LiveLaw Supreme Court Half-Yearly Digest 2026 - Service Law

Service Law - Supreme Court Half Yearly Digest Jan - Jun, 2026

Accelerated Promotion – Counter-Extremism/Naxal Activities – Parity in Treatment – Judicial Review of Committee Decisions – The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's direction to grant accelerated promotion to a police constable (Respondent) who resisted a Naxalite attack on a police station - The State had denied the promotion claiming the Respondent's role was "nominal" compared to a colleague (G. Venkat Reddy) who received the benefit – Supreme Court found the Committee's assessment "perverse" as it was admitted that the Respondent, while on roof-top guard sentry duty, fired more rounds at the Naxalites than the promoted colleague and was instrumental in repelling the attack - Held, when collective efforts repel an attack, it is unfair to belittle the role of individual personnel to deny them benefits intended to boost the morale of the force - While the Court's intervention in decisions taken by specialized Committees for out-of-turn promotion is minimal, such decisions are not immune to interference if they are found to be unfair or based on perverse findings – Appeal dismissed. [Relied on State of Madhya Pradesh & Anr. vs. Sanjay Shukla (Civil Appeal No. 2040 of 2023, decided on March 27, 2023; Paras 9, 10] State of Telangana v. P. Srinivas, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 263 : 2026 INSC 258

Administrative Discretion – Judicial Review – Held that ordinarily, the Court will not exercise the power of statutory authorities or substitute its own decision for that of the authority conferred with discretionary powers - noted that since the Governor had no occasion to examine the request or exercise discretion under the Rules, the High Court's issuance of a writ of mandamus was unwarranted. [Relied on Union of India Vs. S.B.Vohra and Ors. (2004 INSC 5); Paras 10-16] State of Uttarakhand v. Sarita Singh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 353 : 2026 INSC 337

All India Service (Death-cum-Retirement Benefits) Rules, 1958 – Rule 16(2A) – Voluntary Retirement from Service (VRS) – Final Authority of the Central Government - The Supreme Court held that the voluntary severance of an employer-employee relationship pursuant to a VRS notice by an All India Service officer mandatorily requires the acceptance of the Central Government - The Central Government is the ultimate repository of authority over career-terminating decisions for such officers and possesses the final word in deciding a request for VRS - It is not bound by the recommendation or opinion formed by the State Government - The act of "acceptance" under the first proviso to Rule 16(2A) is not a mere automatic, routine, or ministerial function; rather, it requires a genuine, independent assessment and a well-considered exercise of discretion based on the entire material available on record - while not bound by the State Government's views, the Central Government's independent decision must still actively engage with and consider the views expressed by the State Government, as it possesses direct supervisory knowledge of the officer. [Relied on Ashok Kumar Sahu v. Union of India, (2006) 6 SCC 704; Paras 10 - 22] Abdur Rahman v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 550 : 2026 INSC 550

All India Service (Death-cum-Retirement Benefits) Rules, 1958 – Rule 16(2A) read with DoPT Guidelines dated 16.10.1980 [Guideline 3(ii)] – Vigilance Clearance – Distinction Between "Pending" and "Contemplated" Disciplinary Proceedings - The Supreme Court clarified the conditions precedent under Guideline 3(ii) for rejecting a VRS request on vigilance grounds – i. Pending Proceedings: A disciplinary proceeding is legally considered "pending" only when a formal charge-sheet/charge-memorandum has been issued and served upon the employee - The mere existence or pendency of a preliminary investigation or complaint prior to the issuance of a charge-sheet does not amount to "pending" disciplinary proceedings; ii. Contemplated Proceedings: "Contemplation" in the context of disciplinary action connotes a deliberate, concrete intention to act on a complaint - It requires the existence of a genuine possibility or contingency that formal departmental proceedings will follow a given complaint, rather than the mere passive existence of an unexamined pending complaint. [Relied on Union of India v. K.V. Jankiraman, (1991) 4 SCC 109; State of Haryana v. Dinesh Singh, (2024) 13 SCC 357; State of U.P. v. Jai Singh Dixit, 1974 SCC OnLine All 240; Paras 23-34] Abdur Rahman v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 550 : 2026 INSC 550

Allocation of Cadre – Indian Police Service (IPS) – Request for re-allocation to 'insider' vacancy – Finality of Selection – The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals of an IPS officer seeking re-allocation from the Tamil Nadu cadre to an 'insider' vacancy in the Rajasthan cadre from the 2004 examination batch - held that cadre allocation cannot remain fluid indefinitely, as it would lead to a "chain reaction" of reshuffling among selected candidates from the same batch – Noted that the appellant, who was third in the merit list for the 'insider' vacancy, raised his grievance in 2010, six years after the selection process - noted that the appellant had already served in the Tamil Nadu cadre for over two decades by the time of the final hearing. Rupesh Kumar Meena v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 122 : 2026 INSC 119 : AIR 2026 SC 900

Allotment of Housing – Eligibility Criteria – Nepotism and Self-Aggrandizement – Supreme Court set aside the allotment of super deluxe flats to a Governing Body member (Respondent No. 3) and his subordinate (Respondent No. 4) – i. Ineligibility of Respondent No. 3: The allotment was deemed a "blatant display of self-aggrandizement" as the respondent did not satisfy the mandatory six-month deputation period at the time of application and had not submitted a timely application or earnest money deposit (Para 13, 14); ii. Ineligibility of Respondent No. 4: The Court found that Respondent No. 4 did not fall within the stipulated pay-band level (Level 10 to 20) and that the Governing Body's decision to "regularize" the allotment by carving out an exception was an arbitrary exercise of power. [Paras 15, 16] Dinesh Kumar v. State of Haryana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 171 : 2026 INSC 163 : AIR 2026 SC 1495

Annual Confidential Reports (ACRs) – Non-communication of Entries: Obligation to communicate ACR entries, adverse or otherwise - The respondents contended that prior to the 2008-09 policy shift, only 'Average' or 'Below Average' gradings were communicable – Held that the nomenclature of an entry is immaterial; its determinative effect is what matters - Even a 'Good' or 'Very Good' entry becomes adverse in character if it makes an incumbent ineligible for promotion or prejudicially affects empanelment prospects - Non-communication of such entries carries civil consequences, depriving the employee of a fair opportunity to seek redressal or make representations. [Paras 12 – 17] Dr. Indira Saranath v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 577 : 2026 INSC 553

Appeals by Group-A officers of CRPF, BSF, SSB, ITBP, and CISF seeking OGAS status and relief from promotional stagnation due to IPS deputation - Directions - Complete cadre review for all CAPFs within six months. Review and amend service and recruitment rules within six months with cadre officers' inputs. DoPT to decide on action taken reports within three months. Progressively reduce deputation posts up to SAG level within two years. [Relied: Union of India v. Harananda, (2019) 14 SCC 126] (Para 45) Sanjay Prakash v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 625 : 2025 INSC 779

Appointment of Director General of Police (DGP) – Role of UPSC and State Government – Delay in submitting proposals – Selection Guidelines – i. Mandate for Regular Appointment: The Supreme Court reiterated the necessity of appointing a regular Director General of Police (Head of Police Force) in accordance with the time-frame and scheme established in Prakash Singh vs. Union of India, (2006) 8 SCC 1; ii. Obligation of UPSC: Despite inordinate delays by State Governments in submitting proposals, the UPSC is obligated to convene the Empanelment Committee Meeting (ECM) to prevent further aggravation of the situation and to ensure meritorious senior officers are not overlooked; iii. Ad hoc Arrangements Criticized: The Supreme Court expressed concern over States preferring ad hoc arrangements (appointing acting DGPs) instead of regular appointments, which led to the UPSC inserting paragraph 4(xii) into its guidelines requiring States to seek leave from the Supreme Court for delayed submissions; iv. Enforcement Mechanism: To ensure compliance with the Prakash Singh mandate, the UPSC is authorized to: a. Write to State Governments for timely proposals whenever a vacancy arises; b. Move an application before the Supreme Court for enforcement if a State fails to submit a timely proposal; v. Accountability: held that those responsible for the delay in submitting proposals shall be held accountable. [Paras 7-11] Union Public Service Commission v. T. Dhangopal Rao, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 144

Appointment of Vice-Chancellor – Conflict between State/UT Act and UGC Regulations – Legislative Competence – Doctrine of Repugnancy - The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court's decision to strike down Section 14(5) of the Puducherry Technological University Act, 2019 (PTU Act) for being inconsistent with Regulation 7.3 of the UGC Regulations, 2018 - held that since UGC Regulations trace their source to Entry 66 of List I (Union List), they possess an overriding effect over State/UT legislations enacted under Entry 25 of List III (Concurrent List) - The Search-cum-Selection Committee for a Vice-Chancellor must necessarily include a nominee of the Chairman, UGC, and its members must not be connected with the University - Key Legal Issues & Rulings – i. Primacy of Entry 66 List I over Entry 25 List III - Supreme Court reiterated that while both the Union and States can legislate on "Education" under Entry 25 of List III, such power is expressly subject to Entry 66 of List I (Coordination and determination of standards) - Any State legislation that impinges upon or dilutes the standards prescribed by the Union under Entry 66 is ultra vires; ii. Mandatory Nature of UGC Regulations - Regulation 7.3 of the UGC Regulations, 2018, which mandates the inclusion of a UGC nominee in the Search-cum-Selection Committee, is an integral component of "standards in higher education." - Section 14(5) of the PTU Act, which omitted this requirement and included a government official (Pro-Chancellor) in the committee, was declared invalid; iii. Doctrine of Repugnancy and Article 254(2) - noted that the doctrine of repugnancy under Article 254 and the need for Presidential assent apply only when both Central and State legislations operate within the Concurrent List - Since the UGC Act and Regulations are referable to List I (Entry 66), the question of curing repugnancy via Article 254(2) does not arise; iv. Exercise of Article 142 Powers - Despite finding the appointment procedure illegal, Supreme Court invoked its extraordinary powers under Article 142 to allow the appellant to complete his tenure (ending December 2026) - This was done to avoid "grave stigma" to the academician and administrative disruption, noting there were no allegations against the appellant's integrity or merit. [Relied on Hoechst Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. State of Bihar (1983) 4 SCC 45; Gambhirdhan K. Gadhvi v. State of Gujarat (2022) 5 SCC 179; Paras 37-43, 46-48, 51-52] Dr. S. Mohan v. Puducherry Technological University, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 96 : 2026 INSC 100 : AIR 2026 SC 730

Artificial Breaks – Supreme Court observed that the breaks in service were "artificial in nature" as the Appellants were consistently re-engaged and continued to discharge their duties on the same posts. Such breaks do not reflect genuine abandonment of service. Long service cannot be disregarded by labeling initial employment as ad hoc and relying on artificial breaks - Supreme Court directed the regularization of the Appellants' services with effect from the date similarly situated persons were regularized under the 26.05.2003 policy - Appellants are entitled to continuity of service, increments, and retiral benefits, though actual financial benefits are restricted to the period from the date of the order/reporting for duty. [Relied on Secretary, State of Karnataka and Others v. Umadevi and Others (2006) 4 SCC 1; Para 20-22] Prem Chand v. State of Punjab, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 394

Backward Community Status – Exercise of Discretion – Level Playing Field - Supreme Court clarified that belonging to a backward community cannot be a decisive factor in tilting the scales of justice in matters of public employment selection - Adjudicatory bodies (Tribunals and High Courts) must operate within well-defined boundaries of discretion and should not allow "grace, charity or compassion" to interfere with maintaining a fair level playing field – Appeal allowed. [Paras 5-11] Commissioner, Delhi Police v. Uttam Kumar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 328 : 2026 INSC 314

Border Security Force Act, 1968; Section 40, 48(1)(c) and 50 — Dismissal from Service — National Security — Proportionality of Punishment — The Supreme Court upheld the dismissal of a BSF Sub-Inspector with 36 years of service who was convicted of facilitating illegal cattle smuggling at the Indo-Bangladesh border - Noted that when national security is paramount, infractions by officers manning the borders cannot be viewed lightly - held that under Section 50 of the BSF Act, 1968, a Security Force Court is permitted to impose a composite sentence, including both imprisonment and dismissal, as contemplated under Section 48(1)(c). Bhagirath Choudhary v. Border Security Force, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 165

Canara Bank Officer Employees' (Discipline and Appeal) Regulations, 1976 – Regulation 10 – Common Proceedings – Interpretation of the word "May" – Held - The word "may" employed in Regulation 10 of the 1976 Regulations is directory and not mandatory - Construing "may" as mandatory would strip away the employer's necessary discretion in dynamic administrative situations - The roles of different charge-sheeted employees under a common category are often distinct, and their respective disciplinary authorities may vary depending on their cadres - Regulation 10 is a facilitative, enabling provision meant to empower the Bank to hold joint proceedings where necessary, but it does not vest a corresponding legal right in a delinquent employee to demand or insist upon a joint enquiry - the failure to conduct a joint enquiry does not vitiate independent disciplinary proceedings initiated against an individual officer. [Paras 15 – 17] Canara Bank v. Prem Latha Uppal, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 497 : 2026 INSC 478 : AIR 2026 SC 2420

Central Armed Police Forces (CAPFs) - Whether CAPFs qualify as Organised Group-A Services (OGAS) for cadre-related matters, including cadre review and service benefits, and whether deputation of Indian Police Service (IPS) officers to CAPFs causes promotional stagnation for CAPF officers, necessitating reduction. Held, CAPFs are recognised as OGAS for all purposes, including cadre management and service benefits, as per DoPT OM dated 12 July 2019. All OGAS benefits must extend to CAPFs. Central Government directed to complete cadre reviews for all CAPFs and amend recruitment rules within six months to align with OGAS status. To address promotional stagnation, deputation posts up to Senior Administrative Grade (SAG) level to be progressively reduced within two years to enhance promotion prospects for CAPF officers. Ministry of Home Affairs to review service and recruitment rules with inputs from CAPF cadre officers within six months; DoPT to act on reports within three months. Deputation policies remain Central Government's prerogative, but CAPF officers' grievances regarding stagnation and recognition must be addressed to uphold morale. (Paras 43 & 44) Sanjay Prakash v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 625 : 2025 INSC 779

Central Civil Services (Pension) Rules, 1972 – Rule 69(1)(c) – Withholding of Gratuity during pendency of proceedings – Interpretation of "Departmental or Judicial proceedings" – Held: Rule 69(1)(c) operates as a statutory bar or "embargo" on the payment of gratuity - The use of the disjunctive "or" in the provision indicates that gratuity shall not be paid so long as either departmental or judicial proceedings are pending against the government servant - The appellant's contention that gratuity becomes payable upon the conclusion of any one set of proceedings (e.g., exoneration in departmental inquiry while criminal trial is pending) is rejected as it would defeat the purpose of safeguarding the financial interests of the State. Bikram Chand Rana v. Himachal Pradesh Road Transport Corporation, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 344 : 2026 INSC 326

Central Civil Services (Pension) Rules, 1972 – Rule 9(1) – Right to withhold or withdraw pension – Interplay with Rule 69 – Held: Rule 9 is "downstream" in its operation - It applies at the stage where an employee has been found guilty of grave misconduct - It cannot be invoked to justify the release of gratuity during the interregnum of pending proceedings on the premise that recovery could be effected later if a conviction occurs. Bikram Chand Rana v. Himachal Pradesh Road Transport Corporation, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 344 : 2026 INSC 326

Character and Suitability for Disciplined Force – Held that a candidate for the police force must possess impeccable character, rectitude, and integrity - The employer, through a screening committee, has a wide realm of discretion to assess the suitability of a candidate based on their criminal antecedents, even if an acquittal has been recorded - An acquittal based on technical grounds or "benefit of doubt" does not automatically entitle a candidate to appointment. State of Madhya Pradesh v. Rajkumar Yadav, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 234 : 2026 INSC 225 : AIR 2026 SC 1471

Civil Services (Compassionate Financial Assistance or Appointment) Rules, 2019 (Haryana) — Rules 2, 5(1)(a), 5(1)(b), 5(1)(f), 5(1)(g), 7, and 23 — Compassionate Appointment vs. Compassionate Financial Assistance — Structural Distinction — Applicability of Suspension Clause during Pendency of Criminal Proceedings – Held that Rule 23(1) Applies Exclusively to Financial Assistance, Not Compassionate Appointment - The plain, unambiguous language and text of Rule 23(1), as well as its marginal heading, confine its operation strictly to "compassionate financial assistance" - It contains no express or implicit reference to "compassionate appointment" - Extending a provision textually confined to financial assistance to cover compassionate appointment would amount to judicial legislation rather than statutory interpretation - Purposive construction cannot be used to override unambiguous text or plug a perceived legislative gap - The Rules of 2019 maintain a meticulous and deliberate structural separation between the two forms of relief across all definitional, procedural, eligibility, and administrative domains - Rule 5(1)(a) defines financial assistance as a monthly monetary payment, whereas Rule 5(1)(b) defines compassionate appointment as public employment - The two are qualitatively distinct forms of relief - The omission of "compassionate appointment" from Rule 23(1) must be regarded as deliberate - Absence of Sequential Hierarchical Bar for Compassionate Appointment - Rule 5(1)(f) (defining family for financial assistance) utilizes a strict cascading sequencing mechanism using the word "failing" across multiple sub-clauses, creating a mandatory priority bar - Rule 5(1)(g) (defining family for compassionate appointment) merely lists eligible categories (widow/widower, children, dependent siblings) and completely omits any "failing" or conditional language - no absolute statutory bar prevents the consideration of a child's claim for compassionate appointment solely because the widow's claim has not been conclusively determined, particularly where the widow has explicitly renounced her claim - Constitutional Validity of Rule 23(1) Upheld within its Proper Domain - Rule 23(1) is constitutionally valid and does not offend Article 14 of the Constitution - It is a temporary, regulatory, and preventive measure not a penal one aimed at preventing a person criminally culpable for an employee's death from accessing the welfare scheme - The classification has a rational nexus with its object - its validity does not extend its applicability to the field of compassionate appointment, which it does not govern – The Supreme Court noted a significant anomaly in the Rules of 2019: the lesser form of relief (financial assistance) is suspended during criminal trials for the murder of the employee, while the substantially greater form of relief (permanent public employment) lacks a corresponding safeguarding provision - While the Court cannot rewrite the rules to rectify this lacuna, it is strongly desirable for the State Government to introduce appropriate amendments to bridge this legislative gap. [Relied on Tinku v. State of Haryana, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 329; M.P. State Agricultural Marketing Board v. Harpal Singh, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2925; Paras 15-45] Atul Chauhan v. State of Haryana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 630 : 2026 INSC 640

Civil Services (Pension) Rules, 1982 (Maharashtra) - Rule 27 – Mandatory Requirement of Sanction – Held that even if assumed that the 1982 Pension Rules were applicable through the residuary Clause 110 of the 1992 Regulations, observed that Rule 27(2)(b)(i) mandates prior sanction of the Government for instituting proceedings after retirement - rejected the Corporation's argument that a "general sanction" was accorded at the time the 1992 Regulations were originally approved, clarifying that the word 'shall' in the rule implies a mandatory safeguard for each specific case to prevent unwarranted proceedings against superannuated employees – Regulation 110 of the 1992 Regulations is a miscellaneous/residuary provision intended to cover silent areas - it does not confer automatic jurisdiction to initiate departmental enquiries against retired employees unless the Corporation has formally adopted the relevant Government rules at an appropriate level – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Bhagirathi Jena v. Board of Directors, O.S.F.C. and Others, (1999) 3 SCC 666; Girijan Cooperative Corporation Limited Andhra Pradesh v. K. Satyanarayana Rao, (2010) 15 SCC 322; Anant R. Kulkarni v. Y.P. Education Society and Others, (2013) 6 SCC 515; Paras 18-30] Kadirkhan Ahmedkhan Pathan v. Maharashtra State Warehousing Corporation, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 10 : 2026 INSC 16

Conduct of Aspirants – Lack of Drive and Initiative - Supreme Court observed that the respondent's failure to physically report for the test on the scheduled date, despite being mobile on the previous day, demonstrated a "lack of drive and initiative" - For candidates aspiring to join the police force, such "tardy and lethargic conduct" is undesirable - Held that in competitive public employment, opportunities must be "grabbed with both hands". Commissioner, Delhi Police v. Uttam Kumar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 328 : 2026 INSC 314

Constitution of India – Article 136 — Scope of Interference — Contract Law — Unconscionable Agreements — "Lion and Lamb" Analogy - While the Court is cautious with concurrent findings, it can interfere under Article 136 if findings are perverse, disregard statutory provisions, or result in substantial and grave injustice – Noted that an appellant must demonstrate exceptional circumstances for such review - Where a "mighty" State (the lion) contracts with an individual job seeker (the lamb), the inequality is structural - Clauses barring claims for regularization in such standard-form contracts are unconscionable if the employee had no meaningful choice but to "sign on the dotted line." - Acceptance of such terms does not amount to a waiver of fundamental rights - Continuous service for over a decade, supported by repeated extensions and satisfactory performance, nurtures a legitimate expectation of recognition - The bar against this doctrine for contractual workers only applies if the initial appointment lacked a proper selection process - directed the respondent-State to forthwith regularize the services of all the appellants against the sanctioned posts to which they were initially appointed - The appellants shall be entitled to all consequential service benefits accruing from the date of this judgment. [Relied on State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (2006) 4 SCC 1; Central Inland Water Transport Corpn. v. Brojo Nath Ganguly (1986) 3 SCC 156; Chandra Singh v. State of Rajasthan (2003) 6 SCC 545; Army Welfare Education Society v. Sunil Kumar Sharma (2024) 16 SCC 598; Jaggo v. Union of India, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3826; State of Karnataka v. Uma Devi, (2006) 4 SCC 1; Paras 11-14] Bhola Nath v. State of Jharkhand, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 95 : 2026 INSC 99

Constitution of India – Article 14 – Discrimination – noted that the respondents failed to show that any similarly situated candidates (those admitted after the 2010-11 session) were given direct appointments - noted that the last direct appointments (made in 2015) were pursuant to Court orders and limited to batches admitted prior to the 2011 policy change - Noted that the Uttar Pradesh Ayush Department (Ayurved) Nursing Service Rules, 2021 now govern the post, and recruitment must be conducted through the UPSSSC to select the most meritorious candidates. [Relied on Sivanandan C T and Others vs. High Court of Kerala and Others (2023 INSC 709; Paras 19-27] State of Uttar Pradesh v. Bhawana Mishra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 26 : 2026 INSC 38

Constitution of India – Article 14 and 16 — Regularization of Service — Model Employer — The Supreme Court set aside the Jharkhand High Court's refusal to regularize contractual employees who had served for over a decade in sanctioned posts - held that the State, as a "model employer," cannot exploit the unequal bargaining power of employees by keeping them in perpetual contractual roles to evade regular employment obligations - Abruptly discontinuing long-serving employees solely based on "contractual nomenclature" without a speaking order is manifestly arbitrary and violative of Article 14. Bhola Nath v. State of Jharkhand, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 95 : 2026 INSC 99

Constitution of India – Article 16 – Recruitment Process – Challenge by Unsuccessful Candidate – Estoppel – All India Council for Technical Education (Career Advancement Scheme for the Teachers and Other Academic Staff in Technical Institutions) (Degree) Regulations, 2012 – Scope and Applicability – Direct Recruitment vs. Career Progression - Held that it is a settled principle that a candidate who participated in the selection process without protest cannot challenge the "rules of the game" after being declared unsuccessful – Noted that the respondent participated in the interview held on 17.12.2015, secured 28 marks against the qualifying 45, and only challenged the process after failing to secure a recommendation – Held that to apply AICTE Regulations to a candidate participating in recruitment for the post of Professors in the Engineering Colleges in the State conducted by the Commission under State Rules framed by the State, would be to stretch the AICTE Regulations beyond its text, context, and purpose - The law does not permit a regulation crafted as a ladder to be used as a gate – Held that the AICTE Regulations do not apply to the process of direct recruitment under the State Rules - The AICTE Regulations of 2012 are not "Recruitment Rules" but are "Promotion and Progression Rules" - They apply to individuals already within the institutional framework (incumbents or newly appointed staff) for the purpose of career advancement - Suitability for a post determined by a committee of experts does not warrant interference in the exercise of powers of judicial review – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Anupal Singh & Others v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2020) 2 SCC 173; Paras 13 – 18] Gujarat Public Service Commission v. Gnaneshwary Dushyantkumar Shah, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 64 : 2026 INSC 70

Constitution of India - Article 233(2) – Eligibility of Judicial Officers for District Judge Recruitment – Direct Recruitment vs. Promotion – Practice Requirement - Held: In-service judicial officers are eligible for appointment as District Judges through direct recruitment - Their past service as a judicial officer must be counted toward the minimum practice requirement of seven years as stipulated under Article 233(2) - Categories of Relief held – i. Category A (Appointed but Reverted): Officers whose appointments were reversed due to an erroneous interpretation of law are deemed to have continued in service without a break - They are entitled to seniority and notional pay fixation but no arrears of pay; ii. Category B (Selected but not Formally Appointed): Selected candidates whose appointments were stalled by judicial intervention must be immediately offered appointments, subject to vacancy availability. Seniority will be determined by a committee of three senior High Court judges; iii. Category C & D (Ongoing or Future Selection): Officers currently in the selection process or seeking to participate must be treated as eligible; iv. Age Relaxation: Candidates who crossed the age limit while erroneously considered ineligible are granted a one-time relaxation to participate in the next selection process; v. Cadre Management: All officers benefiting from these directions shall be treated as District Judges appointed through direct recruitment. [Overruled Dheeraj Mor v. High Court of Delhi, (2020) 7 SCC 401; Paras 5-22] Rejanish K.V. v. K. Deepa, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 306

Constitution of India - Article 309 – Bihar Pharmacists Cadre Rules, 2014 (as amended in 2024) – Rule 6(1) – Validity of Minimum Qualification – The Supreme Court upheld the constitutional validity of Rule 6(1) and the "Note" in Appendix-I of the Cadre Rules, which prescribes Diploma in Pharmacy as the essential qualification for the post of Pharmacist (basic category) - Noted that candidates possessing higher qualifications (B. Pharma/M. Pharma) are eligible only if they also possess a Diploma in Pharmacy as the essential qualification for the post of Pharmacist (basic category) - Noted that candidates possessing higher qualifications (B. Pharma/M. Pharma) are eligible only if they also possess a Diploma in Pharmacy - It is the exclusive prerogative of the State, as an employer, to determine the most suitable qualifications for public posts based on its independent assessment - The power of judicial review is limited and cannot be used to rewrite service rules, determine equivalence of qualifications, or substitute the Court's assessment for that of the employer – Appeal dismissed. MD. Firoz Mansuri v. State of Bihar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 57 : 2026 INSC 68

Constitution of India — Article 311(1) — Scope of Protection — Employees of Statutory Corporations/Public Sector Undertakings - The protection of Article 311(1) of the Constitution of India providing that a member of a civil service or a holder of a civil post shall not be dismissed by an authority subordinate to the appointing authority applies strictly to persons holding civil posts under the Union or a State - Employees of a public sector company or corporation (such as MSEDCL) having a distinct legal personality independent of the Government do not hold a civil post merely because of government ownership or control - Their disciplinary competence is governed entirely by the internal Service Regulations of the Corporation and not by Article 311. [Relied on S.L. Agarwal v. General Manager, Hindustan Steel Ltd., (1970) 1 SCC 177; Paras 80-110] Surekha Domaji Bele v. Executive Engineer, Testing Division, MSEDCL, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 624 : 2026 INSC 639

Constitution of India — Article 311(2)(b) – Dismissal from service without departmental inquiry – Scope of "Reasonably Practicable" – Requirement of Objective Satisfaction – The Supreme Court set aside the dismissal of a Delhi Police Constable, holding that the power to dispense with a regular departmental inquiry under Article 311(2)(b) cannot be exercised based on mere "assumptions and conjectures" - Supreme Court noted that the disciplinary authority must record satisfaction based on independent material showing that holding an inquiry is not "reasonably practicable" - Key Observations held – i. Judicial Review and Satisfaction - The finality given to the disciplinary authority's decision under Article 311(3) is not binding on the Courts - The scope of judicial review is open to strike down orders dispensing with an inquiry if the reasons are irrelevant, arbitrary, or lack a factual basis – Held that court must consider whether a "reasonable man acting in a reasonable way" would have reached the same conclusion in the prevailing situation; ii. Absence of Material Evidence: In the present case, the Preliminary Inquiry (PE) report failed to record any specific instances of the appellant who was in custody at the time—threatening or intimidating witnesses - The Deputy Commissioner of Police (DCP) relied on the ACP's "presumption" of potential witness tampering without any supporting material, which the Court deemed a failure of application of mind; iii. Custody as a Factor: It was incumbent upon the authority to demonstrate how the appellant, while in jail, posed a threat that made an inquiry "not reasonably practicable"; iv. Adherence to Circulars: noted that the Delhi Police's own circulars (dated 31.12.1998 and 11.09.2007) mandate that Article 311(2)(b) should not be used as a "short cut" and requires "cogent and legally tenable reasons". [Relied on Union of India v. Tulsiram Patel (1985) 3 SCC 398; Jaswant Singh v. State of Punjab (1991) 1 SCC 36; Paras 23-40] Manohar Lal v. Commissioner of Police, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 236 : 2026 INSC 234

Constitution of India – Article 32 – Writ Jurisdiction – Principles of Natural Justice – Doctrine of Bias – Selection Process – Search-cum-Selection Committee (SCSC) – Bias and Malafides in Service Matters - The Supreme Court allowed the writ petition, setting aside the SCSC's decision to reject the petitioner's candidature - held that the inclusion of an officer as a member of the selection committee who had been personally arraigned as a contemnor by the candidate in the same dispute violates the principles of natural justice - Such participation creates a "reasonable apprehension of bias" in the mind of the candidate, rendering the decision-making process vulnerable and a nullity, regardless of whether actual bias is proven – Noted that justice must not only be done but must manifestly be seen to be done, and authorities must appear to act fairly to preserve public confidence in the impartiality of the selection process – Supreme Court directed the DoPT to convene a fresh SCSC meeting within four weeks, excluding "the Officer" in question, and imposed costs of Rs. 5 lakhs on the respondents for "rank procrastination" and "deliberate obstacles" bordering on vendetta. [Relied on State of Gujarat v. R.A. Mehta, (2013) 3 SCC 1; A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India, (1969) 2 SCC 262; S. Parthasarathi v. State of A.P., (1974) 3 SCC 459; Paras 41-46] Captain Pramod Kumar Bajaj v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 97 : 2026 INSC 101

Constitution of India – Article 32, 19(1)(d), 19(1)(e), and 19(1)(g) – Judicial Service – Migration to another State Service – Right to Profession – Petitioners, serving as Civil Judges in Uttarakhand, sought permission to join the Delhi Judicial Service after being declared successful in the recruitment examination - The High Court of Uttarakhand rejected their request, citing concerns over judicial vacancies and the impact on the litigant public - Held: The interest of the individual officers to advance their careers has an overriding effect over the administrative concerns of the parent High Court regarding vacancies - Denial of such permission results in "negativity, frustration," and a violation of fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution - The Supreme Court directed the High Court of Uttarakhand to pass orders for the cessation of their services to enable them to join the Delhi Judicial Service by the stipulated deadline - Supreme Court clarified that while the petitioners' joining was delayed due to the pending legal challenge, their seniority in the Delhi Judicial Service must be maintained as per their original position in the Select List - held that permission cannot be denied to a judicial officer to join the service of another State merely on the ground that migration will give rise to vacancies in the first State - The delay caused by the litigation shall not adversely affect their merit-based seniority – Petition allowed. [Paras 13-18] Anubhuti Goel v. High Court of Uttarakhand, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 67

Constitution of India – Articles 14 and 16 - Retrospective Application of Recruitment Rules — Change in the "Rules of the Game" — The Supreme Court set aside the retrospective application of the Bihar Engineering Service Class-II Recruitment (Amendment) Rules, 2022, which introduced a 25% weightage for contractual work experience after the selection process (written examination and provisional merit list) had already commenced under the 2019 Rules – Supreme Court laid down key legal principles – i. Recruitment Process Sanctity: Eligibility criteria notified at the start of a recruitment process cannot be changed midway unless the extant rules or the advertisement explicitly permit such changes; ii. Vested Rights vs. Selection Criteria: While the State has the power to legislate retrospectively under Article 309, this power cannot be used to arbitrarily disrupt a selection process or alter the "eligibility criteria for being placed in the merit list" once the "game" has already been played; iii. Executive Instructions vs. Statutory Rules: The State cannot rely on executive memos (2018 and 2021) to override statutory recruitment rules that were in force at the time of the advertisement, particularly to the detriment of candidates who had no prior notice of such weightage - Supreme Court directed the State to finalize appointments based on the original merit lists from June/July 2022, strictly following the unamended 2019 Rules, within two months. [Relied on Tej Prakash Pathak and Others v. Rajasthan High Court and Others, (2025) 2 SCC 1; K. Manjusree v. State of Andhra Pradesh & Anr., (2008) 3 SCC 512; Paras 25-45] Abhay Kumar Patel v. State of Bihar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 14 : 2026 INSC 24

Constitution of India – Articles 14 and 16 – Service Law – Promotion – Educational Qualification – Relaxation – Arbitrariness and Discrimination – The Supreme Court set aside the High Court Division Bench order that had upheld the Registrar's rejection of a promotion recommendation - held that when the Board of Directors—the competent authority validly exercises its discretion to grant relaxation in educational qualifications based on an employee's long service and competence, the Registrar cannot arbitrarily reject such a proposal - Denial of promotion to the appellant while granting it to similarly situated employees (Sushil Kumar Tripathi and Ram Swaroop Pandey) possessing the same qualifications constitutes a violation of the fundamental concept of equality. [Paras 6 - 9] Kamal Prasad Dubey v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 365 : 2026 INSC 353

Constitution of India — Articles 14, 16, 226, 142 and 309 — Mandamus for Regularisation contrary to Statutory Rules — High Court dismissed writ petitions filed by contractual para-teachers seeking regularisation — Held that Courts exercising powers under Articles 226 or 142 cannot issue a mandamus to regularise services contrary to the statutory scheme or rules made under Article 309 - Adherence to statutory rules must be insisted upon to protect the rights of open-market candidates and preserve the constitutional guarantees of equal opportunity in public employment. [Paras 11 - 21] Sunil Kumar Yadav v. State of Jharkhand, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 470 : 2026 INSC 462

Constitution of India, 1950 — Article 14 — Equal Pay for Equal Work / Regularization — Parity in Service benefits - The State Government framed a policy in 2005 to regularize Work Charged and Muster Roll workers engaged prior to 01.04.1993, under which approximately 30,000 workers were regularized - The appellants, who were similarly situated, engaged prior to the cut-off date, and had rendered continuous service for decades, were excluded due to clerical errors and administrative lapses on the part of the State - Held, the State cannot extend a benefit to one large group and deny it to a smaller group within the same identifiable class without demonstrating a valid distinction - Equality does not allow selective or partial implementation of a policy - Exclusion of the appellants is manifestly arbitrary, discriminatory, and violative of Article 14. [Relied on Secretary, State of Karnataka v. Umadevi, (2006) 4 SCC 1; State of Karnataka & Others v. M.L. Kesari & Others, (2010) 9 SCC 247; Jaggo v. Union of India, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3826; National Buildings Construction Corporation v. S. Raghunathan, (1998) 7 SCC 66; Bhola Nath v. State of Jharkhand and Others, 2026 INSC 99; Paras 60 - 78] Sukhendu Bhattacharjee v. State of Assam, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 529 : 2026 INSC 523

Constitution of India, 1950 - Article 142 – Gender Equality in Armed Forces – Grant of Permanent Commission (PC) to Short Service Commission Women Officers (SSCWOs) – Assessment of Merit – Casual Grading of ACRs – The Supreme Court held that the Annual Confidential Reports (ACRs) of women officers commissioned between 2010 and 2012 were authored under the systemic assumption that they were ineligible for career progression beyond 14 years - This institutional mindset resulted in "middling" or "average" grades being assigned to women while "outstanding" grades were reserved for male counterparts whose future depended on them - Supreme Court observed that such a structural disadvantage, embedded in years of service assessments, cannot be neutralized by mere procedural safeguards like anonymization of data at the final evaluation stage. Lt Col Pooja Pal v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 283 : 2026 INSC 281

Constitution of India, 1950 - Article 142 — Power to do complete justice — Taking a pragmatic approach to avoid the sudden displacement of a substantial number of in-service teachers and consequent disruption to school-going children, the timeline to qualify the TET is modified - The timeline originally granted in Anjuman Ishaat-e-Taleem Trust v. State of Maharashtra is extended from 2 (two) years to 3 (three) years - In-service teachers must acquire the TET qualification by August 31, 2028, instead of August 31, 2027 - States are directed to conduct the TET periodically, preferably twice a year. State of UP v. Anjuman Ishaat-E-Taleem Trust, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 568 : 2026 INSC 597

Constitution of India, 1950 — Article 226(1) and Article 226(2) — Territorial Jurisdiction of High Court — Central Armed Police Forces (CAPF) / Border Security Force (BSF) — Dismissal from Service — Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens - Key Legal Principles Summarized by Supreme Court – i. Territorial Jurisdiction based on Situs of Office: Even if the entire cause of action arises outside the territorial limits of the Delhi High Court (e.g., the misconduct occurred and the dismissal order was issued elsewhere), a member of the Central Armed Police Forces (CAPF), including the BSF, can maintain a writ petition before the Delhi High Court under Article 226(1) of the Constitution - This is because the overall command, administration, and superintendence vest in authorities whose offices are situated in New Delhi (the Union of India and the Director General, BSF); ii. Inapplicability of Forum Non Conveniens to Article 226(1) Writs - The doctrine of forum non conveniens is misapplied when used by a High Court to refuse to exercise discretionary writ jurisdiction invoked under Article 226(1) based on the situs of the respondent's office - When a suitor chooses a forum that is highly convenient to the respondents themselves, and where the official records are readily available or can be summoned, applying the doctrine of forum non conveniens becomes self-defeating and denies access to justice. [Relied on Shri Ranjeet Mal v. General Manager, Northern Railway (1977) 1 SCC 484; Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd. v. Union of India (2004) 6 SCC 254; Dinesh Chandra Gahtori v. Chief of Army Staff (2001) 9 SCC 525; Eastern Coalfields Ltd. v. Kalyan Banerjee (2008) 3 SCC 456; Paragraph 21-40] Baksish Ahmad v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 616 : 2026 INSC 630

Constitutional Law – Right to Pension – Nature of Pension – Plea of Financial Burden – Constitution of India, 1950 – Article 300A – Held that Pension is not a bounty, grace, or a matter of financial convenience dependent on the employer - It is a deferred wage and a hard-earned benefit amassed by virtue of long and continuous service, constituting "property" within the meaning of Article 300A of the Constitution - A constitutional right cannot be rendered illusory or defeated on account of administrative inaction or the plea of financial burden. [Paras 41-74] Bhikhani Devi v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 582 : 2026 INSC 612

Consumption of Vacancy – Supreme Court observed that even if a senior candidate (Rishikesh Meena or Rajesh Kumar) does not join or accept an 'insider' vacancy, the next candidate in the merit list does not gain an automatic right to claim allocation to that specific post - Finality must be attached to the selection and allocation process to prevent administrative instability – Appeals dismissed. [Paras 9-12] Rupesh Kumar Meena v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 122 : 2026 INSC 119 : AIR 2026 SC 900

Contractual Employment through Third-Party Contractor vs. Direct Contractual Employment – Claim for Minimum Time Scale of Pay – Distinction in Law – The Supreme Court set aside a High Court order directing the Municipal Council to pay the minimum time scale of pay to workers engaged through third-party contractors - held that a valid distinction exists between persons employed directly by a State entity and those engaged through an intermediary contractor - While regular employment involves transparent, merit-based procedures open to all citizens, contractors have absolute discretion in selecting personnel to be sent to the principal employer - Granting equal benefits and status to contractor-engaged workers would sanction an arbitrary recruitment process and bypass constitutional safeguards for public employment. [Relied on Bharat Heavy Electricals Limited vs. Mahendra Prasad Jakhmola and others, (2019) 13 SCC 82; Joint Secretary, Central Board of Secondary Education and Another Vs. Raj Kumar Mishra and Another, Civil Appeal No. 4014 of 2025; Paras 8-11] Municipal Council v. K. Jayaram, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 38

Dearness Allowance (DA) — Legally Enforceable Right — Financial Inability of State — The Supreme Court held that the right to receive Dearness Allowance is a legally enforceable right that accrued in favor of the employees of the State of West Bengal – Held that while the State has the discretion to formulate its pay structure, once it incorporates a specific standard (like the All-India Consumer Price Index - AICPI) into its statutory rules (ROPA Rules, 2009), it cannot deviate from that mechanism through executive memoranda. State of West Bengal v. Confederation of State Government Employees, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 120 : 2026 INSC 123 : AIR 2026 SC 1213

Department of Posts – Casual Labourers (Grant of Temporary Status and Regularisation) Scheme, 1991 – Circular dated 30.11.1992 – Rule 10(1-B) of the Central Civil Services (Temporary Service) Rules, 1965 – Entitlement of temporary status casual labourers to pensionary benefits in the absence of formal regularisation – Held - A casual labourer, upon conferment of "temporary status" and subsequent completion of three years of continuous service in that capacity, is treated at par with temporary Group 'D' employees - This parity functions as a parity in substantive service benefits (including leave, increments, GPF, and pensionary benefits) rather than an identity of formal service status - The expression "after regularisation" in Clause 6 of the 1991 Scheme does not restrict or act as a mandatory prerequisite for the core entitlement to a pension; rather, it provides an additional benefit of counting 50% of the past temporary status service towards retirement benefits once a formal order of regularisation is passed - The foundational right to a pension for such employees flows independently from the operational framework of the Scheme, the Departmental Circular dated 30.11.1992, and Rule 10(1-B) of the CCS (Temporary Service) Rules, 1965 - If a temporary status casual labourer completes the minimum qualifying service of 10 years after attaining parity with temporary Group 'D' employees, they are entitled to superannuation pension, retirement gratuity, and family pension upon death, even in the absolute absence of a formal order of regularisation. [Paras 47-76] Bhikhani Devi v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 582 : 2026 INSC 612

Departmental Enquiry – Post-Superannuation – Lack of Jurisdiction – Adoption of Rules – The Supreme Court quashed a departmental enquiry initiated against a retired employee of the Maharashtra State Warehousing Corporation (MSWC) approximately 11 months after his superannuation - Held that in the absence of specific provisions in the Maharashtra State Warehousing Corporation (Staff) Service Regulations, 1992, the Corporation could not ipso facto apply the Maharashtra Civil Services (Pension) Rules, 1982, to initiate proceedings against a retired employee without a conscious decision or resolution by the Board of Directors to adopt such rules - that a public-sector corporation cannot initiate or continue disciplinary proceedings against an employee after retirement in the absence of an express enabling provision in its service regulations. Kadirkhan Ahmedkhan Pathan v. Maharashtra State Warehousing Corporation, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 10 : 2026 INSC 16

Departmental Inquiries - Allegations of bias - Where an employee has previously levelled allegations of bias against the Disciplinary Authority, the said Authority must recuse herself/himself from conducting or concluding the disciplinary proceedings. The principle that “justice should not only be done but should also be seen to be done” must be strictly adhered to in departmental inquiries. National Bal Bhawan v. Khazan Chand, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 363

Departmental Inquiry - Police Service - Fraud and Dual Employment - Judicial Review - Appeal against the High Court Division Bench judgment which set aside the dismissal of a Constable - The respondent was alleged to have secured simultaneous appointments in the Jharkhand Police (as Ranjan Kumar) and the Bihar Police (as Santosh Kumar) using forged documents and assumed identities - The Supreme Court reiterated that in departmental proceedings, the standard of proof is the preponderance of probabilities, not proof beyond reasonable doubt - Strict rules of the Evidence Act do not apply to domestic enquiries; any material with logical probative value is admissible - Held, the High Court under Article 226/227 cannot act as an appellate authority to reappreciate evidence or interfere with findings of fact unless they are perverse or based on no evidence - The Division Bench erred in substituting its own view over the concurrent findings of the disciplinary, appellate, and revisional authorities - A member of the police force must maintain the highest degree of integrity - Fraud at the threshold of entry strikes at the root of public employment. Forensic evidence, including fingerprint and photographic comparisons, confirmed that the respondent used dual identities to deceive two sovereign employers - To do complete justice, Supreme Court exercised its power under Article 142 to quash the respondent's second appointment in the Bihar Police and directed the initiation of criminal proceedings for cheating and forgery. [Relied on Union of India v. P. Gunasekaran, (2015) 2 SCC 610; State of Haryana v. Rattan Singh, (1977) 2 SCC 491; Union of India v. Subrata Nath, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1617; Paras 8-26] State of Jharkhand v. Ranjan Kumar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 479 : 2026 INSC 466

Departmental Inquiry — Proof of Misconduct — Fabrication of Medical Certificate — Graver the charge, greater the need for caution and circumspection — Findings of Inquiry Officer based on "word against word" without expert verification held perverse — Where a charge of forgery entails mandatory dismissal, fair play requires a thorough investigation consistent with principles of natural justice – Facts - The appellant, a Court Attender, was dismissed from service on charges of unauthorized absence and submitting a fabricated medical certificate. The Inquiry Officer relied on the statement of a Medical Practitioner (PW-2) who denied issuing the certificate, despite admitting the appellant consulted him and that the letterhead belonged to him - The High Court upheld the dismissal - Supreme Court Findings – i. Perversity in Findings: The Supreme Court held that the Inquiry Officer's conclusion was perverse as it was based on no credible evidence - noted that the rubber stamp on the disputed certificate was identical to the one used by the doctor on official notices; ii. Need for Handwriting Expert: Since the certificate was fully handwritten and the doctor's undisputed signatures varied, the Inquiry Officer should have referred the matter to a handwriting expert before recording a finding of forgery; iii. Standard of Proof for Grave Charges: When charges involve consequences like loss of livelihood, investigations must be consistent with the requirement of the situation and fair play. [Relied on Sawai Singh vs. State of Rajasthan (1986) 3 SCC 454; Paras 31-45] K. Rajaiah v. High Court for the State of Telangana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 140 : 2026 INSC 142 : AIR 2026 SC 890

Destruction of Records – Weeding Out During Pendency of Litigation – Adverse Inference - The respondents admitted that the appellant's original ACR service records were destroyed/weeded out in 2013, despite the active pendency of the present civil appeal before the Supreme Court filed in 2009 – Held that Service records are mandatorily required to be retained until the final conclusion of judicial proceedings - The destruction of the records during the pendency of the litigation severely prejudiced the appellant's case and precluded judicial scrutiny - a strong adverse inference is liable to be drawn against the employer-respondents. [Paras 15-17] Dr. Indira Saranath v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 577 : 2026 INSC 553

Direct Recruitment – Recruitment Procedure – Primary Cooperative Marketing-cum-Processing Societies Limited Staff Service Rules, 2003 – Rule 3, Rule 14(a) & Rule 15 – Haryana Cooperative Societies Act, 1984 – Section 36 – Validity of appointments challenged on the ground of non-compliance with amended Rule 3 due to the absence and lack of concurrence of the mandatory official members (Assistant Registrar Cooperative Societies, Inspector Cooperative Societies, and District Manager, HAFED) in the Board of Directors (BOD) meeting finalizing the appointments – Held, that a public recruitment process can be split into three distinct stages: (i) notification/advertisement, (ii) method of selection (interview/written test), and (iii) final appointment by the competent authority - If the first two stages do not suffer from any fundamental defects (such as lack of publicity, fraud, manipulation, or appointment of unqualified candidates), the entire recruitment process cannot be rendered void ab initio due to a procedural loophole at the third stage - The requirement under Rule 3 regarding the presence and concurrence of non-elected official members is supervisory and salutary in nature, designed to ensure cross-checking and adherence to norms - The absence of such officials constitutes a curable procedural irregularity, not a fatal illegality going to the root of the selection - Candidates who entered service in good faith through an advertised, merit-based process cannot be made to suffer for institutional lapses or procedural omissions committed by the authorities - The third stage of the recruitment process is severable from the first two - The defect is rectifiable by directing the Cooperative Society to reconvene the BOD meeting in strict compliance with Rule 3 to re-examine the qualifications and recommendations of the selected candidates, without reopening the validly concluded initial phases of advertisement and interview - Impugned judgment of the High Court set aside and appeal allowed with directions. [Paras 20-22, 40-52, 60-64] Gaurav Mehla v. State of Haryana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 628 : 2026 INSC 641

Disciplinary Enquiry — Principles of Natural Justice — Requirement of Oral Enquiry — Held that even if a case is based solely on documentary evidence, unless the relied-upon documents are admitted by the charged employee, a witness must be examined to prove those documents and be tendered for cross-examination - Unless the charged employee accepts guilt in clear terms, an enquiry must be held where the employer leads evidence first, followed by an opportunity for the delinquent to cross-examine witnesses and lead defense evidence - An evasive reply to a departmental charge-sheet does not amount to an admission of guilt; the burden to prove the charge remains with the employer - Failure to produce any witness when charges are denied vitiates the enquiry. [Relied on Chamoli District Co-operative Bank Limited & Another vs. Raghunath Singh Rana & Others (2016) 12 SCC 204; Sur Enamel and Stamping Works Ltd. v. Workmen AIR 1963 SC 1914; State of Uttaranchal & Ors. v. Kharak Singh (2008) 8 SCC 236; Paras 13-18] Jai Prakash Saini v. Managing Director U.P. Cooperative Federation Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 315 : 2026 INSC 305

Disciplinary Inquiry – Principles of Natural Justice – The appellant alleged a gross breach of natural justice, claiming the inquiry officer abruptly closed proceedings on August 1, 2017, preventing the completion of cross-examination of management witnesses - The High Court erred by not considering these allegations of procedural lapses and the merits of the Tribunal's original findings while ordering a remand. Hemlata Eknath Pise v. Shubham Bahu Uddeshiya Sanstha Waddhamna, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 177 : 2026 INSC 147

Disciplinary Proceedings – Continuance after Superannuation – Permissibility of Punishment – Punjab and Sind Bank Officers' Service Regulations, 1982; Regulation 20(3)(iii) – Punjab and Sind Bank Employees' Pension Regulations, 1995; Regulation 48 - The Supreme Court upheld the dismissal of a writ petition filed by a retired bank officer challenging a punishment of "reduction by three stages in the time scale of pay" imposed after his superannuation - Key Findings by Supreme Court – i. Continuance of Proceedings: If service rules permit, disciplinary proceedings initiated before superannuation can be continued and brought to a logical conclusion even after the employee attains the age of superannuation; ii. Legal Fiction of Service - Regulation 20(3)(iii) of the Service Regulations creates a legal fiction where the officer is deemed to be in service until the proceedings are concluded; iii. Implementability of Punishment - The Court rejected the argument that only penalties under Pension Regulations could be imposed post-retirement - held that a punishment of reduction in pay scale relates back to the date of superannuation and is implementable because pension is computed based on the salary last drawn/payable; iv. Misconduct by Bank Officers: A bank officer holds a position of trust - Failure to ensure the end-use of a loan constitutes a financial irregularity that exposes the bank to risk and amounts to misconduct, regardless of whether an actual loss was suffered. [Relied on Chairman-cum-Managing Director, Mahanadi Coalfields Ltd. vs. Rabindranath Choubey (2020) 18 SCC 71; Ramesh Chandra Sharma vs. Punjab National Bank and Another (2007) 9 SCC 15; State Bank of India vs. Ram Lal Bhaskar (2011) 10 SCC 249; Paras 25-37] Virinder Pal Singh v. Punjab and Sind Bank, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 268 : 2026 INSC 266

Disciplinary Proceedings — De Novo Adjudication before Labour Court — Right to Fresh Post-Enquiry Show-Cause Notice on Quantum of Punishment - Where a domestic enquiry is found to be defective/perverse and the employer successfully proves the misconduct by leading independent evidence de novo before the Labour Court, the disciplinary authority cannot mechanically impose the penalty of dismissal by relying solely on the original show-cause notice that was founded upon the vitiated domestic enquiry - Even if the finding of misconduct attains finality, the regulatory mandate of an explicit post-enquiry notice (such as Regulation 88(j) of the MSEDCL Employees Services Regulations, 2005) requires a fresh application of mind by the disciplinary authority to the findings that ultimately survived the de novo adjudication - The delinquent employee must be given a fresh opportunity to show cause and plead mitigating or extenuating circumstances against the proposed punishment in light of the post-remand findings. [Relied on Managing Director, ECIL v. B. Karunakar, (1993) 4 SCC 727; Workmen of Firestone Tyre & Rubber Co. of India (P) Ltd. v. Management, (1973) 1 SCC 813; Paras 38-56] Surekha Domaji Bele v. Executive Engineer, Testing Division, MSEDCL, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 624 : 2026 INSC 639

Disciplinary Proceedings – Meaning of "Pending" – Effect of Show Cause Notice – Supreme Court observed that for a show-cause notice to trigger the "deemed pendency" of disciplinary proceedings under Regulation 20(3)(ii) of the Service Regulations, it must clearly indicate an intention to institute disciplinary action - A mere request for an explanation regarding alleged irregularities, stating that "further course of action will be taken" in the absence of a reply, does not constitute the institution of disciplinary proceedings. [Paras 36, 37] UCO Bank v. S.K. Shrivastava, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 340 : 2026 INSC 328

Disciplinary Proceedings — Natural Justice — Reasoned Order — Supreme Court emphasized that in cases where no regular inquiry is conducted and the delinquent is deprived of cross-examination, the show cause notice and the final order are critical safeguards - A "cryptic or mechanical" rejection of a detailed, non-frivolous defense violates principles of natural justice - Vague expressions like "morally convincing evidence" fall short of the required standard for recording findings in disciplinary proceedings. [Paras 31 - 33] Ex. Sqn. Ldr. R. Sood v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 376 : 2026 INSC 366

Disciplinary Proceedings – Quantum of Punishment – Principle of Parity – Higher Responsibility of Senior Officers – Doctrine of Accountability – The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgment which had modified the punishment of 'dismissal from service' to 'compulsory retirement' on the ground of parity with co-delinquents - held that the respondent, holding the post of Senior Manager (MMGS-III Scale), cannot be equated with co-delinquents who were an officer and a gunman - Authority carries accountability; the higher the rank, the stricter the scrutiny and degree of responsibility - The differentiation in rank and the increased trust reposed by the employer in a Senior Manager constitutes a compelling ground for a more stringent punishment compared to subordinates involved in the same misconduct – Noted that Interference with the quantum of punishment is warranted only if the decision is strikingly disproportionate, irrational, or shocks the conscience of the Court - Noted that equating a branch manager with a gunman is in "outrageous defiance of logic and reason". [Relied on Bhagat Ram v. State of Himachal Pradesh (1983) 2 SCC 442; Ranjit Thakur v. Union of India (1987) 4 SCC 611; Om Kumar v. Union of India (2001) 2 SCC 386; Union of India v. G. Ganayutham (1997) 7 SCC 46; Paras 9-16] Punjab & Sind Bank v. Sh. Raj Kumar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 322 : 2026 INSC 313

Disciplinary Proceedings against Judicial Officers – Removal from service based solely on judicial orders – Permissibility – Appellant, a judicial officer with 27 years of unblemished service, was removed for granting bail in four cases under the M.P. Excise Act without expressly mentioning the "twin conditions" of Section 59-A - Held: Merely because a judicial order is wrong, erroneous, or fails to refer to a statutory provision, it cannot be the basis for disciplinary action unless there is evidence of corrupt motive or extraneous consideration - The High Court must exercise great caution and protect honest officers from unmerited onslaughts based on motivated complaints. Order of removal set aside with full back wages. Nirbhay Singh Suliya v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 2 : 2026 INSC 7

Disciplinary Proceedings vs. Criminal Trial – Standard of Proof – Held: Even when proceedings stem from identical allegations, their nature, scope, and standards of proof are fundamentally different (preponderance of probabilities vs. proof beyond reasonable doubt) - An acquittal in a criminal case is not automatically determinative of departmental liability, and the pendency of a criminal trial remains a valid statutory bar to the release of gratuity under Rule 69(1)(c). [Relied on Babu Manmohan Das Shah & Ors. vs. Bishun Das (1967 [1] SCR 836); Paras 12-16] Bikram Chand Rana v. Himachal Pradesh Road Transport Corporation, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 344 : 2026 INSC 326

Distinction between "Honourable Acquittal" and "Acquittal on Benefit of Doubt" – An honourable acquittal occurs when the court definitively concludes that the accused did not commit the offence - In contrast, an acquittal based on a "benefit of doubt" due to a weak prosecution case or lack of credible evidence is a technical consideration and does not constitute a "clean chit". [Para 5] State of Madhya Pradesh v. Rajkumar Yadav, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 234 : 2026 INSC 225 : AIR 2026 SC 1471

Equal Pay for Equal Work — Principle Explained — Claim for pay parity by contractual para-teachers with regular Assistant Teachers—Held: Equal pay for equal work is not an automatic entitlement. The claimant must demonstrate that their duties, responsibilities, qualifications, accountability, and conditions of service are qualitatively and substantially identical to those of regular employees. Contractual para-teachers, though performing similar classroom functions, are not assigned the full range of responsibilities attached to regular Assistant Teachers. [Para 20-25] Sunil Kumar Yadav v. State of Jharkhand, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 470 : 2026 INSC 462

Equitable Consideration - Right to Appointment - Relief based on equitable considerations cannot be claimed as a matter of right to protect an inherently illegal selection that breaches essential threshold qualifications - Where a required minimum qualification (such as a specialized work experience external to the post) remains unfulfilled at the threshold, subsequent continuation in service or regularization under interim protections cannot substitute or cure the initial defect in eligibility - Participation in a selection process or fulfilment of eligibility conditions does not confer an indefeasible right to appointment - Where the selection process itself stands vitiated due to non-scrutiny of essential qualifications at the threshold, the appropriate course for the Court is to set aside the selection rather than substituting one illegality with another by directing the positive appointment of an unsuccessful or waitlisted candidate. [Relied on On substitution of qualifications: Zahoor Ahmad Rather and Ors. v. Sheikh Imtiyaz Ahmad and Ors., (2019) 2 SCC 404; Rekha Chaturvedi (Smt.) v. University of Rajasthan and Ors., 1993 Supp (3) SCC 168; am Sarup v. State of Haryana and Ors., (1979) 1 SCC 168; Buddhi Nath Chaudhary and Ors. v. Abahi Kumar and Ors., (2001) 3 SCC 328; Paras 23-54] Himakshi v. Rahul Verma, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 400 : 2026 INSC 391

Equitable Relief – Creation of Supernumerary Post – To balance the equities between a candidate already in service (Appellant) and a deserving candidate deprived of selection due to a contested answer (Respondent No. 3), Supreme Court directed the creation of a supernumerary post – Appellant to retain seniority over the new appointee. [Relied on Vikas Pratap Singh and Others vs. State of Chhattisgarh and Others (2013) 14 SCC 494; Paras 7 - 11] Charan Preet Singh v. Municipal Corporation Chandigarh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 253 : 2026 INSC 248 : AIR 2026 SC 1436

Essential vs. Preferential Qualification - Power to Relax & Exercise of discretion - A candidate who does not possess the prescribed minimum essential qualification cannot be treated as eligible merely on the strength of holding a higher academic degree or achieving a higher merit position - Preferential qualifications operate only within the zone of eligible candidates and cannot supplant, override, or dilute the primary requirement of essential eligibility - The existence of a statutory power of relaxation under Recruitment and Promotion (R&P) Rules does not imply it can be presumed or automatically applied - Any departure from prescribed eligibility criteria requires a structured, conscious, and reasoned exercise of discretion, which must be demonstratingly recorded in writing by the recruiting agency - In a public selection process, transparency and adherence to declared criteria are paramount. Himakshi v. Rahul Verma, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 400 : 2026 INSC 391

Extraordinary Pension – Uttar Pradesh Civil Services (Extraordinary Pension) Rules, 1981 – Mandatory Sanction of the Governor – Writ of Mandamus – Substitution of Discretion – The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's direction to pay extraordinary pension to the widow of a doctor shot dead while on duty - held that under Rule 4 of the 1981 Rules, no award of extraordinary pension can be made except with the sanction of the Governor, which involves the exercise of administrative discretion. State of Uttarakhand v. Sarita Singh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 353 : 2026 INSC 337

Fixation of Pay – Weightage for Past Service – Promissory Estoppel – Withdrawal of pay weightage benefits on the ground that Railway Service is not Central Government Civil Service – Held that unjustified, The Board, having explicitly accepted the pro-rata pension contribution from the Railways and acted upon its own "Board Orders" and settlements for years, is estopped from unilaterally withdrawing the benefit of weightage from the appellant - The High Court erred in holding that because the CCS (Conduct) Rules, 1964 and CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 do not apply to railway servants, their service cannot be reckoned for pay fixation. [Relied on Parshotam Lal Dhingra v. Union of India, AIR 1958 SC 36; Moti Ram Deka v. North East Frontier Railway, AIR 1964 SC 60; State of Assam v. Kanak Chandra Dutta, AIR 1967 SC 884; Paras 32-39, 44 - 47] Bency John v.Kerala State Electricity Board, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 576 : 2026 INSC 562

Forest Service (IFS) – Cadre Allocation – Migration of Reserved Category Candidate to Unreserved Vacancy – Effect of relaxation at Preliminary Examination stage – The Supreme Court held that a reserved category candidate who avails "relaxed standards" (concessions) at the Preliminary Examination stage cannot be treated as a candidate selected on "General Standards" for the purpose of cadre allocation against an unreserved vacancy, even if they secure higher marks than a general category candidate in the final merit list - rejected the High Court's view that "General Standards" only refers to the qualifying marks in the Main Examination - If a candidate's entry into the Main Examination was made possible only through a relaxed cut-off in the Preliminary Examination, they are ineligible to claim an unreserved/General Insider vacancy. Union of India v. G. Kiran, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 8

General Provident Fund (Central Service) Rules, 1960 – Rule 33(ii) – Provident Funds Act, 1925 – Sections 4 & 5 – Rights of Nominee – Release of GPF Dues – The Supreme Court dismissed a Special Leave Petition filed by the Union of India challenging a High Court order that directed the release of GPF amounts to the nominee of a deceased employee - The Government argued that under Section of the Provident Funds Act, 1925, amounts exceeding Rs. 5,000/- require a succession certificate/probate even for a nominee – Supreme Court rejected this, holding that the Rs. 5,000/- threshold established in 1925 has lost relevance due to inflation - held that Rule 33(ii) of the 1960 Rules, framed by the Government itself, stipulates that GPF amounts shall be payable to the nominee regardless of the amount – Held that Section 5(1) of the Act contains a non-obstante clause giving primacy to a valid nominee to receive the funds to the exclusion of others - Sections 4 and 5 of the Act and Rule 33(ii) must be construed harmoniously to avoid rendering the nomination process "otiose" – Noted that a nominee is a "mere trustee" to collect funds and not the beneficial owner - Releasing funds to a nominee does not bar other legal heirs from claiming their share in a competent court – Noted that the Government should not involve itself in protracted litigation regarding the estates of deceased employees, as requiring probate in cases of valid nominations unnecessarily makes the state a party to private disputes – Petition dismissed. [Relied on CIT vs. Hindustan Bulk Carriers, (2003) 3 SCC 5; Sarbati Devi vs. Usha Devi, (1984) 1 SCC 424; Paras 9-15] Union of India v. Paresh Chandra Mondal, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 42

Indian Navy – Grant of Permanent Commission (PC) to Short Service Commission Officers (SSCOs) – Selection Process Fairness – Annual Confidential Reports (ACRs) – Appeal against Armed Forces Tribunal (AFT) order directing fresh Selection Boards for SSCOs who were denied PC in 2020 and 2022 – Appellants contended that ACRs were "casually graded" during periods when they were ineligible for PC, leading to an inherently skewed merit assessment - Held, the appraisal process was inevitably affected from its inception because Reporting Officers were conscious that these officers had no avenue for career progression – High gradings in a bell-curve system were reserved for those with future prospects, while ineligible officers received average marks serving no institutional purpose – The conversion of "Not Recommended for PC" endorsements (recorded when officers were ineligible as a matter of policy) into substantive disqualifications once they became eligible is arbitrary – This circularity, where past ineligibility was transformed into "deemed unsuitability," resulted in an uneven playing field. [Para 16-17] Yogendra Kumar Singh v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 285 : 2026 INSC 282

Inquiry / Departmental Inquiry – Power to order de novo / fresh inquiry – Rule 10 of the Gujarat Civil Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1971 – The Disciplinary Authority ordered a de novo inquiry against a Judicial Officer after rejecting an inquiry report that found only one out of eight charges proved - The High Court upheld this decision - Quashing the High Court's judgment, the Supreme Court held that the expression "further inquiry" as mentioned in Rule 10(1) of the Rules does not mean a fresh or a de novo inquiry, but only a further inquiry - If the Disciplinary Authority disagrees with the Inquiry Authority's findings, Rule 10(2) mandates it to record reasons for disagreement and record its own findings if the evidence on record is sufficient - A notice directing a de novo inquiry is completely impermissible under the mandate of Rule 10. [Relied on Gujarat State Financial Corporation Vs Dilip Patilal Patel (C.A. No. 29/2004); Paras 10 - 12] Chandni Prateek Sharma v. High Court of Gujarat, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 420

Interpretation of "Ratio" vs "Quota" – The Supreme Court clarified that the 11% allocation was intended to upgrade the cadre by ensuring experienced graduates are appointed to Supervisor posts, previously filled from the open category direct recruitment - This earmarking did not reduce the chances of SSLC-only holders, as their 29% ratio remained intact and was not reduced by the amendment. Shiny C.J. v. Shalini Sreenivasan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 247 : 2026 INSC 242 : AIR 2026 SC 1452

Interpretation of Recruitment Notification – A clause stating that "in case of non-availability of qualified UR (PWD-LV) candidate, the vacancy will be filled by PWD candidates of other categories" does not bar more meritorious PWD candidates from social reserved categories from competing for the UR post in the first instance - Such clauses must be read in consonance with the constitutional principles of equality under Articles 14 and 16. [Relied on Saurav Yadav v. State of U.P. (2021) 4 SCC 542; Indra Sawhney v. Union of India 1992 Supp (3) SCC 217; Deepa E.V. v. Union of India (2017) 12 SCC 680; Paras 28-47] West Bengal State Electricity Transmission Co. Ltd v. Dipendu Biswas, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 336 : 2026 INSC 330

Interpretation of Rules and Advertisements — Principles of Eligibility — When the language of a recruitment advertisement admits of only one clear and unambiguous interpretation requiring the "possession" of a degree, considerations of enlarging the candidate pool or promoting competition cannot be invoked to adopt an alternative interpretation - Accepting a contention that qualifications can be acquired at any stage prior to the interview introduces uncertainty into the selection process and imposes an unwarranted administrative burden on the selecting authority. Rajasthan Public Service Commission v. Lavanshu Sankhla, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 455 : 2026 INSC 444

Inter-se Seniority – Direct Recruits vs. Internally Selected Candidates – Reckoning of Seniority from Date of Appointment/Training vs. Date of Commencement of Probation - Tamil Nadu Electricity Board (Service Regulations), 1967 – Regulations 10(9), 87(1), and 97 – Determination of Seniority: The Supreme Court set aside the High Court Division Bench's judgment which had ruled that seniority for direct recruits should only commence from the date their probation started (after completion of training) - held that according to the plain language of the Regulations, a person is considered to be "on duty" and "appointed to a class of service" from the moment they perform duties or commence prescribed training/instruction. [Relied on Govt. of A.P. v. P. Bhaskar (2008) 11 SCC 687; 2008 INSC 267; Paras 19-24] M. Thanigivelu v. Tamil Nadu Electricity Board, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 233 : 2026 INSC 229

Key Directions issued – i. Deemed Service for Pension: SSCWOs released from service during the pendency of litigation (excluding JAG and AEC cadres) are deemed to have completed 20 years of substantive qualifying service and are entitled to pension and consequential benefits; ii. Grant of PC: SSCWOs currently in service who secured the 60% cut-off in the 2020/2021 Selection Boards shall be granted Permanent Commission, subject to medical and disciplinary clearance; iii. Policy Review: The Army is directed to review the method of evaluation of ACRs and cut-offs for future batches to address the disproportionate impact on women officers. [Para 66, 67] Lt Col Pooja Pal v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 283 : 2026 INSC 281

Limited Scope of Judicial Review – Held that courts should not override the wisdom of the employer or substitute their own view regarding a candidate's suitability unless the decision is demonstrably mala fide, arbitrary, or whimsical - The Division Bench erred by intruding into the functional realm of the screening committee – Appeals allowed. [Relied on Commissioner of Police, New Delhi & Anr. Vs. Mehar Singh (2013) 7 SCC 685; Union Territory, Chandigarh Administration & Ors. Vs. Pradeep Kumar & Anr. (2018) 1 SCC 797; State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors. Vs. Parvez Khan (2015) 2 SCC 591; Para 7-9] State of Madhya Pradesh v. Rajkumar Yadav, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 234 : 2026 INSC 225 : AIR 2026 SC 1471

Merit-Based Selection – No Edge for Graduates – The selection process, involving an OMR and main written test focusing on pediatric health, provided a level playing field - The fact that non-graduates significantly outnumbered graduates in the final selection (235 out of 317) dispelled any apprehension that graduation conferred an unfair advantage or "edge" in the examination – Noted that The High Court's interpretation that the quotas were mutually exclusive was termed a "judicial fiat" that interfered with the executive's rule-making authority. "What the executive did not think fit to do by prescription in the Rules, could not have been done by a judicial fiat" – Appeals allowed. [Relied on Sanjay Kumar v. Narinder Verma (2006) 6 SCC 467; Paras 13-23] Shiny C.J. v. Shalini Sreenivasan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 247 : 2026 INSC 242 : AIR 2026 SC 1452

Military Pension – Disability Pension – Attributes of Service – Impact of Lifestyle Habits – The Supreme Court upheld the denial of disability pension to an army personnel suffering from "Stroke Ischemic RT MCA TERRITORY" - Noted that the disease was neither attributable to nor aggravated by military service, as the Medical Board clearly opined that the condition could have been occasioned by the appellant's habit of smoking ten bidis per day. Sarevesh Kumar v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 163

Moulding of Relief — Elimination of Ad-hocism & Timely Recruitment — Though blanket regularisation was denied, the State of Jharkhand had earmarked a 50% horizontal quota for para-teachers in its 2012 and 2022 Recruitment Rules —Held: The State cannot resist the prayer for regularisation while simultaneously failing to give effect to its own statutory mechanism for absorbing para-teachers. To ensure security of employment and eliminate perpetual ad-hocism, the Court molded the relief by issuing a strict time-bound calendar (Immediate and Annual Recurring Schedules) directing the State to notify and fill the 50% earmarked vacancies exclusively from eligible para-teachers every academic year. [Relied on State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (3), (2006) 4 SCC 1; State of Punjab v. Jagjit Singh, (2017) 1 SCC 148; Vinod Kumar v. Union of India, (2024) 9 SCC 327; Union of India v. Ilmo Devi, (2021) 20 SCC 290; Paras 23, 24] Sunil Kumar Yadav v. State of Jharkhand, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 470 : 2026 INSC 462

Non-Stigmatic Reversion – "Unsatisfactory" Performance - Stigmatic vs. Non-Stigmatic Orders – Reversion or termination based on Annual Assessment Reports (AARs) characterizing a performance as "unsatisfactory" or "below average" does not cast a stigma - To amount to a stigma, the language used in the order must explicitly impute something over and above mere unsuitability for the job - Highlighting an employee's unsuitability or unsatisfactory work is merely an unexceptional assessment of performance and is not ex facie stigmatic. [Relied on Deputy General Manager (Appellate Authority) and Ors. vs. Ajai Kumar Srivastava, [2021] 1 SCR 51; State of U.P. and Ors. vs. Gobardhan Lal, [2004] 3 SCR 337; Paras 14-19] Sadachari Singh Tomar v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 432 : 2026 INSC 427

Paucity of Funds as a Defense — Supreme Court categorically rejected the State's plea of financial inability or paucity of funds as a ground to deny the payment of statutory dues like DA - Once a legal right is established, the State, as a "model employer," must honor its obligations regardless of the financial burden - Findings returned in the first round of litigation, which declared DA a legally enforceable right and were reaffirmed by the dismissal of a review petition, attain conclusive finality and bind the parties. [Relied on Francis Coralie Mullin v. Administrator, Union Territory of Delhi (1981) 1 SCC 608; Sivanandan CT v. High Court of Kerala (2024) 3 SCC 799; Jitendra Kumar v. State of Haryana (2008) 2 SCC 161; hayara Bano v. Union of India (2017) 9 SCC 1; Assn. for Democratic Reforms v. Union of India (2024) 5 SCC 1; Lily Thomas v. Union of India (2000) 6 SCC 224; Paras 39-59] State of West Bengal v. Confederation of State Government Employees, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 120 : 2026 INSC 123 : AIR 2026 SC 1213

Payment of Gratuity – Retention of Staff Quarters – Adjustment of Penal Rent from Gratuity – Reciprocal Obligations – The management of Steel Authority of India (SAIL) challenged the High Court's direction to release the full gratuity with interest to retired employees who had failed to vacate official accommodation – Held that the obligation of an ex-employee to vacate staff quarters and the obligation of the management to release gratuity are mutual and reciprocal - Neither can be enforced in isolation - Under Rule 3.2.1(c) of the SAIL Gratuity Rules, 1978, the management is expressly empowered to withhold gratuity for non-vacation of company accommodation - no interest is payable on the gratuity amount withheld during the period of unauthorized occupation. [Paras 19 & 20] Management of Steel Authority of India v. Shambhu Prasad Singh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 262 : 2026 INSC 263

Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 – Jurisdictional Fact – Applicability of Statutes – The applicability of the PG Act depends on "jurisdictional facts" - facts that must exist before an authority can assume jurisdiction - If an employee falls under the exclusionary clause of Section 2(e), the Controlling Authority lacks jurisdiction to award benefits under the PG Act - – Section 14, which provides an overriding effect to the PG Act over other enactments, can only be invoked by those who first qualify as "employees" under Section 2(e) – Noted that since the appellants were excluded by the definition itself, the overriding clause cannot be applied to defeat the specific exclusion. N. Manoharan v. Administrative Officer, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 137 : 2026 INSC 143 : AIR 2026 SC 1061

Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 – Section 2(e) – Definition of "Employee" – Exclusionary Clause – Employees of Heavy Water Plant (HWP), Tuticorin – The Supreme Court held that retired employees of the Heavy Water Plant (HWP), which functions under the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE), are not covered under the Payment of Gratuity Act (PG Act) - Noted that HWP is an adjunct or ancillary of the DAE and is not a separate corporate entity or PSU - Since the appellants held civil posts under the Central Government and were governed by the Central Civil Services (Pension) Rules, 1972, they fall squarely within the exclusionary limb of Section 2(e) of the PG Act – Appeals dismissed. [Relied on Arun Kumar v. Union of India, (2007) 1 SCC 732; Mahalakshmi Oil Mills v. State of A.P., (1989) 1 SCC 164; Paras 12, 13] N. Manoharan v. Administrative Officer, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 137 : 2026 INSC 143 : AIR 2026 SC 1061

Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 – Statutory Interpretation – Section 2(e) of PG Act – Use of "Means" and "Does Not Include" – The use of "means" coupled with "does not include" signifies exclusionary language that strictly removes certain classes from the scope of the provision – Noted that a person holding a post under the Central or State Government who is governed by any other Act or Rules providing for gratuity is excluded at the threshold from the definition of "employee". N. Manoharan v. Administrative Officer, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 137 : 2026 INSC 143 : AIR 2026 SC 1061

Pension as Property – Article 300A of the Constitution of India – Pension is not a bounty or a matter of largesse; it is a deferred portion of compensation for past service that matures into a vested and enforceable right - Withholding accrued arrears of disability pension, which became due following judicial determination and government policy, constitutes a deprivation of property under Article 300A – Noted that the decision in Union of India v. Ram Avtar (2014) is a judgment in rem - Therefore, the Union of India should have extended the benefit of broad banding to all eligible ex-servicemen automatically rather than requiring them to file individual applications. Union of India v. Sgt Girish Kumar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 148 : 2026 INSC 149

Pension Regulations for the Army, 1961 – Regulation 125 & 266 – Pension Regulations for the Army, 2008 – Regulation 44, 173 & 175 – Defence Security Corps (DSC) – Second Service Pension – Condonation of Deficiency in Service – The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals filed by the Union of India, holding that personnel of the Defence Security Corps (DSC) are entitled to seek condonation of shortfall in their qualifying service (up to one year) for the purpose of a second service pension - Key Findings – i. DSC as Part of Armed Forces: DSC constitutes a "Corps" of the Indian Army under the Army Act, 1950, and its personnel are recognized as "Armed Forces personnel"; ii. Applicability of General Rules: Paragraph 266 (1961 Regulations) and Paragraph 173 (2008 Regulations) stipulate that pensionary awards for DSC shall be governed by the same rules applicable to the Regular Army, unless specifically inconsistent; iii. No Inconsistency: There is no "inconsistency" or express prohibition in the DSC - specific chapters against the condonation of shortfall provided in Regulation 125 (1961) or Regulation 44 (2008); iv. Calculation of Service: Before applying condonation, the length of service must be determined by treating a fraction of a year between 3 to 6 months as a completed half-year, as per Note 5 of the MoD letter dated 30th October 1987; v. Executive Letters vs. Regulations: The Government cannot override or amend statutory Pension Regulations through administrative letters (such as those dated 20th June 2017 and 22nd March 2022) to bar condonation benefits. [Relied on Union of India v. Surender Singh Parmar, (2015) 3 SCC 404; Paras 31-48] Union of India v. Balakrishnan Mullikote, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 292 : 2026 INSC 286

Pension Regulations for the Army, 1961 – Regulation 173 – Guide to Medical Officers, 2002 – Paragraph 6 – Supreme Court noted that compensation cannot be awarded for any disablement or death arising from intemperance in the use of alcohol, tobacco, or drugs, as these are matters within the member's own control – Appeal dismissed. Sarevesh Kumar v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 163

Pensionary Benefits — Representation for Compassionate Consideration — While refusing to interfere with the dismissal order due to the appellant's history of multiple offenses (imprisonment in 1980 and severe reprimands in 1989 and 1994), Supreme Court permitted the appellant to submit a representation to the authorities for the grant of pension - The authorities are at liberty to consider this on its own merits, taking into account the appellant's 36 years of service, though this is not a mandatory direction to grant such pension. [Relied on Yasodhar Kamat Vs. Director General, Border Security Force and Ors., (2021) 13 SCC 333; Para 7]. Bhagirath Choudhary v. Border Security Force, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 165

Pre-condition for Migration – Held that a reserved category candidate seeking appointment against an Unreserved vacancy must not have availed themselves of any relaxation in eligibility criteria (such as age or experience) meant specifically for the reserved category - Merit must be the sole decisive factor for Unreserved posts. West Bengal State Electricity Transmission Co. Ltd v. Dipendu Biswas, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 336 : 2026 INSC 330

Promotion – Applicable Rules – Date of Vacancy vs. Date of Consideration – Recruitment Rules – Amendment by Substitution – Meaning and Effect - Held that the right to be considered for promotion is governed exclusively by the statutory rules in force at the time the actual consideration for promotion takes place, and not by the rules that existed when the vacancies originally arose - Public servants do not possess a vested right to be considered under the old or repealed rules - Held that the term "substitution" used in amending or subordinate legislation ordinarily has the effect of deleting the old provision and bringing the new provision into existence in its place - The old rule ceases to exist from the text, and subsequent consideration must be done under the newly substituted rules unless the legislature intended otherwise - Where promotions were granted on a purely ad-hoc basis subject to the outcome of a pending litigation, they do not constitute a "completed act" or create a vested right to protection under the repealed rules - Allowing the Civil Appeal, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgment - The Apex Court held that the legal foundation applied by the High Court was incorrect in view of the three-Judge bench decision in State of Himachal Pradesh v. Raj Kumar (2022), which explicitly overruled the Y.V. Rangaiah doctrine - Supreme Court ordered that all existing vacancies must be filled strictly in accordance with the 2016 Rules. [Relied on State of Himachal Pradesh & Others v. Raj Kumar & Others, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 680; State of Odisha & Ors. v. Sreepati Ranjan Dash, 2026 INSC 505; Gottumukkala Venkata Krishamraju v. Union of India & Others, (2019) 17 SCC 590; Zile Singh v. State of Haryana & Others, (2004) 8 SCC 1; Paras 20- 30] Jagdish Prasad v.P.M. Manoj Kumar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 596 : 2026 INSC 572

Promotion – Indian Railway Medical Service – Evaluation Criteria & Allocation of Points - Challenge to non-promotion to the post of Chief Medical Director in Higher Administrative Grade (HAG) - The Railway Board's promotion policy dated 22.05.1996 prescribed a whole-number point system for Annual Confidential Report (ACR) gradings - The Selection Committee awarded the appellant a fractional score of 19.5 points despite her five-year ACR grading being uniformly 'Very Good' (which mandated 20 points) – Held that there is no provision in the promotion policy for awarding points in fractions - The assessment was made without an objective basis, and the appellant must be deemed to have secured 20 points based on her consistent 'Very Good' gradings. [Paras 16] Dr. Indira Saranath v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 577 : 2026 INSC 553

Proportionality of Punishment — Doctrine of Proportionality — Dismissal from Service - Dismissal from service is the severest form of penalty which leaves a permanent stigma, impairs future public employment prospects, and devastates the employee and their dependent family members - The mere fact that a proved act falls within the broad head of "misconduct" does not mean dismissal must follow as a matter of course - Where the charges involve internal office indiscipline, insubordination, or minor tampering with office documents, but completely lack any element of financial misappropriation, corruption, moral turpitude, or proven pecuniary loss to the employer, a punishment of dismissal is shockingly disproportionate for an employee with over two decades of unblemished service - The disciplinary authority must carefully evaluate mitigating factors such as length of service, age, past record, and the absence of dishonesty to examine whether a lesser penalty would meet the ends of justice. [Relied on Ranjit Thakur v. Union of India, (1987) 4 SCC 611; B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India, (1995) 6 SCC 749; Chairman-cum-Managing Director, Coal India Ltd. v. Mukul Kumar Choudhuri, AIR 2010 SC 75; Paras 105-111] Surekha Domaji Bele v. Executive Engineer, Testing Division, MSEDCL, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 624 : 2026 INSC 639

Prosecution Subordinate Service Rules, 1978 (Rajasthan) — Rule 12 — Academic Qualification — Deletion of Proviso Allowing Final Year Students — Relevant Date for Eligibility — The Supreme Court held that the relevant date for determining the eligibility, including the minimum essential educational qualification, is the date of submission of the application pursuant to the recruitment advertisement, and not any subsequent stage prior to the examination or interview. Rajasthan Public Service Commission v. Lavanshu Sankhla, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 455 : 2026 INSC 444

Public Employment — Doctrine of Estoppel/Acquiescence — Unemployed Candidate accepting Contractual Appointment under Economic Compulsion — The choices for the unemployed are few - Joining a post on a contractual basis and working for a considerable period does not estop the employee from challenging the patent illegality or arbitrariness in the selection procedure, nor does it wipe out the violation of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. (Paras 6, 10 - 14) Lokendra Kumar Tiwari v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 495 : 2026 INSC 487

Public Employment — Regularisation of Para-Teachers / Contractual Employees — Scheme-based appointments vs. Cadre posts — Para-teachers engaged on a contractual basis under the Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan ("SSA") sought blanket regularisation as permanent Assistant Teachers/Sahayak Acharyas bypassing the statutory recruitment rules — Held that a prayer for regularisation from a scheme post to a State cadre post changes the character of the appointment - A scheme post under the SSA is jointly funded and continues until the scheme ceases, whereas a cadre post is governed by Article 309 of the Constitution of India creating public employment via constitutionally aligned recruitment processes - A direct leap from one to the other, bypassing statutory rules, creates an unsanctioned mode of recruitment which is prohibited - Para-teachers have a right to participation and consideration under the statutory rules, but do not possess an absolute right to blanket regularisation. [Paras 19 - 21] Sunil Kumar Yadav v. State of Jharkhand, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 470 : 2026 INSC 462

Public Employment – Selection Process – Rescheduling of Physical Endurance and Measurement Test (PE&MT) – Effect of Non-Appearance due to Illness - The Supreme Court set aside the directions of the Central Administrative Tribunal (CAT) and the Delhi High Court which had allowed a candidate to reappear for the PE&MT with a subsequent batch - held that when an advertisement explicitly stipulates that the schedule for selection tests is final and cannot be altered under any circumstances, candidates do not have an enforceable right to seek rescheduling based on minor ailments like cold, cough, or fever. Commissioner, Delhi Police v. Uttam Kumar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 328 : 2026 INSC 314

Public Services and Recruitment – Disclosure of Marks for Candidates Outside Zone of Consideration - The TNPSC challenged the direction to individual candidates to reveal the marks of those who failed to fall within the zone of consideration – Held that where a recruitment process has been heavily gridlocked in litigation for over five years, it is in the interest of justice and public interest to disclose individual marks to provide transparency and bring closure to the dispute, provided that the candidates are not granted copies of their physical answer sheets. [Relied on Joint Directors and Central Public Information Officer and Another v. T.R. Rajesh, 2018 INSC 179; Paras 20- 22] S. Senthil Kumaran Bose v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 631 : 2026 INSC 645

Public Services and Recruitment – Persons Studied in Tamil Medium (PSTM) Quota – noted that the TNPSC contested the eligibility of candidates claiming the PSTM quota based on certificates issued by the Heads of their respective educational institutions, arguing for independent verification through the Directorate of Technical Education - Held: A certificate issued by the Head of the Institution certifying that the candidate pursued their education/diploma course in the Tamil medium is sufficient to act upon, especially when the recruitment notification did not prescribe any additional criteria or require a verification letter from the Directorate of Technical Education. [Paras 19-21] S. Senthil Kumaran Bose v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 631 : 2026 INSC 645

Public Services and Recruitment – Selection Process – Experience Criteria – Retrospective Renewal of Workshop Approvals – Persons Studied in Tamil Medium (PSTM) Quota – Disclosure of Marks – Broad-based Level Playing Field - Workshop Experience Criteria & Retrospective Approval - Recruitment to 113 posts of Motor Vehicle Inspector-Grade II by the Tamil Nadu Public Service Commission (TNPSC) pursuant to a 2018 notification became heavily mired in litigation - The Division Bench of the Madras High Court directed a fresh recruitment exercise after verifying candidate experience in petrol and diesel fitted engines, and instructed the State to take a decision on granting retrospective renewals to the respective workshops where candidates gained experience – Held that the High Court's directions were cogent and legally sound - Due to the lack of a uniform policy regarding retrospective workshop approval, decisions left to the sole discretion of the Director were arbitrary - Candidates who gained experience at workshops acting on behalf of the Government, or whose renewal applications were pending, cannot be penalized for administrative delays beyond their control - Directing a conscious decision on retrospective renewal ensures a level playing field, bringing more meritorious candidates into a larger selection pool, which aligns with public interest - No vested right to appointment is created merely by inclusion in a previously revised selection list when the right to participate in the fresh process is preserved. [Paras 15, 16, 17] S. Senthil Kumaran Bose v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 631 : 2026 INSC 645

Qualification - A person with higher qualification cannot be appointed to a post exclusively reserved for candidates with lower educational qualifications - Suppression of higher qualification renders appointment non-est. The Supreme Court held that when a post is specifically earmarked for candidates possessing lower educational qualifications (e.g., up to 10th standard), a candidate who possesses higher qualifications and suppresses the same to secure appointment deprives genuinely eligible and deserving candidates of the opportunity. Such an appointment is liable to be cancelled. The State, as a model employer, is justified in reserving certain posts for less educated persons so that they are not required to compete with more highly qualified candidates. Permitting over-qualified candidates to occupy such posts would defeat the very object of the reservation. General Manager (Hr) v. K. Poovarasan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 595 : 2026 INSC 581

Quantum of Punishment — Amalgam of Penalties — Double Punishment for Single Misconduct - A disciplinary authority acts illegally and without jurisdiction if it creates an amalgam of separate substantive penalties for the same misconduct unless expressly authorized by the rules - Where an employee is visited with the ultimate penalty of dismissal, an additional direction in the same order treating the entire past period of suspension pending enquiry as a substantive "punishment" is impermissible and cannot operate as an independent or additional penalty - The monetary and service consequences of the suspension period must strictly be decided only in terms of the regulatory provisions governing regularizations (Regulation 88(a)(v)), which explicitly protect subsistence allowance already paid or payable. [Relied on Union of India v. S.C. Parashar, (2006) 3 SCC 167; Paras 84-89] Surekha Domaji Bele v. Executive Engineer, Testing Division, MSEDCL, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 624 : 2026 INSC 639

Quantum of Punishment — Doctrine of Proportionality and Equality — Imposing the harshest punishment (dismissal) on a subordinate for complying with a wrongful order, while the superior officer who issued the order receives a lenient penalty (severe displeasure), is arbitrary and violates the principle of equality - Following the principle that 100% back wages require an affidavit stating the employee was not re-employed, and in the absence of such material on record, the Court awarded 50% back wages from the date of illegal dismissal until superannuation. [Relied on Union of India v. Harjeet Singh Sandhu (2001) 5 SCC 593; Yuvraj Laxmilal Kanther v. State of Maharashtra 2025 SCC OnLine SC 520; Sengara Singh v. State of Punjab (1983) 4 SCC 225; Paras 37 – 41] Ex. Sqn. Ldr. R. Sood v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 376 : 2026 INSC 366

Recruitment – Basic Eligibility and Medical Fitness – Police Constable – Suppression of Material Facts / Suppressio Veri and Suggestio Falsi – Lack of eligibility goes to the root of the matter – An appointment wrongly made cannot be sustained once the factum of ineligibility comes to light – A candidate claiming parity or applying for consideration of their case for appointment must clearly disclose and spell out all material factors, including medical fitness - The Supreme Court set aside the judgments of the High Court and the State Public Services Tribunal which had interfered with the termination of a Police Constable who suffered from a 'knock knee deformity' - The respondent's initial selection in 2005 was cancelled in 2007 after a Medical Board found him medically unfit due to knock knees - After a series of litigations arising out of en-masse cancellations of the recruitment drive, the respondent sought and obtained provisional reinstatement in 2013 by claiming parity with another candidate (Nitin Kumar Upadhyay), without disclosing his own medical unfitness - Supreme Court observed that the respondent was well aware that his appointment had previously been cancelled on the very ground of being medically unfit - Failing to disclose this to the appointing authority amounts to deliberate suppression (suppressio veri and suggestio falsi) because such disclosure would have disentitled him from even being considered for the post - Supreme Court rejected the technical argument that the departmental proceedings incorrectly cited 'colour blindness' instead of 'knock knees' - It held that a technical defect in the charges does not permit a person with one disqualifying medical deformity to join service merely because they do not suffer from a different deformity listed in the notice - Lack of basic eligibility goes to the root of the matter, and an appointment wrongly made cannot be sustained once ineligibility on the relevant date comes to light. [Relied on Vishnu Vardhan v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1505; Paras 18-22] State of Uttar Pradesh v. Ajay Kumar Malik, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 399 : 2026 INSC 394

Recruitment – Integrated Child Development Scheme (ICDS) – Kerala Social Welfare Subordinate Services – Selection to the post of Supervisor – Eligibility of Graduate Anganwadi Workers to compete in the 29% quota reserved for SSLC holders - Special Rules for the Kerala Social Welfare Subordinate Services, 2010 – Amendment effective from 01.01.2014 – Distribution of Vacancies – Held that the 11% ratio carved out specifically for Anganwadi Workers with a graduate degree does not exclude such graduates from applying under the 29% quota earmarked for Anganwadi Workers with SSLC and 10 years' experience - held that graduates naturally possess the lower SSLC qualification; therefore, unless the rules expressly prohibit higher qualifications or exclude graduates from the general pool, they are eligible to compete in both categories. Shiny C.J. v. Shalini Sreenivasan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 247 : 2026 INSC 242 : AIR 2026 SC 1452

Recruitment – Judicial Review of Answer Keys – Ambiguity in Multiple Choice Questions (MCQs) – Selection for the post of Law Officer – Dispute over the correct answer to a question regarding the immunity of the Ninth Schedule of the Constitution from judicial review – Recruiting body considered "Ninth Schedule" (Option B) as correct, while the respondent claimed "None of the above" (Option D) was correct based on the 'Basic Structure' doctrine – Held: When High Court Judges themselves hold divergent views on the interpretation of Constitutional provisions and Supreme Court precedents spanning decades, law graduates appearing for a recruitment exam cannot be expected to reach a singular "correct" conclusion by such complex interpretation – Both candidates found to be deserving of accommodation as both answers could be considered correct from different perspectives. Charan Preet Singh v. Municipal Corporation Chandigarh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 253 : 2026 INSC 248 : AIR 2026 SC 1436

Recruitment – Karnataka Recruitment of Gazetted Probationers (Appointment by Competitive Examinations) Rules, 1997 – Additional/Waiting List – Key Principle – Absence of Waiting List – Under the 1997 Rules, there is no provision for the preparation or operation of an additional or waiting list - A vacancy arising from a selected candidate's failure to report for duty or complete pre-appointment formalities must be treated as a fresh vacancy for subsequent recruitment – Noted that once a select list is exhausted or finalized as per the statutory rules, its operation cannot be enlarged to fill vacancies caused by non-joining – Appeal allowed. [Paras 16-21] State of Karnataka v. Santhosh Kumar C., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 282 : 2026 INSC 276

Recruitment – Karnataka Recruitment of Gazetted Probationers (Appointment by Competitive Examinations) Rules, 1997 – Additional/Waiting List – The Supreme Court set aside a High Court judgment that directed the State to consider a candidate for a post left vacant due to the non-joining of a selected candidate - held that when recruitment rules specifically define the contours of a select list and do not provide for a reserve or additional list, a post left unfilled cannot be claimed as a right by the next candidate in line. State of Karnataka v. Santhosh Kumar C., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 282 : 2026 INSC 276

Recruitment – Reserve List/Waiting List – Validity Period – Locus Standi of Public Service Commission (PSC) – The Supreme Court set aside the judgments of the Rajasthan High Court which had directed the appointment of wait-listed candidates after the statutory expiry of the reserve list – Supreme Court noted down following points- i. Locus Standi of PSC to Appeal - held that the Rajasthan Public Service Commission (RPSC) has the locus standi to maintain a writ appeal even if the State (Appointing Authority) does not challenge the order - As a constitutional body under Article 315, the PSC is a "person aggrieved" when judicial directions mandate recommendations that bypass statutory rules or its independent advisory role; ii. Nature of Waiting List: A waiting list is not a perennial source of recruitment and does not confer an indefeasible right to appointment - Its purpose is to address contingencies such as non-joining of selected candidates within the same recruitment cycle; iii. Operation and Expiry of Reserve List (Rule 24/Rule 21): Under Rule 24 of the Rajasthan Legal State and Subordinate Services Rules, 1981, and Rule 21 of the Rajasthan Agriculture Subordinate Service Rules, 1978, the reserve list remains valid for only six months from the date the original list is forwarded to the Appointing Authority; iv. held that the period of validity must be calculated from the date of recommendation, not from the date a vacancy arises due to non-joining; v. Mandamus cannot be issued to "pick up" names from a list that has already expired by the time the writ petition is filed – Supreme Court rejected the plea that because some candidates were recommended after the expiry of the list, others must also be recommended - Article 14 constitutes a positive concept; a court cannot mandate the State to perpetuate an illegality or irregularity committed in favour of others – Appeals allowed. [Relied on U.P. Public Service Commission v. Surendra Kumar, (2018) 10 SCC 535; A.P. Public Service Commission v. Baloji Badhavath, (2009) 5 SCC 1; Tinku v. State of Haryana, 2024 INSC 72; Paras 46-90] Rajasthan Public Service Commission v. Yati Jain, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 52 : 2026 INSC 64

Recruitment and Selection — Migration from Reserved to General Category — Teachers Recruitment — The principal issue is whether candidates belonging to reserved categories, who have availed relaxation in a qualifying examination (TET) to become eligible for the main selection process (TAIT), are entitled to migrate to the open/unreserved category on the basis of merit secured in the main examination - Held - The requirement of obtaining 60% marks in the Teachers Eligibility Test (TET) is not an essential eligibility condition, as the NCTE guidelines permit the appropriate Government to grant relaxation to reserved category candidates - Relaxation in qualifying marks for an eligibility test merely creates a "level playing field" and does not amount to a concession in the actual selection process - If a reserved category candidate secures higher marks in the final merit list (TAIT) than the last selected candidate in the general category, they are entitled to be adjusted against the general category - The High Court's view that such candidates are ineligible for the open category is erroneous. [Relied on Jitendra Kumar Singh & Anr. v. State of U.P. & Ors. (2010) 3 SCC 119; Vikas Sankhala & Ors. v. Vikas Kumar Agarwal & Ors. (2017) 1 SCC 350; Paras 22-32] Chaya v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 281 : 2026 INSC 277

Recruitment and Selection – Right to Appointment – Doctrine of Legitimate Expectation – Change in Policy – The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's direction to appoint candidates who completed the Ayurvedic Nursing Training Course from Government institutions without a fresh selection process - held that mere admission to a training course does not confer an automatic right to appointment, especially when the policy environment has shifted – noted that respondents claimed a right to appointment based on a decades-old practice where all 20 candidates from the sole Government college were absorbed into service - Supreme Court noted that since 2012, the State permitted private institutions to impart the same training, leading to an exponential increase in candidates (from 20 seats to 311 institutions by 2019-20) – Held that the doctrine of legitimate expectation cannot be applied where a substantial shift in circumstances and limited vacancies make the earlier practice impossible to sustain. State of Uttar Pradesh v. Bhawana Mishra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 26 : 2026 INSC 38

Recruitment Process – Judicial Interference – Rejection of Online Applications – Held: In large-scale public recruitment where applications are processed via software, errors in application or supporting documents inevitably lead to rejection - Courts should not ordinarily entertain challenges to such rejections as they risk stalling the recruitment process for thousands of aspirants. [Relied on UPSC v. Gaurav Singh & Ors. (2024) 2 SCC 605; Divya v. Union of India and Others (2024) 1 SCC 448; Paras 20-28] Poonam Dwivedi v State of U.P., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 359 : 2026 INSC 351: AIR 2026 SC 1860

Recruitment to Police Force – Criminal Antecedents and "Honourable Acquittal" – Scope of Judicial Review – The Supreme Court set aside the High Court Division Bench's order which had directed the State to treat a candidate's acquittal as "honourable" and reconsider him for the post of constable (driver) - The respondent was previously charged with serious offences involving moral turpitude, including kidnapping and rape (Sections 363, 366, 376(2)(c) IPC), but was acquitted by the trial court by being given the "benefit of doubt". State of Madhya Pradesh v. Rajkumar Yadav, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 234 : 2026 INSC 225 : AIR 2026 SC 1471

Regularisation — Validity of State Notifications — Group 'B', 'C', and 'D' employees — Distinction between "Irregular" and "Illegal" appointments — The Supreme Court examined the validity of Haryana Government Notifications dated 16.06.2014, 18.06.2014, and 07.07.2014, which sought to regularise contractual/ad hoc employees – i. Validity of Notifications dated 16.06.2014 and 18.06.2014: Supreme Court held these notifications valid as they were intended to grant benefits to employees who were eligible under the 1996 policy but were left out due to its administrative withdrawal - Since these employees occupied sanctioned posts and met prescribed qualifications at the time of initial engagement, their appointments were "irregular" but not "illegal"- The High Court's quashing of these two notifications was set aside; ii. Invalidity of Notifications dated 07.07.2014: Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision to strike down the 07.07.2014 notifications - These policies were found arbitrary as they sought to regularise employees engaged without any public advertisement or interview, and utilized a future cut-off date (31.12.2018), which bypassed regular recruitment processes. (Paragraph 21); iii. Protection under Article 142: Despite striking down the 07.07.2014 notifications, the Court invoked its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution of India to protect the services of those ad hoc employees who have already secured benefits and remain in service - to balance equity, such employees are to be placed at the lowest pay scale admissible to their posts. [Relied on State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (2006) INSC 216; State of Punjab v. Jagjit Singh (2016) INSC 993; State of Karnataka v. M.L. Kesari (2010) INSC 469; Paras 18 – 25] Madan Singh v. State of Haryana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 390 : 2026 INSC 379

Regularisation and Permanent Status – Non-compliance with Final Judicial Directions – Scope of Subsequent Proceedings – Model Employer Guidelines - Finality of Judicial Orders & Limited Scope of Subsequent Review - When a judicial direction (ordering the creation of posts and regularisation of casual labourers on a permanent footing) has attained finality up to the Supreme Court, the scope of consideration in subsequent proceedings is strictly confined to examining compliance with those directions - It is wholly impermissible for the High Court in a subsequent round of litigation to reopen the issue on merits, re-examine whether the services could be regularised, or rely on original selection defects to deny relief - The obligation of the State to act as a model employer flows directly from the guarantee of equality enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution, which strikes at arbitrariness and mandates fairness, non-discrimination, and reasoned decision-making - The State cannot dilute final judicial mandates or treat a segment of its workforce especially those contributing indirectly to national endeavours of paramount importance with indifference or arbitrariness. [Relied on State of Karnataka v. Umadevi, (2006) 4 SCC 1; Paras 10-29] R. Iyyappan v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 441 : 2026 INSC 431

Regularization of Ad Hoc Employees – Doctrine of Parity – Artificial Breaks in Service – The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's dismissal of the Appellants' claim for regularization of services - The Appellants, appointed as peons and clerks on an ad hoc basis in 1995-96, were denied regularization by the State on the grounds of non-continuous service due to breaks ranging from 5 to 187 days - Supreme Court found that the State had regularized 46 other similarly placed employees who had service breaks ranging from 64 to 334 days periods significantly longer than those of the Appellants - held that the State cannot selectively deny the application of policy instructions to identically situated persons without cogent justification. [Para 17-19] Prem Chand v. State of Punjab, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 394

Regularization of Casual Workers - Parity in Treatment - Irregular vs. Illegal Appointment - The Appellants, engaged as daily-wage workers (Sweepers and Cook) with the Income Tax Department since the 1990s, sought regularization of their services - The Tribunal and High Court denied relief, citing non-fulfillment of the 10-year continuous service criteria as of 10.04.2006 per the Umadevi (3) judgment - Held: The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgment, noting that the Appellants were similarly situated to other daily-wage workers whose services were already regularized under Court orders – Noted that "irregular" appointments (where procedures like interviews were followed) should be distinguished from "illegal" backdoor entries - It observed that the perennial nature of the work, evidenced by subsequent outsourcing, necessitated regular posts - Denying regularization by misapplying Umadevi (3) to long-serving employees performing indispensable duties is contrary to equity - Services ordered to be regularized from 01.07.2006 with consequential benefits – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Ravi Verma and Ors. Vs. Union of India and Ors. (Civil Appeal Nos. 2795-2796 of 2018); Raman Kumar and Ors. Vs. Union of India and Ors. (Civil Appeal No. 4146 of 2023); Jaggo Vs. Union of India and Ors. (2024 INSC 1034); Paras 7-10] Pawan Kumar v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 159 : 2026 INSC 156 : AIR 2026 SC 997

Relief – One-time Measure to Prevent Protracted Litigation – Supreme Court noted this was the third round of litigation and a fourth round (fresh Selection Board) would not yield equitable results due to inherently skewed ACRs – Supreme Court modified AFT directions to grant PC directly to specific categories: (a) SSCWOs inducted prior to January 2009; (b) SSCWOs inducted after January 2009 in branches other than Law, Education, and Naval Architecture; and (c) Male SSCOs barred by initial terms, subject to medical and disciplinary clearance – Released officers within these categories deemed to have completed 20 years of service for pensionary benefits. [Relied on Union of India v. Annie Nagaraja (2020) 13 SCC 1; Lt. Col. Nitisha & Ors v. Union of India (2021) 15 SCC 125; Amit Kumar Sharma v. Union of India (2023) 20 SCC 486; Shankarsan Dash v. Union of India (1991) 3 SCC 47; Para 54-56] Yogendra Kumar Singh v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 285 : 2026 INSC 282

Relief – Superannuation during Pendency – Held that since the appellant has reached the age of superannuation, reinstatement is no longer possible - The High Court, on fresh consideration, must determine: (i) whether the Tribunal's interference with the disciplinary action was justified, and (ii) the appellant's entitlement to back wages and retiral benefits – Appeal allowed. [Paras 9-11] Hemlata Eknath Pise v. Shubham Bahu Uddeshiya Sanstha Waddhamna, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 177 : 2026 INSC 147

Reopening of Concluded Litigation – Delay and Laches – "Fence-sitters" – The Supreme Court dismissed Special Leave Petitions filed by primary school teachers seeking to revive a service dispute that had attained finality over a decade ago - The petitioners sought directions similar to a 2021 High Court order which directed the consideration of a representation for higher grade pay scales - held that the petitioners, whose services were terminated in 1994 and whose prior challenges were dismissed in 2009 and 2011, were not "identically situated" to the 2021 petitioner who was still in service. Damor Nanabhai Manabhai v. State of Gujarat, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 104

Reservation – Horizontal Reservation – Mobility from Reserved to Unreserved (Open) Category –The Supreme Court set aside the Calcutta High Court Division Bench judgment which held that an Unreserved PWD vacancy must be filled by an Unreserved candidate if available, regardless of more meritorious PWD candidates from reserved social categories - Held, the "Unreserved" or "Open" category does not constitute a separate communal or social category - It represents an open pool available to all candidates irrespective of their social category (SC/ST/OBC), provided they satisfy the specific criteria of the horizontal reservation (e.g., PWD-LV) - Reaffirmed that meritorious candidates belonging to reserved social categories (SC/ST/OBC) who also fall under a horizontal reservation category (like PWD) are entitled to be appointed against the Unreserved horizontal quota based on their merit - A less meritorious candidate from the Unreserved category cannot "steal a march" over a more meritorious reserved category candidate for an Unreserved post. West Bengal State Electricity Transmission Co. Ltd v. Dipendu Biswas, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 336 : 2026 INSC 330

Reservation – Purpose and Function of Roster/Register – Supreme Court clarified that a reservation roster or register is an administrative, post-based instrument maintained to record cadre composition and monitor representation over time - It is not a parallel selection mechanism used during the recruitment process to displace candidates who secure an unreserved place on their own merit – Noted that the roster defines the number of vacant posts for advertisement and ensures that the lawful quota for specific categories is not exceeded within the cadre. [Relied on Rajasthan High Court & Anr. v. Rajat Yadav & Ors. (Civil Appeal No. 14112 of 2024); Indra Sawhney v. Union of India (1992 Supp (3) SCC 217; Saurav Yadav v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2021) 4 SCC 542; Paras 27 – 34] Airport Authority of India v. Sham Krishna B, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 63 : 2026 INSC 69 : AIR 2026 SC 463

Retrospective Promotion – Retiral Benefits vs. Arrears of Salary - Appellant retired from service during the pendency of litigation – Held that where an employee is found to have been treated unfairly in the promotional evaluation, but the original service records are unavailable due to inadvertent weeding out, granting dynamic monetary relief like arrears of salary on a 'no work, no pay' relaxation may not be feasible - the ends of justice are met by directing the grant of notional promotion from the date her juniors were promoted, along with a mandatory re-fixation of pension and payment of retiral arrears. [Relied on Prabhat Ranjan Singh v. R.K. Kushwaha, 2018 INSC 796; Dev Dutt v. Union of India, 2008 INSC 630; distinguished from Union of India v. Chaman Rana, 2018 INSC 230; Paras 18, 19] Dr. Indira Saranath v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 577 : 2026 INSC 553

Retrospective Refusal – Held, that a communication refusing voluntary retirement made after the expiry of the notice period and after the employee has already ceased work cannot be given retrospective effect to undo a retirement that has already become effective by operation of law - any chargesheet issued or dismissal order passed after the date of such deemed retirement is illegal and without jurisdiction. [Relied on Dinesh Chandra Sangma v. State of Assam (1977) 4 SCC 441; B.J. Shelat v. State of Gujarat (1978) 2 SCC 202; State of Haryana v. S.K. Singhal (1999) 4 SCC 293; Tek Chand v. Dile Ram (2001) 3 SCC 290; UCO Bank v. Rajinder Lal Capoor (2007) 6 SCC 694 & (2008) 5 SCC 257; Paras 30 - 45] UCO Bank v. S.K. Shrivastava, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 340 : 2026 INSC 328

Reversion / Repatriation – Scope of Judicial Review of Administrative Discretion - Constitution of India, 1950 – Article 311(2) – ICAR functions as an autonomous Society whose recruitment and service conditions are governed by its own rules and bye-laws—hence, Article 311 is not attracted – A transfer, reversion, or repatriation is ordinarily an incidence of service and cannot per se be considered punitive - Judicial review of administrative discretion is narrowly confined to evaluating the decision-making process rather than the merits or fairness of the conclusion itself - It must strictly assess whether the action was arbitrary, irrational, tainted by mala fides, or colourable, particularly regarding whether it imposes penal or stigmatic consequences without due procedure - Allegations of mala fides must be supported by clear, cogent, and concrete material, and cannot be entertained merely on conjectures or the sequence of events. [Paras 9, 10, 11-16] Sadachari Singh Tomar v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 432 : 2026 INSC 427

Salary Payment and Creation of Posts – Private Aided vs. Self-Financed Schemes – Respondents (lecturers) sought government salary payments and post sanctions for subjects run under a self-financed scheme - The High Court had repeatedly issued "reconsideration" directions without deciding the existence of a legal right, leading to a "Second Season" of episodic litigation spanning 16 years - Held: Constitutional and statutory remedies are not for academic discourse; if a case deserves relief, it must be granted "then and there, unflinchingly". Mahendra Prasad Agarwal v. Arvind Kumar Singh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 195 : 2026 INSC 175

Selection and Recruitment – Migration of Reserved Category Candidates to Unreserved Category – Own Merit – The Supreme Court reiterated the settled legal position that a candidate belonging to a reserved category (SC/ST/OBC) who secures marks higher than or equal to the cut-off marks of the General (Unreserved) category, without availing any concession or relaxation, must be treated as a General category candidate and adjusted against unreserved posts - Such candidates are "own merit" candidates and their selection does not count against the quota earmarked for the backward classes - Migration or "Merit Induced Shift" of reserved category candidates to the open category is a manifestation of the principle of equality - The "Open Category" is not a quota but is available to all candidates regardless of their social category, provided they meet the criterion of merit. Airport Authority of India v. Sham Krishna B, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 63 : 2026 INSC 69 : AIR 2026 SC 463

Selection Criteria – Criteria Appointments and Career-Enhancing Courses – Supreme Court found that SSCWOs were systematically denied criteria appointments and access to important courses (e.g., Junior Command Course) due to their perceived lack of a "future" in the Army - While these may not have a high numerical weightage in computerized evaluation, they significantly influence the "Value Judgement" component (5 marks), which often becomes determinative when officers miss the cut-off by narrow margins. Lt Col Pooja Pal v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 283 : 2026 INSC 281

Seniority from Initial Joining - Administrative Instructions vs. Statutory Regulations - Supreme Court clarified that the period of training is an integral part of service and must be counted for seniority - Regulation 97 specifies that seniority is determined by the rank in the list of approved candidates, and the date of joining duty marks the commencement of the relationship with the service, regardless of whether the candidate is on a consolidated pay during training or a regular scale during probation - rejected the application of the "cyclic order" (Proviso to Regulation 97) because the direct recruits were selected/appointed in 2000 and 2001, while the internal candidates were promoted in May 2002 - Since they were not recruited in the same calendar year, the direct recruits appointed earlier maintain their seniority over those appointed later - noted that any Board Proceedings (BPs) or terms in appointment letters that run contrary to the statutory Regulations (10(9) and 87) cannot override the legal position that seniority counts from the first date of joining for training. M. Thanigivelu v. Tamil Nadu Electricity Board, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 233 : 2026 INSC 229

Service Jurisprudence – Deemed Permanency and Substantive Appointment – Supreme Court ruled that instructors continuing for over ten years in a row against mandatory student-teacher ratio requirements acquire a degree of permanency - Even if originally contractual, these appointments are treated as "substantive in character" because they were made through a public selection process and the nature of work is permanent and integral to the institution - The PAB is the sole central authority with financial powers to approve budgets and fix honoraria under the scheme - Once the PAB approved a proposal to pay ₹17,000/- per month, the State Executive Committee had no authority to unilaterally reduce or ignore this determination. U.P. Junior High School Council Instructor Welfare Association v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 110

Service Jurisprudence – Delay and Laches – Continuing Cause of Action – Arrears Limitation – Held - Pensionary benefits constitute a recurring and continuing cause of action - A substantive claim for pension cannot be rejected or defeated solely on the ground of delay and laches - the grant of financial arrears must be balanced with settled principles of limitation; where the claim was not raised prior to approaching the court, arrears shall remain restricted to a period of three years and two months preceding the filing of the Original Application before the Tribunal. [Relied on Jagrit Mazdoor Union (Regd.) and Others v. Mahanagar Telephone Nigam Ltd. and Another, 1990 Supp SCC 113; Yashwant Hari Katakkar v. Union of India and Others, (1996) 7 SCC 113; M.L. Patil (Dead) through LRs v. State of Goa and Another, (2023) 1 SCC 660; Vinod Kumar and Others v. Union of India and Others, (2024) 9 SCC 327; Jaggo v. Union of India and Others, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3826; Paras 79-83] Bhikhani Devi v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 582 : 2026 INSC 612

Service Jurisprudence – State as a Model Employer – Constitution of India, 1950 – Articles 14, 38, 39, and 43 – Equity and Social Justice – Held that long-serving employees who have rendered continuous, uninterrupted service spanning decades and have been functionally assimilated into the regular framework cannot be retained in a precarious status to deny them social security - The distinction between temporary and permanent employment becomes substantively illusory when the nature of duties performed is identical to regular employees - The State, as a model employer, is bound by constitutional mandates to ensure fair conditions of work and economic justice. [Paras 35-40] Bhikhani Devi v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 582 : 2026 INSC 612

Service Rules – Madhya Pradesh Cooperative Societies Act, 1960 – Rule 19-A – Proviso to Rule 19-A expressly allows for relaxation in educational qualifications for promotion on the basis of "special experience/competence/seniority" - The appellant, having 28 years of experience and a clean track record, was unanimously recommended for the post of Society Manager - The Registrar's cryptic rejection without assigning reasons was deemed unsustainable. Kamal Prasad Dubey v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 365 : 2026 INSC 353

Seventh Central Pay Commission – Para 7.4.13 (iv) (b) – Non-Functional Upgradation (NFU) to Level 9 – Eligibility of Junior Engineers – The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's direction to grant NFU to Level 9 (Grade Pay of ₹5,400) to Junior Engineers (JEs) in the Border Road Organization (BRO) who completed four years of service in Level 8 (Grade Pay of ₹4,800) - rejected the Union's contention that NFU is only applicable to those whose entry-level Grade Pay was ₹4,800 - It held that introducing an "entry-level" requirement constitutes adding an extra condition not found in the plain reading of the recommendations - The only condition precedent for the grant of ₹5,400 Grade Pay is the completion of four years in the Grade Pay of ₹4,800, regardless of whether that level was reached through promotion or the MACP Scheme - Noted that the Central Pay Commission's recommendation cannot be loosely construed to deny a benefit to an employee by creating an additional condition to deny the benefit of the pay commission – Appeal dismissed. [Paras 11-13] Union of India v. Sunil Kumar Rai, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 323 : 2026 INSC 311

Short Service Commission — Grant of Permanent Commission (PC) — Indian Air Force — Retrospective evaluation based on Annual Confidential Reports (ACRs) — Validity of Minimum Performance Criteria — Pregnancy and Medical Category - Key Findings - i. Structural Distortion in Evaluation: ACRs authored in an environment where SSCOs had no future in the service are "structurally distorted" and cannot be deployed to their disadvantage when they are suddenly placed in a competitive fray for PC; ii. Arbitrary Implementation of Policy: The hurried implementation of Human Resource Policy (HRP) 01/2019, which introduced new criteria like "Categorisation" and "Mandatory In-Service Courses" (MISCs) without providing a reasonable gestation period, deprived officers of a meaningful opportunity to meet eligibility requirements; iii. Pregnancy and Gender Equality: The failure to accommodate officers who lost a round of consideration due to a temporary lowering of medical category on account of pregnancy amounts to arbitrariness - The choice to become a parent cannot be equated with an unwillingness to pursue professional advancement. [Relied on Yogendra Kumar Singh v. Union of India and Ors (Civil Appeal No. 14681/2024); AU Tayyaba v. Union of India (2023) 5 SCC 688; Lt. Col. Nitisha & Ors v. Union of India & Ors (2021) 15 SCC 125; Paras 14-17, 26-32, 35-39] Wg Cdr Sucheta EDN v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 284 : 2026 INSC 280

Short Service Commission — Grant of Permanent Commission (PC) — Indian Air Force — Retrospective evaluation based on Annual Confidential Reports (ACRs) — Validity of Minimum Performance Criteria — Pregnancy and Medical Category - The Supreme Court has held that evaluating Short Service Commission Officers (SSCOs) for Permanent Commission based on ACRs authored during a period when they were ineligible for PC is inherently unfair and arbitrary - Supreme Court held that the evaluative lens applied by assessing officers is conditioned by the available career trajectory; thus, reports intended only to assess suitability for short-term extension cannot be retrospectively treated as reliable indicators for long-term retention or advanced leadership potential - While declining reinstatement for released officers due to operational effectiveness, Supreme Court directed that SSCOs considered in the 2019–2021 Boards be deemed to have completed 20 years of substantive qualifying service for pensionary benefits as a one-time measure - For future Boards, the Air Force must disclose vacancies and detailed evaluation criteria prior to the selection process. Wg Cdr Sucheta EDN v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 284 : 2026 INSC 280

State Apathy and Litigation Delay – Award of Costs – Mandate for Expeditious Disposal – Supreme Court expressed deep anguish over gross administrative apathy where an employee, eligible for appointment in 1997, had to litigate for nearly three decades (until 2026) to secure his rightful cadre allocation - Noting that the appellant spent 22 years fighting the State instead of being close to his cognitively disabled son for family support, the Court awarded exemplary costs of ₹1,00,000/- to be paid by the State of Uttar Pradesh - to tackle the systemic issue of long-pending service disputes pushing employees close to superannuation, Supreme Court requested the Chief Justice of the High Court to ascertain such pending cases and distribute them across benches for expeditious disposal. [Paras 11, 12, and 13] Rajendra Singh Bora v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 412 : 2026 INSC 404

State Bank of India Employees' Pension Fund Rules, 1955 - Computation of Qualifying Service under Rules 7 and 20 - Applying Rules 7 and 20, Supreme Court held that pensionable service is reckoned from the date of confirmation (admission to the fund) and not the initial date of appointment - the appellant's service (17.02.1979 to 12.12.1998) totalled 19 years, 9 months, and 25 days, failing to meet the mandatory 20-year threshold. K.G. Seshadri v. Trustees of State Bank of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 350 : 2026 INSC 333

State Bank of India Employees' Pension Fund Rules, 1955 - Eligibility for Pension under Rule 22(i)(c) — Voluntary Retirement Requirement - The appellant sought pension under Rule 22(i)(c), which requires 20 years of pensionable service and retirement at the employee's request in writing – Noted that the appellant ineligible as his cessation of service was not "voluntary retirement" but a "voluntary abandonment of service" declared by the Bank following his unauthorized absence from 24.01.1998 to 11.12.1998 and failure to respond to notices. K.G. Seshadri v. Trustees of State Bank of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 350 : 2026 INSC 333

State Bank of India Employees' Pension Fund Rules, 1955 - Eligibility under Rule 22(i)(a) — Age and Service Criteria Under Rule 22(i)(a) - an employee must complete 20 years of service and attain 50 years of age – Held that appellant failed both conditions, as his service was less than 20 years and he had not reached the age of 50 at the time of cessation - Even if the probation period were included, the claim would fail due to the age requirement. [Relied on Assistant General Manager, State Bank of India & Ors. vs. Radhey Shyam Pandey, 2020 (6) SCC 438; Rugmini Ganesh w/o Ganesh Raman Iyer vs. State Bank of India, 2018 SCC OnLine Bom 3884; Paras 17-32] K.G. Seshadri v. Trustees of State Bank of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 350 : 2026 INSC 333

State Bank of India Employees' Pension Fund Rules, 1955; Rule 22(i)(a), Rule 22(i)(c), Rule 20 and Rule 7 — Industrial Disputes Act, 1947; Section 33C(2) — Entitlement to Pension — Voluntary Abandonment vs. Voluntary Retirement — Qualifying Service - Maintainability of Claim under Section 33C(2) of ID Act - The Supreme Court noted that while the Labour Court and High Court dismissed the appellant's petition at the threshold on the technical ground of non-maintainability holding that proceedings under Section 33C(2) are executionary in nature and cannot adjudicate disputed pensionary rights the Court chose to decide the matter on its merits. K.G. Seshadri v. Trustees of State Bank of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 350 : 2026 INSC 333

State Reorganisation – Cadre Reallocation Criteria – Exceptions for Medical Hardships – The broad principles governing the allocation of State cadre employees to successor States primarily include option, followed by domicile (Home District), and lastly by inclusion of the junior-most personnel in the reverse order of seniority - Department of Personnel and Training (DoPT) guidelines carve out specific exceptions to facilitate allocation based on option for certain vulnerable classes, including handicapped persons and defined medical hardship cases - The exception for "Mental Illness" explicitly covers the employee or their "family" (which includes dependent children) - Where a candidate's child is cognitively challenged, the allocation must be governed strictly by the option exercised by the employee. [Paras 8, 9, and 10] Rajendra Singh Bora v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 412 : 2026 INSC 404

Status of Railway Servants – Civil Post under the Union – Article 309 and Article 311 of the Constitution of India – Whether a railway servant ceases to be a member of the civil service of the Union merely because separate service rules govern their recruitment, conduct, control, and pension – Held that No, A railway servant remains a person holding a civil post in connection with the affairs of the Union under the administrative control of the Central Government - The delegation of powers to the Railway Board does not separate the status of a railway servant from that of a Central Government employee, as the Railway Board functions as the Government of India itself for railway administration - Service under the Railway Board is service under the Central Government. [Paras 42, 43] Bency John v.Kerala State Electricity Board, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 576 : 2026 INSC 562

Superannuation Age of Judicial Officers – Jharkhand Superior Judicial Service (Recruitment, Appointment and Conditions of Service) Rules, 2001 – Article 233 and 309 of the Constitution of India – Petitioner, a Principal District and Sessions Judge, sought enhancement of retirement age to 61 or 62 years - Held, enhancement of retirement age requires a policy decision and consequential amendment in Service Rules - While some States have enhanced the age to 61/62 years to match government departments, such issues should not be resolved through judicial orders for individual benefit - A holistic view is required by stakeholders to ensure parity across States - Writ Petition under Article 32 not entertained. Ranjeet Kumar v. State of Jharkhand, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 123

Supreme Court Observations - The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgment, noting several procedural lapses – i. No Admission of Guilt - rejected the respondent's argument that an "evasive" reply constituted an admission under the Evidence Act - A departmental charge-sheet is not a plaint, and the burden of proof lies strictly on the department unless the charge is categorically admitted; ii. Mandatory Oral Enquiry - Relying on Chamoli District Co-operative Bank Limited, Supreme Court held that under Regulation 85 of the 1975 Regulations (and Rule 84 of the 1980 Service Rules), it is mandatory to hold an oral enquiry when charges are refuted; iii. Order of Evidence - The department must lead evidence first to prove the charges before asking the delinquent for a defense. In this case, no witnesses were produced to prove the documents or the charges, rendering the enquiry "vitiated" - The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the dismissal and recovery orders - The Federation was granted liberty to conduct a de novo enquiry within six months - If no such enquiry is held, the appellant is entitled to reinstatement with full benefits and arrears of salary. Jai Prakash Saini v. Managing Director U.P. Cooperative Federation Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 315 : 2026 INSC 305

Suspension — Prolonged Suspension and Entitlement to Subsistence Allowance — Continuous Reporting Conditions - Suspension is not an indefinite condition of civil and economic disability - Under the MSEDCL Service Regulations, any suspension continuing beyond six months mandates a formal review and recommendation by a higher authority - In the absence of an order on record reviewing or validly continuing the suspension beyond the initial six months, an employer cannot perpetually rely on a week-to-week office reporting condition to mechanically deny subsistence allowance for a prolonged suspension spanning nearly eleven years - While non-compliance with the reporting condition may be scrutinized for the initial regulatory period of six months, the employee is legally eligible for subsistence allowance for the remaining post-six-month period up to the date of final dismissal. [Relied on State of Maharashtra v. Chandrabhan Tale, (1983) 3 SCC 387; O.P. Gupta v. Union of India, (1987) 4 SCC 328; Paras 58-73] Surekha Domaji Bele v. Executive Engineer, Testing Division, MSEDCL, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 624 : 2026 INSC 639

Termination of Service – Validity of Degrees – Prospective Application of Judicial Declaration – Protection of Students' Careers - The appellants were appointed as librarians by the State of Bihar in 2010 based on Bachelor of Library Science (B.Lib) degrees obtained in 2004 from the University of Technology and Science, Raipur - This university was established under the Chhattisgarh Niji Kshetra Vishwavidyalaya Act, 2002 - in Professor Yash Pal v. State of Chhattisgarh (2005) 5 SCC 420, the Supreme Court had declared the 2002 Act ultra vires, resulting in the cessation of all universities established under it - Relying on this, the State of Bihar terminated the appellants' services in 2015, contending their degrees were unrecognized - The Patna High Court upheld the termination - Held: The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgment and the termination orders – i. Protection of Students' Interests: In Professor Yash Pal, Supreme Court specifically directed the State to protect students currently studying by affiliating their institutions with existing State universities - held that this logic extends to students who had already passed out before the Act was struck down, provided the university was not bogus and actual study was imparted; ii. No Fault of Appellants: The appellants could not be held at fault for studying in a university established under a then-valid State law - the State of Bihar appointed them in 2010—years after the Yash Pal judgment—meaning the State was or should have been aware of the legal status but allowed them to work for over five years; iii. Relief: directed the reinstatement of the appellants with continuity of service - back wages were denied as the appellants had not performed duties during the intervening period and the State was not solely at fault – Appeals allowed. [Relied on Prof. Yashpal and Anr. v. State of Chhattisgarh and Ors. (2005) 5 SCC 420; Paras 12-18] Priyanka Kumari v. State of Bihar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 173 : 2026 INSC 167 : AIR 2026 SC 1500

The respondent was appointed as a temporary Bank Attendant in Syndicate Bank against a post reserved for candidates having qualifications up to the 10th standard. He concealed the fact that he was a graduate. The Management terminated his services upon discovering the suppression. The High Court set aside the termination and ordered reinstatement. The Supreme Court reversed the High Court's order. Held, Mere possession of higher qualification does not entitle a candidate to claim appointment to a post for which lower qualification is prescribed. - Suppression of higher educational qualification in such cases amounts to fraud on the public employment process. - Public employment must be offered strictly in accordance with the prescribed qualifications so that all eligible candidates get a fair opportunity. Appeal allowed. Termination of the respondent upheld. [Relied on: Jomon K.K. v. Shajimon P. & Ors., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 381. General Manager (Hr) v. K. Poovarasan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 595 : 2026 INSC 581

Transfer vs. Change in Cadre – Fundamental Distinction – The Supreme Court illuminated the clear and substantive legal difference between a "transfer" and a "change in cadre" - A transfer refers merely to a change in the place of posting of an employee within the same cadre or service, acting as an incident of service routinely exercised for administrative convenience without impacting seniority, rules, or substantive status - a change in cadre is exceptional, altering the very structural framework within which the employee's service, seniority, promotional avenues, and conditions are regulated, thereby requiring specific statutory authority or higher-level approval. [Para 7] Rajendra Singh Bora v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 412 : 2026 INSC 404

Vacancy Cap – Sanctity of 250-Vacancy Ceiling – Supreme Court rejected the Union's contention that the annual cap of 250 vacancies for PC is sacrosanct - Historical data revealed the cap was frequently breached for exigencies like the Kargil War or policy transitions - held that the vacancy cap cannot act as a shield against remedial action where the method of assessment is found to be unfair and discriminatory - Male officers cannot claim a legitimate expectation to compete only against other males for PC vacancies - Following the Delhi High Court's 2010 judgment in Babita Puniya, all parties were aware that women were entitled to PC consideration - Any expectation that runs contrary to the constitutional mandate of gender equality is inherently illegitimate. [Relied on Lt. Col. Nitisha v. Union of India (2021) 15 SCC 125; Paras 32-64] Lt Col Pooja Pal v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 283 : 2026 INSC 281

Vacancy Computation – Dynamic Vacancy Model – Validity of the methodology used in the December 2020 Selection Board – Held, the "Dynamic Vacancy Model" was a rational one-time mechanism to distribute vacancies across 24 batches while maintaining the Navy's pyramidal structure and operational agility – The use of '15' as a divisor is anchored in service realities, representing the approximate years of service accompanying a grant of PC – The methodology does not suffer from arbitrariness or discrimination - Held, unlike the Army and Air Force, the Navy's failure to disclose the evaluation framework and vacancy computation methodology prior to the 2020 and 2022 Boards violated basic norms of fairness and transparency. [Para 25, 38-48] Yogendra Kumar Singh v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 285 : 2026 INSC 282

Voluntary Retirement – Interplay between Pension Regulations and Service Regulations – Deemed Acceptance – The Supreme Court held that under Regulation 29(2) of the UCO Bank (Employees') Pension Regulations, 1995, a notice for voluntary retirement becomes effective automatically upon the expiry of the notice period unless the appointing authority specifically refuses to grant permission before such expiry - Supreme Court clarified that while Regulation 20(3) of the Service Regulations creates an embargo on leaving service during the pendency of disciplinary proceedings, these provisions must be read harmoniously - If the competent authority fails to pass a positive order of refusal within the notice period, the voluntary retirement takes effect ipso facto by efflux of time. [Paras 17 - 26, 43] UCO Bank v. S.K. Shrivastava, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 340 : 2026 INSC 328