Administrative Law & Public Services – Interview/Viva-Voce Benchmarks – Administrative Necessity - Prescription of Minimum 25% Qualifying Marks in Viva-Voce – The introduction of a minimum qualifying benchmark for the interview stage is neither arbitrary nor whimsical; it is rooted in profound administrative necessity to preserve the integrity, calibre, and quality of...
Administrative Law & Public Services – Interview/Viva-Voce Benchmarks – Administrative Necessity - Prescription of Minimum 25% Qualifying Marks in Viva-Voce – The introduction of a minimum qualifying benchmark for the interview stage is neither arbitrary nor whimsical; it is rooted in profound administrative necessity to preserve the integrity, calibre, and quality of judicial administration - While a written examination evaluates academic legal knowledge, the viva-voce is essential to judge crucial personal and intellectual qualities such as alertness, resourcefulness, dependability, and decisive capability required for a high judicial office like an Additional District Judge - A candidate cannot claim a right to appointment based solely on a high aggregate score if they fail to clear the minimum interview threshold. [Relied on Mehmood Alam Tariq v. State of Rajasthan, (1988) 3 SCC 241; Paras 19-25] Manoj Goyal V. Rajasthan High Court, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 695 : 2026 INSC 699
Civil Procedure & Practise – Doctrine of Withdrawal – Effect of Substantive Interim Orders - Withdrawal of Writ Petition with Liberty to Approach High Court – The doctrine of withdrawal cannot be weaponized to erase a prior, conscious, and substantive judicial determination by the Court declining a specific prayer. When a specific prayer challenging finalized appointments is dismissed by the Supreme Court, the subsequent withdrawal of the surviving petition (e.g., academic challenge to the vires of a rule) does not resurrect the challenge against selected candidates or wipe away the finality attained by those appointments. [Paras 25-30] Manoj Goyal V. Rajasthan High Court, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 695 : 2026 INSC 699
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Section 100 – Scope of interference in Second Appeal – Concurrent findings of fact - The High Court displaced the concurrent findings of the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court regarding the genuineness of the transaction and execution of the contract by drawing fresh inferences from surrounding circumstances, without recording any finding of perversity - Held: The High Court transgressed the limits of its jurisdiction under Section 100 of the CPC - The First Appellate Court is the final court of fact. The High Court in a Second Appeal cannot interfere with findings of fact merely because it would have arrived at a different conclusion on the appreciation of the same evidence - Interference is permissible only where the findings are recorded without evidence, ignore material evidence, or are otherwise vitiated by perversity - Findings on the execution of the agreement, readiness and willingness, and the falsity of a defence are pure findings of fact unassailable in a second appeal unless characterized as perverse. [Relied On: Sir Chunilal V. Mehta & Sons, Ltd. v. Century Spinning & Manufacturing Co. Ltd., AIR 1962 SC 1314; Paras 15 – 27] Jaspal Singh v. Ashwani Kumar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 682 : 2026 INSC 700
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 — Section 154 — Multiple FIRs — Test of Sameness — Clubbing and Consolidation of FIRs — Cyber Fraud involving similar modus operandi but distinct victims and transactions - Permissibility of Second/Multiple FIRs - Registration of multiple FIRs is impermissible only if they relate to the exact same incident or form part of the "same transaction" - where a subsequent FIR relates to a distinct occurrence, an independent transaction, or a separate offence, its registration is entirely permissible - Triple-Test for 'Same Transaction' - To ascertain whether a series of acts form part of the same transaction, the Supreme Court applied the triple-test: (i) unity of purpose and design; (ii) proximity of time and place; and (iii) continuity of action - If there are several transactions and distinct offences in relation to different victims, separate trials must take place - Application to Cyber Fraud -The mere fact that a part of the defrauded amounts from different victims across multiple states (Maharashtra, Karnataka, Odisha) was transferred into a single bank account belonging to the petitioner's proprietary concern does not establish a live link or mean the incidents form part of the "same transaction" - Although the modus operandi appeared similar, the victims, the amounts involved, the transactions, and the consequences suffered were entirely distinct - the alternative relief for clubbing and composite investigation cannot be granted, especially when the investigation is at a nascent stage requiring intricate digital and forensic analysis. [Relied on T.T. Antony v. State of Kerala (2001) 6 SCC 181; Babubhai v. State of Gujarat (2010) 12 SCC 254; Anju Chaudhary v. State of U.P. (2013) 6 SCC 384; State of Rajasthan v. Surendra Singh Rathore 2025 SCC OnLine SC 358; State (NCT of Delhi) v. Khimji Bhai Jadeja 2026 SCC OnLine SC 19; Paras 14-18] Rutvij Bhagat Singh Wakhare v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 716 : 2026 INSC 740
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Section 164 - Section 306 – Admissibility and Evidentiary Value of Retracted Confession - Mandatory Compliance with Statutory Safeguards - Resiling Approver / Co-accused Confession - A retracted confession whose voluntariness is seriously disputed and whose authenticity is compromised by repeated recording/repudiation cannot form the primary foundation of a conviction - For a retracted confession to sustain a finding of guilt, it must receive strong, independent, and substantive corroboration in material particulars connecting the accused with the crime - Compliance with statutory warnings under Section 164(2) CrPC is an indispensable prerequisite to ensure the voluntary character of a confession. Any subsequent insertion or procedural variation indicating that warnings were not administered prior to recording diminishes the degree of assurance and invalidates its reliability - Once an approver resiles from a confession made under a grant of pardon and fails to fulfill the conditions under Section 306 CrPC, their statement can at best be treated as a confession of a co-accused under Section 30 of the Indian Evidence Act - Such a confession is not substantive evidence and can only be used to lend assurance to a conclusion otherwise arrived at via independent, legally admissible evidence - Held, the conviction of Accused No. 12 (Pappu @ Salim) rested solely on successive, repeated confessional statements which he subsequently disowned in open court, denouncing his approver status. In the complete absence of independent physical, forensic, or circumstantial evidence, the conviction is unsustainable - Evidentiary superstructure cannot stand once the foundation of the confession is discredited - Conviction set aside. [Relied on Kashmira Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (1952) 1 SCC 275; Suresh Budharmal Kalani v. State of Maharashtra, (1998) 7 SCC 337; Paras 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 69] Abdul Hameed v. State of Rajasthan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 700 : 2026 INSC 734
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Section 299(1) – Purported legislative intent – Exception to Section 33 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 – Prevention of abuse of process - The clear intent behind Section 299(1) of the CrPC is to ensure that evidence against an accused is preserved when they have deliberately absconded from the trial - The provision cannot be given a restrictive interpretation that would defeat its very purpose or incentivize accused persons to willfully abscond for long periods to await the natural death or unavailability of material witnesses - The prosecuting agency is not required to move an application under this Section in the first trial as a matter of rule anticipating the future unavailability of a witness. [Relied on: Nirmal Singh v. State of Haryana, (2000) 4 SCC 41; CBI v. Abu Salem Ansari, (2011) 4 SCC 426; Paras 14-21] State of West Bengal v. Kader Khan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 692 : 2026 INSC 718
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Section 299(1) [Corresponding to Section 335 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023] – Record of evidence in absence of accused – Deposition of a deceased witness recorded in an earlier trial – Admissibility in subsequent trial against an absconding accused – Absence of a formal judicial order recording satisfaction of abscondence before recording deposition does not invalidate its admissibility - There is no statutory requirement under Section 299(1) of the CrPC mandating the formal passing of an order by the Magistrate concerned, recording that the accused is absconding and that there is no immediate prospect of arrest, before the witness deposes - What is essential is whether these two foundational facts stood established on the actual date of the deposition of the witness. [Para 14] State of West Bengal v. Kader Khan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 692 : 2026 INSC 718
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 — Section 482 vs Section 397 — Maintainability of Quashing Petition vis-à-vis Revisional Remedy — The availability of an alternative remedy of criminal revision under Section 397 of the CrPC does not operate as a threshold bar to the exercise of the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 of the CrPC - The two provisions operate in distinct spheres - The nomenclature under which a petition is filed is wholly immaterial; to do substantive justice, the High Court can always treat and convert a petition filed under Section 482 CrPC into a revision under Section 397 CrPC, and vice versa, rather than non-suiting a party on a hyper-technical ground of maintainability. [Relied On Dhariwal Tobacco Products Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra (2009) 2 SCC 370; Prabhu Chawla v. State of Rajasthan (2016) 16 SCC 30; Akanksha Arora v. Tanay Maben 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3688; Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra (1977) 4 SCC 551; Paras 22 – 24] Standard Chartered Bank v. Enforcement Officer Ministry of Home Affairs, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 701 : 2026 INSC 727
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Cr.P.C.) – Appellate Jurisdiction Boundaries - Where the court of first instance only forms an opinion on 'wrong statements', the High Court, in an appeal preferred by the aggrieved party against such an order, cannot improve upon the original order by introducing fresh findings of a 'false affidavit' or 'expediency', especially when the opposite party had not challenged the first instance order - A party cannot be placed in a worse position by preferring an appeal - A direction for filing a complaint under Section 340 Cr.P.C. normally ought not to be made during the pendency of the substantive proceedings, but rather upon their conclusion - This ensures that the primary adjudication is not derailed or delayed by peripheral applications used as tools of distraction. [Relied on Iqbal Singh Marwah and another v. Meenakshi Marwah and another, (2005) INSC 129; Santokh Singh v. Izhar Hussain and another, (1973) INSC 96; James Kunjwal v. State of Uttarakhand and another, (2024) INSC 601; Para 13-17] Prabhakar Yeshwant Masram v. Sou Tula Namdeorao Jaipurkar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 703 : 2026 INSC 724
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Cr.P.C.) – Forming of Opinion on 'Expediency in the Interests of Justice' - Section 340(1) of the Cr.P.C. mandates that a Court must form a specific opinion that it is expedient in the interests of justice that an inquiry should be made into the alleged offence - Prosecution is not ordered in every case or to gratify private vendetta, but in the larger interest of the administration of justice in glaring cases of deliberate falsehood - Ordering a criminal inquiry on the mere recording of a 'wrong statement' without establishing such judicial expediency renders the order bad in law. [Para 12] Prabhakar Yeshwant Masram v. Sou Tula Namdeorao Jaipurkar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 703 : 2026 INSC 724
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Cr.P.C.) – Section 340 r/w Section 195(1)(b) – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) – Sections 193, 199, and 200 – Scope of Inquiry – Meaning of 'Wrong Statement' vs 'False Statement' – Pre-requisites for initiating prosecution under Section 340 Cr.P.C. - Distinction Between 'Wrong Statement' and 'False Statement' -The threshold for initiating action for an offence punishable under Sections 199 and 200 of the IPC is the making of a 'false statement' and not merely a 'wrong statement' - A 'wrong statement' of fact does not automatically assume the character of a 'false statement' - A 'false statement' carries a deliberate intention to deceive or gain an undue advantage with knowledge, actual or constructive - Inadvertent typographical errors or mistakes do not qualify as deliberate falsehoods - Where the court of first instance recorded a prima facie finding that 'wrong statements' (typographical mistakes) were made, it erred in directing the filing of a complaint under Sections 193, 199, and 200 of the IPC. [Paras 11 – 15] Prabhakar Yeshwant Masram v. Sou Tula Namdeorao Jaipurkar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 703 : 2026 INSC 724
Compassionate Appointment – Scheme for Compassionate Appointment in Public Sector General Insurance Companies – Clause 1.1 – Age Threshold Limitation – Effect of Administrative Delay – Employee applied for voluntary retirement on medical grounds before crossing the prescribed age threshold of 55 years and submitted a Civil Surgeon's incapacitation certificate – Employer kept the application pending, failed to communicate any deficiency regarding the medical certificate, and demanded a Medical Board certificate only after the employee crossed 55 years of age – Claim for compassionate appointment subsequently rejected by the employer on the ground that the employee retired after attaining 55 years of age – Held: An employer cannot rely upon the consequence of its own administrative delay to defeat a time-sensitive beneficial claim – The requirement that a claim must remain within the four corners of a scheme does not release the employer from its duty to administer it fairly and within a reasonable time – A technical construction enabling the employer to control eligibility through delayed processing would place the scheme at the mercy of administrative inaction and defeat its inherent fairness – High Court judgment set aside – Rejection communication quashed – Direction issued to grant compassionate appointment to the dependent candidate with necessary age relaxation if required. [Paras 18, 21, 25, 26, 28, 31, 32] Rahul Ramnarayan Madankar v. New India Assurance, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 693 : 2026 INSC 710
Constitution of India – Article 136 – Interference with Concurrent Findings of Fact: The Supreme Court emphasizes that while its powers under Article 136 are expansive, it will not readily disrupt concurrent findings of fact recorded by the Trial Court and the High Court unless the findings are demonstrated to be manifestly perverse, legally unsustainable, or shocking to the conscience of the Court. [Relied on Ganga Kumar Srivastava v. State of Bihar (2005) 6 SCC 211] Mehboob Shah v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 705 : 2026 INSC 729
Constitution of India — Article 21 — Right to a Speedy Trial — Quashing of Delayed Prosecution — The right to a speedy trial is an implicit fundamental right guaranteed under the fair, just, and reasonable procedure of Article 21 of the Constitution, extending to all stages of criminal proceedings including investigation, inquiry, and trial - While systemic delays must be analyzed using a balancing test, a chronicle of persistent, unexplained inaction and lack of ordinary diligence solely attributable to the prosecution violates this right - Keeping an accused in a state of "suspended animation" indefinitely, where 23 years have elapsed since the institution of the complaint and over three decades since the transaction without the trial progressing beyond the stage of service of summons is wholly incompatible with Article 21, warranting the quashing of the criminal proceedings. [Relied On Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak (1992) 1 SCC 225; P. Ramachandra Rao v. State of Karnataka (2002) 4 SCC 578; Kailash Chandra Kapri v. State of Uttar Pradesh 2026 SCC OnLine SC 858; Paras 25 - 27, 29, 30 – 34] Standard Chartered Bank v. Enforcement Officer Ministry of Home Affairs, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 701 : 2026 INSC 727
Constitution of India, 1950 — Article 171(3)(a) vs. Article 243-R — Representation of the People Act, 1950 — Section 27(2)(b) — Karnataka Municipalities Act, 1964 — Section 352(1)(b) — Electoral Rights of Nominated Members in Legislative Council Elections — Purpose of Local Authority Representation - Held: Nominated members of Town Panchayats/Municipalities do not possess the right to vote in elections to the State Legislative Council from a Local Authorities' Constituency - The constitutional distinction between elected representatives and nominated members under Article 243-R is clear and intentional - Nominated members are inducted for their expertise and hold a purely advisory role; they are expressly barred by the Proviso to Article 243-R from voting in the municipal bodies' own meetings - Allowing them to vote in Legislative Council elections would yield the anomalous and unreasonable consequence of granting them greater voting power in a constitutional legislative body than they possess within their own municipality - The expressions "members of municipalities" under Article 171(3)(a) and "every member" under Section 27(2)(b) of the 1950 Act must be contextually and harmoniously interpreted to apply only to those members who are elected representatives and possess active voting rights within their local authority - Inclusion of nominated members in such electoral rolls is unconstitutional and void ab initio. [Paras 30 – 38] Pranesh M.K. v. A.V. Gayathri, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 686 : 2026 INSC 716
Constitution of India, 1950 – Article 21 and Article 32 – Prisons and Inmates – Incarceration of Elderly and Terminally Ill Prisoners – Right to Live with Dignity - Writ petition filed by NALSA under Article 32 raising systemic concerns over the continued confinement of convicted/undertrial prisoners of advanced age (above 70 years) and those who are terminally ill – i. Suspension of Rights Denied - The Supreme Court observed that prisons are instruments of lawful confinement but not spaces where constitutional values are suspended - The guarantees of dignity, fairness, and humane treatment continue to operate with full force even behind prison walls - Prolonged detention under conditions of severe physical suffering and inadequate medical care results in the erosion of human dignity, converting lawful punishment into cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment – ii. Locus Standi of NALSA - NALSA has the requisite locus standi to maintain public interest/social justice litigation to espouse the collective constitutional rights of vulnerable and marginalized sections under Section 4(d) of the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987 - iii. Federal Competence vs. Judicial Restraint - While "prisons and persons detained therein" falls exclusively under the legislative domain of States (Schedule VII, List II), the Court holds that constitutional restraint cannot equate to constitutional abdication where persistent or systemic violations of fundamental rights occur. [Relied on National Legal Services Authority v. Union of India & Ors. (2014) 5 SCC 348; Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (1978) 1 SCC 248; Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration (1978) 4 SCC 494; Dr. P. Varavara Rao v. National Investigation Agency (2022 SCC OnLine SC 1004); Paras 17-38] National Legal Services Authority v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 684 : 2026 INSC 713
Constitution of India, 1950 — Article 226 — Maintainability of Writ Petition — Alternative Remedy under Election Law - Held: The rule requiring the exhaustion of alternative remedies is a rule of convenience and discretion, not a rule of law, and does not oust writ jurisdiction where the controversy involves a pure question of law - When the challenge is raised prior to the election and goes to the root of the composition/legality of the electoral college (inclusion of nominated members) rather than routine irregularities in the electoral roll or the conduct of the election process, a writ petition under Article 226 is fully maintainable - This is particularly true when the statutory remedy under Section 27 of the 1950 Act is illusory or ineffective. [Relied on Ramesh Mehta v. Sanwal Chand Singhvi, (2004) 5 SCC 409; Shelly Oberoi v. Office of Lieutenant Governor of Delhi, (2023) 5 SCC 41; Ram & Shyam Co. v. State of Haryana, (1985) 3 SCC 267; Kuldip Nayar v. Union of India, (2006) 7 SCC 1; Paras 23, 24, 25, 26, 40-49] Pranesh M.K. v. A.V. Gayathri, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 686 : 2026 INSC 716
Constitution of India, 1950 — Article 32 — Writ Petition seeking quashing or alternative clubbing/consolidation of multiple FIRs registered across different States — Cyber Fraud — Maintainability of Article 32 petition for quashing criminal proceedings — Relegation to alternative statutory remedies - Maintainability & Relegation under Article 32 - While a petition under Article 32 of the Constitution to quash an FIR is maintainable, the Supreme Court reiterated that it is an extraordinary remedy to be exercised sparingly - As a matter of self-imposed discipline and orderly procedure, an aggrieved party must ordinarily first approach the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution or Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. Direct invocation of Article 32 is discouraged unless the facts disclose a palpable violation of fundamental rights or other exceptional, exigent circumstances. [Relied On Arnab Ranjan Goswami v. Union of India (2020) 14 SCC 12; Vinod Dua v. Union of India (2023) 14 SCC 286; Rajendra Bihari Lal v. State of U.P. 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2265; Paras 8, 9]. Rutvij Bhagat Singh Wakhare v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 716 : 2026 INSC 740
Constitution of India, 1950 - Articles 21 & 22 – Right to a Fair Trial & Effective Legal Representation - Paramount importance of substantive constitutional guarantees in criminal jurisprudence, particularly in cases involving offences that shock the collective conscience of society - The right to a fair trial encompasses a real, meaningful, and impartial opportunity to defend, which includes effective representation by a counsel of choice or competent legal aid at State expense - The constitutional obligation of the Court is to ensure real and meaningful representation rather than a mere ritualistic or illusory physical presence - Facing a complex trial carrying capital punishment without legal assistance fundamentally vitiates the criminal justice process. Abdul Hameed v. State of Rajasthan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 700 : 2026 INSC 734
Constitution of India, 1950 - Denial of Fair Trial vs. Consequence of Acquittal - Denial of legal representation does not invariably operate as an automatic passport to acquittal - Courts must balance the accused's constitutional entitlement to a fair trial against the nature and gravity of the offence, its societal impact, and the overarching demands of public justice - Where a trial stands constitutionally infirmed due to the complete lack of effective legal assistance, a de-novo trial is the only legally permissible remedy to restore procedural fairness while ensuring justice is carried to its logical conclusion - Held, that the Appellant (Accused No. 9), facing charges under Section 302 IPC and explosive offences carrying the death penalty, remained effectively unrepresented throughout the recording of prosecution evidence, cross-examining 81 witnesses on his own without any amicus curiae or legal aid - Such a hasty and stage-managed trial violates the baseline principle of "judicial calm" - In view of the grave nature of the Samleti bus bomb blast (claiming 14 lives), an outright acquittal is inappropriate; hence, the conviction is set aside and a de-novo trial is ordered before a designated Special Court. [Relied on Mohd. Hussain v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi), (2012) 9 SCC 408; Naveen v. State of M.P., (2023) 17 SCC 381; Suk Das v. UT of Arunachal Pradesh, (1986) 2 SCC 401; Paras 23- 36] Abdul Hameed v. State of Rajasthan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 700 : 2026 INSC 734
Constitution of India, 1950 - Principles of Natural Justice – Audi Alteram Partem – Ex-Parte Orders Impacting Civil Rights – Held: The opportunity of being heard lies at the very heart of procedural fairness, ensuring that no one is condemned or adversely affected without being given an opportunity to present their case - The non-observance of natural justice is itself a prejudice to any person who has been denied justice - When a High Court proceeds to decide a writ petition ex-parte and dispenses with service of notice to the affected party whose ownership, possession, and rights over the suit schedule property are directly impacted, it results in a clear violation of the doctrine of audi alteram partem - Such parties are not merely proper parties but necessary ones to effectively adjudicate the dispute. [Relied on State of U.P. v. Sudhir Kumar Singh, (2021) 19 SCC 706; Central Organisation for Railway Electrification v. ECI SPIC SMO MCML (JV), (2025) 4 SCC 641; Madhyamam Broadcasting Ltd. v. Union of India, (2023) 13 SCC 401; Krishnadatt Awasthy v. State of M.P., (2025) 7 SCC 545; Paras 15 - 18] Basamma v. Goparappa, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 690 : 2026 INSC 712
Constitution of India, 1950; Article 226 – Writ of Certiorari – Scope and Contours of Supervisory Jurisdiction – Held: While exercising extraordinary and certiorari jurisdiction under Article 226, the High Court does not act as a Court of Appeal over findings of facts recorded by subordinate Courts or Tribunals - It does not review or reweigh the evidence upon which the determination of the subordinate court is based - Such writ jurisdiction may be invoked only in cases where there is an error of law, jurisdictional error, or patent illegality, but not to correct an error of fact, however grave it may appear to be - Once a competent Civil Court (First Appellate Court) arrives at a finding of fact upon independent examination and appreciation of pleadings and evidence, the High Court cannot set aside such findings under Article 226. [Relied on Central Council for Research in Ayurvedic Sciences v. Bikartan Das, (2023) 16 SCC 462; C. Basappa v. T. Nagappa, (1954) 1 SCC 905; Paras 12 - 14] Basamma v. Goparappa, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 690 : 2026 INSC 712
Criminal Jurisprudence — Circumstantial Evidence — Role and Absence of Motive - The role of motive in a criminal trial based entirely on circumstantial evidence is limited - The absence of a motive does not ipso facto break the chain of evidence or automatically lead to the acquittal of the accused if the remaining evidence on record is sufficient to prove guilt - A complete absence of motive is merely a factor that may be weighed in favour of the accused during the judicial sifting and balancing of favourable and unfavourable circumstances. [Relied On Vaibhav v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 INSC 800; Paras 24, 25] Piyush Shyamdasani v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 699 : 2026 INSC 721
Criminal Jurisprudence & Appellate Powers - Circumstantial Evidence – The Panchsheel Principles - To sustain a conviction based entirely on circumstantial evidence, the prosecution must establish a complete, coherent, and unbroken chain of clinching circumstances that unequivocally points exclusively toward the hypothesis of guilt and excludes every reasonable hypothesis consistent with the innocence of the accused - Section 386(a) CrPC – Interference with Orders of Acquittal - An appellate court possesses full powers to review and reconsider the entire evidence underlying an acquittal - it must respect the double presumption of innocence operating in favour of an acquitted accused ordinary presumption under criminal law reinforced by the judicial finding of acquittal - An acquittal cannot be disturbed unless the findings of the court below are palpably wrong, manifestly erroneous, perverse, or demonstrably unsustainable - If two reasonable views are possible, the view favourable to the accused must prevail - Held, the High Court's view in acquitting Accused Nos. 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, and 10 was a highly plausible and reasonable view, as the prosecution failed to produce any direct or corroborative evidence linking them specifically to the execution or planning of the Samleti bus blast, apart from generic references in an uncognate confession - Orders of acquittal affirmed. [Relied on Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra, (1984) 4 SCC 116; Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415; Ramesh Babulal Doshi v. State of Gujarat, (1996) 9 SCC 225; Sheo Swarup v. King Emperor, 1934 SCC OnLine PC 42; Paras 54-60, 71-74] Abdul Hameed v. State of Rajasthan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 700 : 2026 INSC 734
Criminal Jurisprudence & Evidence Act, 1872 - Official Witnesses – Reliability of Police Testimony when Independent Witnesses Turn Hostile – The Supreme Court reaffirmed that the testimony of official/police witnesses cannot be generalized as untrustworthy or discarded merely due to their official status or the lack of independent corroboration - If the testimonies of the police officials are consistent, credible, and survive strict cross-examination, a conviction can safely be sustained even if the independent seizure witnesses turn hostile. [Relied on Rizwan Khan v. State of Chhattisgarh (2020) 9 SCC 627; Paras 12-18] Mehboob Shah v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 705 : 2026 INSC 729
Criminal Procedure — Appeal Against Acquittal vs. Appeal Against Conviction — Qualitative Differences in Appellate Review - While the appellate court possesses identical statutory powers to review and reappreciate evidence in both categories of appeals, there are qualitative differences in their execution - Appeal Against Acquittal - A higher threshold is applied for reversal because an acquittal reinforces the presumption of innocence - Under the "two-views theory," if the view favoring acquittal is a plausible one, it must not be disturbed - The presumption of innocence is displaced the moment a conviction is recorded - The prosecution's case is further reinforced when concurrent findings of conviction are rendered by both the Trial Court and the High Court, though the appellate court's power to scrutinize every aspect remains absolute. [Relied on Mallappa & Ors. v. State of Karnataka, 2024 INSC 104] Piyush Shyamdasani v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 699 : 2026 INSC 721
Evidence Act, 1872 — Section 106 & Section 27 — Appreciation of Technical Evidence — Call Detail Records (CDRs) & Adverse Inference - Where the prosecution successfully establishes a strong incriminating nexus through Call Detail Records (CDRs) and location data proving that the accused persons were in constant communication and present around the crime scene, the burden shifts to the accused to explain these facts - The failure or refusal of the accused to offer a plausible explanation for circumstances uniquely within their exclusive personal knowledge leads to a direct adverse inference against them. Furthermore, utilizing fake SIM cards registered under third-party names to evade surveillance constitutes an additional incriminating circumstance if left unrebutted. [Paras 17- 20, 22-28] Piyush Shyamdasani v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 699 : 2026 INSC 721
Evidence Act, 1872 - Section 27 – Scope and Ambit of Disclosure Statements: The statutory exception carved out under Section 27 IEA is attracted only when the information furnished by an accused distinctly relates to a relevant fact discovered which was previously unknown to the investigating agency - A mere statement expressing a willingness to identify a place or location already within the knowledge of the police, or pointing out a spot without resulting in the recovery of an incriminating fact/article having a direct nexus with the crime, does not constitute a "discovery" - Panchnama / Memorandum Not Substantive Evidence - Recitals in a panchnama or site verification memorandum do not constitute substantive evidence - The substantive evidence is the live testimony of the witness in the witness box proving the precise information furnished and the corresponding discovery - Held, the prosecution's reliance on site verification proceedings and the pointing out of Masjids/premises by Accused Nos. 1 and 10 failed to meet the threshold of Section 27, as no incriminating fact, weapon, or explosive substance linked to the Samleti blast was discovered - Generic references or travel companionship in a co-accused's confession do not substitute proof of a specific conspiracy. [Relied on Pulukuri Kotayya v. King-Emperor, 1946 SCC OnLine PC 47; Murli & Anr. v. State of Rajasthan, (2009) 9 SCC 41; Paras 63, 64, 65, 66] Abdul Hameed v. State of Rajasthan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 700 : 2026 INSC 734
Evidentiary Value of Coerced Witness - The testimony of a witness (PW-4) who was threatened at the point of a dagger by the accused to assist in transporting the wrapped body on a bicycle for disposal cannot be discarded as an interested witness or an accomplice - The witness stood firm in cross-examination, and his natural, limited narrative (accompanying the accused only for some distance out of fear) establishes his reliability and credibility - Where a 10-year-old minor child was left in the exclusive custody of the accused by his mother, and the child went missing for 22 days, it was naturally expected of the accused to either report the matter to the police or inform the relatives - The absolute failure of the accused to offer any justifiable or plausible explanation during his Section 313 CrPC examination constitutes a vital additional link in the chain of circumstances to establish his guilt. [Relied on Sevaka Perumal v. State of T.N., (1991) 3 SCC 471; Prithi v. State of Haryana, (2010) 8 SCC 536; Prithipal Singh v. State of Punjab, (2012) 1 SCC 10; Paras 14-17] Debojit Pankika Charaideo Sonari v. State of Assam, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 691 : 2026 INSC 687
Family Courts Act, 1984 – Interlocking Arrangement vs Independent Obligation - Held, that a combined and harmonious reading of the clauses discloses a single interlocking arrangement rather than three independent obligations - Clause 8 fixed the total quantum of maintenance; Clause 9 provided an interim, transitional income-linked mechanism to secure maintenance while the lump sum was being arranged; and Clause 10 identified the definitive point of discharge - Reading Clause 9 as a permanent, standalone obligation would render the express discharge language of Clause 10 entirely redundant and otiose. Vijayalakshmi R. v. C.L. Balaji, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 706 : 2026 INSC 731
Family Courts Act, 1984 – Powers of the Executing Court - The executing court cannot go behind the decree; it must execute the decree as it stands and cannot embark upon a fresh adjudication of rights or substitute a consensual arrangement with a fresh or larger provision - The conduct of the appellant-wife in raising no demand for the income-linked component for nearly five years after the final instalment, alongside executing unconditional release deeds and affidavits acknowledging full receipt of the settlement amount, reinforces the common understanding that the income-linked obligation stood extinguished - The Supreme Court declined to invoke its jurisdiction under Article 142 to create a fresh educational corpus, reaffirming that the wide powers under Article 142 cannot be employed to supplant or recast the concluded and performed terms of a consensual settlement between financially independent parties. [Paras 20 - 41] Vijayalakshmi R. v. C.L. Balaji, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 706 : 2026 INSC 731
Family Courts Act, 1984 – Section 19(1) – Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 – Section 13B & Section 28A – Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Order XXI Rule 10 – Execution of Consent Decree – Interpretation of Compromise/Settlement Clauses - The dispute pertained to the construction of Clauses 8, 9, and 10 of a Settlement Petition incorporated into a mutual consent divorce decree - Clause 8 specified a lump-sum maintenance of ₹2.20 Crores for the minor son payable in installments - Clause 9 linked maintenance to 20% of the husband's annual income - Clause 10 explicitly declared that upon payment of the first ₹1 Crore out of the Clause 8 amount, the husband "need not pay any further amount towards maintenance" - The appellant-wife filed an execution petition approximately five years after the final lump-sum payment, seeking enforcement of the income-linked maintenance under Clause 9. Vijayalakshmi R. v. C.L. Balaji, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 706 : 2026 INSC 731
Finance Act, 1994 – Section 65(19) and Section 65(105)(zzb) – Business Auxiliary Service – Service Tax – Service Tax Liability on Oil Marketing Companies (OMCs) for Dispensing Compressed Natural Gas (CNG) – Sale vs. Agency – Principal-Agent Relationship – Distinction between Outright Sale and Contract of Agency - The Supreme Court allowed the appeals filed by the Revenue, setting aside the order of the CESTAT and restoring the Orders-in-Original that confirmed the service tax demand against the respondent-Corporations (BPCL and HPCL) under the category of "Business Auxiliary Service" - Key Legal Principles Settled by the Court – i. Substance Over Form in Jural Relationships- The true relationship between parties must be gathered from the conjoint reading of all terms and conditions of the agreement in substance, rather than the form, nomenclature, or isolated expressions like "Principal-to-Principal" or "sale" used by the parties; ii. Litmus Test of Title and Retention of Stock - In an outright sale, the buyer acquires absolute dominion and proprietary rights over the goods, and the seller is divested of control - Where the supplier retains ownership of the goods until final dispensation and commands that all unsold/unused stocks be returned or disposed of per its directions upon the contract's termination, the transaction is conclusively one of agency and not sale. iii. Price Control and Pre-Arranged Remuneration as Attributes of Agency - When the retail price is exclusively fixed/revised by the supplier, the infrastructure/equipment belongs to the supplier, and the distributor is remunerated by a pre-arranged commission or profit margin calculated on the actual quantity sold (rather than buying the goods to resell them at their own discretionary profit), the relationship is that of a "Principal and Agent”; iv. Taxability under Business Auxiliary Service - Since the respondent OMCs act as facilitators, marketing promoters, and commission agents for the sale of CNG belonging to their client (MGL), their activities squarely fall within the definition of "Business Auxiliary Service" under Section 65(19) read with Explanation (a) of the Finance Act, 1994, making them liable to pay service tax. [Relied on M/s Snow White Industrial Corporation vs. Collector of Central Excise; Bhopal Sugar Industries Ltd. vs. Sales Tax Officer (1989) 3 SCC 351; Hafiz Din Mohammad Haji Abdulla vs. The State of Maharashtra, 1962 SCC OnLine SC 208; Bharti Cellular Limited v. CIT, (2024) 8 SCC 608; Union of India vs. Future Gaming Solutions (P) Ltd., (2025) 5 SCC 601; Bhopal Sugar Industries Ltd. vs. Sales Tax Officer, (1977) 3 SCC 147; Para 5-12] Commissioner of Service Tax Mumbai v. Bharat Petroleum Corporation, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 698 : 2026 INSC 723
Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973 (FERA) — Section 61(2) Proviso & Section 56 — Mandatory Pre-condition of Opportunity Notice — The service of a meaningful and adequate opportunity notice under the proviso to Section 61(2) of FERA is a mandatory statutory pre-condition - Without complying with this requirement, no complaint under Section 56 or 57 of FERA can validly be instituted, and no Magistrate can validly take cognizance of the offence - The burden lies entirely upon the prosecution to establish at the threshold that such a notice was issued and served in the prescribed manner - Where the prosecution fails to produce the opportunity notice or its proof of service before the Magistrate, taking cognizance in a mechanical manner constitutes a manifest error and violates the principles of natural justice, rendering the summoning order unsustainable. [Relied On Devashis Bhattacharya v. Union of India 2009 SCC OnLine Del 1018; Sanjay Malviya v. R.K. Rawal, CEO, Enforcement Directorate 2015 SCC OnLine Del 7686; United India Airways Ltd. v. Chief Enforcement Officer, Enforcement Directorate 2018 SCC OnLine Del 8233; Shilpi Modes v. Directorate of Enforcement 2023 SCC OnLine Del 6816; Paras 16, 21 -25] Standard Chartered Bank v. Enforcement Officer Ministry of Home Affairs, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 701 : 2026 INSC 727
Housing and Area Development Act, 1976 (Maharashtra) - Definition and Rights of an 'Occupier' - Section 2(25) of the MHAD Act defines 'occupier' broadly to include any person liable to pay rent, an owner in occupation, a rent-free tenant, a licensee, or even a person liable to pay damages for use and occupation - an occupancy under the Act is not a statutory tenancy that continues merely at the will of the owner or on the strength of a strict tenancy agreement - A person's status as a certified occupant in the records of the developer and MHADA enables a valid claim for the reallotment of space upon redevelopment, irrespective of the death of the original tenant. Mahabanoo Contractor v. Kalikund Developers, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 713 : 2026 INSC 737
Housing and Area Development Act, 1976 (Maharashtra) - Estoppel against Developer - Abuse of Process / Conduct of Developer - A developer cannot casually turn around after several years having obtained the occupant's consent, demolished the old building, and constructed the new building to challenge the occupant's status or the validity of a PAAA executed by its erstwhile authorized partners - Internal disputes or "Consent Terms" settled inter se between the partners of a developer firm cannot absolve the developer of its validly executed statutory obligations toward the beneficiaries/occupants who were not parties to such internal settlements - Where a developer undertakes before the High Court to keep certain flats unencumbered as part of an occupant's entitlement, but subsequently files a comprehensive civil suit challenging the occupant's rights in their entirety and seeking to declare the PAAA non-est, such a civil suit is misconceived, mala fide, and an abuse of process - High Court directed not to proceed with such a suit. [Paras 12, 19-25] Mahabanoo Contractor v. Kalikund Developers, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 713 : 2026 INSC 737
Housing and Area Development Act, 1976 (Maharashtra) - Sections 2(25) and 91A — Maharashtra Housing and Area Development Authority (MHADA) — Development Control Regulations for Greater Bombay, 1991, Rule 33(7) — Redevelopment of cessed buildings — Permanent Alternate Accommodation Agreement (PAAA) — Enforceability of PAAA under Writ Jurisdiction — Status of 'Occupant' versus 'Tenant' – Held - Redevelopment Scheme & Statutory Jurisdiction - A Division Bench of the High Court erred in misconstruing the Permanent Alternate Accommodation Agreement (PAAA) as a mere private arrangement not amenable to writ jurisdiction - A PAAA entered into under the statutory scheme of the MHAD Act and the Development Control Regulations (DC Regulations) is regulated by statute - The enforcement of such an agreement falls squarely within the authority conferred on the regulatory body, MHADA, under whose No Objection Certificate (NOC) the project commenced - Orders passed by MHADA to facilitate occupation and execution of a PAAA by the developer in favour of a certified eligible occupant are perfectly sustainable under the statutory scheme. Mahabanoo Contractor v. Kalikund Developers, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 713 : 2026 INSC 737
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Admission of Disputed Claims at Notional Value – The Supreme Court upheld the action of the Resolution Professional in verifying and admitting pending/sub-judice claims of Operational Creditors at a notional value of Rupee 1 - Held, where the final list of creditors omits the clause making the liability contingent upon the outcome of ongoing proceedings and fixes it at a notional value of Rupee 1, such claims attain finality under the plan - The assignment of a notional value of Rupee 1 cannot be construed as a mechanism to keep the claim alive indefinitely pending litigation after the approval of the resolution plan. [Paras 54 - 61] Tata Steel v. Varsha, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 694 : 2026 INSC 717
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Repayment Waterfall – Vulnerability of Small Operational Creditors & MSMEs – Judicial Observation – The Supreme Court observed that the current framework of the Code does not adequately account for or safeguard the position of small operational creditors, including Micro, Small, and Medium Enterprises (MSMEs) and statutory local bodies - By being placed at the bottom of the repayment waterfall, these entities face severe financial disenfranchisement as they are ill-equipped to absorb financial setbacks – The Supreme Court recommended that the Law Commission and the Legislature usefully examine the framework to establish a fair and balanced repayment mechanism alongside an efficient insolvency regime. [Relied on Committee of Creditors of Essar Steel India Limited v. Satish Kumar Gupta and Others, (2020) 8 SCC 531; Ghanashyam Mishra & Sons Pvt. Ltd. v. Edelweiss Asset Reconstruction Co. Ltd., (2021) 9 SCC 657; Kalyani Transco v. Bhushan Power and Steel Limited and Others, 2025 SCC Online SC 2093; JSW Steel Ltd. v. Pratishtha Thakur Haritwal & Ors., (2025) 9 SCC 673; K. Sashidhar v. Indian Overseas Bank and Ors., (2019) 12 SCC 150; Paragraphs 62, 63] Tata Steel v. Varsha, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 694 : 2026 INSC 717
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Section 31(1) – Binding Nature of Resolution Plan – Commercial Wisdom of CoC – Reaffirmed that once a Resolution Plan is approved by the Committee of Creditors (CoC) in its commercial wisdom and subsequently sanctioned by the Adjudicating Authority under Section 31(1), the claims provided therein stand frozen - The plan becomes strictly final and binding on all stakeholders, including the Corporate Debtor, its Creditors, Governmental Authorities, and Employees - Statutory authorities like the NCLT and NCLAT cannot assume the role of a court of equity or exercise plenary powers to alter the commercial treatment of creditors approved under the plan. [Paras 22 - 52] Tata Steel v. Varsha, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 694 : 2026 INSC 717
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Sections 30, 31(1) & 60(6) – Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) – Clean Slate Doctrine – Extinguishment of Sub-Judice Claims – Held, all legal proceedings, including pending civil suits and arbitral references, which have not culminated into determinable and quantifiable claims by the date of approval of the Resolution Plan by the Adjudicating Authority (NCLT), stand abated, extinguished, waived, or withdrawn - A Successful Resolution Applicant cannot suddenly be faced with undecided or unresolved claims after the resolution plan has been accepted, as it would disrupt the commercial calculations and violate the fundamental principles of a "clean slate" and "fresh start" underlying the Code. [Paras 51, 55, 60, 61] Tata Steel v. Varsha, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 694 : 2026 INSC 717
Interpretation of Fiscal Statutes - Vires and Scope of Section 26 of the Stamp Act, 1899 - The Indian Stamp Act, 1899 is a fiscal legislation enacted to generate revenue for the State and must be interpreted strictly and mandatorily - There is no scope for equity or judiciousness if the letter of the law is clear and unambiguous - The Supreme Court rejected the appellant's contention that the proviso to Section 26 is inconsistent with the main section. Section 26 governs instruments where the value of the subject matter is indeterminate at the time of execution - Since the actual value of a mining lease can only be ascertained after mining operations commence, its value is inherently indeterminate at the time of execution - The proviso specifically carves out a mechanism for mining leases, providing that the estimated royalty or the value of the share shall be sufficient for determining stamp duty - Where the Government is the lessor, the Collector is empowered to estimate the anticipated royalty - Under Rule 31 of the Mineral Concession Rules, 1960, executing a lease deed in the statutory 'Form K' is mandatory. Part IX (Clause 9) of Form K explicitly prescribes that anticipated royalty from the demised land shall be the yardstick for calculating stamp duty - Once the parties consciously execute a statutory agreement containing such a clause, it removes any ambiguity, and the method of computing stamp duty must be through anticipated royalty - Dismissing the appeal, the Supreme Court held that the High Court committed no error in upholding the State's demand notice - The stamp duty for a mining lease granted by the Government is legally determinable on the basis of "anticipated royalty" as estimated by the Collector under the proviso to Section 26 of the Stamp Act, read with the statutory covenants contained in Form K of the Mineral Concession Rules, 1960. [Relied on: District Registrar and Collector v. Canara Bank, (2005) 1 SCC 496; Para 8-15] Birla Corporation Ltd. v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 717 : 2026 INSC 738
Judicial Education & Service – Shetty Commission Recommendations – Status of Guidelines vs. Statutory Rules - Recruitment of Additional District Judges – Viva-Voce Cut-Off Marks – The recommendations made by the First National Judicial Pay Commission (Shetty Commission) prescribing that there shall be no minimum cut-off marks for the viva-voce test are merely advisory policy guidelines - They are not rigid statutory mandates and cannot override existing statutory service rules framed by a competent recruiting authority - Once statutory rules are formally enacted, the selection process must strictly adhere to them. [Relied on Mahinder Kumar v. High Court of Madhya Pradesh, (2013) 11 SCC 87; Malik Mazhar Sultan v. UP Public Services Commission, (2008) 17 SCC 703; Paras 17, 18] Manoj Goyal V. Rajasthan High Court, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 695 : 2026 INSC 699
Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015; Section 2(33) and Section 2(54) — Indian Penal Code, 1860; Section 302 — Classification of Offences — Whether Murder is a "Heinous Offence" or "Serious Offence" for Juveniles - An offence punishable under Section 302 of the IPC (now Section 103(1) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023) which prescribes the punishment of "death or imprisonment for life" carries life imprisonment as its minimum statutory punishment - A court convicting an accused under Section 302 IPC has no discretion to impose any lesser sentence than imprisonment for life - The disjunctive word "or" merely confers discretion to choose between death and life imprisonment based on gravity, but does not permit a sentence below life imprisonment - Section 302 IPC qualifies as a "heinous offence" under Section 2(33) of the JJ Act since its minimum punishment is seven years or more. It cannot be classified as a "serious offence" under the fourth category of offences wrapped into Section 2(54)(b) by the 2021 Amendment - The modulation of life imprisonment under Section 21 of the JJ Act (prohibiting life imprisonment without the possibility of release for juveniles) applies only at the stage of sentencing and does not alter the statutory classification of the offence for determining the forum of trial. [Relied on Babasaheb Maruti Kamble v. State of Maharashtra, (2019) 13 SCC 631; Distinguished from Shilpa Mittal v. State (NCT) of Delhi, (2020) 2 SCC 787; Paras 31, 32, 33, 36, 39, 40, 41, and 85(i)] X v. State of Bihar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 702 : 2026 INSC 728
Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015; Section 101(2) vs Section 15(1) Proviso — Nature of Appellate Power — Whether the word “May” is Mandatory or Directory - The expression "may" used in Section 101(2) of the JJ Act, which states that the Sessions Court may take the assistance of experienced psychologists and medical specialists while deciding an appeal against a preliminary assessment order, is directory/permissive and not mandatory - The rule laid down in Barun Chandra Thakur—interpreting "may" as mandatory under the proviso to Section 15(1) when the Juvenile Justice Board lacks an expert member cannot be mechanically transplanted to appellate proceedings under Section 101(2) - The Sessions Court as an appellate court stands on a completely different footing; its object is to examine the legality and correctness of the Board's order based on the existing record (including any expert reports already obtained) - While the Sessions Court has the independent power and discretion to seek fresh expert assistance if the facts and circumstances necessitate it, it is not legally mandated to do so in every single appeal. [Relied On State of U.P. v. Babu Ram Upadhya, 1960 SCC OnLine SC 5; Julius v. Lord Bishop of Oxford, (1880) 5 App Cas 214; Official Liquidator v. Dharti Dhan (P) Ltd., (1977) 2 SCC 166; Paras 46-59, and 85(ii)] X v. State of Bihar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 702 : 2026 INSC 728
Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015; Section 15 — Juvenile Justice Model Rules, 2016; Rules 8(5), 10(5), 10(9), 11(2) — Preliminary Assessment Protocol — Materials to be Considered by the Board - The sole purpose of a preliminary assessment under Section 15 is to evaluate a child above 16 years across four distinct parameters: (i) mental capacity, (ii) physical capacity, (iii) ability to understand consequences, and (iv) the circumstances of the alleged offence - The process is not an adjudication of guilt or innocence - While carrying out this assessment, the Juvenile Justice Board is not bound by the sole opinion or recommendation of the expert psychologist - The Board must apply its mind independently to the totality of the circumstances - The Social Investigation Report (SIR) and the Social Background Report (SBR) are not merely supplementary inputs; they are mandatory statutory considerations that must be evaluated alongside witness statements and expert reports - The Board cannot abdicate its judicial duty by mechanically rubber-stamping the expert's conclusion. [Relied On Pradeep Kumar v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2019 SCC OnLine Del 8251; Child in Conflict with Law v. State of Gujarat, 2023 SCC OnLine Guj 3119; Paras 64-79, 82, 84, and 85(iii)] X v. State of Bihar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 702 : 2026 INSC 728
Maxims – Commodum ex injuria sua nemo habere debet – No authority can take advantage of its own default – A man cannot be permitted to take undue and unfair advantage of his own wrong to gain a favourable interpretation of law – Where an employee acts diligently and the delay is entirely attributable to the employer/authorities, the citizen cannot be made to suffer. [Relied on Umesh Kumar Nagpal v. State of Haryana, (1994) 4 SCC 138; Bhawani Prasad Sonkar v. Union of India, (2011) 4 SCC 209; Malaya Nanda Sethy v. State of Orissa, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 684; Kusheshwar Prasad Singh v. State of Bihar, (2007) 11 SCC 447; Paras 20-30] Rahul Ramnarayan Madankar v. New India Assurance, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 693 : 2026 INSC 710
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 – Conflict between "Geographical Area" and "Limitation as to Use" Clauses – Special Permit for Foreign Territory - The appellant-insurer disputed liability on the ground that the policy's geographical area was limited to "India" - the "Limitation as to Use" clause covered the vehicle's use under a "permit" within the meaning of the MVA - A special permit was validly issued under Section 88(8) of the MVA, explicitly authorizing the vehicle to ply on the Durg-Nepal route - Held, since the "Limitation as to Use" clause was cast in general terms without geographical boundaries, the existence of a valid permit extending to a foreign territory meant the policy covered the use irrespective of the geographical location - If the insurer intended to exclude cross-border territory entirely, it ought to have drafted the exclusion clearly and unambiguously. [Paras 10 - 14] Oriental Insurance v. Durg Roadways, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 696 : 2026 INSC 722
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 – Extra-Territorial Operation of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988: Under Article 245(2) of the Constitution of India, laws made by Parliament cannot be deemed invalid on the ground of extra-territorial operation - The legislative intent to give the MVA extra-territorial application for cross-border transit is evident from Section 139 (power to frame rules for taking vehicles outside India) and Section 149(3) (duty of insurers to satisfy foreign judgments from reciprocating countries) - the provisions of the MVA apply to the third-party claim regardless of whether the accident took place in India or Nepal. [Para 21-30] Oriental Insurance v. Durg Roadways, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 696 : 2026 INSC 722
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 – Section 147(5), Section 139, and Section 149 – Cross-Border Third-Party Insurance Coverage – Accident in Nepal – Liability of the Insurer - Interpretation of Insurance Contract – Harmonious Construction – Rule of Contra Proferentem - An insurance policy must be read as a whole to determine the intent of the parties - Different clauses must be read harmoniously, and one cannot cherry-pick a single clause in isolation to base a claim while rejecting other clauses - Where a policy contains ambiguous or multiple interpretations, the one that aligns with the beneficial purpose of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (MVA) and favours the insured (contra proferentem rule) must be adopted. [Paras 14-16] Oriental Insurance v. Durg Roadways, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 696 : 2026 INSC 722
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 – Statutory Overriding Effect of Section 147(5) MVA over India Motor Tariff Regulations: The insurer argued that the policy was restricted to India because no additional premium was paid to extend coverage to Nepal under General Regulation 4 (GR.4) of the India Motor Tariff (IMT) 2002. Held, Section 147(5) of the MVA contains a potent non-obstante clause which imposes liability on the insurance company to indemnify the specified persons, overriding regulatory instruments like the IMT - Non-payment of the additional premium under GR.4 does not vitiate the valid permit or statutory coverage. [Paras 17 - 22] Oriental Insurance v. Durg Roadways, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 696 : 2026 INSC 722
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 – Validity of Indian Driving License in Nepal – Indo-Nepal Treaty of Peace and Friendship, 1950: The insurer contended that the deceased driver did not possess a valid driving license to drive in Nepal. Held, the driver possessed an effective Indian driving license which was verified without objection by the Nepalese authorities at the border while issuing transit documents. Furthermore, Article 7 of the Treaty of Peace and Friendship between India and Nepal (1950) grants reciprocal privileges regarding the free movement of nationals, ensuring that a valid license issued in India is recognized for movement within Nepal. No evidence was adduced by the insurer to show the license was invalid in Nepal. [Relied on National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Chief Electoral Officer, (2023) 6 SCC 441; Export Credit Guarantee Corpn. of India Ltd. v. Garg Sons International, (2014) 1 SCC 686; Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Sony Cheriyan, (1999) 6 SCC 451; Shivram Chandra Jagarnath Cold Storage v. New India Assurance Co. Ltd., (2022) 4 SCC 539; Syed Mehaboob v. New India Assurance Co. Ltd., (2011) 11 SCC 625; Ningamma v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd., (2009) 13 SCC 710; K. Ramya v. National Insurance Co. Ltd., 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1338; Nidhi Bhargava v. National Insurance Co. Ltd., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 872; Mohd. Abdul Samad v. State of Telangana, (2025) 2 SCC 49; A.G. Varadarajulu v. State of T.N., (1998) 4 SCC 231; Madhav Rao Jivaji Rao Scindia v. Union of India, (1971) 1 SCC 85; Aswini Kumar Ghose v. Arabinda Bose, (1952) 2 SCC 237; Paras 24, 25] Oriental Insurance v. Durg Roadways, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 696 : 2026 INSC 722
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 - Section 21 (as amended by the Amendment Act of 2001) – Retrospective Applicability of Quantity-Based Sentencing - The Supreme Court held that the benefit of the quantity-based sentencing regime introduced by the 2001 Amendment Act cannot be extended to cases where the trial had already concluded and the appeal was pending as on the date the amendment came into force (02.10.2001) - Section 41 of the 2001 Amendment Act expressly restricts application to cases pending investigation or trial as of the commencement date. [Relied on Basheer v. State of Kerala (2004) 3 SCC 609; Para 18-20] Mehboob Shah v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 705 : 2026 INSC 729
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 - Section 50 – Applicability of Personal Search Conditions to Objects/Articles Carried - The Supreme Court reiterated that the sacrosanct right of an accused to be searched before a Gazetted Officer or a Magistrate under Section 50 of the NDPS Act is confined strictly to cases where the recovery is sought to be effected from the personal search of the accused - It has no application whatsoever when the contraband is recovered from an article or object being carried by the accused, such as a bag, container, suitcase, or water bottle. [Relied on State of H.P. v. Pawan Kumar (2005) 4 SCC 350; Ranjan Kumar Chadha v. State of H.P. 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1262; State of Punjab v. Baldev Singh (1999) 6 SCC 172; Paras 12 - 13] Mehboob Shah v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 705 : 2026 INSC 729
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 - Section 52A – Drawing of Samples at the Spot of Seizure vs. Presence of Magistrate – The Supreme Court observed that under the NDPS Act (as it stood at the relevant time), drawing representative samples by the Investigating Officer at the spot of seizure rather than in the presence of a Magistrate is a procedural irregularity and not a fatal illegality - Mere non-compliance or delayed compliance with Section 52A does not automatically entitle the accused to an acquittal, provided the search and seizure were conducted in accordance with the mandatory provisions, a proper chain of custody is established, and no serious prejudice is shown to have been caused to the accused - Documents like the panchnama, seizure memo, and arrest memo prepared on the spot constitute valid primary evidence. [Relied on Narcotics Control Bureau v. Kashif (2024) 11 SCC 372; Bharat Aambale v. State of Chhattisgarh (2025) 8 SCC 452; Paras 14, 15, 16] Mehboob Shah v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 705 : 2026 INSC 729
Penal Code, 1860 — Section 294(b) — Distinction between Obscene and Abusive/Vulgar Words — Swear words or profanity do not automatically amount to obscenity – Held that Legally, obscenity is not synonymous with vulgarity, abuse, or profanity - The use of mere swear words, profanities, and vulgar expletives, however distasteful or uncivil, cannot be equated with obscenity under Section 294(b) IPC - To secure a conviction, the words must be shown to be lascivious, appeal to prurient interests, tend to deprave and corrupt impressionable minds, and cause annoyance to others - Verbal slangs used during altercations (e.g., "Motherfucker", "son of a whore") are, at best, abusive or vulgar but do not satisfy the legal test of obscenity in the absence of a sexual connotation that depraves morals or causes public annoyance. [Relied on Ranjit D. Udeshi v. State of Maharashtra, 1964 SCC OnLine SC 52; Chandrakant Kalyandas Kakodkar v. State of Maharashtra, (1969) 2 SCC 687; Aveek Sarkar v. State of W.B., (2014) 4 SCC 257; Madhanagopal v. Lalitha, (2022) 17 SCC 818; Om Prakash Ambadkar v. State of Maharashtra, (2026) 2 SCC 622; Apoorva Arora v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2024) 6 SCC 18; Sivakumar v. State, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 529; Paras 11 - 17]. Mani @ Subramaniyam v. State, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 687 : 2026 INSC 719
Penal Code, 1860 — Section 302 & 201 — Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 — Section 313 — Evidence Act, 1872 — Section 106 — Conviction on circumstantial evidence and testimony of a material witness upheld despite non-recovery of the dead body - Corpus Delicti in Murder Cases - Corpus delicti means that the offence has been committed and not that the dead body of the murdered person has been recovered - A person can be convicted of murdering another even if the later's body has not been recovered - If recovery of the dead body is treated as an absolute necessity to convict an accused, it would afford complete immunity to the guilty from being punished in cases where the body is destroyed or thrown into a flowing river - What is legally required to base a conviction for murder is reliable and acceptable direct or circumstantial evidence proving the factum of death. [Para 15] Debojit Pankika Charaideo Sonari v. State of Assam, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 691 : 2026 INSC 687
Penal Code, 1860 — Section 326 read with Section 320 (Seventhly) — Voluntarily Causing Grievous Hurt by Dangerous Weapons — Nasal bone fracture constitutes Grievous Hurt - A fracture or dislocation of a bone squarely falls under the definition of "grievous hurt" designated under Section 320 (Seventhly) IPC - When a nasal bone fracture is established through medical and corroborative oral evidence, and is proven to have been caused by an object like a billhook (a dangerous weapon), an offence under Section 326 IPC is fully made out - The contention that Section 326 IPC is not attracted because the injuries sustained were not in the form of incised wounds rejected. [Relied on Mathai v. State of Kerala, (2005) 3 SCC 260; Paras 20-22] Mani @ Subramaniyam v. State, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 687 : 2026 INSC 719
Penal Code, 1860 — Section 34 vs. Section 141 — Common Intention vs. Unlawful Assembly — Physical Presence Not Mandatory For Section 34 IPC - The Supreme Court clarified the distinction between active participation under Section 34 IPC and physical participation under Section 141 IPC – The Supreme Court held that to invoke the provisions of an unlawful assembly under Section 141 IPC, it is necessary that five or more persons physically participate in the actual commission of the offence - Section 34 IPC requires mere active participation in furtherance of a common intention which can occur behind the scenes and does not mandate physical presence at the actual spot of execution. [Para 23-26] Piyush Shyamdasani v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 699 : 2026 INSC 721
Penal Code, 1860 — Section 506(ii) — Criminal Intimidation — Mere use of threatening words during an altercation is insufficient - To attract the offence of criminal intimidation under Section 506 IPC, the threat must be intentional and aimed at causing alarm to the person, or forcing them to do/omit any act to avoid the execution of the threat - The mere utterance of threatening words (such as "I will not rest until I hack you") during the course of a sudden altercation, without independent proof of an intention to cause actual alarm or compel action/omission, does not bring the act within the application of Section 506(ii) IPC. [Relied on Naresh Aneja v. State of U.P., (2025) 2 SCC 604; Paras 18, 19] Mani @ Subramaniyam v. State, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 687 : 2026 INSC 719
Railways Act, 1989 – Section 65(2) Proviso, Section 93, and Section 97 – Shortage of Consignment – Goods carried at Owner's Risk Rate – "Said to contain" Remark – Burden of Proof and Liability for Negligence – Exclusion of General Liability - Interpretation of Non-Obstante Clause in Section 97 - The Supreme Court held that the non-obstante clause contained in Section 97 of the Railways Act, 1989, explicitly overrides and excludes the general obligations cast on the Railway Administration under Section 93 of the Act - Where goods are booked under the "owner's risk" category, the Railway Administration cannot be held responsible for any loss, destruction, damage, deterioration, or non-delivery in transit unless there is clear proof that the same was due to negligence or misconduct on its part or on the part of its servants - Burden of Proof under Section 65(2) Proviso: In cases where a consignment is loaded in a wagon-load or train-load directly by the consignor's employees without supervision or checking by an authorized railway servant, and a "said to contain" remark is endorsed on the Railway Receipt, the statutory burden of proving the actual weight or number of packages dispatched lies squarely on the consignor, consignee, or endorsee - Duty of Care and Negligence: For establishing negligence on the part of the Railway Authorities under Section 97, a pre-existing duty of care must be established - If the Railways were never actively involved in the noting, counting, or weighing of the goods at the booking stage, they cannot be held negligent for an alleged shortage at the destination point unless the initial quantity loaded is conclusively proved by the claimant - Dismissing the appeal, the Supreme Court observed that the appellant failed to discharge the statutory burden of proof under the proviso to Section 65(2) to substantiate the initial number of bags loaded. [Relied on Mohd. Abdul Samad v. State of Telangana, (2025) 2 SCC 49; A.G. Varadarajulu v. State of T.N., (1998) 4 SCC 231; Rajkot Municipal Corpn. v. Manjulben Jayantilal Nakum, (1997) 9 SCC 552; Poonam Verma v. Ashwin Patel, (1996) 4 SCC 332; Jay Laxmi Salt Works (P) Ltd. v. State of Gujarat, (1994) 4 SCC 1; Paras 8-15] Bajaj Trading Company v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 685 : 2026 INSC 711
Railways Act, 1989 – Sections 123(c)(2) and 124A – Claims for Compensation – Untoward Incident – Bona Fide Passenger – Absence of Journey Ticket – The Supreme Court set aside the concurrent findings of the Railway Claims Tribunal and the High Court which had rejected a compensation claim on the grounds that the deceased's ticket was not recovered and his bona fides as a passenger were not established – Held, Section 124A provides for "no-fault liability" and carries a beneficial statutory intent - It must receive a purposive and liberal interpretation rather than a restrictive, literal approach - The standard of proof governing such claims is the preponderance of probabilities, not proof beyond reasonable doubt - Technical approaches or procedural lapses should not defeat the humanitarian and welfare objective of the statute. Lata v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 689 : 2026 INSC 715
Railways Act, 1989 – Status of Passenger when Ticket is Missing – Quantum of Compensation - Reaffirming established precedent, the Supreme Court held that the mere absence of a ticket on the person or body of an injured or deceased passenger is not conclusive proof to negative a claim or classify them as a ticketless traveller - The initial burden on the claimant can be effectively discharged by filing an affidavit of relevant facts, after which the burden shifts to the Railways to disprove the claim based on the attending circumstances - In the present case, since the claimant filed an undisputed affidavit detailing that the deceased purchased a ticket which was subsequently misplaced along with his untraceable luggage during the accident, the initial burden stood discharged - In terms of Schedule I to the Railway Accidents and Untoward Incidents (Compensation) Rules, 1990 (as amended), the compensation for death was awarded at ₹8,00,000/- with a direction to pay within four weeks, failing which it shall carry an interest rate of 8% per annum from the date of filing the claim petition. [Relied on Union of India v. Rina Devi, (2019) 3 SCC 572; Paras 9-21] Lata v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 689 : 2026 INSC 715
Representation of the People Act, 1951 — Section 100(1)(d)(iii) — Finality of Electoral Rolls vs. Constitutional Invalidity — Material Effect Test — Secrecy of Ballot - Held: The principle of finality of electoral rolls is meant to ensure electoral stability, but it cannot override the Constitution or validate the participation of constitutionally ineligible persons whose inclusion is void ab initio - Where the margin of victory is narrow (6 votes) and the number of unconstitutional votes cast by nominated members is double the margin (12 votes), the requirement of the election being "materially affected" under Section 100(1)(d)(iii) stands fully established - the principle of secrecy of the ballot is not absolute and cannot be invoked to perpetuate a constitutional illegality - The segregation of invalid votes using ballot papers, counterfoils, and marked copies of the electoral roll by the Returning Officer is legally permissible to preserve the purity of the electoral process. [Paras 40-46] Pranesh M.K. v. A.V. Gayathri, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 686 : 2026 INSC 716
Service Jurisprudence & Judicial Appointments – Doctrine of Estoppel – Challenge to Recruitment Rules by Unsuccessful Candidate - Rajasthan Judicial Service Rules, 2010 – Rule 41 (as amended in 2011) – A candidate who willingly participates in a recruitment process with full knowledge of the prevailing rules, takes a calculated chance, and appears for the viva-voce examination cannot turn around and challenge the validity of the recruitment criteria or qualifying benchmarks upon being declared unsuccessful - The doctrine of estoppel operates fully against such a candidate who attempts to approbate and reprobate. [Relied on Om Prakash Shukla v. Akhilesh Kumar Shukla and Ors., (1986) Supp SCC 285; Madan Lal and Others v. State of J & K and Ors., (1995) 3 SCC 486; Dhananjay Malik and Others v. State of Uttaranchal and Ors., (2008) 4 SCC 171; Paras 20-30] Manoj Goyal V. Rajasthan High Court, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 695 : 2026 INSC 699
Service Law — Modified Assured Career Progression Scheme (MACPS) — Counts of Same Grade Pay Promotions — Railway Guard Cadre Structure - Modified Assured Career Progression Scheme (MACPS), Paragraphs 2, 5, and 8 — Railway Board Circulars (RBE No. 76/2011 and RBE No. 142/2012) — Entitlement to 2nd and 3rd financial upgradations to Grade Pay Rs. 4600 and Rs. 4800 — Counter-claim based on structural convergence of Grade Pay post-6th Central Pay Commission (CPC) - Key Rulings & Interpretations – i. Applicability of Paragraph 8 to the Guard Cadre - The Supreme Court held that Paragraph 8 of the MACPS strictly applies to the Railway Guard cadre - The movements across the distinct posts of Senior Goods Guard, Passenger Guard, Senior Passenger Guard, and Mail/Express Guard within the cadre constitute functional "promotions" under the relevant Recruitment Rules and Avenue Chart, despite carrying the identical compressed Grade Pay of Rs. 4200 in Pay Band PB-2 post the 6th CPC recommendations - A promotion does not cease to be a promotion merely because the employee's Grade Pay remains constant – ii. Exhaustion of MACPS Slots - An employee who has traversed the promotional hierarchy up to the terminal post of Mail/Express Guard is deemed to have earned three functional promotions (with the movement from Passenger Guard to Senior Passenger Guard ignored under Paragraph 5 due to direct merger of scales) - such an employee has exhausted all three financial upgradation slots available under the MACPS and cannot claim further financial upgradation to Grade Pay Rs. 4600 or Rs. 4800; iii. Financial Reality vs. Stagnation - The Supreme Court observed that promotions within the Guard cadre are not financially neutral - Each advancement involves a formal selection process, pay fixation, promotional increments, and an upward revision of basic pay that significantly enhances running-duty allowances and post-specific additional allowances - employees reaching the terminal post cannot be characterized as suffering from the "financial stagnation" the MACPS was designed to remedy; iv. Scope of Paragraph 5 (Transitional Adjustments) - The illustration appended to Paragraph 5 is a transitional provision regulating the treatment of pre-MACPS ACP-era promotions/upgradations up to 01.09.2008 - It does not override Paragraph 8 for the post-01.09.2008 MACPS operational period, nor does it mandate the total exclusion of structural promotional rungs when calculating future stagnation benefits; v. Binding Nature of Executive Clarifications - Departmental and executive clarifications issued by the Railway Board in consultation with the Department of Personnel and Training (DoPT), such as RBE No. 76/2011 and RBE No. 142/2012, are integral to the Scheme and binding on authorities. Financial upgradation under the MACPS cannot exceed the maximum Grade Pay ceiling attached to the highest promotional post in the respective hierarchy; vi. Precedential Value of Dismissals in Limine - A non-speaking dismissal of a Special Leave Petition (SLP), or an order keeping the question of law open, does not constitute a declaration of law under Article 141 of the Constitution of India and does not invoke the doctrine of merger. [Relied on Union of India and Others v. M.V. Mohanan Nair (2020) 5 SCC 421; Kunhayammed and Others v. State of Kerala and Another (2000) 6 SCC 359; Paras 36-65] Union of India v. Harbans Lal Verma, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 712 : 2026 INSC 739
Specific Relief Act, 1963 – Section 23 – Specific performance of contract – Bar founded on earnest money clause – Absence of express clause enabling enforcement through court does not bar specific performance - The High Court declined a decree for specific performance on the ground that the Agreement to Sell lacked an express clause enabling the purchaser to enforce it through court, stipulating instead that the vendor would refund the earnest money if the sale deed could not be executed - Held: Such a construction is unsustainable - Section 23 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 provides that a contract otherwise proper to be specifically enforced may be so enforced notwithstanding that a sum is named in it as payable in the event of breach, unless the sum was named only to give the defaulting party an option of paying money in lieu of performance - A party in breach cannot resist specific performance merely because the agreement lacks an express stipulation for that relief - The stipulation for a refund operates as a deterrent reinforcing the obligation to perform, not as a substitute for it. [Relied On M.L. Devender Singh & Ors. v. Syed Khaja, (1973) 2 SCC 515; Paras 16 – 21] Jaspal Singh v. Ashwani Kumar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 682 : 2026 INSC 700
Stamp Act, 1899 – Section 26 – Proviso – Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957 – Sections 9 & 9A – Mineral Concession Rules, 1960 – Rule 31 – Form K – Mining Lease – Computation of Stamp Duty – Determinant factor – Dead Rent vs. Anticipated Royalty – Value of subject matter indeterminate at execution – Stamp duty on a mining lease is to be computed on the basis of "anticipated royalty" and not merely "dead rent" where the statutory lease deed (Form K) explicitly specifies anticipated royalty as the yardstick - Distinction between 'Dead Rent' and 'Royalty' in Mining Leases - The Supreme Court elucidated the clear distinction between "dead rent" and "royalty" - Dead rent is the minimal guaranteed amount payable to the lessor based on the leased area, irrespective of whether the mine is worked or not - royalty is a variable return directly proportionate to the actual quantity of minerals extracted or removed from the mine - Looked at from one perspective, dead rent serves as the minimum guaranteed amount of royalty payable. [Relied on D.K. Trivedi & Sons v. State of Gujarat, 1986 Supp SCC 20; Mineral Area Development Authority v. SAIL, (2024) 10 SCC 1; H.R.S. Murthy v. Collector of Chittoor, AIR 1965 SC 177; Paras 6-10] Birla Corporation Ltd. v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 717 : 2026 INSC 738
Transfer of Property – Agreement to Sell – Undivided share of a co-owner – Validity of transaction - The High Court treated the fact that the subject matter of the Agreement was an undivided half share in a jointly owned property (where the vendor's brother was not a signatory) as a suspicious circumstance casting doubt on the genuineness of the transaction – Held that a co-owner's undivided share in immovable property is a valid and marketable subject matter of transfer - An Agreement to Sell such a share cannot be viewed with suspicion merely because the vendor's co-sharer brother was not a signatory - A transfer of an undivided share is a legally recognized and enforceable transaction in its own right; the only consequence is that the transferee's remedy for actual enjoyment lies in a suit for partition - This consequence bears upon the mode of enjoyment following the decree and has no bearing whatsoever on the genuineness or enforceability of the underlying Agreement to Sell. [Relied On Sidheshwar Mukherjee v. Bhubneshwar Prasad Narain Singh & Ors., AIR 1953 SC 487; M.V.S. Manikayala Rao v. M. Narasimhaswami & Ors., AIR 1966 SC 470; Ramdas v. Sitabai & Ors., (2009) 7 SCC 444; Para 25-29] Jaspal Singh v. Ashwani Kumar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 682 : 2026 INSC 700