Administrative Discretion – Judicial Review – Held that ordinarily, the Court will not exercise the power of statutory authorities or substitute its own decision for that of the authority conferred with discretionary powers - noted that since the Governor had no occasion to examine the request or exercise discretion under the Rules, the High Court's issuance of a writ of mandamus...
Administrative Discretion – Judicial Review – Held that ordinarily, the Court will not exercise the power of statutory authorities or substitute its own decision for that of the authority conferred with discretionary powers - noted that since the Governor had no occasion to examine the request or exercise discretion under the Rules, the High Court's issuance of a writ of mandamus was unwarranted. [Relied on Union of India Vs. S.B.Vohra and Ors. (2004 INSC 5); Paras 10-16] State of Uttarakhand v. Sarita Singh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 353 : 2026 INSC 337
Administrative Law – Doctrine of Substantive Legitimate Expectation – Limitation – Legitimate expectation is not a legal right but an expectation based on a promise or practice of a public authority - It cannot override illegalities or serve as an independent basis for judicial review unless the denial leads to a violation of Article 14 - No legitimate expectation arose in favor of GDCL to claim ownership of JUL's assets simply because it cleared company debts, especially given its failure to revive the unit over two decades. [Paras 150–160] Bhartiya Mazdoor Sangh, v. State of U.P., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 373 : 2026 INSC 364
Administrative Law — Subordinate Legislation — Ultra Vires — Bye-laws framed under Section 8 read with Schedule B (Clauses da and v) are intra vires - The power to prescribe norms for "minimum essential utilisation of services" (Clause da) and to "send a representative to another society" (Clause v) provides a direct statutory source for conditions requiring minimum milk supply and operational continuity for contesting elections to District Milk Unions. [Relied on State of T.N. v. P. Krishnamurthy (2006) 4 SCC 517; Naresh Chandra Agrawal v. ICAI (2024) 13 SCC 241] Ram Chandra Choudhary v. Roop Nagar Dugdh Utpadak Sahakari Samiti Ltd; 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 361 : 2026 INSC 347
Agricultural Income Tax Act, 1991 (Kerala) – Section 12, Section 54 – Amalgamation – Set-off of accumulated losses – The Supreme Court held that an amalgamated company cannot claim a set-off of accumulated losses suffered by the amalgamating company under the Kerala Act in the absence of an express statutory provision - Unlike Section 72A of the Income Tax Act, 1961, which contains a deeming fiction for such carry-forward in cases of amalgamation, the Kerala Act lacks any such enabling provision. [Paras 9 - 14] Aspinwall and Co. Ltd. v. Inspecting Assistant Commissioner, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 371 : 2026 INSC 359
Air Force Act, 1950 — Section 19 — Air Force Rules, 1969 — Rule 16 — Administrative Action following Criminal Discharge — Maintainability — The Supreme Court held that once a person subject to the Air Force Act is discharged by a criminal court, administrative action or disciplinary proceedings on the same facts are not sustainable - Supreme Court clarified that "Discharge" stands on a better footing than "Acquittal" because it signifies a lack of sufficient material even to initiate a trial - Where the authorities exercise discretion under Section 124 to have an accused tried by a criminal court rather than a Court Martial, they cannot later fall back on administrative action once that criminal process concludes in a discharge or acquittal. [Paras 18 - 27] Ex. Sqn. Ldr. R. Sood v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 376 : 2026 INSC 366
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; Section 11(6) and Section 43 — Limitation Act, 1963; Article 137 and Article 18 — Appointment of Arbitrator — Dead Claims — The period of limitation for filing a petition seeking appointment of an arbitrator cannot be conflated with the limitation period applicable to the substantive claims under the underlying contract - While Courts must generally leave intricate evidentiary inquiries regarding limitation to the Arbitrator, they have a duty to prima facie examine and reject "dead claims" that are ex-facie and hopelessly time-barred to protect parties from costly and frivolous arbitration. [Paras 4, 5, 6] State of West Bengal v. B.B.M. Enterprises, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 369 : 2026 INSC 358
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; Section 11(6A) — Scope of Judicial Review — While the court's jurisdiction at the Section 11 stage is confined to the examination of the existence of an arbitration agreement and the principle of "When in doubt, do refer" applies, the court can reject an application if, even on a prima facie view, there appears to be no existence of an arbitration agreement. [Relied on NBCC (India) Ltd. v. Zillion Infraprojects Pvt. Ltd. (2024) 7 SCC 174; Himachal Pradesh v. OASYS Cybernatics Pvt. Ltd. 2025 SCC OnLine SC 253; Paras 20-40] Maharashtra State Electricity Distribution Company Limited (MSEDCL) v. R.Z. Malpani, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 356 : 2026 INSC 342
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; Section 21 — Commencement of Proceedings — Arbitration proceedings commence on the date the request for initiation of arbitration is received by the respondent - Where a contractor completes work in July 2000 but issues the notice seeking arbitration only in June 2022 (after 21 years), the claim is hopelessly time-barred under the Limitation Act - The failure of the Engineer-in-Charge to issue a final measurement certificate does not indefinitely extend the limitation period; the contractor is expected to be diligent and initiate arbitration within the prescribed three-year period from the accrual of the cause of action. [Relied on Arif Azim Company Limited v. Aptech Limited (2024) 5 SCC 313; Vishram Varu and Company v. Union of India (2023) 12 SCC 588; Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited and Anr. v. Nortel Networks India Private Limited (2021) 5 SCC 738; Aslam Ismail Khan Deshmukh v. ASAP Fluids Private Limited (2025) 1 SCC 502; Paras 6, 7] State of West Bengal v. B.B.M. Enterprises, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 369 : 2026 INSC 358
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; Section 7 and 11 — Existence of Arbitration Agreement — Incorporation by Reference — Letter of Intent (LOI) — A Letter of Intent is generally a precursor to a contract and not the contract itself - It merely indicates a party's intention to enter into a contract in the future and does not create a binding legal relationship unless the intention to be bound is clear and unambiguous - A general reference in an LOI to terms and conditions of tender documents (which contain an arbitration clause) is a case of "reference" and not "incorporation" - For an arbitration clause from another document to be incorporated, there must be a specific reference to the arbitration clause itself - Where the LOI is contingent upon future acts (like issuance of a work order) and does not specifically incorporate the arbitration clause, no valid arbitration agreement exists. Maharashtra State Electricity Distribution Company Limited (MSEDCL) v. R.Z. Malpani, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 356 : 2026 INSC 342
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1997 (J&K) — Seat as Exclusive Jurisdiction Clause — The designation of a seat operates as an exclusive jurisdiction clause, even if no part of the cause of action arose there - It serves as the "judicial anchor" and "juridical home" of the arbitration - The seat remains immutable unless expressly altered by a subsequent mutual agreement of the parties - A "stray recital" in the arbitral award recording a different place of arbitration is not determinative of the seat if the parties had previously agreed on a specific seat. [Relied on Bharat Aluminium Co. v. Kaiser Aluminium Technical Services Inc. (2012) 9 SCC 55; Indus Mobile Distribution Pvt. Ltd. v. Datawind Innovations Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. (2017) 7 SCC 678; BGS SGS Soma JV v. NHPC Ltd. (2020) 4 SCC 234; Enercon (India) Ltd. & Ors. v. Enercon GMBH & Anr. (2014) 5 SCC 1; Paras 18-24] J&K Economic Reconstruction Agency v. Rash Builders, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 377 : 2026 INSC 368
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1997 (J&K) — Section 34 — Juridical Seat vs. Venue — Exclusive Jurisdiction — The Supreme Court reaffirmed the settled distinction between the "seat" and "venue" of arbitration, holding that once a seat is designated by agreement, the courts of that seat alone possess exclusive supervisory jurisdiction - The mere fact that arbitral proceedings were conducted or the award was signed at a different geographical location (venue) for convenience does not alter the juridical seat. J&K Economic Reconstruction Agency v. Rash Builders, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 377 : 2026 INSC 368
Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) - Key Findings & Observations – i. Settlement Negotiations as Context - Supreme Court noted that prior to the FIR, the parties had engaged in meetings where a financial settlement of ₹30 crores was discussed to bring a "quietus" to the allegations; ii. Preceding Extortion Case - The appellant had previously filed FIR No. 1041/2025 against the complainant and her husband for extortion, leading to their arrest, prior to the filing of the rape allegations; iii. Sequence of Events - Supreme Court highlighted that had the financial settlement reached its logical conclusion, criminal proceedings likely would not have been initiated - The complainant's FIR was filed only after the appellant refused the settlement and initiated criminal action against the couple. [Paras 21-28] Venu Gopalakrishnan v. State of Kerala, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 378
Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) – Section 482 – Grant of Anticipatory Bail – The Supreme Court granted anticipatory bail to a businessman accused of sexual harassment and rape under Sections 351(2), 64, 74, 75, and 79 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS) and Section 67A of the IT Act - Noted that the FIR lodged by the complainant appeared to be a "counter-blast" to an earlier FIR filed by the appellant alleging extortion. Venu Gopalakrishnan v. State of Kerala, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 378
Central Civil Services (Pension) Rules, 1972 – Rule 69(1)(c) – Withholding of Gratuity during pendency of proceedings – Interpretation of "Departmental or Judicial proceedings" – Held: Rule 69(1)(c) operates as a statutory bar or "embargo" on the payment of gratuity - The use of the disjunctive "or" in the provision indicates that gratuity shall not be paid so long as either departmental or judicial proceedings are pending against the government servant - The appellant's contention that gratuity becomes payable upon the conclusion of any one set of proceedings (e.g., exoneration in departmental inquiry while criminal trial is pending) is rejected as it would defeat the purpose of safeguarding the financial interests of the State. Bikram Chand Rana v. Himachal Pradesh Road Transport Corporation, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 344 : 2026 INSC 326
Central Civil Services (Pension) Rules, 1972 – Rule 9(1) – Right to withhold or withdraw pension – Interplay with Rule 69 – Held: Rule 9 is "downstream" in its operation - It applies at the stage where an employee has been found guilty of grave misconduct - It cannot be invoked to justify the release of gratuity during the interregnum of pending proceedings on the premise that recovery could be effected later if a conviction occurs. Bikram Chand Rana v. Himachal Pradesh Road Transport Corporation, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 344 : 2026 INSC 326
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Impleadment of Parties – Necessary and Proper Party – Article 226 of the Constitution of India – Order I Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Appeal against High Court order dismissing impleadment application in a writ petition challenging the Punjab Unified Building Rules, 2025 – Appellant sought impleadment as municipal authorities relied on an interim stay in said writ petition to reject Appellant's building plans and initiate demolition – Held: A person directly and demonstrably affected by an interim order cannot be shut out of proceedings merely because they were not an original party to the principal challenge - The Appellant is at least a "proper party" whose presence enables the Court to effectively adjudicate the consequences of its own interim order. Procedural exclusion of a party facing immediate civil consequences (demolition and refusal of statutory benefits) is unsustainable - High Court's order set aside; Appellant impleaded as a party respondent. Chopra Hotels v. Harbinder Singh Sekhon, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 352 : 2026 INSC 335
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Interconnected Proceedings – Independent Remedies – Multiple proceedings pending including a parent writ petition, an intra-court appeal (LPA), and a civil revision (CR) – Held: Overlap between proceedings is not the same as identity - Unless there is a statutory interdict, maintainable remedies should not be rendered dormant for an indefinite period awaiting the outcome of a broader challenge - Directed the High Court to decide the LPA and CR together on their own merits, independently of the parent writ petition. [Relied on Mumbai International Airport Private Limited v. Regency Convention Centre and Hotels Private Limited (2010) 7 SCC 417; Paras 7-15] Chopra Hotels v. Harbinder Singh Sekhon, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 352 : 2026 INSC 335
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Order II Rule 2 — Identity of Cause of Action — Supreme Court held that Suit-II was barred because the foundational facts regarding the property dispute were identical to Suit-I - Since the plaintiff was aware of the defendant's adverse claim of ownership during Suit-I but omitted to seek a declaration of title without obtaining the court's leave, she was precluded from seeking that omitted relief in a subsequent suit. Channappa v. Parvatewwa, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 354 : 2026 INSC 343
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Section 11, Explanation IV — Constructive Res Judicata — The principle of constructive res judicata applies to matters which "might and ought" to have been made a ground of attack in former proceedings - An adjudication is conclusive not only as to actual matters determined but also as to every matter essentially connected with the subject matter of the litigation that the parties ought to have litigated – Held that High Court exceeded its jurisdiction by reassessing the entire factual matrix and interfering with concurrent findings of fact without demonstrating perversity.. Interference in a second appeal is limited to cases involving a "substantial question of law" and should not result in a "third trial on facts." [Relied on Gurbux Singh v. Bhooralal, AIR 1964 SC 1810; Paras 12-38] Channappa v. Parvatewwa, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 354 : 2026 INSC 343
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 — Section 11, Section 105(1), and Order II Rule 2 — Maintainability of Subsequent Suit — Res Judicata and Constructive Res Judicata — The Supreme Court set aside a High Court judgment that had decreed a second suit (Suit-II) for declaration of title and possession, which was filed while an appeal for a previous suit (Suit-I) for injunction and cancellation of an adoption deed was pending – Noted that that the failure to challenge an interlocutory order (specifically the rejection of an application under Order II Rule 2 CPC) at the time it is made does not preclude the party from questioning its correctness while appealing the final decree - The legislative scheme of Section 105(1) ensures that non-appealable interlocutory orders can be assailed in an appeal against the final decree unless a statute expressly mandates otherwise. Channappa v. Parvatewwa, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 354 : 2026 INSC 343
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Section 482 – Inherent Powers vs. Revisional Jurisdiction – Noted that High Court's inherent power under Section 482 is not barred simply because a revision petition under Section 397 was maintainable or previously dismissed - Section 482 remains available to prevent the miscarriage of justice or abuse of the process of the court, even where a second revision is prohibited under Section 397(3). [Relied on S.M.S. Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. Neeta Bhalla (2005) 8 SCC 89; Krishnan & Anr. v. Krishnaveni & Anr (1997) 4 SCC 241; Paras 10, 11] Saroj Pandey v. Govt of NCT of Delhi, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 349 : 2026 INSC 324
Companies Act, 1956 – Section 394-A – Amalgamation Scheme – Binding nature on State Authorities – Supreme Court rejected the appellant's reliance on a clause in the amalgamation scheme allowing the transfer of losses - It was observed that while the Income Tax Department is statutorily required to be notified of amalgamation proceedings under the Companies Act, there is no such requirement to notify the State Government regarding Agricultural Income Tax - the State of Kerala, not being a party to the proceedings or issued notice, is not bound by the terms of the scheme that affect its tax revenue - Supreme Court upheld the High Court's finding that even if a set-off were permissible, the losses in question pertained to a period beyond the eight-year limit prescribed under Section 12 of the Kerala Act. [Relied on Dalmia Power Ltd. and Another v. Assistant Commissioner of Income-Tax (2019 INSC 1410); Paras 11 - 15] Aspinwall and Co. Ltd. v. Inspecting Assistant Commissioner, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 371 : 2026 INSC 359
Company Law – Subsidiary Companies – Distinct Legal Entity – Rights of Shareholders – While a subsidiary is a separate legal entity, when a holding company is being wound up due to financial distress, the valuation and shareholding of its 100% owned subsidiary (JAIL) must be factored into the rehabilitation or winding-up process - Clandestine changes to the shareholding pattern of a subsidiary by the management company without legal sanction are illegal - Physical revival of a unit closed for nearly four decades is impossible as employees have reached the age of superannuation. Heirs of deceased or superannuated employees do not have a vested right to employment in a defunct unit but maintain a right to receive unpaid wages and statutory dues. [Relied on Sivanandan C.T. and Others vs. High Court of Kerala and Others (2024) 3 SCC 799; Vodafone International Holdings BV v. Union of India (2012) 6 SCC 613; Cement Workers Karamchari Sangh V. Jaipur Udyog Ltd. (2008) 4 SCC 701; BRS Ventures Investments Ltd. v. SREI Infrastructure Finance Ltd. (2025) 1 SCC 456; Paras 112, 136, 155- 177] Bhartiya Mazdoor Sangh, v. State of U.P., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 373 : 2026 INSC 364
Constitutional Law – Article 142 – Scope of Extraordinary Powers – Condonation of Illegalities – Extraordinary powers under Article 142 cannot be invoked to condone significant illegalities committed by a party, such as the unauthorized sale of assets of a sick company and its subsidiary during the pendency of litigation - held it was not a case for "ironing of creases" but one involving multiple illegalities that could not be regularized. [Paras 166–176] Bhartiya Mazdoor Sangh, v. State of U.P., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 373 : 2026 INSC 364
Constitution of India, 1950 — Article 226 — Maintainability of Writ Petition against Co-operative Societies — The Supreme Court held that disputes pertaining purely to the internal management, governance, or electoral processes of co-operative societies do not ordinarily attract writ jurisdiction – Noted that District Milk Unions are autonomous, member-driven bodies and not "State" or "instrumentalities of the State" under Article 12, even if they are subject to statutory regulation or oversight by the Registrar - A writ lies against a non-State entity only when it performs public duties or acts in breach of statutory obligations of a public character, which was not the case here. [Relied on Federal Bank Ltd. v. Sagar Thomas (2003) 10 SCC 733; Thalappalam Service Co-operative Bank Ltd. v. State of Kerala, (2013) 16 SCC 8] Ram Chandra Choudhary v. Roop Nagar Dugdh Utpadak Sahakari Samiti Ltd; 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 361 : 2026 INSC 347
Constitution of India, Article 16 – Reservation for Economically Weaker Sections (EWS) – Validity of Income and Asset Certificates – Requirement of Specified Financial Year – Held: For claiming the benefit of EWS reservation, the Income and Asset Certificate must relate to the financial year prior to the year of application as prescribed in the advertisement and relevant Government Orders - A certificate pertaining to a different financial year, or one issued prior to the closure of the relevant financial year, is invalid and goes to the root of a candidate's eligibility - Candidates must be in possession of the necessary certificate in the prescribed form on or before the cut-off date - Rejection of candidature due to non-conformity with these requirements is justified to ensure the expeditious completion of public recruitment processes. Poonam Dwivedi v State of U.P., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 359 : 2026 INSC 351
Constitution of India – Article 142 – Dissolution of Marriage – Irretrievable Breakdown of Marriage – Mediated Settlement – Appellant-Husband and Respondent-Wife entered into a mediated Settlement Agreement to dissolve marriage by mutual consent - Appellant-Husband performed substantial obligations, including payment of ₹89,00,000 and return of jewellery - Respondent-Wife resiled from the settlement before the Second Motion, alleging oral promises of additional jewellery worth ₹120 crores and gold biscuits worth ₹50 crore - Held: Withdrawal of consent without proving fraud, force, or undue influence, specifically based on terms not included in a signed mediated settlement, indicates an irretrievable breakdown of marriage - Supreme Court exercised powers under Article 142 to grant a decree of divorce to do complete justice. [Paras 36 - 55] Dhananjay Rathi v. Ruchika Rathi, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 366 : 2026 INSC 360
Constitution of India – Article 142 – Matrimonial Dispute – Irretrievable Breakdown of Marriage – Dissolution of Marriage and Quashing of Multiplicity of Proceedings – The parties were embroiled in a decade-long "vicious spate of litigation" including over 80 legal proceedings initiated by the respondent-husband against the appellant-wife, her family, and her legal counsels – Held that the marriage "dead for all practical purposes" and a fit case to exercise extraordinary jurisdiction to do complete justice. XXX v. YYY, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 347 : 2026 INSC 334
Constitution of India – Article 14 – Equality before Law – Reasonable Classification – Dearness Allowance (DA) vs. Dearness Relief (DR) – Whether the State/KSRTC can effect a classification between serving employees and pensioners by granting enhancement of DA/DR at differential rates – HELD: No, The object of both DA and DR is common: to mitigate the hardship of inflation - Inflation hits both serving and retired employees with equal force - Once a decision is taken to provide and increase these allowances based on inflation, fixing a higher rate for serving employees (14%) than for pensioners (11%) has no rational nexus to the object sought to be achieved and is discriminatory and arbitrary. State of Kerala v. M. Vijayakumar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 360 : 2026 INSC 352
Constitution of India – Article 32 – Public Interest Litigation (PIL) – Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006 – Maintainability of PIL based on media reports – Judicial Restraint – Separation of Powers - Public Interest Litigation – Requirements of Credible Material – Petitioner sought a writ of mandamus for the constitution of a National Task Force and a nationwide food safety audit based on various instances of food contamination and regulatory failure - Held: PILs must be founded on credible, cogent, and research-based material - Newspaper reports and media publications highlighting sporadic incidents do not constitute reliable or legally admissible evidence to establish a systemic failure of fundamental rights under Article 32. [Paras 5, 6] Dr. K.A. Paul @ Kilari Anand Paul v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 355
Constitution of India – Articles 14 and 16 – Service Law – Promotion – Educational Qualification – Relaxation – Arbitrariness and Discrimination – The Supreme Court set aside the High Court Division Bench order that had upheld the Registrar's rejection of a promotion recommendation - held that when the Board of Directors—the competent authority validly exercises its discretion to grant relaxation in educational qualifications based on an employee's long service and competence, the Registrar cannot arbitrarily reject such a proposal - Denial of promotion to the appellant while granting it to similarly situated employees (Sushil Kumar Tripathi and Ram Swaroop Pandey) possessing the same qualifications constitutes a violation of the fundamental concept of equality. [Paras 6 - 9] Kamal Prasad Dubey v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 365 : 2026 INSC 353
Constitution of India - Exercise of Powers under Article 142 – Termination of Vexatious Litigation – Supreme Court observed the respondent-husband, a practicing advocate, had misused his legal knowledge to file vindictive and oppressive complaints before various forums, including the State Bar Council and criminal courts - To provide a "quietus" to the dispute, the Supreme Court quashed all pending civil, criminal, and miscellaneous proceedings inter se, including FIRs and disciplinary complaints against advocates. XXX v. YYY, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 347 : 2026 INSC 334
Constitution of India – Key Principles and Reliance – i. Twin Tests of Article 14: For a classification to be valid, it must satisfy two conditions: (1) it must be founded on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes those grouped together from others; and (2) that differentia must have a rational nexus to the object sought to be achieved; ii. Arbitrariness as the Enemy of Equality: Equality and arbitrariness are sworn enemies. Where an act is arbitrary, it is implicitly unequal and violative of Article 14; iii. Financial Crunch vs. Discrimination: While a financial crunch may justify deferring benefits or setting implementation dates, it cannot justify providing discriminatory rates of enhancement for the same inflationary pressure once the decision to grant the benefit has been made. [Relied on D.S. Nakara & Others v. Union of India (1983) 1 SCC 305; State of Punjab & Ors. v. Davinder Singh & Ors (2025) 1 SCC 1; Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi (1981) 1 SCC 72; Paras 20-28] State of Kerala v. M. Vijayakumar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 360 : 2026 INSC 352
Consumer Protection – Banking Service – Deficiency in Service – Negligence in Presenting Cheques – Section 2(g) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 / Section 2(11) of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019 – A bank receiving cheques for collection acts as an agent of the customer and is obligated to exercise due diligence in presenting the instruments within the prescribed validity period - Failure to present cheques before they become stale, without a reasonable explanation, constitutes negligence and a "deficiency in service" - In this case, the Appellant bank failed to re-present cheques on available working days (June 1st and 2nd, 2026) after a bank strike ended, causing the instruments to expire - The Supreme Court upheld the finding of deficiency but modified the quantum of compensation. [Paras 50-69] Canara Bank v. Kavita Chowdhary, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 375 : 2026 INSC 363
Consumer Protection – Compensation – Reasonable Quantum – Section 73 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 – Compensation under consumer law must be fair, reasonable, and commensurate with the loss or injury. Where the loss is indeterminate because the outcome of potential legal proceedings (e.g., Section 138 NI Act) is "imponderable" compensation should be assessed on the principle of moderation - Supreme Court reduced the NCDRC's award of 10% of the cheque amount to 6% as a "token compensation," noting that the actual loss was difficult to accurately reflect. [Relied on Lucknow Development Authority v. M.K. Gupta (1994) 1 SCC 243; Chief Administrator, HUDA v. Shakuntla Devi (2017) 2 SCC 301; MSR Leathers v. S. Palaniappan (2013) 1 SCC 177; Ajay Kumar Radheyshyam Goenka v. Tourism Finance Corporation of India Ltd. (2023) 10 SCC 545; Paras 59 - 72] Canara Bank v. Kavita Chowdhary, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 375 : 2026 INSC 363
Contempt Jurisdiction – Impugned Order Erroneous – In the subsequent contempt proceedings, the High Court erred by expanding the scope of inquiry to re-examine the appellant's eligibility for Class-III posts and his lack of Intermediate qualifications - Such re-examination was impermissible as it effectively reopened issues concluded by the final order of 1st March 2019 - The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgment dismissing the contempt petition - Supreme Court directed the respondent-Bank to pay the appellant gratuity of ₹2,28,000/- with 8% interest per annum from the date of retirement (31st October 2009) - awarded ₹1,00,000/- as compensation to the appellant for the prolonged and unnecessary litigation forced by the Bank. [Paras 10-17] Jalim Singh v. Nand Kishore, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 364
Contempt Jurisdiction – Scope of Inquiry – Re-adjudication Prohibited – Held that exercising contempt jurisdiction, the Court must confine its inquiry to the compliance of the operative directions contained in the original order - The jurisdiction is limited to examining compliance and does not extend to the re-adjudication of issues that have already attained finality between the parties – Noted that the High Court, in its earlier order dated 1st March 2019, unequivocally directed the respondent-Bank to pay the appellant arrears of salary and post-retiral benefits for the post of Cooperative Supervisor or an equivalent post, regardless of whether the post formally existed or whether the appellant possessed Intermediate qualifications - This order attained finality as it was not assailed by the Bank. Jalim Singh v. Nand Kishore, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 364
Co-operative Societies Act, 2001 (Rajasthan) — Section 28 vs. Section 32 — Eligibility vs. Disqualification — Supreme Court distinguished between "disqualifications" (statutory disabilities under Section 28) and "eligibility criteria" (threshold qualifications under bye-laws) - Bye-laws prescribing minimum milk supply (Bye-law 20.2(7)) or audit classification (Bye-law 20.1(2)) are positive, objective functional requirements aimed at ensuring active participation and are not "disqualifications" - The High Court erred by conflating these two distinct legal concepts. Ram Chandra Choudhary v. Roop Nagar Dugdh Utpadak Sahakari Samiti Ltd; 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 361 : 2026 INSC 347
Co-operative Societies Act, 2001 (Rajasthan) — Sections 58, 60, 104, and 105 — Alternative Remedy — Supreme Court ruled that the High Court should not have entertained the writ petitions given the existence of a comprehensive, self-contained, multi-tiered statutory remedial framework - Section 58(2)(c) specifically deems disputes relating to elections as disputes "touching the constitution, management or business" of a society, falling under the Registrar's jurisdiction - Bypassing such efficacious statutory remedies is contrary to legislative intent. [Relied on Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Orissa (1983) 2 SCC 433; Umesh Shivappa Ambi v. Angadi Shekara Basappa, (1998) 4 SCC 529] Ram Chandra Choudhary v. Roop Nagar Dugdh Utpadak Sahakari Samiti Ltd; 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 361 : 2026 INSC 347
Co-operative Societies — Right to Vote vs. Right to Contest — Supreme Court emphasized that neither the right to vote nor the right to contest is a fundamental right; they are purely statutory - While the right to vote is a member's franchise, the right to contest is an additional right subject to stricter regulation and eligibility conditions - The impugned bye-laws regulated the eligibility to contest (candidature) and did not curtail the right to vote. [Relied on Jyoti Basu v. Debi Ghosal AIR 1982 SC 983; Supreme Court Bar Association v. B.D. Kaushik (2011) 13 SCC 774] Ram Chandra Choudhary v. Roop Nagar Dugdh Utpadak Sahakari Samiti Ltd; 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 361 : 2026 INSC 347
Criminal Jurisprudence – Principle of Parity – When there is similar or identical evidence against two accused ascribing them a similar role, the Court cannot convict one and acquit the other - The Principle of Parity dictates that Criminal Courts should decide like cases alike to avoid discrimination - Since the recovery evidence against the acquitted co-accused was nearly identical to that against the appellant, the appellant was entitled to the same benefit of doubt. [Para 24] Gautam Satnami v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 345 : 2026 INSC 325
Criminal Procedure – Limitation for taking cognizance – Relevant date for computation – Section 468 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – The Supreme Court reiterated that for the purpose of computing the period of limitation under Section 468 Cr.PC, the relevant date is the date of filing of the complaint or the date of institution of prosecution, and not the date on which the Magistrate takes cognizance of the offence - held that the High Court committed a "patent error" by quashing an FIR on the ground that the charge-sheet was filed beyond one year, mistakenly treating the date of cognizance as the decisive factor. Roma Ahuja v. State, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 351 : 2026 INSC 336
Criminal Procedure – Quashing of FIR – Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) – Interference at the Stage of Investigation under Section 156(3) CrPC – The Supreme Court set aside a High Court judgment that quashed an FIR at the inception stage - The High Court had reasoned that the dispute was primarily civil and required the cancellation of sale deeds under Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act before criminal proceedings could be sustained - The Supreme Court held that the existence of a civil remedy does not bar criminal proceedings if the allegations prima facie disclose a cognizable offence - At the stage of Section 156(3) CrPC, a Magistrate is only required to determine if a cognizable offence is disclosed, not to conduct a "mini-trial" or evaluate defense material - High Courts must exercise restraint and only intervene under Section 156(3) if the order lacks legal foundation or results in a failure of justice. Accamma Sam Jacob v. State of Karnataka, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 368 : 2026 INSC 362
Criminal Procedure – Suspension of Sentence and Grant of Bail – Disproportionate Assets – Overlapping Allegations – Double Jeopardy – Appellant, a former Minister, was convicted for amassing assets disproportionate to known sources of income and illegal acquisition of tribal lands - Prosecution split the original case into two separate charge-sheets involving overlapping allegations and the same check period - Appellant contended that dual prosecution for identical allegations violates the right against double jeopardy under Article 20(3) of the Constitution of India - The Supreme Court noted that the appellant's sentence in the first case had already been suspended by the Court and that he had undergone substantial custodial incarceration in both matters - Held: Without expressing a final opinion on the merits of the overlapping allegations which must be decided by the High Court, the Court found it fit to grant bail - Bail granted subject to the appellant filing an undertaking within seven days of release to assist in the process of restoring illegally acquired tribal land to its original status. [Paras 13-21] Anosh Ekka v. State through Central Bureau of Investigation, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 367 : 2026 INSC 357
Doctrine of Merger — Dismissal in Default — Supreme Court clarified that the dismissal of an appeal for default or as time-barred amounts to a final disposal and cannot be equated with non-filing or withdrawal - Such a dismissal has the effect of confirming the lower court's decision on merits - Held, that the execution application filed within 12 years from the date of the appellate court's dismissal order is within the limitation period. Gajanan v. Pralhad, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 341
Evidence Act, 1872 – Section 27 – Recovery of Weapons – Supre,e Court observed that the mere presence of human blood on a seized weapon is insufficient for conviction if the blood group is not determined and no definitive link is made between the weapon and the injuries sustained by the deceased - The recovery was further weakened by the fact that seizure witnesses turned hostile or admitted they did not sign the memos at the time of recovery. [Relied on Sharad Birdhi Chand Sarda vs. State of Maharashtra (1984 INSC 121; Agniraj & Ors. vs. State through Deputy Superintendent of Police, CB-CID (2025 INSC 774); Javed Shaukat Ali Qureshi vs. State of Gujarat (2023 INSC 829); State of Rajasthan vs. Smt. Kalki & Anr. (1981 INSC 94); Paras 15-30] Gautam Satnami v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 345 : 2026 INSC 325
Evidence Act, 1872 – Sections 103 and 114(g) – Adverse Inference – Non-production of Best Evidence – Where a party in possession of the "best evidence" (in this case, an unregistered sale deed) withholds it from the Court, an adverse inference must be drawn against them - Supreme Court has no responsibility to compel the party to produce such documents. [Relied on Union of India v. Jahangir Byramji Jeejeebhoy, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 489; Gurnam Singh v. Surjit Singh, (1975) 4 SCC 404; Ajay Kumar D. Amin v. Air France, (2016) 12 SCC 566; Paras 13-19] Hari Ram v. State of Rajasthan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 372 : 2026 INSC 350
Evidence – Partnership and Reconstitution – Mere production of rent receipts in the name of the original firm does not prove continuity of tenancy if the original tenant has retired and divested himself of legal control - Failure to produce an original partnership deed or registered reconstitution deed leads to an adverse inference against the tenant's claim of a bona fide partnership. [Relied on Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited v. Dilbahar Singh (2014) 9 SCC 78; Jagan Nath (D) through LRs v. Chander Bhan and another (1988) 3 SCC 57; Parvinder Singh v. Renu Gautam (2004) 4 SCC 794; Rukmini Amma Saradamma v. Kallyani Sulochana and others (1993) 1 SCC 499; Paras 12 - 14] M.V. Ramachandrasa v. Mahendra Watch Company, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 358 : 2026 INSC 348
Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956 – Section 8(2) – Sale of Minor's Property – Supreme Court noted that a sale deed executed on behalf of a 12-year-old minor without court permission is hit by Section 8(2) - A voidable transaction of this nature can be repudiated through "unequivocal conduct," such as obtaining a declaratory decree, and does not necessarily require a specific suit to set aside the document. Hari Ram v. State of Rajasthan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 372 : 2026 INSC 350
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Reconciliation of Accounts – Supreme Court emphasized that when there is a lack of clarity regarding the amount due and parties have called for reconciliation based on losses from defective supplies, such a situation supports the existence of a dispute - Noted that the respondent's own confusion demanding ₹4.60 crore and later "correcting" it to ₹2.92 crore after the demand notice manifested a lack of consensus on the liability. [Relied on Mobilox Innovations Private Limited vs. Kirusa Software Private Limited (2018) 1 SCC 353; Sabarmati Gas Limited vs. Shah Alloys Limited (2023) 3 SCC 229; Paras 17-21] GLS Films Industries v. Chemical Suppliers, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 362 : 2026 INSC 344
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Scope of Adjudicating Authority's Inquiry – Summary Jurisdiction – Reaffirming the legal position, the Court stated that for the purpose of Section 9, the Adjudicating Authority only needs to satisfy itself that a "plausible" dispute exists which is not "spurious, hypothetical or illusory" - It is not required to determine whether the defence is likely to succeed or to examine the merits of the dispute beyond identifying a non-feeble legal argument. GLS Films Industries v. Chemical Suppliers, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 362 : 2026 INSC 344
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Section 30(2)(e) – Eligibility of Resolution Applicant – A Resolution Professional (RP) must ensure a resolution plan does not contravene any law, including the MSCS Act - Where an MSCS seeks to acquire a Corporate Debtor (CD), it must satisfy the threshold that the CD is either a subsidiary or operates in the same line of business as defined in the MSCS's charter documents - The "same line of business" refers to a substantive sameness or close nexus in core economic activities, not remote or incidental connections - Revenue generated or profit/loss incurred is irrelevant to this determination; the inquiry is strictly governed by the approved bye-laws - Mere reproduction of the statutory language of Section 64(d) in the investment clause of the bye-laws (Clause 52) does not suffice if the core Object Clause (Clause 5) is not correspondingly amended to include the specific line of business of the target institution. [Paras 33-50] Nirmal Ujjwal Credit Co-Operative Society Ltd. v. Ravi Sethia, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 357 : 2026 INSC 338
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Section 9 – Initiation of Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) by Operational Creditor – Pre-existing Dispute – Plausible Contentions – The Supreme Court set aside the NCLAT judgment that had admitted a Section 9 application, holding that the NCLAT erroneously delved into the merits of the dispute rather than merely checking for its existence - Supreme Court found clear evidence of a pre-existing dispute regarding defective supplies and the need for reconciliation of accounts, which dated back to written correspondence from December 2020, long before the demand notice issued in November 2021. GLS Films Industries v. Chemical Suppliers, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 362 : 2026 INSC 344
Interpretation of Statutes – Legal Maxims – Role in developing legal concepts – Professional Ethics – Duty of Advocates – Binding Precedents - The Supreme Court emphasized the importance of legal maxims such as actus curiae neminem gravabit (an act of the court shall prejudice no one) and nullum tempus aut locus occurrit regi (time does not run against the king/crime never dies) as guiding principles founded in reason and public convenience - Noted that advocates have a duty to respect binding precedents and should not consume public time by making submissions that contradict well-settled law or "strong-operated" precedents from a Constitution Bench. [Relied on Sarah Mathew v. Institute of Cardio Vascular Diseases (2014) 2 SCC 62; Paras 5-10] Roma Ahuja v. State, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 351 : 2026 INSC 336
Interpretation of Statutes — Limitation — Held that courts should avoid a hyper-technical approach in matters of limitation to ensure substantive rights are not defeated by rigid procedural rules - A party cannot be allowed to take advantage of its own wrong, such as gaining a limitation benefit from an appeal being dismissed due to their own constant absence. [Relied on Shyam Sundar Sarma vs. Pannalal Jaiswal & Ors. (2005) 1 SCC 436; Sheodan Singh vs. Daryao Kunwar (SMT) 1966 SCC OnLine SC 98; Paras 17-23] Gajanan v. Pralhad, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 341
Judicial Restraint vs. Statutory Regulators – The Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006, is a complete code that established the FSSAI as a specialized body for food safety regulation - When the legislature creates a specialized authority with technical expertise, the Court must exercise judicial restraint. In the absence of demonstrated systemic failure, the Court cannot assume the role of a "super-regulator" or substitute its wisdom for that of the statutory body - Article 32 jurisdiction cannot be expanded to undertake supervisory or managerial functions over statutory fora in technical domains - Intervention in the functioning of a regulatory framework without compelling material runs contrary to the settled principles of separation of powers - Stray instances of non-compliance do not justify a court-directed overhaul of an existing legal machinery. [Relied on Holicow Pictures Pvt. Ltd. v. Prem Chandra Mishra & Ors., (2007) 14 SCC 281; Kushum Lata v. Union of India, (2006) 6 SCC 180; Vishal Tiwari v. Union of India and Others, (2024) 4 SCC 115; Paras 7- 9] Dr. K.A. Paul @ Kilari Anand Paul v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 355
Limitation Act, 1963; Article 136 — Code of Civil Procedure, 1908; Order 21 — Execution of Decrees - Starting point of limitation when an appeal is dismissed in default — The Supreme Court held that the dismissal of an appeal, even if for non-prosecution or on preliminary grounds like limitation, resets the limitation clock for execution proceedings - While a decree remains enforceable if not stayed during the pendency of an appeal, the dismissal of such an appeal confirms the Trial Court's decree and provides a fresh starting point of 12 years for execution under Article 136 - Supreme Court emphasized that an appeal is a continuation of the suit; therefore, a decree does not attain absolute finality until the appeal is disposed of. Gajanan v. Pralhad, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 341
Limitation Act, 1963 – Condonation of Delay – Gross Delay of 31 Years – The Supreme Court set aside the High Court and Board of Revenue orders that had condoned a 31-year delay in filing an appeal against a 1975 decree - held that delay condonation cannot be an act of generosity that defeats substantial justice or causes prejudice to the opposing party - The grounds for delay alleging fraud and lack of knowledge were belied by trial court records showing the defendant appeared through counsel, filed applications, and led evidence through witnesses. Hari Ram v. State of Rajasthan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 372 : 2026 INSC 350
Maintenance and Alimony – Financial Incapacity as Subterfuge – Noted that respondent-husband defaulted on interim maintenance orders despite undertakings to the High Court – Supreme Court rejected his claim of financial incapacity, noting he had resigned from directorships in family-connected companies to evade obligations - A consolidated sum of Rs. 5 Crores was awarded as permanent alimony and child support - held that the appellant-wife's relocation of the children to Kolkata was a protective measure given the intense hostility in Mumbai - Absolute custody was granted to the mother, with specific monthly visitation rights and temporary holiday custody granted to the father. [Relied on Rajnesh v. Neha and Another (2021) 2 SCC 324; Paras 52-62] XXX v. YYY, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 347 : 2026 INSC 334
Money-lending Law - Courts must 'nip in the bud' proceedings instituted by unlicensed money lenders; Enforcement and investigation under existing laws need not await new legislation - The Supreme Court clarified that its earlier order closing the suo motu proceedings concerning unauthorised money lending does not imply that no law exists on the subject or that enforcement actions must wait for fresh legislation by States/Union Territories. Raj Kumar Santoshi v. Prashant Malik, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 342
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 – Future Prospects – Permanent Employee aged 50-60 years – Held: As per the settled legal position, an addition of 15% toward future prospects is mandated for a permanent salaried employee within the age bracket of 50-60 years – Noted that the High Court's grant of 10% was erroneous as the deceased was a 59-year-old railway employee - Held: It is a settled proposition of law that the Court or Tribunal is not barred from awarding more compensation than what is claimed, provided the awarded amount is "just and reasonable". [Relied on Sarla Verma and Ors. vs. Delhi Transport Corporation and Anr. (2009) 6 SCC 121; National Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. Pranay Sethi and others (2017) 16 SCC 680; Helen C. Rebello and others vs. Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation and another (1999) 1 SCC 90; Paras 25-30] Sushila v. Sudhakar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 343
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — High Court's Error — Noted that the High Court of Bombay at Goa erred in dismissing the Insurance Company's appeal as "not maintainable" and refusing to hear arguments on the quantum of compensation - The Supreme Court set aside the impugned judgment and remitted the matter back to the High Court for fresh consideration on the issue of quantum. [Relied on United India Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. Shila Datta & Ors., (2011) ACJ 2729; Paras 12-16] National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Gauri Gurudas Gaonkar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 348
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — Section 149(2), Section 166, and Section 170 — Right of Insurer to contest on merits — Maintainability of Appeal — The Supreme Court held that when an Insurance Company is impleaded as a party-respondent in a claim petition (rather than merely being a noticee), it has the right to contest the claim on all available grounds, including the quantum of compensation, without being restricted to the limited grounds specified under Section 149(2) of the Act – Supreme Court clarified that if the insurer is already a respondent, it does not require the permission of the Tribunal under Section 170 to raise such additional grounds. National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Gauri Gurudas Gaonkar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 348
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 – Section 166 – Just Compensation – Calculation of Notional Income – Deductions based on remaining years of service – Held: Any deduction in income based on the proximity of the deceased to retirement is impermissible in law - The Supreme Court set aside the findings of the Tribunal and the High Court, which had deducted 50% of the deceased's salary because he had only six months of service remaining - Compensation must be calculated based on the "annual" income of the deceased using the last drawn salary to ensure uniformity and consistency. [Para 22] Sushila v. Sudhakar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 343
Multi-State Co-operative Societies Act, 2002 – Section 64(d) – Investment of Funds – Interpretation of "Same Line of Business" – The expression "any other institution in the same line of business" under Section 64(d) is a restrictive standard introduced via the 2023 Amendment to prevent the misuse of society funds and ensure financial discipline - The determination of whether an institution is in the "same line of business" must be made primarily by examining the objects and functions set out in the bye-laws of the Multi-State Co-operative Society (MSCS) - The Supreme Court relied on the Securities and Exchange Board of India (Delisting of Equity Shares) Regulations, 2021 (specifically regarding the classification of entities under the National Industrial Classification (NIC) Code) as an illustrative benchmark to discern the ordinary and contextual meaning of "same line of business". Nirmal Ujjwal Credit Co-Operative Society Ltd. v. Ravi Sethia, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 357 : 2026 INSC 338
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 — Sections 20(b)(ii)(C), 25 and 29 — Concurrent Sentences and Cumulative Fines — The Supreme Court addressed whether separate fines could be recovered when substantive sentences are ordered to run concurrently - held that since Section 53 of the Indian Penal Code treats both imprisonment and fine as "punishments," a direction for sentences to run concurrently must logically extend to the fine as well - The appellant cannot be compelled to pay a double amount of fine for offences arising out of the same transaction. Hem Raj v. State of Himachal Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 346 : 2026 INSC 332
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 — Sections 25 and 29 — Independent vs. Derivative Offences — Section 65 — Default Imprisonment — Supreme Court clarified that Section 25 (allowing premises/conveyance to be used) and Section 29 (abetment/criminal conspiracy) are independent offences that attract separate punishments - Even though these sections do not specify a unique term but refer to the "punishment provided for that offence," they constitute legislation by reference/incorporation - While they are distinct, where they are "parasitic and derivative" or part of the same transaction as the main offence, the rule of wisdom mandates that sentences run concurrently to avoid double jeopardy - Following the settled principle, the Court reiterated that imprisonment in default of payment of fine is not a "sentence" but a penalty incurred for non-payment. [Relied on Shahejadkhan Mahebubkhan Pathan v. State of Gujarat (2013) 1 SCC 570; Gurdeep Singh v. State of Punjab (2025) SCC OnLine SC 1669; Shantilal v. State of M.P. (2007) 11 SCC 24; State (NCT of Delhi) v. Navjot Sandhu (2005) 11 SCC 600; Paras 6-9] Hem Raj v. State of Himachal Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 346 : 2026 INSC 332
Natural Justice — Audi Alteram Partem — Non-joinder of Necessary Parties — The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgment for striking down bye-laws in rem without impleading or hearing all affected District Milk Unions - Adjudicating upon the internal governance of autonomous bodies without granting them an opportunity of hearing is a substantive violation of natural justice. [Relied on Dattatreya v. Mahaveer (2004) 10 SCC 665; Paras 14-22] Ram Chandra Choudhary v. Roop Nagar Dugdh Utpadak Sahakari Samiti Ltd; 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 361 : 2026 INSC 347
Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 – Section 141 – Vicarious Liability of Directors – Essential Averments – Held, merely being a Director of a company is insufficient to make a person liable under Section 141 - It is an essential requirement to specifically aver in the complaint that, at the time the offence was committed, the accused was in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the business of the company - Signing a Board Resolution regarding major directional issues does not ipso facto evidence involvement in the day-to-day management of the affairs of the company. [Paras 6 - 8] Saroj Pandey v. Govt of NCT of Delhi, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 349 : 2026 INSC 324
Negotiable Instruments – Delay in Presentment – Section 75A of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 – While delay in presentment is excused if caused by circumstances beyond the holder's control (such as a strike), the presentment must be made within a "reasonable time" as soon as the cause of delay ceases to operate - The bank's failure to act on the immediate working days following the strike precluded the protection of Section 75A. [Paras 56] Canara Bank v. Kavita Chowdhary, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 375 : 2026 INSC 363
Penal Code, 1860 – Section 302 – Circumstantial Evidence – Witness Testimony – Related vs. Interested Witnesses - The Supreme Court set aside the conviction of the appellant, holding that the prosecution failed to establish a complete and unbroken chain of evidence pointing solely to the guilt of the accused - noted that suspicion, however strong, cannot take the place of proof - Supreme Court emphasized the distinction between a "related" witness and an "interested" witness - A witness is "interested" only when they derive some benefit from the result of the litigation, such as having a motive to falsely implicate the accused due to prior enmity - The testimony of an interested witness, without independent corroboration, cannot sustain a conviction. [Paras 18, 19] Gautam Satnami v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 345 : 2026 INSC 325
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 – Demand and Acceptance – Proof of Demand – While proof of demand is a sine qua non for conviction, it can be inferred from the overall evidence and the conduct of the parties - Noted that the accused admitted to accepting the money but provided a false and inconsistent explanation (claiming it was a loan repayment), which serves as a compelling circumstance pointing toward guilt - The evidence of a person allowed to be cross-examined by the party who called him is not "washed off the record" - The Judge of fact must determine if the witness is thoroughly discredited or if parts of the testimony remain believable in light of other evidence. [Relied on Neeraj Dutta v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2023) 4 SCC 731; Sat Paul v. Delhi Administration (1976) 1 SCC 727; Paras 11-18] State of Kerala v. K.A. Abdul Rasheed, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 374 : 2026 INSC 365
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 – Sections 7, 13(1)(d), 13(2), and 20 – Conviction Restored – Hostile Witness – Efficacy of Testimony – The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's acquittal, holding that the testimony of a hostile witness cannot be discarded in toto if certain portions remain creditworthy - Even if a complainant prevaricates or turns hostile regarding the specific demand at the time of the trap, the prior demand established through the First Information Statement (FIS), affirmed in court and corroborated by independent witnesses, is sufficient to bring home the guilt of the accused. State of Kerala v. K.A. Abdul Rasheed, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 374 : 2026 INSC 365
Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 – Section 12 – Removal of disqualification – Held: Since the Appellants were extended the benefit under Sections 3 and 4 of the 1958 Act, they shall not incur any disqualification affecting their service careers arising out of the conviction - Held: While Section 360 CrPC and the 1958 Act share a common reformative thread, their frameworks differ - Section 360 CrPC creates eligibility distinctions based on age and gender, whereas Sections 3 and 4 of the 1958 Act extend benefits universally, focusing on the nature of the offence and the character of the offender - Held: The 1958 Act is a beneficial legislation intended to rehabilitate and reintegrate offenders into society - Its provisions must be interpreted in a purposive manner, and where two views are possible, the interpretation must favor the beneficiaries. [Relied on Ved Prakash v. State of Haryana (1981) 1 SCC 447; Paras 28 - 45] Milind Ashruba Dhanve v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 370 : 2026 INSC 355
Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 – Sections 3 and 4 – Applicability where sentence is fine only – Held - The benefit of Section 4 of the 1958 Act is available to an offender who has been sentenced only to payment of fine - The expression 'release' in Section 4 cannot mean release only from custody; it must be read as releasing the offender from the obligation to serve the sentence, including the payment of fine - Any reference to 'punishment' in the 1958 Act must be construed as per Section 53 IPC and Section 4 BNS, which undoubtedly include 'fine'. [Paras 24, 25, 26] Milind Ashruba Dhanve v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 370 : 2026 INSC 355
Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 – Section 12 – Quashing of Proceedings – Abuse of Process – Respondent-Wife filed a DV complaint eight months after the settlement and only after the husband initiated contempt proceedings - The complaint lacked specific allegations of violence and was deemed a "premeditated afterthought" to sustain litigation after resiling from the settlement - Held: Continuance of such proceedings constitutes an abuse of the process of law. DV proceedings quashed - Once parties enter a settlement authenticated by a mediator and confirmed by a Court, they cannot be allowed to reverse its effects by pursuing original or subsequent complaints. Deviation from mediated settlements attacks the foundational basis of the mediation process. [Relied on: Shilpa Sailesh v. Varun Sreenivasan, (2023) 14 SCC 231; Ruchi Agarwal v. Amit Kumar Agarwal, (2005) 3 SCC 299; Gimpex Private Limited v. Manoj Goel, (2022) 11 SCC 705; Trisha Singh v. Anurag Kumar, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1191; Paras 29, 30, 37-41] Dhananjay Rathi v. Ruchika Rathi, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 366 : 2026 INSC 360
Recruitment Process – Judicial Interference – Rejection of Online Applications – Held: In large-scale public recruitment where applications are processed via software, errors in application or supporting documents inevitably lead to rejection - Courts should not ordinarily entertain challenges to such rejections as they risk stalling the recruitment process for thousands of aspirants. [Relied on UPSC v. Gaurav Singh & Ors. (2024) 2 SCC 605; Divya v. Union of India and Others (2024) 1 SCC 448; Paras 20-28] Poonam Dwivedi v State of U.P., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 359 : 2026 INSC 351
Rent Act, 1999 (Karnataka) – Section 27(2)(b)(ii) and 27(2)(p) – Unlawful Sub-letting – Proof through Partnership Device – Sub-letting requires the parting of legal possession and exclusive right to enjoy the property - While a tenant may induct partners into a business, if the "partnership" is a cloak to conceal the divestment of the original tenant's control and legal possession, it constitutes unlawful sub-letting - The initial burden lies on the landlord to show a third party is in exclusive possession and the original tenant is absent - Once a prima facie case of exclusive possession by a stranger is established, a presumption of sub-letting arises, and the onus shifts to the tenant to prove the occupation is lawful. [Paras 13- 14] M.V. Ramachandrasa v. Mahendra Watch Company, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 358 : 2026 INSC 348
Rent Act, 1999 (Karnataka) – Section 46 – Scope of Revisional Jurisdiction – Noted that the High Court cannot act as a court of first appeal or undertake a fresh evaluation of evidence under the guise of examining "legality, correctness, or propriety" - Revisional power is supervisory and qualitatively distinct from appellate jurisdiction - Interference with findings of fact is permissible only if such findings are perverse, based on no evidence, or suffer from manifest illegality. [Para 12] M.V. Ramachandrasa v. Mahendra Watch Company, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 358 : 2026 INSC 348
Service Law - Departmental Inquiries - Allegations of bias - Where an employee has previously levelled allegations of bias against the Disciplinary Authority, the said Authority must recuse herself/himself from conducting or concluding the disciplinary proceedings. The principle that “justice should not only be done but should also be seen to be done” must be strictly adhered to in departmental inquiries. National Bal Bhawan v. Khazan Chand, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 363
Service Law — Disciplinary Proceedings — Natural Justice — Reasoned Order — Supreme Court emphasized that in cases where no regular inquiry is conducted and the delinquent is deprived of cross-examination, the show cause notice and the final order are critical safeguards - A "cryptic or mechanical" rejection of a detailed, non-frivolous defense violates principles of natural justice - Vague expressions like "morally convincing evidence" fall short of the required standard for recording findings in disciplinary proceedings. [Paras 31 - 33] Ex. Sqn. Ldr. R. Sood v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 376 : 2026 INSC 366
Service Law – Disciplinary Proceedings vs. Criminal Trial – Standard of Proof – Held: Even when proceedings stem from identical allegations, their nature, scope, and standards of proof are fundamentally different (preponderance of probabilities vs. proof beyond reasonable doubt) - An acquittal in a criminal case is not automatically determinative of departmental liability, and the pendency of a criminal trial remains a valid statutory bar to the release of gratuity under Rule 69(1)(c). [Relied on Babu Manmohan Das Shah & Ors. vs. Bishun Das (1967 [1] SCR 836); Paras 12-16] Bikram Chand Rana v. Himachal Pradesh Road Transport Corporation, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 344 : 2026 INSC 326
Service Law – Extraordinary Pension – Uttar Pradesh Civil Services (Extraordinary Pension) Rules, 1981 – Mandatory Sanction of the Governor – Writ of Mandamus – Substitution of Discretion – The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's direction to pay extraordinary pension to the widow of a doctor shot dead while on duty - held that under Rule 4 of the 1981 Rules, no award of extraordinary pension can be made except with the sanction of the Governor, which involves the exercise of administrative discretion. State of Uttarakhand v. Sarita Singh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 353 : 2026 INSC 337
Service Law — Quantum of Punishment — Doctrine of Proportionality and Equality — Imposing the harshest punishment (dismissal) on a subordinate for complying with a wrongful order, while the superior officer who issued the order receives a lenient penalty (severe displeasure), is arbitrary and violates the principle of equality - Following the principle that 100% back wages require an affidavit stating the employee was not re-employed, and in the absence of such material on record, the Court awarded 50% back wages from the date of illegal dismissal until superannuation. [Relied on Union of India v. Harjeet Singh Sandhu (2001) 5 SCC 593; Yuvraj Laxmilal Kanther v. State of Maharashtra 2025 SCC OnLine SC 520; Sengara Singh v. State of Punjab (1983) 4 SCC 225; Paras 37 – 41] Ex. Sqn. Ldr. R. Sood v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 376 : 2026 INSC 366
Service Rules – Madhya Pradesh Cooperative Societies Act, 1960 – Rule 19-A – Proviso to Rule 19-A expressly allows for relaxation in educational qualifications for promotion on the basis of "special experience/competence/seniority" - The appellant, having 28 years of experience and a clean track record, was unanimously recommended for the post of Society Manager - The Registrar's cryptic rejection without assigning reasons was deemed unsustainable. Kamal Prasad Dubey v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 365 : 2026 INSC 353
Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 (SICA) – Repeal and Abatement of Proceedings – Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC) – Section 252 and Eighth Schedule – Noted that after the repeal of SICA on 01.12.2016, any appeal pending before the AAIFR stood abated - Companies were granted a 180-day window to approach the NCLT under the IBC - Where Jaipur Udyog Ltd. (JUL) and Gannon Dunkerley & Co. Ltd. (GDCL) failed to file any reference before the NCLT within the prescribed period, the appeal pending before the AAIFR abated, and the BIFR's recommendation for winding up of the company stood revived. [Paras 173–174] Bhartiya Mazdoor Sangh, v. State of U.P., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 373 : 2026 INSC 364
Specific Relief Act, 1963 – Section 31 – Intersection with Criminal Law – Held, it is a gross error to hold that criminal proceedings cannot be initiated unless registered instruments (like sale deeds) relied upon by the accused are first cancelled by a civil court - Civil and criminal remedies can proceed simultaneously even when allegations are identical. [Relied on Neeharika Infrastructure (P) Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra (2021) 19 SCC 401; Paras 41-60] Accamma Sam Jacob v. State of Karnataka, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 368 : 2026 INSC 362
State Bank of India Employees' Pension Fund Rules, 1955; Rule 22(i)(a), Rule 22(i)(c), Rule 20 and Rule 7 — Industrial Disputes Act, 1947; Section 33C(2) — Entitlement to Pension — Voluntary Abandonment vs. Voluntary Retirement — Qualifying Service - Maintainability of Claim under Section 33C(2) of ID Act - The Supreme Court noted that while the Labour Court and High Court dismissed the appellant's petition at the threshold on the technical ground of non-maintainability holding that proceedings under Section 33C(2) are executionary in nature and cannot adjudicate disputed pensionary rights the Court chose to decide the matter on its merits. K.G. Seshadri v. Trustees of State Bank of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 350 : 2026 INSC 333
State Bank of India Employees' Pension Fund Rules, 1955 - Computation of Qualifying Service under Rules 7 and 20 - Applying Rules 7 and 20, Supreme Court held that pensionable service is reckoned from the date of confirmation (admission to the fund) and not the initial date of appointment - the appellant's service (17.02.1979 to 12.12.1998) totalled 19 years, 9 months, and 25 days, failing to meet the mandatory 20-year threshold. K.G. Seshadri v. Trustees of State Bank of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 350 : 2026 INSC 333
State Bank of India Employees' Pension Fund Rules, 1955 - Eligibility for Pension under Rule 22(i)(c) — Voluntary Retirement Requirement - The appellant sought pension under Rule 22(i)(c), which requires 20 years of pensionable service and retirement at the employee's request in writing – Noted that the appellant ineligible as his cessation of service was not "voluntary retirement" but a "voluntary abandonment of service" declared by the Bank following his unauthorized absence from 24.01.1998 to 11.12.1998 and failure to respond to notices. K.G. Seshadri v. Trustees of State Bank of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 350 : 2026 INSC 333
State Bank of India Employees' Pension Fund Rules, 1955 - Eligibility under Rule 22(i)(a) — Age and Service Criteria Under Rule 22(i)(a) - an employee must complete 20 years of service and attain 50 years of age – Held that appellant failed both conditions, as his service was less than 20 years and he had not reached the age of 50 at the time of cessation - Even if the probation period were included, the claim would fail due to the age requirement. [Relied on Assistant General Manager, State Bank of India & Ors. vs. Radhey Shyam Pandey, 2020 (6) SCC 438; Rugmini Ganesh w/o Ganesh Raman Iyer vs. State Bank of India, 2018 SCC OnLine Bom 3884; Paras 17-32] K.G. Seshadri v. Trustees of State Bank of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 350 : 2026 INSC 333