it be used without material, to wreck vengeance, or to serve vested interests. Selective bureaucratic reliance on isolated remarks while ignoring consistent 'Outstanding' appraisals and recent promotion constitutes malice in law, perversity, and a colourable exercise of power. [Paras 41, 46, 48–51, 58–61] S.S. Das v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 921 : 2026 INSC 980

Service Law — Grant of Selection Scale / Super Time Scale — Consequential Benefits on Reinstatement — Non-Availability of ACRs Due to Illegal Discharge — Effect of Employer's Own Wrong - Rajasthan Judicial Service Rules, 2010 — Rules 49 and 50 — Grant of Selection Scale and Super Time Scale to District Judges — Absence of Requisite ACRs - Employer Cannot Take Advantage of Its Own Wrong - When an employee/judicial officer is wrongfully discharged/dismissed from service and subsequently reinstated with all consequential benefits including continuity of service and seniority, the employer cannot deny career progression benefits (such as Selection Scale or Super Time Scale) merely on the ground of non-availability of the requisite number of Annual Confidential Reports (ACRs) for the period during which the officer was unlawfully kept out of service - Assessment on Available Valid ACRs - In circumstances where ACRs are short of the required number due to no fault of the employee, or where certain ACRs are uncommunicated/invalid, the employee's entitlement to promotion or higher pay scale must be assessed afresh on the basis of the remaining available valid ACRs, rather than rejecting their claim altogether - Uncommunicated ACRs (such as the ACR for the year 2015 recorded after the discharge order) cannot be relied upon to the detriment of the judicial officer while determining their entitlement to pay scales or career advancement. [Paras 30- 41] High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan v. Abhay Jain, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 733 : 2026 INSC 762

Service Law – Judicial Sympathy cannot Perpetuate or Regularize Illegality - When an appointment or absorption is fundamentally void ab initio and in infraction of statutory rules, it is an incurable illegality distinct from an irregularity - The High Court erred under Article 226 in taking a "sympathetic view" to protect and sustain illegal absorptions on grounds of prolonged service of over 18 years - An illegality cannot be sanctified or regularized by mere passage of time or misplaced judicial sympathy. [Paras 114, 115] Hemant Kumar v. State of Haryana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 822 : 2026 INSC 878

Service Law — Modified Assured Career Progression Scheme (MACPS) — Counts of Same Grade Pay Promotions — Railway Guard Cadre Structure - Modified Assured Career Progression Scheme (MACPS), Paragraphs 2, 5, and 8 — Railway Board Circulars (RBE No. 76/2011 and RBE No. 142/2012) — Entitlement to 2nd and 3rd financial upgradations to Grade Pay Rs. 4600 and Rs. 4800 — Counter-claim based on structural convergence of Grade Pay post-6th Central Pay Commission (CPC) - Key Rulings & Interpretations – i. Applicability of Paragraph 8 to the Guard Cadre - The Supreme Court held that Paragraph 8 of the MACPS strictly applies to the Railway Guard cadre - The movements across the distinct posts of Senior Goods Guard, Passenger Guard, Senior Passenger Guard, and Mail/Express Guard within the cadre constitute functional "promotions" under the relevant Recruitment Rules and Avenue Chart, despite carrying the identical compressed Grade Pay of Rs. 4200 in Pay Band PB-2 post the 6th CPC recommendations - A promotion does not cease to be a promotion merely because the employee's Grade Pay remains constant – ii. Exhaustion of MACPS Slots - An employee who has traversed the promotional hierarchy up to the terminal post of Mail/Express Guard is deemed to have earned three functional promotions (with the movement from Passenger Guard to Senior Passenger Guard ignored under Paragraph 5 due to direct merger of scales) - such an employee has exhausted all three financial upgradation slots available under the MACPS and cannot claim further financial upgradation to Grade Pay Rs. 4600 or Rs. 4800; iii. Financial Reality vs. Stagnation - The Supreme Court observed that promotions within the Guard cadre are not financially neutral - Each advancement involves a formal selection process, pay fixation, promotional increments, and an upward revision of basic pay that significantly enhances running-duty allowances and post-specific additional allowances - employees reaching the terminal post cannot be characterized as suffering from the "financial stagnation" the MACPS was designed to remedy; iv. Scope of Paragraph 5 (Transitional Adjustments) - The illustration appended to Paragraph 5 is a transitional provision regulating the treatment of pre-MACPS ACP-era promotions/upgradations up to 01.09.2008 - It does not override Paragraph 8 for the post-01.09.2008 MACPS operational period, nor does it mandate the total exclusion of structural promotional rungs when calculating future stagnation benefits; v. Binding Nature of Executive Clarifications - Departmental and executive clarifications issued by the Railway Board in consultation with the Department of Personnel and Training (DoPT), such as RBE No. 76/2011 and RBE No. 142/2012, are integral to the Scheme and binding on authorities. Financial upgradation under the MACPS cannot exceed the maximum Grade Pay ceiling attached to the highest promotional post in the respective hierarchy; vi. Precedential Value of Dismissals in Limine - A non-speaking dismissal of a Special Leave Petition (SLP), or an order keeping the question of law open, does not constitute a declaration of law under Article 141 of the Constitution of India and does not invoke the doctrine of merger. [Relied on Union of India and Others v. M.V. Mohanan Nair (2020) 5 SCC 421; Kunhayammed and Others v. State of Kerala and Another (2000) 6 SCC 359; Paras 36-65] Union of India v. Harbans Lal Verma, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 712 : 2026 INSC 739

Service Law – National Institute of Technology First Statutes, 2009 – Statute 30 – Effectiveness of Resignation – Communication & Notice Period - Effective Date of Resignation: Under the proviso to Statute 30 of the NIT First Statutes, 2009, a resignation takes legal effect immediately on the date of its acceptance by the appointing authority - Its legal efficacy is neither conditional upon formal communication nor held in abeyance during the serving of the notice period - While Paragraph 3 of Office Memorandum dated 11.02.1988 permits withdrawal of an accepted resignation prior to actual relieving, the competent authority retains the discretion to reject such withdrawal request by recording rational and communicated reasons. [Relied on High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan v. P.P. Singh & Anr., (2003) 4 SCC 239; National Institute of Technology & Anr. v. Pannalal Choudhury & Anr., (2015) 11 SCC 669; Municipal Commissioner, Jamnagar Municipal Corporation & Anr. v. R.M. Doshi, (2024) 20 SCC 742; Air India Express Ltd. & Ors. v. Captain Gurdarshan Kaur Sandhu, (2019) 17 SCC 129; Paras 27-30] Delhi Technological University v. B.S. Rawat, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 761 : 2026 INSC 797

Service Law – Orissa District and Subordinate Courts' Non-Judicial Staff Services (Method of Recruitment and Conditions of Service) Rules, 2008 – Provision (5) of Appendix-A – Appointment Against Anticipated Vacancies - The Supreme Court observed that under Provision (5) of Appendix-A appended to the 2008 Rules, the District Judge is explicitly empowered to make appointments from the merit list not only against "existing vacancies" but also against "vacancies that have occurred or may occur" within a period of one year from the date of the first appointment - This provision enables the District Judiciary to fill anticipated vacancies promptly for administrative efficiency and continuity without undertaking a fresh recruitment process each time - Where the candidates were selected through a regular recruitment process, continuously discharged their duties against sanctioned posts, and were subsequently confirmed in service, the authorities cannot subsequently argue that the appointments were void ab initio or outside the sanctioned cadre. [Paras 25 - 29] Debashish Mohapatra v. District and Session Judge, Jagatsinghpur, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 721 : 2026 INSC 743

Service Law – Pending Departmental Inquiries – Relevance in National Sports Coaching Requests - The mere existence of a pending departmental inquiry cannot be treated as an automatic, inflexible disqualification to reject an application for relieving a government employee for a national sporting camp or competition - The competent authority must balance the nature of the inquiry against the limited duration and national character of the sporting assignment - A writ court adjudicating a petition for an NOC/relieving order ought not to return conclusive adverse findings on the validity of the employee's initial appointment or service qualifications when such matters are not directly in issue. [Paras 28–30] Indian Kayaking and Canoeing Association v. Union Territory of J&K, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 922 : 2026 INSC 981

Service Law — Pension — Nature of Pension — Deferred Wage and Socio-Economic Justice - Pension is neither a bounty nor an ex-gratia payment, but payment for past service rendered and a social welfare measure aimed at rendering socio-economic justice - When an employee has rendered long and continuous service and is ultimately regularized, denial of pensionary benefits based on technicalities or artificial distinctions is unjustified. [Paras 23-27] Punjab School Education Board v. Satnam Singh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 914 : 2026 INSC 965

Service Law – Promotion – Educational Qualification – Degree Obtained Through Open University / Distance Education Mode – Prospective Operation of Executive Orders Modifying Equivalence – Saving of Existing Rights - Tamil Nadu Government Servants (Conditions of Service) Act, 2016 – Sections 25 (Explanation 1(b)) & 54 – Pre-foundation and Foundation Courses offered by Open Universities – Equivalence to SSLC and Higher Secondary (+2) Courses – Validity of Degrees Obtained Under Prior Prevailing Norms – Noted that Degrees obtained through open university/distance education mode following the two-year foundation course under G.O. Ms No. 528 dated 18.05.1985 (which held the field for over 24 years) cannot be invalidated retrospectively for the purpose of promotion - The cutoff date for declaring pre-foundation and foundation courses as not equivalent to SSLC and +2 is 20.11.2017, being the date of notification of G.O. Ms No. 144 - Persons who acquired such qualifications prior to 20.11.2017 are fully protected, and the invalidity applies only prospectively. [Paras 46–50] R.J. Gajendra Kumar v. Government of Tamil Nadu, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 853 : 2026 INSC 911

Service Law – Promotion – Selection Criteria and Assessment Process – Role of Expert Committees – CSIR Scientists Recruitment & Promotion Rules, 2001 (as amended by Circular dated 01.06.2011) - Interpretation of Rules — Averaging of Marks - The respondent challenged his non-selection for promotion to the post of Senior Scientist - The Central Administrative Tribunal (CAT) and the High Court allowed the claim by interpreting Paragraph 3(b) of the CSIR Circular dated 01.06.2011 to mean that the final suitability score must be calculated by taking the mean/average of the marks obtained in the Annual Performance Reports/Performance Mapping Scheme (APRs/PMS) and the marks awarded on the 'Work Report' - Held: Setting aside the concurrent findings of the CAT and the High Court, the Supreme Court ruled that such an interpretation amounts to adding words to a statutory provision, which is impermissible in law unless there is an accidental omission or an absolute deprivation of meaning - Paragraph 3(b) of CSIR Circular merely mandates that the assessment must be based on both the APR/PMS and the Work Report of the residency period, but it does not prescribe any method of averaging the two scores - In the absence of specific statutory provisions or mathematical instructions governing the division of marks, the method and degree of weight given to the 'Work Report' versus the 'APR/PMS' fall exclusively within the functional domain of the Assessment Committee, which comprises domain experts - The Supreme Court emphasized that for a scientist, the complexity of research captured in the 'Work Report' is of paramount importance, and expert panels must be granted requisite latitude to evaluate suitability objectively without judicial interference, provided there are no allegations of mala fides. [Relied on Surjit Singh Kalra v. Union of India, (1991) 2 SCC 87; Hameedia Hardware Stores v. B. Mohan Lal Sowcar, (1988) 2 SCC 513; Paras 24-34] Director General, Council of Scientific and Industrial Research v. Anil Earnest, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 661 : 2026 INSC 677

Service Law – Recruitment / Verification of Antecedents – Suppression of Criminal Cases – Two-Pronged Enquiry Test – Knowledge as Pre-requisite for Suppression - Service Jurisprudence – Suppression of Criminal Antecedents / Non-Disclosure: The enquiry to be undertaken by the employer prior to terminating the services of an employee on the ground of suppression of information regarding criminal antecedents is essentially two-pronged – i. Factual Enquiry: Whether there has, in truth, been any deliberate suppression or furnishing of false information by the candidate, having regard to the extent of his knowledge at the relevant time and the circumstances in which the declaration came to be made – ii. Application of Mind / Gravity Assessment: The employer/authorities must apply their mind to the specific facts and circumstances of the case, including the type/nature of suppression, the nature of allegations, role and gravity of the offence, the nature of the post and duties attached to it, and the eventual outcome of the criminal proceedings (if concluded), to arrive at a considered conclusion as to whether continuation in service is feasible or if termination is the only available option. [Paras 24-30] Shatrughn Yadav v. Fertilizers and Chemicals Travancore Ltd. (F.A.C.T.), 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 789 : 2026 INSC 829

Service Law — Regularization — Counting of Pre-Regularization Ad-hoc/Daily-Wage Service for Pension — Applicability of Old Pension Scheme vs. Defined Contributory Pension Scheme - Where employees initially engaged on ad-hoc, contractual, or daily-wage basis prior to 01.01.2004 are subsequently regularized (even after the cut-off date of 01.01.2004) pursuant to an established regularization policy adopted by the employer, the substance of the engagement must prevail over form and nomenclature - Pre-regularization service rendered continuously, ignoring purely artificial, notional, or administrative breaks, must be computed as 'qualifying service' for the purposes of retiral and pensionary benefits under the Punjab School Education Board (Employees' Pension, Provident Fund and Gratuity) Regulations, 1991 - such employees are deemed to have entered service prior to 01.01.2004 and are entitled to the benefits of the Old Pension Scheme (GPF Scheme) rather than being compulsorily governed by the new Defined Contributory Pension Scheme. [Paras 22-33] Punjab School Education Board v. Satnam Singh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 914 : 2026 INSC 965

Service Law – Relief & Directions – Non-issuance of Appointment Order – Consequential Benefits - Where a candidate was duly recommended by the PSC, reaffirmed as eligible by the Commission, and unlawfully denied regular posting due to an invalid de novo departmental inquiry, the candidate was entitled to be appointed to the post of Registrar against an available vacancy - The Supreme Court directed the State to issue an appointment order within three weeks, according the appellant parity of service benefits and seniority from the date co-selectees were appointed, though arrears of pay prior to the date of provisional appointment (10.04.2023) were disallowed. [Paras 67 - 70] Shailendra Kumar Patel v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 838 : 2026 INSC 902

Service Law – Resignation – Withdrawal of Resignation – Unauthorised Acceptance and Subsequent Ratification – Relation-back Doctrine – Principle against Approbation and Reprobation - Effect of Ratification by Competent Authority - An acceptance of resignation originally made by an officer lacking competence or holding merely additional charge stands validated upon subsequent ratification by the competent authority - Under the maxim omnis ratihabitio retrotrahitur et mandato priori aequiparatur, a valid ratification operates retrospectively, relating back to the date of the original unauthorized acceptance and curing the defect of lack of prior authority - Once an unauthorized acceptance is ratified by the competent authority, the acceptance relates back to the original date of relieving - there remains no resignation in existence in the eyes of the law that an employee can subsequently withdraw - An employee who requests a waiver of notice period, accepts full settlement (no-dues certificate, last pay certificate, experience certificate), and utilizes the same to secure employment elsewhere is precluded from challenging the resignation's acceptance on technical grounds or alleging lack of authority under the principle against approbation and reprobation. [Para 17 - 25] Delhi Technological University v. B.S. Rawat, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 761 : 2026 INSC 797

Service Law – Scope of "Special Circumstances" under Rule 10 - Routine accrual of vacancies, departmental shortage of staff, or an undertaking given to court deferring fresh recruitments do not constitute "special circumstances" - Rule 10 contemplates out-of-the-ordinary exigencies, such as specialized projects requiring specific talent or qualifications that cannot await regular recruitment - Merely holding a higher degree (M.Tech) or the prospect of becoming junior-most upon repatriation cannot justify bypassing statutory recruitment rules under the guise of "special circumstances". [Paras 92, 107–109, 112] Hemant Kumar v. State of Haryana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 822 : 2026 INSC 878

Service Law – Selection vs. Appointment – Public Service Commission – Right of Recommended Candidates - Mere inclusion of a candidate's name in a select list or a recommendation by the Public Service Commission does not confer an indefeasible or vested right to appointment - Selection only confers a right to fair, non-arbitrary, and equitable consideration for appointment - While appointment pursuant to the Commission's selection is the norm, the Appointing Authority retains ultimate discretion to decide whether or not to appoint - this executive discretion is not absolute or untrammelled; it must be informed by valid, germane, and non-arbitrary reasons supported by the record and the governing statutory rules - When a challenge is mounted against the denial of appointment to a selected candidate, the burden rests on the State/Appointing Authority to justify its decision with cogent reasons. [Relied On Shankarsan Dash v. Union of India, (1991) 3 SCC 47; State of Haryana v. Subash Chander Marwaha, (1974) 3 SCC 220; Commissioner of Police v. Umesh Kumar, (2020) 10 SCC 448; Tej Prakash Pathak v. Rajasthan High Court, (2025) 2 SCC 1; H. Mukherjee (Dr) v. Union of India, 1994 Supp (1) SCC 250; Asha Kaul (Mrs.) & Anr. v. State of Jammu and Kashmir & Ors., (1993) 2 SCC 573; Paras 43 – 68] Shailendra Kumar Patel v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 838 : 2026 INSC 902

Service Law – Tamil Nadu Government Servants (Conditions of Service) Act, 2016 – Saving Clause under Section 54 of 2016 Act - Challenging Feeder Cadre Eligibility at Subsequent Promotion Stage Not Permissible - Section 25 (Explanation 1(b)) of the 2016 Act which prescribes a degree obtained after SSLC and Higher Secondary (10 + 2 + 3 pattern) came into effect on 14.09.2016 and cannot adversely affect degrees obtained prior thereto in view of the savings contained in Section 54 - Explanation 1(b) nowhere mandates that the degree must be acquired through a regular physical course rather than distance education - Where an employee has been promoted to and regularized in a feeder cadre post (Tourist Officer) and has served uninterruptedly for nearly 15 years without any challenge to the said appointment, the employer cannot rake up the validity of his initial entry/feeder cadre eligibility at the time of considering his case for promotion to the next higher post (Assistant Director of Tourism) - Appeals allowed - The judgment and order of the Division Bench dated 06.06.2023 and the Review Bench order dated 18.11.2024 are set aside - The judgment of the Single Judge dated 16.08.2021 is restored, holding the appellant eligible for promotion to the post of Assistant Director of Tourism. [Relied on P. Thavam v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2022 SCC OnLine Mad 6177; Chandrakala Trivedi v. State of Rajasthan, (2012) 3 SCC 129; Annamalai University v. Secretary to Government, Information and Tourism Department, (2009) 4 SCC 590; Paras 23-55]. R.J. Gajendra Kumar v. Government of Tamil Nadu, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 853 : 2026 INSC 911

Service Law – Termination/Discharge based solely on Pendency of Criminal Case – Illegality and Violation of Natural Justice – Subsequent conviction does not cure initial invalidity - Discharge or termination of an employee serving the police force for over a decade solely on the ground of the pendency of a criminal case, without affording an opportunity of hearing or conducting an enquiry, is arbitrary, unlawful, and unsustainable in law - A subsequent conviction recorded against the employee at a later date cannot cure or validate the fundamental illegality that vitiated the discharge order at the time it was passed. [Paras 24-26] Spo/Constable IRB Satpal Singh v. State of Punjab, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 845 : 2026 INSC 798