Supreme Court Weekly Digest February 1 - 5, 2026

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Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2015 — Section 11(6A) — Paradigm Shift — The 2015 Amendment introduced Section 11(6A), which limited the Court's inquiry solely to the "existence" of an arbitration agreement, effectively overruling the Patel Engineering dictum for post-amendment cases – Noted for proceedings commenced prior to 23.10.2015, the broader judicial scrutiny...

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Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2015 — Section 11(6A) — Paradigm Shift — The 2015 Amendment introduced Section 11(6A), which limited the Court's inquiry solely to the "existence" of an arbitration agreement, effectively overruling the Patel Engineering dictum for post-amendment cases – Noted for proceedings commenced prior to 23.10.2015, the broader judicial scrutiny and finality of the Section 11 order under the old regime continue to apply – Appeal allowed. [Relied on SBP & Co. v. Patel Engineering Ltd. & Anr. (2005) 8 SCC 618; Paras 22-32] Eminent Colonizers v. Rajasthan Housing Board, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 109 : 2026 INSC 116

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; Section 29A(4) & 29A(5) - Power of Court to extend mandate after rendering of award – The Supreme Court held that an application for extension of the arbitrator's mandate under Section 29A(5) is maintainable even if it is filed after the expiry of the statutory period (12 months plus optional 6 months) and even after the award has been rendered in the interim - Noted that an award passed after the mandate has expired is unenforceable under Section 36 and "non est," but the arbitrator's indiscretion in passing such an award does not denude or impair the Court's jurisdiction to entertain an extension application. C. Velusamy v. K. Indhera, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 105 : 2026 INSC 112

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; Sections 8 and 11 — Arbitrability and Allegations of Fraud — Whether disputes can be referred to arbitration when the very existence of the arbitration agreement is seriously disputed on allegations of forgery and fabrication — Held: When allegations of fraud are made regarding the arbitration agreement itself, the dispute is generally recognized as non-arbitrable - Arbitration is founded upon consent, and a party can only be bound if it is shown, at least prima facie, that they agreed to the process - Where an arbitration clause is embedded in a document (such as the "Admission Deed") whose existence is stoutly denied and alleged to be forged, the controversy strikes at the root of arbitral jurisdiction – Noted that in such cases, the court must examine the issue as a jurisdictional inquiry rather than referring the matter to an arbitrator - While findings in Section 9 proceedings are prima facie, once they attain finality (e.g., via dismissal of an SLP), they cannot be ignored in subsequent proceedings under Sections 8 and 11 involving the same issue. Rajia Begum v. Barnali Mukherjee, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 101 : 2026 INSC 106

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 — Section 11, Section 16, and Section 34 — Pre-2015 Amendment Regime — Binding Nature of Section 11 Order — Res Judicata — Held that in cases governed by the SBP & Co. v. Patel Engineering Ltd. regime (prior to the 23.10.2015 amendments), the Section 11 Court exercised judicial power to determine the existence and validity of an arbitration agreement - Such a determination, even if implied, is binding on the parties at all subsequent stages, including before the Arbitral Tribunal and the Section 34 Court – Noted that the respondents, having failed to challenge the appointment order in the Supreme Court, cannot subsequently argue that the clause (Clause 23) was not an arbitration agreement. Eminent Colonizers v. Rajasthan Housing Board, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 109 : 2026 INSC 116

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – Section 34 & Section 37 – Scope of Judicial Review – Modification of Arbitral Awards – Power to Modify – The Supreme Court upheld the power of a Court under Section 34 to modify an arbitral award to a limited extent, particularly when applying contractually agreed clauses to admitted facts – Noted that a Section 37 Court cannot substitute its own view for a plausible view taken by a Section 34 Court regarding the determination of "reasonable compensation" unless that determination is arbitrary or perverse. Saisudhir Energy Ltd. v. NTPC Vidyut Vyapar Nigam Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 112 : 2026 INSC 103

Armed Forces Tribunal Act, 2007 – Section 14 – Judicial Review of Show Cause Notice – Where a Show Cause Notice for termination (under Regulation 216 of Navy Regulations) is directly premised on the findings and recommendations of an ICC report, the Tribunal cannot dismiss the challenge as "premature" or "merely at the preliminary stage" - The Tribunal is duty-bound to adjudicate upon the correctness of the ICC report and recommendations which form the foundational basis of the termination notice. 42605-B CDR Yogesh Mahla v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 103 : 2026 INSC 107

Constitution of India, 1950; Article 227 — Code of Civil Procedure, 1908; Order VII Rule 11 and Order VI Rule 16 — Supervisory Jurisdiction vs. Statutory Remedy — The Supreme Court held that the High Court cannot invoke its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 to strike off a plaint when a specific statutory remedy for rejection of the plaint exists under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC - The existence of an alternative remedy under the CPC acts as a "near total bar" against the exercise of powers under Article 227 - Noted that Order VI Rule 16, which pertains to striking out specific "pleadings" (parts or sections), cannot be utilized as a tool to strike down an entire plaint - Supervisory power is intended to keep subordinate courts within their bounds, not to serve as an "appeal in disguise" or to circumvent statutory law - Key Principles held – i. Alternative Remedy as a Bar - Where a specific remedy is provided under the CPC, the High Court should, as a matter of discipline and prudence, desist from exercising its power of superintendence; ii. Factual Inquiry - Rejection of a plaint under Order VII Rule 11 often requires factual inquiries (e.g., disclosure of cause of action, valuation disputes) which are inappropriate for summary determination under Article 227; iii. Scope of Order VI Rule 16 - This provision is for removing unnecessary, scandalous, or vexatious matters within a pleading, not for the wholesale dismissal of a suit – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Shalini Shyam Shetty vs. Rajendra Shankar Patil (2010) 8 SCC 32; Virudhunagar Hindu Nadargal Dharma Paribalana Sabai vs. Tuticorin Educational Society (2019) 9 SCC 538; Radhey Shyam vs. Chhabi Nath (2015) 5 SCC 423; State vs. Navjot Sandhu (2003) 6 SCC 641; Paras 6-11] P. Suresh v. D. Kalaivani, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 116 : 2026 INSC 121

Constitution of India; Article 227 — Supervisory Jurisdiction — The jurisdiction under Article 227 is not an appellate jurisdiction in disguise and does not permit the reappreciation of evidence – Held that the High Court was not justified in dislodging concurrent findings of the Trial Court and First Appellate Court to refer a dispute to arbitration when the existence of the agreement was under serious doubt. [Relied on: Managing Director Bihar State Food and Civil Supply Corporation Limited v. Sanjay Kumar, (2025) SCC OnLine SC 1604; Avitel Post Studioz Ltd. & Ors. v. HSBC PI Holdings (Mauritius) Ltd., (2021) 4 SCC 713; Rashid Raza v. Sadaf Akhtar, (2019) 8 SCC 710; A. Ayyasamy v. A. Paramasivam & Others, (2016) 10 SCC 386; Paras 16- 23] Rajia Begum v. Barnali Mukherjee, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 101 : 2026 INSC 106

Constitution of India – Article 21A and Article 23 – Right to Education and Prohibition of Forced Labour – Contractual Teachers – Honorarium Revision – The Supreme Court held that part-time contractual instructors appointed under the Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan (now Samagra Shiksha Scheme) in Upper Primary Schools are entitled to periodic revision of their honorarium – Noted that keeping such teachers on a stagnant, meager honorarium (initially ₹7,000/-) for over a decade, while prohibiting them from taking other employment, amounts to "economic coercion" and "forced labour" (Begar) prohibited under Article 23. U.P. Junior High School Council Instructor Welfare Association v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 110

Contract Act, 1872 – Section 74 – Liquidated Damages – Public Utility Projects – Proof of Actual Loss –In projects involving public utility or public interest (such as solar power projects under the National Solar Mission), it is not mandatory to prove actual loss for the award of liquidated damages - The delay in commissioning such a utility itself constitutes a loss to the public. The burden shifts to the party in breach to prove that no loss was caused - Key Findings held – i. Admitted Breach - The Solar Power Developer (SEL) admitted to delays in commissioning the 20 MW project (two months for the first 10 MW and five months for the balance); ii. Public Interest - The project, executed under the Jawaharlal Nehru National Solar Mission (JNNSM), was a public utility activity aimed at promoting green energy; thus, the strict proof of financial loss by the nodal agency (NVVNL) was unnecessary; iii. Jurisdictional Error by Division Bench - The Division Bench, acting under Section 37, erred by recalculating and reducing the compensation from 50% of the contractual claim (as awarded by the Single Judge) to a lower amount, as this amounted to a merits-based substitution of a plausible view. [Relied on Gayatri Balasamy vs. ISG Novasoft Technologies Limited (2025 INSC 605); AC Chokshi Share Broker Private Limited vs. Jatin Pratap Desai and another (2025 INSC 174); Paras 12-18] Saisudhir Energy Ltd. v. NTPC Vidyut Vyapar Nigam Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 112 : 2026 INSC 103

Criminal Law — Arrest — Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) — Section 35 — Mandatory issuance of notice for offences punishable with imprisonment up to 7 years — Interplay between Section 35(1)(b) and Section 35(3) to 35(6) — Discretionary nature of arrest - Core Principles and Rulings – i. Rule of Notice vs. Exception of Arrest - The Supreme Court held that for offences punishable with imprisonment up to 7 years, issuing a notice under Section 35(3) of the BNSS is the rule, whereas effecting an arrest under Section 35(6) read with Section 35(1)(b) is a clear exception; ii. Mandatory Checklist for Arrest - For an arrest to be legally justified in the specified category of offences, compliance with Section 35(1)(b)(i) (reason to believe) along with at least one condition mentioned in Section 35(1)(b)(ii) is a sine qua non; ii. No Automatic Arrest on Non-Compliance - Even if an individual fails to comply with the terms of a notice under Section 35(3) or is unwilling to identify themselves, arrest is not a matter of course - The Investigating Agency must still form an opinion that the arrest is an objective necessity for the investigation; iii. Fresh Materials Required for Subsequent Arrest - If a police officer decides to arrest an individual after having already issued a notice under Section 35(3), such an arrest must be based on materials and factors that were not available at the time the notice was issued; iv. Judicial Scrutiny - Magistrates must not authorize detention in a casual or mechanical manner - They are required to peruse the report and checklist furnished by the police officer to ensure the necessity of arrest is justified under the statutory parameters. [Relied on Arnesh Kumar v. State of Bihar & Anr, (2014) 8 SCC 273; Satender Kumar Antil v. Central Bureau of Investigation, (2022) 10 SCC 51; State of Uttar Pradesh v. Bhagwant Kishore Joshi, (1964) 3 SCR 71; Paras 20-33] Satender Kumar Antil v. Central Bureau of Investigation, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 114 : 2026 INSC 115

Criminal Procedure – Social Media Posts & Political Speech – Guidelines for Registration of FIRs – Supreme Court refuses to interfere with the Telangana High Court's judgment quashing criminal proceedings and issuing mandatory operational guidelines for police and Magistrates when dealing with complaints based on social media posts – Noted that the High Court's guidelines (Para 29) aim to safeguard fundamental rights and prevent the mechanical or arbitrary invocation of the criminal process - Key Guidelines Upheld – i. Verification of Locus Standi - Police must verify if a complainant is a "person aggrieved" before registering FIRs for defamation or similar offences; ii. High Threshold for Media-Related Offences - Cases involving intentional insult, public mischief, or threat to public order shall not be registered unless there is prima facie material disclosing incitement to violence or hatred; iii. Protection of Political Speech: Constitutional protections under Article must be scrupulously enforced; mechanical registration of cases for harsh or critical political speech is prohibited; iv. Defamation Procedure - As a non-cognizable offence, police cannot directly register an FIR; complainants must be directed to a Magistrate, and action may only follow an order under Section 174(2) of the BNSS; v. Prior Legal Scrutiny: In sensitive cases involving expression, police must obtain a prior legal opinion from the Public Prosecutor before registration. [Relied on Kedar Nath Singh v. State of Bihar, 1962 Supp (2) SCR 769; Shreya Singhal v. Union of India, (2015) 5 SCC 1; Arnesh Kumar v. State of Bihar, (2014) 8 SCC 273; Paras 6,7] State of Telangana v. Nalla Balu @ Durgam Shashidhar Goud, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 113

Custody of Minors – Paramount Consideration vs. Holistic Factors - The Supreme Court held that while the welfare of the child is the "paramount consideration" in custody disputes, the High Court erred in holding that other factors—such as the conduct of the parents, financial capacity, standard of living, and the child's education are not relevant – Noted that these factors have a cumulative effect and are necessary for determining a custody arrangement - noted that the respondent-wife had removed the children from Qatar to India mid-academic session without the father's consent or original passports, using "fake or duplicate" documents - This conduct, coupled with her violation of a court undertaking to return the children to Qatar for which she was found guilty of contempt constituted material aspects that the High Court failed to consider - Supreme Court highlighted that the High Court ignored the impact of the Qatar Court's order (dated 31.10.2023), which had revoked the wife's custody due to her misconduct in removing the children from its jurisdiction - The Supreme Court observed that, at the time of the High Court's judgment, there was no subsisting order of custody in favor of the mother; rather, an order existed in favor of the father as the guardian - Relying on mediation reports and interviews, noted that both minor children expressed an inclination to join their father in Qatar, despite limited memory of life there - The elder child felt his father's presence was sufficient for his care, and both appeared comfortable being without their mother - The High Court judgment was set aside for ignoring "material and crucial aspects." The matter was remanded for reconsideration on merits within four months – Appeal allowed. [Paras 22-33] Mohtashem Billah Malik v. Sana Aftab, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 115

Discretionary Toolkit of the Court – Held that while exercising power under Section 29A, the Court must examine "sufficient cause" and may deploy several measures to ensure integrity and efficiency – i. Reduction of arbitrator fees (up to 5% per month of delay); ii. Substitution of one or all arbitrators; iii. Imposition of actual or exemplary costs on parties; iv. Imposition of specific terms and conditions for the conduct of proceedings. C. Velusamy v. K. Indhera, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 105 : 2026 INSC 112

Distinction Between Precedent and Res Judicata — Section 11(7) — Held that while a "precedent" operates in rem and serves as a source of law for other parties, "res judicata" operates in personam between the same parties to ensure finality in litigation - Even if other benches of a High Court interpreted an identical clause differently in separate litigations (precedent), the specific order appointing the arbitrator between the current parties constitutes res judicata regarding the existence of the arbitration agreement - The correctness of the initial decision is immaterial unless it relates to a lack of inherent jurisdiction. Eminent Colonizers v. Rajasthan Housing Board, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 109 : 2026 INSC 116

Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 – Section 25 – Permanent Alimony – Enhancement Of Maintenance – The Supreme Court Enhanced The Permanent alimony awarded to the appellant-wife from ₹15,000/- to ₹30,000/- per month - Noted that the initial amount was inadequate considering the respondent-husband's profession as a doctor with an approximate monthly income of ₹1,60,000/-, the current cost of living, and the impact of inflation – Held that a woman Is Entitled To Live A life consistent with the standard of living she was accustomed to during the subsistence of the marriage - The obligation of the husband to ensure the wife lives with dignity does not end merely because she is educated or has parental support - Sustenance does not mean mere survival; it means leading a life in a similar manner as she would have lived in the house of her husband. Anamika Jain v. Dr. Atul Jain, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 111

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947; Section 2(j) – Definition of "Industry" – Temple/Charitable Trust – The Supreme Court declined to interfere with the findings of the Labour Court and High Court which held that the respondent-Trust, being a temple and a charity-based institution with no object of earning profit or manufacturing activity, does not fall within the definition of "industry". Indravadan N. Adhvaryu Pipala Fali Modhvada v. Laxminarayan Dev Trust, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 102

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 – Termination – Grant of Monetary Compensation – Where a permanent employee (Accountant) was orally terminated after twelve years of unblemished service without an inquiry, the Court directed the payment of a lump-sum compensation of ₹12,00,000/- in full and final settlement, even without deciding on the merits of the "industry" status, to lay the entire issue to rest. [Relied on Bangalore Water Supply & Sewerage Board vs. A. Rajappa and Others (1978) 2 SCC 213; Paras 2-5] Indravadan N. Adhvaryu Pipala Fali Modhvada v. Laxminarayan Dev Trust, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 102

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Real Estate Project – Default in Possession – Completion Certificate – Where a developer fails to obtain a final completion certificate and fails to execute tripartite sublease deeds as required by the lessor (UPSIDA), physical delivery of possession without such legal formalities has no legal import - The existence of a financial debt and default is established when units are not made ready or delivered in a fit state for occupation despite payment of consideration. [Relied on Manish Kumar vs. Union of India (2021) 5 SCC 1; Surendra Trading Company vs. Juggilal Kamlapat Jute Mills Company Limited (2017) 16 SCC 143; Edelweiss Asset Reconstruction Company Limited vs. Sachet Infrastructure Private Limited (2019) SCC OnLine NCLAT 592; Paras 31 - 37] Satinder Singh Bhasin v. Col. Gautam Mullick, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 100 : 2026 INSC 104

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Section 7(1) Second Proviso – Threshold of 100 Allottees – Relevant Date for Calculation – The Supreme Court reaffirmed that the crucial date for ascertaining whether the minimum threshold of 100 allottees (or 10% of total allottees) is met is the date of filing of the petition, and not the date of its admission or hearing - Any subsequent settlements or withdrawals during the pendency of the proceedings do not render the petition non-maintainable if the threshold was met at the time of presentation. [Para 9, 21] Satinder Singh Bhasin v. Col. Gautam Mullick, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 100 : 2026 INSC 104

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Section 7 – Maintainability of Joint Petition – Multi-Corporate Entities – Threshold Requirement – Supreme Court upheld the maintainability of a single Section 7 application against two separate corporate entities (Grand Venezia Ltd. and Bhasin Ltd.) where they were found to be "intrinsically linked" in the construction and implementation of a real estate project -Noted that interlinkage of related corporate debtors is beneficial for value maximization and for continuing companies as going concerns. [Para 11 - 16, 20 - 26] Satinder Singh Bhasin v. Col. Gautam Mullick, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 100 : 2026 INSC 104

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 — Sections 8(b), 22(c), 25, 27-A, and 29 — Grant of Bail — Prolonged Incarceration vs. Seriousness of Offence — Prosecution's Intention to Examine 159 Witnesses — The petitioner was arrested on March 29, 2022, in connection with the recovery of approximately 2428 Kilograms of Mephedrone - Despite the seriousness of the crime, Supreme Court noted that the petitioner remained in judicial custody as an undertrial prisoner for over 3 years and 6 months - the charge was only framed on January 16, 2026, after the Court's previous intervention. Chintan Rajubhai Panseriya v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 99

National Company Law Tribunal Rules, 2016 – Rule 28 – Amendment of Petition before Registration – Abuse of Process – held that alterations or substitutions in the memorandum of parties (names of allottees) made after the initial filing but before formal "registration" by the Registrar do not constitute an abuse of process - Under Rule 28(3), a party is allowed to rectify and amend a returned petition - An application is only treated as "validly filed" once it is complete in every respect and registered under Rule 28(4). [Paras 23, 24] Satinder Singh Bhasin v. Col. Gautam Mullick, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 100 : 2026 INSC 104

Navy Act, 1957 – Section 15(2) read with Regulation 216 of Navy (Discipline and Miscellaneous Provisions) Regulations, 1967 – Termination of Service – While the Government/Chief of Naval Staff has the power to terminate services for misconduct, such power must be exercised based on specific foundational facts: (i) meaningful consideration of misconduct reports, (ii) satisfaction that a court-martial is inexpedient, and (iii) an opinion that further retention of the officer is undesirable – Appeal allowed. [Paras 20 - 27] 42605-B CDR Yogesh Mahla v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 103 : 2026 INSC 107

Practice and Procedure – Misconceived SLPs – Article 136 – The Supreme Court observed that the petitions were "misconceived at the threshold" as they combined a challenge to a High Court order with a prayer to secure the benefits of that very same order - Discretionary jurisdiction under Article 136 cannot be invoked to grant relief that does not arise from an adjudication of the petitioners' rights on merits. Damor Nanabhai Manabhai v. State of Gujarat, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 104

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988; Section 17A – Jurisdiction of State Anti-Corruption Bureau (ACB) over Central Government Employees – The Supreme Court upheld the Rajasthan High Court's finding that the State ACB has the jurisdiction to register criminal cases, investigate, and file charge-sheets against Central Government employees for offences committed within the State's territorial jurisdiction - It is incorrect to contend that the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) holds exclusive jurisdiction or that its prior consent is mandatory for the ACB to proceed. [Para 3] Anil Daima v. State of Rajasthan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 108 : 2026 INSC 72

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988; Section 17A – Scope of Previous Approval – Demand of Illegal Gratification –The protection under Section 17A, which requires previous approval for enquiries or investigations into decisions taken or recommendations made by a public servant in the discharge of official duties, does not apply to cases involving the demand of illegal gratification - Noted that Section 17A was enacted with a specific object and cannot, by any stretch of imagination, be applied to bribery/extortion cases as these do not constitute "official functions or duties." [Paras 6-7] Anil Daima v. State of Rajasthan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 108 : 2026 INSC 72

Quantum Of Maintenance – Factors To Be Considered – While Fixing the quantum, courts must consider the status of the parties, reasonable needs of the wife and dependent children, the husband's actual income, and his liabilities - The financial position of the wife's parents is immaterial - The fact that a wife is educated or capable of earning is not a sufficient ground to deny or reduce maintenance if her independent income is insufficient to maintain the lifestyle of the matrimonial home – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Bhuwan Mohan Singh v. Meena and others (2015) 6 SCC 353; Rajnesh v. Neha and another (2021) 2 SCC 324; Manish Jain v. Akanksha Jain (2017) 15 SCC 801; Shailji v. Khobbanna (2018) 2 SCC (Civ) 712; Paras 10-15] Anamika Jain v. Dr. Atul Jain, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 111

Representation of the People Act, 1951 – Section 8A, Section 99, and Section 123 – Corrupt Practices – Power of Disqualification – Issue- Whether the High Court, while setting aside an election on the grounds of corrupt practices, has the jurisdiction to directly disqualify a candidate for a specific period? - Held: No, The power to pass an order of disqualification under the Representation of the People Act, 1951, rests solely with the President of India and not with the High Court – Held that - i. Statutory Procedure for Disqualification - Under Section 8A of the RP Act, 1951, once a person is found guilty of a corrupt practice by an order under Section 99, the case must be submitted to the President of India for determination of whether the person shall be disqualified and for what period; ii. Role of the President and Election Commission - The President must obtain the opinion of the Election Commission before making a decision and is bound to act according to such opinion; iii. Excess of Jurisdiction - In the instant case, the High Court erred by directly disqualifying the appellant for six years in its operative order - By doing so, the High Court exercised powers and jurisdiction that are statutorily reserved for the President of India; iv. Operative Portion Set Aside - The Supreme Court set aside Clause 2 of the High Court's order which had disqualified the appellant for six years - noted that since the 2016-2021 term had already lapsed, the challenge to the setting aside of the election was no longer a "live issue". [Paras 7-12] K.M. Shaji v. M.V. Nikesh Kumar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 107 : 2026 INSC 111

Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 – Section 7(5) and Rule 20(3) – The State Government has an "onerous duty" to provide funds for the Act's implementation - Under Rule 20(3), instructors must be paid at par with regular teachers having similar qualifications and experience - The State cannot deny payment citing the Central Government's failure to release its 60% share; the State must "pay and recover" the balance from the Union - Reaffirmed that the existence of an alternative remedy (under Section 24(3) of the Act) is a rule of "prudence and self-restraint," not an absolute bar - Since the matter was already adjudicated on merits by the High Court, relegating parties to an alternative forum would defeat the ends of justice - directed the State of Uttar Pradesh to pay an honorarium of ₹17,000/- per month to all instructors with effect from 2017-18. [Relied on Rajasthan State Electricity Board v. Union of India (2008) 5 SCC 632; Harbanslal Sahnia v. Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. (2003) 2 SCC 107; Jaggo v. Union of India and Ors. 2024 SCC Online SC 3826; People's Union For Democratic Rights v. Union of India (1982) 3 SCC 235; Paras 41-69] U.P. Junior High School Council Instructor Welfare Association v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 110

Role of the Bar – Professional Ethics – Supreme Court emphasized that the Bar has an important role in ensuring litigation does not become endless - Counsel are expected to place the full procedural history with clarity and advise litigants against pursuing repetitive proceedings that seek to reopen concluded issues. [Relied on Union of India v. M.K. Sarkar, (2010) 2 SCC 59; State of Uttar Pradesh v. Arvind Kumar Srivastava, (2015) 1 SCC 347; Paras 7-9] Damor Nanabhai Manabhai v. State of Gujarat, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 104

Service Jurisprudence – Deemed Permanency and Substantive Appointment – Supreme Court ruled that instructors continuing for over ten years in a row against mandatory student-teacher ratio requirements acquire a degree of permanency - Even if originally contractual, these appointments are treated as "substantive in character" because they were made through a public selection process and the nature of work is permanent and integral to the institution - The PAB is the sole central authority with financial powers to approve budgets and fix honoraria under the scheme - Once the PAB approved a proposal to pay ₹17,000/- per month, the State Executive Committee had no authority to unilaterally reduce or ignore this determination. U.P. Junior High School Council Instructor Welfare Association v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 110

Service Law – Reopening of Concluded Litigation – Delay and Laches – "Fence-sitters" – The Supreme Court dismissed Special Leave Petitions filed by primary school teachers seeking to revive a service dispute that had attained finality over a decade ago - The petitioners sought directions similar to a 2021 High Court order which directed the consideration of a representation for higher grade pay scales - held that the petitioners, whose services were terminated in 1994 and whose prior challenges were dismissed in 2009 and 2011, were not "identically situated" to the 2021 petitioner who was still in service. Damor Nanabhai Manabhai v. State of Gujarat, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 104

Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013 – Section 18 – Appeal against ICC Recommendations – Jurisdiction of Armed Forces Tribunal (AFT) – The Supreme Court held that an appeal under Section 18 of the POSH Act is maintainable before the Armed Forces Tribunal when read in juxtaposition with Section 14 of the Armed Forces Tribunal Act, 2007 – Held that the High Court erred in holding that the appellant had no right of appeal under Section 18 of the POSH Act against the recommendations of the Internal Complaints Committee (ICC). 42605-B CDR Yogesh Mahla v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 103 : 2026 INSC 107

Stale Claims and Representations – The Supreme Court reiterated that the practice of reviving stale or dead claims by making repeated representations followed by a prayer to "consider" them is disapproved - Rejection of a belated representation does not furnish a fresh cause of action - Courts must satisfy themselves that a claim relates to a "live issue" before issuing directions for consideration. Damor Nanabhai Manabhai v. State of Gujarat, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 104

Statutory Interpretation of Section 29A – The expression "if an award is not made" in Section 29A(4) does not create a threshold bar for cases where a late award has been delivered; rather, it empowers the Court to ensure proceedings reach their logical conclusion of a binding award - Termination of the mandate under Section 29A(4) is "conditional" and not "absolutistic," meaning it is subject to the Court's power to revive and extend the mandate retrospectively – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Rohan Builders (India) Pvt. Ltd. v. Berger Paints India Ltd., 2024 SCC Online SC 2494; Paras 13-23] C. Velusamy v. K. Indhera, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 105 : 2026 INSC 112

Trial Delay and Witness Management — Noted that the prosecution expressed intent to examine 159 witnesses - noted that even examining 50% of these witnesses would take a "pretty long time" and questioned the necessity of multiplying witnesses on the same issues – noted that the prosecution should focus on important witnesses to establish its case rather than prolonging the trial - While acknowledging the gravity of the NDPS charges, exercised its discretion in favor of the petitioner due to the overall delay and the age of pending cases in the Trial Court - Bail granted subject to terms imposed by the Trial Court and specific conditions including a travel restriction to Ankleshwar, Gujarat, and surrender of passport. [Paras 5-11] Chintan Rajubhai Panseriya v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 99

Water Disputes - The Supreme Court directed constitution of a Tribunal for resolving disputes pending between the States of Tamil Nadu and Karnataka over sharing of Pennaiyar river water resources. The Court ordered the constitution of a Water Disputes Tribunal by the Central Government within 1 month. State of Tamil Nadu v. State of Karnataka, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 106

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