Supreme Court Weekly Digest January 11 - 20, 2026

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; Section 11(6-A) — Appointment of Arbitrators — Scope of Judicial Review — The Supreme Court or High Court, while considering a Section 11 application, must strictly confine its examination to the existence of an arbitration agreement - The use of the word "examination" indicates a limit to the court's jurisdiction, intended for a prima facie determination rather than a "laborious or contested inquiry" - Noted that Section 11(6-A) continues to remain in full force as its omission (by the 2019 Amendment) has not yet been notified. [Paras 14–17] Motilal Oswal Financial Services v. Santosh Cordeiro, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 32 : 2026 INSC 5

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; Section 16 & 23 - Jurisdiction to decide disputes not specifically mentioned in invocation notice - Unless the arbitration agreement specifically restricts the tribunal to only decided "specifically referred disputes," the claimant is entitled to add or amend claims in the statement of claim, and the respondent is entitled to file counter-claims, provided they are arbitrable and within limitation - Where an arbitration clause is widely worded to cover "any matter arising out of or connected with the agreement," the tribunal has jurisdiction to entertain all such disputes once constituted. Bhagheeratha Engineering Ltd. v. State of Kerala, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 31 : 2026 INSC 4

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; Section 16 — Doctrine of Competence-Competence — Arbitrability of Disputes — The determination of the substantive existence and validity of an arbitration agreement, as well as the arbitrability of the dispute, is the domain of the Arbitral Tribunal under Section 16 - The Referral Court is not the appropriate forum to conduct a "mini-trial" regarding the validity of the agreement. [Paras 15–16] Motilal Oswal Financial Services v. Santosh Cordeiro, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 32 : 2026 INSC 5

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; Section 21 & 23 - Object of Section 21 Notice - The object of Section 21 is primarily to determine the commencement of arbitral proceedings for reckoning limitation - It is a procedural rather than a jurisdictional requirement. Failure to issue a Section 21 notice is not fatal to a party's claim if the dispute is otherwise arbitrable and covered by the arbitration agreement - The claims raised in a Section 21 notice do not restrict or limit the claims that can be subsequently raised before the Arbitral Tribunal in the statement of claim under Section 23 - held that an arbitral tribunal cannot decide disputes beyond a specific issue referred to it and that a party cannot raise additional disputes without issuing a separate notice under Section 21 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. Bhagheeratha Engineering Ltd. v. State of Kerala, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 31 : 2026 INSC 4

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 — Interpretation of Contracts — Arbitral Autonomy — Patent Illegality — Section 34(2A) - held that the interpretation of the terms of a contract is primarily the domain of the Arbitral Tribunal - Even if a second view is possible, an award cannot be set aside merely because the appellate court prefers an alternative interpretation – Held that the Tribunal's decision to award idling charges for a Backhoe Dredger (BHD) under Clause 51.1 of the License Agreement despite the respondent's claim that Clause 38 only specified charges for "major dredgers" was found to be a logical and reasonable construction of the agreement - For an award to be set aside for patent illegality, the error must be apparent on the face of the award - A speaking award based on logical reasoning and proper interpretation of clauses does not suffer from patent illegality - a mere contravention of substantive Indian law is no longer a standalone ground for setting aside an award – Appeal allowed. [Relied on MMTC Limited vs. Vedanta Limited (2019) 4 SCC 163; UHL Power Company Limited vs. State of Himachal Pradesh (2022) 4 SCC 116; Bombay Slum Redevelopment Corporation Private Limited vs. Samir Narain Bhojwani (2024) 7 SCC 218; National Highways Authority of India v. M/s Hindustan Construction Company Ltd. 2024 INSC 388; Larsen Air Conditioning and Refrigeration Company vs. Union of India & Ors. (2023) 15 SCC 472; Paras 30-46] Jan De Nul Dredging India Pvt. Ltd. v. Tuticorin Port Trust, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 47 : 2026 INSC 34

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 — Section 34 and Section 37 — Scope of Appellate Interference — The Supreme Court reiterated that the jurisdiction of an appellate court under Section 37 is extremely circumscribed and akin to the limited jurisdiction under Section 34 - An appellate court cannot undertake an independent assessment of the merits of the award or reappraise evidence as if it were an ordinary court of appeal - Its primary role is to ascertain whether the court exercising power under Section 34 acted within its prescribed limits or exceeded them - If an Arbitral Tribunal's interpretation of a contract is a "plausible view" and is upheld under Section 34, the Section 37 court has no authority to substitute it with a different interpretation. Jan De Nul Dredging India Pvt. Ltd. v. Tuticorin Port Trust, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 47 : 2026 INSC 34

Campus Suicide – Mandatory registration of FIR – Higher Educational Institutions (HEIs) - Institutional Responsibility vs. Student Autonomy - Mandatory Directions under Article 142 - The Supreme Court addressed the alarming rise in student suicides across Higher Educational Institutions (HEIs) in India - Recognized student suicide as the "visible tip of a much larger iceberg of student distress," Supreme Court noted that the legal and moral obligation of educational authorities to create safe, inclusive, and nurturing environments - Supreme Court reviewed an interim report by a National Task Force (NTF) and issued several mandatory directions under Article 142 of the Constitution to address structural, social, and academic stressors - Key Legal Issues & Rulings held – i. Mandatory Registration of F.I.R. for Campus Suicides – Noted that educational institutions have an unequivocal legal obligation to promptly lodge an F.I.R. with appropriate authorities if an incident of suicide occurs on campus - This follows the clarification of law regarding mandatory registration of F.I.R.s in the event of disclosure of a cognizable offence; ii. Institutional Responsibility vs. Student Autonomy - Supreme Court criticized the tendency of HEIs to "shift the blame" onto the individual autonomy of the deceased student to avoid institutional responsibility - held that HEIs cannot shirk their fundamental duty to ensure institutions are safe and conducive spaces for learning; iii. Mandatory Directions under Article 142 - Data Maintenance: SRS data on suicides for the 15-29 age group must be centrally maintained - The NCRB must distinguish between school-going and higher education students in its reports; iv. Reporting Protocol - HEIs must report all student suicides or unnatural deaths (on or off-campus) to police immediately - Annual reports of such incidents must be submitted to regulatory bodies like UGC, NMC, BCI, etc; v. Faculty Vacancies - All vacant faculty positions, with priority to reserved categories (SC/ST/OBC/PwD), must be filled within four months; vi. Scholarship Disbursements: Pending scholarship backlogs must be cleared within four months - HEIs are strictly prohibited from barring students from exams or hostels due to administrative delays in scholarship disbursals; vii. Regulatory Compliance - HEIs must strictly adhere to UGC regulations concerning Ragging (2009), Equity (2012), Sexual Harassment (2016), and Grievance Redressal (2023); viii. Accessibility and Mental Health - Supreme Court mandated accessibility audits for marginalized groups (PwDs and Transgender students) and emphasized the need for student-friendly mental health services provided by qualified professionals rather than untrained faculty members. [Relied on Sukdeb Saha v. The State of Andhra Pradesh, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1515; Paras 19-39; 44, 45] Amit Kumar v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 56 : 2026 INSC 62

Civil Procedure Code, 1908; Section 100 — Second Appeal — Interference with concurrent findings — Held that the High Court is justified in interfering with concurrent findings of fact in a second appeal if such findings are found to be perverse, contrary to the statutory framework, or based on a misapplication of settled legal principles - The absence of cogent evidence regarding the exact location and measurements of the disputed property renders a decree for mandatory injunction legally unsustainable - A suit filed by partners of an unregistered firm for the protection of property rights (common law action) rather than the enforcement of a contractual right is maintainable and not barred by Section 69. [Relied on Anathula Sudhakar v. P. Buchi Reddy (Dead) by LRs and Others, (2008) 4 SCC 594; Para 13, 24 - 27] Sanjay Paliwal v. Bharat Heavy Electricals Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 54 : 2026 INSC 61

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Order XXII Rule 4 – Abatement of Appeal – Substantial Representation of Estate – Suit for Specific Performance – Appeal does not abate if the estate of the deceased party is sufficiently represented by other legal heirs already on record - In the present case, while the vendor (Kishorilal) died during the appeal, all his four legal heirs were initially substituted - Upon the death of one of those heirs (Murarilal), the appeal could not be declared to have abated because the remaining three heirs and the lis pendens transferees (who held the title) remained on record, ensuring the estate was sufficiently represented. [Paras 30 - 40] Kishorilal v. Gopal, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 39 : 2026 INSC 48

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Sections 11, 151, and 152 – Res Judicata between stages of the same proceeding – Clerical Errors – Once a High Court holds at an intermediate stage that an appeal has not abated because the deceased's interest is sufficiently represented, it cannot revisit and reverse this finding at a later stage of the same proceeding - Such a reversal is barred by the principle of res judicata - a typographical error in a court order directing the deletion of the original party instead of a deceased legal representative is a clerical mistake that can be corrected under Sections 151 and 152 of the CPC and should not be used to the disadvantage of a party. [Paras 41-44] Kishorilal v. Gopal, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 39 : 2026 INSC 48

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Section 378 – Appeal against Acquittal – Grounds for Reversal – Noted that an order of acquittal may be reversed if the High Court rejects incontrovertible evidence based on unrealistic suspicion or surmises, or if it discounts the testimony of relatives solely on the ground of being 'interested' witnesses – Held that High Court wrongly placed undue reliance on the testimonies of hostile witnesses and contradictory defence evidence while ignoring the cogent testimonies of independent public servants – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar (2022) 3 SCC 471; Sadhu Saran Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2016) 4 SCC 35; State of Madhya Pradesh v. Phoolchand Rathore 2023 SCC OnLine SC 537; State of Uttar Pradesh v. Ajmal Beg 2025 SCC OnLine SC 280; Surajdeo Mahto v. State of Bihar (2022) 11 SCC 800; Paras 14-26] State of Himachal Pradesh v. Chaman Lal, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 48 : 2026 INSC 57

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Appellate Jurisdiction – Interference with Order of Acquittal – Principles Reiterated – The Supreme Court observed that there is no absolute restriction in law on the appellate court to review and reappreciate the entire evidence upon which an order of acquittal is founded - While an appellate court is ordinarily slow to interfere with an acquittal, it must do so if the judgment is manifestly erroneous, perverse, or based on a misreading of evidence or incorrect application of law - Where the High Court adopts a wholly erroneous process of reasoning and ignores vital circumstances resulting in a grave miscarriage of justice, interference is imperative. State of Himachal Pradesh v. Chaman Lal, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 48 : 2026 INSC 57

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Attendance of Accused during Appeal/Revision – Suspension of Sentence – Validity of requiring physical presence on every hearing date – The Supreme Court held that once a sentence has been suspended and bail has been granted by an Appellate or Revisional Court, it is "unwarranted" and "burdensome" to require the accused to be present on every date of hearing - Such a practice serves no purpose, as the jurisdictional magistrate remains empowered to secure the accused's presence should the appeal or revision eventually be dismissed - noted that even if the prevalent practice is driven by the terms of Form No. 45 (Schedule II of the CrPC/BNSS) regarding bail bonds, it does not justify mandatory attendance for proceedings that may remain pending for years. [Paras 6 - 8] Meenakshi v. State of Haryana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 60

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Section 362 - Bar on Alteration or Review of Signed Orders – The Supreme Court set aside an order of the Patna High Court which had recalled its earlier grant of bail to the appellant - The High Court had reversed the bail order on the grounds of a clerical error by the Court Master, who recorded the petition as "allowed" despite the operative portion allegedly being "rejected" - The Supreme Court held that under Section 362 CrPC, no alteration or review of a signed judgment or order is permissible except to correct clerical or arithmetical errors – Noted that no such error justified the recall, rendering the High Court's action unsustainable in law. Rambali Sahni v. State of Bihar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 61

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Section 378 – Appeal against Acquittal – Scope of Interference by Appellate Court – The Supreme Court reiterated that an appellate court must exercise caution before reversing an order of acquittal - While the appellate court has full power to review and reappreciate evidence, it should not disturb the findings of the Trial Court if two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record - Interference is only justified if the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity, is based on a misreading or omission of material evidence, or if the Trial Court's view is "clearly unreasonable" - The acquittal further strengthens the double presumption of innocence in favor of the accused. [Paras 27 - 31] Tulasareddi @ Mudakappa v. State of Karnataka, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 59 : 2026 INSC 67

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 — Section 439 — Scope of Bail Jurisdiction — The jurisdiction of a Court under Section 439 is limited to granting or refusing bail based on prima facie evidence - It is coram non judice for a bail court to issue general mandatory directions to investigating authorities that contravene express legislative intent - Determination of age is a matter of trial and not a "matter of course" step during bail proceedings. [Relied on Chandrapal Singh v. State of U.P. (2022 SCC OnLine All 934); State v. M. Murugesan (2020) 15 SCC 251; Abuzar Hossain @ Gulam Hossain v. State of West Bengal (2012) 10 SCC 489; Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb (2021) 3 SCC 713; Paras 13-19] State of Uttar Pradesh v. Anurudh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 29 : 2026 INSC 47

Companies Act, 2013 — Sections 212(6), 447, 448, 451 — Cognizance of offences involving fraud — Bar on private complaints — Whether a Special Court can take cognizance of offences under Sections 448 (false statement liable to punishment for fraud) and 451 (repeated default) of the Companies Act, 2013 on the basis of a private criminal complaint. Held, an offence under Section 448 is an "offence covered under Section 447" within the meaning of Section 212(6), as it prescribes punishment in terms of fraud as defined and punishable under Section 447. Consequently, the second proviso to Section 212(6) bars the Special Court from taking cognizance of such offences except upon a written complaint by the Director of the Serious Fraud Investigation Office (SFIO) or an officer authorised in writing by the Central Government. This statutory bar serves as a safeguard against frivolous or motivated complaints by disgruntled shareholders, members, or competitors in corporate disputes. It rejected the contention that the 2015 amendment to Section 212(6) limited the bar solely to the offence under Section 447 itself, holding that offences inextricably linked to fraud (such as under Section 448) attract the same restriction. The ancillary offence under Section 451 was also held to be covered by the bar. However, aggrieved persons are not remediless: they may approach the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) under Section 213 for an order directing investigation into the affairs of the company by SFIO, upon satisfying the eligibility criteria under clauses (a) or (b) thereof. (Para 26, 35) Yerram Vijay Kumar v. State of Telangana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 28 : 2026 INSC 42

Companies Act, 2013 — Sections 212(6), 447, 448, 451 — The case arose from a management dispute in a Hyderabad-based real estate company, where the original promoter (complainant) filed a private complaint alleging that former directors (appellants), after removal, fraudulently convened an EGM, passed forged resolutions, appointed new directors, and filed false Form DIR-12 with the Ministry of Corporate Affairs. The Special Court took cognizance of offences under Sections 448 and 451 of the Companies Act and various IPC sections (including 420, 468, etc.). The High Court declined to quash the proceedings, leading to the appeal. Allowing the appeals in part, the Supreme Court quashed the proceedings and cognizance to the extent of offences under Sections 448 and 451 of the Companies Act. The Court directed transfer of the remaining complaint (IPC offences) to the appropriate court having territorial jurisdiction for trial on merits. It set aside the High Court's order. (Para 26, 35) Yerram Vijay Kumar v. State of Telangana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 28 : 2026 INSC 42

Company Law – Control and Management – "Head and Brain" Test – In determining the residence and commercial substance of the respondents, the AAR applied the "head and brain" test - It was found that though the companies were incorporated in Mauritius, the real control over transactions exceeding USD 250,000 rested with a non-resident individual in the USA – Held that if the board of directors of a subsidiary is reduced to "puppets" and the steering interference of the parent/owner is such that the subsidiary does not perform activities on its own authority, the corporate veil can be pierced - It held that the AAR's findings on the lack of commercial substance and the centralized control in the USA were sufficient to establish a prima facie case of tax avoidance - the applications for advance rulings were not maintainable. Authority For Advance Rulings v. Tiger Global International II Holdings, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 50 : 2026 INSC 60

Constitutional Law – Articles 14, 21, and 41 – Directive Principles of State Policy – Article 142 of the Constitution – Supreme Court noted that Fundamental Rights (Part III) and Directive Principles (Part IV) are "two wheels of a chariot," where the principles of Article 39(a) (right to livelihood) and Article 41 (right to work in cases of disablement) must guide the interpretation of fundamental rights - The right to work is recognized as a precious liberty that enables a person to live with dignity beyond "mere animal existence." – Exercising its power to do complete justice, directed the creation of a supernumerary post for the appellant at North Eastern Coalfields CIL - The employer was directed to provide "reasonable accommodation" in the form of a suitable desk job with a computer and keyboard designed as per "universal design" under Section 2(ze) of the RPwD Act. [Relied on Omkar Ramchandra Gond v. Union of India; 2024 INSC 775; Anmol v. Union of India 2025 SCC OnLine SC 387; Om Rathod v. Director General of Health Services 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3130; Rajive Raturi v. Union of India 2024 16 SCC 654; Paras 13- 24] Sujata Bora v. Coal India Ltd; 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 46 : 2026 INSC 53

Constitutional Validity — Articles 14 and 21 - Classifying widowed daughters-in-law based solely on the timing of their husband's death (before or after the father-in-law) is arbitrary and lacks a rational nexus with the Act's object of securing maintenance for vulnerable dependants - Denying maintenance on such technical grounds would expose them to destitution, violating the right to life with dignity under Article 21 - Section 19 casts a personal obligation on the father-in-law to maintain his daughter-in-law during his lifetime - Section 22 creates an obligation on the heirs of the deceased to maintain dependants out of the estate - A claim under Section 22 arises only after the death of the father-in-law – Appeals dismissed. [Relied on B. Premanand v. Mohan Koikal (2011) 4 SCC 266; Vinod Kumar v. DM, Mau (2023) 19 SCC 126; Paras 16-28] Kanchana Rai v. Geeta Sharma, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 41 : 2026 INSC 54

Constitution of India – Article 142 – Restoration of Withdrawn Petitions – National Highways Act, 1956 – Sections 3G and 3J – Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – Section 34 – The Supreme Court invoked its extraordinary powers under Article 142 to set aside an order of the Trial Court, which had allowed land owners to withdraw their Section 34 petitions following a High Court judgment declaring Sections 3G and 3J of the National Highways Act unconstitutional - noted that since the High Court's judgment was subsequently stayed, the land owners were left "remediless" as fresh petitions would be barred by limitation under Section 34(3) of the 1996 Act - Supreme Court has raised concerns over the deep structural flaws in determining the land acquisition compensation acquired under the National Highways Act, 1956. The Court said that land owners whose lands were acquired under the 1956 Act faces significant disadvantage when compared to land owners whose lands were acquired under different laws. [Para 1-3] Riar Builders Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 65

Constitution of India - Article 14 - Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 - Section 17A - Vires of Section 17A - Whether the requirement of prior approval for conducting an enquiry, inquiry, or investigation into offences relatable to recommendations made or decisions taken by a public servant is unconstitutional? - Held (per Nagarathna, J.) - Section 17A of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 is unconstitutional and is liable to be struck down - The provision is a resurrection of the Single Directive 4.7(3) and Section 6A of the Delhi Special Police Establishment (DSPE) Act, 1946, both of which were previously struck down by the Supreme Court - Resurrection of Struck-down Provisions: Section 17A is an attempt to reintroduce a prior approval regime that was already declared unconstitutional in larger bench decisions. It is "old wine in a new bottle" and does not remove the basis on which Section 6A of the DSPE Act was invalidated - The primary object of the Act is to effectively curb the "cancerous growth of corruption" - Section 17A forestalls even a bare preliminary enquiry, thereby protecting corrupt officials rather than merely honest ones - The provision is arbitrary because it requires approval from the very government department to which the public servant belongs - This creates a "policy bias" and a "conflict of interest," as the authority granting approval may have been involved in the same decision-making process, leading to a lack of objectivity and neutrality - The classification based on the nature of duties (recommendations or decisions) to protect a certain class of public servants is illegal and violates the mandate of equality before the law - The expression "Government" or "competent authority" in Section 17A cannot be substituted with "Lokpal" or "Lokayukta" through interpretation, as such substitution would amount to impermissible judicial legislation. [Relied on Vineet Narain vs. Union of India, (1998) 1 SCC 226; Subramanian Swamy vs. Director, CBI, (2014) 8 SCC 68; Lalita Kumari vs. Government of Uttar Pradesh, (2014) 2 SCC 1; Manohar Lal Sharma vs. Principal Secretary, (2014) 2 SCC 532; Paras 19-22] Centre for Public Interest Litigation v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 43 : 2026 INSC 55

Constitution of India – Article 16 – Recruitment Process – Challenge by Unsuccessful Candidate – Estoppel – All India Council for Technical Education (Career Advancement Scheme for the Teachers and Other Academic Staff in Technical Institutions) (Degree) Regulations, 2012 – Scope and Applicability – Direct Recruitment vs. Career Progression - Held that it is a settled principle that a candidate who participated in the selection process without protest cannot challenge the "rules of the game" after being declared unsuccessful – Noted that the respondent participated in the interview held on 17.12.2015, secured 28 marks against the qualifying 45, and only challenged the process after failing to secure a recommendation – Held that to apply AICTE Regulations to a candidate participating in recruitment for the post of Professors in the Engineering Colleges in the State conducted by the Commission under State Rules framed by the State, would be to stretch the AICTE Regulations beyond its text, context, and purpose - The law does not permit a regulation crafted as a ladder to be used as a gate – Held that the AICTE Regulations do not apply to the process of direct recruitment under the State Rules - The AICTE Regulations of 2012 are not "Recruitment Rules" but are "Promotion and Progression Rules" - They apply to individuals already within the institutional framework (incumbents or newly appointed staff) for the purpose of career advancement - Suitability for a post determined by a committee of experts does not warrant interference in the exercise of powers of judicial review – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Anupal Singh & Others v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2020) 2 SCC 173; Paras 13 – 18] Gujarat Public Service Commission v. Gnaneshwary Dushyantkumar Shah, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 64 : 2026 INSC 70

Constitution of India – Article 226(3) – Vacation of Interim Orders – Mandatory Timeline for Disposal – Special Leave Petition filed against an interim order of status quo – Petitioner submitted that an application for vacating the interim order had been pending since January 2025 – Held, Article 226(3) of the Constitution of India mandates that upon an application for vacating an interim order being filed, the High Court is required to dispose of the same within a period of two weeks – In light of this provision, the Supreme Court requested the High Court to take up and dispose of the pending application on its own merits. [Paras 3, 4] Giriraj v. Mohd. Amir, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 66

Constitution of India – Article 309 – Bihar Pharmacists Cadre Rules, 2014 (as amended in 2024) – Rule 6(1) – Validity of Minimum Qualification – The Supreme Court upheld the constitutional validity of Rule 6(1) and the "Note" in Appendix-I of the Cadre Rules, which prescribes Diploma in Pharmacy as the essential qualification for the post of Pharmacist (basic category) - Noted that candidates possessing higher qualifications (B. Pharma/M. Pharma) are eligible only if they also possess a Diploma in Pharmacy as the essential qualification for the post of Pharmacist (basic category) - Noted that candidates possessing higher qualifications (B. Pharma/M. Pharma) are eligible only if they also possess a Diploma in Pharmacy - It is the exclusive prerogative of the State, as an employer, to determine the most suitable qualifications for public posts based on its independent assessment - The power of judicial review is limited and cannot be used to rewrite service rules, determine equivalence of qualifications, or substitute the Court's assessment for that of the employer – Appeal dismissed. MD. Firoz Mansuri v. State of Bihar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 57 : 2026 INSC 68

Constitution of India – Article 32, 19(1)(d), 19(1)(e), and 19(1)(g) – Judicial Service – Migration to another State Service – Right to Profession – Petitioners, serving as Civil Judges in Uttarakhand, sought permission to join the Delhi Judicial Service after being declared successful in the recruitment examination - The High Court of Uttarakhand rejected their request, citing concerns over judicial vacancies and the impact on the litigant public - Held: The interest of the individual officers to advance their careers has an overriding effect over the administrative concerns of the parent High Court regarding vacancies - Denial of such permission results in "negativity, frustration," and a violation of fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution - The Supreme Court directed the High Court of Uttarakhand to pass orders for the cessation of their services to enable them to join the Delhi Judicial Service by the stipulated deadline - Supreme Court clarified that while the petitioners' joining was delayed due to the pending legal challenge, their seniority in the Delhi Judicial Service must be maintained as per their original position in the Select List - held that permission cannot be denied to a judicial officer to join the service of another State merely on the ground that migration will give rise to vacancies in the first State - The delay caused by the litigation shall not adversely affect their merit-based seniority – Petition allowed. [Paras 13-18] Anubhuti Goel v. High Court of Uttarakhand, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 67

Constitution of India – Article 91 – Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968 – Section 3(1) – Competence of Deputy Chairman – Held that the office of the Chairman of the Rajya Sabha is vacant, the Deputy Chairman is constitutionally mandated under Article 91(1) to perform all duties of the office - The statutory powers vested in the "Chairman" under Section 3 of the Inquiry Act are inseparable from the office of the Presiding Officer and must be read in harmony with the Constitutional scheme - the Deputy Chairman is competent to consider a notice of motion and exercise discretion to admit or refuse it under Section 3(1) of the Act. [Paras 17 - 22] X v. Speaker of the House of the People, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 53 : 2026 INSC 65

Consumer Protection Act, 2019 – Section 71 – Execution of Orders – Liability of Directors/Promoters – The Supreme Court held that an order passed by a Consumer Forum against a company (Corporate Debtor) cannot be executed against its Directors or Promoters if they were not parties to the original complaint and no specific findings of liability were recorded against them - Noted that execution must strictly conform to the decree and cannot be used to enlarge liability to bind persons who were not parties to the adjudication. Ansal Crown Heights Flat Buyers Association v. Ansal Crown Infrabuild Pvt. Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 40 : 2026 INSC 51

Contract Law; Procedural Prerequisites and Waiver - A party at fault cannot be permitted to set up a bar of non-performance of prerequisite obligations to exclude the operation of an arbitration clause - If a party's conduct such as failing to adhere to strict timelines for Engineer decisions or Adjudicator recommendations disables preceding steps, those procedural prerequisites are deemed waived. [Relied on M.K. Shah Engineers & Contractors vs. State of M.P. (1999) 2 SCC 59; ASF Buildtech Private Limited vs. Shapoorji Pallonji & Company Private Limited (2025) 9 SCC 76; State of Goa v. Praveen Enterprises (2012) 12 SCC 581; Paras 16-20] Bhagheeratha Engineering Ltd. v. State of Kerala, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 31 : 2026 INSC 4

Criminal Law — Bail Cancellation — POCSO Act — Heinous Offences — Allegations of Gang-rape of a Minor — Grant of bail by High Court without considering the nature and gravity of the offence, the statutory rigour under the POCSO Act, and the filing of the chargesheet — The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's order granting bail, observing that the exercise of discretion was "manifestly erroneous"- Noted that while the filing of a chargesheet does not preclude bail, the Court is duty-bound to consider the gravity of the offence and the material collected – Noted that the allegations involved repeated penetrative sexual assault under armed intimidation and blackmail via recorded acts, which have a "devastating impact on the life of the victim and shakes the collective conscience of society" - The High Court failed to apply settled parameters, including the vulnerability of the victim and the likelihood of witness intimidation – Held that the bail order was perverse, unreasonable, and ignored the relevant material – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Bhagwan Singh v. Dilip Kumar @ Deepu @ Depak and another (2023) 13 SCC 549; State of Bihar v. Rajballav Prasad @ Rajballav Pd. Yadav @ Rajballabh Yadav (2017) 2 SCC 178; Deepak Yadav v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2022) 8 SCC 559; Paras 12-18] X v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 36 : 2026 INSC 44

Criminal Law — Bail — POCSO Act — Age Determination — Section 439 CrPC vs. Section 94 JJ Act — Mini-Trial at Bail Stage — The Supreme Court set aside the Allahabad High Court's directions mandating medical age determination tests in all POCSO cases at the commencement of investigation - held that while exercising bail jurisdiction under Section 439 CrPC, a High Court cannot conduct a "mini-trial" by entertaining challenges to the veracity of age-related documents or ordering roving inquiries. State of Uttar Pradesh v. Anurudh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 29 : 2026 INSC 47

Criminal Law - Quashing of Prosecution – Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 – Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) – Essential Ingredients - The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and quashed the criminal prosecution against the appellant, holding that the mere presence of an accused at the scene of an incident, without a specific overt act or intentional insult directed at the complainant's caste, does not satisfy the statutory requirements for an offense under the SC/ST Act – Noted following points – i. Ingredients of Section 3(1)(r) - To constitute an offense under this section, there must be an intentional insult or intimidation with the specific intent to humiliate a member of a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe in a place within public view Noted that mere fact that a complainant belongs to a protected community is insufficient; the insult must be because of their caste identity - Even knowledge of the complainant's caste is not enough to attract this section without the intent to humiliate; ii. Ingredients of Section 3(1)(s) - This section requires the accused to abuse a member of a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe "by the caste name" in public view - noted that the intent behind the abuse must be found to be denigrating toward the caste, resulting in a feeling of caste-based humiliation - Merely saying a caste name or simple abuse does not automatically constitute an offense; iii. Application to Facts - Held that neither the FIR nor the chargesheet contained allegations of the appellant uttering any specific words or performing overt acts - The allegations were deemed general in nature and failed to prima facie constitute an offense – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Shajan Skaria v. The State of Kerala & Anr., 2024 SCC OnLine SC 224; Paras 11-20] Keshaw Mahto @ Keshaw Kumar Mahto v. State of Bihar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 62

Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940; Drugs and Cosmetics Rules, 1945 – Rule 49 – Power of the State Government to prescribe essential qualifications for the post of Drug Inspector (DI) or Drug Control Officer (DCO) - Key Issues – i. Whether the State Government, under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution of India (or State Acts), can prescribe "experience" as an essential qualification for appointment to the post of Drug Inspector when such qualification is absent in the Central Rules; ii. Applicability of the Doctrine of Occupied Field where the Central Government has already exercised its rule-making power under Section 33 of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act (D&C Act) – Held that when a field prescribing a qualification for a public post is occupied by the Union, then it is impermissible for the States to impose additional qualifications, observed the Supreme Court - Main Findings & Ratio – i. Doctrine of Occupied Field - The D&C Act is a "central law" that occupies the field regarding the prescription of qualifications for Inspectors under Section 33(2)(b) and Section 33(2)(n) - The State Government's power to appoint persons "as it thinks fit" under Section 21 does not extend to altering the "prescribed qualifications" set by the Central Government; ii. Interpretation of Rule 49 - The substantive part of Rule 49 of the Drug Rules, 1945, mandates specific educational degrees as the only essential qualifications for appointment - The 18-month experience mentioned in the proviso to Rule 49 is not a condition for eligibility for appointment; rather, it is a condition precedent for authorizing an already appointed Inspector to inspect the manufacture of substances listed in Schedule C; iii. Constitutional Supremacy - Rules framed by the State under the proviso to Article 309 or State enactments (like the Karnataka State Civil Services Act) cannot override or be inconsistent with the Central Drug Rules in an occupied field. [Relied on A.B. Krishna v. State of Karnataka (1998) 3 SCC 495; Paras 38 – 63] State of Haryana v. Krishan Kumar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 58 : 2026 INSC 63

Drugs and Cosmetics Rules, 1945 – Directions issued by the Court – i. Selection Criteria - Public Service Commissions (HPSC and KPSC) must complete selections based strictly on educational qualifications in Rule 49, ignoring the "experience" requirement added by State Rules; ii. Redrawing Merit List - Lists must be redrawn within eight weeks; iii. Protection of Existing Appointees (Haryana) - Selected candidates who remain in the new merit list shall continue in service - Those who fall out of the merit list may be continued only at the State's discretion via supernumerary posts, placed at the bottom of the seniority list. State of Haryana v. Krishan Kumar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 58 : 2026 INSC 63

Employer-Employee Relationship – Sham or Camouflage – Held that mere fact that the same individuals continued to work for the principal employer despite periodic changes in contractors does not, by itself, establish a direct relationship or prove a "sham" arrangement - Contractors may retain existing personnel to ensure continuity and prevent complaints from the principal employer - Regularization – Despite allowing the appeals, the Supreme Court exercised its discretion to direct the appellant to consider the respondents' cases for regularization on a sympathetic basis, given their decades of uninterrupted service in jobs that appear perpetual in nature - This direction was issued under the "special facts and circumstances" of the case and is not to be treated as a precedent. Municipal Council v. K. Jayaram, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 38

Evidence Act, 1872; Section 32 – Dying Declaration – Credibility and Corroboration – held that a dying declaration, if found to be true and voluntary, can form the sole basis for conviction without any further corroboration – Held that High Court erred in discarding a dying declaration recorded by a Tehsildar (PW-1) after obtaining a medical certificate of fitness - Discrepancies regarding the exact time of the Tehsildar's arrival at the hospital were minor and did not justify discarding a clear and consistent statement by the deceased identifying her husband as the perpetrator. State of Himachal Pradesh v. Chaman Lal, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 48 : 2026 INSC 57

Factories Act, 1948; Section 59(2) — Overtime Wages — Definition of "Ordinary Rate of Wages" — Inclusion of Compensatory Allowances — The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision that compensatory allowances such as House Rent Allowance (HRA), Transport Allowance (TA), Small Family Allowance (SFA), and Clothing and Washing Allowance (CWA) must be included in the "ordinary rate of wages" for the purpose of calculating overtime wages - noted that Section 59(2) provides for only two specific exclusions: bonus and wages for overtime work - In the absence of statutory rules, the Executive cannot use Office Memorandums to read additional exclusions into the Act that the Legislature did not contemplate - Noted that different Ministries cannot assign different meanings to the same statutory provision, noting that the Ministry of Railways was already including such allowances in its calculations. [Paras 14, 15] Union of India v. Heavy Vehicles Factory Employees Union, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 70

Factories Act, 1948; Sections 64, 65, 112, & 113 — Rule-making Power — Jurisdiction of Central Government — Under Chapter VI and Chapter XI of the 1948 Act, the power to frame exempting rules or general rules is vested primarily with the State Governments - The Central Government's role is limited to issuing directions to State Governments for the execution of the Act's provisions - various Ministries (Defence, Labour, and Finance) lack the legal authority to issue clarifications or Office Memorandums that modify the definition of "ordinary rate of wages" under Section 59(2) – Held that The Factories Act, 1948, is a beneficial legislation intended to protect workers from exploitation and ensure their health and safety - Any interpretation that restricts or curtails benefits admissible to workers under the Act must be avoided - Executive instructions that lack statutory force cannot override the law or run contrary to literal statutory mandates – Appeals dismissed. [Relied on Gujarat Mazdoor Sabha & Anr. v. State of Gujarat (2020) 10 SCC 459; Paras 9 - 13] Union of India v. Heavy Vehicles Factory Employees Union, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 70

Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956; Sections 21(vii) and 22 — Maintenance of Dependants — Whether a daughter-in-law who becomes a widow after the death of her father-in-law is a 'dependant' entitled to claim maintenance from his estate? - Held that a plain and literal reading of Section 21(vii) makes it crystal clear that "any widow of his son" is a dependant - The legislature deliberately avoided using the word "predeceased" before "son" in this section, unlike other statutes – At the time of the son's death, whether before or after the father-in-law's demise is immaterial for determining the status of the widow as a dependant - When the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, it must be given its natural meaning – Held that Courts cannot "add, and mend" or supply assumed omissions to the text of the law - Departure from the literal rule is only permissible in rare cases, as the exclusive domain to legislate lies with the legislature. Kanchana Rai v. Geeta Sharma, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 41 : 2026 INSC 54

Income Tax Act, 1961 – Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement (DTAA) – India-Mauritius Treaty – Tax Residency Certificate (TRC) – Held that the limited evidentiary role of a TRC in proceedings under Section 245R(2) - While a TRC establishes residency, it does not prevent the Revenue from examining whether an entity is a mere "conduit" or a "see-through entity" used as a device for tax avoidance – Held that the applications were rightly rejected by the AAR as being hit by the threshold jurisdictional bar under proviso (iii) to Section 245R(2) – Supreme Court concluded that capital gains arising from transfers effected after the cut-off date of 01.04.2017 are taxable in India under the Income Tax Act read with the DTAA – Appeals allowed. [Relied on Vodafone International Holdings BV v. Union of India (2012) 6 SCC 613; Balvir Singh v. State of Uttarakhand (2023) SC 5551; Union of India v. Azadi Bachao Andolan (2004) 10 SCC 1; LIC v. Escorts Ltd. (1986) 1 SCC 264; McDowell & Company Ltd v. Commercial Tax Officer (1985) 3 SCC 230; Paras 12-25; 40-50] Authority For Advance Rulings v. Tiger Global International II Holdings, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 50 : 2026 INSC 60

Income Tax Act, 1961 – Section 245R(2) Proviso (iii) – Advance Rulings – Chapter X-A (GAAR) – General Anti-Avoidance Rules - Rejection of application on the ground of being prima facie designed for the avoidance of tax – held that the use of the term "prima facie" in Section 245R(2) implies that the Authority for Advance Rulings (AAR) needs only an initial examination of documents to be satisfied that a transaction is for tax avoidance - The level of satisfaction for a prima facie conclusion is much lower than what is required for final proof – Held that that where evidence prima facie establishes that transactions do not qualify as lawful and are impermissible tax-avoidance arrangements, Chapter X-A becomes applicable. Authority For Advance Rulings v. Tiger Global International II Holdings, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 50 : 2026 INSC 60

Income Tax Act, 1961 – Section 260A – Jurisdiction of High Court – Substantial Question of Law – Whether the High Court can decide an issue (taxability under Section 28) not specifically framed as a substantial question of law – Held: Issues incidental or collateral to the main formulated question, on which parties have been heard and which go to the root of the matter, can be considered by the High Court - The absence of a formal formulation does not vitiate the judgment if no prejudice is caused and parties had the opportunity to address the dispute – Appeal dismissed. [Para 9] Jindal Equipment Leasing Consultancy Services Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax Delhi – II, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 37 : 2026 INSC 46

Income Tax Act, 1961 – Section 28 and Section 47(vii) – Amalgamation – Substitution of Shares held as Stock-in-Trade – Whether the receipt of shares of an amalgamated company in lieu of shares of an amalgamating company held as stock-in-trade gives rise to taxable business income – Held: Amalgamation is a statutory process of substitution - While Section 47(vii) exempts capital gains arising from such substitution if the shares are "capital assets," it does not apply if they are held as "stock-in-trade" - Taxable business income under Section 28 arises when an assessee receives a real and presently realisable commercial benefit - In the context of amalgamation, the charge under Section 28 crystallises only upon the allotment of new shares, as this is when the assessee receives realisable instruments capable of valuation in money's worth - At the stages of the "appointed date" or "date of court sanction," no such benefit accrues or is received - The profit arising on receipt of the amalgamated company's shares may be taxed under Section 28 where the shares allotted are tradable and possess a definite market value - This is a fact-sensitive test to be determined based on the realisability of the shares in each case. [Relied on Commissioner of Income-tax, Cochin v. Grace Collis and others (2001) 3 SCC 430; Orient Trading Company Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Calcutta (1997) 3 SCC 340; R. Nagaraj v. Rajamani 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 416; Shiv Raj Gupta v. Commissioner of Income-Tax, Delhi (2020) 425 ITR 420 (SC); Paras 18 - 31] Jindal Equipment Leasing Consultancy Services Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax Delhi – II, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 37 : 2026 INSC 46

Income Tax Act, 1961 – Section 90 – Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement (DTAA) – India-Mauritius Treaty – Tax Residency Certificate (TRC) – Supreme Court clarified that while a TRC is a valid piece of evidence to establish residence in a contracting state, it does not act as a complete bar to further enquiry by the Revenue - If the Revenue establishes that a Mauritian company was interposed merely as a "conduit" or a "device" to avoid tax, the tax authorities are entitled to "look through" the entity and discard the device to tax the real transaction - The dispute involved the sale of shares of a Singapore-based entity (Flipkart) that derived its value substantially from assets located in India - held that even if the transfer involved shares of a non-resident company (Singapore), the capital gains are taxable in India if the value is derived from Indian assets - The AAR found that the exemption under the India-Mauritius DTAA was intended for the alienation of shares of an Indian company and did not automatically extend to shares of a company resident in a third country (Singapore). Authority For Advance Rulings v. Tiger Global International II Holdings, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 50 : 2026 INSC 60

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016; Section 7 and Section 31 — Contract Act, 1872; Section 126 — "See to it" Guarantee — Distinction between an Undertaking to Infuse Funds and a Contract of Guarantee — Extinguishment of Debt against Third-Party Sureties - Contract of Guarantee vs. Deed of Undertaking - A "Deed of Undertaking" requiring a promoter to arrange for the infusion of funds into the borrower to comply with financial covenants does not, by itself, constitute a contract of guarantee under Section 126 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 - To constitute a guarantee, there must be a direct and unambiguous promise to the creditor to perform the promise or discharge the liability of the third person in case of default - An obligation to facilitate the borrower's compliance with covenants is not equivalent to a promise to discharge the borrower's liability to the lender. [Para 20-22] UV Asset Reconstruction Company v. Electrosteel Castings, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 33 : 2026 INSC 14

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 - Extinguishment of Debt under Resolution Plan - The approval of a Resolution Plan under Section 31 of the IBC does not ipso facto result in the extinguishment of the entire debt against third-party sureties or security providers unless expressly provided for in the plan - Where a Resolution Plan (specifically Clause 3.2(ix) in this case) explicitly reserves the rights of financial creditors to proceed against third parties or promoters for the "unsustainable debt" portion, the discharge of the Corporate Debtor does not bar claims against such third-party security providers – Appeal dismissed. [Relied on Lalit Kumar Jain v. Union of India (2021) 9 SCC 321; Paras 23-25] UV Asset Reconstruction Company v. Electrosteel Castings, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 33 : 2026 INSC 14

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Object of Code – Resolution vs. Recovery – The fundamental object of the IBC is resolution and revival, not mere recovery - the concept of revival does not exclude recovery altogether; it only excludes the abuse of insolvency as a pressure tactic - Alternative remedies under SARFAESI or RERA remain available, but the presence of such recovery proceedings does not bar the initiation of CIRP under Section 7. [Para 10, 12] Elegna Co-Op. Housing and Commercial Society v. Edelweiss Asset Reconstruction, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 51 : 2026 INSC 58

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Protection of Homebuyers – Specific Directions – To ensure transparency and safeguard homebuyer interests during CIRP - issued mandatory directions: (i) The Information Memorandum must disclose comprehensive details of all allottees; (ii) The CoC must record specific written reasons if they find it not viable to approve handover of possession under Regulation 4E; and (iii) Any recommendation for liquidation must be accompanied by a reasoned justification. [Relied on Innoventive Industries Ltd. v. ICICI Bank (2018) 1 SCC 407; Pioneer Urban Land and Infrastructure Ltd v. Union of India (2019) 8 SCC 416; GLAS Trust Co. LLC v. BYJU Raveendran (2025) 3 SCC 625; Swiss Ribbons (P) Ltd. v. Union of India (2019) 4 SCC 17; Para 15] Elegna Co-Op. Housing and Commercial Society v. Edelweiss Asset Reconstruction, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 51 : 2026 INSC 58

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Section 14 – Moratorium – Liability of Natural Persons – While a moratorium under Section 14 shields the corporate debtor, it does not extend to its directors or promoters - the mere absence of a moratorium-related bar does not automatically make directors liable in execution proceedings unless their independent liability was established during the adjudicatory process - A company is a distinct legal entity from its shareholders and directors - The doctrine of "piercing the corporate veil" is an exceptional measure that requires specific pleadings and a determination of fraud or dishonest misuse of the corporate personality, which cannot be introduced for the first time at the execution stage. [Relied on Rajbir v. Suraj Bhan (2022) 14 SCC 609; Electronics Corpn. of India Ltd. v. Secy., Revenue Deptt., Govt. of A.P. (1999) 4 SCC 458; Paras 11-20] Ansal Crown Heights Flat Buyers Association v. Ansal Crown Infrabuild Pvt. Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 40 : 2026 INSC 51

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Section 7 – Admission of CIRP – Mandatory Nature – Discretion of Adjudicating Authority – Supreme Court issued a set of directions regarding the functioning of the Committee of Creditors (CoC) under the Insolvency & Bankruptcy Code, noting that while the commercial wisdom of the CoC is paramount, such power must be exercised with responsibility, transparency and proper application of mind, particularly in real estate insolvencies where homebuyers' interests are deeply involved - Held, the inquiry under Section 7(5)(a) is confined strictly to the determination of debt and default - Once the Adjudicating Authority is satisfied that a financial debt exists and a default has occurred, it must admit the application unless it is incomplete - Considerations such as project viability, business status (going concern), stage of completion, or perceived prejudice to homebuyers are extraneous and irrelevant at the admission stage. [Para 12] Elegna Co-Op. Housing and Commercial Society v. Edelweiss Asset Reconstruction, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 51 : 2026 INSC 58

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Section 7 – Locus Standi of Homebuyer Societies – Held, a society or Resident Welfare Association (RWA) does not possess locus standi to intervene in Section 7 proceedings at the pre-admission stage - At this stage, proceedings are in personam between the applicant creditor and the corporate debtor - While individual allottees are "financial creditors" under the Explanation to Section 5(8)(f), this status does not automatically extend to a society unless it is a creditor in its own right or a statutorily recognized authorized representative. [Para 13] Elegna Co-Op. Housing and Commercial Society v. Edelweiss Asset Reconstruction, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 51 : 2026 INSC 58

Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968 – Section 3(2) First Proviso – Interpretation – Joint Committee – Supreme Court dismissed the writ petition filed by Justice Yashwant Varma of the Allahabad High Court challenging the Lok Sabha Speaker's decision to form an inquiry committee as per the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968, in the impeachment motion moved against him in relation to the discovery of unaccounted cash at his official residence - The first proviso to Section 3(2) of the Inquiry Act mandates the constitution of a Joint Committee only in the specific situation where notices of motion are given in both Houses of Parliament on the same day and are subsequently admitted by both Houses - The proviso is situational and not exhaustive; it does not contemplate or govern scenarios where a notice is admitted in one House but rejected in the other - Rejection of a motion in one House does not render the other House incompetent to proceed independently - To hold otherwise would allow for the scuttling of proceedings through the deliberate introduction of defective notices in one House to frustrate a valid motion in the other. [Relied on Sub-Committee on Judicial Accountability v. Union of India, (1991) 4 SCC 699; Tribhovandas Haribhai Tamboli v. Gujarat Revenue Tribunal, (1991) 3 SCC 442; Amina Marwa Sabreen v. State of Kerala, (2018) 14 SCC 193; Paras 12, 14-22, 29- 45] X v. Speaker of the House of the People, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 53 : 2026 INSC 65

Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968 – Section 3 – Role of the Secretariat – The Secretariat of a House should exercise restraint and confine its role to administrative scrutiny, such as verification of procedural compliance (e.g., signature verification) - It cannot assume quasi-adjudicatory functions by performing a substantive assessment of the merits of allegations or the correctness of facts pleaded in a notice of motion - The final decision on the admission of a motion rests solely with the Speaker or the Chairman as the case may be. [Paras 49 - 54] X v. Speaker of the House of the People, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 53 : 2026 INSC 65

Judicial Conduct – Appellate Court's handling of Non-Appearance – The Supreme Court expressed that it was "appalling and shocking" for an Appellate Court to insist on the appearance of an appellant on every date despite a suspension of sentence - If a counsel is not assisting or has been changed frequently, the appropriate course is for the Court to appoint an amicus curiae or allow the accused to make alternative arrangements, rather than immediately cancelling bail and issuing Non-Bailable Warrants (NBW). Meenakshi v. State of Haryana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 60

Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 — Section 94 — Mandatory Procedure for Age Determination — The procedure for determining the age of a victim or juvenile is strictly governed by Section 94(2) of the JJ Act - Priority must be given to: (i) school/matriculation certificates, or (ii) birth certificates from local authorities - Medical age determination (ossification test) can only be resorted to in the absence of such documentary evidence – Held that the High Court erred in holding that medical reports could prevail over school records at the bail stage. State of Uttar Pradesh v. Anurudh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 29 : 2026 INSC 47

Land Acquisition – Disparity in Compensation Mechanism – National Highways Act, 1956 vs. Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 – Supreme Court observed a lack of "intelligible differentia" in the treatment of land owners whose land is acquired under the 1956 Act compared to those under the 2013 Act - While 2013 Act acquisitions involve judicial oversight by District Judges, the 1956 Act relies on administrative officers (Collectors/Commissioners) acting as arbitrators who may lack a "judicially trained mind" to adjudicate complex market value issues – Noted that the Union of India to revisit the legislative scheme to bring parity in the mechanism for determining market value with reference to Article 300-A of the Constitution – Supreme Court directed that the Interim orders to continue; Registry directed to forward the order to the Attorney General and Solicitor General of India for consideration. [Relied on Union of India & another vs. Tarsem Singh & others, (2019) 9 SCC 304; Para 5-12] Riar Builders Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 65

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 – Grant of Anticipatory Bail – Co-accused Statements – Noted that the appellant was arraigned as an accused solely on the basis of a statement made by a co-accused (who was apprehended with 6.330 kg of Ganja) - noted that the actual complicity of the appellant is a matter to be thrashed out during trial - Supreme Court restored the bail and directed that the appellant be released on anticipatory bail by the jurisdictional Investigating Officer – Appeal allowed. [Paras 5-8] Rambali Sahni v. State of Bihar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 61

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 – Section 138 – Separate Cause of Action – Held that a separate cause of action arises upon each dishonour of a cheque, provided the statutory sequence of presentation, dishonour, notice, and failure to pay is complete - The fact that multiple cheques arise from a single transaction does not merge them into a single cause of action - Once a cheque is issued in discharge of liability and subsequently dishonoured, a presumption of liability in favour of the complainant arises - The burden of proving the absence of a debt or liability lies with the accused and must be discharged during the trial – Noted that the High Court, while exercising power under Section 482, must avoid conducting a "mini-trial" or usurping the function of the Trial Court when disputed factual questions exist - The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's finding that maintaining two separate complaints for the same underlying debt (one for personal cheques and one for firm cheques) amounted to parallel prosecution - held that since the instruments were distinct, drawn on different accounts, and presented on different dates, the law does not bar separate prosecutions - Questions regarding whether cheques were issued as alternative securities or in substitution of one another are mixed questions of fact that cannot be resolved at the threshold under Section 482 - Noted that statutory weight must be given to the presumption under Section 139 - Quashing proceedings prematurely overlooks this legal presumption which operates in favor of the complainant. [Relied on State of Haryana and Others vs. Bhajan Lal and Others, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335; Neeharika Infrastructure Private Limited vs. State of Maharashtra and Others, (2021) 19 SCC 401; Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd. vs. Pennar Peterson Securities Ltd. and Others, (2000) 2 SCC 745 M.M.T.C. Ltd. and Another vs. Medchl Chemicals and Pharma (P) Ltd. and Another, (2002) 1 SCC 234; Paras 26-45] Sumit Bansal v. MGI Developers and Promoters, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 34 : 2026 INSC 40

Penal Code, 1860; Section 300 Exception 4, Section 302 and Section 304 Part II — Culpable Homicide Not Amounting to Murder — Free Fight and Private Defence — The appellant was initially convicted under Section 302/149 for the death of the deceased during a group clash - The High Court altered the conviction to Section 304 Part II, holding that in a "free fight" involving two rival groups where both sides sustained injuries, a common object for an unlawful assembly cannot be easily inferred - The Supreme Court upheld this alteration, noting that the appellant acted without premeditation in the midst of a sudden commotion - While the appellant's use of a lathi on the deceased's head established "knowledge" that the injury was likely to cause death, the lack of specific intent to cause death in the context of a group fight justifies the invocation of Section 304 Part II. Shrikrishna v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 35 : 2026 INSC 45

Penal Code, 1860 – Sections 302, 120-B, 201, 506 r/w 34 – Circumstantial Evidence – Reliability of Sole Eye-Witness – In a case primarily resting on circumstantial evidence and the testimony of a purported eye-witness, Supreme Court found the evidence insufficient to sustain conviction - Noted significant discrepancies: the eye-witness failed to report the incident for 21 days, alleged threats were not substantiated, and the witness was treated as partially hostile - medical evidence regarding the time of death (10 days prior to post-mortem) conflicted with the prosecution's timeline (21 days prior) - held that the prosecution failed to establish a complete and unbroken chain of circumstances - Required – Conspiracy cannot be presumed and requires proof of a meeting of minds, prior agreement, and concerted action - Mere suspicion, association, or the existence of civil disputes cannot substitute for proof of a criminal conspiracy – Appeals allowed. [Relied on Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar v. State of Karnataka, 2024 (8) SCC 149; Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar, (2022) 3 SCC 471; Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415; Ramesh v. State of Uttarakhand, 2020 (20) SCC 522; Paras 7, 24, 25] Tulasareddi @ Mudakappa v. State of Karnataka, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 59 : 2026 INSC 67

Penal Code, 1860 - Sentencing Policy — Advanced Age of Appellant — While upholding the conviction under Section 304 Part II, the Supreme Court reduced the sentence to the period already undergone (approximately six years and three months) – Held that since the appellant is now over 80 years old, sending him back to prison would be "harsh and inadvisable," emphasizing that courts should not be insensitive to the advanced age of convicts – Appeal dismissed. [Relied on Kesar Singh and Another vs. State of Haryana, (2008) 15 SCC 753; Paras 5, 6] Shrikrishna v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 35 : 2026 INSC 45

Pharmacy Act, 1948 – Pharmacy Practice Regulations, 2015 – Repugnancy – Classification and Equality – Articles 14 and 16 - Supreme Court ruled out repugnancy between the State Cadre Rules and Central legislation/regulations - While the Pharmacy Act and 2015 Regulations govern professional standards and create a "pool" of registered pharmacists, they do not mandate that every registered pharmacist must be considered for public employment. The State Cadre Rules operate in the distinct domain of public recruitment – The prescription of a Diploma as an essential qualification is not arbitrary or irrational - noted a valid "intelligible differentia" based on:i. Course Structure: Diploma holders undergo 500 hours of compulsory hospital training compared to 150 hours for B.Pharma students; ii. Employment Avenues: Diploma holders have more limited career opportunities compared to degree holders, who can apply for higher posts like Drug Inspectors or industrial roles. [Relied on Zahoor Ahmad Rather & Ors. v. Sheikh Imtiyaz Ahmad & Ors. (2019) 2 SCC 404; Maharashtra Public Service Commission v. Sandeep Shriram Warade & Ors. (2019) 6 SCC 362; &K Service Selection Recruitment Board & Anr. v. Basit Aslam Wani & Ors. (2020); Paras 47-55, 59 – 64] MD. Firoz Mansuri v. State of Bihar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 57 : 2026 INSC 68

Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, 1882; Section 41 — Non-arbitrability and Public Policy — Merely because a statute (like Section 41 of the 1882 Act) confers exclusive jurisdiction on a specific court for certain types of disputes (licensor-licensee/landlord-tenant), it does not ex proprio vigore (by its own force) neutralize arbitration clauses in private agreements. The Court distinguished the present case - where possession had already been handed over and the dispute was purely a monetary claim from cases requiring special statutory protection - Arbitration clauses find their roots in Section 28 of the Contract Act - Exceptions 1 and 2 to Section 28 expressly provide that a contract to refer disputes to arbitration is not rendered illegal or void as a restraint of legal proceedings – Appeal dismissed. [Relied on In re Interplay Between Arbitration Agreements under Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 & Stamp Act, 1899, (2024) 6 SCC 1; Paras 19–26] Motilal Oswal Financial Services v. Santosh Cordeiro, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 32 : 2026 INSC 5

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988; Section 17A — Constitutional Validity — Reading Down (per K.V. Viswanathan; J) — The Supreme Court delivered a split verdict, holding the constitutional validity of Section 17A but read it down to mandate an independent screening mechanism - held that the "previous approval" of the Government/Competent Authority for conducting an enquiry, inquiry, or investigation must be preceded by an independent screening of the information/complaint by the Lokpal (for Central Government employees) or Lokayukta (for State Government employees) - The recommendation of the Lokpal/Lokayukta shall be binding on the Government/Authority. Centre for Public Interest Litigation v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 43 : 2026 INSC 55

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988; Section 17 — Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Section 4 and 156 — Jurisdiction of State Anti-Corruption Bureau (ACB) over Central Government Employees — The Supreme Court upheld the Rajasthan High Court's finding that the State ACB has the jurisdiction to register criminal cases, investigate, and file charge-sheets against Central Government employees for offences committed within the State's territorial jurisdiction - Noted that the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act (DSPE Act), 1946, is permissive and does not expressly or impliedly divest regular State police authorities of their power to investigate offences under the PC Act - While an internal arrangement exists where the CBI typically handles Central Government employees and the ACB handles State employees to avoid duplication, this does not exclude the State's legal power to investigate - The only mandatory requirement is that the investigating officer must hold the rank specified under Section 17 of the PC Act – Key findings by Supreme Court – i. CrPC as Parent Statute: Unless a special law provides a separate, exclusive procedure for investigation, the general provisions of Section 156 CrPC (powers of police to investigate cognizable offences) prevail; ii. Non-Exclusivity of CBI: The DSPE Act (which governs the CBI) does not impair any other law empowering State police authorities to investigate offences - It is incorrect to claim that only the CBI has the authority to institute such prosecutions; iii. Validity of Charge-sheet: A charge-sheet filed by a State agency against a Central Government employee without the prior consent or approval of the CBI is valid in law – Appeal dismissed. [Relied on A.C. Sharma v. Delhi Administration (1973) 1 SCC 726; Paras 3-9] Nawal Kishore Meena @ N.K Meena v. State of Rajasthan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 68 : 2026 INSC 71

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 - Difference between Section 6A (DSPE Act) and Section 17A (PC Act) — While Section 6A was struck down in Subramanian Swamy for being discriminatory (protecting only high-ranking officers), Section 17A is applicable to all levels of public servants - the requirement for an independent screening mechanism remains a constitutional necessity to prevent the "chilling effect" on honest officials while ensuring the accountability of the corrupt - In cases where the public servant is not covered under the jurisdiction of the Lokpal/Lokayukta, the competent authority must commission an appropriate independent investigative agency to screen the information before granting or refusing approval. [Relied on Vineet Narain vs. Union of India (1998) 1 SCC 226; Subramanian Swamy vs. Director, CBI (2014) 8 SCC 682; K. Veeraswami vs. Union of India (1991) 3 SCC 655; Lalita Kumari vs. Govt. of U.P. (2014) 2 SCC 1: Paras 50, 81, 93, 98-100] Centre for Public Interest Litigation v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 43 : 2026 INSC 55

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 - Rule of Law — Independence of Investigative Agency — The executive cannot have the unbridled power to foreclose an enquiry into corruption allegations against its own officials, as this would violate the "rule of law" and the principle of independent investigation - Any decision to block an enquiry must be taken by a body independent of the executive - SOP) — Held that the existing SOP (dated 03.09.2021) governing Section 17A to be "wholly unsatisfactory" as it failed to provide for an independent screening mechanism and allowed the executive to judge the actions of its own limbs. Centre for Public Interest Litigation v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 43 : 2026 INSC 55

Preventive Detention – Telangana Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Boot-Leggers, Dacoits, Drug-Offenders, Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offender Act, 1986 – Section 2(a), 2(f) and 3 – Detention of "Drug Offender" – Law and Order vs. Public Order - Subjective Satisfaction and Extraneous Factors - Supreme Court observed that the Detaining Authority manifested an intention to detain the detenu "at any cost" - held that preventive detention should not be used as an alternative to the ordinary criminal law or to "clip the wings" of an accused when the State fails to resist bail – Held that if the detenu violated bail conditions, the appropriate remedy was to seek cancellation of bail under ordinary law, which the State failed to do - Resorting to the extraordinary measure of preventive detention to circumvent ordinary criminal procedure is unsustainable – Held that mere registration of three criminal cases involving "Ganja" does not automatically impact "public order" unless there is specific material showing the activities caused harm, danger, or a feeling of insecurity among the general public - The detention order failed to indicate how the detenu's acts were prejudicial to the maintenance of public order as opposed to mere "law and order" - Law of preventive detention is a "hard law" and must be strictly construed - Liberty cannot be jeopardized unless the case falls squarely within the four corners of the relevant statute – Held that simply declaring the detenu a 'habitual drug offender' was not sufficient for preventive detention unless shown how detenu's actions specifically threatened public order – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Ameena Begum vs. State of Telangana and Others 2023 INSC 788; Vijay Narain Singh vs. State of Bihar 1984 3 SCC 14; Paras 8-10] Roshini Devi v. State of Telangana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 30 : 2026 INSC 41

Public Auction – Duty of Disclosure – Failure to disclose pending litigation – Refund with Interest – The Supreme Court set aside a Punjab and Haryana High Court judgment that had dismissed a writ petition filed by an auction purchaser - The appellant had purchased property in an open auction conducted by The Improvement Trust, Ludhiana, but the Trust failed to disclose that the property was subject to a pending lawsuit - Held, it is the legal duty of authorities (such as banks, recovery officers, or state bodies) conducting public auctions to disclose all known encumbrances and litigation in the auction notice - Suppressing such material facts invalidates the sale and renders the auction fraudulent or vitiated by material irregularity - Public auctions must ensure fairness, objectivity, and be free from suspicion or bias - emphasized that restitution is a "moral imperative" and an inherent jurisdiction of every court to prevent unjust enrichment - An innocent auction purchaser who acts in good faith and pays hard-earned money should be restored to their original position if the auction lacks legitimacy - directed the Trust to refund the deposit of Rs.1,57,04,580/- with interest at 9% per annum from the date of deposit (19.07.2021) within six weeks – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Delhi Development Authority vs. Corporation Bank & Ors, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 953; Paras 9 – 13] Viney Kumar Sharma v. Improvement Trust, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 69

Reservation – Purpose and Function of Roster/Register – Supreme Court clarified that a reservation roster or register is an administrative, post-based instrument maintained to record cadre composition and monitor representation over time - It is not a parallel selection mechanism used during the recruitment process to displace candidates who secure an unreserved place on their own merit – Noted that the roster defines the number of vacant posts for advertisement and ensures that the lawful quota for specific categories is not exceeded within the cadre. [Relied on Rajasthan High Court & Anr. v. Rajat Yadav & Ors. (Civil Appeal No. 14112 of 2024); Indra Sawhney v. Union of India (1992 Supp (3) SCC 217; Saurav Yadav v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2021) 4 SCC 542; Paras 27 – 34] Airport Authority of India v. Sham Krishna B, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 63 : 2026 INSC 69

Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 – Five Duty Bearers – Supreme Court identified five core duty bearers responsible for the realization of the right to education: (i) the appropriate government, (ii) local authority, (iii) neighbourhood schools, (iv) parents/guardians, and (v) primary school teachers. [Para 6, 15] Dinesh Biwaji Ashtikar v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 45 : 2026 INSC 56

Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 – Section 12(1)(c) – Admission of children from weaker sections and disadvantaged groups – Constitutional Mandate and Fraternity – The Supreme Court issued a slew of directions for the effective implementation of Section 12(1)(c) of the Right to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 (RTE Act) - Noted that the 25% reservation in unaided neighbourhood schools is a deliberate constitutional strategy to operationalize equality of status and social integration - It seeks to concretize the principle of fraternity by creating shared institutional spaces where children from diverse socio-economic backgrounds can form solidaristic bonds and "lose suspect identities" based on caste or class. [Paras 7–10] Dinesh Biwaji Ashtikar v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 45 : 2026 INSC 56

Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 – Section 12(1)(c) – Implementation Hurdles – Digital Literacy and Transparency – Supreme Court noted significant barriers to accessing the 25% quota, including digital illiteracy regarding online application processes, language barriers, and a lack of information on seat availability - Noted that despite RTI information showing vacant seats, eligible children are often turned away due to procedural technicalities. [Paras 5-7] Dinesh Biwaji Ashtikar v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 45 : 2026 INSC 56

Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 – Section 38 – Direction to Frame Rules –Finding that the Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) issued by the NCPCR are merely guidelines and lack the character of enforceable rules, Supreme Court directed "appropriate authorities" to prepare and issue necessary rules and regulations under Section 38 of the Act - Such subordinate legislation must prescribe the specific method and manner for admissions under Section 12(1)(c) to ensure the statutory policy does not remain a "dead letter." [Paras 15–16] Dinesh Biwaji Ashtikar v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 45 : 2026 INSC 56

Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 – Intersectionality and Gender Justice – Supreme Court highlighted that disability-based discrimination is often intersectional, particularly for women, who face multiple axes of discrimination. Redressal of disadvantage must account for these intersecting identity markers to ensure substantive equality is not rendered unworkable by a "parochial understanding of discrimination." - Disability inclusion is a vital component of the "Social" dimension in the Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) framework - Enterprises have an obligation to view disability rights from a non-discrimination angle and as a strategic advantage rather than just a compliance issue. Sujata Bora v. Coal India Ltd; 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 46 : 2026 INSC 53

Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 – Section 2(y) and Section 2(s) – Concept of Reasonable Accommodation – Intersectionality of Disability and Gender – The Supreme Court set aside the Division Bench order of the Calcutta High Court which had denied employment to a female candidate with 57% disability (visual impairment and partial hemiparesis) on the technical grounds of the recruitment panel having expired - held that "reasonable accommodation" is a fundamental "gateway right" rooted in Articles 14, 21, and 41 of the Constitution, essential for substantive equality - Technicalities such as the expiry of a recruitment panel cannot obstruct "complete justice" when the denial of employment was due to the employer's failure to recognize multiple disabilities and provide necessary adjustments. Sujata Bora v. Coal India Ltd; 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 46 : 2026 INSC 53

Service Law – Contractual Employment through Third-Party Contractor vs. Direct Contractual Employment – Claim for Minimum Time Scale of Pay – Distinction in Law – The Supreme Court set aside a High Court order directing the Municipal Council to pay the minimum time scale of pay to workers engaged through third-party contractors - held that a valid distinction exists between persons employed directly by a State entity and those engaged through an intermediary contractor - While regular employment involves transparent, merit-based procedures open to all citizens, contractors have absolute discretion in selecting personnel to be sent to the principal employer - Granting equal benefits and status to contractor-engaged workers would sanction an arbitrary recruitment process and bypass constitutional safeguards for public employment. [Relied on Bharat Heavy Electricals Limited vs. Mahendra Prasad Jakhmola and others, (2019) 13 SCC 82; Joint Secretary, Central Board of Secondary Education and Another Vs. Raj Kumar Mishra and Another, Civil Appeal No. 4014 of 2025; Paras 8-11] Municipal Council v. K. Jayaram, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 38

Service Law – General Provident Fund (Central Service) Rules, 1960 – Rule 33(ii) – Provident Funds Act, 1925 – Sections 4 & 5 – Rights of Nominee – Release of GPF Dues – The Supreme Court dismissed a Special Leave Petition filed by the Union of India challenging a High Court order that directed the release of GPF amounts to the nominee of a deceased employee - The Government argued that under Section of the Provident Funds Act, 1925, amounts exceeding Rs. 5,000/- require a succession certificate/probate even for a nominee – Supreme Court rejected this, holding that the Rs. 5,000/- threshold established in 1925 has lost relevance due to inflation - held that Rule 33(ii) of the 1960 Rules, framed by the Government itself, stipulates that GPF amounts shall be payable to the nominee regardless of the amount – Held that Section 5(1) of the Act contains a non-obstante clause giving primacy to a valid nominee to receive the funds to the exclusion of others - Sections 4 and 5 of the Act and Rule 33(ii) must be construed harmoniously to avoid rendering the nomination process "otiose" – Noted that a nominee is a "mere trustee" to collect funds and not the beneficial owner - Releasing funds to a nominee does not bar other legal heirs from claiming their share in a competent court – Noted that the Government should not involve itself in protracted litigation regarding the estates of deceased employees, as requiring probate in cases of valid nominations unnecessarily makes the state a party to private disputes – Petition dismissed. [Relied on CIT vs. Hindustan Bulk Carriers, (2003) 3 SCC 5; Sarbati Devi vs. Usha Devi, (1984) 1 SCC 424; Paras 9-15] Union of India v. Paresh Chandra Mondal, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 42

Service Law – Recruitment – Reserve List/Waiting List – Validity Period – Locus Standi of Public Service Commission (PSC) – The Supreme Court set aside the judgments of the Rajasthan High Court which had directed the appointment of wait-listed candidates after the statutory expiry of the reserve list – Supreme Court noted down following points- i. Locus Standi of PSC to Appeal - held that the Rajasthan Public Service Commission (RPSC) has the locus standi to maintain a writ appeal even if the State (Appointing Authority) does not challenge the order - As a constitutional body under Article 315, the PSC is a "person aggrieved" when judicial directions mandate recommendations that bypass statutory rules or its independent advisory role; ii. Nature of Waiting List: A waiting list is not a perennial source of recruitment and does not confer an indefeasible right to appointment - Its purpose is to address contingencies such as non-joining of selected candidates within the same recruitment cycle; iii. Operation and Expiry of Reserve List (Rule 24/Rule 21): Under Rule 24 of the Rajasthan Legal State and Subordinate Services Rules, 1981, and Rule 21 of the Rajasthan Agriculture Subordinate Service Rules, 1978, the reserve list remains valid for only six months from the date the original list is forwarded to the Appointing Authority; iv. held that the period of validity must be calculated from the date of recommendation, not from the date a vacancy arises due to non-joining; v. Mandamus cannot be issued to "pick up" names from a list that has already expired by the time the writ petition is filed – Supreme Court rejected the plea that because some candidates were recommended after the expiry of the list, others must also be recommended - Article 14 constitutes a positive concept; a court cannot mandate the State to perpetuate an illegality or irregularity committed in favour of others – Appeals allowed. [Relied on U.P. Public Service Commission v. Surendra Kumar, (2018) 10 SCC 535; A.P. Public Service Commission v. Baloji Badhavath, (2009) 5 SCC 1; Tinku v. State of Haryana, 2024 INSC 72; Paras 46-90] Rajasthan Public Service Commission v. Yati Jain, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 52 : 2026 INSC 64

Service Law – Selection and Recruitment – Migration of Reserved Category Candidates to Unreserved Category – Own Merit – The Supreme Court reiterated the settled legal position that a candidate belonging to a reserved category (SC/ST/OBC) who secures marks higher than or equal to the cut-off marks of the General (Unreserved) category, without availing any concession or relaxation, must be treated as a General category candidate and adjusted against unreserved posts - Such candidates are "own merit" candidates and their selection does not count against the quota earmarked for the backward classes - Migration or "Merit Induced Shift" of reserved category candidates to the open category is a manifestation of the principle of equality - The "Open Category" is not a quota but is available to all candidates regardless of their social category, provided they meet the criterion of merit. Airport Authority of India v. Sham Krishna B, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 63 : 2026 INSC 69

Service Tax — Finance Act, 1994 — Sections 65(40), 65(41), 65(105)(zu), 66A — Reverse charge — “Event Management Service” — Fees paid to foreign booking agencies for procuring speakers for Hindustan Times Leadership Summit — HELD: Not taxable as Event Management Service — Booking of speakers is distinct from managing, organizing, planning, or presenting an event — Mere procurement of speakers does not amount to “event management” — Presence of speakers being essential to the Summit does not convert booking agents into “event managers” — Tax cannot be imposed by stretching the statutory definition — Strict interpretation of taxing statutes must prevail – Further held that i. The contracts with Washington Speakers Bureau and Harry Walker Agency were speaker-booking contracts, not contracts for event management; they did not involve management of venue, logistics, stage, publicity, sound, light, security, invitations, or coordination of the event; ii. “Event management” under Section 65(40) requires services relating to planning, promotion, organizing, or presentation of an event; mere facilitation of a speaker's appearance does not satisfy this test; iii. The CBIC/TRU Circular dated 08.08.2002 supports the assessee, as it contemplates an event manager as one who manages venue, stage, artists, logistics, and production of the event — functions absent in the present case; iv. Even if speakers are central to the Summit, participation in the event is not equivalent to managing the event; booking agents cannot be treated as “event managers”; v. Applying the principle of strict interpretation of taxing statutes, tax cannot be imposed by analogy or inference if the service does not fall squarely within the statutory entry; vi. Applying the common parlance test, ordinary understanding of “event management” does not cover speaker-booking services – Appeals allowed. [Relied on: Shiv Steels v. State of Assam, 2025 SCC Online SC 2006; CST v. Jaswant Singh Charan Singh, 1967 SCC Online SC 154 (Para 46); Indo International Industries v. CST, (1981) 2 SCC 528; Paras 28, 37-41, 44-48] HT Media Ltd. v. Principal Commissioner Delhi South Goods and Service Tax, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 55 : 2026 INSC 66

Specific Relief Act, 1963; Section 41(h) — Injunction when refused — Maintainability of suit for injunction simpliciter when title and possession are in dispute — The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court's decision that a suit for a bare mandatory injunction is not maintainable when there is a serious cloud over the title and possession of the property - the appropriate and efficacious remedy is to seek a decree for possession and declaration of title, rather than mere injunction - A suit for mandatory injunction without seeking possession is barred under Section 41(h) as an equally efficacious relief can be obtained through the usual mode of a suit for possession. [Para 13, 16, 22, 23] Sanjay Paliwal v. Bharat Heavy Electricals Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 54 : 2026 INSC 61

Specific Relief Act, 1963 – Specific Performance – Necessary Parties – While a lis pendens transferee is not a necessary party, the vendor remains a necessary party in a suit for specific performance to fulfill contractual obligations and special covenants - if the vendor's estate is represented by multiple substituted heirs, the death of one such heir without timely substitution of their own LRs does not lead to the abatement of the entire appeal if other heirs of the vendor are still on record – Appeals allowed. [Relied on Mahabir Prasad v. Jage Ram & Others (1971) 1 SCC 265; Bhurey Khan v. Yaseen Khan (Dead) by LRs & Ors. 1995 Supp (3) SCC 331; Satyadhyan Ghosal & Ors. v. Deorajin Debi (Smt.) & Anr. AIR 1960 SC 941; Lala Durga Prasad and Others v. Lala Deep Chand and Others (1953) 2 SCC 509; Shivashankara v. H.P. Vedavyasa Char 2023 LiveLaw SC 261; Paras 36 - 44] Kishorilal v. Gopal, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 39 : 2026 INSC 48

Stamp Act - Agreement to Sell - Stamp Duty - Possession - Relationship between Landlord and Tenant - Andhra Pradesh Stamp Act, 1922 - The Supreme Court addressed whether an agreement to sell, entered into by a tenant who had been in possession of the property for fifty years, should be treated as a "conveyance" for the purpose of charging stamp duty under Explanation I to Article 47A of Schedule I-A of the Andhra Pradesh Stamp Act, 1922 – Supreme Court noted Key Findings – i. Nexus of Possession: For Explanation I to Article 47A to apply, the delivery of possession must have a nexus to the agreement to sell meaning it must "follow" the agreement or be "evidenced" by it as a result of the sale transaction; ii. Continuance of Tenancy: Supreme Court noted that the appellant's possession remained that of a tenant and was not converted to that of a vendee - This was evidenced by the fact that the respondent successfully pursued an eviction order against the appellant as a tenant even after the agreement to sell was executed; iii. Nature of Agreement: Since the possession was not "followed by" or "evidenced" as a result of the agreement to sell, but rather preceded it by fifty years due to a pre-existing tenancy, the agreement did not constitute a "deemed conveyance" - The Supreme Court set aside the orders of the Trial Court and High Court, ruling that the appellant was not liable for additional stamp duty or penalty and directing the Trial Court to mark the agreement as an Exhibit. [Distinguished from Ramesh Mishrimal Jain vs. Avinash Vishwanath Patne, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 329; Paras 6-12] Vayyaeti Srinivasarao v. Gaineedi Jagajyothi, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 49 : 2026 INSC 59

Transfer of Property Act, 1882 – Section 52 – Doctrine of Lis Pendens – Specific Performance – Execution of Decree – Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Order XXI Rules 35, 97, 98, 101, and 102 – Specific Relief Act, 1963 – Section 19(b) – The Supreme Court reaffirmed that a purchaser who acquires property during the pendency of litigation, as a transferee pendente lite, has no right to obstruct the execution of the decree and remains bound by the outcome of the proceedings, holding the transfer strictly subservient to the decree - Key findings held i. Doctrine of Lis Pendens and Transferee Pendente Lite: The principle of lis pendens enshrined in Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, is based on equity, good conscience, justice, and public policy - A transferee pendente lite is bound by the ultimate decree of the court, irrespective of whether they had notice of the pending suit or acted in good faith; ii. Registration of Lis Pendens (Bombay Amendment): Under the Maharashtra amendment to Section 52, once a notice of lis pendens is registered, the property cannot be transferred or dealt with so as to affect the rights of any party under a subsequent decree - The lack of knowledge of the proceedings is not a valid defense against the application of this doctrine; iii. Execution against Obstructionists: In execution proceedings for the delivery of immovable property, the Executing Court has the mandate under Order XXI Rule 97 and Rule 98 CPC to remove any person bound by the decree, including a transferee pendente lite, who resists or obstructs possession; iv. Adjudication of Rights in Execution: All questions relating to the right, title, or interest of an obstructionist arising under Order XXI Rule 97 must be determined by the Executing Court under Rule 101 and not by a separate suit - For transferees pendente lite, their title is subservient to the decree and is effectively extinguished by the court-executed sale deed; v. Interplay between Specific Relief Act and Transfer of Property Act: While Section 19(b) of the Specific Relief Act protects subsequent transferees for value without notice at a stage prior to the institution of a suit, it must give way to Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act once a suit is instituted – Appeals dismissed. [Relied on Celir LLP v. Somati Prasad Bafna (2024 SCC Online SC 3727); Sanjay Verma v. Manik Roy (2006) 13 SCC 608; Guruswamy Nadar v. P. Lakshmi Ammal (2008) 5 SCC 796; Jayaram Mudaliar v. Ayyaswami (1972) 2 SCC 200; Danesh Singh v. Har Pyari (2025 SCC OnLine SC 2805); Paras 41-64] Alka Shrirang Chavan v. Hemchandra Rajaram Bhonsale, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 44 : 2026 INSC 52