Administrative Law – Publication and Promulgation – Noted that Law, to bind, must first exist and be made known in the manner ordained by the legislature - The requirement of publication in the Official Gazette for delegated legislation is not an "empty formality" but a dual-purpose constitutional requirement to ensure accessibility to the governed and accountability in the exercise...
Administrative Law – Publication and Promulgation – Noted that Law, to bind, must first exist and be made known in the manner ordained by the legislature - The requirement of publication in the Official Gazette for delegated legislation is not an "empty formality" but a dual-purpose constitutional requirement to ensure accessibility to the governed and accountability in the exercise of executive power - Until publication, a Notification is merely an "intention" and has not crossed the threshold to become a legal "obligation." Viraj Impex Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 76 : 2026 INSC 80
Advocates Act, 1961 – Section 35 and Section 38 – Professional Misconduct – Withdrawal of Complaint – Sustainability of Disciplinary Action – The Supreme Court set aside the order of the Disciplinary Committee of the Bar Council of India (BCI) which had held an advocate guilty of professional misconduct and imposed a penalty of Rs. 1 Lakh – Noted that the BCI failed to consider that the complainant had filed a sworn affidavit seeking to withdraw the complaint, stating the initial grievance arose from a "misunderstanding" regarding the deposit of costs and expressing full satisfaction with the advocate's services. Monty Goyal v. Navrang Singh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 91 : 2026 INSC 94
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; Section 2(1)(e), Section 11, and Section 29A — Jurisdiction to extend the mandate of an Arbitral Tribunal — Held that the expression "Court" used in Section 29A for the extension of time or substitution of arbitrators refers strictly to the Court as defined under Section 2(1)(e) of the Act - This definition encompasses the Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction in a district and includes a High Court only if it exercises ordinary original civil jurisdiction - The Supreme Court or High Courts exercising power under Section 11 to appoint an arbitrator do not retain supervisory control and become functus officio once the appointment is made. Jagdeep Chowgule v. Sheela Chowgule, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 89 : 2026 INSC 92
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; Section 29A vs. Section 11 — Separation of Appointment and Supervision — Held that the power of appointment under Section 11 is a "special and limited" jurisdiction - It is a misconception to assume a hierarchy where only the appointing Court can extend the mandate - The extension of a mandate or substitution under Section 29A is a measure of curial supervision, not an "appointment" under Section 11 – Held that applications for extending an arbitral tribunal's mandate under Section 29A (4) of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 must be filed exclusively before the 'Court' as defined in Section 2(1)(e) i.e., the principal civil court of original jurisdiction, regardless of which authority appointed the arbitrators - Interpretations based on a perceived "conflict of power" or "hierarchical difficulties" between a Civil Court and a High Court are untenable and opposed to the rule of law. Jagdeep Chowgule v. Sheela Chowgule, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 89 : 2026 INSC 92
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; Section 42 — Inapplicability to Section 11 — Section 42, which mandates that subsequent applications be filed in the same Court where the first application was made, does not apply to Section 11 applications - The Chief Justice or their delegate exercising power under Section 11 is not a "Court" as defined by Section 2(1)(e); therefore, a Section 11 application does not fix the jurisdiction for Section 29A applications – Appeals allowed. [Relied on SBP and Co. v. Patel Engineering Ltd. (2005) 8 SCC 618; State of West Bengal v. Associated Contractors (2015) 1 SCC 32; State of Jharkhand v. Hindustan Construction Co. Ltd. (2018) 2 SCC 602; Chief Engineer (NH) PWD (Roads) v. BSC&C and C JV 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1801; Paras 15-26] Jagdeep Chowgule v. Sheela Chowgule, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 89 : 2026 INSC 92
Arbitration — Setting aside of Award — Patent Illegality and Public Policy — Interpretation of Contract: The Supreme Court affirmed that the construction and interpretation of contractual terms are primarily within the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal - If an arbitrator adopts one of two plausible interpretations, the court cannot substitute its own view merely because an alternative view is possible - An award is not "patently illegal" or against "public policy" simply because of a mere contravention of law; it must violate fundamental principles of justice. [Paras 26, 29, 33, 59] National Highways Authority of India v. Gammon Atlanta (JV), 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 71 : 2026 INSC 76
Bail - Condition of Upfront Deposit or Undertaking to Pay Arrears/Siphoned Amounts as a Pre-condition for Bail Deprecated - High Courts Must Decide Bail on Merits Rather Than Deferring Due to Non-Payment - The Supreme Court of India has reiterated that the practice of courts insisting on upfront deposits, or undertakings for such deposits, as a condition for considering a bail prayer on merits is improper - Such practices have the potential to derail the criminal justice delivery system by becoming a tool for complainants to extort settlements and forcing the accused to give up their right of defense - In the present case, the appellant was denied an extension of interim bail by the High Court solely because he failed to fulfill an undertaking to deposit the remaining balance of an alleged siphoned subsidy amount (approx. ₹4.10 crore), despite having already deposited over 50% of the amount - The Supreme Court held that – i. In offences under Section 409 IPC, there is no automatic presumption regarding the culpability of a Director; it must be established during the trial; ii. An inability to comply with a financial undertaking is not a valid ground to defer the consideration of a bail prayer on its merits, especially when the investigation is complete and the accused has already suffered significant incarceration; iii. The appropriate course for the High Court was to decide the regular bail application on its own merits rather than keeping the matter pending through repeated interim extensions tied to upfront deposits. [Relied on Gajanan Dattatray Gore vs. State of Maharashtra and Anr. 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1571; Paras 11-14] Rakesh Jain v. State, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 81
Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) – Section 175(3) and Section 175(4) – Interplay and Procedural Safeguards - The Supreme Court clarified that Section 175(4) is not an independent or standalone provision, nor is it a mere proviso to Section 175(3) - the two sub-sections must be read harmoniously. Section 175(4) acts as a procedural adjunct and an additional protective layer for public servants - Supreme Court held that although Section 175(4) uses the term "complaint" (which under Section 2(1)(h) can include oral allegations), in the context of proceedings against public servants, it must be interpreted as a written complaint supported by an affidavit - It is illogical to require an affidavit for allegations against private individuals under Section 175(3) but exempt it for public servants under Section 175(4). [Relied on Priyanka Srivastava v. State of U.P. 2015 6 SCC 287; Lalita Kumari v. Govt. of U.P 2014 2 SCC 1; Radhe Shyam v. Chhabi Nath 2015 5 SCC 423; Pradnya Pranjal Kulkarni v. State of Maharashtra 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1948; Paras 20-29, 37-39, 45-48] xxx v. State of Kerala, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 85 : 2026 INSC 88
Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) – Two-Tier Protection for Public Servants – Noted that BNSS provides a dual-protection mechanism for public officials: i. Threshold Stage: Under Section 175(4), a Magistrate must call for a report from the superior officer and consider the assertions of the accused public servant before ordering an investigation; ii. Cognizance Stage: Under Section 218(1), prior government sanction is required before the Court takes cognizance. xxx v. State of Kerala, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 85 : 2026 INSC 88
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Order I Rule 10 – Dominus Litis – Joinder of Parties – Noted that the petitioner is dominus litis and has the right to decide who to join as a party - The Registry cannot make inroads into judicial domains by questioning why a particular party was arrayed as a respondent - If unnecessary parties are joined, Supreme Court can delete them under Order I Rule 10 CPC or deal with it judicially if done with ill-motive - Supreme Court observed with "pain" that there was an "abandonment of its judicial role by the High Court" in rejecting the petition in such an unjust manner – Appeal allowed. [Paras 7-13] Sri Mukund Maheswar v. Axis Bank Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 82 : 2026 INSC 84
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Order VII Rule 11 – Rejection of Plaint – Where a property is neither notified in the official list of auqaf nor registered with the Waqf Board, a suit for injunction simpliciter regarding such property cannot be entertained by the Waqf Tribunal – noted that the plaint is liable to be rejected as the Tribunal lacks the mandatory statutory requirement to adjudicate the property's status – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Ramesh Gobindram v. Sugra Humayun Mirza Wakf (2010) 8 SCC 726; Paras 20-50] Habib Alladin v. Mohammed Ahmed, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 88 : 2026 INSC 90
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Order VII Rule 7 and Order VI Rule 17 CPC – Pleadings and Reliefs – Multiple reliefs and defective prayers –Rejection of a writ petition because multiple reliefs were claimed in a single prayer is "perhaps, unprecedented" - If a prayer is defective or does not conform to Writ Rules, the High Court should permit amendments under principles of Order VI Rule 17 CPC or mould the relief - A claim cannot be dismissed simply because a suitor claims a wider relief than they are entitled to; the court remains free to grant a lesser relief. Sri Mukund Maheswar v. Axis Bank Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 82 : 2026 INSC 84
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Order VI Rule 4 CPC – Pleading Standards – Rule Against "Clever Drafting" – A party alleging that a registered Deed is a sham must satisfy a rigorous standard of pleading by providing clear, cogent, and convincing averments with material particulars - Adopting a test akin to Order VI Rule 4 of the CPC, Supreme Court held that "clever drafting" creating an illusion of a cause of action is impermissible - Mere suspicion or nebulous averments without material particulars are insufficient to dislodge the presumption under Sections 91 and 92 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. [Paras 34, 35] Hemalatha v. Tukaram, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 79 : 2026 INSC 82
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Quashing of FIR – Validity of interim directions to follow arrest procedures – The Supreme Court set aside an order of the High Court of Telangana which, while disposing of a petition to quash an FIR on the very first day, directed the Investigating Officer to follow the procedure under Section 35(3) of the BNSS (previously Section 41-A Cr.PC) and the Arnesh Kumar guidelines without hearing the defacto complainant. Practical Solutions Inc. v. State of Telangana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 74
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 — Section 164 — Confessional Statements — Retracted and Exculpatory Confessions — Legal Aid — Held: A confession must be a direct acknowledgment of guilt to form the basis of a conviction – noted that in the present case, the confession of A1 was exculpatory (accusing the co-accused), and A2's statement did not admit to murder; thus, they could not be relied upon - the Magistrate failed to inform the accused of their right to legal aid before recording the statements, violating mandatory duties. [Paras 23-28] Bernard Lyngdoh Phawa v. State of Meghalaya, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 84 : 2026 INSC 85
Condonation of Delay – Special Leave Petition – Consistent Negligence by Statutory Body – The Supreme Court dismissed a Special Leave Petition filed by the Delhi Development Authority (DDA) due to an unexplained and "fatal" delay of 235 days - noted a pattern of consistent delay by the DDA, highlighting prior delays of 685 days in filing a Letters Patent Appeal (LPA) and 577 days in filing a review petition before the High Court - clarified that a development authority cannot be granted special indulgence or immunity from limitation periods simply by virtue of its status - The explanation provided for the delay was deemed neither satisfactory nor sufficient in law – Noted that that the DDA should implement a robust litigation policy and screening process for cases before filing them belatedly, noting that such actions contribute to "docket explosion" and the unnecessary consumption of judicial time - The petition was dismissed on the grounds of delay with a cost of Rs. 10,000/- to be paid to the Supreme Court Legal Services Committee within six weeks. Delhi Development Authority v. Shilya, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 75
Constitution of India, 1950; Article 136 — Scope of Interference — Contract Law — Unconscionable Agreements — "Lion and Lamb" Analogy - While the Court is cautious with concurrent findings, it can interfere under Article 136 if findings are perverse, disregard statutory provisions, or result in substantial and grave injustice – Noted that an appellant must demonstrate exceptional circumstances for such review - Where a "mighty" State (the lion) contracts with an individual job seeker (the lamb), the inequality is structural - Clauses barring claims for regularization in such standard-form contracts are unconscionable if the employee had no meaningful choice but to "sign on the dotted line." - Acceptance of such terms does not amount to a waiver of fundamental rights - Continuous service for over a decade, supported by repeated extensions and satisfactory performance, nurtures a legitimate expectation of recognition - The bar against this doctrine for contractual workers only applies if the initial appointment lacked a proper selection process - directed the respondent-State to forthwith regularize the services of all the appellants against the sanctioned posts to which they were initially appointed - The appellants shall be entitled to all consequential service benefits accruing from the date of this judgment. [Relied on State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (2006) 4 SCC 1; Central Inland Water Transport Corpn. v. Brojo Nath Ganguly (1986) 3 SCC 156; Chandra Singh v. State of Rajasthan (2003) 6 SCC 545; Army Welfare Education Society v. Sunil Kumar Sharma (2024) 16 SCC 598; Jaggo v. Union of India, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3826; State of Karnataka v. Uma Devi, (2006) 4 SCC 1; Paras 11-14] Bhola Nath v. State of Jharkhand, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 95 : 2026 INSC 99
Constitution of India, 1950; Article 14 and 16 — Regularization of Service — Model Employer — The Supreme Court set aside the Jharkhand High Court's refusal to regularize contractual employees who had served for over a decade in sanctioned posts - held that the State, as a "model employer," cannot exploit the unequal bargaining power of employees by keeping them in perpetual contractual roles to evade regular employment obligations - Abruptly discontinuing long-serving employees solely based on "contractual nomenclature" without a speaking order is manifestly arbitrary and violative of Article 14. Bhola Nath v. State of Jharkhand, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 95 : 2026 INSC 99
Constitution of India, 1950 — Article 14 — Substantive Equality — The principle of substantive equality requires the State to remedy structural, institutional, and systemic disadvantages - Mere equal treatment is insufficient when individuals are placed in unequal positions due to biological, social, or economic factors. Inaccessibility of MHM measures converts a biological reality into a structural exclusion, violating the right to participate in education on equal terms. [Paras 41- 65] Dr. Jaya Thakur v Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 94 : 2026 INSC 97
Constitution of India, 1950 — Article 21 — Right to Dignity, Privacy, and Health — The right to life includes the right to a dignified existence and the right to menstrual health - Dignity is undermined when girl children are subjected to stigma or compelled to adopt unsafe practices due to a lack of facilities - Privacy is a concomitant of dignity, imposing a positive obligation on the State to facilitate a private space for menstrual management. [Paras 70 -80, 85 – 96] Dr. Jaya Thakur v Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 94 : 2026 INSC 97
Constitution of India, 1950 – Article 226 – Writ Jurisdiction – Disputed Questions of Fact and Delay – Held that High Court erred in entertaining a writ petition filed in 2015 challenging construction activities that commenced in 2002 and were completed by 2007-2008 - Held: Gross delay in approaching the Court disentitles a petitioner to discretionary relief under Article 226 – Noted that in writ proceedings decided on affidavits, the burden of proof lies on the petitioner to specifically plead and substantiate facts with cogent material; mere abstract points of law without evidence are insufficient. [Paras 66 - 70] Raj Singh Gehlot v. Amitabha Sen, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 72 : 2026 INSC 77
Constitution of India, 1950 – Article 226 – Writ Jurisdiction – Rejection of Writ Petition at the threshold on technical office objections – Sustainability of – High Court rejected a writ petition arising under the SARFAESI Act based on Registry objections regarding prayer revision, multiple reliefs in a single prayer, and joinder of parties – Held that the High Court erred in sustaining these technical objections to "nip a proceeding in the bud" - When fraud and collusion are alleged specifically regarding the conduct of a Commissioner appointed under Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act; the court must remember the maxim "fraus omnia corrumpit" (fraud unravels everything) - Allegations of fraud should not be buried without an examination of merits due to mere technicalities. Sri Mukund Maheswar v. Axis Bank Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 82 : 2026 INSC 84
Constitution of India, 1950 — Articles 14, 15(3), 21, and 21A — Right to Education and Menstrual Health — The Supreme Court held that the right to education is a "multiplier right" that enables the exercise of other human rights and forms an integral part of the right to life and human dignity - Noted that inaccessibility to Menstrual Hygiene Management (MHM) measures including clean gender-segregated toilets, sanitary napkins, and safe disposal mechanisms constitutes a violation of the fundamental rights of adolescent girl students. [Paras 20-40] Dr. Jaya Thakur v Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 94 : 2026 INSC 97
Constitution of India – Article 142 – Dissolution of Marriage – Irretrievable Breakdown – Exercise of Extraordinary Jurisdiction despite opposition by one spouse - The Supreme Court dissolved a marriage that had lasted only 65 days of cohabitation followed by over a decade of separation and excessive litigation - held that where a marriage is wrecked beyond salvage, maintaining a formal legal relationship is unjustified and the Court can exercise its power under Article 142 to do "complete justice," even if one spouse opposes the divorce. Neha Lal v. Abhishek Kumar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 73 : 2026 INSC 73
Constitution of India – Article 32 – Writ Jurisdiction – Principles of Natural Justice – Doctrine of Bias – Selection Process – Search-cum-Selection Committee (SCSC) – Bias and Malafides in Service Matters - The Supreme Court allowed the writ petition, setting aside the SCSC's decision to reject the petitioner's candidature - held that the inclusion of an officer as a member of the selection committee who had been personally arraigned as a contemnor by the candidate in the same dispute violates the principles of natural justice - Such participation creates a "reasonable apprehension of bias" in the mind of the candidate, rendering the decision-making process vulnerable and a nullity, regardless of whether actual bias is proven – Noted that justice must not only be done but must manifestly be seen to be done, and authorities must appear to act fairly to preserve public confidence in the impartiality of the selection process – Supreme Court directed the DoPT to convene a fresh SCSC meeting within four weeks, excluding "the Officer" in question, and imposed costs of Rs. 5 lakhs on the respondents for "rank procrastination" and "deliberate obstacles" bordering on vendetta. [Relied on State of Gujarat v. R.A. Mehta, (2013) 3 SCC 1; A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India, (1969) 2 SCC 262; S. Parthasarathi v. State of A.P., (1974) 3 SCC 459; Paras 41-46] Captain Pramod Kumar Bajaj v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 97 : 2026 INSC 101
Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 – Section 10 – Sham vs. Genuine Contracts – Following the Constitution Bench in SAIL, Supreme Court reiterated that the prohibition of contract labour does not lead to automatic absorption - if a contract is found to be a "sham" or "camouflage" intended to bypass labour laws, the workers are treated as de facto employees of the principal employer - Such a determination involves disputed questions of fact that must be adjudicated by the Industrial Tribunal/Court, not a Writ Court – Appeal dismissed. [Relied on Steel Authority of India Limited (SAIL) v. National Union Waterfront Workers (2001) 7 SCC 1; Shambu Nath Goyal v. Bank of Baroda (1978) 2 SCC 353; Paras 24-40] Premium Transmission v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 86 : 2026 INSC 87
Contract Labour – Sham Contracts and Regularization – If a contract is proved to be a "camouflage" or "sham" to hide a real employer-employee relationship where the principal employer retains full control, the workers must be treated as direct employees and regularized - determining whether a contract is "sham" or "genuine" involves disputed questions of fact that must be adjudicated by the Industrial Tribunal/Court, not by Writ Courts under Article 226 – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Steel Authority of India Ltd. and others v. National Union Waterfront Workers and others (2001) 7 SCC 1; Paras 8-11] Premium Transmission v. Kishan Subhash Rathod, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 87
Contract Law – Apartment Buyers' Agreement – Dominant Position and Fraud – The High Court's finding that flat owners were made to "sign on the dotted line" due to the developer's dominant position was held to be conjectural – Held - In the absence of foundational pleadings alleging fraud, misrepresentation, or coercion at the time of execution, a decade-old registered agreement cannot be disregarded or held to be executed under misrepresentation. [Paras 61, 62] Raj Singh Gehlot v. Amitabha Sen, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 72 : 2026 INSC 77
Contractual Interpretation — Subsequent Legislation Clause: In contracts where the bid was submitted before the actual implementation of the BOCW machinery in a specific State, the introduction of cess collection via subsequent State Notifications/Rules qualifies as "subsequent legislation." - Contractors could not have factored in the 1% cess component in their bids when no mechanism for collection existed at the time of submission (28 days prior to the bid deadline). [Relied on A. Prabhakara Reddy and Company vs. State of Madhya Pradesh and others (2016) 1 SCC 600; Paras 38, 51, 52] National Highways Authority of India v. Gammon Atlanta (JV), 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 71 : 2026 INSC 76
Criminal Intimidation – Section 506 IPC – Mere threats without intention to cause alarm do not constitute an offence – Vague allegations and delayed improvements in statements weaken the prosecution's case - The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and quashed proceedings against the appellant (Accused No. 5), a lawyer, who was primarily charged under Section 506 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) - Noted that the prosecutrix's initial statement under Section 161 of the CrPC did not mention any threats from the appellant - after a delay of seven to eight days, she improved her version in a statement recorded under Section 164 of the CrPC, making a vague reference to "an uncle" (the appellant) threatening her - held that for a charge of criminal intimidation to stand, there must be a clear intention to cause alarm, irrespective of whether the victim was actually alarmed - Vague allegations unsupported by prima facie cogent evidence do not satisfy the requirements of Section 506 IPC - noted that a lawyer discharging professional duties, such as giving advice or suggestions, cannot be deemed to be engaging in intimidation – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Naresh Aneja Vs. State of U.P., (2025) 2 SCC 604; Sharif Ahmad Vs. State of U.P., (2024) 14 SCC 122; Paras 6-8] Beri Manoj v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 92
Criminal Jurisprudence — Last Seen Together Theory — Proximity to Death — Held: For the "last seen together" theory to hold weight, it must be proximate to the time of death – Noted that in this case, there was no proof the deceased was with the accused immediately before death, and the identification of the accused by an auto-driver in a police station (without a Test Identification Parade) was unreliable. [Paras 13-15] Bernard Lyngdoh Phawa v. State of Meghalaya, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 84 : 2026 INSC 85
Criminal Law — Circumstantial Evidence — Appeal Against Acquittal — Reversal of Acquittal by High Court — Held: The High Court erred in reversing the well-reasoned acquittal by the Trial Court without recording a clear finding that the Trial Court's view was not a possible view - An acquittal reinforces the presumption of innocence, which should not be displaced lightly by substituting inferences - The "golden principles" for circumstantial evidence were not satisfied as there was no complete chain of incriminating circumstances. Bernard Lyngdoh Phawa v. State of Meghalaya, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 84 : 2026 INSC 85
Development and Regulation of Urban Areas Act, 1975 (Haryana) – Section 3(3A) – De-licensing and Validation – Power to grant a license includes the implied power to withdraw, modify, or de-license, as supported by Section 21 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 – Held - The 2020 Amendment to the 1975 Act retrospectively validated de-licensing actions taken by the authorities. [Para 71, 72] Raj Singh Gehlot v. Amitabha Sen, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 72 : 2026 INSC 77
Drugs - Legal Definition of "Drugs" vs. "New Drugs" regarding Stem Cells - While autologous stem cells used in ASD treatments (not undergoing substantial manipulation) may not qualify as "new drugs" under the New Drugs and Clinical Trial Rules, 2019 (NDCT Rules), they fall under the broader definition of "drug" as "substances" under Section 3(b)(i) of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 - stem-cell derived products involving "substantial manipulation" are perpetually categorized as "new drugs" under Rule of the NDCT Rules. [Relied on Chimanlal Jagjivan Das Sheth v. State of Maharashtra 1962 SCC OnLine SC 16; Ishwar Singh Bindra and Others v. State of U.P. 1968 SCC OnLine SC 98; Paras 101 – 109] Yash Charitable Trust v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 93 : 2026 INSC 96
Environmental Law – CPCB Methodology for Environmental Compensation – Scope and Applicability – The Central Pollution Control Board (CPCB) is a facilitative and indicative tool, not a rigid or exhaustive code - While primarily designed for industrial sectors, its adoption by the NGT for residential projects is not legally impermissible, especially when the resulting quantification is not arbitrary or disproportionate. Rhythm County v. Satish Sanjay Hegde, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 98 : 2026 INSC 102
Environmental Law – Principle of Correlation – Actual Damage vs. Statutory Violation – While mere violation of law without demonstrable harm may not automatically warrant compensation in all cases, activities with the potential to degrade the environment or those involving "flagrant violations" (such as continuing construction despite stop-work orders) justify the imposition of deterrent and restorative damages – Appeal dismissed. [Relied on M/s. Goel Ganga Developers India Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India (2018) 18 SCC 257; Deepak Nitrite Ltd. v. State of Gujarat (2004) 6 SCC 402; Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai v. Ankita Sinha (2022) 13 SCC 401; Research Foundation for Science (18) v. Union of India (2005) 13 SCC 186; Paras 21-46] Rhythm County v. Satish Sanjay Hegde, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 98 : 2026 INSC 102
Evidence Act, 1872 — Section 27 — Recovery of Weapon and Discovery of Body — Held: Recoveries made from open spaces or crime scenes already searched (like a graveyard) without a recorded disclosure statement are suspect - Since the rope was not linked to the crime through forensic evidence (no blood, skin, or hair detected), it failed as an incriminating circumstance. [Paras 17-19] Bernard Lyngdoh Phawa v. State of Meghalaya, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 84 : 2026 INSC 85
Evidence Act, 1872 – Sections 91 and 92 – Admissibility of Oral Evidence – Where the terms of a written registered document are clear and unambiguous, extrinsic evidence to ascertain the true intention of the parties is inadmissible - While oral evidence may be admissible to show a document is a "sham," the threshold for such a claim is extremely high and must be supported by strong evidence of surrounding circumstances, not subsequent conduct - Supreme Court suggested an urgent need for the Union and State Governments to digitize land records and registered documents using secure, tamper-proof technologies like Blockchain to minimize forgery and "clever drafting" that clogs the judicial system – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Prem Singh and Ors. vs. Birbal and Ors., (2006) 5 SCC 353; Rattan Singh and Ors. v. Nirmal Gill & Ors., (2021) 15 SCC 300; Gangabai w/o Rambilas Gilda (Smt.) vs. Chhabubai w/o Pukharajji Gandhi (Smt.), (1982) 1 SCC 4; Paras 35, 41-47, 76, 77] Hemalatha v. Tukaram, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 79 : 2026 INSC 82
Foreign Trade (Development and Regulation) Act, 1992 – Section 3 – Minimum Import Price (MIP) – Commencement of Delegated Legislation – The Supreme Court held that a Notification issued under Section 3 of the Act acquires the force of law only upon its publication in the Official Gazette - The expression "date of this Notification" used in such instruments must necessarily be construed as the date of its publication in the Gazette (in this case, 11.02.2016), rather than the date it was signed or uploaded on a website (05.02.2016). Viraj Impex Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 76 : 2026 INSC 80
Foreign Trade Policy (2015-2020) – Paragraph 1.05(b) – Transitional Protection – Importers who opened irrevocable Letters of Credit prior to the actual date of Gazette publication (11.02.2016) are entitled to the transitional protection under Para 1.05(b) of the FTP - Supreme court rejected the argument that "uploading" a notification on a website constitutes sufficient notice to curtail rights before formal Gazette publication – Appeal allowed. [Relied on B.K. Srinivasan & Ors. v. State of Karnataka & Ors. (1987) 1 SCC 658; Paras 16-23] Viraj Impex Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 76 : 2026 INSC 80
Guide for Judicial Magistrates – Discretionary Power - The use of the word "may" in Section 175(4) signifies discretionary power- i. If the Magistrate is prima facie satisfied the act was in the discharge of official duty, they must follow the Section 175(4) procedure; ii. If they are satisfied the act had no reasonable nexus to official duty, they may proceed under the general procedure of Section 175(3); iii. Magistrates are not required to wait indefinitely for a report from superior officers; if a report is not submitted within a reasonable time, the Magistrate may proceed based on the public servant's version if available - Supreme Court reiterated that a judicial order passed by a Magistrate in criminal matters (such as calling for a report under Section 175(4)) cannot be challenged through a writ petition under Article 226 - The appropriate remedy is a petition under Section 528 of the BNSS or Article 227 of the Constitution. [Paras 46-55] xxx v. State of Kerala, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 85 : 2026 INSC 88
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 – Section 2(k), Section 10(1), and Section 12 – Existence of Industrial Dispute – Requirement of Prior Demand – The Supreme Court held that a formal written demand by a workman/Union to the employer is not a sine qua non (indispensable condition) for an industrial dispute to exist under Section 2(k) - The ID Act does not prescribe a specific manner for a dispute to arise - Supreme Court distinguished between an existing dispute and an "apprehended" dispute, noting that under Section 10(1), the appropriate Government has the administrative power to refer a matter if it forms an opinion that a dispute is either existing or apprehended – Held that the initiation of conciliation proceedings via a representation to the Conciliation Officer without a prior demand notice to the Management is not ex-facie illegal. Premium Transmission v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 86 : 2026 INSC 87
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 – Section 33(1) – Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 – Interim Relief – Status of Workman – The Supreme Court set aside the orders of the Industrial Court and the High Court which had directed the Management to provide work and pay wages to contract labourers during the pendency of a dispute - held that the restrictions under Section 33 of the ID Act against changing service conditions are attracted only if the relationship of "workman" and "management" is established - Where workers are engaged through a registered contractor, their status as direct employees of the management is a matter of adjudication - Granting interim relief that directs continuation or regularization at the preliminary stage amounts to a "virtual pre-judgment" of the main dispute. Premium Transmission v. Kishan Subhash Rathod, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 87
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 – Section 33(1) – Interim Relief for Contract Labour – Supreme Court set aside interim orders directing the Management to provide work and pay wages to contract labourers during the pendency of a dispute regarding their status - held that the restrictions under Section 33(1) regarding changes to service conditions are only attracted if a direct master-servant relationship is established - Granting such interim relief amounts to a "virtual pre-judgment" of the main dispute where the workers' status as "workmen" of the principal employer is still under adjudication. Premium Transmission v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 86 : 2026 INSC 87
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 vs. CLRA Act, 1970 – Comparative Scope of "Workman" – Supreme Court observed that while the definition of "workman" in Section 2(1)(i) of the CLRA is textually derived from Section 2(s) of the ID Act, they differ in juridical scope - The ID Act requires a direct master-servant relationship (privity of contract), whereas the CLRA recognizes a tripartite relationship where the workman is hired through a contractor - Unlike the ID Act, the CLRA specifically excludes "out-workers" and does not extend the definition to include terminated employees for the purpose of locus standi in disputes. Premium Transmission v. Kishan Subhash Rathod, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 87
Informed Consent vs. Patient Choice - Supreme Court clarified that while patients have the autonomy to "opt in" or "opt out" of offered treatments, they do not have a right to demand a particular form of treatment - Valid "informed consent" requires "adequate information" concerning the nature, risks, and benefits of a treatment - Because scientific evidence for stem cell therapy in ASD is currently non-existent or inconclusive, practitioners cannot provide the "adequate information" necessary for a valid consent. [Relied on Samira Kohli v. Dr. Prabha Manchandra and Another (2008) 2 SCC 1; Common Cause (A Registered Society) v. Union of India and Another, reported in (2018) 5 SCC 1; Paras 92-95, 131, 151] Yash Charitable Trust v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 93 : 2026 INSC 96
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Section 60(5)(c) – Jurisdiction of Adjudicating Authority (NCLT) – Declaration of Title to Assets – Held, the NCLT cannot exercise its residuary jurisdiction under Section 60(5)(c) to adjudicate upon complex disputes of title to property (such as trademarks) that are dehors the insolvency proceedings - The nexus with the insolvency of the Corporate Debtor must exist for the NCLT to exercise power under this section – Noted that in the present case, where the approved Resolution Plan itself recognized rival claims and "beliefs" regarding the ownership of the "Gloster" trademark rather than an undisputed assertion of title, the NCLT exceeded its jurisdiction by recorded a finding that the trademark was an asset of the Corporate Debtor. Gloster Cables Ltd. v. Fort Gloster Industries Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 80 : 2026 INSC 81
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Sections 31, 43, and 45 – Modification of Resolution Plan – Avoidance Transactions – Noted that the NCLT cannot, while adjudicating a miscellaneous application, grant rights to a Successful Resolution Applicant (SRA) that are better than or different from those recognized in the Committee of Creditors (CoC) approved Resolution Plan - Any such declaration amounts to an impermissible modification of the approved plan - the NCLT cannot suo motu or "by a sidewind" neutralize transactions as preferential (Section 43) or undervalued (Section 45) without a formal application by the Resolution Professional (or under Section 47 by a creditor) and without providing the affected party clear notice and a fair opportunity to respond - Such summary findings are perverse and violate principles of natural justice. Gloster Cables Ltd. v. Fort Gloster Industries Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 80 : 2026 INSC 81
Judicial Propriety – Right of Hearing – Held, that the High Court should not have entertained and disposed of the matter without issuance of notice to either the State or the Defacto Complainant – Noted that in petitions praying for the quashing of an FIR, the High Court should not pass orders directing compliance with Section 41-A Cr.PC (or Section 35(3) BNSS) as it indirectly amounts to granting relief that should only be considered if a prima facie case for quashing is established. [Relied on Neeharika Infrastructure (P) Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra (2021) 19 SCC 401; Paras 9-13] Practical Solutions Inc. v. State of Telangana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 74
Labor Law — The Building and Other Construction Workers (Regulation of Employment and Conditions of Service) Act, 1996 (BOCW Act) and The Building and Other Construction Workers' Welfare Cess Act, 1996 (Cess Act) — Implementation and Levy: Held, that although the BOCW Act and Cess Act were enacted in 1996, they remained "dormant" in various states until the necessary machinery, specifically the Welfare Boards under Section 18, was constituted - The constitution of Welfare Boards is a sine qua non (condition precedent) for the levy and collection of cess - While the registration of workers is not a prerequisite for collecting cess, the existence of a Board to receive and utilize the funds is essential. [Paras 36, 50, 59] National Highways Authority of India v. Gammon Atlanta (JV), 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 71 : 2026 INSC 76
Land Acquisition (Special Railway Projects) Rules, 2016 — Railways Act, 1989 — Section 20-F — Setting aside of Award — Scope of judicial interference — Representative Capacity — The Supreme Court held that the setting aside of a compensation award on grounds of excessive payment, collusion, or "colourable exercise of powers" against specific land owners does not ipso facto result in the entire acquisition award being set aside for all beneficiaries - Noted that out of 550 land owners, only a few were specifically impleaded and alleged to have received unjust enrichment - Since the appellant was not part of the inquiry report, not arrayed as an accused in the FIR, and his specific award was not challenged by the Railways, the High Court erred in applying a blanket cancellation of his award based on a separate judgment involving different parties - noted that the Railways Act, 1989, does not confer any power of review on the Competent Authority or the Arbitrator appointed under the Rules of 2016 - The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's orders and restored the initial award and the arbitral enhancement in favor of the appellant, directing disbursement within three months with interest and solatium – Appeal allowed. [Paras 10-14] Niraj Jain v. Competent Authority-cum-Additional Collector, Jagdalpur, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 83 : 2026 INSC 86
Matrimonial Litigation – Misuse of Courts – Perjury and Costs - Supreme Court criticized the practice of warring couples treating courts as "battlefields" to settle scores, noting that the parties had filed over 40 cases against each other - While disposing of all matrimonial disputes, the Court specifically directed that applications related to perjury (Section 340 CrPC / Section 379 BNSS) must continue, as no one can be permitted to "pollute the stream of justice" - imposed a token cost of ₹10,000 on each party for choking the judicial system with numerous litigations - Supreme Court emphasized that earnest efforts should be made for pre-litigation mediation and counselling - It observed that the immediate initiation of criminal proceedings often destroys any chance of reconciliation and leads to a "point of no return," especially if arrests occur. [Relied on Shilpa Sailesh vs. Varun Sreenivasan, (2023) 14 SCC 231; Achin Gupta vs. State of Haryana, (2024) 6 SCR 129; Rakesh Raman vs. Kavita, (2023) 3 SCR 552; Paras 11 – 15, 26-32] Neha Lal v. Abhishek Kumar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 73 : 2026 INSC 73
Medical Negligence and Standard of Care: Permissibility of Stem Cell "Therapy" for Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) - held that every medical practitioner owes a fiduciary duty to exercise a reasonable degree of care, skill, and knowledge expected of a prudent practitioner - A practitioner fails to meet this standard if they administer an intervention that lacks credible scientific evidence of safety and efficacy, or is explicitly not recommended by authoritative medical bodies - Since therapeutic use of stem cells in ASD is not recognized as a "sound and relevant medical practice" by the ICMR or NMC, offering it as a routine clinical service outside an approved clinical trial constitutes a failure to meet the reasonable standard of care. [Relied on Indian Medical Association v. V.P. Shantha and others (1996) 86 COMP 806; Jacob Mathew v. State of Punjab (2005) 6 SCC 1; M.A. Biviji v. Sunita and Others, reported in (2024) 2 SCC 242; Paras 59, 61, 63, 70, 90, 151] Yash Charitable Trust v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 93 : 2026 INSC 96
National Green Tribunal Act, 2010 – Section 14 – Jurisdiction – Substantial Question Relating to Environment –The NGT's jurisdiction is limited to civil cases involving a "substantial question relating to environment" arising from enactments in Schedule I - Held: Issues intrinsically connected to building plan violations and land-use disputes already under adjudication by the High Court do not qualify as substantial environmental questions for NGT intervention - Every dispute pertaining to the environment is not a "substantial question" under Section 2(1)(m) of the Act. [Relied on Bharat Singh v. State of Haryana, AIR 1988 SC 534; Auroville Foundation v. Navroz Kersasp Mody, (2025) 4 SCC 150; State of M.P. v. Centre for Environment Protection Research & Development, (2020) 9 SCC 781; Paras 104 - 106] Raj Singh Gehlot v. Amitabha Sen, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 72 : 2026 INSC 77
National Green Tribunal Act, 2010 – Section 15 – Remedial Jurisdiction – Enhancement of Compensation – The NGT is competent to enhance compensation recommended by a Joint Committee if it finds the amount inadequate to reflect the scale and impact of violations - Such an exercise of informed discretion, where expert findings are filtered and integrated into a reasoned outcome, does not amount to an abdication of adjudicatory functions. Rhythm County v. Satish Sanjay Hegde, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 98 : 2026 INSC 102
National Green Tribunal Act, 2010 – Sections 15 and 20 – Environmental Compensation – Quantification Metrics – Project Cost and Turnover – The Supreme Court upheld the power of the National Green Tribunal (NGT) to use project cost or turnover as a relevant yardstick for calculating environmental compensation - held that while a uniform formula is not prescribed by statute, linking the scale of operations to environmental harm is a permissible exercise of discretion under the 'Polluter Pays' principle - Larger operations signify a larger environmental footprint, and it is logical for companies profiting from scale to bear higher responsibility for environmental costs. Rhythm County v. Satish Sanjay Hegde, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 98 : 2026 INSC 102
Police Manual - Media Briefing - The Supreme Court directed all States to formulate a policy for police media briefing, taking into account a "Police Manual for Media Briefing" furnished before it by amicus curiae. The Court has given 3 months' time to the states to do the needful. Peoples Union for Civil Liberties v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 77
Primacy of Statutory Rules over Executive Orders - Supreme Court addressed a conflict between the NDCT Rules, 2019 and a DHR Order dated March 3, 2024, which attempted to remove the Department of Health Research (DHR) from its regulatory role in stem cell research - held that executive instructions cannot supplant or whittle down the effect of statutory rules - Clause 2(vi) of the March 3, 2024 order was declared non est to the extent of its conflict with Rules 17 and 18 of the NDCT Rules - The administration, promotion, or advertisement of stem cell therapy for ASD outside an approved clinical trial setting is categorized as "professional misconduct" under Regulation 7.22 of the IMC (Professional Conduct, Etiquette and Ethics) Regulations, 2002 - Errant clinics are liable for cancellation of registration and penalties under the Clinical Establishments Act, 2010 - Held that stem cell therapies for ASD cannot be offered as a commercial service and must be restricted to clinical trial settings - To protect patients currently undergoing treatment, the Secretary, MoHFW is directed to consult with AIIMS and the NMC to provide a solution for re-routing these patients to institutions conducting legitimate clinical trials, with a compliance report due within four weeks. [Relied on State of M.P. v. G.S. Dall and Flour Mills 1992 Supp (1) SCC 150; Paras 136-138, 151, 123, 145-151] Yash Charitable Trust v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 93 : 2026 INSC 96
Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 – Section 12 – Effect of Probation on Conviction and Departmental Action – The Supreme Court reiterated that the release of an offender on probation does not obliterate the stigma of conviction - The conviction of the accused or the finding of the court that he is guilty remains untouched, as it is the sine qua non for an order of release on probation – Held that in a case where a workman obtained employment as a Helper by using his brother's educational certificates and impersonating him, Supreme Court held that such misconduct justifies departmental action - that Section 12 of the Probation of Offenders Act does not preclude a department from taking action for misconduct leading to an offence or conviction – Noted that Section 12 only removes "disqualifications" provided by other laws (e.g., for holding office or seeking elections) but does not sweep away the factum of guilt or the misconduct resulting in conviction - a person dismissed from service due to conviction is not entitled to reinstatement merely because they were granted the benefit of probation - While the Supreme Court set aside the High Court's observation that conviction alone is not a ground for removal, it declined to interfere with the modified punishment of "compulsory retirement" in this specific instance, noting that the respondent-workman had since passed away and the appellant did not wish to unsettle benefits accrued to the family. [Relied on Union of India Vs. Bakshi Ram (1990) 2 SCC 426; Paras 9-13] Superintending Engineer v. Labour Court Madurai, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 78
Procedural Fairness – Right to Cross-Examination – Supreme Court noted that the finding of professional misconduct was based merely on "bald allegations" in the complaint without the complainant being examined on oath or the appellant-advocate being afforded the right of cross-examination – Held that such findings are legally unsustainable when the substratum of the complaint has ceased to exist due to an amicable settlement between the parties. [Paras 7- 10] Monty Goyal v. Navrang Singh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 91 : 2026 INSC 94
Public Interest Litigation (PIL) - Property Rights - The Supreme Court set aside a Calcutta High Court judgment that had ordered the demolition of a residential building constructed by the appellant near Visva-Bharati University – Noted that the High Court had initially ruled the construction illegal on the grounds that it was raised on preserved "khoai" land and lacked approval from the competent authority (Panchayat Samiti) - Supreme Court found that the High Court's conclusions were based on conjectures rather than scientific evidence and failed to account for the appellant's right to property under Article 300A of the Constitution - Key Legal Issues & Findings – i. Burden of Proof in PIL and Disputed Facts: The Court emphasized that in a PIL, the burden lies squarely on the petitioners to provide clear, cogent, and reliable material - held that writ jurisdiction should not be invoked to resolve contested factual issues—such as the geological nature of land—which cannot be determined solely on affidavits; ii. Nature of "Khoai" Land - noted that "khoai" is not a recognized category under West Bengal revenue laws but a colloquial term for geological formations - Reports from the District Magistrate and the West Bengal Pollution Control Board (WBPCB) failed to provide objective or scientific evidence that the specific subject plot was "khoai" land; iii. Procedural Irregularities vs. Substantive Illegality - held that even if the Gram Panchayat was not the competent authority to sanction the building plan (vesting instead with the Panchayat Samiti), such a lapse constituted a "minor procedural irregularity" that was curable, especially since the plan had been vetted by the higher-tier Zilla Parishad - This did not warrant the "draconian consequence" of demolition; iv. Procedural Irregularities vs. Substantive Illegality - held that even if the Gram Panchayat was not the competent authority to sanction the building plan (vesting instead with the Panchayat Samiti), such a lapse constituted a "minor procedural irregularity" that was curable, especially since the plan had been vetted by the higher-tier Zilla Parishad - This did not warrant the "draconian consequence" of demolition; v. Bona Fides and Concealment of Facts: Noted that the PIL lacked bona fides as several writ petitioners owned existing residential structures within the same tract of land, a fact they failed to disclose - The petition "selectively targeted" the appellant's construction while ignoring similar surrounding structures - set aside the High Court's demolition order, and expunged adverse remarks against the Sriniketan Santiniketan Development Authority (SSDA). Due to the lack of bona fides and non-disclosure of material facts, the Court imposed costs of ₹1,00,000 on the writ petitioners. Appeals allowed. [Relied on Sushanta Tagore and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors., (2005) 3 SCC 16; Chairman, Grid Corporation of Orissa Ltd. (GRIDCO) v. Sukamani Das, (1999) 7 SCC 298; Shubhas Jain v. Rajeshwari Shivam, (2021) 20 SCC 454; Paras 36, 45 - 47, 49 – 52, 58] Aarsuday Projects & Infrastructure v. Jogen Chowdhury, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 90 : 2026 INSC 93
Registered Documents – Presumption of Validity – Standard of Proof to Declare a Registered Sale Deed as "Sham" – A registered Sale Deed carries a formidable presumption of validity and genuineness. Registration is a solemn act imparting a high degree of sanctity to the document; therefore, courts must not lightly or casually declare it a "sham" - The burden of proof to displace this presumption rests heavily upon the challenger, requiring material particulars and cogent evidence to demonstrate that the Deed was never intended to operate as a bona fide transfer of title. [Paras 31 - 33] Hemalatha v. Tukaram, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 79 : 2026 INSC 82
Retrospective Application of Cess — Execution Proceedings: Noted that in the case of Prakash Atlanta (JV), the Court held that NHAI could not unilaterally deduct cess during execution proceedings for a contract that was terminated in 2008, based on a State notification issued in 2010 - Such a deduction was an "afterthought" and lacked contractual or statutory basis for retrospective application to a closed contract. [Paras 43, 54, 60] National Highways Authority of India v. Gammon Atlanta (JV), 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 71 : 2026 INSC 76
Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 — Sections 3 and 19 — Mandatory Norms and Standards — Held that "Free education" under Section 3 includes the removal of any financial or gender-specific barrier, such as the cost of sanitary napkins, that prevents a child from pursuing education - The provision of separate toilets and "barrier-free access" under Section 19 and the Schedule is a mandatory constitutional and statutory obligation that cannot be avoided by pleading a paucity of funds - Key Directions Issued by the Court: i. Toilets - Provision of functional, gender-segregated toilets with usable water and hand-washing facilities in all schools; ii. Menstrual Absorbents - Free distribution of oxo-biodegradable sanitary napkins and the establishment of "MHM Corners" with spare uniforms and innerwear; iii. Disposal - Installation of safe, hygienic, and environmentally compliant disposal mechanisms; iv. Awareness - Integration of gender-responsive curricula by NCERT/SCERT and sensitization of both male and female teachers; v. Monitoring - Periodic inspections by District Education Officers (DEO) including anonymous student feedback. [Relied on: Right to Education: Mohini Jain (Miss) v. State of Karnataka (1992) 3 SCC 666; Unni Krishnan, J.P. v. State of A.P.(1993) 1 SCC 645; Joseph Shine v. Union of India (2019) 3 SCC 39; Janhit Abhiyan v. Union of India (2023) 5 SCC 1; Gaurav Kumar v. Union of India (2025) 1 SCC 641; Common Cause v. Union of India (2018) 5 SCC 1; Rajiv Raturi v. Union of India (2024) 16 SCC 654; Vikash Kumar v. UPSC (2021) 5 SCC 370; Society for Unaided Private Schools of Rajasthan v. Union of India (2012) 6 SCC 1; State of Orissa v. Mamata Mohanty(2011) 3 SCC 436; Paras 159 – 172, 173-180] Dr. Jaya Thakur v Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 94 : 2026 INSC 97
Service Law – Appointment of Vice-Chancellor – Conflict between State/UT Act and UGC Regulations – Legislative Competence – Doctrine of Repugnancy - The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court's decision to strike down Section 14(5) of the Puducherry Technological University Act, 2019 (PTU Act) for being inconsistent with Regulation 7.3 of the UGC Regulations, 2018 - held that since UGC Regulations trace their source to Entry 66 of List I (Union List), they possess an overriding effect over State/UT legislations enacted under Entry 25 of List III (Concurrent List) - The Search-cum-Selection Committee for a Vice-Chancellor must necessarily include a nominee of the Chairman, UGC, and its members must not be connected with the University - Key Legal Issues & Rulings – i. Primacy of Entry 66 List I over Entry 25 List III - Supreme Court reiterated that while both the Union and States can legislate on "Education" under Entry 25 of List III, such power is expressly subject to Entry 66 of List I (Coordination and determination of standards) - Any State legislation that impinges upon or dilutes the standards prescribed by the Union under Entry 66 is ultra vires; ii. Mandatory Nature of UGC Regulations - Regulation 7.3 of the UGC Regulations, 2018, which mandates the inclusion of a UGC nominee in the Search-cum-Selection Committee, is an integral component of "standards in higher education." - Section 14(5) of the PTU Act, which omitted this requirement and included a government official (Pro-Chancellor) in the committee, was declared invalid; iii. Doctrine of Repugnancy and Article 254(2) - noted that the doctrine of repugnancy under Article 254 and the need for Presidential assent apply only when both Central and State legislations operate within the Concurrent List - Since the UGC Act and Regulations are referable to List I (Entry 66), the question of curing repugnancy via Article 254(2) does not arise; iv. Exercise of Article 142 Powers - Despite finding the appointment procedure illegal, Supreme Court invoked its extraordinary powers under Article 142 to allow the appellant to complete his tenure (ending December 2026) - This was done to avoid "grave stigma" to the academician and administrative disruption, noting there were no allegations against the appellant's integrity or merit. [Relied on Hoechst Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. State of Bihar (1983) 4 SCC 45; Gambhirdhan K. Gadhvi v. State of Gujarat (2022) 5 SCC 179; Paras 37-43, 46-48, 51-52] Dr. S. Mohan v. Puducherry Technological University, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 96 : 2026 INSC 100
Trademarks Act, 1999 – Title and Registration – The Supreme Court clarified that the NCLT and NCLAT are not the appropriate fora to decide highly contentious issues of trademark title involving technical collaboration agreements, contingent assignments, and the effect of BIFR restraint orders - Supreme Court set aside findings on title from both the NCLT and NCLAT, leaving the parties free to litigate the issue of title before a competent civil court or authority. [Relied on Gujarat Urja Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Amit Gupta (2021) 7 SCC 209; Tata Consultancy Services Ltd. v. SK Wheels (P) Ltd. (2022) 2 SCC 583; SREI Multiple Asset Investment Trust Vision India Fund v. Deccan Chronicle Marketeers (2023) 7 SCC 295; Ebix Singapore (P) Ltd. v. Educomp Solutions Ltd. (CoC) (2022) 2 SCC 401; Paras 26- 47] Gloster Cables Ltd. v. Fort Gloster Industries Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 80 : 2026 INSC 81
Transfer of Property Act, 1882 – Section 58(c) – Mortgage by Conditional Sale vs. Outright Sale – No transaction shall be deemed a mortgage by conditional sale unless the condition for reconveyance is embodied in the document that effects or purports to effect the sale - In the absence of such a clause in the registered Sale Deed, the transaction cannot be construed as a mortgage by conditional sale. [Paras 44 - 49] Hemalatha v. Tukaram, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 79 : 2026 INSC 82
Waqf Act, 1995 – Effect of 2013 Amendment – Overruling of Precedents – Noted that the 2013 Amendment removed the sub-stratum of the decision in Ramesh Gobindram v. Sugra Humayun Mirza Wakf only regarding the Tribunal's lack of power to remove encroachers (now covered under Section 54) - the larger principle that the Tribunal's jurisdiction is limited to specific statutory powers remains valid - Supreme Court found the expansive interpretation of Section 83 in Rashid Wali Beg v. Farid Pindari to be divergent from the correct legal position established in Ramesh Gobindram. Habib Alladin v. Mohammed Ahmed, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 88 : 2026 INSC 90
Waqf Act, 1995 – Sections 6, 7, 83, and 85 – Jurisdiction of Waqf Tribunal vs. Civil Court – Ouster of Civil Court Jurisdiction – Rejection of Plaint under Order VII Rule 11 CPC – The Supreme Court reaffirmed that the jurisdiction of the Waqf Tribunal to determine whether a property is a waqf property or not is limited to properties specified in the "list of auqaf" - The "list of auqaf," as expanded by the 2013 Amendment, includes both lists published after a survey under Chapter II and registrations made under Chapter V (Section 37) - Section 83 is not an omnibus provision conferring expansive jurisdiction on the Tribunal for any dispute relating to waqf; rather, it enables the constitution of the Tribunal for matters specifically required "under the Act" to be determined by it - The ouster of Civil Court jurisdiction under Section 85 is not absolute and is confined only to matters expressly conferred upon the Tribunal by the statute. Habib Alladin v. Mohammed Ahmed, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 88 : 2026 INSC 90